


ACTION
COPY

M.H.
VN
KWS
RO/NH

ODA



Note to Mr. Nambiar

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S DISARMAMENT SPEECH AT HARVARD

1. As you will recall, since last year the Secretary-General supported the idea of his delivery of a major speech at Harvard on disarmament. Due to scheduling difficulties, the event could not take place in 2007, however, earlier this year the Secretary-General re-affirmed his interest in making such a speech.
2. I included the proposal as a recommendation to the Policy Committee on 21 January, which the Secretary-General approved on 8 February. Decision No. 2008/5, (i) reads as follows:
"To promote a conducive diplomatic atmosphere for a successful 2010 NPT Review Conference and further progress on nuclear disarmament the Secretary-General will make a strong public statement calling for urgent action and progress towards the achievement of a nuclear weapon free world, in accordance with existing international obligations.[...]"
3. This decision is consistent with Secretary-General's personal priority to revitalize the international disarmament and non-proliferation agenda, as well as the UN's effectiveness in these areas, and his proposal – approved by the General Assembly in March 2007 – to establish a new Office for Disarmament Affairs, led by a High Representative, so as to better mobilize the political will necessary to overcome the current stalemate and re-energize action in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation.
4. As I previously informed you, my staff has been in contact with Mr. Eric Rosenbach, Executive Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, as well as with Mr. Yeocheol Yoon, Head of Scheduling Office in the EOSG. As a result, it has been agreed that the Secretary-General will deliver his speech on Friday, 23 May 2008, at a Kennedy School "Forum", from 2:00 – 4:00. The programme will also include a lunch with the faculty and selected guests.
5. I submit herewith a draft speech entitled "The United Nations and Security in a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World". We have done our best to ensure that the text reflects the intention of the Secretary-General to deliver a major address on disarmament in accordance with the above-mentioned policy decision.

Sergio Duarte
8 May 2008

cc: Mr. Kim
Mr. Orr
Mr. Haysom
Mr. Meyer

[drafted by Ioan Tudor]



The United Nations and Security in a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World

Remarks by United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts
23 May 2008

I would like to begin today by expressing my deep appreciation to the John F. Kennedy School of Government and its Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs for inviting me to re-visit my old alma mater. I am especially pleased to have this opportunity to address one of my favorite subjects, the contributions of disarmament to international peace and security.

Of course, many years have passed since I studied here as an Edward S. Mason Fellow, working hard on my M.P.A. degree. Yet I am pleased that many of your fine teachers—including Graham Allison, Joseph Nye, Ashton Carter, and others—are continuing this School's great tradition of preparing our younger generation to meet the great challenges facing not just this country, but the entire world.

I have long been an admirer of the great man who inspired the creation of this School. In 1962, when I was an 18-year old boy from rural Korea, I was one of a group of teenagers who had the privilege of meeting President Kennedy. It was not his tragic death, but his full and inspired life and his vision of global peace, justice, prosperity, and his respect for the rule of law and the work of the UN that continue to influence me as I grapple with the many complex challenges I face as Secretary-General.

One of my highest priorities is to revitalize international efforts—including efforts inside the UN itself—in the field of disarmament. Much of my original interest in this subject no doubt stems from my experience of living in a country that has directly experienced threats from nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Such threats are surely not unique to my region and there is widespread support throughout the world for the view that nuclear weapons must never again be used, due to their indiscriminate effects, their impact on the natural environment, and their profound implications for regional and global security. Some now call this an emerging nuclear “taboo.”

Yet if these views are so strong, why do such threats persist? Why has disarmament remained only a noble goal, rather than a historic achievement? In short, how can international peace and security be achieved in a nuclear-weapon-free world?

Today—23 May 2008—is a fitting occasion to examine such questions. It is the thirtieth anniversary of the UN General Assembly's first Special Session dedicated just to disarmament. The Final Document of that conference included a declaration of principles, a programme of action, and an institutional blueprint for the multilateral “machinery” needed to convert the lofty ideal of disarmament into a concrete reality.

The conference—known as “SSOD-I”—specifically identified “general and complete disarmament under effective international control” as the world’s ultimate objective. This goal also appears in numerous multilateral treaties—including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and several others creating regional nuclear-weapon-free zones. It remains today the ultimate strategic goal of the UN in disarmament. For this audience, I would like to recall that it was also the subject of a concrete set of proposals made by President Kennedy in his historic speech to the General Assembly on 25 September 1961.

So what does this curious notion of “general and complete” disarmament really mean and is it still relevant?

Far from being a utopian fantasy, general and complete disarmament is one of the most practical, realistic approaches to security that the world community has ever invented. No, it does not mean the elimination of each and every weapon on earth. And no, it does not mean the unilateral relinquishing of weapons without any controls or means of defence.

It involves instead the simultaneous pursuit of two essential goals: the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction—namely, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons—and the limitation of other types of weapons to serve legitimate defensive purposes, like the maintenance of borders and internal order, and sustaining international peacekeeping operations. Such goals serve the national security interests of all countries. In words agreed at SSOD-I, the objective—at each stage of the disarmament process—should be “undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces.”

Let me put it this way, if disarmament does not enhance security, it will not occur. Disarmament is not simple philanthropy. It may be morally desirable, but it is not undertaken just for moral reasons. Disarmament is also neither an end in itself nor is it alone sufficient to produce a safer and more secure world for all. Yet it serves many indispensable functions in achieving such a goal, which accounts for its strong popular support over the ages.

The UN has for several decades been working to promote WMD disarmament and non-proliferation, along with conventional arms control. Disarmament and the regulation of armaments are goals found in the Charter, which was adopted even before nuclear weapons had ever been tested. On 24 January 1946, the General Assembly—meeting in London—adopted its first resolution, which contained the goal of eliminating what it called “weapons adaptable to mass destruction”. These goals have been supported by every Secretary-General and none more sincerely than the present incumbent. They have been the subject of hundreds of General Assembly resolutions and have repeatedly been endorsed by all our Member States.

I think it is fair to say that disarmament has become part of the very identity of the UN as an institution. Everybody knows that the most important decisions in disarmament are made by states and that the UN’s role in promoting this goal relates to its value in serving as a central forum for debate and deliberation in the world community, a forum that can produce common standards and agreed norms to serve the interests of all.

As an organization, the UN can also advocate, educate, analyze, and prioritize, in the pursuit of these agreed goals. Our value is in assisting our Member States to achieve what they have already decided to pursue. Disarmament is one such goal, and when disarmament advances, the world advances. Yet when it is not achieved, the unconstrained competition in weaponry can not only jeopardize national and regional security, but the very survival of our planet.

Supporters of all of the UN's great goals—in such fields as development, human rights, the environment, and humanitarian relief—quietly assume the non-use of nuclear weapons, whether by states or by terrorist groups. Verified and irreversible disarmament remains the safest, most reliable way to ensure against the use of such weapons. This is why disarmament—nuclear disarmament in particular—is so closely identified with the work of the UN, which has the maintenance of international peace and security as one of its primary missions. We view disarmament as a vital step in achieving this goal, for we recognize that it simply is not sufficient just to “reduce the risk” of a global nuclear catastrophe.

All nuclear threats—whether from existing arsenals, from the proliferation of such weapons to additional states, or from their acquisition by terrorists—derive from some fundamental, intrinsic qualities of nuclear weapons. The effects of such weapons are characteristically indiscriminate, respecting no distinctions between citizen and soldier, men and women, the old and the young, plant and animal—indeed, no distinctions between all living things. Such effects are also long-lasting, reaching even to future generations.

Even when such weapons are not used they pose great risks. They have been subject to accidents. Some have been lost. They could be used as a result of a miscalculation, faulty intelligence, or a computer problem. Some are vulnerable to unauthorized use. Some could be stolen. The nuclear materials that go into such weapons have their own vulnerabilities from the day they are produced, transported from place to place, stored, inserted into a weapon, and removed from a weapon. Significant amounts of fissile materials have been “unaccounted for.” Some such materials pose major risks to human health and the environment even when mined, well before they are suitable for use in an actual weapon.

It is perhaps not surprising that threats from such weapons would persist over so many years, despite persistent disarmament efforts. The horrific effects of these weapons are so frightening that several states view them as offering the ultimate deterrent of nuclear attack. While less than ten states possess such weapons, more than half of humanity lives in states that have them. About 26,000 nuclear weapons reportedly remain in this world, some 38 years after the parties to the NPT agreed in Article VI to pursue negotiations “at an early date” on effective measures to end the nuclear arms race and to advance nuclear disarmament.

The logic of nuclear deterrence has unfortunately proven to be contagious, which has made the task of promoting non-proliferation more difficult. It is challenging to halt the global spread of weapons that several states have declared are indispensable to their own security. All states that possess nuclear weapons claim that they only have the minimum number needed to maintain deterrence. Yet the world is clearly seeking far more than just to limit the number of states possessing such weapons, or to limit the size of existing arsenals. As is well documented

in deliberations at the UN, the vast majority of states continues to view *zero* as the most desirable minimum number of such weapons.

There are of course other reasons—bureaucratic, political, and economic why such weapons persist. In one way or another, even the news media and entertainment industries make their own contributions in perpetuating such weapons, by overselling their contribution to security while belittling prospects for disarmament. No doubt nationalism has its own role to play. Interestingly enough, these forces seem to apply regardless of political system or culture. The weapons have taken on a life of their own that transcends national frontiers.

Yet while the obstacles to disarmament are formidable, I am astonished that the risks of the alternatives to disarmament never get the attention they deserve. I have already addressed the problems of security over existing stockpiles and the dangers from the global spread of such weapons. But what of the other alternatives? Will the endless expansion of military budgets produce world peace? The world is currently spending well over \$1 trillion per year for military purposes, yet the prevailing mood is one of growing insecurity and fear, rather than security and hope for a better world. Just a tiny fraction of that expenditure would go far in providing the resources needed to fund all the Development Goals agreed eight years ago at the Millennium Summit. Under-funding development and short-changing the environment are only worsening conditions of human security throughout the world.

Lasting security will not be found on a mountaintop of weapons. It will not be found in nuclear deterrence nor will it be reliably found in attempts to halt technological progress through export denial strategies, as illustrated by the illicit nuclear supplier network of Dr. A. Q. Khan. If undertaken without disarmament and non-proliferation, it will not be found in other forms of defence. It also won't be found even in noble words about disarmament, if detached from the deeds that give such words meaning and respect.

Lasting security will only be achievable if both disarmament and non-proliferation are pursued together as mutually reinforcing means to the same end, a secure world free of WMD. International efforts to halt the spread of these weapons would be helped enormously by significant progress in the field of disarmament—progress that would signal that the purpose of non-proliferation is not simply denial, but the achievement of a fair, universal standard of non-possession. Disarmament is, in this sense, indispensable to non-proliferation by strengthening its legitimacy. Non-proliferation is itself indispensable in enabling disarmament to proceed in an environment free of WMD threats.

So what exactly are the deeds that are needed to breathe new life into disarmament? Some have been offered in a series of opinion-editorials and speeches by four former U.S. officials, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn. Some have been put forward by the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission chaired by Hans Blix. Many of these proposals in turn built upon earlier recommendations by such groups as the Canberra Commission, the Tokyo Forum, the New Agenda Coalition, and the seven-nation initiative spearheaded by Norway.

It is important to note that the nuclear-weapon states have themselves undertaken various actions and made their own proposals for further progress in disarmament—actions including the closing of some nuclear test sites, halting production of fissile material, declared reductions in existing stockpiles, and the retirement of certain classes of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. The General Assembly's First Committee has also produced numerous resolutions to advance specific disarmament goals. There is clearly no shortage of proposals, which is a good sign that more people are taking this issue seriously not just as a vision, but as a call to action.

I would like to offer my own thoughts on what is needed to revitalize the international disarmament agenda. The time has clearly come to stop thinking of disarmament as merely a goal, and to start thinking of it more as a process—one that includes curbing the proliferation of WMD. Since the goal is already widely accepted, how can disarmament become more action-oriented?

First, the world has already agreed by treaty to outlaw both biological and chemical weapons. Achieving these goals will remain difficult, since the respective treaties have not yet gained universal membership and still face their own unique challenges of achieving full and effective implementation. Yet those obstacles did not prevent the negotiation of those treaties, nor did the cliché that these various weapons “can’t be disinvented.” They were outlawed even though it might be technically possible to produce them—the challenge is to reduce or eliminate the incentive and capability to do this, though early detection and collective action.

What these treaties did was to establish a global taboo on the very possession of such weapons. And that is a very good start indeed—nobody today is describing biological or chemical weapons as vital or indispensable to their security.

Though we have not yet reached this point with respect to nuclear weapons, I believe the world is clearly moving in this direction. Long after the end of the Cold War and amid growing calls for progress in nuclear disarmament, world public opinion would enthusiastically welcome any indication that the nuclear-weapon states had agreed to start discussing the basic outlines of a nuclear-weapons convention.

So today I call upon all states that possess such weapons to give some serious consideration to such a convention, through their own internal studies and in their international consultations. The complexity of the issues involved argue strongly for starting this process of assessment and dialogue sooner rather than later.

What would such a treaty have to contain to ensure that security would be strengthened in a nuclear-weapon-free world? How could the treaty advance the goals of transparency, irreversibility, and verification that the world community has long been seeking in disarmament agreements? Some significant effort has already been invested in drafting such a treaty. Last January, I received from Costa Rica and Malaysia a draft that had been prepared by an international consortium of experts. I circulated that text to all UN member states and believe that it offers a good point of departure for study, debate, and elaboration.

As the nuclear powers consider this issue, they should also engage with other key states and the appropriate venue for this is the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. I call upon the CD to set up a working group to begin discussions on nuclear disarmament.

With respect to the Security Council, it too has several important contributions to make in this field—which is not surprising, given its primary role in the maintenance of international peace and security. The issue of eliminating WMD was high on the Council's agenda for several years in the early history of the UN and may one day again return. One possible approach would be for the five permanent members to commence discussions within the Military Staff Committee—consistent with Article 47 of the Charter—with the goal of drafting a plan for enhancing military security through the nuclear disarmament process.

The Security Council might also wish to consider convening a special meeting or summit at the level of heads of state and government devoted to global nuclear disarmament. Meeting at this level in January 1992, the Council declared the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to be a threat to international peace and security, while also underlining “the need for all Member States to fulfil their obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament.” I hope that the permanent members of the Council will give some consideration to adopting a joint statement strongly reaffirming their own commitments to global nuclear disarmament and their willingness to undertake new initiatives in fulfilling this historic goal.

I also call upon all non-NPT states to contribute to this process by refraining from further development of their own nuclear-weapon capabilities, as well as their delivery vehicles, and by undertaking their own disarmament commitments.

To reinforce the nuclear-weapons convention, governments must invest more in the technology needed to verify such a treaty, in particular to satisfy the criteria of “timely warning” of non-compliance and timely detection of violations. Achieving these goals will likely require a substantial investment in verification research and development. I note that the government of the United Kingdom has recently proposed to host a conference of nuclear-weapon states to consider technical issues relating to the verification of nuclear disarmament—this is a very encouraging initiative, very much consistent with what I am proposing today.

In parallel with this work, I strongly encourage all nuclear-weapon states to commence operational military planning for security in a post-nuclear-weapon world—they could examine the need for new doctrines, training, defensive measures, and improvements in verification, as well as ways to reinforce the Charter's key norms concerning the peaceful settlement disputes and the avoidance of threats or use of force. Disarmament will not itself solve the problem of war, but it will help to ensure that any such war will not lead to the end of civilization.

My third initiative relates to the broader need to strengthen the “rule of law” for disarmament. Nuclear weapons will never be eliminated in a vacuum—other steps will be needed to ensure against the reappearance of such weapons. Eliminating the world's deadliest weapons will require many steps that must be legally binding. Unilateral moratoria on conducting nuclear tests and producing fissile materials for weapons can only go so far in advancing disarmament, and the same is true with respect to non-binding declarations of support

for non-proliferation. Neither approach offers any acceptable substitute for binding legal obligations in both these areas.

Accordingly, I am renewing my calls for new efforts to bring the CTBT into force and for the CD to commence immediately negotiations on a fissile material treaty. I also call upon the nuclear-weapon states to ratify all the protocols to the regional nuclear-weapon-zone treaties and to offer nuclear security assurances—in a legal and unqualified form—to parties to such zones and to the NPT. I also call for the early entry into force of the Central Asian and African nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. I urge all NPT parties to conclude their safeguards agreements with the IAEA and voluntarily to agree to accept the strengthened safeguards under the Additional Protocol.

I do not have an answer for the longer-term problem of the future of the civilian nuclear fuel cycle, but I know that global nuclear disarmament will be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve as long as states are continuing to produce even more weapon-usable fissile material—namely, separated plutonium and highly-enriched uranium. Whether the solution is to outlaw such activities, put them under multilateral control, or allow them under much stricter safeguards, is for states to decide—and there are discussions in progress in several forums. The point I wish to make here is that we should not just view the fuel cycle as strictly an energy issue or a non-proliferation issue. It is also a profoundly important issue bearing upon prospects for global nuclear disarmament.

My fourth proposal is for enhanced accountability throughout the disarmament process—what might be called “results-based disarmament.” The nuclear-weapon states have often circulated descriptions of all they are doing to pursue the goal of nuclear disarmament, yet the general public seldom sees such material, which is often distributed at specialized treaty review conferences or in various other multilateral forums. I invite all the nuclear-weapon states to send such material to the UN Secretariat and, in general, to encourage its wider public dissemination. These states clearly have an interest in keeping the international community informed on past and future measures to implement their international obligations, a goal that is also consistent with the expectations of the parties to the NPT, as voiced at several of the treaty’s Review Conferences, notably in 1995 and 2000. I can only see benefits for international peace and security from more active engagement on the basic facts of the process of disarmament.

My fifth proposal is for a set of what might be called, “collateral measures” to ensure that security is not jeopardized during the disarmament process. My proposals here rely heavily upon the familiar notion of “general and complete disarmament”—including, separate agreements to limit conventional arms, new efforts to achieve universal membership in the key WMD treaties and their full implementation, bans on certain types of weapons (for example, long-range missiles and space weapons), and placement of U.S. and Russian military fissile material under safeguards as agreed in the US/Russia/IAEA “Trilateral Initiative,” which has not yet been implemented. I also think the time has come for the UN to take a good close look at the adequacy of its own disarmament machinery, and one way to do this is by convening another special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, an “SSOD-IV.”

Some may wonder, at this point, what about terrorism, especially nuclear terrorism? My answer is that if real, verified progress is underway, along with all the collateral measures I have addressed, the ability to eliminate the threat of WMD terrorism will grow exponentially. It will be much easier to encourage governments to tighten their physical security and non-proliferation controls if there exists a basic global taboo on the very possession of certain types of weapons. I am concerned that simple "anti-terrorist" initiatives alone will not solve the problem of terrorism. As we progressively eliminate the world's deadliest weapons and their unique component materials, we will make it harder to execute WMD terrorist attacks—and if our efforts also seek to address the social, economic, cultural, and political conditions that aggravate terrorist threats, so much the better.

"Let us call a truce to terror," said President Kennedy at the UN in 1961, adding "Let us invoke the blessings of peace. And as we build an international capacity to keep peace, let us join in dismantling the national capacity to wage war."

It is ironic that the keys to world peace have been in our collective hands all along. They are found in the UN Charter. I have offered this afternoon a fresh start not just to revitalize disarmament, but to strengthen the whole system of international peace and security that the survivors of World War II left for succeeding generations as the path to avoid the scourge of war.

I call upon you and all students and faculty of this great University to recall the words of one of America's great educators, Horace Mann, who once said, "Be ashamed to die until you have won some victory for humanity." Achieving disarmament would be no small victory for humanity. It is a good and noble cause and I invite you all to contribute all you can. There is much to do. Let us start today.