


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Note to Mr. Vijay Nambiar


**REQUEST FOR AN INTERVIEW GIVEN BY THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR PUBLICATION IN THE NEWSLETTER OF
THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION FOR THE COMPREHENSIVE
NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY ORGANIZATION (CTBTO PREPCOM)**

Interview
Edited
+
sent.

1. The Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO PrepCom) has approached the Office for Disarmament Affairs (ODA) with a request that the Secretary-General consider providing an article in the format of an interview, to be published in the September 2007 edition of their newsletter *CTBTO Spectrum*. The interview includes, *inter alia*, the Secretary-General's views and personal efforts to counter the serious threat that nuclear weapons pose to international peace and security, as well as a close look into his role as Depositary of the CTBT, in light of the forthcoming fifth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT on 17 and 18 September 2007, in Vienna. As a former Chairperson of the CTBTO PrepCom, the Secretary-General would address issues related to the work of the Organization and the importance of establishing the global verification regime as a key for the successful implementation of the Treaty. The questions for the interview are provided by the PTS of the CTBTO PrepCom. This interview would be accompanied by a photograph and a biographical note of the Secretary-General.
2. ODA would recommend that the Secretary-General agree to the interview for the newsletter before the convening of the fifth Conference in order to generate maximum visibility and encourage high-level representation by all States that have ratified the Treaty. The interview would also provide a timely opportunity to inform decision-makers and the general public about the Secretary-General's personal efforts to counter the threat posed by nuclear weapons and the role of the United Nations in achieving this goal.
3. In this connection, please find attached draft elements for the answers of the interview for the consideration and approval by the Secretary-General.
4. The *CTBTO Spectrum* is a bi-annual publication of the CTBTO PrepCom. As you may recall, in January 2007 the Secretary-General provided a short quotation (attached) expressing support for the CTBT in light of the nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 9 October 2006.

Hannelore Hoppe

Hannelore Hoppe
Officer-in-Charge
Office for Disarmament Affairs
7 June 2007



cc: Mr. Kim

Draft elements

Secretary-General' interview for the CTBTO Newsletter "Spectrum"

Q. One of the key objectives of the United Nations is to establish and maintain international peace and security. In the first resolution adopted by the General Assembly in January 1946, Member States agreed unanimously that specific proposals should be made "for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction."

How do you as the United Nations Secretary-General intend to further this goal and to counter the serious threat that nuclear weapons pose to mankind and to international peace and security?

A. Draft for Question 1

I am personally concerned about this issue because nuclear weapons pose a number of threats to international peace and security. Some threats arise from existing arsenals, while others stem from the proliferation or terrorist acquisition of such weapons.

Since becoming Secretary-General, I have consulted with Member States and civil society and am convinced that these threats are best addressed by multilateral action, emphasizing in particular the goals of disarmament, non-proliferation, and collective action against nuclear terrorism.

Both experts and the general public share a common awareness of the growing gap between agreed goals in these areas and actual results. Tens of thousands of nuclear weapons remain almost two decades after the end of the Cold War. The CTBT has not yet entered into force, nor do we have a fissile materials treaty. Meanwhile, solemn safeguards and non-proliferation commitments under the NPT have been breached. Venerable components of the multilateral disarmament machinery – notably the Conference on Disarmament, the Disarmament Commission, and the General Assembly's First Committee – remain deeply divided, particularly over steps needed for new progress on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. They have increasingly become forums for the voicing of competing national policies, rather than serving as crucibles for uniting all nations in common cause.

While I cannot alone solve all these problems, I can and will use my voice as Secretary-General to underscore the concerns and expectations of the peoples of the United Nations. I specifically intend to strengthen the contributions of the United Nations Secretariat in meeting this challenge. I have established an independent Office for Disarmament Affairs, building on the work of the former Department, which will be headed by a High Representative who will report directly to me.

The new Office will actively promote disarmament and non-proliferation as mutually reinforcing objectives. Success in these areas will serve to reduce threats associated with existing nuclear weapons as well as the danger that such weapons will be acquired by additional countries. Such progress will also help to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism. The Office will cooperate closely with civil society and promote educational goals to overcome complacency and ignorance. It will assist Member States in their efforts to promote universal membership in key multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation treaties as well as full

compliance. It will continue to pursue its work in a spirit of openness and transparency, so that disarmament-related information is readily available to Member States and the public, including on such issues as the status of treaties, votes on General Assembly resolutions, and details on other deliberations in the United Nations disarmament machinery.

I am taking these steps because I believe that progress in disarmament, non-proliferation, and in preventing terrorism is valuable not only in itself, but because this progress is also essential to the achievement of many other goals of the United Nations Charter, including those relating to the use of force, as well as economic and social development. When United Nations efforts in these fields move forward, the world moves forward.

Q. With the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) more than ten years ago, the political objective to end all nuclear tests had been achieved and the legal framework established. But today, despite nearly universal adherence, the Treaty has yet to enter into force.

What will you do, as Secretary-General of the United Nations and Depositary of the Treaty, to forward the entry into force of the CTBT? What steps do you envisage that the international community and in particular those states whose ratification is necessary for entry into force must take?

A. Draft for Question 2

On 17 and 18 September 2007, in my capacity as Depositary of the Treaty, I am convening the fifth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT, in Vienna at the request of a majority of States that have ratified the CTBT. I support plans for this Conference that would create maximum visibility and encourage high-level representation by all States that have ratified. Those seeking entry into force of the CTBT should encourage all signatories to ratify as soon as possible.

While the Conference will review a range of important technical issues, the most urgent task would be to reaffirm the States commitment to the Treaty and to resolve to work for its prompt entry into force. Therefore, it is expected that a Final Declaration would be adopted – as in 1999, 2001, 2003, and 2005. The majority of the States – 177 in all – has signed it. Of these, 138 States have ratified it, including 34 of the 44 States whose ratification is essential for the Treaty to enter into force.

I urge those States that have not yet signed to sign and ratify the Treaty as soon as possible, in particular those States whose ratification is essential for the Treaty to enter into force. I urge participants in the forthcoming Conference to reaffirm the importance of a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the CTBT pending its entry into force. I see emerging in the world today a “zero tolerance” of any further tests of nuclear explosive devices. I hope to see the day when this expectation is made legally binding and remain convinced that the CTBT is the way this will ultimately be achieved.

Q. The global verification regime that the CTBTO Preparatory Commission establishes to monitor compliance with the CTBT must be operational once the Treaty enters into force. On 9 October 2006, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) announced its test of a nuclear explosive device. With less than 60% of the monitoring stations in operation, and

working in test-mode only, the verification system provided States Signatories with reliable and high quality data, assisting them to make their own judgments.

As a former Chairperson of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission, how do you view the work of the PrepCom and its Technical Secretariat, in particular the build up of the verification regime in the wake of the DPRK event?

A. Draft for Question 3

I have a very high regard indeed for the work of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission, based not only on its formal goals, but also on my own personal experience in promoting them.

Since its establishment in March 1997, the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) has successfully conducted many activities to deepen the understanding of the Treaty among decision-makers and the general public. It has also worked to strengthen political support, encourage international cooperation, build technical capabilities, and train its personnel in the arts and sciences of treaty verification.

The global verification regime is the key for the successful implementation of the Treaty and should be strong enough to detect any nuclear test explosion in a way that would leave no chance that such a test could occur undetected. The verification regime is indispensable in constraining the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the development of new weapons.

By enhancing the world community's confidence that nuclear tests are not occurring, the PrepCom and its Technical Secretariat are not only serving the immediate goals of the CTBT – notably non-proliferation and disarmament. These activities also strengthen international peace and security and the rule of law. This is how I view their work and I will continue to do all I can to bring this historic treaty into force.