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ACC. 1998/0282

CODE  
CABLE

UNAMIR

UNAMIR

KIGALI RWANDA

94 JUL 30 22 37

FAX OUT NO: CRN:-276  
MIR:-1464

PAGE 1 OF 2

TO: M. ANNAN, DPKO UNAMIR KIGALI	FROM: MGEN DALLAIRE, FC
PREFIX NO:	DATE: JULY 30, 1994
ATTN: DPKO	PHONE:
FAX NO: 1 212 963 1999	FAX NO: 1 212 963 3097
INFO:	DRAFTER: DALLAIRE
FAX NO:	
Internal Dist.:	
SUBJECT: INVITATION TO MEET FRENCH PRIME MINISTER	
REFERENCE:	

AAA IN RESPONSE TO THE INVITATION EXPRESSED BY THE FRENCH PRIME MINISTER FOR THE RWANDAN FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE FC TO MEET WITH THE FORMER IN CYANGUGU ON 31 JULY AT 1030 HOURS, RELAYED TO FC BY MS ISEL RIVERO AT 1930 HOURS 30 JULY, THE FC CONDUCTED A CHECK WITH THE FOLLOWING PERSONS:

A. THE RPF LO ATTEMPTED TO GET IN TOUCH WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER BUT TO NO AVAIL. THE FORMER KNEW NOTHING OF THE INVITATION.

B. THE FC MEET THE RWANDAN PRIME MINISTER WHO EXPRESSED TOTAL SURPRISE AT THE INVITATION AND STATED THAT NEITHER HE, NOR THE PRESIDENT, NOR THE VICE-PRESIDENT WERE AWARE OF THE INVITATION. HE FOUND THIS WHOLE AFFAIR OF THE FRENCH PRIME MINISTER AND FRENCH MINISTER OF HEALTH VISITING THE HUMANITARIAN PROTECTION ZONE WITHOUT COMING/ESTABLISHING A PROPER VISIT TO THE GOVERNMENT AS DEMEANING, INSULTING. HE STATED THAT RWANDA WAS A SMALL AND POOR COUNTRY BUT HAD SOME ELEMENT OF DIGNITY THAT SHOULD BE ACKNOWLEDGED.

BBB. FC RECEIVED A MESSAGE THROUGH FRENCH ARMY LO TO FORCE HQ FROM OP TURQUOISE HQ AT 2030 HOURS 30 JULY, STATING THAT FRENCH PRIME MINISTER HAD RECEIVED AN INVITATION FROM THE RWANDAN FOREIGN MINISTER TO MEET WITH THE FORMER IN CYANGUGU. FC HAD THIS MESSAGE VERIFIED AND IT WAS CONFIRMED FROM PARIS.

CCC. THIS HAS PUT A TOTALLY DIFFERENT TWIST TO THE POSSIBLE RENCONTRE. BUT EITHER WAY, THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT, THROUGH THE COMMENTS FROM PRIME MINISTER FAUSTIN, HAS NO INTENTION NOR KNOWLEDGE OF THE INVITATION AND CERTAINLY IS MOST UPSET WITH THIS SITUATION.

DDD. FC REGRETS NOT BEING AVAILABLE TO MEET AT LAST MINUTE THE

CODE  
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CRN 276. 2/2

FRENCH PRIME MINISTER AS HE IS WHOLLY INVOLVED WITH THE VISIT AT  
SAME TIME OF USA DEFENCE SECRETARY AND IN DETAILED  
PLANNING/COORDINATION WITH US ARMY LOCAL COMMANDER OF OPERATIONS IN  
PROGRESS.

EEE. FC WISHES TO STATE THAT SUCH A CIRCUMSTANCE INVOLVING THE  
FRENCH PROTOCOL OF VISITING POLITICAL DIGNITARIES HAS BECOME THE  
NORM THAT IS MOST UNACCEPTABLE.

BEST REGARDS



UNAMIR - MINUAR

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

94 JUL 20 18 43

To: **BARIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK** CRN 259  
From: **DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI**  
Date: **20 July 1994**  
Number: **MIR 1398**  
Subject: **MILITARY ASSESSMENT OF RWANDA - UNAMIR MANDATE**  
Reference: **Code cable MIR 1330 dated 11 July 1994 from SRSG**

1. Since the last analysis of the political/military situation at reference, the war in Rwanda has evolved significantly. Although we still do not have a formal cease-fire, there appears to be only one portion of the country that will remain under a security control of a foreign force and that is the south-west area currently called the Humanitarian Protection Zone (HPZ). All the rest of the country has been militarily conquered by the RPA and is under their security umbrella.

2. RPA Area. This area covers approximately 80% of the Rwandese sovereign territory, including the capital and all major urban zones, except for CYANGUGU, GIKONGORO and KIBUYE (see map attached). The RPA have essentially pacified the area under their military control. They have deployed troops throughout and have proceeded to consolidate the security situation through patrols, movement of the population that remains in camps/towns, check points at tactical spots, local investigation of undesirables according to their criteria, summary executions, holding of prisoners, rehabilitation training of those who have opted to join them, and a continuing good level of discipline in their army. There is a

concern of possible infiltration over the next few months as the bulk of the political/military/militia extremists have escaped, in particular to Zaire. This requires a joint monitoring of border areas as per our mandate and possible ambush sites.

3. The aspect that is still nebulous is the civil police or possibly gendarmerie portion of their security structure. There are no forces dedicated to these tasks. Currently, the soldiers of the RPA are performing the checks and patrolling in a normal military fashion, with arrests being done as part of their duties. The level of looting and squatting that is being done in Kigali by both civilians and military is such that no one, not even the agencies, are spared from these activities. Food stocks, supply/distribution material, vehicles, buildings, furniture, all have been the object of these intensive wrongdoings. The return of refugees from the late 50's, of the more recent refugees (1990) and of the displaced persons who have survived the present war, have created an infrastructure/accommodation imbalance that will be more and more the cause of friction between the ethnic groups and those belonging to various political allegiances. As an example, a moderate ex-minister who has returned to Kigali found his home destroyed, so he has been permitted to take over the house of a former political adversary whose residence is still in excellent condition.

4. Apart from these obvious frictions, the current demographic imbalance in the various camps in favour of Tutsi/RPF supporters has raised concerns on the safety and tranquility of the other displaced persons, and even of those still in their houses. The eventuality of the previously mentioned "5ème colonne" of armed extremist subversive elements seeing the day is not to be discarded, although they may not be in evidence immediately due to the very detailed surveillance and monitoring of such possible elements by the RPA. Lastly, there is the option of creating large camps on

the Rwandese border to cater to over one million refugees in Zaire and Tanzania. It is felt however that it would be more effective to set up these camps, with UNAMIR protection, in Rwanda, instead of keeping the Rwandese refugees out of their country.

5. Thus in the RPA area, the security requirements that must be met by UNAMIR according to its mandate can be assessed as follows:

- a. Responding by UNMO escorts and formed-troops guards to all UN agencies' and NGOs' calls for security support to be done by an outside neutral force or non/Rwandese service.
- b. Responding by either UNMOs or formed troops to calls for security of safe sites where the displaced persons and refugee population feel threatened.
- c. The secure return of displaced persons and refugees back to their homes or to safe sites will require transport assets and escorts.
- d. Assisting/monitoring the evolution of the civil security organs through the auspices of UNCIVPOL expertise at communal, prefectoral and national police or gendarmerie levels.

6. The task of assisting in the mine clearance, particularly in the northern portion of Rwanda where an estimated 40,000 mines were laid before this war still remains. The presence of mines is a serious threat to displaced persons and refugees as they return to the limited land space available and conduct their normal rural way of life. This war has seen some additional mines and considerable unexploded ordinance having been laid along certain axis coming to and around Kigali that must be marked and eliminated. Furthermore, the terrible

state of the roads/bridges in the north precludes reasonable humanitarian aid deliveries/support. This infrastructure has also deteriorated in other parts of the country where the fighting was most severe. Due to the above, getting a composite engineer company on the ground is of the utmost urgency. People are streaming back and it is most difficult to have them avoid the contaminated areas, and at least three important bridges on main supply routes must be rebuilt from scratch.

7. In response to the requirement stated above for an outside force to be present in the RPA held territory, which will be called the Broad-Based Government territory over the next few days, the following deployment plan is recommended for the next 6 months or until the end of January 95 (refer to attached map):

- a. Sector 1. Deploy soonest the previous Bangladesh Engineer company which has all the reconnaissance data still on hand but with an increased EOD capability and bridge-building materials. We deploy them back to BYUMBA, at the heart of the engineering problem, but with elements deployable throughout the country on demand. A MILOB Sector HQ and CIVPOL Sector HQ, co-located at BYUMBA with a strength of 41 UNMOs (12 teams) and 15 CIVPOLs.
- b. Sector 2. Deploy the Force HQ and Signals Squadron, the Field Hospital, one large independent motorized company, 50 UNMOs (15 teams) and 55 (incl HQ) CIVPOLs in KIGALI, with an out-station in GIKONGO.
- c. Sector 3. Deploy the Force HQ tactical HQ in BUTARE with an UNMO/CIVPOL out-station, but have one large independent motorized company and the bulk of the 53 MILOBS (16 teams) and 15 CIVPOLs based out of

BUTARE. They would conduct similar tasks as Sectors 1 and 2, but would also monitor the RPA side of the HPZ.

- d. Sector 5. Deploy a large independent motorized company in RUHENGIRI with 41 UNMOs (12 teams) and 20 CIVPOLs, with an out-station in GISENYI. The tasks are the same as those described at sub-paragraph c. above.
- e. Summary of UNMOs/CIVPOLs. Including the HQ, a total of 320 UNMOs and 130 CIVPOLs would be required.

8. The Humanitarian Protection Zone (HPZ) (Sector 4). The future security of this zone and even its existence is directly related to both the on-going methods of security of the French-led coalition forces, their interactions with the RPA, the rapidity of deployment and the state of operational capability of UNAMIR forces, coupled with and the parallel departure of the coalition forces, the overall threat situation over the next 4 weeks (RGF/militia), and most importantly, the method of planned integration of this region, its inhabitants and its very large displaced persons population, into the mainstream of the evolving Broad-Based Government and related structures. It is not clear at this time how long this sector will be either accepted or needed as a separate Rwandese entity in the national framework.

9. Discussions held with Maj Gen Kagame of RPA have revealed that he has no ambitions to enter the HPZ while either the French-led coalition forces are present nor during the transition between those forces and UNAMIR. He did however express concern over the eventual movement of those large numbers of displaced persons westerly through the forest. This would create more suffering and a destabilisation of the area and in the border area with Zaire. He gave no indication of when this zone would be normalized into the rest of Rwanda.



10. The current situation in the HPZ however is a considerable cause of concern:

- a. Cease-fire. The tardy announcement of the cease-fire, coupled with the successful offensive into the north-west (GISENYI), a very large number of displaced persons in the HPZ have commenced to move westerly. They fear that the RPA will finish off the GISENYI pocket and then simply order the coalition forces out of the HPZ in order to take full control of all of Rwanda. An estimated 500,000 people are mobile now through the forest.
- b. A significant number of RGF elements, no less than three battalions, have come down into KIBUYE but have been disarmed and cantoned by the French and Senegalese. Those RGF elements already in the HPZ are presently being cantoned and disarmed slowly by the coalition forces. It is estimated that about a strength 2,000 to 3,000 RGF personnel are still deployed tactically in the HPA. The militia and self-defence groups are still very much in evidence, particularly in KIBUYE and CYANGUGU.
- c. The local government elements in KIBUYE (Prefect, Gendarmerie, et al have run away leaving this area without any social/bureaucratic/security structure upon which the coalition and the future UNAMIR forces can build on. It is hoped that the GIKONGORO and CYANGUGU prefecture structures will remain in place. But, should they leave, then we would face a serious vacuum. Efforts to have those people stay in place are on-going.
- d. A large number of extremists, civil and military/militia, have entered and are in place in both KIBUYE and CYANGUGU. Their influence is still

very strong on the mood of the locals towards the coalition forces, the NGOs and UNAMIR. The security situation, particularly for UNAMIR elements, is very risky and not in the least improving, even though the coalition forces are providing security and are starting to disarm the locals.

11. The dominant factor that could affect the future situation in the HPZ is the early withdrawal of the French-led coalition forces. Any option that might delay their departure will be seen in a very bad light by the RPF and its new Broad-Based Government (BBG). Their reaction could be anywhere from stating that all foreign forces are to withdraw immediately from the HPZ so that they can finish the job they had started throughout the rest of the country, to demonstrating a certain level of tolerance to the evident inability of the UN to meet any reasonable deployment and operational milestones, and as such permit a few weeks delay. Until personal contact between Maj Gen Kagame and FC is accomplished over the next few days on this specific matter, there is no telling what the RPF/BBG reaction will be.

12. Under the above-mentioned set of circumstances and factors, it is the FC's analysis that all planning, deployment, equipping and training of the forces for at least Phases 1 and 2 levels must continue with few exceptions. There is an absolute need for UNAMIR to enter the HPZ with the overwhelming force and mandate to respond to the very real security and humanitarian concerns still in evidence in that zone. UNAMIR will have to continue providing assets to the protected sites as these individuals are at risk. We have to give assurances to NGOs et al that they are able to count on our protection in their movements (convoys, etc.), at their distribution/warehouses. We have to instill confidence in the very large number of displaced persons so that they can feel secure against any RPA offensive into the area until at least

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the BBG political/security situation is clear. We must provide enough self-protection to our own forces in order to permit them to operate with a minimum of security as the whole attitude of both the locals and the displaced persons is most aggressive towards UNAMIR because in their opinion our involvement in their conflict has been to their disadvantage. This final aspect UNAMIR operations in the HPZ cannot be minimized as our observers already working as Liaison Officers with the French forces are very much under threat of death at this time.

13. In conferring in detail with the French Commander in Goma on the eventual hand-over of the HPZ to UNAMIR, no vacuum of security must be permitted during this transitional period. It is thus strongly recommended that the force deploy accordingly:

- a. Armed troops of at least equivalent quality/quantity should be present in the HPZ for at least three months after hand-over.
- b. The size of the force, due to the threat, the geography, the tasks and the on-going complex political/social vagaries, should be no less than three battalions of 800 men each of which two must be mechanized and one motorized, deployed as per map attached.
- c. At least 35 UNMOs (10 teams) in sub-sectors 4A and 4B, and 18 UNMOs (6 teams) in sub-sector 4C. The monitoring of the HPZ boundary is an essential task requiring these extra UNMOs.
- d. No less than 25 CIVPOLs per sub-sector 4A and 4B with a stronger presence of CIVPOL, particularly in CYANGUGU due to the border crossing and the concentration of extremist elements in tht area.

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14. There is an overriding facet of our deployment in the HPZ that must be responded to, and that is the rules of engagement and our response to the threat. UNAMIR is seen by the Rwandese as a force that is not prepared to use its capabilities to defend others in the accomplishment of its tasks. This has been the result of our mandate/force levels and determination of units involved during this war. It is imperative that the force deploying into the HPZ demonstrate not only locally overwhelming force, but also and most importantly, the determination to use that force (to a minimum level, of course) should the situation require it. It should also have the flexibility and resources to establish its dominant protective presence in the accomplishment of its duties.

15. It is thus proposed that only during the hand-over phase of this operation with the French-led coalition force in the HPZ, UNAMIR be authorized to operate under chapter VII of the Charter. Once having established its credentials in the HPZ during this phase, it could revert to Chapter VI for the continuation of the security task.

16. Equipment/Deployment/Sustainement. Although Rwanda and UNAMIR have been at the centre of a terrible human tragedy, not to say holocaust, and although many fine words have been pronounced by all, including the members of the Security Council, the tangible effort on the ground to meet the minimum viable operational needs of this mission have been totally, completely ineffective. We have no food/fuel/water stocks, we have no operational vehicles in theatre, we have no spare parts, we have no logistics support as the contractor has not been hired, we have no water supply. What is worse, we have no sign of the situation getting better in the near future. It is hoped that hard driving is being done to get the \$ needed for the Brown and Root contract and that the official request has already been sent to Paris for the French to leave behind, in situ, for us, the equipment listed at Annex A.

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17. What we have been living here is a disgrace. The international community and the UN Member States have, on the one hand, been appalled at what has happened in Rwanda while, on the other hand, these same authorities, apart from few exceptions, have done nothing substantive to help the situation. The credibility of this mission is being for the second time undermined by both the UN administrative structure and the individual troops contributing sovereign member Nations as the Force has been prevented from having a modicum of self respect and effectiveness on the ground. If we cannot even support those elements we now have in Rwanda, how can we continue to say that we will be starting to replace the French-led coalition in 10 days time? FC acknowledges that this mission is a logistical nightmare for your HQ, but that is nothing compared to the living hell that has surrounded us, coupled with the obligation of standing in front of both parties and be the bearer of so little help and credibility.

18. Conclusion. The above assessment of the military situation and its deducted tasks and troop/force requirements, including rules on the use of force, are provided for your action (see Annex B). It is to be noted that all the operational planning going on, with its political/security ramifications, will all be for nothing if UNHQ and its Member States fail to provide the personnel, the equipment and the strategic airlift to bring the force into theater over the next few weeks.

19. In assessing the current personnel, equipment, material and budgetary situation, it is the FC's opinion that there does not seem to be the sense of urgency to implement innovative options to meet the critical operational needs of this mission. UNHQ, and sovereign countries, with few exceptions, have solidly failed in providing any reasonable/tangible/timely support to the expanded UNAMIR so far. The APCs are still in Entebbe, we don't have water, no support contracts are signed, no conversions of staff have

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
been done, no UN vehicles <sup>or</sup> camp stores have moved from anywhere, no hiring of locals has been initiated, etc.

20. The time has come to state openly that this mission cannot take over the HPZ from the French-led coalition on 31 July and that after deployment of troops, their marrying up with the equipment yet to arrive, and then the training and indoctrination before tasking, we will not be ready before well into August, and certainly not wholly operational before the end of September if we continue at this rate. FC's disappointment at this time of events is so profound that it is taxing beyond reason his loyalty to both the UN and to his subordinates. The FC considers the inability of the UN and its sovereign Member States to come to the assistance of this mission to achieve a minimal level of credibility in stabilizing Rwanda as nothing less than an outright scandal on the part of the "international community".

21. It is hoped that this military assessment will be of use to you in the decision process of the UN.




# DEPLOYMENT PLAN



13/12







15/17

UNAMIR - MINUAR



ANNEX A

Kigali,  
1000.1/FC/BOI


1994

To: General Lafourcade, Operation Turquoise  
From: Force Commander, UNAMIR  
Date: 18 JUL 1994

Subject: REQUEST FOR MATERIEL

1. The following list of materiel is requested from Operation Turquoise to be left in place for transfer to UNAMIR.

- a. support vehicles for 3 battalions,
- b. operational\section to company level vehicles for one motorized battalion to include section level weapons,
- c. heavy equipment and mine clearance equipment for one engineer company,
- d. bivouac stores for 2 & 1/2 battalions including tentage, kitchens, generators, lighting, water purification and camp stores,
- e. logistics company vehicle lift to include airhead handling capacity (forklifts), PLS, and equipment for log base materiel handling,
- f. food, water and fuel for up to 30 days for up to 2800 personnel,
- g. 30 days supply of ammo for any weapons systems left, and;
- h. section/platoon/company level night vision devices for 2 x battalions.

  
R.A. Dallaire  
MGEN  
FORCE COMMANDER  
UNAMIR

(C)  
RECOMMENDED FORCE STRUCTURE  
FOR UNAMIR  
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1. Force HQ of approximately 65 personnel.
2. Force Signal Squadron and defense element of 440 personnel.
3. Force Field Hospital and self-defense element of 300 personnel.
4. Three (3) independent/autonomous motorized companies of a maximum of 200 personnel each.
5. Two (2) mechanized infantry battalions of four (4) companies each for a total of 800 personnel per battalion.
6. One (1) motorized infantry battalion of four (4) companies for a total of 800 personnel.
7. Force transport company of a maximum of 60 major vehicles and 200 personnel.
8. Force composite helicopter and fixed wing Squadron of four (4) LOH (with weapons/door guns) for one convoy overwatch and one monitoring task at a time, and up to 4 UTH for troop, logistics and MEDEVAC lift for a total of 250 personnel. The fixed wing requirement for logistics, MEDEVAC and command liaison is to be finalized as civilian contracted.
9. Military Observer Group and Liaison HQ and five (5) subordinate Sectors for a total of 320 UNMOs.

10. Civilian Police Group and five (5) subordinate Sectors for a total of 130 CIVPOLs.
11. All second and third logistics and maintenance, plus movement control are to be either contracted or run by UN civilian staff.
12. The total military strenght is thus expected to be:
  - a. Military Observers: 320 UNMOs.
  - b. Civilian Police: 130 CIVPOLs.
  - c. Staff Officers/NCOs: 65 personnel.
  - d. Formed troops: 4,190 personnel.

UNITED NATIONS  
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES  
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR  
94 JUL 25 20 45

UNAMIR - MINUAR

CRN-263

1/4

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

To: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
From: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI  
Date: 25, July 1994  
Number: MIR-1427  
Subject: Support to UNAMIR Humanitarian Mandate  
Reference: A. Your code cable No. 2319 dated 21 July 1994  
B. My code cable MIR 1398 dated 20 July 1994

*Shahmury, Khan*

94 JUL 25 20 59

UNAMIR

1. In response to reference A and given the positive reaction, particularly by the U.S., in favour of the refugees in GOMA, it is felt that some absolutely essential requirements could/should be met for both the humanitarian effort and the UNAMIR build-up. It is to be noted that although the humanitarian concerns are now directed at the terrible situation in GOMA, there is a very real possibility of an even greater disaster in the south-west of Rwanda if the over 2 million local and displaced persons start to move west. The French-led coalition forces will be pulling out on 31 July 1994 and will be finished by 21 August 1994. Should UNAMIR not be present in force and with sufficient credibility to relieve the French, the reaction of the displaced persons will be immediate. They will move in mass across the border. Furthermore, if they perceived that the humanitarian support is going to sites outside the country instead of to the heartland, they will move to BUKAVU, thus creating a worse scene than the one in GOMA.

2. Mission/Infrastructure needs. In response to the agreed UNAMIR/UNREO/UNHCR concept of support to the GOMA tragedy, it is proposed that the aid effort must be funnelled through Rwanda to the outlying areas. This will both attract the people back and assist in bringing the national infrastructure towards normalcy.

The critical nature of this concept cannot be overemphasized. 2/4  
It is therefore proposed:

- a. That a developed nation immediately provide a self-contained composite Engineer Company for bridge and road reconstruction, water purification and drilling, mine clearance, hydro and electrical repair/rebuilding.
- b. A self-contained transport company that can move large tonnage of food, water, material and possibly fuel and, just as important, that will be able to move large numbers of people with their meagre belongings back to their homes. The trucks from the U.K. are fine but drivers are needed and maintenance is required.
- c. Because the contractor is barely starting, warehousing/supply expertise and assets for material handling is an urgent demand.
- d. Airfield control, security, fire fighting, medical evacuation (ambulance) are all totally deficient in Kigali and this situation will seriously hamper every humanitarian operation in Rwanda as GOMA Airfield is already saturated. See attached preliminary ICAO report.
- e. Airfield/aircraft material handling is non-existent although SABENA is coming to look at the situation. We are literally starting from scratch and cannot off load any commercial nor wide-body military aircraft.
- f. A medical (field) company that can handle up to 50 beds in austere conditions is a minimum requirement for the Force, the civilian staff, the agencies and the NGOs, as we expect road accidents, mine casualties, and maybe aircraft disaster due to volume

the NGOs, as we expect road accidents, mine casualties, and maybe aircraft disaster due to volume etc. The local population needs of all sorts are off the scale, including health protection and hygiene. The Australians are to respond soon.

- g. Helicopter support is essential for urgent resupply, for medical evacuation, for security tasked troop deployment, for observation and for command and liaison. At least four UTH and four LOH aircrafts are needed.

3. In response to specific questions at reference A, may we offer the following:

- a. Border sit (para 2). The Zairians have opened the border and a trickle is coming through. But many are coming by side tracks and the like all along the border. The RPA are noting but not stopping the ordinary people from entering at all.
- b. French zone sit (para 2). They are continuing to try to disarm the militia and the RGF but success is not easy, particularly in the area south of CYANGUGU where banditry is on the rise. Three liaison teams (one with each Battalion HQs) will be deployed by tomorrow. We plan the hand-over to commence on 31 July in GIKONGORO.
- c. RGF in Zaire (para.3). The units are crowded in disarray, with no ammo, food, fuel or communications, with limited heavy weapons, but with families. They have been disarmed by the Zairian forces, and most of them are held together (8,000 out of about 12,000) in GOMA. Others in the French zone (2 Bns) have all been disarmed and cantoned. The situation in BUKAVU is not clear as yet. It is our assessment and that of the

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French that no actions will be possible for months (2 to 3) as they must find a leader (FC is in constant contact with COS RGF in GOMA but he is not in any shape now to start anything), get logistics under arms embargo, and overcome their fear of the RPA capabilities.

- d. RPA and French Zone (para.3) The RPA can, at will, move into the Humanitarian Protected Zone and gain total control quickly if they so decide. The limiting factor will be the volume of displaced persons trying to get out of the way of their advance. However, they will not do this as long as the French are in place. As for UNAMIR, as it stands now we cannot stop anyone yet by force. Once we have responsibility of the zone, we will be able to stop them if necessary.
- e. Humanitarian Assistance (para. 4) We can assist in patrolling sites, routes, moving people, engineering, communications, water supply, medical.
- f. Camps (para 4) The last thing we want are refugee camps in Zaire. The aim is for transit camps in Rwanda. Transit sites with protection, some food and basic implements, water and medical help (limited) is the proper option, with emphasis on transport and movement of people back to their homes. Security from the Zairian border to home must be a joint UNAMIR/RPA operation.

4. Regards.





INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION  
EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICAN OFFICE  
P.O. BOX 46294, NAIROBI, KENYA

FAX NO. 226706  
TEL. 622395/96  
TELEX NO. 25295



**Summary of the major items discussed during ICAO Assessment Mission to Rwanda  
following recent events which affected aviation facilities and services**

**(Kigali, 20 July 1994)**

BY:

Mr. Z.M. Baliddawa	-	ICAO Regional Representative
Mr. A. Kharuga	-	Technical Officer, Air Traffic Services and Search and Rescue
Mr. L.W. Ndiwaita	-	Technical officer, Aerodromes and Grounds Aids
Mr. E.G. Anzeze	-	ICAO Consultant, Communications

**THIS IS A SUMMARY - FULL REPORT TO FOLLOW**

1. Following cession of hostilities in Rwanda and in consultation with the United Nations Assistance in Rwanda (UNAMIR) and agreement with ICAO Headquarters, it was decided to carry out an urgent Assessment Mission to Rwanda to evaluate the extent to which facilities and services required for aircraft operations into and out of Kigali and the associated airspace of Rwanda needed improvement and rehabilitation including human resources needs.

2. With the assistance of UNAMIR the ICAO mission was carried out on 20 July 1994 accompanied by Capt. Lambo, Officer-in-charge, UNAMIR Air Operators and Officers of the Canadian Airforce. UNAMIR kindly provided free air transport for which the mission is grateful.

3. In Kigali the mission was received by the Chief of UNAMIR Operations, Col. Moeen U Ahmed on behalf of the Force Commander and other senior officers of UNAMIR as well as Maj. KAMANZI Frank, the Liaison Officer of the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF). On the return leg, opportunity was taken to discuss some of the problems, particularly financial support with the UN Secretary General's Special Representative to UNAMIR-Kigali, H.E. Mr. Shahriyar Khan.

4. Detailed discussions were carried out with Wing Commander NAZRUL Islam,

the Air Traffic Control Officer (UNAMIR, Kigali) and other members of his staff, Lt. Col. Jacques Magnanlt, Commander, Canadian Airlift Control Element (Nairobi), Maj. KAMANZI Frank and Lt. Joseph Ndahiro, both RPF Officers.

5. Visits were made to all operational and technical Air Navigation facilities at Kigali airport. During the inbound and outbound flights opportunity was taken to discuss with the crew the existing procedures both within Kigali FIR and the adjacent FIRs of Dar-es-Salaam, Entebbe and Kinshasa. In this connection proposals were made for improvement. These will be taken into account in subsequent actions by the Regional Office.

ACTION AGREED:

**THAT ICAO WILL REVIEW THE ATS OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES RELATING TO KIGALI FIR.**

6. At the time of the visit the Cabinet had just been set up with H.E. Mr. BIZIMUNGU Pasteur as the President of the Republic and H.E. Mr. TWAGIRAMUNGU Faustin as Prime Minister. The Minister of Transport and Communication is H.E. Mrs. KAYUMBA Immaculate. The full list of Cabinet is at Attachment.1. The RPF Liaison Officer informed ICAO Representative that organization of the civil aviation sector would soon take place but that Cabinet was too busy with the enormous human problems. The need for proper organization of civil aviation and rehabilitation of the civil aviation infrastructure was stressed both to RPF and UNAMIR the latter being fully aware of these needs. ICAO Representative offered the assistance of the organization in this regard.

ACTION AGREED:

**THAT ICAO OFFERS THE ASSISTANCE OF THE ORGANIZATION IN THIS REGARD.**

7. At the time of the visit, civil aviation matters were being handled by the RPF and UNAMIR and close coordination exists with the RPF having appointed Maj. KAMANZI Frank as the Liaison Officer and UNAMIR having Wing Commander NAZRUL Islam as the Air Traffic Controller as well as Liaison Officer in Kigali on civil aviation matters. In addition close coordination between ICAO and UNAMIR is facilitated by the Officer-in-charge, UNAMIR Air Operations, Capt. Lambo co-located with ESAF Office.

8. In order to enhance the existing coordination between ICAO and UNAMIR it was agreed during the mission to set up a coordination committee. This subsequently met at ESAF Office on 21 July 1994 to draw up detailed procedures and contents of a NOTAM to be issued after consultations with the Authorities in Rwanda and Tanzania who are directly involved. Other States of Uganda and Zaire would also be consulted.

ACTION AGREED:

**THAT ICAO AND UNAMIR SET UP A COORDINATION COMMITTEE TO WORK OUT OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES IN KIGALI FIR AND MONITOR THEIR IMPLEMENTATION.**

9. A number of facilities were found to be intact with minor damages which could be repaired at minimum cost. The runway suffered some superficial damage which have not affected operations. Repairs have been done by UNAMIR. However, the lighting system will require some repairs and replacement parts. One of the immediate major requirement is the rehabilitation of the fire and rescue services. The fire vehicles formally at the airport were not physically there. UNAMIR Headquarters agreed to take up the matter with the Authorities. The mains power supply was not available for the whole city of Kigali as well as the airport. However, the secondary power supply generators at the airport were intact.

IT WAS AGREED:

- a) **THAT UNAMIR WOULD REQUEST THE AUTHORITIES TO LOCATE THE FIRE TENDERS AND RETURN THEM TO KIGALI.**
- b) **UNAMIR WOULD SUPPLY THE REQUIRED FUEL TO START UP THE GENERATORS WHOSE POWER ALSO WOULD USED TO TEST OTHER AIR NAVIGATION FACILITIES AT THE AIRPORT.**

10. Most of the communications and navigational aids appeared to be intact and a follow-up mission is being planned for this week to verify functional and non-functional equipment and determine repairs required and costs involved.

11. Air Traffic Control Service is being provided using a generator VHF operated radio set with an approximate range of 70 nautical miles supplemented by a hand held battery operated radio set.

12. Regarding Meteorological Services the only available information is Tower observation by the Air Controllers. The equipment will also require checking which will be followed-up in subsequent missions.

13. For Search and Rescue (SAR) services UNAMIR is providing alerting services and their facilities are available for SAR. This will be promulgated in the NOTAM referred to in para.8.

14. In respect of AIS it was ascertained that at least one copy of the Rwanda AIP is available. Due to non-availability of many facilities and services it would be necessary to reflect

those available in a NOTAM. In the absence of the AFTN facility, assistance will be provided by one of the NOF Offices within the adjacent FIRs.

ACTION AGREED:

**THAT ASSESSMENT BE MADE OF CRITICAL AREAS OF DEFICIENCIES AND A NOTAM BE ISSUED TO REFLECT THE STATUS OF FACILITIES AND SERVICES. TO BE ISSUED.**

15. The UNDP Resident Representative for Rwanda Mr. Hein had been briefed on the situation in Rwanda vis-a-vis civil aviation and was aware of the mission. He authorised the use of funds under RWA/87/006 for ad-hoc consultancies. It is under this arrangement that the consultant Mr. E.G. Anzeze was used for the mission and will be continuing with the evaluation and repair of the facilities. It is very clear that additional resources will be required to address the urgent needs including personnel. At least one Civil Aviation Advisor may be required urgently to handle the planning and organization supported as necessary by specialists in ATS and COM and a number of United Nations Volunteers (UNVs). In Mr. Baliddawa's discussion with Mr. Shariyar KHAN UN Special Representative offered to do whatever he can to solicit the necessary support for the rehabilitation of the essential civil aviation facilities.

ACTION AGREED:

- a) **DETAILED REQUIREMENTS ARE TO BE WORKED OUT WHICH WILL BE IN THE FORM OF AN ICAO TECHNICAL COOPERATION PROJECT PROPOSAL.**
- b) **UNAMIR PROMISED TO CONTINUE PROVIDING THE MINIMUM AIR TRAFFIC SERVICES PENDING ICAO SUPPORT. THIS MATTER IS VERY URGENT IN ORDER TO ADDRESS THE ENORMOUS HUMAN PROBLEMS FACING THE COUNTRY.**

16. With regard to the request of Belgium to the Council of ICAO to investigate the aircraft accident it was not opportune to discuss the matter with the Authorities as a Civil Aviation Administration is yet to be set up. However, information was exchanged with UNAMIR regarding preservation of the salvage and UNAMIR as before promised to do its best to assist ICAO. It was not possible, in the circumstances, to visit the site.

ACTION AGREED:

**THIS MATTER WILL BE FOLLOWED UP BY THE REGIONAL OFFICE AT AN OPPORTUNE MOMENT.**

**Z.M. Baliddawa**

**Z.M. Baliddawa**



CODE CABLE

OUTGOING FAX NO. CRN-244

PAGE 1 OF 1

TO: MR ANNAN, UNNY	FROM: <u>MD</u> MGEN DALLAIRE FORCE COMMANDER UNAMIR, KIGALI
PREFIX/NO: MIR/ <u>1354</u>	DATE: 13 JUL 94
ATTN:	PHONE: 1-212-963-3092
FAX NO: <del>1-212-963-4879</del>	FAX NO: 1-212-963-3090
INFO: FAX NO:	DRAFTED BY: <u>EC</u>
Internal Dist.: CHAC, COO, C PLANS	
SUBJECT: COMBATANTS THAT SEEK REFUGE WITH UNAMIR	
REFERENCE: YOUR <del>FAX</del> <u>CODE CABLE</u> 2145 DATED 1 JUL 94	

1. THIS HQ HAS REVIEWED YOUR COMMENTS CONTAINED IN THE REFERENCE REGARDING THE UNAMIR INTERIM SOPs ON THE VOLUNTARY DISARMING OF MILITARY, PARAMILITARY, SELF-DEFENCE AND CIVILIAN FORCES.

2. CONTRARY TO THE VIEW EXPRESSED IN PARA 4 OF THE REFERENCE, THIS HQ STRONGLY FEELS THAT WRITTEN SOPs OR PROCEDURES ON THE SUBJECT ARE ESSENTIAL TO SERVE AS DOCUMENTARY GUIDANCE TO ALL UNAMIR TROOPS WHO MIGHT BE FACED WITH SUCH A SITUATION.

3. THE SOP IN FACT ADDRESSES YOUR CONCERNS EXPRESSED IN PARA THREE. THE ICRC IS A KEY ELEMENT IN THE ENTIRE EXERCISE AND CLOSE COORDINATION WOULD BE DONE WITH THE ICRC PRIOR TO ANY TRANSFER OF INDIVIDUALS.

4. UNAMIR HAS NO DESIRE TO KEEP OR PROTECT INDIVIDUALS IDENTIFIED AS COMBATANTS BY EITHER SIDE, WE DO HOWEVER WANT TO ENSURE THAT WHEN THESE INDIVIDUALS ARE TURNED OVER THAT THEY WILL BE AFFORDED THE APPROPRIATE PROTECTION AND TREATMENT BY THE CLAIMING SIDE.

5. UNAMIR WILL ENSURE THAT ALL APPROPRIATE DOCUMENTATION IS COMPLETED PRIOR TO TRANSFER AND THAT IT IS DONE UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE ICRC.

6. REGARDS.



94 JUL 14 11:18  
UNAMIR




## INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL CORPS

P.O. Box 67513, Central Place, Nairobi, Kenya Fax 565140, Tel: (254 2) 562939, 564648

Nike, (AUSTDAL)

1. We spoke on the issue of SOPs for POWs.
2. The guidelines given by UN New York are essentially the same as what are contained in our proposed SOPs.
3. Contrary to the view vide para 4, I strongly feel that SOPs on the subject are most essential to serve as documentary guidance to all UNAMIR troops who might be faced with such situations.
4. Could you draft a response to UN New York for the FC based on our collective views.
5. Thanks.

  
Dr. JAMES



UNAMIR - MINUAR

CRN - 239

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNAMIR  
94 JUL 12 17 45

P1/2

To: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

From: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

Date: 12 JULY 1994

Number: MIR-1335


Subject: PARTICIPATION OF CONGO, EGYPT, ETHIOPIA,  
SENEGAL AND TOGO IN UNAMIR

1. Please find attached copy of a letter dated 9 July 1994 received from the Chairman of the Rwandese Patriotic Front in response to our query concerning the participation in UNAMIR of military observers from the above-mentioned countries.

2. Best regards.

UNAMIR  
94 JUL 12 18 11





P2/2

# FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT



Mulindi, le 09 juillet 1994

Monsieur Shahryar M. Khan  
Représentant Spécial du  
Secrétaire Général des  
Nations Unies pour le  
Rwanda, KIGALI


Monsieur le Représentant,

J'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception des lettres signées par le Général-Major Roméo DALLAIRE le 4/7/94 et le 3/7/94 relatives aux éléments devant faire partie de la MINUAR II suivant la résolution 925 (1994) adoptée par le Conseil de Sécurité.

Le Front Patriotique Rwandais marque son accord pour le Contingent Ethiopien de 800 (huit cents) hommes devant se joindre à la MINUAR II.

Par contre le FPR a le regret de vous faire part de son opposition aux observateurs en provenance du Congo, de l'Egypte, du Togo et du Sénégal pour leur participation à la MINUAR II du fait qu'il se sont joints à la mission turquoise menée par la France au Rwanda. Leurs pays ont retirés leurs hommes du Rwanda pour rallier la France dans une opération qui, manifestement, devait être menée contre le FPR, même si, dans la suite, le risque a pu être minimisé. Dès lors la fin de la mission turquoise impose le départ du Rwanda de tous ceux qui s'étaient alliés à la France.

Veuillez croire, Monsieur le Représentant Spécial, en l'assurance de notre collaboration.

  
Colonel Alexis KANYARENGWE  
Président  
FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS

Copie pour information au :  
Général-Major Roméo Dallaire  
Commandant de la MINUAR

3, Avenue de L'Observatoire, #8, 1180 Brussels, Belgium Tel: 32-2-374-5892 Fax: 32-2-374-4626



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


UNAMIR - MINUAR

CRN 233

UNAMIR

OUTGOING CODE CABLE 94 JUL -7 11 58

TO:  BARIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI  
DATE: 7 JULY 1994  
NUMBER: MIR 1300  
SUBJECT: RADIO REPORTS

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1. Please find attached the reports from Radio Rwanda and Radio Muhabura of 6 July 1994.
2. Best regards.

94 JUL -7 13 24  
UNAMIR  
✓ OK.

1. The Army Chief of Staff issued a communique on the prevailing war situation in Rwanda after the "tactical retreat from Kigali and Butare". In the communique, he announced to Rwandese Kigali and Butare did not fall but that the RGF decided to make a retreat, for they had run short of ammunition. He said that after the Arusha Peace Agreements, the Rwandese army believed in the accords and thought war was over while the RPF was preparing an imminent war and supplying itself in ammunition and war equipment. The Rwandese Army has followed the Arusha Peace Agreements at word and did not purchase ammunition and stopped recruiting new elements whereas the RPF was recruiting and buying ammunition without any control. When the RPF launched the attack after having killed the President, the RGF has tried its best to stop the RPF with the available means thinking they could meanwhile purchase but the international took a decision of an embargo to buy weapons while the RPF was receiving weapons from Museveni and elsewhere. He added that the Rwandese Government did never refuse negotiations and it was the UNATIONS through the auspices of UNAMIR but this was a show for the RPF to make the international community believe it was credible and eager to finish hostilities. The RPF has signed a lot of cease-fires it had never respected and the last one on the long list was signed in Tunis but again it was a false way of making people trust its readiness to make peace. He has gone on thanking the UNATIONS for their effort to solve the Rwandese case through negotiations and helps of all kinds, especially with the resolution on UNAMIR II but denounced the embargo made on the purchase of weapons for the Rwandese Government at the time the RPF was getting supplies from everywhere and in Uganda. He indicated that Kigali and Butare were strategically abandoned for a better reorganization, for they were short of ammunition. He thanked the RGF elements because they had helped the population to get out of the towns before they went away. He asked the international community to come to reason and to understand the Rwandese conflict. He declared that 400,000 minority people would never rule over more than 4,000,000 of the majority people. He urged the international community to condemn Museveni who helped the RPF to attack and kill the Rwandese. He affirmed that the RPF would never rule over by force the majority and asked the international community to help them organizing a referendum which would determine the truth. He declared that they were organizing themselves for a serious counter-attack, for they would never stand the RPF ruling the country. He maintained that the striking example of how the population did not like the RPF was that they ran away from it. He said to believe in his army and in the full morale of his soldiers. He indicated that all the chiefs commanding officers were alive and that he hope the victory of war and the success of the truth. He ended up with thanking the RGF and the population and denounced Museveni for his wicked ambition to make the majority be ruled over.

by the minority.



2. The Designated Prime Minister and the Chairman of MDR Party, Mr Twagiramungu Faustin was replaced at his post of the chairmanship. The new elected President was made Karamira Frodouald, the former second Vice-chairman of MDR. In the communique issued on Radio Rwanda, the Secretary General of the MDR party called on the Rwandese Government to do what can be urgently done to send out of the country the "betrayal General DALLAIRE". He condemned the international organizations which left at a time they were seriously needed and did not come back. He thanked the French for having proved their friendship and have come to help the country whereas the others were reluctant to come. He asked them to stop the RPF progression and to help people also held in the RPF controlled zones. He declared that the UNATIONS would respond for the innocent people's blood with the decision of weapons embargo, and thus letting the population helpless. He urged the RPF to stop hostilities and asked that a particular inquiry should be conducted to determine the bands of killers who assist the RPF such as the band of Museveni and of Willy Class and Jean Goll.

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06.07.1994      19:30      News from Radio Muhabura: the  
Voice of RPF.

1. The RPF high command issued a communique calling the fair RGF elements to get apart from the bloody band and join the RPF. In the communique, the high command reminded that the Presidential Guard elements and some others unfair RGF killers massacred the innocent people they were supposed to protect. They reminded that the band was already defeated and asked those who had kept on fighting due to fear to come join the RPF, for no one was going to blame them. They also urged the population to come to reason and come back to their properties. They reminded the frightened RGF elements that the Government they had been fighting was destitute and that the Front would receive them with the respect of a valuable soldier.
2. The capture of Kigali by the RPF is an unforgettable event in the history of the Front, this declaration was made by the RPF High Commander, General Kagame in a press conference with foreign journalists. He has also declared that the Front was thinking of setting a Broad Based Government according to the Arusha Peace Agreements. To the question of the ambiguity of the French Humanitarian Intervention, General Kagame answered that some negotiations were going on to clear the ambiguity but if the mission was not convincingly explained, the RPF would continue its objective of liberating the whole country. The Radio Muhabura correspondent asked the High Commander was

4/4

they talked about with the UNAMIR Force Commander, General DALLAIRE. General Kagame responded that with the Force Commander they discussed on the foreign forces in Rwanda and the cooperation of UNAMIR and the RPF. To the question of knowing what General thought of the capture of Kigali, General Kagame answered that General DALLAIRE has declared that the RGF and the militia only run away during the night and that he had harries to send his people to ensure security who had found that the RPF soldiers was perfectly controlling the situation. He also added that the Force Commander said that it could be better if the humanitarian action was done by the UN peace-keepers. The journalist went on stating that General DALLAIRE was one among others who had condemned the French intervention in Rwanda: The Designated Prime Minister, Mr Twagiramungu Faustin has declared that the French intervention constituted a violation of the Rwandese sovereignty and freedom. A US authority has also put that the Rwandese case deserved to be treated by the UN and no other country has the right to interfere in the matter. The former president of France, Giscard Destin declared that the French Intervention had to only to come back to its initial mandate as a humanitarian action and urged the French soldiers to go back to the frontiers with Zaire. The French association MSF has also condemned the French Intervention and said it was not intended to be a humanitarian action looking at the weapons and the military equipment they had. The journalist reported that Mitterand of France had declared in RSA that France was not going to stop the RPF take power and that French were not the RPF enemies. He journalist said he did never believe in smooth words of Mitterrand.

3. The RPF has started the social action of assisting the rescues in Butare. 5 nuns were rescued at the Official School of Butare with a Canadian priest who was traumatized because he had the same nationality with General Dallaire. The journalist reported that the population had started coming back to Butare from Gishamvu commune.



1/3

(U) UNAMIR - MINUAR

CRN 232

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNAMIR

94 JUL -6 11 15

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: KITTANI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 6 July 1994

NO. OF PAGES: 3 MIR 1292

SUBJECT: Force Commander's Meeting with RPF Chief of Staff

I attach hereto a "Note for the File" on the above subject which may be of some use for the briefing note we understand is being prepared for the Security Council.

Best regards.

NOTE FOR THE FILE

**Force Commander's Meeting with RPF Chief of Staff**

1. The Force Commander, Major General Romeo A. Dallaire, met today, 5 July 1994, at Kanombe Camp in Kigali, with Major General Paul Kagame, the Chief of Staff of RPF forces. The main topics discussed included the role of UNAMIR, the French-led multinational operation and the overall politico-military situation in Rwanda.
2. General Kagame expressed the hope that the expanded UNAMIR would soon be brought up to full strength to allow it, inter alia, to take over as soon as possible the humanitarian role from "Operation Turquoise". He indicated that the RPF had no objection to the participation of Ethiopian troops in the UNAMIR force. He said, however, that troops from Congo, Egypt, Senegal and Togo, were unacceptable. He emphasized that UNAMIR was free to operate in RPF-controlled areas, including to evacuate civilians who may wish to leave those areas. The RPF COS told the Force Commander that UNAMIR could begin using Kigali International Airport "within a few days". He stressed, in this connection, that French aircraft would not be allowed at the Airport. He was pleased to learn from the Force Commander that Mr. Shaharyar Khan, the new SRSG, had arrived in Kigali and he looked forward to meeting the SRSG in the near future. General Kagame also expressed the hope that UNAMIR could play a larger intermediary role, not only with regard to RPF contacts with the RGF, but also in connection with links between the RPF and "Operation Turquoise". He informed the Force Commander that he would be receiving a French Government delegation from Paris later in the day. He added however that the RPF was not prepared at this stage to discuss or meet with participants or the leadership of "Operation Turquoise".
3. In the course of a detailed exchange of views on the French-led operation, the Force Commander told the RPF COS of his recent visit to the operation's command headquarters in Goma and of his discussions with the Commander, Brigadier General Lafourcade. The Force Commander recalled that General Lafourcade had reaffirmed the humanitarian, impartial and temporary nature of the operation, in accordance with Security Council Resolution 929. General Kagame, on his part, reiterated the RPF's opposition to the operation which, he said, was unnecessary, as the Security Council had recently decided to enlarge UNAMIR's mandate and to strengthen it to pursue the same humanitarian tasks. He felt that France should rather have placed its equipment and other material resources currently devoted to "Operation Turquoise" at the disposal of the United Nations to equip those troops promised to UNAMIR which still lacked the necessary material support. Referring specifically to "Operation Turquoise's" proposed humanitarian safe area in southwestern Rwanda, General Kagame said that the RPF would not object to the establishment of the zone. He stressed, in this connection, that the RPF itself was actively engaged in relocating civilians to safe areas under its control and thus it was not opposed to activities genuinely intended to save people. He felt, however, that arrangements to that end should be worked out with mutual accord, and in a climate devoid of threats.
4. Concerning the politico-military situation in the country, General Kagame indicated that following its recent capture of Butare and Kigali, which now gave it control of most of the national territory, the RPF was considering declaring a unilateral cease-fire "in a few

days" as well as setting up "soon" a broad-based government within the Arusha framework. In that connection, the RPF, he said, was consulting with President Mwinyi of Tanzania, the Facilitator of the Arusha peace process. General Kagame emphasized, however, that the Arusha accords would, in their implementation, need to be adapted to the changed politico-military situation in the country. Specifically, he stressed, the RPF and other political forces allied to it or participating with in the formation of a broad-based government would not accept the participation of people who had carried out or had otherwise been involved in committing massacres and other killings of civilians. He reaffirmed that the RPF would not negotiate with the Interim Government. He expressed the hope, however, that the RGF would take advantage of the unilateral cease-fire the RPF planned to declare and indicate clearly what its intentions were. In this connection, he agreed that UNAMIR could play an important intermediary/mediatory role towards forging a peaceful conclusion of the conflict. If the RGF did not reciprocate, General Kagame stated, RPF forces would have no alternative but to resume and continue fighting. In his view, Rwanda was currently divided into three zones: the RPF-controlled areas, the "Operation Turquoise" humanitarian safe area which he suggested should be monitored by UNAMIR, and areas still held by the RGF. The RPF, after declaring its unilateral cease-fire, would not look for confrontation with any force, he said. However, it would respond to any attacks against it or directed at its areas.

5. The meeting, which lasted nearly two hours (14H45 to 16H30), took place in a cordial atmosphere. Also present were Major Frank Kamanzi, the RPF Liaison Officer to UNAMIR, Sammy Kum Buo, Political Adviser, UNAMIR and Captain Francis Vib-Sanziri, ADC to the Force Commander, UNAMIR.



Sammy Kum Buo  
Political Adviser  
5 July 1994

FC only

CRN 229

IMMEDIATETO: *Callin* ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

UNAMIR

94 JUL -4 17 05

DATE: 04 JUL 94

NUMBER: MIR 1281

SUBJECT: OP TURQUOISE PROPOSAL FOR A HUMANITARIAN PROTECTED ZONE.

REFERENCE: A. LETTER NO. 150/PCIAT/COMFORCE DATED 2 JUL 94  
B. LETTER TO UN SEC GEN FROM FRANCE DATED 1 JUL 94  
C. YOUR FAX NO. 1 DATED 031402NYT JUL 94

1. THE AIM OF THIS FAX IS TO FURTHER CLARIFY UNAMIR'S POSITION REGARDING THE PROPOSED FRENCH LED COALITION HUMANITARIAN PROTECTED ZONE IN THE SOUTH-WEST OF RWANDA. IT WILL ALSO POSE A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS THAT REQUIRE FURTHER CLARIFICATION BY THE COALITION FORCES AND/OR UN NEW YORK.

2. IN REFERENCE C. YOUR FAX PROVIDED NEW YORK'S INTERPRETATION OF THE HUMANITARIAN PROTECTED ZONE. THIS INTERPRETATION IS BASED ON REF B. UNAMIR'S INTERPRETATION DIFFERS FROM YOURS AND IS ATTACHED FOR YOUR INFORMATION. ESSENTIALLY IT INCLUDES KIBUYE AND SOUTH AND THEN EXTENDS EAST AS FAR AS N'DABA, THE LINE THEN EXTENDS NEARLY DIRECTLY SOUTH UNTIL IT JOINS UP WITH THE GIKONGORO/BUTARE PREFECTURE BOUNDARY AND THEN FOLLOWS THIS BOUNDARY SOUTH TO THE BURUNDI BORDER. OF COURSE THIS INTERPRETATION WILL ALSO BE DISCUSSED WITH THE COALITION FORCES. THIS ZONE MAY ALREADY CROSS THE RPF FRONT LINES AND EXACT INFORMATION FROM THE RPF ON THE FORWARD LINE OF THEIR TROOPS IS BEING SOUGHT.

3. AT THE PRESENT TIME, ESPECIALLY IN THE ABSENCE OF A FORMAL CEASEFIRE, THERE IS NO MANDATE TO FORCE THE RPF TO WITHDRAW EAST BEYOND THIS LINE, SHOULD THEY HAVE ALREADY CROSSED IT.

4. IN THE ABSENCE OF A CEASEFIRE THE COALITION MAY DEMAND THAT ANY RPF FORCES WHICH ARE CURRENTLY LOCATED INSIDE OF THE PROTECTED ZONE BE FORCED TO WITHDRAW OUTSIDE THE BOUNDARY. THIS OPTION MAY REQUIRE THE APPROVAL OF EVEN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

5. THE SECOND QUESTION POSED IN REF A. CONCERNED THE DISPOSITION OF THOSE INDIVIDUALS/GROUPS ETC. SUSPECTED OF





COMMITTING OR PARTICIPATING IN THE COMMITTING OF MASSACRES OR GENOCIDE. RESOLUTION 935 HAS ESTABLISHED AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF EXPERTS. THIS COMMISSION WILL BE CONSTITUTED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. IN ADDITION HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS ARE ALREADY IN THE REGION PREPARING TO DEPLOY. THESE ORGANIZATIONS NEED TO BE SUPPORTED BY UNAMIR AND OP TURQUOISE. UNAMIR PROPOSES THAT ELEMENTS OF THE UNAMIR CIVPOL DETACHMENT BE ATTACHED TO THESE ORGANIZATIONS TO PROVIDE LIAISON AND TO AID IN THE INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS. IT IS TO BE NOTED THAT THERE IS CURRENTLY NO MANDATE FOR ANY OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS TO ACTUALLY ARREST OR DETAIN ANYONE THOUGHT TO BE INVOLVED IN THE KILLINGS. THIS QUESTION OF PHYSICALLY BRINGING INDIVIDUALS TO JUSTICE MUST BE RESOLVED AND APPROPRIATE GUIDANCE OR INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN IF UNAMIR, OR POSSIBLY OP TURQUOISE IS TO BE GIVEN THE AUTHORITY FOR ARREST AND DETENTION PENDING TRIAL.

6. THE THIRD QUESTION POSED IN REF A. INDICATES THAT THE RGF CURRENTLY LOCATED IN THE PROPOSED HUMANITARIAN PROTECTED ZONE SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO MOVE WITHIN THE ZONE. THIS PROPOSAL MAKES THE FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTION THAT THE RPF ACCEPTS THE PROTECTED ZONE CONCEPT AND HAVE AGREED NOT TO ENTER. UNAMIR PROPOSES THAT RGF LOCATED WITHIN THE ZONE MOVE INTO GARRISONS. THEY WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED ANY TACTICAL MOVEMENT OR WITHDRAWAL TO OTHER PARTS OF THE COUNTRY. THEY WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO MOVE OUTSIDE OF THE GARRISON WITH WEAPONS. THE ONLY RESUPPLY ALLOWED WOULD BE FOOD, WATER AND FUEL. THOSE RGF UNITS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE PROTECTED ZONE BUT BETWEEN THE ZONE AND THE FORWARD LINES OF THE RPF WOULD BE FACED WITH THREE CHOICES. THE FIRST WOULD BE TO REMAIN IN LOCATION AND CONTINUE TO DEFEND. IF THEY CHOOSE TO STAY-THE RESUPPLY TO THOSE UNITS THROUGH THE PROTECTED ZONE WOULD HAVE TO BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL.. THE SECOND CHOICE OF THE RGF UNITS COULD BE TO WITHDRAW. IN THIS CASE, THEY WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO DO SO THROUGH THE PROTECTED ZONE UNLESS THEY WERE WILLING TO REMAIN IN GARRISONS IN THE ZONE. THE THIRD CHOICE COULD BE THE DECISION THAT THEY DON'T WANT TO FIGHT ANY LONGER. IN THIS CASE, THEY COULD BE MOVED TO GARRISONS WITHIN THE ZONE UNDER THE CONDITIONS LISTED ABOVE.


7. THE FOURTH QUESTION IS LINKED TO THE QUESTION OF BOUNDARIES AND IS DISCUSSED IN PARAS 2,3,4 AND 6.

8. THE FINAL QUESTION CONCERNS THE DEPLOYMENT OF LIAISON AND COORDINATION IN THE OP TURQUOISE CONTROLLED ZONE. UNAMIR HAS CURRENTLY DEPLOYED A SMALL LIAISON CELL IN GOMA IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN COMMUNICATIONS AND LIAISON WITH OP TURQUOISE. THIS TEAM ALSO PROVIDES A MEANS FOR COMMUNICATING FROM OP TURQUOISE TO THE RPF AS CURRENTLY THE RPF REFUSES TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE. IF THE PROTECTED ZONE IS ESTABLISHED UNDER THE CONDITIONS LISTED ABOVE; UNAMIR FORESEES THE REQUIREMENT FOR AN EXPANDED LIAISON AND COMMUNICATION ROLE. THIS WOULD ENTAIL THE DEPLOYMENT OF ADDITIONAL TEAMS IN BUKAVU

AND PROBABLY DOWN TO COY LEVEL WITHIN THE OP TURQUOISE FORCES. TEAMS WOULD ALSO BE REQUIRED TO MONITOR THE RGF GARRISONS WITHIN THE PROTECTED ZONE-TO HELP ALLEVIATE ANY CONCERNS THE RPF MIGHT HAVE ON THE ACTIONS OF THE RGF IN THOSE LOCATIONS. THESE TEAMS FROM UNAMIR WILL REQUIRE SECURITY, THIS MAY HAVE TO BE REQUESTED FROM OP TURQUOISE, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT THE RGF SECTOR COMMANDER IN GISENYI HAS INDICATED THAT IT IS STILL NOT SAFE OR ADVISABLE FOR UNAMIR TO MOVE IN RGF HELD AREAS. ALONG WITH THIS INCREASED LIAISON TO OP TURQUOISE, UNAMIR WILL REQUEST THAT WE BE ALLOWED TO MONITOR THE SITUATION FROM BEHIND THE RPF LINES LOCATED NEAR THE PROTECTED ZONE TO ENSURE THAT THE RPF ARE RESPECTING THE CONDITIONS REGARDING THE PROTECTED ZONE.

9. YOUR COMMENTS ON THESE PROPOSALS WOULD BE GREATLY APPRECIATED.

## AREA PROPOSED FOR THE CREATION OF A SAFE HAVEN



MAP NO. 3717 UNITED NATIONS  
DECEMBER 1992



**PROPOSED  
AREA**

4/8

**OPERATION TURQUOISE  
COMFORCE**GOMA, le 2 juillet 1994  
N° 42 /PCIAT/COMFORCE**OBJET** : Propositions pour améliorer la situation au RWANDA Ouest

Mandatées par l'ONU, dans le cadre de la résolution 929, les autorités françaises vont faire des propositions à l'ONU pour améliorer la situation. Ces propositions pourraient être les suivantes :

**1 - Création d'une zone de protection humanitaire :**

Les limites de la zone proposée sont en annexe. Il s'agit de régions où sont réfugiées de nombreuses populations, notamment dans la zone de GIKONGORO.

**2 - Concernant le jugement des coupables d'exaction et de massacre subsistant dans la zone :**

Nous pouvons demander que les dispositions soient prises par l'ONU pour que les coupables soient jugés.

**3 - Concernant l'activité des FAR :**

Nous n'avons pour l'instant aucun mandat ONU contre les FAR. Nous sommes d'accord sur le principe qu'ils ne devraient pas agir dans la zone qui est une zone humanitaire. Nous pouvons demander à l'ONU de prendre en compte cette question.

**4 - Concernant la mise au point de propositions raisonnables :**

Nous pourrions coordonner notre travail par l'intermédiaire de la MINUAR (Général DALLAIRE).

**5 - Concernant l'exécution sur le terrain des nouvelles dispositions :**

Pour éviter les confrontations ou les agressions, il faudrait mettre en place des détachements de liaison et de coordination qui pourraient être fournis par la MINUAR.

Nous confirmons que notre objectif s'inscrit bien dans le cadre du mandat humanitaire que nous a donné l'ONU. Il a pour but d'assurer la protection des populations en attendant de pouvoir transmettre, le plus tôt possible, la responsabilité de cette mission à la MINUAR, puis de quitter la zone dès que la MINUAR sera en place.

Général LAFOURCADE


UNAMIR  
194 JUL -2 17 57

Ref: A page 2 6/8

From: Général LAFOURCADE  
To: Général DALLAIRE

Proposition Zone de Protection Humanitaire

N°	Nom	Coordonnées
1	RUTSIRO	01°58' 29°e23' 35M QH 6634 8204
2	Corne nord de la forêt MUKURA	01°56' 29°e29' 35M QH 7778 8449
3	Talweg en	2°00' 29°e37' 35M QH 9228 7797
4	Carrefour route/talweg	2°12' 29°e35' 35M QH 8740 5587
5	KIBIKA	2°26' 29°e41' 35M QH 9960 2931
6	HUYE	2°35' 29°e42' 35M RH 0053 1394
7	Piton 1862m en	2°43' 29°e42' 35M RG 0050 9793
8	Sortie frontière route → BUJUMBURA	2°47' 29°e39 35M QG 9597 9057



Setc3n1 SECRETARY:GLASS994ailed

*Mission Permanente de la France  
auprès des Nations Unies  
L'Ambassadeur Représentant Permanent*

*Ref B. 7/8  
One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza  
245 East 47th Street, 8th Floor  
New York, N.Y. 10017*

le 1er Juillet 1994

Monsieur le Secrétaire Général,

J'ai reçu instruction ce matin de vous faire part de la très vive préoccupation des autorités françaises devant la dégradation de la situation au Rwanda et les risques d'un nouveau drame humanitaire dans ce pays.

Au cours des derniers jours, les combats se sont intensifiés au-delà de la capitale et sont en train de s'étendre au sud dans la région de Butare, non loin de la frontière du Burundi, ainsi qu'à l'ouest semble-t-il, en direction de Kibuye. D'ores et déjà nos éléments, en place dans la région en application de la résolution 929 du Conseil de sécurité, ont effectué des reconnaissances à Butare. Ils ont constaté l'afflux de dizaines de milliers d'habitants fuyant les combats, qui s'ajoutent à plusieurs centaines de milliers de personnes déplacées dans cette partie du pays. La poursuite des combats est en passe de créer dans le sud-ouest du Rwanda une situation qui sera à très brève échéance totalement incontrôlable sur le plan humanitaire. Si aucune mesure n'est prise pour y remédier, toute cette partie du pays va être le théâtre de désordres considérables, avec des mouvements de centaines de milliers de personnes fuyant dans le plus grand désespoir, et des risques d'élimination physique des minorités sur place qui se sont déjà matérialisés au cours des mois d'avril et mai. Il est à craindre que toutes ces personnes cherchent à trouver refuge dans les pays avoisinants, notamment au Burundi, aggravant une situation dont la fragilité vous est bien connue.

La France considère qu'il est de sa responsabilité d'alerter la communauté internationale à travers vous-même, afin de l'informer de la situation qui exige, comme cela avait été demandé par les Nations Unies et l'OUA, un cessez-le-feu immédiat. L'arrêt des combats est en effet le seul moyen véritablement efficace pour stabiliser la situation humanitaire et ouvrir la voie à une reprise des discussions avec l'aide des pays de la région en vue d'un règlement politique, à partir des accords d'Arusha dont bien entendu doivent être exclus les responsables des massacres et notamment des actes de génocide.

Son Excellence  
Monsieur Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI  
Secrétaire Général de l'Organisation  
des Nations Unies  
Bureau S-3800

Si le cessez-le-feu ne pouvait être obtenu immédiatement, la France se trouverait confrontée au choix suivant :

○  
- soit se retirer en dehors du territoire rwandais, en s'efforçant, ce qui serait extrêmement difficile et limité, de sauver par des actions ponctuelles, des vies humaines.

- soit en s'appuyant sur les résolutions 925 et 929, organiser une zone humanitaire sûre où les populations seraient à l'abri des combats et des conséquences dramatiques qui en découlent dans ce pays. Les forces franco-sénégalaises veilleraient, dans le cadre du mandat qui est le leur, à ce que ne s'exerce dans cette zone ou à partir de cette zone, aucune activité de nature à porter atteinte à la sécurité de ces populations. Cette zone devrait être centrée sur la région où les problèmes humanitaires sont les plus aigus, suffisamment vaste compte-tenu du nombre de personnes concernées et d'un seul tenant pour stabiliser les populations sur place et faciliter l'acheminement des secours humanitaires.

Sur la base des informations en notre possession, cette zone devrait comprendre les districts de Cyangugu, Gikongoro et la moitié sud de celui de Kibuye, incluant l'axe Kibuye-Gitarama jusqu'au col de N'Daba compris.

La France estime que, sur la base des résolutions 925 et 929, elle est autorisée à organiser cette zone humanitaire sûre. Elle souhaiterait néanmoins que, par votre intermédiaire, l'Organisation des Nations Unies exprime son appui à la création d'une telle zone.

Je me permets d'attirer à nouveau votre attention sur l'urgence de la situation et de souligner qu'à défaut de pouvoir organiser une zone humanitaire sûre avec le soutien de la communauté internationale, la France n'aurait d'autre choix que celui de se retirer très rapidement du territoire rwandais.

Je ne verrais que des avantages à ce que cette lettre soit diffusée aux membres du Conseil de sécurité.

Je vous prie de croire, Monsieur le Secrétaire Général, en l'expression de ma haute considération.

Jean-Bernard MERIMEE

Ap

7/11/94 8:24

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UNITED NATIONS  
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES  
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR

MINUAR

194 JUL -3 14 371

CRN-227

1/3

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: BARIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI  
DATE: ~~JUNE~~ 1994  
NUMBER: MIR-1275  
SUBJECT: RADIO REPORT

1. Please find attached the RTLM radio report of today's date.
2. Best regards.

UNAMIR  
194 JUL -3 14 571

1. In "News Review," Nkurunziza Ananie came back to the appointment of the acting congressmen tomorrow. He rejoiced of the appointment of the CDR party deputies, for the "inyenzi" had refused to seat in the same assembly with a CDR party representative. He also rejoiced of the appointment of his colleague journalist, Hangimana Francis of UDPR party. He maintained the deputy journalist would plead for the press and probably would explain to other deputies the problem of the press and they would help him defend the RTL case before the international community which is strongly opposed to it today.
2. He also reported that the Minister of Information, on the behalf of the Government, had denied the arrival of the UN Human Right Commission Reporter in the country. The Minister had said that the reporter did not receive visa from any Rwandese embassy and that no authority had even seen him. Therefore, the report cannot be accepted by any Rwandese officials. The journalist added that the reporter should rather be sued, for he illegally entered the country.
3. The journalist commented on the RFI information on the surrounding of Kigali town by the inyenzi elements and the quick progression of the inyenzi towards the South. The journalist said that the RFI radio had been unjustly praising the inkotanyi from the resumption of war in April. He reminded that this broadcast had reported 2 days after the recrudescence of hostilities that the inyenzi were soon going to march on the city and that the Government had run away from the Capital, that the RTL had ceased tuning for ever when the Belgian had shelled and destroy its studio and that Kigali were taken and so on.
4. The journalist said something on the Security zones that French wanted to create in the western south of the country. He reminded that the French Government had asked the UN Security Council for the creation of such zones and that the UN Secretary General had promised his support to the proposal. He [the journalist] said however that the RPF, through its Secretary General, had refused the proposal, for they had planned to take over the whole country and the creation of the zones would stop their project. The journalist thanked the French initiative but expressed his concern on such zones. For him, creating zones in which hutu would flee to supposed the creation of the hutu homeland system inside the country; thus tutsi would go into the whole RPF controlled zone and hutu in the homeland guarded by French troops. He added that tutsi had started thinking on this system, for those that the French soldiers have rescued in Kibuye, Cyangugu and Gisenyi had expressed their wish of being evacuated so as to join their relatives in the RPF held zones.

5. He ended up with speaking of the inyenzi incredible progression towards the south. The journalist maintained that the RFI journalist was exaggerating, for the inyenzi did not have enough strength both in men and in weapons to arrive in Butare. He said that the RFI correspondent had declared that he held the information from the French soldiers who also had got it from "UNAMIR of DALLAIRE". He concluded with saying that he was not surprised at the statement that General DALLAIRE would make, for "he has been working for the inyenzi".
  6. Gahigi Gaspard urged the French soldiers to come to Kigali and see their real enemies. He said that the Rwandese had welcome the French and their initiative but that the inkotanyi had proved their hatred toward them. He reminded that the inyenzi have started proving their wickedness to French while shooting at one of them in Butare. He invited the French to continue their way toward Kigali, for they were going to see the difference of the Rwandese welcome and the inyenzi's. He said he hoped that the French would know better the inyenzi and their misdeeds and that they would help the Rwandese explaining the international community that RTLM was telling the truth; thus the international community would perhaps come back on his decision to stop their station and judge them.
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UNITED NATIONS  
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES  
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR

UNAMIR - MINUAR

194 JUN 30 18 57

CRN-226

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: BARIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: ANYIDOHU, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 30 JUNE 1994

NUMBER: MIR-1255

SUBJECT: RADIO REPORT OF 30 JUNE 1994 FROM RTLM

194 JUN 30 19 12  
UNAMIR

1. Please find attached today's radio report from RTLM.
2. As in the case of yesterday's radio report sent to you, the present one has not been discussed by Maj Plante during his conversation today with Spokesman Frank Eckhard.
3. Best regards.



30.06.1994

RTLM

1. Today at 09:06 AM, Habimana Cantano, a journalist on RTLM radio declared that General Roméo DALLAIRE, "the RPF envoy" had gone to Goma to meet the French General commanding the French troops who came for a humanitarian intervention in Rwanda in order "convince him how the French could work with the inkotanyi". He said that General had declared to the press that the French were going to work and UNAMIR would work in the RPF held zones; Following this interview by the General, he invited the Rwandese to be vigilant, for "General DALLAIRE wanted to give to tutsi their own country: the RPF held territory". He added that the Rwandese would never accept that their country be divided into two parts and affirmed that the youth would soon start to counterattack in order to win back all the RPF held zones. He went on saying that it was unfair to UN peace-keeping troops to serve only in one side of the warring factions.
2. Nkurunziza Ananie, another journalist on the same radio in "Press Review", a chronicle about Rwanda in the international broadcasts reported that a humanitarian organizations for cripples went to Burundi yesterday to see if any assistance could be given to people maimed due to thrashing of all kinds. The journalist affirmed that the envoys had found that a lot of Hutu were mutilated by the inyenzi. The envoys declared that they were planning to meet the RPF representatives in Brussels and ask them the authorization to get to Burundi from the RPF controlled areas in the South of Rwanda in order to assess the situation of refugees in the North of Burundi.
3. The journalist came back on the interview given by the former Minister of Finances, Mr Rugenera Marc to the RFI correspondent in Byumba where the former had sought refuge. The journalist ridiculed the former minister who "was speaking of the Democratic Forces for Change (an old coalition of moderate opposition parties). He indicated that the change was already made, for the inyenzi's supporters [moderate opponents] had joined their friends. He reminded that the minister had refused to purchase weapons and ammunition for the RGF at a time he was still the minister of finances. He also added that he had tried to destroy the National Bank while dismissing the Bank Governor.
4. Gahigi Gaspard, another journalist, spoke of the French intervention in Rwanda. He maintained that the mission was not yet fully started as long as the French did not yet go into the RPF held zones to redeem some hutu rescues from the "genocide" committed by the inyenzi. He criticised the foreign journalists who "are busy reporting that the French have saved 10,000 of tutsi threatened by the hutu" but never mentioned anything concerning hutu who were blocked into the inkotanyi held territories. He urged the French to come to Kigali and save the population who was threatened

with the "inyenzi" mortar shells at the market, into their houses and into hospitals. He also asked them to go into the "inyenzi held zones" and redeem numerous hutu hidden in trenches, bushes and everywhere in banana plantations in Byumba, Kibungo and rural Kigali. He put forwards that for him the French intervention had not started yet since they had not yet redeemed the hutu in the East, for hutu were attacked and it was unthinkable to save only tutsi. He concluded with saying that if the French had really come for a humanitarian action, they would go to the RPF held territories to save some hutu rescues.

UNAMIR  
194 JUN 30 13 50

CRN-225

P 1/2

UNITED NATIONS  
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES  
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

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OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS NEW YORK  
INFO: RIZA, BARIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
FROM: BGEN ANYIDHOHO, UNAMIR, KIGALI  
DATE: 30 JUNE 1994  
NUMBER: MIR-1254  
SUBJECT: CEASE-FIRE TALKS

*H. G. K. K.*

*Disc  
The  
Disc  
4/7*

UNAMIR  
194 JUN 30 14 02

1. During the last meeting the DFC held with the COS of RGF MGEN BIZIMUNGU, resumption of the cease-fire talks was one of the major topics discussed. MGEN BIZIMUNGU made it clear that the position of the RGF is that the cease-fire signed by their political leaders in Tunis is valid and acceptable to them, therefore there is no requirement for any cease-fire talks at UNAMIR HQ. What he considers important is the modalities of the cease-fire and he was happy that UNAMIR has already submitted to them standing operating procedures (SOPs) for the implementation of the cease-fire.

2. He therefore proposed that both the RGF and the RPF should study this document and pass their comments in written form to UNAMIR, after which a meeting could be arranged to discuss issues so raised. He considers one meeting enough to iron out whatever observations might have been raised by both parties. He also

expressed his worries about the security of his delegation to the cease-fire meeting place at UNAMIR HQ since it is on RPF territory and events following the last meeting held at the UNAMIR HQ created some anxiety for the members of the delegation.

3. RPF's position on the cease-fire talks is that they consider the continuation of the evacuation of displaced persons very important and a necessary prerequisite for the resumption of the talks. They made no mention of the cease-fire signed in Tunis. Meanwhile both parties continue fighting in the city without agreeing on a complete truce for evacuation of even wounded civilians. UNAMIR, MSF and ICRC carry out these evacuations by taking chances. RGF appears not to be finding a suitable and secured drop-off place for the their evacuees.

4. We continue to press home to both parties the need to resume the talks even if it means the discussion of the modalities by which we will be making some progress.

5. Best regards.





UNAMIR

UNAMIR - MINUAR

194 JUN 29 18 07

CRN-224 1/4

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: BARIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: ANYIDOHU, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 29 JUNE 1994

NUMBER: MIR-1248

SUBJECT: RADIO REPORT OF 29 JUNE 1994

1. Please find attached a radio report of today's date.

2. During his conversation today with Mr Frank Eckhard, Major Plante, UNAMIR's Military Spokesman, did not discuss this report with him.

3. Regards.

UNAMIR  
94 JUN 29 18 21

1. Today at 9:03 AM, Habimana Cantano, a journalist at RTLM, commented on the decision of the UN Secretary General to extend the appointment of General DALLAIRE in his post as the UNAMIR Force Commander. He said that the UN Secretary General ought to know that Rwanda is a sovereign country and that they would not accept anyone imposed to them. He reminded that RTLM did not persecute DALLAIRE as some journalists had lied but that it had repeated the Government's wish to replace DALLAIRE. He added that RTLM had only proved his incompetence, for he failed to publish the results of inquiries of massacres in Kirambo. He went on saying that Boutros Boutros Ghali had also started being partial, for if he had accepted to change Booh Booh to please the inyenzi, he would have also agreed on changing General DALLAIRE as the Rwandese Government had requested his departure. He told he would advise General DALLAIRE to claim his last salary from the inkotanyi and then pack his luggage and quit the country.
2. An unknown radio is going to start broadcasting in North Kivu region (Zaire). The journalist declared that the Radio would be called "Reporter Sans Frontières" and that unfortunately UNESCO was going to participate in it at 20%. He maintained that Reporter Sans Frontières like Médecins Sans Frontières are pro-inkotanyi organizations; he indicated that all the things "Sans Frontières" are definitely pro-RPF and that their personnel members were people who were just creating jobs for themselves. He added that the radio was intended to appoint tutsi who had also been working in MSF, UNDP due to their "smooth words" and their malignity. He called on tutsi to abandon their "smooth language full of lies" and tell the truth.
3. The French soldiers continue to perform their humanitarian action successfully, but journalists accompanying them continue to prove their partiality in the inkotanyi's favour. He asked the French not to exaggerate, saying that they had found the tutsi who had been hiding in mountains of Kibuye from the resumption of hostilities due to the harassment of the interahamwe and the RGF soldiers. He criticized the French of making their advertisement. He warned tutsi that they would not complain to French that they were harassed, for the French were not going to take them from Rwanda and that the people whom they were denouncing would be their neighbours even after the withdrawal of the French. He criticized the attitude of the tutsi who "brought about war" and were crying that Hutu were killing them. He asked them to keep quiet, to try to approach those interahamwe with whom they were going to leave together for ever, and to avoid sharpening hatred between them and hutu.
4. In "Press Review" a news edition of RTLM, Anania Nkurunziza reminded that in a rally of APROSOMA (one of the parties in 1959) at Kinteko (Shyamba commune) in March 1959, it was

said that Hutu were not spiteful, for if they were all tutsi would have been killed or would have left the country. He went on saying that the "inyenzi" declared on international radios that they shelled onto the hutu militia and the RGF only. He informed that however yesterday they shot dead their "kin tutsi" guy at Rugenge in Kiyovu after a lot of other tutsi they had killed on road-blocks.

5. The French humanitarian mission went on in Kibuye, Cyangugu and Gisenyi and the RTLM declared that it supported the action. The journalist affirmed that the inkotanyi were still opposed to the intervention as their "supporter DALLAIRE" has stated on RFI. He reminded that those troops had not come to fight for the RGF. He said that they had come for a peace mission and that the Rwandese needed peace. He also put that nuns who were evacuated to Goma had willingly accepted to stay in Kibuye but that they only left because it was said that inkotanyi were progressing towards Kibuye. So, they had left to avoid the inyenzi wickedness against the clergymen.
6. He reported that the RFI correspondent affirmed that tutsi armed with their home-made weapons were found in the mountains of Kibuye. He thanked God on the behalf of the majority hutu because he thought that those tutsi had kept their weapons to kill hutu once the inkotanyi would arrive in Kibuye. He called on all the hutu of Kibuye to thank the French who managed to find out those hidden "ibytso" (supporters) who were prepared to exterminate the hutu. He declared that General DALLAIRE had decided with his own initiative to meet the French High Commanding General in order to inform him of troubles his mission had brought between him [DALLAIRE] and the RPF. The journalist indicated that if General DALLAIRE was refused by the inkotanyi after the Government, "he should pack and get out of the country". He denounced the RFI correspondent who "was making propaganda in favour of RPF while reporting that he had talked to a RGF Lt.Col. who had declared that the RGF were happy with the French intervention. He said that the journalist wanted to convince the international community of the cowardice of the RGF army. Coming back on the French intervention, he put that tutsi in presence of French, they said whatever they had to say against hutu. He indicated that they still kept their arrogance towards hutu and that hutu would give a deserved punishment to the RPF supporters as the Prefect of Butare had declared in Ndora Commune (Butare).
7. The USA had changed their policy concerning Rwanda. The journalist indicated that Americans were lied by the Tutsi who had fled to USA and the Belgian who called themselves the "specialists of Rwanda". He criticised the policy of the current American ambassador in Rwanda, his predecessor and the former cultural Attaché, miss Linda whom he accused of being a particular friend of the RPF officer, Col. Karenzi Karake, for all of them did not explain the American Government of the hutu-tutsi problem between

Rwandese while they knew it.

8. Gahigi Gaspard, another <sup>©</sup>journalist on RTLM radio came back on General DALLAIRE visit to Goma. He said that General had gone to Goma to tell the French that they are against him. He declared that they had proved that General was incompetent through his failure to publish the results of the inquiries of massacres in Kirambo, and his incapacity to discipline the Belgian soldiers who were serving with UNAMIR- "an important condition for an valuable officer". He stated that General should not have gone to see the French but that he should have addressed the UNATIONS, for they were his employers and they have covered the mission. He maintained that General was probably afraid of not commanding UNAMIR II. He wondered why the General was afraid and put that he has to, for the French were going to spend only two months here in Rwanda; "therefore they were not coming to replace him", had the journalist gone on. He repeated his request to the Government that General DALLAIRE would be declared "persona non Grata" in Rwanda because it was unfair for him to Command UNAMIR II



UNAMIR - MINUAR

CRN 219  
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNAMIR

94 JUN 24 10 06

To: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

From: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

Date: 24 June 1994

Number: MIR 1222

Reference: YOUR CODE CABLE 2046 OF 22 JUN2 1994

1. There has been a misunderstanding concerning the information received by the US Permanent Mission to the UN with regard to the safety of Mr David Violet, the American interpreter working for UNAMIR.
2. Mr Violet telephoned a friend in New York, told him that he was in Kigali, that his security was assured but that he was somewhat worried about the impending French initiative. His friend over-reacted, called the State Department and the information was somehow distorted. Mr Violet was not "harassed by the RPF while crossing into Rwanda from Uganda".
3. Please reassure the US Permanent Mission that Mr David Violet is in no danger.
4. Best regards.

R O M Y

UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

Date: 23 June 1994

To: Mr. Alli Golo, CAO

From: David Violet, Interpreter/Chief Translation Unit

Subject: Misunderstanding beyond my control concerning my safety

I must explain the facts concerning a misunderstanding regarding my security: I called a friend in New York, whom I told I was in Kigali, and that my security was assured, but that I was somewhat worried about the pending French initiative. I can only assume that this friend over-reacted, perhaps upon hearing news that the initiative had passed, called the State Department and the information was somehow distorted.

cc: FC

DFC

②  
Suzana / S.  
A/MK  
we should back  
up the  
23/6