

112

G3 OPERATIONS/PLANS - CONFERENCES
AND MEETINGS

5 MAR 1995-28 FEB 1996

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

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RH/WG JUNE 2009

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES S1002

BOX 141

FILE 1

ACC. 1998/003

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TO : OFFICE OF THE SRSG
MA TO A/FC

FILE : MILOB/OPS/50

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

DATE: 28 FEB 96

SUBJECT : MINUTES OF SECTOR COMMANDERS' CONFERENCE
HELD AT KIBUNGO ON 21 FEB 96

Ref: MILOB/OPS/49 dated 27 Feb 96.

1. Please amend figure 154,677 stated in paragraph 25 of mentioned reference to read 15,677. This figure represents the total number of prisoners in various commune cachots in the GIKONGORO and BUTARE Prefectures.
2. The inconvenience caused is very much regretted.


C DEBRAH
Maj
for SOO

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CMO

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TO : OFFICE OF THE SRSG
MA TO A/FC
ALL SECTORS

FILE : MILOB/ops/49

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

DATE : 27 FEB 96

SUBJECT : MINUTES OF SECTOR COMMANDERS' CONFERENCE
HELD AT KIBUNGO ON 21 FEB 96

Attached, please find a copy of the Sector Commanders' conference, held at Kibungo on 21 Feb 96.


C. DEBRAH
Maj
for SOO

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MINUTES OF SECTOR COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

HELD AT SECTOR 1 KIBUNGO

ON 21 FEB 96

Present:

Ambassador	S Khan	SRSG	Special Guest
Col	CA Nelson	CMO	Chairman
Lt	VS Dadhwal	Comd Sect 1	Member
Lt Col	K Mbemba	Comd Sect 3	"
Lt Col	DJK Akplor	Comd Sect 4	"
Lt Col	B Vladimar	Comd Sect 5	"
Maj	AO Nutakor	Comd Sect 2	"
Lt Col	W Chomba	SOO	"
Lt Col	A Sibanda	SMPO	"
Maj	SA Yusuf	SLOGO	"

In Attendance:

Brig	M Alam	UNILOI
Lt Col	SN Yadav	A SOO
Lt Col	BS Ndiaye	G3 OPS
Lt Col	B Dukobo	Rep HAC
Maj	RK Jagga	Sig Offr
Maj	GA Biah	Ops Offr Sect 1
Maj	KBS Sirohi	Ops Offrs Sect 3
Maj	CA Cariappa	Ops Offrs Sect 5
Flt Lt	S Parry	SO CMO
Ms	Isel Riveror	Advisor to SRSG
Maj	AE Airende	Sect 1 Secretary

DISCUSSION

ITEM 1. WELCOME ADDRESS BY COMD SECTOR 1

1. The Comd Sect 1, Lt Col VS Dadwa gave a short welcome address and expressed his happiness for the opportunity given to him to host the Sector Commander Conference at a time when the current mandate of UNAMIR was at a crucial stage. He was particularly thankful to the SRSG for sparing time to attend in spite of his busy schedule.

ACTION

ITEM 2. OPENING ADDRESS BY THE CHAIRMAN

2. The Chairman welcomed present to yet another Sector Commander conference. He explained that

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the conference had to be held in Kibungo instead of Ruhengeri as agreed during the last conference because of the closure of the latter. He went further to highlight the happenings in the Great Lakes Region in the recent past as follows:

- a. The region has seen a new president in Tanzania.
- b. There is the escalation of ethnic tension in Burundi.
- c. Tension between Uganda and Sudan and also problems in Uganda relating to the impending general elections.
- d. Arrest of Rwandese Refugees in Kenya.
- e. The general situation is still tense in Sudan cutting across into Angola.

3. He observed that in spite of problems in the area, the UNAMIR mandate reduced the strength of MILOBS drastically. This greatly reduced our ability of gather information widely at a time our effort should have been consolidated. Valuable time was also lost as result of late deployment after the new mandate due to a large number of MILOBS being repatriated. This further caused a gap in the information flow regarding the real situation in Rwanda.

4. The Chairman noted that due to International pressure and the efforts of Government of Rwanda, the International Tribunal has made tremendous progress in the Kibuye Prefecture.

5. He emphasised that as we have come to the end of the mandate, there is a need for all to start the preparation of a consolidated report to give a clear and deep picture of the real situation despite limitations of information availability. The problems pending at the end of the mandate have to be identified. Successes achieved must be highlighted.

ITEM 3. REMARKS THE SRSG

6. In response, the SRSG stated that UNAMIR attaches great importance to the role of MILOBS in their assessment of the general situation

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in Rwanda. These assessments vary from prefecture to prefecture depending on the ground situation.

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ITEM 4: BRIEFING BY COMD SECTOR 1

7. The general situation in the sector was reported as relatively calm and stable with the RPA and locals becoming friendly except for a few incidents which can be considered as an aberration.

8. However, arbitrary arrests and quiet elimination of people in areas where entry by UN and International Agency personnel is restricted is known to be taking place. Some of these areas include the Akagera National Park and Nyange in Mugesar Commune.

9. The reaction of various groups to UNAMIR withdrawal seems to be at variance. While the local authorities look upon UNAMIR as a support agency to assist in their reconstruction projects, others find their presence irritating.

10. The returnees are reported to be facing a number of problems ranging from malnutrition, dehydration of children and malaria. There has also been lack of adequate transport to move them internally. At the transit camps, their conditions have been satisfactory.

11. The returnees have been given adequate assistance by UN Agencies/NGOs in the areas of resettlement. Eleven areas have been earmarked in the Sector for old case loads with a capacity of 5,000 each. For the new case loads, no major problems have arisen or are anticipated since attempts are being made to give them back their properties on their return even though the process of repair/reconstruction of these have been affected by the rains. They have also been able to start farming activities.

12. The main problems being faced by returnees were stated as follows.

a. The rains are making it difficult for the construction of houses.

b. Lack of money to pay school fees for children of school going age.

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- c. Inability to pay hospital bills.
- d. Lack of farm implements.

13. With the renovation and expansion of Nsinda prison, the condition of prisoners in sector has improved remarkably. There are 5220 prisoners in Nsinda and 1517 in Kibungo with about 1500 in Commune catchots.

14. There are positive signs of reconciliation process amongst the ethnic groups. But this can only be realized if the resettlement of old case loads in isolated areas is discouraged.

ACTION

15. Co-operation between MILOBS and other UN agencies and NGOs remain satisfactory.

16. The Sector Commander concluded by enumerating some achievements by the sector in the area of humanitarian assistance to the commune, assistance to other UN Agencies etc. He also made the following recommendations:

- a. The United Nations must continue to maintain a significant presence in Rwanda till the tempers between the two major ethnic groups cool off and some headway is made towards the Arusha Peace Agreement.
- b. That the allocations of settlements to returnees on ethnic basis be discouraged.
- c. MILOBS should be allowed access to the refugees camps across the borders in Zaire and Burundi should the mission continue in some other form beyond 8 March 96.

ITEM 5. BRIEFING BY COMD SECT 2

17. In general, the situation in the sector was reported calm but there are continued arrests by RPA, intimidation of the locals, widespread banditry and resurgence of Interhamwe activities in the northern communes of Gitarama Prefecture, Gitesi and Rutsiro communes of Kibuye Prefecture.

18. The Gitarama prison is in fairly good condition. There are currently 6,350 inmates including 219 women. The nine communes in Kibuye hold approximately 1200

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prisoners excluding the main Kibuye prison. Feeding is a major problem in all the prisons.

19. The campaign on reconciliation process does not appear to have reached the grassroots. This is attributed to the fact that in most cases the RPA have virtually usurped the powers of the IPJS while some local authorities order arbitrary arrest of person on mere suspicion of involvement in the genocide.

20. UNHCR records show that a total 299 and 6800 returnees have returned to Gitarama and Kibuye prefectures respectively from 12 Dec 95 to date. Of these only 176 and 360 have been confirmed as having actually returned to their home communes/sectors. Most of the returnees are facing accommodation problems and arbitrary arrests.

21. With the withdrawal of formed troops, UN Agencies and NGOs have become more dependent on MILOBS for information and protection.

ACTION

22. Hostility to UNAMIR from local authorities has greatly reduced. There has been excellent co-operation with local officials over the last two months which underscores the fact that people have now understood what UNAMIR stands for.

23. The transmitter at Gitarama for UNAMIR Radio is still in operation. Its security should not be left in the hands of the RPA to avoid being vandalized.

ITEM 6. BRIEFING BY COMD SECTOR 3.

24. The general situation in the sector has greatly improved with the local authorities and the RPA becoming more friendly. However, cases of thefts and banditry have increased perhaps due to the influx of returnees to the sector.

25. There are ^{12,122}~~15,677~~ prisoners in various communes cachots in the sector. Of this number, about 95 per cent are accused of taking part in the genocide. Conditions in these cachots are deplorable with their congestion and lack of proper judicial system in the sector.

26. Reconciliation process is on course in the sector although slow. Total number of returnees to the sector between Dec 95 and 20 Feb 96 is 14,921. Most of these

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have gradually settled down but not without problems as being faced in other sectors. The most notorious of them is the continuing arrests particularly at the sector level.

ITEM 7. BRIEFING BY COMD SECTOR 4

27. The sector was reported as being relatively calm particularly the central Kamembe. The northern area of Nyamasheke continued to record insurgent activities by the FRGF elements. However, counter-insurgent activities by the RPA on the locals of the infiltrated areas had resulted in indiscriminate arrests and killings. Negative feed-back from these activities filter to other areas of the prefecture and refugees camps across the frontier. Implicitly, this had been hampering the expected return of refugees from Zaire. A number of anti-personnel mine explosions were also reported,

28. A total of 2,404 refugees have returned to the sector and have progressively settled down. The judicial system is still undergoing reformation. The Tribunal de Premier Instance set up to try cases of genocide is yet to take off. The prisons and detention centres are holding about 3,500 inmates. The prisons are over-crowded and detainees are poorly fed.

29. Considerable progress by Rwandese government towards reconciliation is noticeable though limited to official levels. There were a number of confidence tours undertaken by UNHCR for the purpose of encouraging the refugees in Zaire to return home.

30. The presence of MILOBS in the sector has remained as a booster to the confidence of the NGOs operating in the sector.

ITEM 8. BRIEFING BY COMD SECTOR 5

31. The general situation in the sector was reported as having deteriorated since Jan 95 after a period of calm in Dec 95. Incidents of banditry, killing and mine explosions have increased. There is significant apprehension by the populace of insecurity as result of the impending closure of UNAMIR.

32. Relations with the RPA has improved appreciably. This has also been extended to other UN agencies operating in the sector.

ACTION

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33. The Zairian government handed over to the Government of Rwanda military equipment (Mortars, anti-tank weapons, artillery pieces, APCs and Helicopters) that were carted away by the erstwhile government in a ceremony held at Gisenyi border post. This is expected to serve as a further move to put the reconciliation process fully on course.

34. The Gisenyi prison has about 1,838 inmates. There are other detainees in cachots in various communes. The prison condition as compared with others in the country can be described as satisfactory.

35. Night curfew is still in place to enforce security measures by the RPA.

36. High rate of infiltration/insurgency operations by FRGF are still occurring in the sector. RPA has made concerted efforts to put this to check. These incursions by FRGF has often resulted in casualties on both sides and in some cases on the side of unfortunate locals.

37. Returnees to the sector between Nov 95 to Feb 96 is 20,778. They are gradually settling down to normal lives in their respective home communes/sectors.

ITEM 9. REMARKS BY THE SRSG

38. Earlier on, the SRSG had requested for views on the following points which were exhaustively discussed:

a. Indiscriminate killings are taking place in all some sectors. Indications are that there are a number of areas with access denied to UNAMIR and UN agencies by the RPA, where secret killings are reported to be taking place. The SRSG advised that efforts should be made to confirm this report, particularly in Sector 1, 4 and 5.

b. It is suspected that insurgency operations training centres exists across the borders although their exact locations are not identified. The type of weapons recovered by the RPA in counter-insurgency operations and the results of the interrogation of those arrested are never disclosed.

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Number of casualty in these indiscriminate killings are unknown. However the figure of 300,000 killed as claimed by the exiled Prime Minister of Rwanda appear to be highly exaggerated.

c. The reconciliation efforts by the Government are not particularly noticeable.

d. Are any efforts being made to win the hearts and minds of the people?

e. Why is it that there is no noticeable increase in the numbers of refugees from Burundi, Zaire and Tanzania? Should the refugees come in large numbers in the future, do the UNHCR and other agencies have adequate transport to cope with such an eventuality.

f. What arrangements can be made for ensuring the security of NGOs after UNAMIR has closed down. Should the RPA be asked to take on the responsibility?

39. In brief, the SRSG stated that the future of UNAMIR remains unclear with the Security Council yet to take a decision. However, there are three possible options:

a. To replace UNAMIR with an entirely Non-Military establishment providing civilian assistance.

b. To retain the present status-quo.

c. To proceed as a MILOBS Mission, which is most unlikely.

40. Finally, he thanked everyone for their valuable contributions at the conference.

ITEM 10. BRIEF BY HAC

41. The HAC Representative thanked all the sector Commanders for their contributions and support for its successful operations. He also said that with the recent influx of returnees and their associated needs, more requests can be expected from the communes and prefectures. He requested the Sector Commanders to exercise restraint in accepting such requests. The situation is very difficult with the Mission winding up soon. However, he promised to route all formal requests to the appropriate NGOs for consideration.

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ITEM 11. BRIEF BY SAO

42. The SAO emphasized the following points:

ACTION

a. Radio discipline is of utmost importance. Radios are not meant to replace telephones.

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b. Although security assessment is not part of the current mandate, efforts should be made to report on them where applicable.

All
Sects

c. Every effort is being made improve the communication state, especially in sectors 1 and 5.

Sig
offr

d. Sectors bordering the refugees camps in Zaire must make all efforts to collect and update information on the situation there.

Sect
4, 5

e. Only urgent and most essential requests for transport as a complement to UNHCR for movement of refugees would be approved henceforth.

All
Sects

f. The current UNAMIR liquidation plan already issued stands until otherwise directed.

g. Sector commanders are requested to apply themselves in the timely submission of their final reports.

Sects
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ITEM 12. BRIEF THE SMPO

43. Sector Commanders are requested to render confidential reports of MILOBS being repatriated and ensure their submission to the MILOBS Gp HQ Seven days before their departure.

ACTION
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44. All documents of MILOBS posted to another sector must be sent at the earliest to their new sectors.

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45. He requested the Sector Commanders that 75% strength availability must be ensured when considering CTO/Leave applications.

All
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46. MILOBS being repatriated must ensure that all bills for rented accommodation, telephone, electricity and water are settled and

All
Sects

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certificate of non-indebtedness obtained where applicable before departing the mission area.

47. Payment of MSA to the recipient will still be done on production of UN ID to the cashier.

All
Sects

ITEM 13. BRIEF BY S/LOGO

48. The S/LOGO observed that the delay in submission of vehicle Weekly Trip Tickets have resulted in avoidable queries being raised. He requested the sectors to pay more careful attention to this important aspect.

49. He said that with the mission entering its final liquidation phase, MILOBS should exercise due care in driving and rigorously follow up vehicles sent to the workshop for servicing.

All
Sects

50. Reports on loss of communication equipment must be forwarded directly to the Field Service Communications.

ITEM 14. CLOSING REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN

52. The CMO thanked the Sector Commanders and the Staff Officers for making meaningful contributions at the conference which marks the last of a series. He said the schedule on repatriation of MILOBS would be confirmed very soon.


All
Sects

53. He exhorted the Sector Commanders to impress upon MILOBS to maintain the high standards of discipline and dedication in the performance of their duties now that the mission is coming to a close.

All
Sects

54. He thanked Sector Commander, Sector 1 for hosting the conference. He also invited all to attend the Medal Presentation for MILOBS scheduled to take place at Amahoro, Kigali on 24 Feb 96.

24 Feb 96


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Major
Secretary

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BRIEFING NOTES - OPERATIONS

FORCE HQ - UNAMIR

INTRODUCTION

1. UNAMIR has gone through a great transformation since Oct 93 and this has led to a remarkable modification in the deployment and the operations of the Force.

AIM

2. The aim of this brief is to give a background history of RWANDA and UNAMIR since its inception in Oct 93.

SCOPE

3. The brief will cover the following:
- a. GENERAL INFORMATION.
 - b. BACKGROUND HISTORY OF THE RWANDAN CONFLICT.
 - c. FORMATION OF UNAMIR AND ITS DEPLOYMENT.
 - d. UNAMIR DEPLOYMENT AFTER 06 APRIL 94.
 - e. NEW MISSION AND CONCEPT OF OPERATION.
 - f. IMPORTANT OPERATIONS BY UNAMIR.
 - g. CONCLUSION.

GENERAL INFORMATION

4. Geographical Location. Rwanda is located in East Central Africa, having a relatively small area. The country is bounded on the North by UGANDA, to the East by Tanzania, to the South by Burundi and Zaire to the West.

5. Terrain. The terrain is rugged with steep hills and ridges. The North is dominated by a powerful chain of volcanoes known as the VIRUNGA. The highest is the KARISIMBI (Approx 4500 meters).

6. Vegetation. This varies from tropical rain forest in the West to savanna grassland in the East.

7. Ethnic Division. The population is made up of three ethnic groups: HUTU 85%, TUTSI 14% and TWA 1%.

BACKGROUND HISTORY OF CONFLICT

8. ZAIRE, RWANDA and BURUNDI have identical colonial past in that they were all under Belgian domination.

9. RWANDA and BURUNDI were both originally inhabited by the TWA tribe. Then came the HUTUS from the North, hundred of years ago followed by the Tutsis during the 18th century. Under colonial rule the Tutsis were exclusively given western education which made them dominant over the rest of the local population even though they did not form the majority. The Tutsi domination created problems in both countries. In Burundi the minority Tutsi tribe still controls the military, Civil Service and the economy of the country.

10. In 1959 the Tutsi domination of the majority Hutu in RWANDA was rejected through a rebellion which resulted in the overthrow of the ruling Tutsis. The rebellion led to the fleeing of over 160,000 Tutsis into neighbouring countries while an estimated 20,000 were killed. In 1961 a UN supervised referendum in the country brought victory to the Hutu led party known as the "Party of Hutu Emancipation Movement (PARME HUTU). The power base in Rwanda therefore shifted to the Hutu majority from 1961.

11. The situation in Rwanda though tense was stable until Oct 1990 when an estimated force of about 10,000 men largely made up of exiled Tutsis crossed into North Eastern Rwanda from Uganda. The initial attack was repulsed by the RGF with the help of Zairian and French troops. The force which was known as the Rwandan Patriotic Force turned guerrilla with most of its attacks on Rwanda coming from the North and North West. The attacks continued with the RPF gaining territory until March 1993 when a cease fire agreement was signed between the Government and the rebels. Under the truce, the RPF gave up about half the territory it controlled to give way for the creation of a 19 KM wide demilitarized Zone. On 04 August 1993 the RPF and RGF under the aegis of the OAU signed the ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT which called upon the UN to put in place an International neutral force known as United Nations Assistance Mission In Rwanda (UNAMIR) to assist in a 22 month peace process starting from 5 Oct 93. At Arusha the warring factions agreed on the following:

- a. Install a Broad Base Transitional Government.
- b. Set up transitional institutions
- c. Deploy a neutral international force
- d. Withdraw foreign troops from Rwanda.
- e. Deploy an RPF battalion in Kigali to protect RPF dignitaries involved in the transition process.

- f. Integrate RGF and RPF into the National Defence Force.
- g. Protect expatriates and ensure the security of humanitarian agencies operating in Rwanda.
- h. Integrate OAU observers into UN observers.
- i. Repatriate refugees and resettle displaced persons.
- j. Ensure a secure atmosphere for a general election.

FORMATION OF UNAMIR AND ITS DEPLOYMENT

12. Based on the Arusha Agreement, the Security Council adopted Resolution 846 which sent a Reconnaissance Mission to Rwanda on 17 Aug 93. The mission was assigned the task of assessing and reporting on the contributions which the UN could make to assist the OAU in the implementation of the peace agreement. It was also assigned the task of assessing the human and material requirements essential to the implementation of the peace agreement. On 5 Oct 93 the Security Council adopted Resolution 872 which gave UNAMIR a mandate for 6 months.

13. Prior to the arrival of UNAMIR troops in Rwanda, the OAU had an observer team of 104 officers and a sixty-man company from Tunisia to monitor the cease fire. These officers and men were absorbed by UNAMIR when it was established.

14. In order to execute this mandate, the UNAMIR force was deployed in 6 Sectors as follows:

- a. **UNOMUR Sector.** The UNOMUR Sector covered areas in northern Rwanda and part of southern Uganda. The Sector was patrolled by Military Observers.
- b. **RPF Sector.** The RPF Sector, referred to the area north of the DMZ. This included areas occupied by the RPF during the cease fire in 1993.
- c. **The DMZ Sector.** The DMZ Sector was a 19 KM wide "No mans Land" or buffer zone created to separate the warring factions. UNAMIR had the following forces deployed in the area:

- (1) Ghanaian Bn.
- (2) Bangladesh Engr Coy.
- (3) MILOB Teams.
- (4) Tunisian Coy (-)

d. The RGF Sector. The RGF Sector referred to the areas immediately south of the DMZ controlled by the RGF. MILOBs were responsible for monitoring the cease fire in that sector.

e. KIGALI WEAPON SECURE AREA (KWSA). KWSA included areas immediately surrounding Kigali the capital, and it had the following units:

- (1) Belgian Bn (-).
- (2) Bangladesh Bn (-) comprising:
 - (a) Log Coy.
 - (b) Med Pl.
 - (c) Mov Con Pl.
 - (d) Tpt Pl.
- (3) MILOBS.

f. The Southern Sector. The Southern sector referred to the area south of the RGF Sector. The forces which operated there were largely MILOB Teams.

UNAMIR DEPLOYMENT AFTER APR 94.

15. After the death of President Juvenal Habyarimana under very suspicious circumstances, the Presidential Guard went on a rampage killing opponents of the government and all Tutsis they could lay their hands on with the assistance of the Interhamwe, a pro-government militia organisation. Their reasons being that the plane crash was the work of forces opposed to the government. The RPF in Kigali having been appalled by the systematic killing of their sympathizers, broke out of their confinement at Parliament House thus ending the cease fire reached with the former Government in March 1993. In order to stop the carnage by the Presidential Guards and the Interhamwe, the RPF in the North moved southwards to link up with those in Kigali and advanced in three fronts, a Western, a Central and an Eastern front. The main thrust of the RPF advance was concentrated on the eastern front which turned westwards after moving southwards from the east. The RPA leadership was resolute so was their advance, with the RGF, Presidential Guards and Interhamwe fleeing ahead of the RPF advance. The RPF advance only stopped when the French occupied the Sector 4, formerly known as the Humanitarian Protection Zone (HPZ). The HPZ thus provided a safe haven for both the RGF and Militia, majority of whom since the withdrawal of the French on 21 Aug 94 have fled to Zaire.

16. During the war the deteriorating situation led to the scaling

down of the UNAMIR force from 2517 to just under 500 and the tasks the small force undertook were as follows:

- a. Provided security to displaced persons in camps under UNAMIRs care.
 - b. Performed escort duties.
 - c. Provided Humanitarian Assistance to Displaced Persons.
 - d. Monitored the activities of Non Government Organizations.
 - e. Ensured the security of personnel involved in Humanitarian Aid distribution. And finally,
 - f. Transfer of Rwandese from territory held by either the RGF or the RPF to the other.
17. After the war UNAMIR strength went up to 6,100 untill JUNE 95. Contributing countries were the following:
- a. Australia.
 - b. Britain.
 - c. Canada.
 - d. Ethoipia.
 - e. Ghana.
 - f. Malawi.
 - g. Nigeria.
 - h. Senegal, Chad, Congo, Niger, Guinea Bissau
(Chad, Congo, Niger and Guinea Bissau withdrew in February 95)
 - i. Tunisia.
 - j. Zambia.
 - k. India and Mali.

UNAMIR MISSION AND CONCEPT OF OPERATION
FROM 08 JUNE 94 TO 08 JUNE 95

18. UNAMIR mission was to assist and co-ordinate the humanitarian support of participating countries and NGOs with the view to bringing an end to the crisis in Rwanda.

19. The thrust of UNAMIR's effort was to bring back refugees and displaced persons and settle them in their respective home areas. Rwanda had therefore been divided into 6 sectors.

- a. SECTOR 1 - NIBATT AND MILOBS.
- b. SECTOR 2 - GHANBATT AND MILOBS.
- c. SECTOR 3A - MALAWICOY AND MILOBS.
- d. SECTOR 3B - MALICOY AND MILOBS.
- d. SECTOR 4A - ZAMBATT AND MILOBS.
- e. SECTOR 4B - SENBATT AND MILOBS.
- f. SECTOR 4C - ETHIOBATT with MILOBS.
- g. SECTOR 5 - TUNBATT with MILOBS.
- h. SECTOR 6 - INDBATT with MILOBS.

20. Due to the large IDP population after war the UNAMIR concept of operation aimed at:

- a. Stabilizing refugees and displaced persons in their various locations.
- b. Preparing the home communes for their return by helping to improve essential life supporting services with the assistance of NGOs.
- c. Then encouraging them to return to their home areas.
- d. Providing transportation, food, water, medical assistance on their way to their homes.
- e. Assisting the people to return to their normal life and finally,
- f. Handover in due course all humanitarian activities to the Rwandese Government.

21. Based on the concept of operations some of the tasks performed by the formed troops included the following:

- a. Conduct of protective operations such as:
 - (1) Road blocks.
 - (2) Check Points (static and random).

- (3) Vital point protection.
 - (4) Observation posts.
 - (5) Cordon and search and
 - (6) Patrol.
- b. Provide security in large towns, villages and in refugee/displaced peoples camps.
 - c. Deny insurgent activity in their sectors.
 - d. Guard UN installations within the UNAMIR AOR.
 - e. Assist local authority in maintaining law and order in camps.
 - f. Motivate the displaced persons to return to their homes.
 - g. Assist the NGOs in the distribution of food, water and medical support.
 - h. Assist in the coordination of all activities of NGOs.
 - i. Handover all activities to the Government and NGOs progressively as the situation becomes normal.

NEW MISSION AND CONCEPT OF OPERATION.

22. UN Security Council Resolution 997 dated 9 JUNE 95 decided to:

- a. Extend UNAMIR mandate until 8 December 95.
- b. Reduce the Force level to 2,330 troops before 9 AUG 95, and to 1,800 troops from 9 OCT 95.
- c. Adjust the UNAMIR mandate so that UNAMIR will:
 - (1) Assist the Government of RWANDA in facilitating the voluntary and safe return of refugees and their reintegration in their home communities, and, to that end, to support the Government of RWANDA in its ongoing efforts to promote a climate of confidence and trust through the performance of monitoring tasks throughout the country with military and police observers;
 - (2) Support the provision of humanitarian aid, and of assistance and expertise in engineering, logistics, medical care and demining.

(3) Contribute to the security in RWANDA of personnel and premises of United Nations agencies, of the International Tribunal for RWANDA, including full time protection for the Prosecutor's office, as well as those of human rights officers, and to contribute also to the security of humanitarian agencies in case of need.

23. Based on the new mandate, which has shifted the focus of peace-keeping to a role of assisting in the normalisation and stabilization of RWANDA, the AOR has been therefore divided into five sectors:

- a. SECTOR 1 (KIGALI) : INDBATT AND GHANCOY WITH MILOBS.
- b. SECTOR 2 (KIBUNGO) : GHANCOY AND MILOBS.
- c. SECTOR 3 (GIKONGORO): MALICOY AND MILOBS.
- d. SECTOR 4 (SHAGASHA) : MALAWICOY AND MILOBS.
- e. SECTOR 5 (NYUNDO) : NICOY AND MILOBS.

24. As UNAMIR has been tasked to sustain a UN peace-keeping presence in RWANDA, mainly in KIGALI, and to assist the govt of RWANDA in promoting reconciliation and reconstruction and in a promotion of a climate conducive to the stability and to the return of refugees, troops will perform the following:

- a. Continue occupying the existing sectors.
- b. Be prepared to provide transport for the movement of refugees as required.
- c. Assist where possible the humanitarian agencies in their operations.
- d. Provide a focal point for the coordination and provision of humanitarian aid.
- e. Provide security for UNAMIR personnel and property.
- f. Contribute to the security for the personnel and premises of UN agencies.
- g. Contribute to the security of the International Tribunal.

h. Contribute to the security of Human Rights offices,
where possible.

i. Contribute to the security of the humanitarian agencies
in case of need.

IMPORTANT OPERATIONS BY UNAMIR

25. UNAMIR Occupation of the HPZ. On 22 Aug 94, UNAMIR took over the HPZ and the French Forces (less FRAFBATT) withdrew from Rwanda. It was at this point that the HPZ became known as Sector 4.

26. Operation FOXTROT. During the French occupation of Sector 4, a Gendarmerie was established which was not recognised subsequently by the newly established Rwandan Government. UNAMIR undertook to successfully disarm and demobilise this force.

27. Reintegration of Sector 4. The RPA was gradually reintegrated in Sector 4 in the Sep/Oct period. During this time, the Government policy of reconciliation was articulated by leaders and Prefect administration was re-established. RPA troops are now permanently deployed throughout the Sector.

28. Operation HOMEWARD. Operation Homeward was mounted in Sep 94 to capitalise on the temporary availability of UNAMIR resources (principally transport and coordination expertise) to assist relief agencies to relocate IDPs to their homes. Although the operation was relatively limited in its success, it provided valuable lessons as precursor to Operation RETOUR.

29. Operation HOPE

a. Operation Hope was a cordon and search operation which was undertaken by UNAMIR in co-ordination with the RPA to clear KIBEHO and NDAGO IDP camps (Sector 4) of criminal elements which were looting and committing acts of banditry and murder aimed at discouraging IDPs in those camps from voluntarily going back to their respective home communes. The operation was conducted from 13-15 Dec 94. A total of 1,552 UNAMIR troops, MILOBS and support staff participated in the op.

b. The RPA contributed two battalions during the op as the outer cordon troops. In addition, they provided a small number of liaison officers.

c. The operation was extremely successful, as several hundred weapons were confiscated and 44 suspected criminals were apprehended and handed over to the office of the

Prosecutor in GIKONGORO in the presence of Human Rights and ICRC representatives.

30. Operation RETOUR. This operation was aimed at an information campaign to create conditions in the Displaced People's Camps to sufficiently motivate IDPs to return to their homes while simultaneously gearing up the target communes to receive the returnees. The operation was conducted in three phases.

a. Phase 1.

- (1) The preparation of home communes, ORCs, temporary shelters for IDPs;
- (2) Information campaign in target camps.
- (3) The establishment of conditions in the camp which are conducive to voluntary vacation.

b. Phase II.

- (1) Processing of IDPs through registration, screening and search procedures in marshalling areas.
- (2) The safe movement of IDPs to ORC/home communes.

c. Phase III. Establishment of IDPs in their home communes.

31. Currently two camps have been officially closed by OP RETOUR, Cyanika and Rukondo. Over 35000 IDPs have so far been evacuated by vehicles to various sectors within the UNAMIR AOR.

CONCLUSION

32. UNAMIR since 6 Apr 94 has undergone very important changes. The force in the previous mandate vigorously pursued its mandate to return the country to normality. There was a steady influx of refugees and internally displaced persons to their respective homes in towns and villages across the length and breadth of the country due to the improved security situation in the country. The new mandate assigns to UNAMIR a role of assisting the Rwandese Govt in the normalisation and stabilization of the country, in facilitating the voluntary and safe return of the refugees, and in providing humanitarian aid. The military situation is at the moment stable and the government's policy of reconciliation if pursued diligently by the people and government of Rwanda will yield great dividends.

Date JULY 95

NDIAYE B.S
Lt Col

THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC ARMY ASSAULT ON ISLE IWAWA

A report to the Force Commander, United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda

9 November, 1995

Background

At first light on Sunday, 5 November 1995, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) launched an amphibious operation on Isle Iwawa, fifteen kilometres west of the Rwandan mainland on Lac Kivu. The island lies 2 kilometres from the border with Zaire, and 4.5 kilometres from Ijwe Island, in Zaire. (Please see the map at Annex A) The island is 2.5 kilometres long, and 800 metres wide. It consists of a large southern land mass, connected to a small northern mass by a narrow isthmus. The southern mass is covered with heavy jungle, and the northern mass is dominated by an open pine forest. (Please see the map at Annex B.)

The island was defended by a force of approximately five hundred soldiers of the former Rwandan regime, and hereafter referred to in this report as the ex-FAR. The ex-FAR had prepared defensive works such as trenches and bunkers on the southern part of the island. The defensive positions were just inside the vegetation line along the shore. The trenches did not appear to be mutually supporting, and appeared to be isolated.

The northern part of the island had an ex-FAR defensive position on the dominating hill feature. It consisted of a number of bunkers. There was a small village in the narrowest part of the isthmus.

According to Colonel Charles Ngoga, the Brigade Commander of the RPA's 211 Brigade, his troops made the crossing at night using three high-speed patrol boats and two large fishing boats. The fishing boats were towed to a position near the island, and then rowed in by the soldiers.

According to the RPA battalion commander who led the operation, they knew that the ex-FAR had perimeter defences consisting of a bunker system just above the vegetation line around the southern mass of Isle Iwawa. The northern mass had a defensive position on the high ground, and was covered by ex-FAR positions on dominant terrain on the north edge of the southern mass. The battalion commander said that they believed that any attack would come via the northern extension crossing the isthmus on to the southern mass or directly against the northern end of the southern mass.

To avoid the ex-FAR positions on the dominant terrain on the north face of the southern mass, the RPA decided to attack on two beach heads from the south. The two landing sites used were a small bay just west of the southern-most tip of the island, and a similar bay on the southwest face of the island approximately 600 metres northwest of the first landing site.

The RPA used the two landing sites to break through the southern end of the ex-FAR perimeter. They effectively split and flanked the eastern and western defensive lines along the edges of the island. This allowed the RPA to roll up the ex-FAR as they moved north to attack the main defences on the dominant terrain from the rear. The assault plan worked. The RPA surprised the defenders on the southern face and in quick but close fighting pushed inland and northward. Most of the RPA casualties of 5 dead and 17 wounded occurred in this phase.

Once into the centre of the island, the RPA assault moved north against sporadic resistance that strengthened as the ex-FAR pulled back on both flanks and attempted to re-organize for a counter-attack. At the mid-point of the southern island, the ex-FAR managed to get a 75 millimetre recoilless rifle into the battle using high-explosive anti-tank ammunition, but the RPA took them out after only a few rounds were fired. As the ex-FAR became more desperate, they began scattering Italian TS-50 anti-personnel mines to delay the RPA advance while they withdrew to the main positions on the northern face. The fighting stabilized until the next morning.

The RPA closed in on the final defences of the ex-FAR the next morning. The RPA assault overwhelmed the defenders and some 100-plus ex-FAR retreated west along the northern edge of the island and entered the water. Most drowned or were shot as they tried to swim the 4.5 kilometres to Ijwe Island. The island was declared secure on the evening of 6 November. The RPA took 25 to 30 prisoners and counted 171 dead ex-FAR on the island, not including those that died in the water. The RPA believe that another 200 escaped the first evening of the fighting, including the ex-FAR commander.

Observations

I toured the island on 8 November, accompanied by Warrant Officer Pugh, Canadian Forces, and Lieutenant-Colonel Odom, United States Defense Attache to the US embassy in Kigali. We were in the company of the G2 and G3 of the RPA, the Brigade Commander, and an officer from the Vice-President's office. We flew by UNAMIR helicopter to Gisenyi, where we were picked up by one of the RPA's new rigid-hull inflatable boats (RHIBs). The boat is armed, equipped with radar, and is powered by two 200-horsepower outboard engines. We made the 25 kilometre trip to the island in 20 minutes.

We circled the island once, which gave us an opportunity to see and photograph the defensive works on the shoreline. We also observed what appeared to be an ex-FAR training area. We landed on the western side of the island, at the narrowest point of the isthmus.

At the landing site were an array of captured ex-FAR weapons. They included the following;

- a. two 12.7mm tripod-mounted heavy machine guns (serial numbers H27-318 241796-1, and X3.184 241776-1);

- b. one 75mm recoilless rifle, (serial number 20110, identification plate data number 111189, December 1988);
- c. five G3 7.62mm rifles, (serial numbers 7000781, 7000783, 7002168, 7003614, 7001499);
- d. one FAL 7.62mm rifle, (serial number GDN-1190);
- e. one SG542 rifle, (serial number 43291); and
- f. two 7.62mm General Purpose Machine Guns, Fabrique National, (serial numbers FN 141789 and FN 47104).

We observed 15 prisoners at the beach. They appeared to be in good health, and seemed to all be in their middle to late teens.

We then moved up into the village where we were shown a large number of cloth sacks. They contained weapons components, most still in the original polyethylene plastic wrapping, and covered in cosmoline. These weapons had never been assembled, let alone used. We found components of thirty-seven R-4 assault rifles. They all had the letters FP-03 05-92 stamped on them, and a proof mark depicting an upper-case P in an elongated circle. Of particular interest, there were no serial numbers of any sort on the barrels or receivers.

At this site we found components of between twenty and thirty FN 7.62mm General Purpose Machine Guns (GPMG). These components included feeder plates and receiver covers. We did not observe any barrels or other GPMG parts that normally carry serial numbers. We did not find enough components to assemble a full weapon, which leads us to suspect that there may be more weapons caches on the island. Other items found at this site include:

- a. thirty Italian TS-50 anti-personnel mines in a carrying case, lot number obscured;
- b. several anti-tank mine fuses, (FUZE, MINE, AT M603, LOT LOP-1-63, DWG 73-9-55);
- c. a carrying case for an anti-tank mine, (R7PAA, AT MINE, LOT LOP-1-43, LOADED 5/44);
- d. several large sacks of military TNT, (in poor condition);
- e. a roll of explosive det cord, (S5ICOR9 99-30-90314611); and
- f. one R-4 assault rifle, 5.56 mm, (07-1D, serial number 788105A1).

We then toured the northern mass of the island. During the tour of the northern part of Iwawa, during which we carefully remained on cleared trails, we observed approximately 15 bodies of dead males in their late teens and twenties. We also observed a site where the 75mm recoilless rifle had been fired several times. We toured the defensive position on the high ground on the northern mass. We saw several bunkers and trenches, a carrying case for thirty TS-50 anti-personnel mines (empty), and a large amount of 7.62mm by 51mm and expended 12.7mm ammunition. (7.62mm by 51mm is the standard NATO round, fired by the G3, FAL, and GPMG. The AK-47, used by the RPA, fires 7.62mm by 39mm ammunition.) We also saw some 7.62mm by 39mm ammunition at the site.) The RPA said that the area was booby-trapped, so we stayed on the trails and did not disturb anything. Most of the dead we saw on the northern part of Iwawa were at this site.

We then embarked on a tour of the southern mass of the island. We saw at least fifteen dead on this tour, ten of them scattered on a small sports field. We saw the landing sites, we examined one of the fishing boats used to carry troops, and we saw a building where bags of beans were stockpiled. We observed a large number of captured ex-FAR documents, maps, and sketches. We found some anti-RPF propaganda. We then returned to the village at the isthmus.

As we approached the village, we heard a small explosion. A young RPA soldier had stepped on an anti-personnel mine less than a metre from the site on the beach where some of the captured weapons were displayed, an area where we had spent considerable time recording serial numbers. The soldier was evacuated by speed-boat to hospital in Kibuye. We returned to Gisenyi soon after.

Conclusions

I believe that the ex-FAR had been occupying Isle Iwawa as a training and staging base for infiltrations into Kibuye Prefecture. Isle Iwawa was a good choice, because it cut 25 percent off the distance between Ijwe Island and the coast of Rwanda. They would be able to conduct training and preparations for operations without being observed by Zairian authorities or anyone else. It also gave them the ability to truthfully say that they were occupying some Rwandan territory, which may have important morale consequences.

We found no reason to dispute the RPA claim that they killed 171 ex-FAR on the island. We directly observed at least thirty bodies, and we did not stray off the beaten paths. We did, at times smell more dead bodies, but they could not be observed from the trail. The bodies seen in the southern mass of the island were at a more advanced stage of decomposition, including bloating and insect infestation, than the bodies at the northern island mass. This is consistent with the sequence of events as reported by the RPA. Of the thirty bodies we observed, we only saw one in uniform. LTC Odom reports that he saw two other bodies in uniform, for a total of three. We have no way of estimating the number that died trying to swim to Ijwe Island, but do not expect it to be in excess of one hundred.

This action, coupled with the existence of new armed speedboats on Lac Kivu, should have the beneficial effect of reducing the incidents of infiltration into Kibuye Prefecture, which should in turn reduce the number of mines being laid in that area.

This defeat of the ex-FAR will be tremendously humiliating for them. The RPA has proven again that they are a superior fighting force. This action will reduce the already small threat of a conventional invasion by the ex-FAR, but the ex-FAR will probably compensate by increasing the insurgency pressure on Cyangugu, Gisenyi, and Ruhengeri Prefectures. They will likely do this quickly, to try and restore the confidence of their own soldiers and the refugees living in the camps. They will also want to blunt the increase in morale that the RPA will get as a result of this victory.

This action has also provided us with something that has been eluding us until now - hard evidence of weapons being made available to the ex-FAR. Using the serial numbers we obtained, we should be able to trace the manufacture and sales record of some of the arms that were captured. Two of the captured G3s were one weapon apart in manufacturing sequence. Furthermore, the weapons components we saw were still in the manufacturer's original packing. This removes any doubt that the ex-FAR have been purchasing weapons.

R.L. Johnson
Major
Force G2

Annex A - 1:250,000 Joint Operations Graphic of Lac Kivu
Annex B - 1:25,000 Topographic Map of Isle Iwawa

MINUTES OF THE SECTOR COMMANDER'S CONFERENCEHELD AT SECTOR 5C KIBUYEON 20 OCTOBER 1995Present:

Ambassador S. Khan		SRS	SpecialGuest
Col Maj A. Toumia		DFC/CMO	Chairman
Col C. A. Nelson		DCMO	Member
Lt Col R.V. Blanchette		Comd, 1B	"
Lt Col B. Coulibaly		Comd, 2A	"
Lt Col R.M. Manz		Comd, 2B	"
LT Col M. Keita		Comd, 3B	"
Lt Col D.J.K Akplor		Comd, 4	"
Lt Col B. Vladimir		Comd, 5A	"
Lt Col V. Belski		Comd, 5B	"
Lt Col W. Chomba		Comd, 5C	"
Lt Col MD. Ahsanullah		SOO	"
Lt Col G. Adjei		SMPO	"
Maj Mpanda		A/comd 1A	"
Maj H.P. Zimba		SLOGO	"
Maj S K Prasad		HAC	"

In Attendance:

Lt Col SN Yadav	Ops offr, MILOB GP
S/Supt O.M. Gyeabour	CIVPOL
Mlle P. Tome	Radio UNAMIR
Maj Monir	Sig Offr

DISCUSSION	ACTION
<p>ITEM 1. WELCOME ADDRESS BY SECTOR COMD 5C</p> <p>1. Lt-Col Chomba welcomed all present. He thanked particularly the SRS who took time to attend this conference, clearly showing his recognition of the importance of MILOBS operations within UNAMIR.</p> <p>ITEM 2. OPENING ADDRESS BY THE CHAIRMAN</p> <p>2. The DFC/CMO, before starting his address, requested that all stand in silence for a moment in remembrance of our colleagues who died in this area. After this, he passed on the congratulations and encouragement of the FC. He then outlined the changes in the political, security and social situations since the last conference. He singled out the incident at KANAMA, in Sector 5B, as being the most important event of that period. He concluded by wishing everyone a good conference.</p>	

DISCUSSION	ACTION
<p><u>ITEM 3. OPENING REMARKS OF THE SRSG</u></p> <p>3. The SRSG first praised the MILOBS for their work at obtaining valuable information and the job that they are performing in this mission. Now that we are reaching the end of mandate, it is possible that we will be continuing for three to four or six months; or it is also possible that we windup and our strength is reduced gradually after 9th Dec 95. He informed that within two to three weeks, UNAMIR will be getting clear ideas regarding the mandate. He enquired whether or not RADIO UNAMIR was received in the Sectors. He enquired what difficulties were encountered in Sectors where formed troops were not available.</p> <p>4. He emphasized on the importance of the following points on which he would like to receive specific feedback from the Sectors :</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Is the system of justice prevailing ? What is the status of refugees/returnees ? What is the state of economic activity ? What is the state of the reconciliation process ? <p><u>ITEM 4. BRIEFING BY SECTOR COMD 1A</u></p> <p>5. The situation in the sector seems to improve greatly with locals and RPA soldiers becoming more friendly. The Sector has also seen a large influx of returnees during the past months.</p> <p>6. The number of returnees that have come into the Sector is estimated at 6,900 from August to October (about 2,000 old case load and 4,000 new case load). Most returnees have resettled very well with their old relation but still some require accommodation, food, seeds, and farming implements.</p> <p>7. The general conditions of communes seem to be greatly improving as the rehabilitation work of many buildings continues and as life gradually normalizes. The problems faced by most communes are no different than in any other sectors.</p> <p>8. The sector has 19 commune prisons with a total of 12,900 inmates. Most of the prisons living conditions are pathetic, except for the communes of Rushashi and Ngenda where the room is enough and relatives are free to visit their relations.</p> <p>9. There is no proper judicial system prevailing in this sector. Not much progress has been done by the government to promote reconciliation in the sector.</p> <p><u>ITEM 5. BRIEFING BY SECTOR COMD 1B</u></p> <p>10. In general, the situation in the sector is calm, but numerous killings, arbitrary arrests and acts of banditry could easily warrant the label of "tense". The population shows signs of insecurity throughout the Gitarama prefecture.</p>	

DISCUSSION	ACTION
<p>The RPA does not have support of the population at large.</p> <p>11. The most significant problem in the sector is still the overcrowding of the Gitarama prison. No serious improvement had taken place since the movement of 225 prisoners to Nyanza prison on 14th July 95.</p> <p>12. The general condition of the returnees is fairly good, as most have settled in their former homes after receiving on month basic needs on arrival from UNHCR. One of the acute problems faced by some of the returnees is the reconstruction of their destroyed houses.</p> <p>13. The general condition in the communes could be referred to as satisfactory, even though a feeling of insecurity persists. The major problem in communes is insecurity in the form of banditry, often performed by soldiers.</p> <p>14. The judiciary system in the sector can be expected to operate in early January 96. No noticeable improvement to the reconciliation process has been noticed in this sector.</p> <p>15. Radio UNAMIR cannot be received in Gitarama. Some of the communes nearer to Kigali could receive it; however, the local population shows only a remote interest in it.</p> <p>16. Although the problem has been alleviated with the hiring of two night guards, our local security situation is still disturbing, especially with the prospect of retaliation after the capture of 11 thieves.</p> <p>17. Kabgayi is still awaiting a decision about the requested retention of the 100 KW generator.</p>	
<p>ITEM 6. BRIEFING BY SECTOR COMD 2A</p>	
<p>18. The sector remained calm since the last conference. The relationship with the local authorities, RPA, UN agencies and NGOs remained very cordial and the general security situation in the prefecture has tremendously improved.</p> <p>19. The major problem in the sector is that of loose explosive ordnance and unmarked mines in most of the communes. This problem compels MILOBS patrol teams to use specific routine roads.</p> <p>20. There are 1246 returnees who came to the sector since 20th Jul 95. All the returnees who have hitherto been received have been peacefully resettled and accepted by their fellow locals, albeit the availability of food is their main concern.</p> <p>21. There is a tremendous improvement on the general living conditions in most of the communes. Some NGOs are assisting</p>	

DISCUSSION	ACTION
<p>tithe developmental project such as rehabilitation of schools, commune offices, health centres and roads.</p> <p>22. There is only one central prison in Byumba, which as at 17 Oct 95 had a total of 368 inmates.</p> <p>23. The first tribunal has all the judges appointed, as well as the prosecutor. The prosecutor is already dealing with some cases. All the cases which cannot be handled at commune level are referred to Byumba Court.</p> <p>24. The reconciliation process is going along well. The Prefect is making every possible efforts to achieve this.</p> <p>25. There is a problem with communication, as the Sector Commander who is a francophone cannot communicate effectively due to a lack of interpreters who can speak French.</p>	
<p><u>ITEM 7. BRIEFING BY SECTOR COMD 2B</u></p>	
<p>26. The general situation in the sector has been relatively calm and stable. Cases of cow stealing and odd cases of thefts by groups across the border continue.</p> <p>27. The situation in the refugee camps is reported to be volatile. The presence of politically active interest groups and intimidators has been confirmed. The presence of armed groups cannot be denied.</p> <p>28. The number of returnees that have come during the past three months is 17,428. The condition of the returnees has been fairly satisfactory.</p> <p>29. The general condition in the communes is satisfactory. However, as the number of returnees is increasing, the local administration has been under increased pressure to repair the basic infrastructure.</p> <p>30. There have been positive signs of re-conciliation between the various ethnic groups. Regular meetings are being held at commune and sector levels to bring about increased re-approachment.</p> <p>31. The total number of prisoners in the sector is 4,021. There is no judiciary system prevailing presently in the sector.</p> <p>32. The sector requests that a First Aid kit be available for each vehicle. Furthermore, training should be given on how to use this kit.</p>	
<p><u>ITEM 8. BRIEFING NOTES OF SECTOR COMD 3A</u></p>	
<p>33. The operational situation in the sector is calm. The RPA are conducting vigorous patrols in Muko and Musebeya communes, where there occurred incidents of ambush and mines.</p>	

DISCUSSION	ACTION
<p>34. Since the beginning of last month, there has been no returnees coming to the sector. The current number of returnees is 2,329 who are all Hutus from Zaire refugee camps.</p> <p>35. The communes are generally in satisfactory living conditions. Shortage of essential items like food, medical and agriculture implements is their prime concern.</p> <p>36. The current number of prisoners in the prefecture prisons is 1,138. The judicial system is in place; however, there is not enough trained personnel.</p> <p>37. The prefect is making every effort to get the people to live together. He has made several visits to communes accompanied by MILOBS to address people on reconciliation.</p> <p>38. The sector is short of seven MILOBS from an authorized strength of 31 personnel.</p> <p><u>ITEM 9. BRIEFING BY SECTOR COMD 3B</u></p> <p>39. Since the last conference, the security condition of the sector has gradually improved, and is now stable and calm. The relationship with the prefecture authorities and the RPA local commanders has also improved considerably.</p> <p>40. Security in the communes is stable. The returnees are all settled down well in their respective areas, and no longer face the hostility that was experienced earlier. There is a noticeable increase in the agricultural activity in all the communes. The fisheries in Kigembe and Ngoma communes are being revitalized again.</p> <p>41. The flow of returnees into the sector has been slow and gradual. The present state of reconciliation process in the sector is hard to tell. Though on the surface it may appear to give false signals, the roots of hatred and distrust run very deep.</p> <p>42. The total number of prisoners in the sector is 8,729, in very overcrowded accommodations. They suffer the same problems as prisoners everywhere in Rwanda.</p> <p>43. The sector no longer has the security of formed armed troops in the area, making the MILOBS Sector HQ vulnerable.</p> <p><u>ITEM 10. BRIEFING BY SECTOR COMD 4</u></p> <p>44. The general situation of the sector is relatively calm. However, a series of continuous banditry activities ranging from household robberies, stolen livestock and farm products to indiscriminate killings. Personalities in political authorities are being targeted for assassination.</p>	

DISCUSSION	ACTION
<p>45. The redeployment of RPA during the period 2-4 Oct 95, to cover the main approaches from Ijwi Island and contain FRGF operations launched from the Nyungwe Forest, have stemmed from reported FRGF infiltrations. The RPA redeployment appears to have contained FRGF/Interahamwe, for the time being.</p> <p>46. The total number of returnees in the past four months to this sector is 10,633. Their condition is very poor.</p> <p>47. The prefecture remains a stronghold of FRG/Interahamwe political support, with many sympathizers among the population. The behavior and attitude of the Prefect and Bourgmestres now seems positive.</p> <p>48. There is a total of 3,400 prisoners in the prefecture prisons. The judicial system is still not functional. The local authorities are still working on the process of reconciliation; but, still not to a satisfactory level.</p> <p>49. The sector does not still have office accommodations hired by UNAMIR. Office accom n-eds to be hired.</p>	SLOG O
<p><u>ITEM 11. BRIEFING BY SECTOR COMD 5A</u></p> <p>50. The sector is relatively calm, except for some minor incidents. The RPA deployment along the Zairian border has intensified.</p> <p>51. Out of 16 communes in the sector, only two have Judges. They only deal with minor cases. Other communes have an Inspector Judiciary Police (IPJ) who presides over minor cases at commune level.</p> <p>52. The sector has one main prison in Ruhengeri. Its maximum capacity is 600, but as at 16 Oct 95, there were 1,495 inmates.</p> <p>53. A total number of 3,169 returnees were recorded in the sector as from Aug 95. They have the general problems of food, seeds, farming implements and building material.</p> <p><u>ITEM 12. BRIEFING BY SECTOR COMD 5B</u></p> <p>54. The operational situation of the sector has been deteriorating over the past months. There has been a very definite increase in murder, thefts, and insurgency.</p> <p>55. At Gisenyi, on 10thOct 95, the governments of Rwanda and Zaire, and the UNHCR conducted a tripartite meeting regarding the repatriation of those refugees still in Zaire.</p> <p>56. The total number of returnees in the past three months is 19,439 persons. The condition of the returnees is poor.</p>	

DISCUSSION	ACTION
<p>57. The population at the Gisenyi Prison is a total of 1,414 inmates. There have been no significant changes in the judiciary system in the past few months. The process of reconciliation is most difficult in this sector.</p> <p>58. The Sector Comd points out that Hel request should not be turned down, due to the onset of the rainy season. All vehicles should be provided with the necessary tools for driver maintenance. An extra computer is also required.</p> <p><u>ITEM 13. BRIEFING BY SECTOR COMD 5C</u></p> <p>59. The general situation of the sector is that of an uneasy calm. Rumours are in the increase within the sector, especially along the costal belt, that the FRGF will be launching attack by infiltration in near future.</p> <p>60. During the last three months, Kibuye prefecture received 2,900 returnees. They are generally fatigued from travelling and have very low morale. They often suffer from dehydration, malnutrition, malaria, dysentery, measles and constantly suffering from shortage of food, water, blankets, medical supplies and the day to day required items.</p> <p>61. The general condition of the commune is improving slowly. Normal life is slowly returning to its expectancy. The local population is going about their normal activities.</p> <p>62. The one prison here in Kibuye now houses 2,220 inmates. This facility was built for 250 people so acute space problems occur.</p> <p>63. The proper justice system is still not in place to begin the trials of prisoners accused of genocide. The reconciliation process has not changed. From our perception, it is not materializing, although the situation appears to be calm.</p> <p>64. The problems in the sector for the MILOBS are a lack of an adequate system of potable water supply, and the need for another computer.</p> <p><u>ITEM 14. BRIEFING BY HAC</u></p> <p>65. The representative stated how he appreciated the works accomplished by the humanitarian officers of the sectors. He covered the following points:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. No promises or commitments should be made by MILOBS, without confirming from HAC as UNAMIR has severe resource constraints. b. The request from Prefectures was being compiled to assess and determine the priority of works. c. All humanitarian assistance were provided as per 	SLOG 0

DISCUSSION	ACTION
<p>priority decided by UHAAG.</p>	
<p><u>ITEM 15. BRIEFING BY CIVPOL</u></p>	
<p>66. The representative reminded the attendees the UN Security Council resolution which states the mandate of CIVPOL and the analysis of its specific tasks.</p>	
<p><u>ITEM 16. CONCLUDING REMARKS OF THE SRSG</u></p>	
<p>67. The SRSG requested that all present encourage everyone to listen to Radio UNAMIR. He expressed his satisfaction with the HAC, and stated that with such meager resources available to them, they are doing sterling work. He asked for advise on means to improve prison facilities and provide for extension of their existing infrastructure.</p>	
<p>68. On the subject of returnees, he asked for advise on a workable plan to cope with a sudden and massive influx of returnees. He asked if the present structure of transit camps is sufficient to absorb the flow of refugees, and that at their arrival in their respective communes, if there is sufficient food and accommodations to support them.</p>	
<p>69. He thanked everyone for a most informative briefing.</p>	
<p><u>ITEM 17. BRIEFING BY SOO</u></p>	
<p>70. The SOO reminded each sector of the following:</p>	
<p>a. The sector vehicles must be judiciously utilized.</p>	
<p>b. Usage of proper communicative and language skills on the radio, telephone and fax by the Duty officer.</p>	
<p>c. Sector Commanders to provide, as required, an assessment of the events covered in the daily SITREP.</p>	
<p><u>ITEM 18. BRIEFING BY SMPO</u></p>	
<p>71. The SMPO reported that the current MILOB strength is 286 against an authorized strength of 320, thus a shortfall of 34. With the normal attrition rate, the MILOB strength will be 233, which will certainly affect the operational efficiency of the group.</p>	
<p>72. He reminded all Sector Commanders and Branch Heads that confidential reports are supposed to be written on MILOBS before they depart from the mission area. It should reach the HQ 7 days before the departure of the MILOB.</p>	
<p>73. On the subject of a MILOB being promoted during his tour, the SMPO reminded that the allocated rank structure to countries to comply with does not change. However, if for morale reason should an officer be promoted in the mission</p>	

DISCUSSION	ACTION
<p>and authorization by CMO before wearing the rank.</p> <p><u>ITEM 19. BRIEFING BY SLOGO</u></p> <p>74. The SLOGO stated that since the mission is about to finish, many projects are blocked due to financial constraints.</p> <p>75. He stated that the vehicle strength of sectors 3A, 4, and 5B will be increased.</p> <p>76. He stated that if a MILOB fails in his second attempt to acquire a UNAMIR driving permit, he will be repatriated.</p> <p>77. He reminded that accommodation returns for MILOBS should reach him by the 12th day of each month.</p> <p>78. Finally, he stated that at this time the vehicles of sectors 3A, 3B and 4 will be able to receive A and B level maintenance and small repair at the workshop in Butare. Sector 1B, if they so wish, can also use this service. However, sector 5C has to take their vehicles to the Kigali Main Workshop for servicing.</p> <p><u>ITEM 20. CLOSING REMARKS OF THE DCMO</u></p> <p>79. The DCMO stated the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. We are towards the end of the mandate of the mission, so, we should not expect any new things to become available. b. At least a minimum of two patrols must be sent out everyday from each sector. c. No rotation of MILOBS will take place before 8thDec95. d. A person without a driving permit should not approach the wheel of a vehicle. <p><u>ITEM 21. CONCLUDING REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN</u></p> <p>80. The CMO thanked the Sector Commanders for this conference. He stated that there was a increase in sexually transmitted diseases, and this is no longer any personnel matter. All MILOBS should take great care in the security of their personal property.</p> <p>81. He thanked Sector Commander 5C for hosting this conference, and invited all to attend the next conference which will take place in Ruhengeri at a date to be later determined.</p>	<p>All Sec Comd, SMPO, SOO & SLOG O</p>

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DCMO'S BRIEF FOR GEN VAN KAPPEN,
MA TO DPKO,
ON SUNDAY, 12 NOVEMBER 1995

12 NOV 95

MILOB GP HQ
KIGALI

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DCMO'S BRIEF FOR GEN VAN KAPPEN, MA TO DPKO, ON SUNDAY, 12 NOVEMBER 1995

GENERAL

1. Milobs are the eyes and ears of the SRSB and the Force Commander. They are reasonably senior, highly matured and experienced military officers who are carefully selected for an objective and unbiased reporting of incidents in Rwanda.

ORGANIZATION /DEPLOYMENT OF MILOBS

2. The HQ of Milob Group is headed by the CMO with a DCMO. Working directly under the CMO are three branches, namely the Operations, Personnel and Logistics. The rest of the milobs operate in the field.

3. UNAMIR has divided the country into 5 Sectors. Milobs have sub-divided these Sectors into 10, to conform with the existing Prefectures of Rwanda. Each Milob Sector comprises the Sector Commander, Operations Officer, Logistics/Personnel Officer, Humanitarian Officer and minimum of 5 Patrol Teams. A patrol team is made up of 3 milobs.

TASKS

4. Some very important tasks performed by Milobs include the following:

a. **Patrolling**. Patrolling is very essential for observing, dominating, enquiring and assessing the prevailing situation in an area. Patrolling is necessary in confirming, verifying and supervising an incident, agreement and any violation. It also helps to gather information on terrain and topography. The general situation of a given area may be best assessed through patrolling. It is also important in showing the presence of UN.

b. **Visits to the Communes**. Milobs do visit various communes in their areas of responsibility to enquire about the following and take the necessary actions or inform the appropriate Agency:

(1) They meet Commune Bourgemestres and enquire about commune problems.

- (2) They take population details and assess the living conditions of the local population.
- (3) They check availability of food and water in the communes.
- (4) They check on the number and condition of orphans in the communes.
- (5) They monitor the state of education, number of children attending schools and availability of teachers and teaching aids. They also report problems facing the schools.
- (6) They check on the condition of prisoners, human right violations and judicial system available in the communes. They take note of the conditions of the prisons and the problems being faced.
- (7) They report the prevailing diseases in the hospitals/health centers, availability of doctors and essential drugs.
- (8) They assess the security situation, cases of banditry, arrests, killings by RPA and others.
- (9) Milobs monitor the deployment of the RPA, their strength, Commanders and their attitude towards local population..
- (10) Finally, Milobs check on returnees, their integration into the mainstream, their problems and assistance provided by administration.

c. **Escorts.** Milobs provide unarmed escorts to VIPs, NGOs and IDPs being transported to their home communes.

d. **Humanitarian Activities.** Milobs monitor the humanitarian situation in their respective communes. Each sector has a Hum Officer who works in close liaison with the local Humanitarian, Human Rights Officer and the NGOs. Some of the important tasks include:

- (1) Close contact with the Prefect and the representatives of the Ministry of Rehabilitation.
- (2) Work in close cooperation with UNHCR and render necessary assistance to them in the execution of their tasks of rehabilitating IDPs and Returnees.
- (3) Assist World Food Programme (WFP) in coordinating food and aid delivery to medical centres and orphanages.
- (4) Work in close coordination with HR and ICRC to assess the situation in the commune cachots and prisons.

ADVANTAGES OF MILOBS

5. Milobs have tremendous advantages over other agencies in carrying out accurate observation, evaluation and assessment since they are all trained military officers with good experience and analytical minds. Some of the striking advantages of military observers are:

- a. They can carry out their tasks effectively even with the absence of comprehensive guidelines. They do not need supervision.
- b. Correct assessment is very essential for optimum utilization of meagre UN resources. Milobs can make an accurate assessment of the existing situation including what to expect in future, due to their constant interaction with the locals and NGOs.
- c. It is much easier for an officer to interact with the local population taking into consideration the language problem in Rwanda.
- d. It has been experienced that representatives of HR and NGOs often insist on Milobs accompanying them.

PRESENT SECURITY SITUATION

6. The general security situation can be described as calm however, the western region is relatively tense. In recent times, low level insurgency is rearing its head in that part of the country.

7. Activities such as rounding up of civilians, discreet killings, planting of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines on known routes and armed robbery are being carried out in that region. Brutal beating of the local populace, banditry and sabotage activities including blowing of electric pylons have increased. However, RPA insists it is in control, hence there is little Milobs can do about the situation.

PROBLEMS

8. In the course of their day to day performance of their duties, Milobs tend to come across the following problems:

a. More often than not, there is lack of cooperation between Milobs and the local authorities. The authorities tend to hold back essential information from the Milobs. In certain communes, the RPA intimidate the locals and demand that they avoid any contact with Milobs. As a result, information gathering becomes difficult.

b. The authorities have also designated certain areas out of Bounds to Milobs, hence they cannot monitor security situation in such areas. The general area of Akagera, Mulindi etc are declared out of bounds to Milobs.

c. The next problem that comes to mind is that of manpower shortage. The approved strength of Milobs in this mission is 320. However, this outfit operates with 286, a short fall of 34 Milobs. Consequently, some sectors are facing severe manpower problems.

d. Lack of sound vehicles for long-range patrols is another problem. The current fleet of vehicles on charge to Milobs are very old and cannot withstand the rigours of long patrols. The vehicles often breakdown yet there is no effective spare backing for these vehicles.

CONCLUSION

9. In conclusion, I like to emphasize that Milobs are very useful in this mission, moreso, at a time when the mandate places more emphasize on humanitarian assistance.

10. Milobs patrol, visit, escort and provide necessary information to the appropriate agencies to give meaning to the new mandate. Thank you.



UNAMIR - KIGALI

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

8 September 1995

To: Col. Maj. A. Toumia
DFC

Mr. W. Clive
A/CAO

From: Norris Jorsling
CITMM/Secretary/Member, VEC

Subject: Today's VEC Meeting

Thank you for your prompt response to this office's request for a VEC meeting to be held on 8 September 1995.

Reference your para 2 of the attached memorandum, please be advised that the VEC is the sole authority at the mission headquarters level for defining and approving the initial vehicle establishment for each Unit/Section as well as any amendments to it which may be required from time to time.

We await your decision as to the date in the near future when the next VEC meeting can be convened.

Thank you for your cooperation.

cc: Deputy Chief Military Observer
Civpol Commissioner
D/Cos Sp
Legal Adviser, OSRSG

Member
Member
Member
Member

19/95
VEC file



UNITED NATIONS

NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

From: Co Chairmen VEC

To: CITMM

Info:

File Reference: 4000.1/LOG-41

Date: 8 Sep 95

Subject: VEC MEETING 8 SEP

Reference: CITMM Memo dated 7 September 1995

1. It is unfortunately an inopportune time to hold a meeting of the VEC as requested at ref. A meeting of the VEC will be convened in the near future at a date convenient to all parties.
2. Your concerns at ref will be addressed in a separate forum.

A. Toumia
Col Maj
DFC

W. Clive
A/CAO

W. Clive




0945 hrs

DCMO

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UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

**DCMO'S BRIEF FOR US OFFICIALS FROM THE OFFICE OF
THE INSPECTOR-GENERAL ON MONDAY,
30 OCTOBER 1995**

30 OCT 95

MILOB GP HQ
KIGALI

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**DCMO'S BRIEF FOR US OFFICIALS FROM THE
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2. The HQ of Milob Group is headed by the CMO, with myself, as his DCMO. Working directly under the CMO are three branches, namely the Operations, Personnel and Logistics. The rest of the milobs operate in the field.

3. UNAMIR has divided the country into 5 Sectors. Milobs have sub-divided these Sectors into 10, to conform with the existing Prefectures of Rwanda. Each Milob Sector comprises the Sector Commander, Operations Officer, Logistics/Personnel Officer, Humanitarian Officer and minimum of 5 Patrol Teams. A patrol team is made up of 3 milobs (ORBAT attached).

CONS - Main means of work with Vehicles - F&A - Reports - TFM

TASKS

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e.) Naming some key staff posts in UNAR HQ
ADVANTAGES OF MILOBS — Coordination & Liaison Officer UNAR — UN Agencies — KIA Airport — NAIROBI C-Team — VIP Guest! ..

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CONCLUSION

9. In conclusion, I like to emphasize that Milobs are very useful in this mission, moreso, at a time when the mandate places more emphasize on humanitarian assistance.

10. Milobs patrol, visit, escort and provide necessary information to the appropriate agencies to give meaning to the new mandate.

11. Thank You.



CHARLES A NELSON
Col
DCMO

MINUTES OF THE SECTOR COMMANDERS' CONFERENCEHELD AT SECTOR 1B GITARAMAON 25 AUGUST 1995

Present:	Ambassador S. Khan	SRS	Special Guest
Col Maj	A. Tomia	DFC/CMO	Chairman
Col	C. A. Nelson	DCMO	Member
Lt-Col	M. Ahsannulla	SOO	"
Lt-Col	E. Castro	Comd, 1A	"
Lt-Col	R. V. Blanchette	Comd, 1B	"
Lt-Col	E. A. Mahachi	Comd, 2A	"
Lt-Col	R. M. Manz	Comd, 2B	"
Lt Col	Nestor Sainz Tranto	Commnd, 3A	"
Lt Col	D.J.K.Akplor	Commnd, 4	"
Lt-Col	V. Belski	Comd, 5B	"
Lt-Col	B. Coulibali	Comd, 5C	"
Lt-Col	G. Adjei	SMPO	"
Maj	K.B.S.Sirohi	Act Commnd	"
Maj	Z.Alam	Act Commnd	"
Maj	H. P. Zimba	SLOGO	"

In attendance:

Lt-Col	T. J. Fox	CHAO	
S/Supt	D. S. Njase	CIVPOL	
Lt-Cdr	Y. D. Gunat	G3 Med	
Maj	M. Fensom	FMO	
Maj	S. Saklayen	SO to DCMO	
Maj	R. Munir Khan	Sig Offr	
Maj	H. Oueslati	Ops Offr, 1B	Secr
Maj	G. Dube	Team Ldr, 1B	Secr

DISCUSSIONACTIONITEM 1. WELCOME ADDRESS BY COMD SECTOR 1B

1. Lt-Col Blanchette welcomed all present and gave a short history of Kabgayi and its place into the modern Rwandese history.

ITEM 2. OPENING REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN

2. The chairman made his opening remark in French. He expressed his honour to have the SRS present and explained the purpose of the monthly Sector Commanders' Conference. Within two weeks of the mandate half point,

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the Chairman said that it was a good time to review our role and efficiency.

3. He covered the following points:

a. The situation in Rwanda is improving and the international community is paying a lot of attention to Rwanda;

b. The economy is picking up but inflation is felt;

c. The security situation is of concern but it is understandable when considering the war trauma syndrome;

d. The suspension for one year of the arms embargo has incited Zaire to threaten and to actually forcibly return refugees to Rwanda. The Chairman invited Milobs to pay particular attention to the gathering of information related to this movement of population;

All Sect
Cdrs

e. The risk of an external attack has diminished;

f. The slow pace of reconciliation raises the specter of internal insecurity and the justice system is at the centre of the challenge. The various actors of the judiciary are slowly moving into position and some international help is being made available to speed up the process; and

g. UNAMIR is doing its tasks according to its mandate.

ITEM 3. REMARKS BY THE SRSG

4. The SRSG stated that he trusted the assessments made by Milobs and that his decisions were often based on such assessments. The SRSG stressed the need to establish good relations with Rwandese authorities in relation to the new mandate. He emphasized the importance of the following points on which he would like to receive specific feedback:

DCMO, all
Sect Cdrs
and Milob
Staff

a. The improvement of the penitentiary system;

b. The return of refugees (which he had discussed with the Rwandese President);

c. The delay in pledges made by the international community to assist the Rwandese government (not a point that Milobs can influence);

d. The difficulties with the reconciliation process; and

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e. The possible enlargement of existing transit centers and eventual establishment of new centers.

5. At the end of the SRSG's address, the DCMO asked the SRSG to comment on the mine problem in Rwanda. The SRSG advised that the issue was tackled by the US demining team since UNAMIR engineer resources are too limited.

DCMO, all
Sect Cdrs
and Milob
HQ

ITEM 4. DCMO'S REMARKS

6. The DCMO introduced two of the Sector Commanders who were not present at the last conference, namely Cdr Sector 2B (Lt-Col Manz1) and Cdr Sector 4 (Lt-Col Akplor).

ITEM 5. REMARKS BY COMMANDER SECTOR 1A

7. The Sect Cdr reported that the operational situation in sector 1A has changed drastically for the better as most locals and RPA have become more friendly with UNAMIR personnel.

8. Problems in the sector are:

- a. Lack of funds to pay government workers;
- b. Poor road network linking the various communes making difficult the monitoring of the development; and
- c. Lack of resources for the reconstruction of various infrastructure.

9. Returnees into the sector are gradually integrating themselves into their home communes. Some arrests linked to the genocide and banditry have been reported. Most of the returnees have lost almost all of their property.

10. The Sect Cdr cited the words of the Ugandan President who stated that the division between the Tutsi and Hutu was caused by those whom he called exploiters who support "a divide and rule system" to fulfil their interests. The Ugandan President also encouraged the Rwandese to stay together as one to improve the economy of the country.

11. In concluding, Lt-Col Castro underlined the following problems:

- a. The repatriation of Milobs and posting early in August caused a lot of changes in key personnel in the Sector;
- b. The Sect Comd requested another six vehicles to be able to operate smoothly; and

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c. His new offices require some cooling system, toilet facilities closer than those at INDBATT and a fridge to store cold water.

ITEM 6. REMARKS BY COMMANDER 1B

12. The Sect Cdr stated that in general, the situation in the sector was tense due to numerous killings, arbitrary arrests and acts of banditry. The population shows signs of insecurity throughout the Gitarama prefecture. The RPA does not have the support of the population at large and the local RPA Bde Cdr admits that he is not "winning the battle for the hearts and minds".

13. The Sect Cdr stated that the most significant problem in the prefecture is still the overcrowding of the Gitarama prison. No serious improvement has taken place since the movement of 225 prisoners to Nyanza prison on 14 July 95. Human Rights representatives have indicated that a movement of more than 2 000 inmates was being considered to the temporary detention facilities in Kigali in the first weeks of September. This will be a major undertaking for this sector's resources which will need to be reinforced for the task at hand.

14. Since the last report, the most important change in the prefecture has to do with increased pressure from FRGF forces or its fifth column. Several acts of sabotage have now been investigated and confirmed by Milob teams. They are mostly related to the electrical network where expensive transformers are emptied of their oil, turned on and burnt. Eucalyptus forest burning has also been reported. In line with what could be construed as "economy sabotage", it was also reported that peasants are instructed and pressured not to produce more than what they require to survive. Large towns then lack supply and prices go up, as noted throughout the country.

15. In the same vein, deep FRGF incursions into the northern communes have been reported and confirmed by milob patrols which have verified the information with locals. This new factor was initially reported by the RPA Bde Cdr who was explaining why they had "slightly tightened the screw". The alleged FRGF patrols are apparently not armed to facilitate their movement but they are travelling with radio equipment.

16. The minister of the interior's announcement concerning the disbandment of "local defence forces", made on Radio Rwanda during the weekend 12 and 13 august 95, is not being followed in this prefecture. The prefet does not seem to want to make waves about the fact that the LDFs may have been disbanded *de jure*, but *de facto* they are alive and kicking. Citizens night

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patrols are still sent in the various sectors where banditry is suspected. It turns out, however, that these patrols are often accompanied by RPA soldiers and proceed with arbitrary arrests at night time. The RPA Bde Cdr, Lt-Col Kayonga, who is also chairing the war council (military tribunal for serious offenders from the rank of private to captain inclusive), is only paying lip service to the disbandment order. He was responsible for the training of this personnel but, as he puts it, that is where his input ended since the LDFs were paid by the communes. The Minister of the Interior, to say the least, is not a popular man with the RPA.

17. There has also been a lot of pressure being exerted on various civilian authorities. At the top level, the Prefet is obviously heavily relying on UNAMIR observers to provide him at least an "institutional protection". In that respect, he often visits the Sector 1B HQ and seizes every opportunity to be seen with UNAMIR. The murder of the Ruhango sous-prefet has made a serious dent in whatever little confidence the political class had. The dismissal of the Mugina bourgmestre by the Minister of the Interior was seriously contested through organized demonstrations which could have easily turned violent. The bourgmestre of Bulinga commune is now fearing for his life, following his decision to dismiss his IPJ who was accepting bribery.

18. In Kabgayi, a clear tug-of-war is being witnessed between the RPA and the Catholic Church. In the aftermath of the killing of a priest in Taba commune, this tension was crystallized with two arbitrary arrests which were cancelled following interventions by the Bishop directly to the Prime Minister. The Bde Cdr, in a private conversation, said that he considers the Bishop to be Interhamwe. Obviously, the RPA keeps a close eye on Kabgayi which is seen as a hotbed of nationalist Hutu intellectuals.

19. On the humanitarian scene, there has been little change since the last report when it was reported that a critical point had been reached where supply can no longer meet demand. There is a growing sense of frustration at the bourgmestre level which translates into more difficulties in obtaining information or visiting commune cachots. From Sector 1B's perspective, however, the transport support provided by INDBATT resources has been outstanding. A monthly coordination and security meeting with NGOs has been institutionalized and has proved to be a success.

20. As requested, complete updated statistics concerning returnees were provided to Milob HQ. These numbers are being constantly reviewed everytime commune offices are visited. With regards to the upcoming wave

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of returnees, the local population shows mixed emotions, that is to say happiness of possible reunions but fears of reprisal. No major changes are reported on the situation of returnees, IDPs and rescapes.

21. As explained in the last report, it is difficult to make such an assessment which is obviously based on "gut feeling". The lifting of the arms embargo has obviously changed the strategic or at least the operational disposition of the sub-region. The Zairian decision to force the return of refugees is speeding up what ultimately needs to happen but the risk of "slippage" in conducting these operations, both in Zaire and in Rwanda, is high. The RPA Bde Cdr is of the opinion that the RPA is facing a stiff disciplinary challenge but that they can be up to this challenge, just like they did during the war.

22. Sector 1B was privileged with a UNHCR sponsored seminar on arrest procedures and this subject is obviously the corner stone of an "orderly reconciliation". Milobs should be very familiar with the distinction between an arbitrary arrest and an illegal arrest. At all levels, milobs are sending the clear message that illegal arrests will continue because of a lack of means but that arbitrary arrests must stop. To achieve this, the RPA must use their newly installed IPJs and be familiar with what constitutes an illegal arrest. In parallel with this, Sector 1B has a serious problem with a complete void of gendarmes. The Prefet is working hard at obtaining the deployment of a gendarme group in the prefecture but progresses are slow. The current national recruitment of communal police is seen as an encouraging sign but locals do not foresee the RPA conceding too much of its authority.

23. The Ugandan President's visit has been perceived, at least in this very politicized prefecture, as a reflection of the sub-region's instability. The increasing pressure from the neighboring countries adds to the expectation of renewed fighting. Both the FRGF and the Rwandese government are exaggerating the risk of invasion, thus creating what is labelled as a "war dynamics". This results in a climate where both Hutu and Tutsi can hardly consider reconciliation when rumors of war are looming.

24. The level of tension in the population can still be perceived through casual discussions. The impression that worse days lay ahead of them is quite symptomatic of a very slow reconciliation process, perhaps even a regressing one.

25. The departure of all Mali Coy troops from sector 1B has been delayed with the 63 soldiers remaining in Kabgayi. The transition to the new perimeter, much

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smaller, with the very walls of the Petit Seminaire, is going smoothly.

26. Sector 1B is now manned with only 21 officers and its strength will go down to 17 as of 26 August 95, that is to say only 60 % of its authorized strength. The Sect Cdr expressed hope that the reinforcement plan be known as soon as possible.

27. There is a certain amount of uncertainty concerning the FC's letter dated 7 Aug 95 that expressed that "all sector MILOBs are under direct command and control of the formed troop (sic) Commanding Officer". This letter was not followed by any change of situation on the terrain but it would be advantageous to clarify the command and control relationship, especially if the theater of operations "heats up" in the future.

28. Lt-Col Blanchette concluded in saying that he has now completed his observation period and that there was a clear feeling amongst Milobs that a lot of action lay ahead of them.

ITEM 7. REMARKS BY COMMANDER 2A

29. The Sect Cdr explained that the situation was relatively calm. Relationships with local authorities and other agencies are very cordial and the general security situation has tremendously improved. The prefecture has not yet been affected by the exodus of refugees from Zaire.

30. Developments and projects are road construction, rehabilitation of schools, health centers and drilling of bore holes. There are three orphanages in the prefecture.

31. There is a tremendous improvement of the general living conditions in most of the communes in the Sector. There is a continuous flow of returnees from the neighboring countries. Their accommodation is provided by UNHCR, WFP and ADRA whilst on transit. Milobs continue to monitor the returnees in their new places of settlement to ensure that they are peacefully integrated into the community.

32. Problems that are common to all communes are lack of essential services such as potable water and electricity. There is a lot of loose explosive ordnance and unmarked mines in some communes, thus resulting in the injury or death of livestock and human beings.

33. The only computer and fax terminals allocated to the Sector often break down and create serious delays in reporting. Three of the vehicles allocated to the sector have been in the workshop since April 95.

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Manpower shortage has also hit Sector 2A due to a large number of Milobs who have been repatriated without replacement.

34. Lt-Col Mahachi concluded by recommending that additional computers be allocated to his Sector, that the replacement of repatriated Milobs be speeded up and that cannibalization be authorized to facilitate the repair of vehicles that have been in the workshop for a long period.

ITEM 8. REMARKS BY COMMANDER SECTOR 2B

35. The Sect Cdr reported that the security situation in his sector is more than calm and that it is actually peaceful. He left his written text to talk about the history of his sector and some of the peculiar inhabitant of the swamps which make the largest part of his sector. In his written report, the Sect Cdr explained that the rate of intimidation and indiscriminate arrests of locals has been reduced. However some cases of infiltration by armed elements of the FRGF, with the aim of taking their relatives to Tanzania, have been reported.

36. In response to an anticipated FRGF threat, the RPA has deployed its troops along the Southern border with Burundi and Tanzania. The relationship between UNAMIR and the RPA has improved considerably.

37. So far, 1574 returnees have been registered in August. Their overall condition is quite satisfactory. They face problems of accommodation and a shortage of cultivation equipment. Returnees are being assisted by NGOs in terms of health, educational aid, food distribution, reunion of lost family member and establishment of local cooperatives. There have been positive signs of reconciliation between the two ethnic groups.

38. The Sect Cdr expressed the same concern about the command and control of Milobs and Formed troops as expressed by Cdr Sect 1B. He explained that he loosely interpreted this letter since he could not understand how the Commanding Officer of formed troops could actually tell him how to run his sector. In his written brief, the Sect Cdr stated that the security of Milobs was a matter of some concern. This could be overcome to a certain extent by co-locating Milobs with formed troops when feasible.

39. Lt-Col Manz1 concluded in making reference to problems of accommodation, lack of adequate food storage facilities, inadequate office and communication equipment and slow repair of vehicles at the workshop.

UN RESTRICTED

40. The SRSG asked three questions to the Sect Cdr. Firstly, he wanted to know if there were any potential prison facilities in Sector 2B. Secondly, he inquired whether Radio UNAMIR was heard in his sector and thirdly whether he knew anything about an old cross-over area which could greatly facilitated the movement of population if a bridge could be built thereto. The Sect Cdr said that he would find answers to these questions.

Cdr Sect
2B

ITEM 9. REMARKS BY COMMANDER SECTOR 3A

41. The Sect Cdr announced that the security situation in all the communes has remained stable since the last conference. In his written brief, the killing of the Sous-prefet was noted as a serious indicator of tension within the communes.

42. There still exists two camps in the prefecture, with 2150 and 420 returnees. The NGOs, other UN Agencies and UNAMIR operating in the sector supervised the evacuation of the Murambi Camp IDPs which began on 7 Aug 95. So far, 354 families of approximately 1450 persons have been evacuated to their home communes namely, Kivu, Mubuga and Rwamiko. The evacuation of the remaining 185 families (400 people) which was scheduled to resume on 16 Aug was postponed because of a perceived insecurity in Rwamiko commune. This development resulted, as far as the Sect Cdr can assess, in the arrest of between 100 and 130 people in the communes suspected of having been involved in the Genocide.

43. There are clear indications that some NGOs are doing everything possible to rehabilitate the returnees by providing food and shelter in their communes. The Sect Cdr stated that the gradual increase in the commune population has made the health care and the food delivery system grossly inadequate. Most of the clinics are short of drugs and facilities to cope with patients. The withdrawal of ZAMBATT formed troops which used to assist the clinics has worsened the situation. The locals need seeds, farm implements and fertilizers. Most of the schools in the prefecture are functioning at 80%.

44. The Sect Commd concluded his remarks by reporting that the logistic situation in his sector is most unhealthy. Out of nine vehicles allocated to the sector, five are presently in the workshop.

ITEM 10. REMARKS BY COMMANDER SECTOR 3B

45. The Acting Sect Cdr reported that the situation in all 20 communes is generally stable and calm. Milob teams still face problems with the RPA in performing

UN RESTRICTED

their day to day duties. The security of material especially UN property transported out of SENBATT location on its departure is of concern.

46. A team from the Force Engr Coy has started work at the rehabilitation center in Butare. The Reconnaissance of two bridges was also carried out by Force Engr Coy representatives. No progress report have been heard of since then.

47. The flow of the returnees into the sector has been slow and gradual. Since the closure of IDP camps in April 1995, a total of 73,303 of them have registered. A large number of humanitarian activities were undertaken in coordination with UN agencies and NGOs. There are two prisons in the prefecture. As of 24 Aug 95, one is holding 6660 and the other one 1067.

48. Major Sirohi concluded by stating that he was facing an acute shortage of vehicles as there are only six vehicles while eight patrol teams need to operate.

ITEM 11. REMARKS BY COMMANDER SECTOR 4

49. The Sect Cdr indicated that he had just taken command of his sector and that the general situation was relatively calm. However, a series of continuous banditry activities ranging from household robberies, stolen livestock and farm products to indiscriminate killings, including political killings, have taken place in the Bugarama subsector. There, bandits have clearly focussed their action on traders and returnees with money as well as livestock who are being systematically targeted. RPA soldiers are still suspected of having committed some of these crimes.

50. In terms of political killings, one took place in Gishoma commune on 5 Aug 95 and an attempted one in Mukinbangiro sector where the counsellor was seriously wounded by unknown individuals for reasons suspected to be political. On 30 July 95, a firefight took place between unidentified elements and the RPA at Kamembe commune. Rifle launched grenades were used and the commune office sustained damages.

51. Airspace violations continued during the period from 16 to 30 June where 19 sightings of unidentified aircraft violating the Rwanda airspace were reported. 15 other sightings were reported during the period 1-31 July. In August, there were seven sightings. All of these aircraft are of a grey metallic color and no clear markings have been observed.

52. On 9 August at Kirangira sector, the bodies of four suspected FRGF soldiers were photographed by UN personnel along the Rwanda-Burundi border and a joint

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UNAMIR/UNHCR investigation was launched. These soldiers are alleged to have been shot by the RPA.

53. All refugees arriving from Zaire in Sector 4, both in Bugarama and Rusizi I and II, are processed through the Nyagatare transit camp. This camp has been developed to accommodate 10,000 refugees and the another one at Nyarushishi can accommodate 15,000 refugees.

54. The Sect Cdr assesses that the FRGF does not possess the force preparedness and the necessary logistic support from the Zairian Government to launch major offensives in the Cyangugu Prefecture. The military option is fading although it is expected that political killings and low level operations to disrupt command, control and communication systems will continue under the cover of "bandit" activities. Also, acts of terrorism and intimidation of the population along the border areas will continue as a warning not to overtly support the Government of Rwanda.

55. Lt-Col Akplor ended his remarks by stating that there is a lack of vehicles in Sector 4.

ITEM 12. REMARKS BY COMMANDER 5A

56. The Acting Sect Cdr described the operational situation in his sector during the past month as quite satisfactory. Rumors of FRGF invasion has considerably died down. There was a peaceful demonstration on 31 July in the town of Ruhengeri by government employees and civilians against the promotion of the Ruhondo and Kigombe bourgmestres to the respective positions of Ruhengeri and Kibuye subprefects.

57. There has been some tension at the RPA occupied former TUNBATT position in Nemba, including the hospital area run by an NGO. The general humanitarian situation has improved tremendously. The general situation in the communes is considered to be similar to the national average. Although there are three hospitals and 26 Health Centers in the Prefecture, the area is still not adequately covered.

58. The reconciliation process is apparently gaining root but its success will likely take a long time, depending on the people's attitude towards the arrival of returnees.

59. Major Alam concluded by stating that his sector had vehicle, computer, telephone and fax problems.

ITEM 13. REMARKS BY COMMANDER SECTOR 5B

60. The Sect Cdr stated that the overall situation may be deemed as tense. Incidents include infiltration,

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patrol clashes, sabotage, mine explosions and killings of suspected FRGF by the RPA. The relations between Milobs and the RPA has remained at a distance and guarded.

61. The refugee figures increased considerably over the last few days to approx 2,000 per day. It was observed that a large percentage of the refugees are women, children and aged males. The contingency plan for the large repatriation of returnees was put into effect.

62. The plan included the setting up of two transit camps at Nkamira and at the College Complex, depending on the number of returnees. In addition, NGOs have made plans for the distribution of food, water and medical care at the border posts and transit camps. The NICOY was incorporated in the plan to provide necessary security and additional transport. It is understood that UNHCR officials in Goma consulted the Chief of security in Zaire and learnt that authorities are going to interrupt forced repatriation for the present. They were going to encourage voluntary return as of 26 Aug 95. The Goma border remained closed to all Milobs and Humanitarian food convoys.

63. The conditions in the Gisenyi Prison are considered good when compared to other prisons in Rwanda.

64. The Sect Cdr stated that from June to 24 August 95 a total of 12,925 have returned to the Sector. The main problem the returnees are facing is the distribution of land.

65. The problem of reconciliation, though not simple, is not being addressed in the correct perspective. The RPA, the local authorities and the Government have made it clear that the perpetrators of the Genocide would be brought to courts but the arbitrary arrests that are being perpetrated are seriously hindering the reconciliation process.

66. There is a propaganda campaign going on in the GOMA camps. Led by the politically active refugees, the campaign aims at discouraging the returnees from leaving. The propaganda also relies on the fact that UNHCR and NGOs are providing greater accessibility to education for children, free and better medical care than what is available in Rwanda.

67. It is estimated that the FRGF's strength in the Goma area is approximately 30 000 but they are poorly equipped, not receiving any significant arms deliveries. There are about 40 AMLs and 25 artillery pieces (presumably 105 mm) located immediately west of GOMA and guarded by some Zairian soldiers. This equipment is serviceable, however it is felt that there is a limited

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amount of ammunition available. Consequently, the chances for the FRGF to launch a massive organized attack across the border are very little.

68. The presence of FRGF in the area of the Gishwati Forest is suspected. This assessment has been reinforced by a few recent incidents which have forced Milobs to avoid certain locations. The presence of mines is also strongly suspected.

69. Lt-Col Belski concluded by stating that he needed Force Engrs for the following tasks:

- a. Demining of road Kayove - Kibuye;
- b. Illumination of the area near the border post and the transit camp; and
- c. Improvement of the road circuit at the Nkamira transit camp.

ITEM 14. REMARKS BY COMMANDER SECTOR 5C

70. The Sect Cdr said that the period under review was calm but that there had some serious moments of tension. In his written brief, he stated that the general security situation which earlier seemed to be improving, later started to deteriorate. The recent mass killing of the mine workers by RPA soldiers and a mine explosion in Rutshiro commune has changed the situation abruptly. In a separate development, rumors are on the increase that the FRGF will be launching an attack by infiltration in the near future.

71. A significant development is the deterioration of the security situation in Rutshiro commune where nearly 1080 returnees have arrived in the past three months. The population is facing problems related to a lack of piped water, medical centers, accommodations, arable land and education facilities and materials.

72. The reconciliation process has not changed in its perception by the local population. Nothing is really materializing although the situation appears to be calm. The Hutu population feels that the reconciliation is not required because they anticipate that the FRGF will return and save them from persecution and harassment from the Tutsi RPA.

73. The Sect Cdr stated that a high percentage of his vehicles are off road at any given time. The creation of a mobile repair teams or the establishment of a repair element is recommended. The sector needs two more computer sets.

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74. Lt-Col Coulibali concluded by saying that the situation was not conducive for the dreamt development to take place. The frequent harassment, arrests and killings of local people are still jeopardizing the establishment of a durable peace.

ITEM 15. DEPARTING REMARKS OF THE SRSG

75. Before his departure, the SRSG emphasized on the following points:

a. Although transit camps are functioning but he needs the inputs from Milobs as regard to where new ones should be established or existing ones be enlarged;

DCMO, All
Sect Cdrs

b. Bourgmestres and prefets may not be quite ready to accept the large number of returnees we can expect and that a "gentle pressure" could be the right action for Milobs to execute when dealing with these civilian authorities;

c. There is a need to review the situation of Milob sectors which are without formed troops, both in terms of security and resources available to cater for humanitarian needs.

d. Relations with local authorities seem to be relatively good throughout the country and this should actually spread to all NGOs operating in a given sector;

e. The penitentiary system needs a lot of attention, both in the short and the long terms. The expansion of prison should be preferred to the creation of new ones since the latter require a lot more personnel and efforts.

ITEM 16. REMARKS BY THE FORCE MEDICAL OFFICER

76. The FMO informed the conference that Casevac by helicopter was available and explained the procedures by handing out some written documentation. She emphasized the prioritization system which can best ensure that the operational efficiency of resources available is optimized.

DCMO, All
Sect Cdrs

77. The DCMO noted that priority would be given according to the seriousness of the injuries, independently of the person who needs the evacuation. He also asked that the FMO review the situation of Milob group which operate away from formed troops. The discussion evolved towards the need of emergency first aid kits and Maj Fensom said she would look into the matter.

FMO

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ITEM 17. REMARKS BY THE CHAO

78. The CHAO emphasized the need to work at the lower level when contacting authorities to prepare the arrival of returnees. He considers that a lot more can be achieved at the counsellor level than at the prefet level for example.

All Sect
Cdrs

79. MILOBS have to continue to collect as much information as possible and Sect Cdrs have to do a proper screening of priorities. In the same vein, Milobs were reminded not to make any promises since it was causing a lot of frustration and was actually quite counter-productive.

All Sect
Cdrs

80. Lt-Col Fox concluded in announcing in a nutshell that he needed the help of Milobs if he wanted to be able to help Milobs.

ITEM 18. REMARKS BY THE CIVPOL SUPERINTENDANT

All Sect
Cdrs

81. The acting CIVPOL Superintendant stressed his concern on the shortage of CIVPOL personnel in the sectors. He explained that the bulk of his CIVPOL personnel were actually needed at the Ruhengeri Gendarmerie Training Institute.

82. He also explained, in answering a remark by Cdr Sect 1B, that CIVPOL had absolutely nothing to do with either the gendarmerie recruiting or posting process. He realized that the void created by a lack of gendarmes in most prefectures was very much linked to insecurity and this was probably the reason why the new UNAMIR mandate had specified this need of training a national gendarmerie.

83. In terms of the use of CIVPOL members among a Milob group, a discussion developed and it was felt that there were actually little difference between what a CIVPOL and a Milob have to do in their observation duties. The suggestion came out that CIVPOL could advantageously be employed in investigation linked to criminal action but that the Sect Cdr would always have the prerogative of using this specialized resource as he best sees fit.

84. The DCMO asked that the CIVPOL Superintendant prepare a study on how to best employ CIVPOL resources in the UNAMIR context. S/Supt Njase said that he would inform Col Diarrha of this request.

CIVPOL

ITEM 19. REMARKS OF THE SOO

85. The SOO informed the forum that Milob Group HQ is now located at UNAMIR HQ Ops Branch. He advised that all Milobs have to have an updated knowledge of current

UN RESTRICTED

events and that for this reason information had to be passed precisely and in a timely manner. He announced that Channel 12 has to be reprogrammed on all sets as soon as possible. Humanitarian requests have to be followed up by the sectors. He emphasized the need to coordinate and cooperate closely with UN Agencies and NGOs. He suggested, like it is done in some sectors, that joint patrols and meetings be coordinated and executed. He stressed the need to give correct grid references in the daily SITREPs and to remember that UNAMIR HQ is using a small scale map and that all features and names cannot be found on this map. Additionally, a prompt and early warning when a significant incident occurs.

All Sect
Cdrs

86. Lt-Col Ahsannulla concluded in reminding everyone that a high priority must be given to the gathering of information concerning IDPs and returnees.

ITEM 20. REMARKS BY THE SMPO

87. The SMPO said that the most significant issue since the last conference was the repatriation of 81 Milobs in August 95 and that 28 more were expected to be repatriated in September 95. This situation has affected Milobs strength in all sectors and branches except MILOB GP HQ. He also said that Milobs overdue for posting will be considered for deployment after the situation stabilizes in all sectors. He stated that Milobs would have a minimum stay of six months in each sector.

All Sect
Cdrs

88. Unless a fax message is received at Milob GP HQ about a Milob's extension of tour of duty, they will assume that Milobs are repatriating on their DDMS. To avoid confusion, Milobs should coordinate these matters long before their DDMS.

89. The MSA is likely to be late in view of the movement of finance to Traffipro. A discussion was initiated by Cdr Sect 2B to the effect that this was his first Peacekeeping Mission where MSA was not being paid on the first of the month since this money was required to pay rents which are due on the first of the month. The DCMO acknowledged the problem and tasked Cdr Sect 2B to prepare a correspondence which should reach the new CAO.

Cdr Sect
2B

90. Lt-Col Adjei concluded in saying that he hoped the Milobs shortfalls will stabilize by mid-Sep 95.

ITEM 21. REMARKS BY SLOGO

91. The SLOGO stated that after the vehicle allocation meeting, the vehicle strength for Milobs was increased

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from 89 to 107. The registered holding is 94 but only 55 are serviceable. He stressed the need to take more care of the vehicles in the sectors and encouraged Sect Cdrs to supervise closely the use and maintenance of vehicles. Accident reports are to be forwarded within 24 hours in Kigali and its neighborhood or, at the latest, within 48 hours in sectors further away.

All Sect
Cdrs

92. Major Zimba concluded in requesting that a list of all Milobs without a driving permit be forwarded by sectors ASAP to Milob Group HQ.

ITEM 22. REMARKS BY THE DCMO

All Sect
Cdrs

93. In articulating his closing remarks, the DCMO emphasized the following points:

a. After three Sect Cdrs' conferences, he is now convinced that information does not actually filter down to individuals. Sect Cdrs have the responsibility of not only passing this information but also to ensure that it is well understood. In that respect, all Milobs need to be thoroughly familiar with the UNAMIR mandate and its five main parts;

All Sect
Cdrs

b. There is a need for better leadership and discipline. The problem is not that the personnel is not aware of the rules. Rather, there is too often only a weak enforcement of these regulations. Accordingly, negligence will not be tolerated anymore, especially in the mishandling of vehicles which, with communication means, are actually the only weapons or tools to accomplish our mission with. As of 1 Sep 95, there will be no more tolerance in that area of activity and driving licenses will eventually be withdrawn.

c. CTO has to be deserved and Sect Cdrs should allocate it accordingly.

d. In terms of Command and Control, in response to the questions raised by two of the Sect Cdrs, the DCMO suggested that if any problem were encountered in implementing the recent FC directives, there was always the possibility of faxing immediately the details of the communication obstacle to the Milobs HQ. Meanwhile, the DCMO will review the impact of the new command and control instructions in coordination with UNAMIR authorities.

DCMO

e. Col Nelson concluded the conference by requesting Sect Cdrs to brief their Milobs as soon as administratively possible and to have the minutes of the meeting available to all for their

UN RESTRICTED

perusal. He then thanked all the participants and the hosts of the conference. The next two monthly conferences will respectively be held in Kibuye (Sector 5C) and Ruhengeri (Sector 5A).



(G Dube)
Major
Secretary

Distribution

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MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

TO : ALL MILOB SECTORS

File : OPS/SEC/CONF


FROM : MILOB GP HQ

DATE : 08 Aug 95

INFO : DFC
DCMO ✓
SMPO
SLOGO, MILOB GP HQ
HAC
CIVPOL

SUBJECT: MINUTES OF THE SECTOR COMMANDERS CONFERENCE
AT GIKONGORO ON 28 JULY 1995

1. The subject minutes are attached for your action/information. Please ensure that the contents of the minutes are disseminated to all appropriate personnel.
2. Best regards.


C. Karer
Maj
Ops Offr

MINUTES OF THE SECTOR COMMANDER'S CONF HELD AT SECTOR 3 A,
GIKONGORO ON 28 JULY 95

Present :	Col Maj	A Tomia	DFC/	CMO	Chairman
	Col	C A Nelson	DCMO		Member
	Lt Col	M Ahasanullah	SOO		"
	Lt Col	K Opong- Kyekyeku	SMPO		"
	Sqn Ldr	F A Ayamgha	SLOGO		"
	Lt Col	E A Mahachi	Comd, Sect	1A	"
	Lt Col	R V Blanchette	"	1B	"
	Major	Opoku Adusei	"	2A	"
	Lt Col	Hadji Kante	"	2B	"
	Lt Col	E Castro	"	3A	"
	Lt Col	I Abubakar	"	3B	"
	Lt Col	V S Dadhwal	"	4	"
	Lt Col	N Sianz	"	5A	"
	Lt Col	V Belski	"	5B	"
	Lt Col	Lt Col B Coulibaly	"	5C	"

In attendance:

Col H Osae Addae	CHAO
Col Diarra	CIVPOL
	Commissioner
Lt Col C Ahmed	MA to DFC
Lt COL A B Sibande	Sect 5A
Maj K Ruhul Munir	MILOB GP HQs

ITEM 1. WELCOME ADDRESS BY COMD SECTOR 3A

ACTION

1. Lt Col Castro welcomed all participants to the conference. He expressed his sincere regards to everyone and his happiness to the commanders in this forum.

ITEM 2. OPENING REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN

2. The chairman expressed his happiness and welcomed all in the conference. He passed on congratulations and words of encouragement from the Force Commander for the work being done in the sectors. Recalling the last meeting he presided over on 30 June 95, he said that he was still in the exploration phase but took note of all commanders concern and problems. He assured all that many of those problems have ended with good solutions and for the rest, it was only a matter of time.

3. The chairman explained that the general situation in Rwanda has been gradually improving while political situation experienced some normalization. He added that since the KIBEHO incident which was followed by reprisals from the international community, the Rwandan Government has not stopped showing its good

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intention and willingness to cooperate with the international community. In that vain, he assured that restrictions on heli flights have been lifted and there is scope for a lot of improvement. Acts of banditry and theft continue to be reported from different corners which demands caution for everyone. He referred to the lack of spontaneity in official encounters, for example, the refusal by the Rwandan Parliament to pass a law recruiting foreign magistrates and the slowness in appointing Supreme Court members are indicator of such caution.

4. He stated that the refugee situation remained confused and that there was not much information regarding FRGF strengths or intentions. As such, no large scale actions are expected. Referring to the UN mandate, he explained that it is oriented towards humanitarian assistance and close cooperation with the Rwandan Government with a view to installing and consolidating an atmosphere of confidence and security so that the people of Rwanda could reconcile with each other. He called upon the MILOBs to continue to report on the situation objectively and in a complete manner as they occur. For this MILOBs are required to use their willingness, initiative and professionalism. He also advised all the MILOBs to use their knowledge of the people, customs and traditions which would demonstrate one's integration into the local society and gain the confidence and acceptance of the local population. For this it is imperative to have good relations with the locals, the RPA, other UN agencies and NGOs. He also emphasized on increasing the numbers of patrols both by day and by night.

5. The chairman advised not to make any promises or commitments to the locals in terms of Aid. He explained that MILOBs have nothing to give them, but it is their duty to determine their needs and report them to the higher HQs. It is the HQs who will make assessment, decisions and arrangements. He also stressed on the point that the locals must be made aware of the fact that all the needs and request received by the HQs daily can't be met as UNAMIR does not have the wherewithal to do work like the construction of roads, bridges, etc. The essence of UNAMIR role is to orient the international community's efforts and to ensure that the humanitarian organizations are aware of the needs of the country. The question of needs must be dealt with on an urgency basis, he added.

6. At the end of his remarks the Chairman reminded every one to remain vigilant and take all active or passive measures to ensure safety and the security of personnel and UN equipment. All are expected to share

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6. At the end of his remarks the Chairman reminded every one to remain vigilant and take all active or passive measures to ensure safety and the security of personnel and UN equipment. All are expected to share the same military ethos and to keep up the image of UNAMIR.

ITEM 3. BRIEF FROM THE SECTORS

7. The Sector Commanders presented briefs on their activities:

a. Sector 1 A (Kigali)

(1) The Sector was fairly calm since the last conference. Reports of arrests continued to come in. A worrying phenomenon was that of people missing in the KAMUVU secteur of the NGENDA commune. The report was made to RPA to stress the trend of disappearance but nothing has been done. However efforts to investigate the reports were set in motion.

(2) With the revision of the MILOBs sector boundaries to the Rwandan prefecture administrative boundaries, the Sector inherited 10 more communes. Six of the new communes have been reconnoitered and operations commenced in them.

(3) General conditions in the town communes remained quiet. There was an continuous rise in population as some refugees flocked into the town regularly. There was also an increase in the price of fuel which resulted in instant rise in the bus fare. The Trade Union's call for the consumers to boycott the minibuses was met with a one day strike by the bus owners. Further to that economic related problem, sudden fall of the value of Rwf to Dollars caused a sharp price hike in commodities putting the price of consumer products out of the reach for most of the town dwellers. Salaries remained static. All these could call for more assistance in terms of food and clothing.

(4) The Kigali Prison was holding close to 10000 inmates instead of it's capacity of 2000. The overcrowding figures were not sufficient to describe those things lacking. The inmates were all suspected of genocide but they do not have a space to sleep. Some have chosen the toilet to sleep on. The

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hygiene situation is exceptionally bad. There are no vehicles to carry the sick persons to the hospital. There were not enough uniforms for the prisoners so that they could meet their relatives. Those who did not have clothing were not permitted to do so. On the other hand the problem of orphans continued be serious. A large number of unidentified orphans were turning to crime in a desperate struggle to live.

(5) Explosive materials continued to claim victims, particularly the young who picked up objects and play with them. There were quite a few incidents reported where the young children were seriously injured. An awareness campaign for children to recognize those devices was recommended and which could be aimed at the school level.

(6) It was reported that most old caseload returnees were settled in NZENDA. That area became so saturated that the Bourgemester refused to take any more. The problem was that most of the returnees had found their houses occupied which forced them back to

the transit camps. If something is not done immediately NZENDA could become another IDP camp. Food distribution in that area has become almost unworkable. The food intended for the needy families found its way to the friends of the Bourgemester. UNHCR is planning to implement a new strategy in this regard.

(7) On the surface, reconciliation appears to be working however in following particular cases it was found that there was still the existence of some serious animosity between the two ethnic groups. Continuous cases of arrests followed by some reprisal attacks were evidence of this. It seemed all refugees in Burundi would eventually be repatriated sooner or later. This was as result of the Government's effort to lure those refugees home. It was reported that some refugees were taken back home to their communes then went back to tell others the situation. It also seemed that there is some pressure from the Burundi

Government to solve the refugee issue.

(8) The Sector should be able to perform a maximum of 7 patrols per day. This would mean a patrol would be able to visit each

UN RESTRICTED

commune every third day.

(9) The sector suffers a serious transport problem with only three vehicles. Additionally, some areas within the sector have no radio communication with the HQs. It was recommended the area be surveyed and proper communication facilities be installed.

b. Sector 1B (Gitarama)

(1) In general the situation in the sector appeared calm but numerous killings, arrests and act of banditry have left a sense of insecurity throughout the Gitarama Prefecture. The RPA was most often linked to those actions.

(2) The most significant problem in the prefecture is the overcrowding of Gitarama prison. The movement of 225 prisoners to NYANZA prison on 14 Jul 95 was only a small fraction of what needs to be done. The sector Commander established an arbitrary goal of 3000 prisoners to be moved before

the condition could be deemed acceptable. A number of attempts to pressure the Director of Rwandan penitentiary services yielded no results. The RPA interestingly enough, seemed quite willing to allow the movement of the prisoners to NYANZA prison, which they said could host at least another 200 prisoners. This was probably their witnessing of the appalling conditions of the 225 prisoners who were almost crawling out of the prison. Discussion with Human Rights authorities revealed that the construction of temporary detention centers could shortly relieve the Gitarama prison situation. UNAMIR should consider this project a top priority.

(3) An interesting tendency seemed to be developing in the communes where the level of banditry is found to be high or in the communes where the Bourgemester shows a good sense of initiative. This tendency saw locals being organized at the cellule level to catch the bandits. This technique has

proved successful in some areas. The RPA in those areas have sanctioned these patrols as they themselves were no longer patrolling at night. This kind of initiative could potentially lead to abuse but for the time

UN RESTRICTED

being, the results are quite positive.

(4) On the Humanitarian scene, it is quite obvious that all agencies were reaching a point where the supply could no longer meet the demands. This was of course always the case but there is a sense of frustration developing at the Bourgemester level. At the latest Humanitarian Prefecture coordination meeting many NGOs did not attend and it is indicative of weak organizational leadership. The sector commander recommended that a Coordination Center be established at the Prefecture level to ensure that no Communes are forgotten by NGOs.

(5) Most communes were complaining about shortage of seeds and agricultural material. This is a good sign in that they were not asking for food. Returnees and IDPs all faced problems of accommodation, water and farming tools. The sector commander appreciated the appointment of a full time representative from UNHCR. It would allow him to provide the organization with a clear

picture of what conditions the returnees could expect in the area.

(6) The question of reconciliation was difficult to assess and is based on "Gut Feeling". The level of tension in the population could easily be perceived through casual discussions. They have the impression that the worse days lay ahead of them. The Bourgemester's first priority of work should be the rebuilding the houses so that the returnees can move to the community where reconciliation can be given a chance to succeed.

(7) The UN Secretary General's visit has been perceived that the world community considers the main problem in the sub-region to be the Rwandese Government's lack of flexibility in improving the human rights situation in the country. The increasing pressure from the neighboring countries, real or perceived, and especially Zaire, added to the rumor of renewed fighting. Both

the FRGF and the Rwandese Government seem to be exaggerating the risk of invasion. This could result in a climate where both Hutu and Tutsi would hardly consider reconciliation when rumor of war were

looming.

(8) The departure of MALICOY, however would greatly affect the security situation throughout the prefecture. The Bourgemester of the Ruhengo Sous-Prefect requested to keep the Mali troops in his commune for security reasons. There are fears of atrocities being committed by RPA upon the departure of the formed troops. This has also created a security problem in the Petit Seminaire where the MILOBs Sector HQ is located. The concept of operation for the changes is that a new perimeter has to be formed. The plan was forwarded to the MILOB GP HQ.

(9) The separation of the Kibuye Prefecture from the Gitarama sector was long overdue. The merging of the Sector and Prefecture boundaries greatly helped MILOBs achieving their mandate. But the possibility of the rotation of 72% of MILOBs from the sectors was very disturbing. The need to consider the extension was of paramount importance.

c. SECTOR 2 A (Byumba)

(1) The sector remained relatively calm within the period. Relationship with government authorities and RPA in the prefecture appear to be cordial, however the intentions of RPA are still not clear. The security situation in the prefecture experienced tremendous improvement. Even though external threat is possible, it was quite remote through the sector. As a result of the conducive atmosphere in the sector, more people were coming back to their home communes. A few returnees from Zaire, who used the Gatuna boarder, confirmed RPA soldiers at the boarder accorded them a very warm reception. Commercial activities in the prefecture have increased; brisk market activities and intensive farming were noticed in all the communes. The transport situation continues to improve.

(2) The conditions in the communes remained deplorable since most of the infrastructure was destroyed during the war. A few NGOs have been assisting in development activities such as rehabilitation of the commune offices, schools and health centers

UN RESTRICTED

as well as digging of wells, constructions and renovations of feeder roads. More of such assistance is required. There was strong general discontent at the ineffective UNAMIR and NGO assistance provided for improvement of roads, agriculture and schools in the prefecture. The officials are of the view that the problems have been repeatedly projected to UNAMIR but no concrete solutions or assistance have been given.

(3) IDPs returned from Kibehho and Gikongoro had been received and settled. Many of them have been settled in their original homes. MILOB patrols still visit them to assure security and help build their confidence. Returnees continued to cross into Rwanda from Uganda, Zaire and Tanzania through Gatuna, Kagitumba and Buziba boarder posts. The reconciliation programme of the prefecture is still on course. The youth have were organized reconciliation lectures in their respective communes.

(4) The Sector recommended to have an out post collocated at Nygatare with the NGOs. There should have been some improved vehicles holding for the speedy reaction.

(5) With the withdrawal of formed troops the sector considers that day and night watchman should be employed for security of UNAMIR property. The concentration of a large fleet of vehicles, a generator, fuel dumps, computers, etc presented MILOB locations as an attractive target to attacks by the misguided elements. The sector requested 2 x 25 KVA generator for security and office use. The MILOBs at Kageyo need potable water to be provided.

(6) The MILOB teams need sufficient vehicles to perform their duties.

d. SECT 2 B (Kibungo)

(1) The security situation in the sector has been generally calm. There have not been any reports of major incidents since

last conference. The rate of indiscriminate arrests and intimidation of the locals has reduced drastically. However the situation could be foreseen as continuing in the near future as the strengths of formed troops is

UN RESTRICTED

reduced. RPA increased its deployment along the Southern Border with Burundi and Tanzania, apparently in response to the anticipated threat from the FRGF. Their new deployment had brought them into contact with the locals more than before. Again the attitude of RPA towards UNAMIR has improved considerably.

(2) Returnees for the last one month from Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania and Zaire were 2173. These figures included the old and new refugees. BARE transit camp has been dismantled and a new camp at BIRENGA is under construction. When completed it could accommodate over 2000 people. The overall conditions of the returnees are satisfactory. Two transit camps at NYAKARAMBI and at BIRANGA sponsored by UNHCR and run by AEE could be maintained and provided with the needs. When leaving the camps, the inmates are issued with one month rations, blankets, cooking utensils, etc. On return home communes however they faced problems of housing, employment, the lack of farming tools, drinking water, payment of

tuition fees for the students and transportation of critical patients.

(3) Reconciliation was going smoothly through out the sector. But of some hostile refugees in the camps were reportedly affecting the repatriation, especially in the Tanzania refugee camp. This will likely create suspicion among the locals and could affect the reconciliation progress.

(4) The check point at MUGESERA remained an obstacle to patrolling in the area. MILOBs were not allowed to cross without the written authority of the Bourgemester.

(5) To maintain the continuity in the sector it is considered that some of the old MILOBs can be retained from the scheduled rotations. The sector also suffers problems with MILOBs accommodation. The delay in the delivery of serviceable vehicles from the workshop greatly hindered the operational capability.

e. SECTOR 3 A (Gicongoro)

(1) The sector observed relatively calm situation except for isolated cases of

UN RESTRICTED

banditry, arrests and demonstrations in some of the communes. This has created a lot of apprehension in those communes especially after they heard about the down scaling of UNAMIR operations and subsequent withdrawal in December.

(2) Some of the communes in the prefecture witnessed incidents of banditry and stealing. Some of the perpetrators were arrested by RPA and their cases were being dealt by the commune authorities. There was also a peaceful demonstration by the locals at MUSANGE commune (5347) demanding the dismissal of the Bourgemester for his inefficiency and mismanagement. The Prefect of Gikongoro intervened and the problem was resolved peacefully by replacing the Bourgemester with one of the Sector leaders.

(3) IDPs who have returned to their home communes after closure of the camps had gradually integrated themselves into their Sectors. Most of them have started farming. But IDPs from other communes who refused to

go back to their home communes were squatting in most of the sectors and creating security problem. They have undertaken banditry, stealing of farm produce and domestic animals in the areas. General living conditions have improved to a great extent and most of the returnees have found their shelter or joined their relatives. Reports on shortage of seeds, farming implements and fertilizer continue to come in from all the settlers.

(4) To assist in the achievement of the goal of new mandate, the Sector suggested that the MILOBs participate in seminars organized by local authorities.

(5) The Sector requires adequate vehicles and the authorized strength of 31 MILOBs to produce the results expected.

f. SECTOR 3 B (Butare)

(1) The situation in the sector's AOR was relatively stable and the area was returning to normalcy. MILOBs relation with the Prefecture authorities and the local RPA commanders have seen a tremendous improvement over the last one month. MILOBs

UN RESTRICTED

teams have faced difficulties in two communes (ie. MUYAGA and MUYIRA) where the Bourgemester and the local RPA both demanded letters of authority from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to have access to the areas.

(2) At Kabilizi returnees transit camp approx 450 returnees were still waiting to be transported to their home communes in the Gikongoro prefecture. However the returnees were living in a deplorable state without any aid either from the Government or NGOs. UNICEF who was supporting the camp had ceased to do so for last one month hence living without water and food but with malnutrition being on the increase which sooner or later might result into death. The prefect of Butere alleged that the returnees problems was for the Ministry of rehabilitation since the returnees were those who let Rwanda a long time back and had no accommodation and land to settle.

(3) Security situation in most of the communes were stable apart from few cases of

banditry. Also acts of violence against IDPs as experienced soon after the closure of the camps were reducing gradually. It was observed all over the communes that agricultural activities had increased to an great extent. The IDPs though faced difficulties in some cases had managed to settle down well with other locals. Communes on border areas of KIGMI, KIBAYI, MUGANZA and MUYIRA who in the past experienced banditry activities, allegedly committed by the refugees from neighbouring Burundi, were organizing sector security schemes assisted by local RPA commanders with aim of countering future banditry activities. However the sector also received information to the effect that the Bourgemester of Ruhashya Commune was trying to lure young men to join the RPA but it could not be confirmed.

(4) A rehabilitation center for the children soldiers had been situated at Butare. The aim is to support the

reintegration of the children soldiers into communities through registration and tracing their families. The educational programme in the center will include basic literacy, numeracy, psychosocial support and

UN RESTRICTED

recreational activities. The center is directed by Ministry of Defence and UNAMIR will provide logistical support, WFP provide food and UNICEF assist educational facilities for both students and the teacher.

(5) Like many others the Sector faced transportation problem in carrying out daily patrols. The Sector suggested at least a section strength of formed troops to be stationed in the sector to provide security to UN property and personnel.

g. SECTOR 4 (Cyangugu)

(1) Since the last conference the Sector experienced relatively calm situation until 10 Jul 95. Since then, the security situation has deteriorated. Acts of banditry are being committed ranging from household robberies, stealing livestock and farm products to selective killings. The focus of banditry activities appeared to be shifted to Bugarama Sub Sector and to a lesser extent, the Cyangugu Sub Sector.

Surprisingly, the Nyamasheke Sub Sector has been relatively quite for the month. In the Bugarama Sub Sector, the focus was on the traders and the returnees who returned with money and livestock. The reports on RPA involvement in banditry has stopped since the formation of unarmed "watch group" at the cell level. These groups proved to be one of the most effective measures for detecting banditry. However their efforts were reduced when some of the members were killed or seriously injured and the RPA refused some groups to carry even some clubs or stones as weapons. From the period 01 to 27 Jul 95, there have been 30 different incidents of robbery, killings, mine explosions and banditry. This is compared to June 95 when 50 such incidents were reported. The FRGF have not changed their political or military goals. Political killings were reported which were aimed at terrorizing the population and its leadership.

(2) During the period the Sector reported 15 sightings of unidentified aircraft violating Rwanda airspace. It was confirmed that none of the aircraft were UN. All of them were of an off-white to light gray

UN RESTRICTED

color with no visible markings on any part of the aircraft. The RPA took no action to engage any of those aircraft.

(3) For the last period of 1-27 Jul 95, spontaneous refugees were entering Rwanda in greater number through entry points located on islands on Lake Kivu and 10 entry points manned by RPA in different communes. There were many other entry points used by the refugees which are unknown to UNHCR and MILOBs. Up to 1099 refugees have been accounted for to the date. Those refugees required blankets and food support on arrival and will continue needing support until the first crop is harvested in their communes.

(4) The Sector believes that the FRGF doesn't possess the Force or preparedness required to launch major offensive operations in the Cyangugu Prefecture. The level of training required to achieve adequate communications, command and control structure, in addition to individual and collective training with new recruits, new

equipments and new weapons was not possible less than one year. However a limited military aim could be possible before the next rainy season in November.

(5) The Sector suggested that UN strategy must be based on a dual approach to create a wedge between the extremist elements of the FRGF located in the camps and the refugees: firstly, to actively support and encourage the return of refugees by providing them with food, clothing and seeds in addition to close liaison with each commune which may require assigning permanent liaison officers to each communal office, as the influx of refugees gained momentum; secondly to exert intense international pressure on the Zairian Government to ensure and guarantee the security of all refugees within the camps and their orderly return to Rwanda, as Zaire openly supported the repatriation process. In doing so the Zairian government must be held accountable before the world community.

(6) All Communes appear to suffer the same problem of lack of potable water, electricity, poor hygiene, and lack of educational infrastructure. A population

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survey supposed to be conducted but no announcement to that effect was made by the Prefecture authorities. An overall decrease of population is expected. The prefecture severely lacks a sound justice system.

(7) An UNHCR repatriation meeting was held on 5 Jul 95. The Pqanzi camp incident of 12 Jul 95 and letter of protest from the Zairian government which followed was not seen as a serious obstacle or deterrent to the reconciliation process. The RPA appeared to be less intimidating at the various entry points and the message of reconciliation was getting through to the refugees who were still apprehensive about returning to their respective communes.

(8) MILOB Sector has already made suggestions and recommendations on the their future employment of MILOBs prior to the last conference added with the logistic support required for the sector. One thing the sector realized that an additional vehicles are most essential to accomplish the new assignment.

h. SECTOR 5 A (Ruhengeri)

(1) The operational situation in the Sector is reportedly calm except for a few cases of arrests. Rumor of FRGF invasion had considerably died down however there were still doubts among the NGO community regarding UN evacuation plan considering the reduction in the number of formed troops. In generally the relation with RPA in the sector remained normal.

(2) The sector observed that unconfirmed rumors among the locals and some RPA stated that a group of former Interhamwe (Approx 20) infiltrated into Ruhengeri. For the past two weeks RPA have intensified their patrols of their intelligence personnel in Ruhengeri. RPA continued patrols along the Volcanos Forest.

(3) The Sector MILOBs, UN agencies and NGOs were able to provide services in all the

communes. The Prefect of Ruhengeri held meeting with the NGOs every month in order to coordinate their activities with the local administrations. In the communes the locals were observed being busy harvesting

crops.

(4) Relatively low numbers of returnees have been reported in the last one month. Those returnees were transported by IOM and UNHCR to their respective communes. Problems being experienced were identification of land for resettlement and shortage of food. The Ministry of Rehabilitation and UNHCR were identifying resettlement areas in all of the communes.

(5) The Sector requested for new accommodation for the office as the number of MILOBS increased after the reorganization had been made. The shortage of vehicles also detracted from fulfilling operational requirements of the MILOBS.

i. SECTOR 5 B (Gisenyi)

(1) The operational situation in the sector remained relatively unchanged. The level of incidents have not changed, however the location had shifted from the area of the Zaire/Rwanda border to the general areas

bordering the eastern and western sides of the Gishwati forest and the coast line in the area of Kayove. The over all situation may be deemed as calm. The incidents of thievery, murder have remained at a constant level for the last one month.

(2) The general situation in the communes could be considered as average. The local commercial situation seems to have returned to almost pre-war conditions and there were noticeable increases in the number of private vehicle traffic. There is no problem with the availability of fuel. On the other hand the relations with the Prefect had significantly improved and could be considered quite good. In a recent speech the Prefect indicated that significant amount of the reconstruction could be attributed to the UN agencies and NGOS. The shortage of basic office supplies persisted and if it was possible a small amount of pen and paper could be procured and distributed to the prefecture. In addition it was also

felt that the prefect's vehicle wind shield, which was vandalized, could be replaced if one of the same could be obtained from the CTO.

UN RESTRICTED

(3) The numbers of returnees in the sector had been relatively constant for past few months. The process used when they passed the border through the Rwandan customs and then on to the UNHCR compound where they received an initial issue of supplies and registration. The specific problem faced by the returnees passing through the sector areas ranged from robbery by the Zairian boarder officials to the lack of settlement land alluded to earlier. Lack of farming implements and seeds remains a problem.

(4) Reconciliation process in the sector is difficult at best. It appeared that the returnees were given the conditions of the country and other limitations and were well treated and incorporated into the society.

(5) The sector solicited an early replacement of the rotating MILOBs because it would suffer an effective strength of only 10 MILOBs by 01 Sept 95. Additionally, the delay in delivery of the vehicles from the workshop, even for the minor cases were also marked as an added problem. The

quality of the fuel being provided was found dirty and contaminated which rendered the vehicles unreliable.

(6) The sector suffers difficult communications with the HQ. As such it was requested by the sector install an INMARSAT as soon as possible.

(7) It appeared that the FRGF had built up there location in GISHWATI Forest, which directly effects the MILOBs patrol routes to the forest on both sides. Though they had not yet been harassed but presence of mines and hostile forces are strongly suspected.

j. SECTOR 5 C (Kibuye)

(1) The situation in the sector had not changed much. It continued to be calm but tense. There was an apprehension among the population due to harassment and arrests by the RPA. Majority of the sector reports and the thrust of the sector's efforts has been

in the area of killings. However the sector had undertaken some tasks of Humanitarian activities. During the period an undisclosed number of bandits landed by boat from Zaire in Rusebaya, Rwamatamu commune

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and took away food and property from the locals. The bandits were suspected to have come from GISHWATI Forest.

(2) The general condition in the communes had not changed at all. Normal was slowly returning. The local population were observed going about their normal activities, although they appeared apprehensive of the RPA. Agricultural products have improved. However, lack of seeds and farming implements remain a problem.

(3) During the last three months the Prefecture received nearly 1080 returnees and 560 IDPs have also returned. They were constantly short of food, blankets, drinking water, etc but the biggest problem was the need of permanent settlement. Also the Prefecture suffered serious damage to basic infrastructure during the last civil war, and it was unable to support large numbers of returnees until those problems were solved. Due to poor road condition in the Prefecture, the humanitarian aid program

continues to encounter logistical problems both for transportation of the returnees to their home communes and to supply their primary needs.

(4) The reconciliation process has not changed in the Sector. It was learnt that the Hutus honestly feel that reconciliation was not required because they anticipated that the FRGF would return and save them from persecution and harassment from the Tutsis and RPA.

(5) The Sector could improve its performance with an increase in the MILOBs strength and an increase of MOTOROLA hand sets with battery chargers. But the unacceptably high percentage of vehicles off-the-road and the absence of most rudimentary services or repair team/MRT is a genuine problem for the Sector which is surrounded with most poor roads.

(6) The departure MALAWI coy was felt like a blow to the Humanitarian support to the local community in the Sector because its heavy vehicles had played a major contribution in coordinating and assisting NGOs in various aspects.

UN RESTRICTED

ITEM 4 BRIEFS FROM THE STAFF OFFICERS

8. The staff officers of MILOB GP HQ presented their brief seriatim.

a. S00 Referring to the last conference the S00 briefly touched upon the following points and requested concern of all the sector commanders.

(1) Some of the sector had shown remarkable improvement in initiating their sitreps accordingly however a definite improvement for others is expected.

ALL SECTOR

(2) All the sectors were requested to follow the laid down procedure for duties.

ALL SECTOR

(3) MILOB HQ must be kept in picture about the movement of the Sector Commander.

(4) All actions/information must be follow the channel of communication.

ALL SECTORS

(5) Delivery/receipt of official mail had become more regular for last one month.

ALL SECTOR

b. SMPO

(1) MSA for the month of July will be paid 10 Aug 95.

ALL CONCERNED

(2) With regard to the balance money contributed by the MILOBs, a team was set on working to find out a suitable commemorative plaques as soon as possible.

(3) Policy on MILOBs rotation for Sector 3A, Sector 4 and Sector 5C can opt to remain unchanged, but for others should be ready for re-deployment.

ALL SECTOR

(4) Planned rotations will be done considering posting of new arrivals and persons who had spent less than 4 months in the Sector.

ALL SECTOR

(5) To ensure security, deployment of formed troops should be done in location of MILOBs.

(6) LCol G.K. Aidjei was welcomed as the new SMPO at the conference.

c. SLOGO

UN RESTRICTED

(1) All the Sector's returns on their holdings as well as the requirements of logistic support were received. These were carefully scrutinized by the SLOGO and necessary adjustments were made.

(2) Upon the outcome of the analysis made by the SLOGO, a letter was initiated to all the outlets that supported MILOBs logistically outlining the total requirements. This was treated with a lot of urgency because most of the outlets summoned to either discussions, clarifications or amendments of some of the requirements. All the agencies concerning MILOBs logistics have been put in picture about the requirements and working feverishly towards resolving them.

(3) A number of meetings have taken place between the SLOGO and SO (LOG), SO (SUP) and OC LOG OPS at 95 FLSG, which were all aimed at trashing out the requirements of MILOBs and working out methods of delivery. In addition those were also discussed in the COS's fortnightly conference. The DFC/CMO

had taken personal interest on the matter and in possession of a requirement chart with him in the office.

(4) In pursuit of some of the basic requirements the OC OPS 95 FLSG and the SLOGO undertook some recce of the 6 Sectors on 20 and 21 Jul 95 to determine water and fuel requirements. But the team did not visit three of the Sectors which were thought to be sufficiently covered by the troops in location. Sector 5B, which was originally in the list of recce, informed the HQ that they did not require the same because they were provided for by the NIBATT. 95 FLSG was willing to visit any other Sector which they think might have some problems. A message to that effect in the SLOGO's Br would be enough to arrange such visit.

(5) Communication has been a problem in the restructuring process which was looked at by the SLOGO, SOO and MILOBs Sig officer. The

sig officer had visited some of the sectors and was working on solving the communication problem.

(6) At the last conference it was decided

UN RESTRICTED

that with the departure of formed troops, MILOBs might be able to inherit some of the returned vehicles. After consultation with the DCMO and CTM it was accepted that MILOBs vehicles strength would be increased to at least 95. An initial issue of 15 vehicles was in progress, where 3 vehicles were already issued to sector 5A.

SLOGO

(7) Security of UN property was discussed with great concern but there has been no concrete solution found since MILOBs were completely defenseless in an event of any hostile act.

(8) An arrangement for the issue of helmets, flack jackets and binoculars has been made, and all the logistics officer in the sectors were asked to collect those from the TRAFIPRO directly.

(9) Maj Zimba was welcomed by the chair as new SLOGO.

ITEM 5. BRIEF FROM HAC

9. The Chief Humanitarian Affairs Officer appreciated all the works done by the respective humanitarian officer of the Sectors and covered the following points:

a. No commitments or promise should be made by the MILOBs as UNAMIR ran recourse constrains. Only in case of magical cover some assistance would be possible.

b. All the commune details were being collected to assess and determine the priority of works and what could be done.

c. Most of the NGOs had been cooperating well, while some considered the UN as their rival. However, we must maintain good relations with all of them.

d. LCol T. Fox was welcomed as the new CHAO.

ITEM 6. BRIEF FROM CIVPOL

10. CIVPOL would remain responsible, like the MILOBs, for monitoring the situation.

11. Though they are not MILOBs but would remain under command of the Sector Commander when they were posted in the Sector for administrative and operational

purpose.

12. The Rwandan Government had planned for a new Civil police Force and UN CIVPOL had been entrusted with their training responsibilities.

13. At the end of the mandate 1000 Gendarmerie and 750 communal police are expected to be trained.

14. For information CIVPOL HQ is expected to be shifted to TRAFIPRO shortly.

ITEM 7. DCMO's REMARKS

15. The DCMO appreciated the work being done by all the Sectors. It was obvious that we had to live with a lot of problems everyday. However the HQ are working to bring out good solutions concerning vehicle distribution and communication equipment. He gave assurance that MILOBS would have priority as far as vehicles distribution were concerned.

16. DCMO mentioned " Negative " remarks made by the Secretary General regarding the deployment of MILOBS in Zaire. It is not possible at this time.

17. Although the provision for an administrative channel were discussed in the last conference, the DCMO invited more suggestions reduce the administrative radio traffic on the operational channel.

18. The Prefect and other office staff, if possible, could be provided transport privilege occasionally by the MILOBS.

19. Everyone must remain extra careful during the process of thinning out of formed troops.

20. Any invitation concerning National Day Function or of common interest must be processed through MILOB GP HQ to facilitate coordination.

21. The CIVPOL commissioner was requested to provide more CIVPOL MILOBS to fulfill the Sector's requirements and until it could be implemented, all the Sector Commanders were asked to manage within their own resources.

ITEM 8. SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

22. The conference decided the following :

a. The priority of the redistribution and maintenance of vehicles and communication

UN RESTRICTED

equipments would be given to MILOBS.

b. MILOBS should carry out patrols on a daily basis, even during UN holidays.

c. MILOBS should not make any commitments or promises in terms of getting aid to the locals.

d. MILOBS should provide transport facilities to the Prefect or his staffs if possible or as required.

e. All invitations concerning National Day functions or of common interest must be made through MILOBS GP HQ.

ALL

ALL

ALL

ITEM 9. ARRANGEMENTS FOR NEXT CONFERENCE

23. Many sector Commanders who have not hosted the conference requested to be considered for the same.

24. Decision. The next conference will be hosted in Sector 1B. Details pertaining to the date and time of the conference will be disseminated as soon as possible.

SECT 1B

ITEM 10. CLOSING REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN.

25. The Chairman, before concluding, reminded every one to remain vigilant and to take all active or passive measures to ensure safety and security of personnel and UN equipment. He also advised everyone to keep up a positive image of UNAMIR. Lastly the Chairman thanked all at the conference for the good job being done.

MD. KAMAL REZA
Maj
Secy

22 Jul 95

MINUTES OF FC'S CONFERENCE WITH UNIT/SECTOR COMMANDERS HELD AT
UNAMIR HQ BRIEFING ROOM ON 21 JUL 85

ITEM 1 - FC'S POINTS

1. The FC welcomed all present and explained that the aim of the conference was to give an update on the current situation, lay emphasis on certain important issues and to bid farewell to the contingents that are leaving the mission area on completion of their tour of duty. He explained that the role to be performed by UNAMIR as per the new mandate, was very limited. He also stated that he saw the phasing out of formed troops as a prelude to the final closing of the mission unless something drastic takes place in Rwanda.

2. The FC remarked that in view of the improved security situation within Rwanda, the govt wanted to take the country's affairs into its own hands. He further stated that the security situation had improved considerably and that the problem was now only in the border areas. He also mentioned that lately, the various leaders of Rwanda were working in a tolerant though tense atmosphere with each other.

3. As regards the threat from outside, the FC said that it was still present and there that was no immediate increase in the external threat. He also mentioned that the intentions of the RPA were not clear with regards to the refugee camps in the neighbouring countries.

4. Gen The FC emphasised the need to remain operationally focussed inspite of the improved security situation and the revised mandate tasking. He asked all unit comdrs to double their vigilance as the strength of troops has been reduced and to continue to maintain close contact with the locals as the situation could

change for the worse anytime as it did in Apr 1994. He asked all units to maintain a presence throughout the AORs within limitations of personnel, vehicles and new tasks.

5. Int Collection The FC remarked that there was a marked improvement in the int collection programme.

6. Sources The FC said that there were a number of NGOs and other sources of info which were available and from whom, valuable info could be obtained. He asked all present to maintain close contact with these sources and to gain all possible info from them. At the same time, the FC cautioned against taking the info provided by the NGOs at face value as they had a tendency to overdramatise issues. The FC also mentioned that UNAMIR was in Rwanda at the invitation of the Rwandese Govt and thus it was important to inculcate a atmosphere of confidence with the RPA and to keep in close touch with them so as to gain as much info as possible.

7. Reporting of Incidents The FC emphasised the need for prompt reporting of incidents especially in view of the downsizing of formed troops. He also said that it was important that detailed investigation be carried out subsequently by all concerned into incidents which are reported.

8. Protection of UN assets The FC asked all present to be vigilant in the protection of UN facilities, eqpt and personnel that UNAMIR is tasked to protect. He also emphasised the need to maintain a positive image through cooperation with local officials, good conduct and military turnout till the last batch of troops leaves Rwanda.

9. Comm Resources The FC informed that plans had been finalised to reallocate comms eqpt like VSAT and fax etc. However, due to shortage of these resources, he said that they would be allotted only to sectors and Milobs sub-sectors.

10. Use of Helis The FC asked all present to make use of the helis to the maximum extent possible for recce and liaison tasks. He asked all unit comdrs to ensure that suitable LZs are selected near the new unit loc for both routine traffic and for use in case of emergencies.

11. Downsizing of formed troops Regarding the actions to be taken by contingents being repatriated, the FC emphasised the following points:

a. Survey All units will carry out proper survey and hand over all UN assets in a proper condition in conjunction with the PCIU.

b. Load tables All units will prepare list of stores and load tables for containers so as to facilitate the move out of

eqpt and stores.

c. Transit Camp Additional facilities have been created at the transit camp in Kigali to accomodate contingents being repatriated.

by the staff.

12. Humanitarian Assistance The FC remarked that inspite of the fact that there was a drastic shortage of resources, max humanitarian assistance wiould be provided by contingents within the existing constraints. He also said that the locals must be informed about the lack of resources in UNAMIR so as to present a true picture of the assistance that UNAMIR can provide. He further stressed the following points:

a. All requests for humanitarian assistance will be coordinated through UNAMIR HAC.

b. HAC will coordinate within UNAMIR HQ through the UHAAG.

c. UNAMIR does not have the capability to undertake large demining tasks. The US demining team consisting of 50 personnel which is currently in Rwanda, is only there to increase mine awarness and to train the RPA to carry out demining tasks themselves.

13. Reports and returns The FC stated that he expected all units to forward timely reports and returns which are accurate and elaborate and which cover activities in the complete AOR.

14. Reallocation of Vehs, Eqpt and Stores The FC informed that in view of the reduction of troops, reallocation of vehs, eqpt and stores is being carried out by the DCOS Sp in accordance with DCOS Ops direction and that fresh allotment lists would be issued shortly.

15. Security of Milobs Sector HQ and their assets The FC said that by virtue of their task, Milobs are very vulnerable and thus contingents must give all possible administrative and operational assistance to them. He further stated that Milobs would get a high priority in the allocation of vehs and comm resources. He asked all unit comdrs to ensure that their units work as a team with the Milobs so as to achieve the desired results.

SUPPORT ASPECTS

16. Medical The FC stated that in view of AUSMED being repatriated on 23 Aug 95 without a known replacement, the situation is alarming as UNAMIR would be without medical support except those

resources which are integral to units. He however mentioned that negotiations were on with NGOs to provide medical cover and the fact that Canada is likely to include a larger medical component in the Canadian rotation. The FC stated that at the end of Aug 95, the medical cover available in Rwanda would also be supported by an enhanced aeromedical evacuation system to hospitals in Nairobi.

been distributed to contingents.

18. Vacation of Premises occupied by contingents The FC stated that he had noticed that troops leave the sites being vacated in a deplorable state. He said that the reputation of the contingent, the countries as well as the UN is at stake. He directed that all contingents will ensure that the premises which they are vacating, are cleaned properly and that any damage that has been caused during the period of occupation, is repaired properly. Any repair that is out of the capability of the contingent, will be projected in time to UNAMIR HQ in time for necessary action. The FC warned that he would not hesitate to order troops back from their home countries to clean up and repair accommodation vacated by them if so required.

MISC ASPECTS

19. MT Accidents The FC said that though the number of MT accidents had gone down, there were still a number of accidents occurring involving UNAMIR vehs. He asked unit comdrs to exercise strict control on the use of vehs and to improve the standard of driving in their respective units.

20. Relaxation of Curfew In view of the improved security situation within Rwanda, the FC said that the curfew timings would likely be relaxed upto 2300 hrs from the present 2130 hrs with effect from 24/25 Jul 95. He said that this action would also be an indicator to the Rwandese Govt on the level of confidence that UNAMIR has in their ability to improve the security situation within the country.

ITEM 2 - SECTOR 1

Operational Points

21. Ad hoc Coy CO Indbatt informd that the adhoc coy comprising of pers from the Force Engr Coy and the Force Sig Coy was formed with effect from 20 Jul 95.

22. Recce of AOR CO Indbatt informed that recce had been carried out of the portions of previous sector 2 and of Gitarama which now form part of the Indbatt AOR. He stated that only the northern part of the new AOR was left to be recced which would be carried out shortly.

23. Security Duties CO Indbatt stated that although 27 sections were now available for security duties, a total of 33 sections worth of duties have been allotted. He stated that in view of the paucity of troops, no addl duties can be undertaken. The COS informed that security duties at the UNDP compound and the UNHCR complex were being withdrawn forthwith so as to decrease the load

concerned.

24. Access to Trafipro PX shop CO Indbatt informed that he had received intimation that International Civilian Staff should be permitted 24 hrs access to the PX shop in Trafipro. As this would create serious security problems as also the fact the the PX shop is open only from 0800 hrs to 2000 hrs, the FC asked the DCOS Sp to look into the matter and sort it out. He further directed that 24 hrs access will not be permitted to the PX shop in Trafipro.

25. Humanitarian Aspects CO Indbatt informed of the various humanitarian assistance provided by his unit particularly to two orphanages run by the Sisters of Charity at Kigali and at Kibungo.

Admin Problems

26. CO Indbatt informed of the problems being faced by the guards at Trafipro and at the UN Service Station. He stated that no ablution units have been installed at the Trafipro and neither has adequate accn been allotted which has resulted in the troops staying in tentage. He further asked that a hard standing be provided at the UN Service Station so as to enable the unit to construct proper accn for the guard.

ITEM 3 - SECTOR 2

Accn for troops to be repatriated

27. CO Ghanbatt informed that pl locs where APCs are located, have not been able to pull back to coy locs as the APCs are not permitted to move on tracks. The COS informed that flatbeds are being provided shortly for the transportation of the APCs. Once the APCs move out, the COS said that the pls must pull back and conc in coy locs.

28. CO Ghanbatt asked that the 530 tps to be repatriated in Sep 95 be accomodated in the Transit Camp as there was a shortage of space in the coy locs. The COS directed that as it was not possible to accomodate 530 personnel for two months in the transit camp in view of the ongoing repatriation, Ghanbatt should accomodate these personnel in the coy locs itself.

29. Payment to local employees The CO informed that the local employees have not been paid by the UN for the last seven months and that they should be paid at the earliest. The COS said that the DCOS Sp should look into the matter at the earliest and sort it out.

30. [REDACTED] requested that necessary liaison be carried out by UNAMIR HQ with the RPA to sort out the issue. The COS assured him that this would be done and that DCOS Sp would organize a proper handover system with unit personnel, the FSA, G3 Plans and the landlord involvement.

ITEM 4 - SECTOR 4

31. OC Malawicoy informed that his unit was not able to move into sector 4 in the laid down time due to lack of basic amenities at Shagasha. However, now that the infrastructure has been created, he informed that Malawicoy will complete its move into sector 4 by 22 Jul 95.

32. The OC further asked permission to provide security to that certain NGOs in his AOR that had requested for security at various offices, residences and at the ICRC warehouse in Cyangugu. This would also enable Malawicoy to maintain outposts in Cyangugu which was far away from the coy loc at Shagasha. The COS asked the OC that since these types of tasks are no longer mandated, to discuss the issue separately with G3 Plans and said that Malawicoy must work out an arrangement to collect the sitrep daily from the Milobs in Cyangugu and fax it to the Force HQ as Milobs have no means of comm.

ITEM 5 - SECTOR 5

33. OC Nicoy informed that the complete coy was now located at Nyundo and was fast settling down. However, there were a number of operational and administrative problems which needed attention.

34. Operational problems

a. Lack of patrol vehs Nicoy has no light vehs for patrolling and the Isuzu trucks that are held, are not suitable for mobile patrols. DCOS Sp to investigate spare parts for Nicoy vehicles.

b. Communications Hand held Motorola sets have not been reprogrammed for use in the new loc. FSO informed that this would be completed by 24 Jul 95 as per the given schedule.

c. EOD Accessories Demolition accessories and plastic explosives for destroying EOD is lacking. The COS informed that no stock of plastic explosive has been received and all

tasks of demolition of ordnance recovered by Nicoy, will be undertaken by the Force Engr Coy.

35. Administrative problems

- a. Toilets and Showers The toilets and showers bathing in the
- b. Electrical defects The complete wiring of the living complex requires overhauling. Also, the complex requires cut outs of bigger amperage to prevent repeated tripping.
- c. Broken doors and window panes Most of the doors and window panes are broken and none of the doors have any locks on them. In spite of best efforts of the integral engr resources, much still needs to be done.
- d. Cooking facilities The cooking stoves held by Nicoy are very old and difficult to repair which makes cooking cumbersome and time consuming. These stoves need to be replaced urgently.
- e. Medical
 - i. One addl amb required for both the Humanitarian Clinic which has been established outside the unit lines as well as the unit MI Room.
 - ii. Two addl interpreters are needed for the Humanitarian clinic.
 - iii. A number of items and chemicals for preventive health are required by the coy. FMO informed that the chemicals are available and can be collected at any time from AUSMED. The other items he informed, however are stuck with the Rwandese customs and will be issued once they are cleared by them.

ITEM - 6 ZAMBATT

36. CO Zambatt informed that preparations were on to receive Malicoy in the loc. He said that accn was a problem but it was being addressed by the FSA and Malicoy was being given tentage accn. The CO further informed that preparation of load tables and identification of equipment for handing over had been carried out. All vehs beyond first line repairs, had been backloaded to the UN Workshop in Kigali. He also informed of the existing water shortage problem in Gikongoro.

37. Finally, the CO thanked all contingents and staff for the

cooperation and sp rendered during Zambatt's tenure in Rwanda.

ITEM 7 - SENBATT

38. The Ops Officer of Senbatt informed that the contingent was making all preparations to ensure a smooth repatriation.

ITEM 8 - AUSMED

39. CO AUSMED gave details of the med sp which had been provided and the sp planned to be provided in the near future. He informed of the ongoing negotiations with the BMS to repair the complete hospital complex and the Academy. Keeping in mind the fact that gradual winding down would start shortly for repatriation, he asked all contingents to send in their bids for medical/environmental sp as after 01 Aug 95, AUSMED would be able to undertake only minimum essential tasks.

ITEM 9 - 95 FLSG

40. Rotation CO 95 FLSG informed that the rotation was due to take place on 26 Jul 95. He stated that the advance party of the relieving unit arrived on 18 Jul 95 and that the main body would be arriving on 24 Jul 95. An addl 13 medical/surgical personnel would form part of the new unit till such time UN sorts out the issue of the replacement of AUSMED. He however stated that this detachment was likely to be redeployed elsewhere and a decision to this effect would be taken by the Canadian CDS on 01 Aug 95.

41. Return of stores The CO said that the stores were being returned in a dirty condition. He asked contingents to ensure that stores are returned in a good condition as these are required to be used by soldiers in other missions.

42. The CO finally thanked all present especially Indbatt and Tunbatt for having provided security at the Trafipro which enabled them to perform their tasks effectively. -

ITEM 10 - FC'S CLOSING REMARKS

43. The FC thanked all present for having attended the conference. He praised Ghanbatt for the trg being imparted to their troops and asked all unit comdrs to conduct periodic mil trg of their soldiers. He asked all present to learn from each other and improve standards of trg, turnout etc.

44. The FC stated that UNAMIR will be in Rwanda till Dec 95 and thus though the new mandate is different, there is still an important task to be performed. He praised the excellent work done by all contingents and thanked the rotating contingents for all the hard work put in especially AUSMED and 95 FLSG. \ /

Maj
SO 2 Ops

Distribution:

External:

Sector 1
Sector 2
Sector 3
Sector 4
Sector 5
Zambatt
Senbatt
AUSMED
95 FLSG
Force Engr Coy
Force Signal Coy
DCMO

Internal:

FC
DFC
COS
DCOS OPS
DCOS SP
G3 OPS
G3 PLANS
G1
G2
G3 ENGR
G4
CLO
FSO
CMO
FMO
G3 AIR
Office Copy
CISS
CAO

SO 10/8 a Copy to - SDO
- SDO
- SLOGO MILOB Gp Hqrs.

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

Ref # : Butare/95-053
Date : 5 July 1995
To : Mr. William Clive
Chief Integrated Support Services
From : Donald Stead, FSA *D Stead*
TAC Hqrs - Butare
Subject : Sector Commanders Conference 30 June 1995

1. On the 30 June 1995, I attended a Sector Commanders Conference (MILOB) under the Chairmanship of the Chief Military Observer (CMO) Colonel Major Abdoul Aziz, also attendance was the Deputy Chief Military Observer (DCMO) Colonel C.A. Nelson.

2. The opening remarks were directed at the drawing up of new Sector boundaries, it was also stated that each Sector would be a full Sector with its Headquarters (co-located where possible with an Independent Company Group) in the following prefectures:

Sector 1A : Kigali	28 MILOBS
Sector 1B : Giterama	28 MILOBS
Sector 2A : Byumba	25 MILOBS
Sector 2B : Kibungo	28 MILOBS
Sector 3A : Gikongoru	31 MILOBS
Sector 3B : Butare	31 MILOBS
Sector 4 : Cyangugu	34 MILOBS
Sector 5A : Ruhengeri	22 MILOBS
Sector 5B : Gisenyi	28 MILOBS
Sector 5C : Kibuye	25 MILOBS

In addition to the MILOBS there will be approximately (4) four CIVPOL officers stationed at each Headquarters.

3. Items 5 & 6 on the agenda, open the conference to discussion on the "revised mandate and proposed reorganization of MILOBS" including comments and suggestion from Sector Commanders on the reorganization.

4. With regards to the administrative support by either the FSA's or direct through Kigali, the general theme throughout the discussions mainly zeroed in on the areas of Communications, Vehicles, Water, Fuel and Interpreters.

5. (i) Communications:

It was mentioned that radio communications (VHF) in some Sectors were poor, I presume that the MILOB Group Headquarters has raised this subject with the CCO, and that this matter is being looked into.

(ii) Vehicles:

Once the troop withdrawal is complete this may release sufficient 4 X 4 type vehicles that could be issued to the MILOBS.

(iii) Water:

As you are aware the MILOBS are paid MSA for which a component of this entitlement includes food, however I recommend that if sufficient water tank or bladders are available, each MILOB Headquarters be issued with this storage facility. Apart from personal use, this would give the Headquarters an emergency reserve that would be in line with the policy for the Independent Companies.

(iv) Fuel:

One of the biggest problems in supporting MILOB personnel will be that of supplying fuel for their fleet of vehicles, where a Sector Headquarters is co-located with an Independent Company Group there should be no problem, however, there will be Sector Headquarters that will be on their own. With the departure and re-deployment of SENBATT and MALICOY, this will release 3 x 10.000 litres and 2 x 5.000 litre fuel tanks. I recommend that these fuel tanks be distributed to the Sector Headquarters not co-located with the Independent Companies.

(iv) Fuel continued:

If the above recommendation is approved, there will be an added problem of administering the issuance (and entitlement) of this product. I suggest that one or two local staff be employed to issue and log vehicle particulars, however the day to day control of this facility should come under the control of the Sector Logistics Officer.

(v) Interpreters:

This item is a subject that has been raised on previous occasions, I informed the meeting that due to a recruiting freeze imposed by UN Headquarters, New York, no new interpreters could be recruited. I went on to state that with the reduction of formed troops, this will release a number of interpreters that could be re-distributed to the MILOBS Sectors. The Staff Officer, Personnel indicated that he would submitted a manning table on their personnel (interpreters) requirements.

6. Forwarded for your information and appropriate action.

cc: Chron
MILOB Group Hqrs

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Sector 3B (Butare)
UNAMIR

See Distribution

MINUTES OF SECTORS COMMANDERS' CONFERENCE HELD
AT BUTARE ON FRI 30 JUN 95

Present	:Col-Maj A Toumia	-DFC/CMO	Chairman
	Col CA Nelson	DCMO	Member
	Lt Col I Abubakar	Comd Sector 4B	"
	Lt Col GK Adjei	" " 1	"
	Lt Col M Ahsanullah	SOO	"
	Lt Col E Castro	Comd Sector 4A	"
	Lt Col T Fox	" " 3	"
	Lt Col A Jounitsyn	" " 4C	"
	Lt Col EA Mahachi	" " 6	"
	Lt Col K Opong-Kyekyeku	SMPO	"
	Lt Col AB Sibanda	Comd Sector 2	"
	Maj MK Carswell	Ag Comd Sector 5	"
	Sqn Ldr FA Ayamgha	SLOGO	"
	Maj L Adekagun	MILOBS Sector 4B	Sec
	Capt S Dubreuil	" " Asst Sec	
In attendance :	Col H Osae-Addae	CHAO	
	Lt Col C Ahmed	MA - DFC	
	Lt Col C Bakary	Dy Comd Sector 3A	
	Lt Col V Curren	G3 Med Ops	
	Lt Col VS Dadhural	Dy Comd Sector 4C	
	Lt Col H Kaute	Dy Comd Sector 2B	
	Lt Col SE Keita	Dy Comd Sector 4B	
	Mr Donald Stead	FSA Butare	

ACTION

ITEM 1 WELCOME ADDRESS BY COMD SECTOR 4B

1. The Comd Sector 4B welcomed all participants to the conference. He wished the conference had been scheduled for 2 or more days so that he could take participants round Butare city on sightseeing. He however counselled for short briefs which should not exceed 10 minutes in view of the limited time available.

ITEM 2. OPENING REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN

2. The Chairman expressed happiness to be at the conference even though he was not new to

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ACTION

the Mission but had just taken over as DFC/CMO barely one week from the outgone DFC/CMO(Brig-Gen Anyidoho). He stressed the calmness of the situation generally except for the increase in banditry acts while check points were on the decrease.

3.He intimated the conference that a paper had already been issued out on the new UNAMIR mandate and called for vigilance and keeping in place of all security measures. He stressed that more responsibilities had been added for the MILOBS which required more dedication, imagination and commitment. He cautioned against inadequate/destructive rumour peddling in the name of information gathering.

4.The Chairman noted that UNAMIR was set up for reconciliating assistance to Rwanda and not as a spying outfit. Been the field operatives of UNAMIR, MILOBS were enjoined to produce detailed and accurate information on which actions would be based. He promised more logistics support from defunct formed troops resources towards the enhancement of the duties of MILOBS.

ITEM 3. BRIEFS FROM THE SECTORS

5. The various commanders presented briefs on the activities of their sectors seriatim.

a. Sector 1

- (1) The sector experienced relative calm since the last sectors comds' conference till date while the negative propaganda against UNAMIR on Radio Rwanda seemed to have died down. The locals who fled the prefecture (Byumba) had been returning and presently engaged in various agricultural and commercial activities. However 45% of the prefecture were mine infested and this hampered agriculture.

2

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ACTION

(2) The prefecture seriously lacked essential services like portable water, electricity, adequate transportation and medical facilities which was consequent upon the aftermath of the war. The destroyed communes offices were yet to be rehabilitated. The government officials in the prefecture had since embarked on reconciliation campaigns for which a six-day seminar was held for the youths in May 95.

(3) The sector's duties could best be carried out with additional logistics support/facilities like an additional radio base station, fax machine, telephone, more vehicles, fuel dumps, electric generator, portable water supply among others.

b. Sector 2

(1) The operational situation within the sector had been quite satisfactory within the past month. Arrests of locals and returnees had considerably decreased. Except for the Mugesera Bourgmestre who gave instruction that UNAMIR vehicle should not cross a particular check point without his specific authorization, other RPA/militias at the check points were cooperative. RPA deployment at the border had been increased.

(2) Primary and secondary schools had since re-opened but they lack qualified teachers. The remuneration for the available teachers were inadequate and irregular. Some NGO had been providing infrastructural and other assistance to the schools.

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(3) The prefecture lacked adequate social services of pipe borne water electricity and transport whilst the population had steadily been on the increase with the return of so many people including those that departed the prefecture since 1959/60. The number of returnees was put at 2,526 by UNHCR which MILOBS could not verify due to their denial of access to the border crossing figures with the government officials.

(4) No case of illegal occupation of peoples houses was reported within the period. The local authorities embarked on reconciliatory campaigns which yielded cordial living relationship among the locals including the returnees. However the ration usually doled out to these returnees at Transit camps hardly lasted more than a month. Farming implements should be supplied to them towards attaining self sustenance/sufficiency.

(5) The prefecture had 21,250 registered orphans scattered all over the communes including 9 orphanages that were been supported/ maintained by the NGOs.

(6) The sectors interpreters holding was reduced to one by Messrs Brown and Root which terminated their employments. An urgent provision of more interpreters would enhance the sector's performance.

c. Sector 3A

(1) The situation in the sector was calm but tense due to apprehension among locals of arrest and harassment by the RPA soldiers.

Agricultural activities increased due to the support of the NGOs who provided initial food aid, tools and seeds to the locals.

(2) Inadequate social services was the main problem within the prefecture. The water supply system destroyed during the war were yet to be resuscitated. Inavailable teachers and teaching materials hampered education while no medical centres in some secteurs thereby compelled carriage of the sick to distant commune hospitals without transport facilities.

(3) The prefecture received over 2,000 refugees and ex-IDPs from Gisenyi and Kibeho respectively including those of 1959/60 cases with incidental accommodation problems. There were reported cases of forceful grabbing of other people's property with the active connivance of the RPA.

(4) There seemed to be mutual mistrust amongst the two main tribes which was not helpful to the expected reconciliation.

(5) The sector required some mentioned additional logistics support to enhance its duties.

d. Sector 3B

(1) The prefecture in which the sector is located had an estimated 775,400 people on a land mass of 2,339 square kilometres before the war of which about 200,000 died in the 1994 war. The reburial of the dead had since commenced throughout the secteurs.

(2) About 10,200 people of different categories returned to the commune within the last three months with the attendant accommodation problem. Those suspected of genocide acts resorted to banditry to survive while living as fugitives in the neighbourhood.

(3) The last sector comd(Col Hassnain) built a good relationship with the RPA local Bde comd which had been maintained as evidenced in the last week visit of the RPA Bde Comd to the sector. This good relationship informed courteous attitudes from the RPA soldiers at the check points to all UN members.

(4) The prefect of Gitarama though a moderate Hutu, friendly and amiable had been exploiting his relationship with the sector for selfish ends. MILOBS in the sector had good working relationships with the NGOs and other UN agencies.

(5) The prisons were overcrowded with kids and babies among the inmates and of which 16 people died within the past one week.

(6) The so-much desired reconciliation could be achieved through education of the people and justice.

e. Sector 4A

(1) After the forceful closure of all the IDP camps in the sector, the activities of the sector changed drastically from monitoring IDPs in the camps to monitoring and assessing their general well being in their home communes. The local administrators had so far kept the

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ACTION

communes under effective control but their efforts were hampered by lack of expertise and resources.

(2) The returnees experienced initial hardships due to loss of personal effects enroute and the consequential impact of food supply. Some NGOs had since come to their assistance with foods aid. However some of the NGOs who functioned at the camps had withdrawn their services.

(3) The President of Rwanda and the Prime Minister jointly visited the prefecture on reconciliation campaign within the period.

(4) Among the problems faced by the prefecture during the material time were lack of funds for civil servants salaries and poor or non-existing infrastructures.

(5) The sector's duties would best be facilitated with additional logistics support especially vehicles as five of the sector's vehicle had been in the workshop for a relatively long period.

f. Sector 4B

(1) The sector was pre-occupied with monitoring resettlements of ex-IDPs in their home communes after the forced closure of the IDP camps in Apr 95. The RPA and Commune officials were hostile to patrol teams for alleged spying against the government to the extent that an interpreter that accompanied a patrol team was detained sometimes ago. However, with the intervention of the minister of Internal

7
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ACTION

Affairs, the situation had since normalized.

(2) The calm situation that prevailed in the sector was recently disturbed by robbery incidents by men dressed in RPA uniforms. NGOs (females) were the main targets.

(3) In line with the new mandate, the sector liaised with the NGOs to get desired aids material and even on occasions transported same to their respective destinations.

(4) The Force Engineer Company team was used to mend some of the bad roads within Butare town as requested by the local RPA Brigade Commander. This act was a right step in the right direction.

(5) A total of over 2,000 returnees from Burundi, Uganda and Tanzania, 518,623 ex-IDPs and a lot of orphans were received/registered in the sector within the last 3 months. Their problems were similar to those of the ex-IDPs and these were housing, farmland, tools, seeds etc. The NGOs had been assisting to resettle them. Initial hostilities to ex-IDPs had since died down.

(6) The returnees and ex-IDPs were reported fast settling down and this had been facilitated by commendable rehabilitation campaigns of most of the Bourgmestres.

(7) Most of the social services utilities had broken down and required rehabilitation. Some commune offices also required rehabilitation. Though schools had since re-opened but remuneration for teachers were inadequate and

8
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ACTION

irregular.

(8) Unconfirmed report had it that some FRGF and militia organised themselves at the refugee camps in Burundi to stop refugees from returning home.

g. Sector 4C

(1) The sector experienced relative calm since the last conference, however banditry, robbery and killing incidents were on the increase with 50 reported cases of killings as against 40 of the previous month.

(2) The sector recorded 15 sightings of unidentified aircrafts within the airspace of the sector. The aircrafts were suspected to belong to either the FRGF or Zairean government and were on air recce/taking of air photographs missions. The aircraft always came from the direction of Zaire and returned there after some interval.

(3) The prefecture appeared to be a stronghold of FRGF and Interahamwe sympathizers even though its prefect enjoyed the trust and confidence of local RPA authorities. Rebuilding the prefectures damaged infrastructures did not appear to be given any attention yet.

(4) Two battalions of RPA soldiers were deployed within the prefecture while their uncooperative officers attempted stopping the locals and NGOs from giving information to MILOBS.

5. A total of 672 returnees were received at the Nyagatare transit camp in the prefecture within the past three months. The refugees came from Burundi and Zaire.

9
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Repatriation meetings were held on monthly basis by UNHCR representative. The prefect of Cyangugu and the Deputy Governor of South Kivu recently held a meeting to improve relations between them.

(6) Population survey would be conducted in the prefecture at a future date. The prisons at Kamembe and Cyangugu had more inmates than they were built for.

(7) Reliable and increased vehicle fleet would be a sine-qua-non to whatever tasks that would be assigned to MILOBS in the sector.

h. Sector 5

(1) The operational situation in the sector remained relatively unchanged since the last conference. Constant rumours of FRGF invasion, reduction of armed troops and unavailability of resources to perform duties created uncertainty within the NGO community.

(2) RPA deployment to forward positions in defensive posture had checkmated armed incursions from Zaire. However, elements of the FRGF were suspectedly operated in gang of between 13 to 30 persons to cause havoc. The sector however had good relationship with the RPA.

(3) The MILOBS were in constant liaison and cooperation with the NGOs. A combined MILOBS/WFP team went on a flight of the general area and it observed imminence of harvest of crops.

(4) A total of 11,004 returnees were registered in the sector. Various NGOs were on hand to aid resettlement of these returnees. However, the commune offices did not are well in matter of stationery stock. HR and UNHCR conducted a seminar on arrest and detention of subjects last week. This was aimed at enhancing reconciliation. Similar informal programmes were conducted for the gendamerie by the CIVPOL on proper arrest and investigation procedures.

(5) The sector could not obtain independent information on happenings at the neighbouring country's refugees camps hence reliance was placed on what the NGO could provide. However their information were somehow contradictory with high suspicion of deliberate disinformation/distortion.

(6) The sector required additional 5 radio-equipped Toyota 4x4's vehicles and communication equipment to facilitate its duties. As at date the sector had no computer and photocopier.

i. Sector 6

(1) The situation in the sector was generally calm and fairly stable. Except for some minor incidents of robberies and harassment of locals at Kanombe commune, there were no major banditry acts reported. Though the arrest of genocide crime suspects continued but on a little scale.

(2) INDBATT and Australian EOD continued providing engineering and

disposal ammunition assistance creditably.

(3) RPA had been rehearsing for the National Day celebration fixed for 1 Jul 95 at the stadium. They intensified patrols and checkpoints which reduced the robbery on UN and members property.

(4) The population was on the increase but could not be monitored due to the cosmopolitan nature of Kigali. A number of returnees were received in the sector and settled in Kanombe. The locals in the city communes engaged in commercial activities while those in the rural communes engaged in agriculture. Damaged private buildings were observed been repaired just as new ones were springing up in the cities. Some houses were abandoned in the villages. However, no rehabilitation observed on damaged government buildings yet ostensibly due to lack of money.

(5) The prisons continued to be overcrowded and required urgent attention. The NGOs could not be easily tracked down for liaison due to the constant changes in their addresses. The available ones had been responding positively to issues taken up with them.

(6) Water supply was hampered by unstable electricity supply just as the rural roads were only motorable to 4 wheel drive vehicles. Nothing concrete seemed to have been done on the high number of orphans who out of neglect resorted to organising and fending for themselves.

RESTRICTED

ACTION

(7) Reconciliation efforts were being hampered by property disputes. Returnees who fled the country in 1959 and now in occupation of other people's houses were not prepared to vacate same and this had become the main source of contention. Radio transmission continued hampering on genocide thus rekindled hostilities among locals especially after the April reburials.

(8) The main problem of the sector had been that of inadequate logistics support especially vehicles and lack of sufficient number of interpreters.

ITEM 4 REVISED MANDATE AND REORG OF MILOBS SECTORS

6. The new mandate of UNAMIR divested it of involvement in the security of the nation which should be left with the Rwandese government. The mandate resulted in the reduction of formed troops but increased responsibilities to MILOBS. Each prefecture would become a sector with emphasis on humanitarian and reconciliatory assistance. MILOBS GP HQ was in receipt of all sectors' inputs to the reorganisation exercise but verbal discussion thereon would be better.

7. Decision. It was decided that all sectors commanders should verbally discuss their recommendations for the reorganisation at this meeting.

All Sectors Comds

ITEM 5. SECTOR COMD'S COMMENTS ON THE REORGANISATION

8. The sector commanders presented various comments whose summary were as follows :

13

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- a. The exit of formed troops in some sectors would badly affect communication, fuel and water supply support for MILOBS since reliance was hitherto placed on the formed troops resources.
- b. The decision of Messrs Brown & Root on laid off interpreters would have adverse effect on sectors' activities.
- c. The severance of Kibuye from Gitarama was a saluted decision as the prefectures could now interact in a natural way.
- d. Almost all the sectors had inadequate logistics back-up especially vehicles, hand held radios etc.
- e. Special equipment like binoculars would be required to view happenings in Burundi from hill tops in Rwanda borders.
- f. The out post team of sector 4A colocated with the about-to-move Zambian troops in school building would be disadvantaged with schools imminent resumption.
- g. Proposed sectors 2A & 2B were big enough to have much formed troops and MILOBS.
- h. Each sector should deal with communes within its prefecture boundary.
- i. The sub sector in Rilima required immediate fold up just as the sector 4A (new 2A) outpost. Sector 4A required relocation for security reasons.

RESTRICTED

ACTION

- j. A lot of indiscipline acts were observed on the radio for private and personal matters to the detriment of official messages. Necessity for separate administrative and operations net was stressed.
9. Decisions. The conference agreed that :
- a. Field services officials to relocate near sectors for possible logistics support. FSA
 - b. Available interpreters would be equitably distributed among sectors after the exit of formed troops. Two interpreters to a sector would be the minimum standard S00
 - c. Sector comds would personally check outposts if and when deployed as a result of absolute necessity. All Sectors Comds
 - d. Incoming GHANBATT would provide accommodation for sector 2 from its office building. DFC/CMO
 - e. The vehicles and other assets of defunct troops would be shared among sectors. DFC/CMO
 - f. Sectors would operate in conjunction with local officials and not in antagonism. All Sectors Comds
 - g. The outpost in sector 4A to be withdrawn after some time, thereafter patrols should be sent there on scheduled periods. Comd Sector 4A
 - h. Both the Forces HQ and UNO office in New York were informed of the unidentified aircraft activities. Possible enquiries were already on. DFC/CMO

RESTRICTED

ITEM 6 BRIEFS FROM THE STAFF OFFICERS

10. The staff officers at MILOBS GP HQ presented their brief seriatim.

a. SOO

(1) Some sectors were used to forwarding their sitreps and other vital reports late.

(2) Some sectors sent letters to higher headquarters to the embarrassment of MILOBS GP HQ which was oblivious of such correspondences.

(3) Actions/utterances of some MILOBS portrayed ignorance of contents of official mails/directives.

(4) Some sectors evolved local methods of performing duty contrary to MILOBS GP HQ directive.

(5) MILOBS GP HQ was kept in the dark on the movement of sector commanders.

(6) Letters piled up for sectors at the MILOBS GP HQ uncollected.

b. SMPO

(1) The MSA for the month of Jun 95 would be paid on 5 Jul 95. Manpower problem militated against payment at sectors by the finance section.

(2) No favouritism intended with the latest redeployment, rather need to avoid destabilising MILOBS due for repatriation in Jul & Aug 95 necessitated it.

RESTRICTED

ACTION

(3) Decision should be taken on what to do with the balance of money contributed by MILOBS and used to buy items in aid of Rwandese orphans.

(5) MILOBS needed not to procure more than basic necessities to facilitate their duties in Rwanda.

(5) Medical assistance for MILOBS needed to be worked out in view of moving out of formed troops in some areas.

c. S LOGO

(1) Over speeding and unauthorized parking cases had commendably declined.

(2) Delays on receipts back of vehicles sent to workshop were caused by inavailability of spare parts and other sundry problems.

(3) Programme for move of newly posted MILOBS already issued out.

(4) Some logistic officers of sectors failed to adhere to guidelines on requisitions and indenting.

11. Decisions. It was decided that :

a. Sitreps should be sent to MILOBS GP HQ at the latest 1800 hrs daily. Fax or even telephone could be utilised there for.

All Sectors Comds

b. Laid down procedures on sitreps should be followed. Occurrence reports should be promptly sent and be sufficiently detailed enough.

All Sectors Comds

c. Channel of communication should be adhered to. In case of absolute

All Sectors Comds

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

ACTION

necessity for its breach, the MILOBS GP HQ should be sent information copies.

- d. All MILOBS should see all mails for adequate information. Furthermore each sector must have "daily prayers" at whatever time it chose.
- e. A three-man duty team should be established in every sector. The radio set should be manned round the clock while a MILOBS team should patrol 2 or 3 communes daily and this accounted for number of MILOBS deployed to each sector.
- f. MILOBS GP HQ should be informed of the absence of sector commander from the sector and an acting sector commander should be appointed and communicated to the MILOBS GP HQ.
- g. MILOBS were to be enjoined to check for both official and personal mails for their sectors at the HQs whenever they are opportuned to be around Kigali.
- h. Every MILOBS were now entitled to 100 kilograms of accompanied baggages on coming to the mission and 100 kilograms of unaccompanied baggages on repatriation from the mission at UN expense. (These excluded whatever the airlines offered)
- i. Balance from the money contributed to assist Rwandese orphans should be used to produce commemorative plaques as souvenirs and to be purchased by MILOBS.
- j. Information should be sent to MILOBS GP HQ on MILOBS admitted in the

All Sectors Comds

All Sectors Comds

All Sectors Comds

All Sectors Comds

All Sectors Comds

SMPO

All Sectors Comds

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

ACTION

hospital so that he could be paid get-well visits by HQ staff which could lift morale and speed up recovery.

- k. NGO's in hospitals and available formed troops would continue to give medical cover to all MILOBS. Possibility of issuing first aid kits to MILOBS would be viewed.
- l. UN equipment with defunct formed troops would be shared among the sectors.
- m. Recalcitrant logistic officers would be surcharged for indenting and collecting unauthorized items.
- n. Newly posted MILOBS would be moved with effect from Tue 4 Jul 95 as per programme already issued out. Necessary changes be timely communicated to MILOBS GP HQ.
- o. Sector commanders placed under obligation to take interest in the activities of their logistics officers.

G3 MED OPS

DFC/CMO
SLOGO

SLOGO

All Sectors Comds

All Sectors Comds

ITEMS 7. BRIEF FROM HAC

12. Receipt was acknowledged of daily sitreps on humanitarian affairs. Need for accurate, concise and unambiguous weekly reports stressed to avoid loss of confidence as some weekly report contained exaggerations. Patrols to schools, villages and medical centres to interview people directly involved could facilitate accurate reporting.

13. Appointment of 2 MILOBS as Humanitarian Affairs Officers in a sector suggested for continuity sake because of inadvertent absences like CTO, leave or even repatriations. Inaccuracies in reports could

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ACTION

be avoided if sector commanders had gone through them before despatch.

14. Establishment of good cordial working relationship with RPA local commanders, Bourgmestres, Prefects and even NGOs would yield good, positive and desired results.

15. Decision It was decided that special format proforma as desired by HAC be made for use by the Humanitarian Affairs Officers.

ITEMS 8. DCMO'S REMARKS

16. Every sector would face various insecurities consequent upon reduction of formed troops strength hence every MILOBS was enjoined to be prepared. MILOBS would continue to be the ears and eyes of UNAMIR even in neighbouring countries if UNO decided to extend UNAMIR mandate there after Special Envoy's report.

17. Notice was taken on observed change in some government officials attitudes. Need to be closer with these officials was emphasized.

18. Decision. It was decided that all sectors would operate closely and in liaison with governmental officials at whatever level notwithstanding the uncooperative attitudes of some.

ITEM 9. ARRANGEMENT FOR NEXT CONFERENCE

19. Every sector commander who had not hosted the conference wanted to be considered to be the next host who would take over the mantle of hostship from commander sector 4B.

20. Decision It was decided that the next conference would hold at Gikongoro and its date and other details would be communicated to all as soon as they were worked out.

21. Summary of decisions. The conference decided that :

CHAO

All Sectors Comds

Comd=Sector 4A

RESTRICTED

ACTION

- | | | |
|----|--|-------------------|
| a. | All sectors commanders should verbally discuss their recommendations for the reorganisation at this meeting. | All Sectors Comds |
| b. | Field services officials to relocate near sectors for possible logistics support. | FSA |
| c. | Available interpreters would be equitably distributed among sectors after the exit of formed troops. Two interpreters to a sector would be the minimum standard. | SOO |
| d. | Sector comds would personally check outposts if and when deployed as a result of absolute necessity. | All Sectors Comds |
| e. | Incoming GHANBATT would provide accommodation for sector 2 from its office building. | DFC/CMO |
| f. | The vehicles and other assets of defunct troops would be shared among sectors. | DFC/CMO |
| g. | Sectors would operate in conjunction with local officials and not in antagonism. | All Sectors Comds |
| h. | The outpost in sector 4A to be withdrawn after some time, thereafter patrols should be sent there on scheduled periods. | Comd Sector 4A |
| i. | Both the Forces HQ and UNO office in New York were informed of the unidentified aircraft activities. Possible enquiries were already on. | DFC/CMO |
| j. | Sitreps should be sent to MILOBS GP HQ at the latest 1800 hrs daily. Fax or even telephone could be utilised there for. | All Sectors Comds |

RESTRICTED

ACTION

- | | | |
|----|--|-------------------|
| k. | Laid down procedures on sitreps should be followed. Occurrence reports should be promptly sent and be sufficiently detailed enough. | All Sectors Comds |
| l. | Channel of communication should be adhered to. In case of absolute necessity for its breach, the MILOBS GP HQ should be sent information copies. | All Sectors Comds |
| m. | All MILOBS should see all mails for adequate information. Furthermore each sector must have "daily prayers" at whatever time it chose. | All Sectors Comds |
| n. | A three-man duty team should be established in every sector. The radio set should be manned round the clock while a MILOBS team should patrol 2 or 3 communes daily and this accounted for number of MILOBS deployed to each sector. | All Sectors Comds |
| o. | MILOBS GP HQ should be informed of the absence of sector commander from the sector and an acting sector commander should be appointed and communicated to the MILOBS GP HQ. | All Sectors Comds |
| p. | MILOBS were to be enjoined to check for both official and personal mails for their sectors at the HQs whenever they are opportuned to be around Kigali. | All Sectors Comds |
| q. | Every MILOBS were now entitled to 100 kilograms of accompanied baggages on coming to the mission and 100 kilograms of unaccompanied baggages on repatriation from the mission at UN expense.
(These excluded whatever the airlines offered) | All Sectors Comds |

RESTRICTED

ACTION

- | | | |
|----|---|-------------------|
| r. | Balance from the money contributed to assist Rwandese orphans should be used to produce commemorative plaques as souvenirs and to be purchased by MILOBS. | SMPO |
| s. | Information should be sent to MILOBS GP HQ on MILOBS admitted in the hospital so that he could be paid get-well visits by HQ staff which could lift morale and speed up recovery. | All Sectors Comds |
| t. | NGO's in hospitals and available formed troops would continue to give medical cover to all MILOBS. Possibility of issuing first aid kits to MILOBS would be viewed. | G3 MED OPS |
| u. | UN equipment with defunct formed troops would be shared among the sectors. | DFC/CMO
SLOGO |
| v. | Recalcitrant logistic officers would be surcharged for indenting and collecting unauthorized items. | SLOGO |
| w. | Newly posted MILOBS would be moved with effect from Tue 4 Jul 95 as per programme already issued out. Necessary changes be timely communicated to MILOBS GP HQ. | All Sectors Comds |
| x. | Sector commanders placed under obligation to take interest in the activities of their logistics officers. | All Sectors Comds |
| y. | Special format proforma as desired by HAC be made for use by the Humanitarian Affairs Officers. | CHAO |
| z. | All sectors would operate closely and in liaison with government officials at whatever level notwithstanding the uncooperative attitudes of some. | All Sectors Comds |

RESTRICTED


ACTION

- aa. The next conference would hold at Gikongoro and its date and other details would be communicated to all as soon as they were worked out.

Comd Sector 4A/S00

ITEM 10. CLOSING REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN

18. The chairman thanked everybody at the conference for frank/genuine discussions and deliberation. He reiterated his earlier call for dedication for duty and promised solutions to the enumerated problems within available resources. He wished everybody 'bon voyage' back to their stations.


L ADEKAGUN
Maj
Sec

10 Jul 95
Butare - Rwanda

Distribution :

External :

Action :

DFC/CMO

DCMO

Sector 1A(Kigali)

Sector 1B(Gitarama)

Sector 2A(Byumba)

Sector 2B(Kibungo)

Sector 3A(Gikongoro)

Sector 3B(Butare)

Sector 4(Cyangugu)

Sector 5A(Ruhengeri)

Sector 5B(Gisenyi)

Sector 5C(Kibuye)

S00

SMPO

SLOGO

CHAO

G3 MED OPS

FSA(Butare)

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Information :

SRSG

FC

COS

DCOS (OPS)

DCOS (SP)

CAO

CISS

Internal :

Action :

Sector 4B

Information :

Capt S Dubreiul

RESTRICTED

DCMO

MIL OBS CP HQ

Acorn

4013

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

FROM : MILOB GP HQ (OPS)

FOR INFO OF BRANCH HEADS	
SOO	
SMPO	
SLOGO	
(PL INITIAL	RETURN)

SUB : SECTOR CDRS CONFERENCE/ CONFERENCE WITH SRSG

FILE : 234/OPS/95 DATED 15 MAY 95

SO
info B-H
and return

1. THE NEXT SECTOR CDRS CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD AT SECTOR 6 HQ AT KIGALI LATER THIS WEEK. THE DCMO DESIRES THAT ALL SECTOR CDRS BE PREPARED TO ATTEND THE CONFERENCE AT A SHORT NOTICE AND BE PREPARED TO BRIEF ON THE ACTIVITIES /ACHIEVEMENTS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE SECTORS. SRSG IS ALSO LIKELY TO ATTEND OR HOLD A SEPARATE MEETING THEREAFTER TO ALSO DISCUSS ABOUT YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE MANDATE OF UNAMIR.

2. SECTOR 6 ONLY. PLEASE BE PREPARED TO ORGANIZE THE CONFERENCE AND WORKING LUNCH.

3. BEST REGARDS.

Handwritten signature
(H S RATNAPARKHI)
MAJOR
SOO
FOR DCMO

INTERNAL : LOG/PERS

COPY TO : COMMISSIONER CIVPOL/HAC/HRC

*Faxed to all sectors and passed to
Sect 4B on radio.*

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

MILOB GP HQ

87 12/13

TO : FHQ(OPS)

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

OPS/CIV AFFAIRS

INFO : DCMO ✓

11 MAR 95

SUBJECT- MEETING BETWEEN COMD SECT 2 AND PREFECT KIBUNGO
ON 09 MAR 95

Reference-

A Our HQ SITREP dated 10 Mar 95.

1. Please find herewith attached a report on the above subject for your information please.
2. Best Regards.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'K Thacker', is located above the typed name.

KIRON THACKER
MAJOR
FOR CMO

FROM :Milob Sect 2 KIBUNGO
TO :Milob HQ KIGALI

DATE :10 Mar 95
FILE :Ops/2

SUBJECT :MEETING WITH PREFET KIBUNGO

1. The Sector Cdr had a meeting with the Prefet of Kibungo on 09 Mar 94. Main issues discussed are given in succeeding paragraphs.

2. Law and Order. The Prefet mentioned that in Feb 21 killings had occurred in the prefecture. Out of these, 12 had taken place in Rukira, 5 in Muhazi and 4 in Birenga. Around 3000 arrests had been made since the war, out of which 600 persons had been transferred to Kigali. In view of the overcrowding in the prisons, he stated that he was interested in reducing the arrests but could not help it because he was afraid that this would lead to people taking the law into their own hands and may even vent their anger on him.

3. Judiciary. No trials have been done since the end of the war. Investigations were however being done. There are 8 judges in the prefecture but the requirement is of 3 judges in each commune as per law. Consequently, no trials have taken place. Recommendations have been made by the Prefet to the Ministry of Justice that two panels be made out of the existing number of judges and they visit all communes by turn. This way at least the process of dispensing justice would start. However, no decision has yet been given by the Govt.

4. Prisons. The govt is making attempts to construct an additional prison in Kibungo to reduce the load on the existing one.

5. Humanitarian Aid:-

(a) Medical. The level and quality of medical support is good. There is a shortage of medical equipment which needs to be looked into.

(b) Agriculture. The prefecture has received 120 tons of seeds, mainly beans and peas, as against a projected requirement of 500 tons. Pesticides have not been received at all. These are especially required for coffee and tomatoes. Rusumo, Kigerama, Kaborondo and Mugesera are the worst affected communes.

(c) Orphanages. There are six orphanages in the prefecture housing approx 600 children. However, there are an estimated


2

30,000 orphans in the prefecture. There are problems of water, food and electricity in the orphanages.

(d) Essential Services. The power station at Kibuye needs to be made operational as soon as possible. Water supply is erratic mainly because the generators running the pumps are old and they break down often. The Prefet requested UNAMIR assistance in this regard.

6. Revenue. The Prefet informed that as of now, revenue was being collected only from markets. Normally every family is required to pay 100 AF per year but at present they are not being taxed. At present only teachers and medical staff are being paid by the Govt.

7. Miscellaneous. The prefet requested UNAMIR permit him to accompany milobs during heli recce missions as he was interested in seeing the extent of settlement and cultivation in the commune. This was agreed to.



(Vijay Pande)

Major

Ops Offr

For Sect Cdr

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

MILOB GP HQ

8713/3

TO : FHQ(OPS)

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

OPS/RPA

INFO : DCMO ✓

11 MAR 95

SUBJECT- MEETING BETWEEN COMD SECT 2 AND LOCAL RPA COMD
ON 10 MAR 95

Reference-

A Our HQ SITREP dated 11 Mar 95.

1. Please find herewith attached a report on the above subject for our information please.
2. Best Regards.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'K Thacker'.


KIRON THACKER
MAJOR
FOR CMO

FROM :Milob Sect 2 KIBUNGO
TO :Milob HQ KIGALI

DATE :10 Mar 95
FILE :Ops/2

SUBJECT :MEETING WITH RPA CDR

1. The Sector Cdr had a meeting with the RPA Bn Cdr at Kibungo on 10 Mar 95. The purpose was to discuss inter relationships and foster better understanding of each other.
2. The RPA cdr stated that he had no problems regarding the functioning of milobs in the area. When questioned about the restriction of movement in the Muhazi area, he stated that this matter would have to be taken up with the concerned cdr.
3. He agreed to milobs visiting the Kibungo prison and said that he was also willing to accompany them. A visit will accordingly be planned in the near future.
4. The RPA Cdr requested for fuel from the milobs but was informed that this would not be possible as milobs are drawing fuel as required either from Ghanbatt or from the authorised fuel stations at Kigali. He also requested for a set of maps. He was asked to forward a formal request for the same.


(Vijay Pande)

Major

Ops Offr

For Sect Cdr

3000.26/1/OPS

FROM: G3 OPS

TO: COS

DCOS OPS

DCOS SP

~~MEMO~~

ARMY HQ (RPA)

RPA LO

DATE: 14 Mar 95

SUBJECT: FORTNIGHTLY MEETINGS BETWEEN UNAMIR AND
RPA STAFF OFFICERS

1. The next RPA/UNAMIR principal staff Officers' meeting is scheduled for Thu 16 Mar 95, at 1400hrs at Force HQ.
2. The meeting will be held in the FC's Conference Room.
3. No submissions for the Agenda by UNAMIR staff have so far been received. For your necessary action please.

Please include the case of our
civ clerk.

3000 —

14/3

Please return after reading.

8/19/3

SOO

12/03

8/19/3

SMPO

13/3

SLogO

14/3

UNAMIR Force HQ
Kigali
RWANDA

3000.10 (Ops)

S Mar 95

See Distribution

MINUTES OF MEETING BETWEEN RPA REPS AND UNAMIR
PRINCIPAL STAFF OFFICERS HELD AT FORCE HQ CONFERENCE
ROOM ON 17 FEB 95

Present:	Brig Ayidoho	HK	DFC	Chairman
	Col Sivakumar	KS	COS	Member
	Col Tutt		DCOS SP	Member
	Col Muhire	C	ARMY HQ (RPA)	Member
	Maj Kamanzi		LO (RPA)	Member
	Capt Karimba	P	ARMY HQ (RPA)	Member
	Lt Col Apogan-Yella	A	G3 OPS	Member/Secretary

OPENING REMARKS

1. The meeting commenced at 1430 hrs and the Chairman welcomed all participants.

MATTERS ARISING FROM MINUTES OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING.

2. Access/Freedom of Movement Throughout Rwanda. UNAMIR staff mentioned that RPA had now allowed UNAMIR to deploy at NYAGATARE and NGARAMA but have not responded to UNAMIR's request to deploy to GATUNA to monitor the inflow of refugees. RPA Rep in response said UNAMIR should indicate specifically which part of GATUNA UNAMIR would want to deploy its troops for consideration. The RPA Reps however added that they did not see the need for UNAMIR to deploy close to the border.

3. Operation of Barge. The RPA reps were asked to inform the meeting about the latest developments on the issue of barge operation on lake KIVU. In response it was mentioned that the RPA's stance on the issue has not changed due to security reasons.

4. Visibility of RPA Check Points. UNAMIR staff mentioned that RPA check points were still not visible to road users to which the RPA said they were encountering some logistic problems at the moment but would do something about the issue soon.

5. Searches of UN Vehicles. On the question of RPA searches of UN

vehicles, it was generally agreed that the situation had improved considerably.

6. Flying of UN Flags. The RPA reps said that some UNAMIR contingents were still flying their National flags at their unit locations and should be stopped, and that there were only two flags that could be flown in Rwanda, the Rwandese flag and UN flag. The RPA cited a UNAMIR contingent as an example. UNAMIR staff indicated that all contingents will be advised accordingly.

7. Traffic Offences and Accidents. UNAMIR staff informed the RPA that efforts have been made to check traffic offences and road accidents by UNAMIR personnel through the deployment UN MPs, on the roads to check UN personnel who flout traffic regulations.

8. Seduction of girls below 18 years. It was agreed that the situation had improved and no violation of instructions on the subject have so far been brought to the notice of UNAMIR HQ.

9. Verification of Reports. The RPA re-emphasized that the news letter released by UNAMIR on 11 January 1995 on alleged FRGF attacks on coastal towns and villages in Sector 4C was grossly exaggerated and had adversely affected the international community's perception of the security situation in Rwanda. They asked for it to be retracted, unless the UNAMIR still believed the events at Sector 4C at the time were "a consolidated and well planned attacks by the FRGF troops" as reported by the newsletter. UNAMIR staff informed the meeting that the necessary damage control measures have been put in place and that there is now an increased level of checking of news despatches before they were released. The RPA insisted the press release had adversely affected investment opportunities in the country and the return of Rwandese citizens currently displaced outside the country, and should be retracted. It was agreed that the issue will be clarified during the next meeting.

10. Status of Mission Agreement. UNAMIR staff enquired about the current situation on the above document submitted to the present government for ratification. The RPA Reps said the appropriate officials had been contacted and that the matter would be progressed soon.

11. Display of Arrogance by UNAMIR personnel. UNAMIR staff said since the discussion on the issue, there had been a noticeable improvement in paying of complements by RPA soldiers to senior UNAMIR officials and hoped that the UNAMIR troops were doing the same to the RPA. The RPA reps in response said the situation with UNAMIR had not changed and an incident was cited in which a UNAMIR Non Commissioned Officer was alleged to have been abusive towards an RPA Major at the Military Academy. This issue was later resolved during the conference.

12. RPA Flights in UN Helis. On UN heli flight timings, UNAMIR staff mentioned that if the RPA informed UNAMIR staff of any logistic problems on the above subject in advance, efforts would be made to render the required assistance so as not to delay UN flights. It was also mentioned that requests for UN flights by Rwandese Authorities to neighbouring countries can only be met after appropriate flight clearance had been obtained from authorities of the countries to be visited by the Rwandese Authorities.

INDISCIPLINE OF UN PERSONNEL

13. The RPA cited the following examples to demonstrate indiscipline on the part of UNAMIR personnel and added that as a sovereign nation, this would not be tolerated and should be checked:

a. 29 Jan 95, a UNAMIR soldier burnt a Rwandese currency note, a protest letter was lodged with the Force Commander and the SRSG by the Chief RPA LO. The LO claimed that there has been no response and nothing had been done to the soldier by UNAMIR.

b. 30 Jan 95, UNAMIR vehicle hit two RPA soldiers at BUTARE, one died on the spot the other died later, Australian soldiers cocked their weapons when the gendarmerie tried to take the UN driver and the vehicle to their HQ for a statement to be taken.

c. 11 Feb 95, two Ghanaian soldiers at RUSOMU in Sector 2 beat up two locals. One of the locals is still hospitalised.

d. 15 Feb 95, Australian driver pushed an RPA vehicle which had a deflated tyre and was blocking the road near the area of CHK with their vehicle in a manner which was provocative. This led to a stand-off between the Australians and the RPA. On the same day, 2 RPA soldiers on a motor bike were hit by a UNAMIR vehicle in KIGALI. The driver failed to stop.

14. The RPA said this kind of behaviour by UNAMIR personnel was unacceptable and specifically emphasised that UNAMIR personnel should be warned against cocking their weapons in the presence of the RPA. The RPA also added that a repeat of UNAMIR troops cocking weapons against the RPA will attract very serious consequences.

15. UNAMIR staff agreed totally with the sentiment expressed by the RPA on the incidents mentioned and promised that all would be investigated and the necessary corrective measures effected. UNAMIR staff strongly condemned the burning of the Rwandese currency and agreed that it was unacceptable in every country.

INTRODUCTION OF NEW COMMAND ELEMENT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CONTINGENT

16. The Chairman at this juncture, introduced the new command elements of the Australian contingent to the RPA Reps. The contingent comd and the CO said, they have come to Rwanda to assist the Rwandese people and want to foster good relations between Australian troops and RPA and said that they would discipline their soldiers who misbehaved towards the RPA if informed of such misconduct. The Comd element emphasised that they wanted to start on a clean sheet.

17. The RPA were appreciative of the gesture but mentioned that Rwanda was a sovereign nation and its people should be respected as such. The RPA then cited the incident in which a Rwandese currency was burnt by an Australian soldier to demonstrate the arrogance and lack of respect displayed by some UNAMIR personnel in the country. The CO and the Contingent Commander agreed that the behaviour by the Australian soldier, was totally unacceptable and unfortunate and the soldier would be disciplined.

DIFFICULTY IN IDENTIFICATION OF UNAMIR PERSONNEL

18. The RPA expressed grave concern about lack of control of the issue of UNAMIR ID cards. They mentioned that Brown and Root employees, NGO personnel, UN agencies and even foreign journalists operating in Rwanda have been issued with UNAMIR ID cards, creating difficulties of identifying actual UNAMIR personnel. The RPA warned that if UNAMIR continued to issue identity cards to individuals with questionable identities as UNAMIR personnel, then RPA will be compelled to consider holders of UNAMIR ID cards liable to search if the RPA has reason to suspect such individuals. They also mentioned that some holders of UNAMIR ID cards were engaged in business in the country which was detrimental to the Rwandese economy. They said that, most of the bottled water, beer and video cassettes sold in Rwanda were imported into the country by UNAMIR personnel, who then sold them to locals vendors without paying the appropriate custom duty.

19. On the question UNAMIR ID Cards, UNAMIR staff said the allegations will be investigated and corrective measures affected if necessary. On the issue of UNAMIR personnel engaged in unauthorised economic ventures in the country, the chairman viewed the allegation as serious and said this would be investigated. It was however mentioned that the RPA had a part to play in arresting the situation by instituting measures to discourage local vendors from buying uncustomised items from the so called UNAMIR businessmen. UNAMIR Staff also requested the RPA to quote specific instances of such activities by UNAMIR tps to punish defaulters.

OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE UNDER THE COVER OF UNAMIR PROTECTION

20. The RPA reps complained that UNAMIR was obstructing justice by providing protection to Rwandese citizens alleged to have committed crimes contrary to the laws of the land. They cited a case in which one Rwandese local called Mr. MAJAMBIRE, who shot an RPA soldier was heli-lifted to Kigali by UNAMIR when the RPA tried to arrest him. In a second example, the RPA said, a local from MUHAZI commune who was alleged to have killed 7 people during the war and had escaped from RPA custody in Sector 2 was assisted by the Sector Human Rights to seek refuge with Ghanbatt troops. The whereabouts of the fugitive was still unknown. He said UNAMIR stood the risk of being accused of complicity in the genocide if it continued to provide protection to known perpetrators of the genocide. The RPA Reps added that the Human Rights teams in Rwanda were supposed to have come to investigate the genocide and to monitor human rights violations in the country if any and not to provide protection for criminals.

21. The UNAMIR staff in response said the issues expressed by the RPA will be investigated and the necessary remedial measures put in place.

WOMANISING BY UNAMIR TROOPS

22. The RPA mentioned that in Sector 2, locals in NYANGE (ZAZA commune) were not very happy with UNAMIR troops getting drunk, womanizing, and fighting with locals in the area. They want the troops warned to desist from the practice.

23. UNAMIR staff said the necessary instructions will be issued to troops and the allegations made by the RPA will be investigated.

DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY FOR UNAMIR PERSONNEL AND CHECKING OF UNAMIR PERSONNEL AT THE AIRPORT

24. It was explained to the RPA reps that when UN personnel operate in any country they have certain immunities. It was therefore unfortunate that newly arrived Austrian MILOBS were requested to submit to a search at Kigali Airport. UNAMIR therefore wanted the RPA stance on the handling of incoming and outgoing troops at the Airport and on the issue of diplomatic community.

25. The RPA in response said personnel holding UNAMIR ID cards have behaved in a manner that has cast suspicion on the activities of the Force, and for this reason, UNAMIR personnel will be requested to submit to a search at the Airport if they have cause to suspect impropriety. Especially now that UNAMIR ID cards are held by many individuals who are not UNAMIR personnel. The matter was inconclusive and was to be referred to higher authorities.

USE OF RPA RANGE AND TRAINING AREAS

26. Permission was recently sought by UNAMIR from the RPA to use their range and training areas. No response has yet been received.
27. The RPA said they would follow up.

✓ REQUIREMENT FOR RPA LO WITH MILOB GP HQ AND FORCE ENGR COY

28. UNAMIR staff requested that one RPA LO each be assigned to MILOB GP HQ and Force Engr Coy for co-ordination of their activities with the RPA.
29. The RPA reps agreed to provide a permanent LO at MILOBs HQ and on as requested basis for Force Engr Coy.

NIGHT PATROL

30. UNAMIR staff informed the meeting that recent increase in banditry activities within the sectors called for UNAMIR to complement RPA patrols at night. Examples of night attacks on both civilian and UNAMIR installations were cited and it was suggested that there was a need for coordination between the RPA and UNAMIR on night patrols.
31. In response, the RPA said security in Rwanda was their responsibility and that they did not see the requirement for UNAMIR patrols at night, which could risk clashes between UNAMIR troops and the RPA. The RPA however suggested that coordination at the local level was necessary, when agreed to permit night patrolling in any given area. A blanket sanction can not be accorded.

NIGHT FLYING ON LAKE KIVU

32. UNAMIR staff reminded the RPA reps that permission had been sought by UNAMIR regarding night flying over Lake Kivu from RPA authorities and wondered whether a response was on hand. The RPA said that they wanted an explanation for why RPA troops trained for the heli flight with UNAMIR were to be excluded from the operation. Despite a fulsome explanation by the UNAMIR reps of the importance the UN attaches to the maintenance of its strict neutrality, the RPA reps continued to refuse permission for the night operation unless its officers were allowed to fly aboard the aircraft. This the UNAMIR reps refused to do, and the matter was treated as closed, as the RPA was not interested in the issue.

IMPOSITION OF CURFEWS

33. UNAMIR staff requested that UNAMIR is informed in advance before curfews are imposed in any of the sectors to facilitate logistic planning, ie resupply convoys and activities in the sectors.

34. The RPA reps informed the meeting that this would be seen to.

CLOSING REMARKS

35. In his closing remarks the Chairman said the usefulness of such meetings as forum for discussing potentially explosive issues cannot be under estimated. He advised that the RPA should always feel free to inform UNAMIR authorities of any undisciplined acts by UNAMIR personnel for the necessary corrective measures. He concluded by saying that maintenance of relations between the RPA and UNAMIR depended on such meetings.



AA APOGAN-YELLA
Lt Col
Member/Secretary

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