



THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Security Council  
NATO


9 December 2008

Dear Mr. President,

I have the honour to convey the attached communication dated 28 November 2008 from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, covering the International Security Assistance Force operations during the period from May to August 2008.

I should be grateful if you would bring it to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

  
BAN Ki-moon

His Excellency  
Mr. Neven Jurica  
President of the Security Council  
New York

28-14153




ACTION COPY

NH  
VN  
KWS

Note to Mr. Nambiar

NATO report on ISAF operations in Afghanistan



1. Please find attached a quarterly report by NATO on ISAF operations in Afghanistan, covering the period from February to April 2008. As is the usual practice, NATO has requested that the Secretary-General make this report available to the Security Council.
2. Attached also is a draft letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council conveying the report. I would be grateful if you could bring it to the attention of the Secretary-General.

*h. weber*  
Alain Le Roy  
4 September 2008  
*Dec?*



DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL  
LE SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL DÉLÉGUÉ  
AMBASSADOR - AMBASSADEUR  
CLAUDIO BISOGNIERO

DSG(2008)0883

28 November 2008

Dear Secretary-General,

In accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions 1386 and 1510, I attach a report on ISAF operations covering the period from May to August 2008. I would appreciate you making this report available to the UN Security Council.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, which appears to read "Claudio Bisogniero".  
Claudio Bisogniero

Encl.

His Excellency  
Mr Ban Ki-moon  
Secretary-General  
United Nations Headquarters  
United Nations Plaza 2  
New York 10017  
U.S.A.

## QUARTERLY REPORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS ON ISAF OPERATIONS

1. This report, pursuant to the obligation under UN SCR 1386 to report to the UN on the progress of the ISAF mission, covers the period from 1 May to 1 August 2008. As at 25 July 2008, ISAF strength stood at 49,101 personnel from the 26 NATO nations and 2,215 from 14 non-NATO nations.

2. Throughout the reporting period ISAF continued to assist the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) in accordance with relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. Key themes are that:

a. ISAF continued to conduct security operations while supporting governance, reconstruction and development. Security operations focused on disrupting and defeating the threat from Opposing Militant Forces (OMF) while simultaneously developing the capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).

b. The Afghan National Army (ANA) increased in size and capability during the reporting period. Combined ANSF/ISAF operations built on previous successes in order to counter OMF intentions and undermine OMF capacity for future actions. The greatest challenge to the security of Afghanistan continued to be found in the southern and eastern portions of the country, where additional forces, both ISAF and ANSF, have made a very significant contribution to the mission.

### Security Situation

3. OMF activity throughout Afghanistan during the reporting period was higher than the same period in 2007. For the most part, OMF tactics focused on small-scale, asymmetric attacks rather than large-scale, force-on-force engagements against ISAF and Coalition Forces (CF). Also, many OMF attacks continued to be directed against the ANSF, especially the Afghan National Police (ANP) and civilians who work for or support the GIROA. OMF attacks that inflicted the greatest numbers of casualties primarily utilised Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), with IEDs accounting for the overwhelming majority of Afghan civilian casualties. The OMF strategy continued to be centred on discrediting and undermining the authority of the GIROA, as well as ISAF and the International Community (IC), in order to influence the population, thus creating favourable conditions that would be conducive to the establishment of a radical Islamic government within Afghanistan. The regional security situations were as follows:

a. Regional Command (RC) Capital (Kabul). OMF activity increased slightly but was within expected seasonal norms. The potential for "high visibility" attacks against high-value/high-payoff targets remained constant. The Suicide Vehicle Borne IED attack on the Indian embassy was an example of the type of spectacular attack that OMF strive to achieve in Kabul city. OMF weapons caches in RC Capital and its surroundings were discovered by ISAF with the help of local nationals, a positive sign of increasing will to cooperate by Afghan locals against OMF.



b. RC North. OMF activity within RC North remained within historical norms. Criminal activity and Illegal Armed Groups (IAGs) continued to be the primary threats to stability. Although the Taliban may have had ambitions to establish a greater presence outside of Pashtun pockets, regional and local powerbrokers as well as the non-Pashtun ethnic population continued to limit Taliban influence.

c. RC West. OMF activity slightly increased during the reporting period, particularly in areas adjacent to RC South. This is assessed to be due to the effects of continued ISAF and ANSF security operations against OMF in RC South.

d. RC South. RC South continued to be the focus of the OMF main effort, despite the death or capture of a number of OMF leaders. ISAF and ANSF operations disrupted OMF activity within many traditional Taliban areas of operation. Taliban in RC South, deeply anchored into the population, nevertheless remained the primary threat to regional stability during the reporting period and continued to possess the capability to conduct a range of attacks against ISAF, CF, and GIRoA forces.

e. RC East. Insurgent activity in RC East increased significantly compared to last year, particularly along the Afghan/Pakistan border. OMF groups routinely transited the porous border in order to conduct hit-and-run attacks against ISAF, CF, and GIRoA forces before retreating back across the border into Pakistan. The OMF attack against Combat Outpost (COP) Waynat (also known as COP Kahler) in Kunar Province demonstrated the OMF ability to conduct punctual large scale direct attacks against ISAF and CF if conditions are favourable.

#### **Afghan National Army (ANA)**

4. The ANA continued to improve in terms of both strength and capability, as evidenced by several additional ANA formations achieving Full Operational Capability during the reporting period. Limited international assistance with ANA training initiatives, the shortage of mentor teams, and the lack of adequate equipment support continued to hamper the overall pace of ANA development.

a. **Capability.** The ANA continued to develop into a respected and professional force, with over half of ANA units partially capable of conducting counter insurgency (COIN) operations with ISAF and CF support. The remaining units grew in capability and are expected to meet developmental goals in accordance with established timelines. ANA participation in security and stability operations continued to climb, mirroring the ANA's growth in capability and capacity, with more than half of ISAF operations conducted jointly with ANA units.

b. **Manning.** The manning of the ANA continued to grow steadily, with approximately 60,000 personnel currently assigned by the end of the reporting period. "Present for duty" numbers increased proportionally, with approximately 35,000 personnel available for operations in July 2008.

c. **Equipment.** The ANA equipment situation improved, albeit at a slower rate than desired. The fielding to priority units of a limited number of USA-provided weapons progressed.

d. **Training.** The failure to source the required number of Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) continues to be the most significant contributing factor restricting ISAF's ability to accelerate the pace of ANA development. Sourcing additional OMLTs therefore remained NATO's number one force generation priority.

#### **Afghan National Police (ANP)**

5. Although IC efforts to enhance ANP capabilities by transforming the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) into a service loyal to the Afghan people and Afghan national interests continued, the ANP still requires significant support to transform it into a 'fit-to-purpose' security institution. Having reached the level of approximately 78,000 personnel during the reporting period, the ANP continued to rely on substantial support from the IC in order to support security operations in Afghanistan. The Focused District Development (FDD) program, conducted by the Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A) during the reporting period, remained the primary focus of IC support to ANP development. An acute shortage of Police Mentor Teams (PMT) remains a critical challenge to the continued implementation of FDD across Afghanistan.

#### **Counter Narcotics (CN)**

6. The link between the illegal narcotics industry and OMF was further confirmed during the reporting period, and continues to fuel instability and corruption. This continues to threaten all levels of governance, including police authority and the wider rule of law. Ultimately, the effect of the illegal narcotics trade jeopardises meaningful reconstruction and development. Key points are that:

a. ISAF support to CN operations focuses on cross-agency coordination with the Afghan Ministries of the Interior, Counter Narcotics, and Defence, as well with the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

b. Within its mandate and resources, ISAF supported the Afghan Special Narcotics Force (ASNF) and the National Interdiction Unit (NIU), which are the key Afghan CN interdiction forces. The GIRoA, supported by ISAF, conducted a pre-planting information operation campaign that appeared to have achieved some positive results. ISAF also provided logistical support to a number of Afghan interdiction operations.

#### **Neighbouring Countries**

7. Movement of OMF between Pakistan and Afghanistan persisted across what is a largely porous border. Criminal elements continue to use smuggling routes across Central Asian countries neighboring Afghanistan to access Europe and Asia. Reports of foreign fighters arriving in Afghanistan from Central Asia continued as well.



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**Judicial Reform (JR) and Rule of Law (RoL)**

8. There was no significant change from the last reporting period. Public access to justice remains limited. The prison system continues to lack sufficient infrastructure and personnel, and the majority of Afghans were unaware of their rights and the legal process. The judicial system continues to remain weak with widespread corruption. Slight progress was noted with respect to judicial training.

**Governance**

9. The military mission of ISAF, as mandated by the relevant UN SCRs, is intended to assist the GIRoA in providing security across Afghanistan. Events on the ground during the reporting period reinforced the view that security, development and governance are interdependent. Reinforcing the positive influence of the creation of the Afghan Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), ISAF continued to engage with the Afghan government at all levels in order to help extend its authority and improve its capabilities. Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) leadership remained vital in buttressing the GIRoA's authority against the effects of continued efforts by the OMF and/or criminal elements to frustrate this process. Deeper and wider engagement of the central government and proof of its impartial beneficiary effects for the whole population, at the grass roots level, remained a priority for sustained improvements. Capacity building at all levels of the GIRoA administration remains a prerequisite for extending government authority.

**Development**

10. The Joint Force Command Brunssum Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) conference held in May 2008, with participants from ISAF troop contributing nations, the IC, and GIRoA, provided a venue for coordinating PRT long term guidance and direction. The outcome was an action plan to further align NATO's support for reconstruction and development with the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS). In terms of building better governance, it was agreed that PRTs should provide support to the IDLG's Five Year Plan. This could best be achieved through enhanced coordination with UNAMA at the regional level as well as increased emphasis from a reinvigorated PRT Executive Steering Committee (ESC), co-chaired by the IDLG rather than the Ministry of the Interior.

United Nations



Nations Unies

Executive Office of the Secretary-General  
Cabinet du Secrétaire général

To: Mr. Nambiar,

Please find attached, for your approval and SG's signature a letter addressed to the President of SC transmitting a quarterly report by NATO on ISAF operations in Afghanistan.

  
Nicholas Haysom  
9 December 2008

Cc: KWS

28-14153