

UNAMDR

OPERATIONS-GENERAL

10 OCT - 7 DEC 1964

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

[10 CONFIDENTIAL]
RM/WG JUNE 2009

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES	<u>S-1002</u>
BOX	<u>159</u>
FILE	<u>5</u>
ACC.	<u>1998/0283</u>

Subs. Copy for [unclear]



UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR KIGALI

Office of the DFC/COS/CMO
UNAMIR Force HQ
Kigali
Rwanda

1000 7(DFC)/G/8

11 November 1994

THE DIRECTOR OF CABINET
MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT AND
COMMUNICATIONS
B.P. 720
KIGALI

SUBJECT: CESSATION OF AIR OPS CELL OPERATION AT KIGALI
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

1. Reference your letter No. 16.01.0059/94 dated 24 October, 1994, you are kindly requested to nominate three staff members to commence familiarization training at the Air Ops Cell, Kigali International Airport. The training is scheduled to commence on 17 November, 1994 at the Airport. Also, your request for a donation of the equipment currently being used at the Air Ops Cell is being considered, and you will be notified on the final decision of UNAMIR in due course.
2. The official handing-over of the Air Ops Cell operation to the government is scheduled for 10 December, 1994. Please complete all necessary formalities to ensure a smooth hand-over.
3. UNAMIR is grateful for the cooperation extended to us during the period of the humanitarian airlift operation through Kigali International Airport and hope that this will continue.

MR. Desmole
I know there is nobody else
around. Who-ever is in charge
of the administration or the logistics,
is would like us to release the
equipment to the Rwandese authorities
on loan is start with
wait a final decision is
taken. (See para 1 above
and para 2 of their letter
attached)

HK Anyidoho
Brig Gen
DFC/COS/CMO

20/12
DFC

58
16/11/94
SB



UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

Office of the DFC/COS/CMO
UNAMIR Force HQ
Kigali
Rwanda


1000.7(DFC)/G/8

14 November 1994

THE DIRECTOR OF CABINET
MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT AND
COMMUNICATIONS
B.P. 720
KIGALI

SUBJECT: CESSATION OF AIR OPS CELL OPERATION AT KIGALI
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

1. Reference your letter No. 16.01.0059/94 dated 24 October, 1994, you are kindly requested to nominate three staff members to commence familiarization training at the Air Ops Cell, Kigali International Airport. The training is scheduled to commence on 17 November, 1994 at the Airport. Also, your request for a donation of the equipment currently being used at the Air Ops Cell is being considered, and you will be notified on the final decision of UNAMIR in due course.
2. The official handing-over of the Air Ops Cell operation to the government is scheduled for 10 December, 1994. Please complete all necessary formalities to ensure a smooth hand-over.
3. UNAMIR is grateful for the cooperation extended to us during the period of the humanitarian airlift operation through Kigali International Airport and hope that this will continue.


HK Anyidoho
Brig Gen
DFC/COS/CMO

G8
16/11/94
SB

UNAMIR
FORCE HQ
OPS BRANCH

28 Oct 94

3000.4(CASO)

See Distribution:

SUBJECT: CESSATION OF AIR OPS CELL OPERATION

Refs:

- A. AOC, KIA ltr Misc/ltr dt 25 Oct 94 (attached).
- B. Ltr 3000.4(CASO) dt 15 Oct 94.

1. The proposal made in ref A is agreed to in principle. Accordingly, you are requested to postpone/cancel the posting order of Milobs of AOC KIA except para B (1) of letter ref A. You are also requested to take the Air Ops Ln team under command and control of MILOB HQ effective 01 Dec 94.

J. ARP
J. ARP
Col
DCOS OPS

Distribution;

External:

Action:

CMO/MILOB GP HQ

Info:

DFC/COS
SSMO SEC-6
AOC KIA

DCMO

Learn. let is discuss

4/21

21/10

DFC/WS/CMO

G-8

SB
28/10/94

MISC/LTR

AIR OPS CELL KIA
OPS BRANCH
UNAMIR

25 OCT 94

See Distribution

SUBJECT : CESSATION OF AIR OPS CELL OPERATION

Refs :

- A. Letter from Ministry of Transport and Communication dt 24 Oct 94
- B. Milobs\6443.15 dt 18 Oct 94 (Deployment of Milobs)
- C. Ltr 3000.4(CASO) dt 15 Oct 94

1. Having been discussed the above mentioned subject with the appropriate authorities a plan has been prepared for gradual reduction of Air Ops Cell manning and operation. Proposal is made considering the request made by Rwandese authority to extend the activities of Air Ops Cell for another one month with effect from 1st November 1994 (ltr is attached herewith). Regarding the request made for donating the equipment presently used by this cell to Rwandese authority may be considered at appropriate level.

A. The present activities of Air Ops Cell may be continued until 30 Nov 94. After handing over the function of this cell to Rwandese authorities the role of this cell may be changed into Air Ops Liaison Cell to liaise any air ops matter(military) in Airport on behalf of UNAMIR.

B. The reduction of manning may be effected as follows :

- 1. Phase-1 . Two officers, Maj Monjur Hossain UNID MO-604 and Sqn Ldr Antwi Boasiakoh Samuel UNID M-1218, will be released with effect from 26 Oct 94 as per Milobs deployment plan(Ref B).
- 2. Phase-2 . Two officers, Wg Cdr ATM Nazrul Islam UNID MO-576 and Maj Radomir Jass UNID M-1632, will be repatriated by the end of Nov 94 on completion of their tour of duties with the UNAMIR.
- 3. Phase-3 . With the strength of 4xMILOBS the Air Ops Liaison Cell will function its activities until UNAMIR interest is required to be served.
- 4. Transport. With the reduction of manpower , the Cell will surrender one transport to the MILOB HQ as discussed.

2. In view of the reductions in the flow of UNAMIR flights the hours of ops of this cell may be reduced to 0600-2000LT.

3. Submitted for your perusal and information.

N-3

ATM NAZRUL ISLAM
Wg Cdr

Distribution:

Action :

DCOS OPS

Info:

DFC/COS

CMO\MILOB Gp HQ

SSMO SEC-6

OUTGOING FAX NO

3720

UNAMIR

DATE

MIR-2695

07 December 94

TO: BEISSEL/ACT.DIRECTOR FOD/DPKO/UNHQ - NEW YORK	FROM: BGEN HK ANYIDHO DFC/COS/CMO UNAMIR - RWANDA <i>[Signature]</i>
FAX NO:(212) 963-2116	FAX NO: 1-212-963-3090
SUBJECT:TRANSFER OF BLANK AMMUNITION FROM UNOSOM II TO UNAMIR	
INFO:	ORIGINATOR ROOM NO: 2029
TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES TRANSMITTED INCLUDING THIS ONE: 1	

1. REFERENCE: YOUR FAX SOM-869 OF 2 DEC 94.
2. PLEASE BE INFORMED UNAMIR DOES NOT HAVE ANY OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT FOR BLANK AMMUNITION. HENCE, PROPOSED FUTURE SHIPMENT OF EXCESS BLANK AMMUNITION FROM UNOSOM II TO THE MISSION AS MENTIONED IN THE REFERENCE ABOVE IS CONSIDERED UNDESIRABLE.
3. REGARDS.

DFC/cos/cmo

UNAMIR
94 DEC -1 21

G8
13/12/94
SB



UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

Memorandum

From: MA to FC

To: See Distribution

Date: 7 Dec 94.

Subject: SUPPORT TO US GAO INSPECTION KIBUNGO AND CYANGUGU 9-10 DEC

1. US GAO is conducting an inspection to confirm that funds donated by the US are being appropriately spent by UN and agencies in Rwanda. The group (7 pax) requires to conduct field visits. They will require briefings, hel and ground transport. This memo will outline their requirements.
2. Fri 9 Dec - Kibungu. Sector Comd and HRC to provide operations brief at UNREO building in Kibungu 1430 to 1500. No ground or air transport required.
3. Sat 10 Dec - Cyangugu. Contingent Comd, Milob Comd and HRC to provide operations brief at 0730 hrs. Briefing area to be arranged by Contingent Comd. Ground transport (7 pax) to be arranged by Milobs from LS. That ground transport to be available to allow team to conduct local area inspection of NGOs until 1100.
4. Hel Sp. Hel sp required 0700 Sat 10 Dec lift from KIA to Cyangugu. Leave from Cyangugu LS for KIA at 1100.

Distribution:

Action:

Milob HQ Kigali
G3 Ops
G3 Air Ops
HRC HQ Kigali

Information:

DFC
D Cos Ops
DCMO
LO Ethiobatt
Charles Petrie UNREO

(2)

DCMO

I hope this has been conveyed
to all our milobs
HJH
09/12
DFC/COS/CMO

Name: Hadow Signature: *[Signature]*

Rank: Lt Col RM

G8
10/12/94
SB

UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

To: DFC/COS/CMO
From: Force PM/SO2 G1 Disc
Info: DCOS Sp
Date: 5 Dec 94
File: FPM/6
Subject: MILITARY POLICE DUTY OFFICER

1. Thank you for your minute 1000.7(DFC)/G/8 dated 3 Dec 94; I fully understand the concern that you express and share your desire that MP support should always be available to UNAMIR and other agencies as and when it is needed.

2. Although my office cannot be manned on a 24-hour basis because I have no deputy - nor even my own clerk - I am always ready to be called; the procedure is explained in the Minute that I supplied to G3 Ops on 1 Dec, of which I attach a copy. I hope that this is acceptable.

M. Cuthbert-Brown maj.

M CUTHBERT-BROWN
Maj
Force PM/SO2 G1 Disc

DCOS OPS

For your info and rec action pse

06-12-94

*G8
9/12/94
SB*

UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - KIGALI

To: G3 Ops

From: Force PM/SO2 G1 Disc

Info: DCOS Ops
DCOS Sp
C Civpol
SO2 Air Ops (93H)
CO Force MP Coy

Date: 1 Dec 94

File: FPM/6

Subject: UNAMIR MILITARY POLICE CONTACT PROCEDURE

1. Kigali Detachment of the Force MP Company is now manned around the clock - collocated with Company HQ at 10 Rue de Travail. Telephone numbers are:

Kigali Det MP Station:

Kigali 86855
(24 hours)

CO Force MP Coy (Major Plante):

Kigali 86856
(office hours only)

Force PM (myself):

Amahoro ext 11108
(office hours, room 1050)

Neither the CO of the unit nor myself have home telephone numbers but we both maintain a listening watch on Channel 7. If I cannot be raised on this means out of hours, there is a good chance that callsign 93H will know where I am because we share a room in the British Bungalow - the first on the right as one climbs the hill into the Belgian Village.

2. Radio Callsigns. Although it is less than satisfactory that the MP Company is constrained to the Force Command Net, it is using Channel 7 for the time being. A list of its callsigns is attached; in addition, I use callsign PAPA MIKE.

M CUTHBERT-BROWN
Maj
Force PM/SO2 G1 Disc

UNAMIR MILITARY POLICE

CALL SIGNS

1. KIGALI DET MILITARY POLICE STATION..... Escort 0
2. COY HQ
 - a) COMMANDING OFFICE..... Mike Papa 9
 - b) OPERATIONS OFFICER Escort 1
 - c) LOGISTICS OFFICER..... Escort 4
 - d) OPERATIONS WO..... Escort 1A
3. KIGALI DETACHMENT
 - a) DET COMD Escort 2
 - b) DET OPERATIONS WO..... Escort 3
 - c) INVESTIGATIONS

Team No 1	Delta 1
Team No 2	Delta 2
Team No 3	Delta 3
 - d) SHIFTS
 - (1) Shift 1 (Patrols)..... Alfa 1,2,3,4,5
 - (2) Shift 2 (Patrols)..... Bravo 1,2,3,4,5
 - (3) Shift 3 (Patrols)..... Charlie 1,2,3,4,5



UNAMIR - MINUAR

To : DFC/COS/CMO

File Ref: 5000.1(HAC)/G/16

From: CHAC

Date: 05 Dec 94

Subject: DUTY OFFICERS/WATCH KEEPERS

Reference:

A. 1000.7(DFC)/G/8 dated 03 Dec 94.

1. The Humanitarian Assistance Cell (HAC) has long recognised the need to maintain a Duty Officer/Watch Keeper system. However the system has to date not been fully established due to the following reasons:

a. Lack of adequate manpower resources in the Cell to man a CP in the same manner as UNAMIR OPs on a 24 hour/seven days a week basis. The Cell currently has a strength of four officers (1 Col, 2 Majs and 1 Capt).

b. The reluctance by UNREO to provide the needed office space and personnel to man a joint CP on 24 hrs basis which is a requirement for an effective watch system.

2. However an alternative system has been put in place since Oct 94 that ensures that all distress calls from UN Agencies and NGOs are attended to with minimum fuss. The system was developed in close consultation with UNAMIR OPs and the Force Signals Officer.

3. The system involves the monitoring of Channel 8 (the UN Agencies and NGOs net) from 1900 hours to 0700 hours daily by the UNAMIR HQ Duty Officer as this is the silent period for UNREO Base Station at UNREO HQ. All Agencies and NGOs have been briefed to contact UNAMIR OPs on Channel 8 in an emergency for the needed help.

4. Although this arrangement is not the most satisfactory, it nevertheless answers the basic requirement of ensuring that all genuine emergencies from Agencies and NGOs can be handled by the Duty Officer at UNAMIR HQ. Furthermore UNAMIR OPs controls all the assets for emergencies ie transport, armed troops and communications. A duty system at the HAC merely serve as a conduit through which emergencies are passed to Channel 7 for action which is likely to lead to unnecessary waste of time and indeed reduce the urgency of the problem.

5. It is the view of the HAC that the system currently in place can work effectively provided that all Agencies and NGOs are fully aware of the procedures and that duty officers at UNAMIR OPs are alive to their responsibilities.

1 COS OPS

Are you aware

there

arrangements?

1

06/12


DFC/105

G8

8/12/94
SB

6. The Cell will however comply with ref 'A' when the problems indicated at para 1 are addressed. In particular once the manpower problem is overcome, the Duty officer of HAC could co-locate with that of UNAMIR OPs.

7. Respectfully submitted for your attention please.



CB YAACHE
Col
CHAO

MESSAGE FORM
FORMULE DE MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION — COTE DE SECURITE

FILE — DOSSIER

UNCLAS

PAGE 1 OF 1	DATE — TIME GROUP GROUPE DATE — HEURE			PRECEDENCE PRIORITE		CLASS	SPECAT CAT SPEC	LMF L DIFF	CAI/CIC IAG/ICC	ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER NUMERO DE L'EXPEDITEUR
	DATE — TIME DATE — HEURE	MONTH MOIS	YEAR ANNEE	ACTION	INFO					
	051900Z	DEC	94	R						OPS 018

BOOK
DOSSIER

MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS — INSTRUCTIONS D'ACHEMINEMENT DU MESSAGE

FROM — DE UNTAC HQ BUTARE // COO //

UNAMIR HQ KIGALI // DFC //

UNAMIR HQ KIGALI // COS //

Subj: WORKING IN OPS ROOM

Ref: Your (1000.7 DFC) G/8 DATED 05 DEC 94

Receipt acknowledged with profound
thanks

EOM

DISTRIBUTION — DIFFUSION

DRAFTER — REDACTEUR			SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS — DIRECTIVES SPECIALES
NAME — NOM	OFFICE — BUREAU	TEL — TEL	
RELEASING OFFICER — L'OFFICIER APPROBATEUR			MOTOROLA 051903Z DEC 94 MCPL JACKLIN
NAME — NOM	OFFICE — BUREAU	TEL — TEL	
SIGNATURE G8 7/12/94 SA			SECURITY CLASSIFICATION — COTE DE SECURITE UNCLAS

NAA
Lt Col Apoya yulla
Lt Sgt
20/11
DTC/LOS

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Assumptions

1. RPA cooperation will be forthcoming throughout the operation.
2. There will be no national impediment to participation by the force envisaged.

Situation

3. G2 to develop (see threat assessment)

Mission Analysis

4. The essential task is to separate the criminal element from Kibeho and Ndago Camps.
5. Specified tasks are:
 - a. Search allocated objectives;
 - b. Arrest criminals;
 - c. Provide security;
 - d. Effect command and control.
6. Implied tasks are:
 - a. Identify criminals (RPA)
 - b. Locate caches;
 - c. Confiscate weapons (firearms);
 - d. Prepare for post Op camp clearance (Op Homeward)

Concept of Manoeuvre

7. A two phase cordon and search operation with the cordon provided by RPA troops and the search force provided by UNAMIR:
 - a. Phase 1 Linear oriented search by five companies commencing at Kibeho with a three company blocking force inserted at Ndago. A two platoon support/reserve element would be located at Kibeho.
 - b. Phase 2 Search of Ndago camp by the company blocking force from phase 1. Forces from phase 1 remain in place as blocking /security force.
8. Objectives Obj 1 - Kibeho; Obj 2 - Ndago. Company objectives to be specified subject to detailed reconnaissance.

Key Timings

9. Pre operation outline timings are:

G8
3/12/94
GP

- a. D Day - Op commences;
- b. D-1 - Move to blocking/cordon positions/FUP;
- c. D-2 - Move to assy area;
- d. D-3- Coy comd O Gp;
- e. D-4 - Coy level recon;
- f. D-5 - DFC/Bn Comd recon;
- g. D-6 - FC O Gp;
- h. D-7 - FC approval of OPORD;
- i. D-8 - Spt plans complete;
- j. FC approval of outline plan;
- k. D-10 - Staff guidance on outline concept.

10. Outline timings for the operation depend entirely on the degree of search required. For intensive search, a three day operation based on one objective per day per company. A further day is allocated for reorganisation/ post operation security. For a low degree of search (two objectives per company per day), a 48 hour operation is indicative.

Support Plans

11. The following support plans will be required:

- a. Communications;
- b. Medical;
- c. Logistics;
- d. Liaison;
- e. Detainee handling.

FROM: UNAMIR HQ KIGALI//Air ops

TO: Sector 5 Gisenyi Milob HQ//Sec Comd

INFO: MILOB GP HQ//CMO

SUBJECT: Helicopter Assistance for Missing NGO Search.

1. Further to your signal 291840Z Nov 94 requesting technical assistance to effectively utilise helicopter for search operations 25 nm north of Goma. G3 Air Ops flew on the last mission on 28 Nov. He is the only current SH/SAR qualified helicopter pilot assigned to this HQ and is the only member of the G3 Air ops cell.

3. In both G3 Air's and Canadian Helicopter's opinion, further search missions over the area are pointless. If the person is injured and under cover, the chances of finding him are minimal in that terrain. If the person has tried to leave the area further search patterns are worthless. Unless agencies on the ground can ascertain from the locals and police or military, a more specific area to search, further air searches are not an option.

4. By all means send a Milob or UNHCR person to be briefed on SAR patterns and methods at this HQ. However it is more a case of where to look, not how. Even with thermal imaging equipment, random searches of the area would not be productive. UNAMIR have cooperated fully in this operation but with incredibly limited air assets a realistic approach must be taken. No doubt UNAMIR's image with the agencies and NGOs are a factor in deciding if to fly further missions.

5. Please could you investigate the availability of Jet-A1 for refuelling at Goma. If more information is forthcoming UNAMIR will fully support your operations with further SAR missions. The intention is to provide a SAR mission tomorrow whilst a helicopter is in Gisenyi with the DFC. Times will be notified by radio. Note that the minimum search speed depends on the helicopters all up weight. A maximum of 4 persons in the rear cabin will allow a slower search speed to be flown.

G3 Air

I believe this issue has
been resolved

[Signature]

60/12

DFC/LOS

[Signature]

J D JANIUREK
Sqn Ldr
SO2 G3 Air

G8
3/12/94
SB

③ DCS OPS

1. To my knowledge
we did not ask for
blender ammo
2. I see no great
requirement for it.
Indeed, its use may
not even be operationally
desireable

WJ G3KANS 6/72

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

 FIELD OPERATIONS DIVISION
 LOGISTICS & COMMUNICATIONS SECTION UNAMIR

IN 5083

MIR-481

FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

91 DEC -3 07 18

Outgoing Fax #: 50M-869	Date: 2 December 1994
To: UNOSOM II Att: BJORNSSON, DOA GODRFIN, UNAMIR Attn: GOLO, OIC	From: BEISSEL/ACT. DIRECTOR FOD/DPKO/UNHQ - NEW YORK
Fax #: 3-3082/3 3-3090	Fax #: (212) 963-2116
Number of transmitted pages: 1	Ref: Fax No. 1024 of 25.11.94
Subject: BLANK AMMUNITION (1)	

1. IN VIEW OF THE NEW FACTS WHICH HAVE EMERGED, IT HAS NOW BEEN DECIDED THAT THE EXCESS BLANK AMMUNITION WHICH IS IN GOOD CONDITION SHOULD NOT BE WRITTEN OFF AS EARLIER ADVISED, BUT SENT TO UNAMIR IN RWANDA TO BE USED IN THAT MISSION.

2. PLEASE THEREFORE ARRANGE TO INCLUDE AMMUNITION WHICH IS CERTIFIED SAFE BY THE ATO, AND CORRECTLY PACKED, IN A FUTURE SHIPMENT TO THAT MISSION.

3. ANY OF THE AMMUNITION THAT IS NOT IN GOOD CONDITION SHOULD BE DESTROYED IN SOMALIA.

3. REGARDS.

Drafted by: MM Campbell-White
Cleared by: D Hamon, Chief Current Ops
Cleared by: 1 Divers, Chief Supply Unit

Cleared by: D Behrstock, Chief Log Ops
Authorized by: A. Waldrum, OIC/LCS

MMCW1

(4) DFC/COS

1. I am unsure why we would want blank ammo. I believe it dangerous to have both avail.
2. Suggest we reply that we do not want any blank ammo.
3. Your direction pls.

(5) DFC/OPS

If we succeed in having a big area in the near future, we may need the blank ammo. What do you think?

(2) G3 Plans.

Did you ask for this?

ACSS

G8
13/12/94
SB

(5) DFC/OPS

5/12

Prepare a fax to the originator that we do not need

Pre prepare a fax for me to discuss with the staff that we don't need the blanks.
+ sh
06/12
DFC/COS

File pse
#09 30/11/94

OPERATIONAL BRIEFING SECTOR 1

1. GENERAL:

Sector 1 is located in the north-eastern part of Rwanda.

a. SECTOR 1 BOUNDARIES

NORTH: border with Uganda

EAST: AKAGERA river which is also the border with TANZANIA

SOUTH: The boundary runs through the lake MUHAZI approx.

10km north of KIGALI. It crosses the main road KIGALI - GATUNA until it reaches the main road KIGALI - RUHENGARI

WEST: Sector boundary with sector 5 is running along main road KIGALI-RUHENGARI up to the village BASE. Then it leads to the north till reaching the Ugandan border near the village of KIVUYE.

b. MAJOR SETTLEMENTS IN SECTOR 1:

- BYUMBA: is the seat of the prefecture BYUMBA and the administrative center. The prefecture of BYUMBA is the largest one in Rwanda. However it includes part of the AKAGERA PARK which is almost unpopulated.

- NGARAMA
- NYAGATARE
- MURAMBI
- MUGAMBAZI
- KINIHIRA

c. MAJOR ROADS IN SECTOR ONE/BORDER CROSSING POINTS:

- Road KIGALI - RUKONDO - GATUNA BORDER: main entry point to and from Uganda (commercial traffic)

- Road KAYONZA - GABIRO - KAGITUMBA: leads to the border crossing point

- Road RUKONDO - NGARAMA - NYAGATARE: Dirt road throughout linking these settlements with BYUMBA.

2. FRIENDLY FORCES

A) NIGERIAN COY: is colocated with the Milobs HQ Sector 1 in the Ecole Sociale de Byumba

B) CANADIAN SIGNALS DETACHMENT: also located in BYUMBA camp

G8
2/12/94
SB

3. RPA:

The RPA Forces are still in firm control of sector 1 area of responsibility.

4. OWN ACTIVITIES

The sector has a strength of 28 out of 41 Milobs posted during the ongoing deployment exercise. Nine Milobs deliberately refused to report.

At present the Milobs are operating from BYUMBA, but serious efforts are being made to establish a subsector at RWAMAGANA (Grid 4884). Recce is already done. The contract paper for the office to be finalized with FHQ. Milobs expected to move to RWAMAGANA latest monday 28 Nov 94.

5. GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION AND INCIDENTS

The Situation in Sector 1 is generally calm. RPA has a firm control over the area of sector 1.

The problem of unexploded devices and mines still remains unsolved. There are so many unexploded devices being discovered and all efforts to get engineers to detonate them proved abortive.

Security situation is observed to be o.k. except for few incidents of arrests of locals by RPA.

6. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION:

Although there are no displaced people's camps in sector 1, there are "short-time" camps created for returnees. In such camps returnees from UGANDA are concentrated for a period of about one week before they are sent to their various homes. Such camps are in TABAGWE, RUKOMO, MUVUMBA and GATUZA communes. We are now liaising with NGOs to start providing food for them (ICRC, UNHCR, AMREF, GOAL).

A hospital was newly established by German Medical Team since 03 Nov 94.

Milobs in Sector 1 have also concluded an arrangement with the Nigerian contingent to provide trucks twice weekly (mondays and thursdays) for returnees at KAGITUMBA border post. The trucks are to carry all the stranded returnees to their homes. The first trips were made on thursday 10 Nov 94 and monday 21 Nov 94, the next trip will be on friday 25 Nov 94.

Milobs also discovered that the hospital at RUTONGO needs assistance in terms of drugs and even staff. There are so many patients but the hospital has only one doctor and most of the

nurses have resigned because of non-payment of their monthly salaries.

Salaries were paid to teachers in MUTARA zone on 21 Nov 94. Recently there was an outbreak of malaria and dysentery reported in some communes. The areas most affected are: GITTI, RUTONGO, RUTARE and KINYAMI communes. Efforts by NGOs (ICRC, AMREF, German Medical Team).

7. LOGISTICS SITUATION

The sector is facing an acute vehicle shortage. Two vehicles had been in the workshop at KIGALI. For details see ANNEX B.

8. CONCLUSION

In general, there is good cooperation between the NGOs, the RPA and Milobs in the sector. Information about returnees from UGANDA at GATUNA border now possible. An average of 8 persons crossed per day.

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS

GENERAL

1. Sector 1 seems to share common problems with other sectors, especially that of accumulation of Leave/CTO days and the reduction of October's MSA. To note could be the strength of Milobs in Byumba, which has been decreasing due to repatriations and other reasons beyond the sectors control.

PERSONNEL

2. The sector has a strength of (28) twenty eight officers out of (41) forty one which were posted in during the ongoing deployments.

3. As mentioned before (9) nine milobs deliberately refused to report. The reasons are not known to this sector. In addition to this, (3) three officers from Bangladesh were repatriated on 20 Nov 94 and (4) four officers including the sector commander will be repatriated in Dec 94. Whilst the sector will loose (16) sixteen officers this year 1994, (4) four more officers will be repatriated early Jan 95, on completion of their tour of duty.

4. Tabulated hereunder is a detailed account of Milob personnel in Sector 1:

- a. Posted strength 41
- b. Present Strength 19
- c. CTO and Leave 9
- d. Total 28
- e. Repatriations
 - (1) Nov 94: 3 officers
 - (2) Dec 94: 4 officers
 - (3) Jan 95: 4 officers

LEAVE/CTO AND MSA

5. Problems experienced with Milobs are more or less the same, that of the accumulation of CTO/Leave and the cut in October's MSA. The cut affected even those who were not in the mission during the period in question, hence these factors have drastically affected the Milobs morale.

6. To date it is not clear whether the reduction will continue or was meant for October's MSA only.

6. With your good offices in Kigali we anticipate our problems will be looked into.

LOGISTIC SITUATION IN SECTOR ONE

1. VEHICLES

A) GENERAL: As the saying goes "The efficiency of an army depends on its mobility". This sector is facing an acute shortage of vehicles. In all the sector has nine (9) vehicles.

B) THE LIST AND DISTRIBUTION OF VEHICLES IS TABULATED BELOW

(1) TOYOTA 4-RUNNER

- UNAMIR 1022 for Team 1
- UNAMIR 1023 for Team 2
- UNAMIR 1029 for Team 3
- UNAMIR 1047 for Sector Cdr
- UNAMIR 1052 for Team 4
- UNAMIR 1045 stolen

(2) LAND CRUISER

- UNAMIR 805 for Team 5
- UNAMIR 1272 pool

(3) NISSAN PICK-UP

- UNAMIR 431 for Logistics
- UNAMIR 516 for Operations

C) Out of the vehicles above, UNAMIR 805 and UNAMIR 516 have been in the workshop in Kigali for some time now. UNAMIR 805 was sent to the workshop on 7 Oct 94 and UNAMIR 516 was sent to the workshop on 15 Oct 94. Both vehicles are there up to now.

D) UNAMIR 1272 has been in the workshop for two days now.

E) Because of the delay in the repairing of vehicles by the workshop personnel in Kigali, this has contributed to the shortage of vehicles in the sector. A request is therefore made if civilians could be informed to speed up the repair of sector vehicles in order to maintain the operational vehicle requirement within the sector.

F) Milob HQ is also aware that the sector lost UNAMIR 1045 to armed robbers some weeks back.

2. RADIO COMMUNICATION

Our radio sets in the sector have been reprogrammed. The sector now operates on channel 5 with patrol teams and on channel 14 with Milob HQ. We are now able to communicate to Kagitumba border post from Byumba.

3. ACCOMODATION

At present, all Milobs are operating from Byumba.

John P. de
Lam

HQ UNAMIR

FROM: MAJ H. NICHOLSON, SO SUP, G4

TO: DCOS SP

FOR INFORMATION: ✓ MA to FC
✓ DFC
DCOS OPS
CLOGO

DATE: 30 NOV 94

SUBJECT: BARGE OPERATIONS LAKE KIVU

ADC
Let us take this
to Gisingi body
of 12
05/12

1. Yesterday 29 Nov, I was contacted by the MILOB Commander Sector 5, stating that the local RPA had not been notified of our intended barge operation. He said that the operation was only possible as a result of some long negotiations on his part, and that the local RPA would not allow the barge operation to occur today, unless the Minister of Defence gave approval.
2. I was then requested to attempt to gain permission from the relevant RPA authorities.
3. I subsequently briefed yourself, DFC and DCOS OPS.
4. I then contacted the RPA LO requesting that he gain permission for the barge. He then contacted the Rwandese Army, Chief of Staff (C of S) office and passed our request. The message passed back to me was that the C of S had no problems with us conducting barge operations, however, written permission would be necessary from the Minister of Defence before we could continue with such operations.
5. I then requested an interview with the Minister of Defence for a member of UNAMIR staff to gain the required permission. This was not possible in the short time frame. However, it is still required and will be necessary to gain permission for the operation planned for next Tuesday and Wednesday.
6. I then went back to the RPA LO requesting that the C of S office send a radio message to their commanders in Sector 5 and 4B stating that permission was given for the barge operations, thus allowing today's operation to go ahead. I am unaware if this was successful, as the RPA LO departed before I could confirm this with him. I contacted Sector 5 this morning and they were unaware if contact had been made from the C of S office to the local commander. However they were going to attempt to conduct the operation anyway.
7. With your permission I will request the senior UNAMIR LO to seek an interview with the Minister for Defence for a senior member of UNAMIR Staff to gain the required written permission.

G8
11/12/94
SB

HQ UNAMIR

FROM: MAJ H. NICHOLSON, SO SUP, G4 *H. Nicholson*

TO: ✓ DFC

FOR INFORMATION: CDOS SP
DCOS OPS
MA to FC

DATE: 29 NOV 94

SUBJECT: BARGE OPERATIONS ON LAKE KIVU

*DCOS SP
T. Spence is the
RPA on this...
Any more problems
Pse let me know
Thx
30/11
DFC*

1. Sir, you will be aware that the FC has had discussions with MAJGEN Kagame concerning UNAMIR barge operations on lake KIVU, to resupply FRAFBATT. The FC informed MAJGEN Kagame of his intentions to recommence the operations in a letter (attached). I passed on this letter (copy enclosed) to the RPA LO on 26 Nov requesting that he inform the RPA commanders in Sector 5 and 4B of our intended operations. At no stage has the RPA LO contacted me concerning any misgivings he may have had about the letter.
2. Our convoy arrived at Gisenyi to load on the barge this morning as scheduled, however the local RPA were very agitated as they had not received any word from their chain of command that the barge operations had been sanctioned. The barge was only allowed to proceed as a result of some very fine negotiations by the Commander MILOBS in Sector 5, LTCOL Austdal. The report I have from LTCOL Austdal is that unless the local RPA receive direct instructions from their chain of command **this afternoon** they will not allow the barge to land back in Gisenyi this evening to discharge the empty vehicles, nor will they allow our scheduled barge operation to proceed tomorrow. I request that this matter be given immediate attention. It has been stressed by LTCOL Austdal that these operations can not continue with this level of interference by the RPA and that a serious incident may occur if the matter is not resolved once and for all. It is also an administrative burden that his small team could well do without.
3. May I make a few suggestions to resolve the immediate crisis.
 - a. the RPA LO be instructed to communicate via UNAMIR communications net, with the RPA commanders in both Sector 5 and 4B and instruct them that the barge operation is not to be hindered; or
 - b. the RPA LO be flown to both Gisenyi and Kibuye in a UNAMIR helicopter to instruct the RPA commanders of the above.
4. The long term solution is for MAJGEN Kagame to send a personal letter to the RPA commanders in question concerning this subject.
5. I request your personal assistance in negotiations with the RPA on this matter.

GH

HQ UNAMIR

FROM: MAJ H. NICHOLSON, SO SUP, G4 *HN*
TO: MAJ F. KAMANZI, RPA LO
FOR INFORMATION: DCOS OPS
DCOS SP
CLOGO
OPS DUTY OFFER
DATE: 26 NOV 94
SUBJECT: BARGE OPERATIONS ON LAKE KIVU

1. Enclosed find a copy of a letter to MAJGEN P. Kagame confirming discussions about barge operations on Lake Kivu, between MGEN Kagame and the Force Commander UNAMIR, MAJGEN Tousignant.
2. UNAMIR will recommence barge operations on Lake Kivu between Gisenvi and Kibuye on 29 Nov 94. I have complied with the conditions of the enclosed letter and notified MILOBS in both Sector 5 and 4B of the intended barge timings. Unfortunately, the RPA Commanders in each sector when notified of the intention to restart the barge operation say that they have not been notified of the decision between MAJGEN Kagame and MAJGEN Tousignant. The RPA Commanders also state that they will not allow a barge operation to take place until they have received formal notification from the Ministry of Defence.
3. It is stressed, that these resupply convoys are vital to UNAMIR, which is self evident from the matter being elevated to the level of generals. Please take action to notify your respective commanders of our intention to conduct these operations and that the operations have been sanctioned by MAJGEN Kagame. In this way unnecessary delays and incidents will be avoided for both your administration and ours.
4. Kind regards.

Enclosure:

1. Letter MAJGEN Tousignant dated 15 Nov 94

Chgo

Go for it



Kigali 15 November 1994

Dear General,

When Ambassador Kari and I visited you a few weeks ago, we discussed the manner in which the UNAMIR battalion based in Kibuye was resupplied. You explained that you had concerns over the use of a barge which we had used to convey supplies down Lake Kivu, from Gisenyi to Kibuye, and I agreed to examine other methods of resupply.

All available options have been examined and alternative means have been attempted without success. The ideal situation would be to be able to rely on the use of the road Kigali-Gitarama-Kibuye but experience has shown that the condition of the Gitarama-Kibuye section is such that, after rain, it becomes impassable to some of the vehicles which we need to move across it. Indeed, it was in anticipation of just this problem that we began the barge operation. You will understand that the necessary repairs, unless the proper maintenance of this road is beyond the resources available to the Government of Rwanda, while I understand that a number of agencies are collaborating in considering the funding of the work necessary to make this a route on which we could rely, this will not solve the immediate problem of getting food and other supplies to our troops.

Routes to Kibuye from Kigali via Gisenyi or Cyangugu have been examined. You will know that they are far from ideal for heavy traffic and suffer from the same limitation as the Gitarama-Kibuye road; they cannot be relied upon to remain passable after rain.

I have therefore concluded that we have no option but to recommence the barge operation, with probable effect from the week beginning Monday 21 November 1994. You will recall that under Article IV.12 of the Status of Mission Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Rwanda, 'UNAMIR and its members shall enjoy, together with its vehicles, vessels, aircraft and equipment, freedom of movement throughout the territory'.

As in other instances, we are prepared to cooperate with your authorities in an attempt to allay your concerns. Specifically:

- a. Notice of all barge operations will be provided to your local commanders, not less than 36 hours in advance.

b. Planning will be based on the basis that all land operations will take place in daylight. Operations difficulties may, of course, impede the achievement of this objective. You should be aware that the offer of this self-imposed condition will have been put to the United Nations of conducting this operation.

c. A UNAMIR military officer will personally supervise all barge operations.


d. You will know that your forces previously oversaw the loading and unloading operations of the barge; we have no objection to this continuing.

e. We are prepared for a number of three liaison officers to travel on the barge at all times that it is engaged in operations on our behalf. These observers are to be nominated in advance.

f. In conducting our operations with the barge, we had attempted to assist the Government in its attempts to return refugees to their homes by allowing them to occupy unused space on the barge. I would wish this to continue but will withdraw the facility if you so wish.

I shall now instruct my staff to inform your local commanders to discuss the detailed procedures which we will adopt for communication etc.

Yours sincerely,


MGen G.C. Tousignant
Force Commander

MGen Paul Kagame
Vice President
Ministry of Defence
Kigali

Copy to:

External:

Ministry of External Affairs
RPA Liaison Officer

Internal:

SRSG

OAAUZYUW UCCVVDH0333 3331840-UUUU--UCCVVD.

ZNR UUUUU

O 291840Z NOV 94

FM SECTOR 5 GISENYI MILOB HQ//SEC COMD//

TO UNHQ KIGALI//COS/DCOS OPS/AIR OPS//

INFO MILOB GP HQ//CMO//

BT

UNCLAS MILOB 048

SUBJ: UNAMIR ASSISTANCE TO UNHCR SEARCH OP IN ZAIRE 26-29 NOV 94

1. UNHCR REQ FOR CONTINUED HEL SP TO THIS OP RECEIVED NEGATIVE RESPONSE FROM HQ UNAMIR ON 29 NOV 94. IT WAS STATED THAT FURTHER SP WOULD NOT BE PROVIDED UNTIL SUCH TIME AS UNHCR PROVIDED QUOTE

"PROPER SEARCH PLAN" UNQUOTE.

2. TO DATE THE COOP IN THIS OP HAS GREATLY ENHANCED REPUTATION OF UNAMIR WITH UN/NGO AGENCIES IN ZAIRE WHO ARE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT WE ARE HERE TO HELP THEM. WE HAVE ALSO RECEIVED POSITIVE MEDIA COVERAGE.

3. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT A MORE POSITIVE SOLUTION TO THIS SITUATION WOULD BE AN OFFER FROM UNAMIR TO UNHCR TO PROVIDE A TECHNICAL EXPERT TO ASSIST THEM IN MORE EFFECTIVELY UTILIZING OUR HEL ASSETS.

4. UNHCR GOMA MAY RECEIVE GROUND SEARCH HELP FROM JAPANESE AS WELL. THEY WILL CONTACT US IN THE MORNING (30 NOV) WITH DETAILS OF SEARCH.

5. UNHCR GOMA IS WORKING WITH VERY LIMITED RESOURCES AND ARE NOT TRAINED SEARCH SPECIALISTS. YOUR COOPERATION AND HELP IN THIS MATTER WOULD BE GREATLY APPRECIATED.

BT

#0333

Received 11-29-1994 19:24:56

AOC
we shall discuss
this also today at
Gisenyi
JG
3/11
DFC/LW

G8
3/12/94



TO: SECTOR 4B KIBUYE//CMD

3000.5/1

FROM: G3 AIR OPS

28 November 94

INFO: CMO
DCOS OPS
MILOB HQ

SUBJECT: HELICOPTER TASKING

Reference: Ops/6464 Dated 25 nov 94.

1. This HQ fully supports your request to use helicopters for operational tasks within your sector, this is exactly what helicopter support is here to achieve.
2. Helicopter support should be bid for using the standard Air Task Request format directly to Air Ops, at least 24 hours in advance of the task. Note that Air Ops have produced a user's guide to tasking that outlines capabilities and tasking procedures. If you require a further copy or any additional information do not hesitate to get in touch.
3. Task forms should specify landing site details, there is still a high risk of landing on mines in most sectors and sites should be pre-recced. A helicopter will not shut down unless the area is secure, it would be better to drop a patrol and then extract them later, at a specific time.
4. The only reliable method of communicating air to ground is on Motorola channel 7, none of the other channels are compatible with the aircraft's radios.
5. Helicopter air requests may be sent to Air Ops via UNAMIR HQ Ops, Air ops is adjacent to the Ops room for precisely that reason. Please use the standard form to ensure that no vital details are omitted. Be sure to give a callsign and contact number to enable Air ops to confirm tasks or inform users of delays; weather, aircraft unservicability and higher priority tasks may interfere with your task request.

Mr Desende
See me
J.D.

J D Janiurek

J D JANIUREK
Sqn Ldr
SO2 G3 Air

68
2/12/94
SB

35/11
DCOS/CMO



SECURITY OF OPS

Relative Strength

1. Degradation of sy will be insignificant:
 - a. Threat to own forces in sectors almost NIL.
 - b. Threat to Rwandese? RPA can be relied upon for the period of the ops since its in their interest.
 2. This ops should not require national clearance. It fall within mandate.
- 3/~~6~~ If Force has 6 Bns, why are only 5 listed at para 4j? Total coys sub-para (1) - (5) is 8, not 7.
INDBATT could raise 2 more, to bring total to 10?

Ground

5.
 - a. Could discuss Objectives as a sub-para?
 - b. That will help when we come to 'Assessment of Tasks' para.
 - c. Ground appreciation should also identify:
 - (1) Likely Assy Areas.
 - (2) Likely FUPs, LD or Start Lines.
 - (3) Holding/Screening Facility (for Force). Units/Coys need their own too.
 - (4) Boundaries.
 - (5) Bridges along approaches that may require some engr effort to be able to take the traffic.
 - (6) Key terrain (ie key objective).
6. What does this mean? Is it during approach march or throughout ops?

7. Once cut offs are in posn, and we don't anticipate effective attach on us (or do we?) do we require to worry about flank security? There is no significant deduction out of this factor. (Ref para 8).
8. Lack of cover and concealment should be considered an advantage for us since we don't need to conceal our forces, once the ops begins. In fact we need to be conspicuous for deterrent effect. On the other hand it is a disadvantage to the objective criminals as they will have no cover to escape under.
9. See (7) above. In addition, coys (own tps) will have to provide own inner cordons which could double as own security.
- 10a. How was D-11 arrived at, at this stage?
Guess para 9a - c are what total 11 days?
11. 5 Days for the ops will be too long. 30 hrs maximum. Otherwise fatigue will set in and the chances of targets escaping will arise. Surprise entirely lost.
12. Why is 13 Dec so critical? Why would RPA take unilateral action if that date is not met?
13. Since we're considering all 15 objectives, then 15 x coys required. Right?
14. Not required.
15. Total str reqd will be 18 coys. But can be considerably reduced if:
 - a. Coys security FUP could join search after others have passed through FUP. Saves 3 coys (assuming Approaching A x B are used simultaneously).
 - b. Some few (2 or 3) coys should just hold southern half of objective while search effort is concentrated on northern half. The south can be tackled in phase 2. Especially so, as it seems the conc of criminals and arms is in the north. Otherwise lets cfm from RPA.
16. Why should comd/con of 7-coy force be beyond our resources? With the RPA we only need coord/coop, not con. Why is max practical UNAMIR force only four coys? Could be more. The deduction contradicts para 4k.
17. Approach B is also good & both A & B could be used simultaneously.

Courses of Action

18. Opposition. Good Appreciation.
19. Own Courses. Lets look at possibility of using approach B as well, may be simultaneously with 'A'.

COMD'S GUIDANCE

20. a. Intended ops is within mandate. *what does JAHHA have to do here?*
b. Risk to UNAMIR tps from the opposition should be minimal.
21. Troops to task? Writer should suggest based on his appreciation.
22. Tasks/Roles? As at (21) above.
- a. RPA - already indicated.
- b. CIVPOL - normal police role in cordon & search.
ie take part in search, arrests.

MEMORANDUM

3000.5(FEO)/OPS/-1

12 Nov 94

Distribution List

THE ROAD KIGALI-GATUNA REPAIR AND MAINTENANCE


1. A lack of regular road maintenance and the recent heavy rainfalls associated with the short rainy season has caused deterioration of the Kigali-Gatuna road. Therefore, you are asked to carry out a confirmatory recce of that road and to provide UNAMIR HQ with a suggested road improvement schedule. The report should examine the following options:

a. Scope of work to be done which does not require external support; and

b. ~~Total work specification for which heavy equipment is required.~~

2. The determination of availability of local road building materials such as aggregate, gravel or volcanic slag is also requested.

3. The above mentioned report should be sent to that HQ NLT 19 Nov 94. Attached please find copies of the general recce report prepared by B&R.


J. Arp
COL
D-COS OPS

DISTRIBUTION LIST


<u>Action</u>	<u>Info</u>
NICOY	DFC/COS

Seen
13/12
DFC/WS

G8
15/11/94
SB

15 DLT 44

ROAD BELCE FROM KIGALI TO GATUNYA @ UGANDA BORDER



X = POTHOLES Z = SURFACE REMOVED C.P. = Check Point
W = MARSH

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2


82

UGANDA
BORDER


81

STEEL
BRIDGE
AT
GATUNA


200M




40.5K. 15 OCT 94
Road to Byumba/Gatuna
BAILEY BRIDGE




40.5K. 15 OCT 94
Road to Byumba/Gatuna




47.8K 15 OCT 94
Approx. 700m. washout. Asphalt
surface completely gone.
Road to Byumba/Gatuna



5 OCT 94
Site of previous bridge at
UGANDA 200750



15 OCT 94
Steel bridge at Gatuna on
Kagera River



15 OCT 94
Steel bridge @ Gatuna

(UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA)
(UNAMIR)

(MISSION DES NATIONS UNIES POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA)
(MINUAR)

KIGALI, RWANDA

UNAMIR MILITARY POLICE COMPANY

OUTGOING FAX NO. _____

PAGE 1 OF 2

TO: NDHQ OTTAWA	FROM: PLANTE\KIGALI\UNAMIR <i>Plante</i>
PREFIX/NO:	DATE: 12 NOV 94
ATTN: DG SECUR/D POLICE OPS	PHONE: 1-212-963-3092 LOCAL 11108
FAX NO: 1-613-995-4038 TEL: 1-613-995-7275	FAX NO: 1-212-963-3090
INFO: SIU DET, ST HUBERT, PQ FAX NO: 1-514-462-8101	DRAFTED BY: MAJ J-G PLANTE FORCE PROVOST MARSHAL
INTERNAL DIST: FC, DFC, DCOS OPS AND DCOS SP	
SUBJECT: CANADIAN MILITARY POLICE EQUIPMENT	
REF:	

1. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TWO FOLDS: INFORM MPS WHO ARE POSTED TO UNAMIR THAT THEY SHOULD BRING ADDITIONAL POLICE EQPT OVER IN ADDITION TO WHAT IS LISTED IN INDIVIDUAL KIT LISTS AND ASK/BEG TO INQUIRE INTO THE POSSIBILITY OF TEMPORARILY BORROWING POLICE EQPT FROM YOUR OFFICE TO BE USED BY MY UNIT HERE IN RWANDA PENDING THE ARRIVAL OF THE POLICE KITS WHICH I HAVE ASKED FOR THROUGH THE UN BUT WILL NOT ARRIVE HERE FOR SOMETIMES.

2. MPS POSTED HERE SHOULD BRING THE FOLLOWING EQPT:

- A. COMBAT SHOULDER HOLSTER
- B. ASP BATON WITH CARRIER
- C. MINI FLASH LIGHT
- D. SENSORY INFLAMMATORY AEROSOL (PEPPER SPRAY) FOR THOSE WHO ARE QUALIFIED
- E. LAERDAL MOUTH TO MASK (FOR RESUSCITATION)
- F. BINOCULARS;
- G. AS MUCH STATIONARY AS POSSIBLE

*See
12/11
DFC/WS*

*G8
SB
11/11/94*

3. EQPT TO BE BORROWED:

- A. POLAROID INSTAMATIC CAMERA WITH FILMS
- B. ALL WEATHER VIDEO CAMERA (COMPLETE WITH TRI- POT, RECHARGER, FOUR BATTERIES, CLEANING KIT AND BLANK TAPES)
- C. MICRO CASSETTE AND UHER TAPE RECORDERS (WITH MICROPHONE AND TAPES)
- D. NIGHT OBSERVATION DEVICE
- E. 12 SETS OF "MILITARY POLICE MILITAIRE" ADHESIVE DECALS (LARGE)
- F. 12 SETS OF "MILITARY POLICE MILITAIRE" ADHESIVE DECALS (SMALL)
- G. THREE MEASURING TAPES
- H. ONE BOX OF WHITE CHALK
- J. ACCIDENT SCENE TEMPLATE
- K. ONE ROLL OF "POLICE LINE - DO NOT CROSS"
- M. ONE BOX OF GLOW STICKS
- N. TWO SETS OF PERMANENT MARKERS
- P. TWO SETS OF NON PERMANENT MARKERS
- Q. ANY MP COMPUTER PROGRAM (RUNNING ON DOS/WINDOWS) FOR FILING SYSTEM, REPORT WRITING TEMPLATES, DOB, CRIME FILE LEDGER, "POLICE INVESTIGATION RECORDS DATA BASE", OCCURRENCE REPORTS, MP 245, ETC, AND
- R. 15 BILINGUAL MP ARMBANDS (NOT COMBAT TYPE)

4. FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS, PLS GIVE ME A TELEPHONE CALL.



UNAMIR - MINUAR

Office of the DFC/COS/CMO
UNAMIR Force HQ
KIGALI
Rwanda

1000.8 (DFC)/G/8

09th November, 1994

COO
TAC HQ - BUTARE

MANNING OF G2 CELL AT TAC HQ

Reference:

A. Your Ops 222 dated 6 Nov 94.

1. Receipt is acknowledged of reference A above. I concur that every successful military operation depends largely upon a well evaluated intelligence. In which case, a qualified Intelligence personnel such as WOII Tapping is an asset to the operational efficiency of the Tac HQ.

2. Nonetheless, in our quest for the operational efficiency of the Tac HQ, we should not lose sight of the fact that the Contingent Commander in his administrative and other functional responsibilities, reserves the right to move his personnel anywhere he considers convenient, hence any attempt at influencing this may be considered as interference in his national responsibilities.

3. I will therefore advise that since the replacement for the incumbent G2 has become a source of concern, you should contact the Malawi company to confirm whether they have any inherent capability. Meanwhile we shall keep your request under constant review.

HK ANYIDOH
Brig Gen
DFC/COS/CMO



UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

Force Commander's Memorandum

From: Maj Gen GC Tousignant

To: DFC

Date: 7 Nov 94

Subject: Helicopter Tasking

②
MA
1/6 G3 Air is back
from Genve, let him
see you
JGH
12/11
DFC

I don't want to create an incident with the CAO but perhaps he should be made aware that when he uses his position to change priorities on vital assets to the military mission, it creates an unacceptable confusion.

Could you take this up with Mr. Golo and solicit his cooperation before it becomes a big issue. Thanks.

G8
SP
11/9/94

WJH



Government
of Canada

Gouvernement
du Canada

**ACTION
REQUEST**

**FICHE DE
SERVICE**

To - À

MA to FC

Date

6. 11. 94

Time - Heure

From - De

DCOS Ops

Language spoken - Langue utilisée

☐ English
Anglais

☐ French
Français

Telephone - Téléphone

Extension
Poste

☐ Please call
Prière d'appeler

☐ Returned your call
Vous a rappelé

☐ Will call again
Vous appellera

☐ Wants to see you
Désire vous voir

☐ Action
Donner Suite

☐ Approval
Approbation

☐ Note and return
Noter et retourner

☐ Comments
Commentaires

☐ Draft reply
Projet de réponse

☐ Note and forward
Noter et faire suivre

☐ As requested
Comme demandé

☐ Signature

☐ Note and file
Noter et classer

File No. - N° de dossier

Message taken by - Message reçu par

1. I warned the FE about these incidents and told him that I would submit a report to him.
2. The CAO should adhere to the established priorities and procedures and be informed that he can not short circuit or abuse the system
3. His actions caused a lot of confusion, cancellation, inconvenience, waste, etc.

GC 12 (91.01)

7540-21-868-3907





3000.5/Task/1

TO: FC

THROUGH: DCOS OPS

FROM: G3 AIR

DATE: 5 November 94

HELICOPTER TASKING PROCEDURE AND TASK MANAGEMENT

1. At 2040 on Friday 28 October CAO changed the details of Task 2905 directly through Civilian air ops. This was a VIP sortie to Goma that had been scheduled from 0800 to 1500 on 29 Oct. Such late planning was eventually accommodated at the expense of relinquishing the standby helicopter. For a period of 2.5 hours on the 29 Oct a helicopter would have been no nearer than Kibuye should an emergency have occurred.

2. At 1910 on Thursday 3 Nov, CAO asked for a helicopter to take 3 passengers to Gikongoro the next day for a medal presentation ceremony. He made this bid once again through Steve Smith, the Civilian Air Ops Officer. G3 Air did not wish to comply with this request as it would involve tasking all 3 helicopters over a period of 3 hours. This was overridden by CAO and the mission was tasked for 0900 the next day.

3. There was some confusion over numbers of passengers the next day and G3 Air went to Canadian Helicopters early next morning to try to resolve matters. It was decided that to ensure no passengers were left behind, as it was impossible to contact all those scheduled to fly, holding the 0900 flight until 0945, when the FC was due to depart for Gikongoro, was the best option.

4. At this juncture G3 Air was informed by CAO's party that Air Ops was a 24 hour service and thus eminently capable of last minute changes to the programme at any hour of the day or night. The party were firmly informed that the helicopter was to be back at Kigali by 1145 as it was required for a further task.

5. By 1230 only one helicopter was available for a 2 helicopter task scheduled to take off at 1245. G3 Air instructed Sector 4A Ops to tell the helicopter to return to Kigali immediately, irrespective of whether it had passengers or not.

6. Fortunately, the FC then decided to cut short his itinerary and return also. The Human Rights delegation on the subsequent afternoon's task were delayed by some 50 minutes, it was not possible to contact the MilOb team that were marking the landing

site, a site that had not been used before.

7. Eventually both helicopters managed to get airborne, mainly through a very cooperative and flexible approach from the Canadian Helicopter crews and assiduous replanning between their passengers and G3 Air. The task was staggered by 30 minutes, however the Mil Ob team had already departed the location when the teams arrived late.

8. The following points should be noted:

a. Routine tasks are coordinated and promulgated to all agencies by cease work each day. It is very difficult to contact user units outside normal working hours.

b. Helicopter tasking is run by the G3 Air function of UNAMIR operations. The Civilian Air Ops are there to confirm that the mission is getting both value for money and effective use of the helicopters.

c. There is one G3 Air staff officer and no other member of that branch within UNAMIR HQ. The post is held by an experienced Royal Air Force staff officer with 15 years operational flying and tasking experience.

d. A user's guide to helicopter operations was disseminated to the HQ staffs 10 days ago. It includes sections on task priority and air task request formats.

e. The mission requested on the 4 November for 3 passengers was not urgent, nor priority 1, in fact it was, and I quote, "a protocol visit".

f. The following Human Rights task was not carried out because the helicopter had been delayed. This and the task flown to Gikongoro amount to 3 hours flying. This has cost the UN \$4650 in helicopter operating costs discounting wasted effort and time.

9. I have set out the facts to highlight that the proper function of helicopter tasking is to ensure that maximum effectiveness is always attained. This cannot be achieved with double standards and by finding short cuts in the system.

10. This mission is here to help the people of Rwanda and the helicopters are an essential tool in that aim. This HQ should never lose sight of that aim.

J D Janiurek

J D JANIUREK
Sqn Ldr
SO2 G3 Air

DFC/CAS

UNCLASSIFIED

3000.15 (OPS)

02 07 060800 NOV 94 RR RR UUUU

FROM: UNAMIR HQ

TO: GHANBATT
FRAFBATT
TUNBATT
ZAMBATT
SECTOR 3 HQ (MALICOY)

INFO: TAC HQ BUTARE
MILOB GP HQ

SUBJ: FRAGO 04

REF: A. OPOD 20 DATED 6 OCT 94.
B. WNG O OF 240800Z OCT 94.
C. FRAGO 03 OF 281400Z OCT 94.

1. SIT.

A. GEN NO CHANGE.

B. UNAMIR FORCES. ZAMBATT ADVANCE FORCES DEPLOYED IN 4A NORTH AND CHAD COY LOC IN 4B.

2. MSN. RESUME AND REDEPLOY WITHIN NEW BOUNDARIES BY 082359B NOV 94.

3. EXECUTION.

A. GENERAL OUTLINE TO BE CONDUCTED IN TWO PHASES.

(1) PHASE 1. RELIEF IN PLACE IN 4A NORTH AND CHAD COY LOC IN 4B.

(2) PHASE 2.

(A) ADOPTION OF NEW BOUNDARIES.

(B) DEPLOYMENT WITHIN NEW BOUNDARIES.

1

UNCLASSIFIED

Seis
12/11
DFC/wi

08
9/11/94

UNCLASSIFIED

B. GP AND TASKS.

(1) ZAMBATT.

(A) GP NO CHANGE.

(B) TASKS (PHASE 1). NO CHANGE AS PER REF A, B AND C.

(C) PHASE 2.

(I) DEPLOY AND CONDUCT OPS WITHIN NEW BOUNDARIES.

(II) BE PREPARED TO DEPLOY AS PER REF B.

(2) GHANBATT.

(A) GP. NO CHANGE.

(B) TASKS (PHASE 1). AS PER REF A, B AND C.

(C) PHASE 2.

(I) ADOPT NEW BOUNDARIES.

(II) DEPLOY RELIEVED TROOPS AND CONDUCT OPS WITHIN NEW BDRYS.

(III) BE PREPARED TO DEPLOY AS PER REF B.

(3) FRAFBATT.

(A) GP. NO CHANGE.

(B) TASKS (PHASE 1). NO CHANGE TO REF A, B AND C.

(C) PHASE 2.

(I) ADOPT NEW BOUNDARIES.

(II) DEPLOY RELIEVED TROOPS AND CONDUCT OPS WITHIN NEW BDRYS.

(4) TUNBATT.

(A) GP. NO CHANGE.


(B) TASKS (PHASE 1). NO CHANGE.

UNCLASSIFIED

- (C) PHASE 2.
 - (I) ADOPT NEW BOUNDARIES.
 - (II) DEPLOY AND CONDUCT OPS WITHIN NEW BOUNDARIES.
- (5) SECTOR 3 HQ.
 - (A) GP. NO CHANGE.
 - (B) TASKS (PHASE 1). NO CHANGE.
 - (C) PHASE 2.
 - (I) ADOPT NEW BOUNDARIES.
 - (II) DEPLOY AND CONDUCT OPS WITHIN NEW BOUNDARIES.
- (6) COORD INSTRS.
 - (A) BOUNDARIES. AS PER TRACE SUBMITTED AT OPS OFFRS CONFERENCE ON 07 NOV 94
 - (B) TIMINGS.
 - (I) PHASE 1 ON GOING.
 - (II) PHASE 2 EFFECTIVE 082359B NOV 94.
- 4. ADMIN AND LOG. NO CHANGE.
- 5. COMD AND SIGNALS.
 - A. LOC OF HQ.
 - (1) SECTOR 4A - KARAMA.
 - (2) SECTOR 4B - GIKONGORO.
 - (3) SECTOR 5 - NO CHANGE.
- 6. ACK.

UNCLASSIFIED

LIST A
LIST B
LIST C
ETHIOBATT
MALICOY
TUNBATT



COL J. ARP, DCOS OPS, 11186

UNCLASSIFIED



UNAMIR

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: D COS SP
INFO: → DFC
FROM: Maj Plante *Plante*
Force Provost Marshal
DATE: 7 Nov 94
SUBJECT: UNAMIR MILITARY POLICE COMPANY
EQUIPMENT/VEHICLES

1. To day , I have spoken to the CTO regarding your Memo in which you have requested patrol and investigation vehicles for the MP Company. According to the latter, nothing will be done to that effect pending the meeting of the Vehicle Establishment Committee (VEC) schedule to take place on 11 Nov 94 and chaired by the DFC.
2. Pls note that I am getting 8 MPs this week.
2. Attached is another one of the many investigation requests I keep receiving.

*Seen
F Li
07/11
DFC/WS*

*68
SB
2/11/94*

PAAUZYUW UCCVVD0010 3061930-UDUD--UCCVDA

ZNR 00000

P 061930 NOV 94

FM TACHQ BUTARE

TO UNAMIR HQ KIGALI//OPS//TRAFCS

BT

UNCLAS OPS

SUBJ: TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS INVOLVING UNAMIR AND NGO

1. RPA HAVE ESTABLISHED POLICE FORCE WHO ARE ENFORCING TRAFFIC REGULATIONS INCLUDING ISSUING TICKETS AND FINES TO UNAMIR VEHICLES FOR VIOLATIONS. FSO ADVISES THAT UN VEHICLES ARE EXEMPT PAYMENT OF FINES HOWEVER WE HAVE NO DOCUMENTATION TO THIS EFFECT AND RPA ARE NOT AWARE.

2. REQUEST:

A. PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITH LOCAL POLICE FORCE WHEN UN VEHICLES ARE CITED FOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS
B. RWANDAN GOVERNMENT BE ASKED TO DISSEMINATE THESE PROCEDURES TO THEIR POLICE FORCES AND THAT UNAMIR BE GIVEN COPY OF THEIR INSTRUCTION FOR INCLUSION IN OUR VEHICLE DOCUMENT PACKAGE.

PAGE2 UCCVVD0010 UNCLAS

3. NGO HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN VERBALLY ABOUT RPA POLICE PROCEDURES WHEN NGO VEHICLES ARE INVOLVED IN ACCIDENTS. IN PARTICULAR A TENDENCY, PERHAPS PERCEIVED, TO ARREST INDIVIDUALS AND/OR IMPOUND VEHICLES FOR MINOR ACCIDENTS. BELIEVE PROBLEM MAYBE THAT NGO DO NOT KNOW WHAT ARE THE LAWS/PROCEDURES IN RWANDA AND THUS CANNOT DETERMINE IF THEY ARE BEING TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF. SUGGEST THIS MATTER BE PASSED TO UNREGO TO CONSIDER WHETHER THERE IS ANYTHING WHICH CAN/SHOULD BE DONE.

2030

TAC HQ Butare

OPS 222

06 November 1994

Distribution List

MANNING OF G2 CELL - TAC HQ


References:

- A. UNAMIR HQ 8000 (G2) Sep 94
- B. UNAMIR HQ Weekly SITREP dated 1 Nov 94

1. The importance of having qualified G2 personnel for collection, collation and detailed evaluation of information has been well documented at reference A. It is however pertinent to observe that with the departure of the incumbent G2, WO2 Tapping from AUSCON on 9 Nov 94, TAC HQ will lose all intelligence handling ability as the replacement identified is not Intelligence qualified.

2. The intention of this letter is not to question the rationale behind withdrawing WO2 Tapping but rather to point out that his absence will adversely effect the success of intelligence gathering both at TAC HQ and UNAMIR HQ. To this end I refer you to reference B paragraph 3A, where 14 of the 15 incidents reported, were from Sector 3 and 4 and formed part of our daily SITREPs and periodic Information Summaries.

3. It is in light of the foregoing, that we request UNAMIR HQ to prevail upon the Australian Contingent Commander to defer removing WO2 tapping until a suitable replacement is provided to this HQ.


H. Osae-Addae
Colonel
Chief Operations Officer
TAC HQ Butare

DISTRIBUTION LIST:

ACTION
UNAMIR HQ/DCOS OPS

INFORMATION
FC
DFC
AUSTRALIAN CONTINGENT/COMD

MA/MADE
Prepare a letter for me
explaining to the Contingent Command
that the right to remove WO2
all the men of whom he wishes maintain
he should contact Malawi to
see if they have any inherent
capability.
07/11
20/11/94

G-8
28
27/11/94

MEMORANDUM

9350-2 (Sig Ops)

5 Nov 94

Distribution List

FORCE CO-ORD NET CALLSIGNS (CH 7)

1. Following callsigns have been added or deleted as indicated:

a. DELETE	AMA TO FC	Z9B
ADD	AMA TO FC	Z9G;
b. ADD	D COS OPS DRIVER	Z9B
	FORCE MED LOG	M94
	FORCE HEALTH O	M94A; and
c. DELETE	SUSANA	SUSANA.

2. As all callsigns for channel 7 have yet to be recorded, pers are reminded to send a list of all unrecorded callsigns to Sig Ops so that callsigns list can be updated. Your co operation is appreciated.

J.E.B. Savard
 J.E.B. Savard
 MWO
 Ch Comm Op
 2013

DISTRIBUTION LIST

List a
 List b
 HQ Mil Obs Gp
 UN Civ Pol
 AUSMED
 BRITCON
 CANCON

*Seen
 Agi
 07/11
 DFC/WS*

*G-8
 sb
 7/11/94*

DFC/COS

MEMORANDUM

3350-2 (Sig Ops)

3 Nov 94

Distribution List

MESSAGE ADDRESS AND ADDRESSEES UCRRTZ (TELETYPE)

1. Can Sig Sqn has established a teletype net in sector HQs. The following message address and addressees will be used when transmitting traffic:

<u>MESSAGE ADDRESS</u>	<u>ADDRESSEES</u>
UNAMIR HQ KIGALI//	MILOBS HQ CANCON BRITCON AUSMED CIVPOL HQ SECTOR 6 HQ
UNAMIR TAC HQ BUTARE//	MALAWI COY SECTOR 3A MILOBS AUSMED TSC CIVPOL
SECTOR 1 HQ BYUMBA//	SECTOR 1 MILOBS NICOY GP HQ
SECTOR 3 HQ GITARAMA//	MALI COY SECTOR 3B MILOBS CIVPOL
SECTOR 4A GIKONGORO//	GHANBATT SECTOR 4A MILOBS CIVPOL ZAMBATT 4A NORTH
SECTOR 4B KIBUYE//	FRAFBATT SECTOR 4B MILOBS CIVPOL
SECTOR 4C CYANGUGU//	ETHIOBATT SECTOR 4C MILOBS CIVPOL
SECTOR 5 MUTURA//	TUNBATT SECTOR 5 MILOBS

G-8
SB/11/94

2. As an example if duty offr in ops room wishes to send a message to malawi coy, From and to lines of message should read as follows:

a. from: UNAMIR HQ KIGALI

b. to: UNAMIR TAC HQ BUTARE//MALAWI COY//

3. Any queries or change of adresses should be directed to Sig Ops local 2013.

J.E.B. Savard

J.E.B Savard

MWO

Ch Comm Op

2013

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Action

Info

List A
List B
HQ Milobs Gp
AUSMED
BRITCON
CANCON

UNHQ OR

TO : DFC/COS
FHQ

FROM : AIR OPS CELL, KIA

DATE : 04 NOV 94

SUBJECT: HAND-OVER OF AIR OPS CELL OPERATION TO THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT

Sir,

1. A letter was sent to the FHQ proposing the hand-over of the Air Ops Cell operation to the Rwandan government not later than 01 Dec 94. However, the government requested to deploy 3 staff to the Air Ops Cell to understudy the operations at the Air Ops Cell. This request is yet to be sanctioned by UNAMIR. Also, the request made by the Rwandan government for the donation of the equipment currently being used at the cell is still being considered by UNAMIR.

2. At the inception of the Air Ops Cell, the duties at the cell were jointly being performed by UNAMIR and military personnel from the US, Britain and Canada. The activities of the cell were then being coordinated by UNHCR Geneva. Presently, the US, British and Canadian forces have left. Also, UNHCR Geneva has ceased coordinating further humanitarian airlift for Rwanda. The responsibility of coordinating all humanitarian airlift has since been transferred to the Air Ops Cell, Kigali. The Rwandan government appointed an officer and a non-commission officer(NCO) to function as liaison between UNAMIR and the government. The RPA officers were tasked by the government to vet all requests for clearances on security grounds and thereafter give the necessary approval for the flight to operate. Due to other duties assigned to these two officers by the government, they have not been fully involved in the duties of the Air Ops Cell.

3. In compliance to the directives to hand-over the Air Ops Cell operation to the Rwandan government by 01 Dec 94, a proposed hand-over programme is hereby forwarded for approval. However, to ensure a smooth hand-over, it is proposed that the hand-over be carried-out in phases, considering the level of experience of the staff being nominated for the Air Ops duties by the government. Also, a decision is yet to be taken by UNAMIR on the request made by the government for the donation of the current equipment at the Air Ops Cell.

4 The hand-over plan of the Air Ops Cell is proposed as follows:

AOC
Ask this officers
to see me immediately
with this paper.
12/11
DFC/WS

Who is holding these

Why then did they have to take over by 01 Dec?

Who is to take the decision

89 SP
14/11/94

from
whoan? //

- a. The Ministry of Communication and Transport should be informed to immediately send 3 civilian staff to understudy the operation at the cell. Apparently, the government is waiting for formal reply to the request made to UNAMIR on this issue. (A DRAFT reply is Attached)
 - b. A reply should also be sent to the government on the request for the donation of the current equipment at the Air Ops Cell.
 - c. A transitional hand-over period of one month is also proposed with effect from the date the nominated government staff commence training.
 - d. After the official hand-over of the cell, a Monitoring Team comprising not less than 4 MILOBS should remain at the Airport to ensure UNAMIR interest. The Team is to function in conjunction with the MOVCON office at the Force HQ. However, the Team should revert to MILOB Gp HQ for operational control.
 - e. The Monitoring Team apart from the daily SITREP, is in addition to submit weekly reports on the general security situation at the Airport.
5. Sir, with the approval of the above hand-over plan, it is expected that a smooth and orderly hand-over could be achieved by 10 Dec 94.


AA GAJERE
Sqn Ldr

TO : DFC/COS
FHQ

FROM : AIR OPS CELL, KIA

DATE : 02 NOV 94

SUBJECT: CESSATION OF AIR OPS CELL OPERATION

Sir,

A. Letter from Ministry of Transport and Communication dated 24 Oct 94.

B. MSC/Ltr, Air OPS KIA dated 25 Oct 94.

1. The plan to gradually handover UNAMIR activities at Kigali Airport by the Air Ops Cell has been presented to the Force Headquarters. However, there has been a request by the Rwandan Government for an extension of the planned handover date due to the fact that there are no competent personnel to take over the activities of the Air Ops Cell. Additionally, the government has requested that equipment currently being used at the Air Ops Cell be donated to the Rwandan government at the time of handing over.

2. In Ref B, a plan was suggested to gradually scale down the activities of the Air Ops Cell. The plan also recommended the reduction of the number of MILOBS currently deployed to the Air Ops Cell. Consequently, two MILOBS have already been posted out. It is expected that eventually UNAMIR will cease to be responsible for issuing clearances to flights operating into or out of Kigali. However, a review of the present activities at the airport will reveal the following:

a. A training programme for Rwandese in the manning of the airport has just commenced. The first batch are the Air Traffic Controllers (ATC). This is part of a larger plan by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) to assist Rwanda in reactivating and maintaining a safe airspace. The duration of the training programme has not been decided.

b. The necessary communication equipment for coordination with other agencies or airports are either not available or have not been harmonized.

c. There are plans by the Rwandan authority to re-open the airport for a 24hr operations. Sabena Airlines has already started operating its night scheduled flights into Kigali on 31 Oct 94.

- 1 -

Sgn Ldr Gajere
See my annotations.
I think we have
to copy with the
015 Dec, as whatever
you can to ensure
smooth handover
dfh
02/11
DFC/WS

Why has it
not been
decided?

Why
not all
this time

This is
the reason
why
our port is
unhappy.

GB
5/11/94

3. With the above points in mind, it is suggested that in response to the request made in Ref A, the planned scaling down of UNAMIR activities as suggested vide Ref B be implemented as follows:

a. The Rwandan government should immediately nominate 3 civilians with a background knowledge in air transportation to understudy operations at the Air Ops Cell. It is hoped these 3 will in turn train other Rwandese in handling the operations at the airport.

Why has this not been done all along?

b. An assessment of the current equipment holding at the Air Ops Cell be carried out by UNAMIR communication section to determine those that could be handed-over to the Rwandan authority.

Why have you not done so all this time?

c. The reduction in the strength of the MILOBS deployed to the Air Ops Cell has commenced. The Cell will continue to advise the FHQ on the progress.

d. A final reduction of the number of MILOBS should coincide with the successful completion of the On the Job Training for the Rwandese deployed to Air Ops Cell by the Rwandan authority. This should also mark the official handing-over of the equipment recommended by the UNAMIR communication section to the Rwandan Government.

When will be this?

e. A notification be sent to ICAO through the regional office in Nairobi reminding them on the promises made to the Rwandan Government to reactivate the Air Traffic system in Rwanda. These promises were obtained through contacts made by the Air Ops Cell in July 94.

This is the responsibility of the Rwanda Govt.

4. Finally, the plan to monitor the activities at the airport would be designed to cover the period of all air activities at the airport.

AA GAJERE
Sqn Ldr



UNAMIR - MINUAR

INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

To: CAO 1000.7(DFC)/G/13

Info: SRSG
FC
DCOS OPS

From: DFC/COS/CMO
Brig Gen HK Anyidoho *H. Anyidoho* (1)

Date: 01st November, 1994

Subject: REMOVAL OF SANDBAGS FROM UNAMIR FORCE HQ BUILDING

1. It has been noticed with concern that sandbags which have been used for the reinforcement of the UNAMIR Force HQ building are being removed with no consultations with the FC.
2. Since the security of the Headquarters is the sole responsibility of the Military Component of the Mission, it is only appropriate that the FC is consulted before any changes are made to existing facilities/structures that affect security.
3. The office of the Deputy Chief of Staff Operations is the contact point for all matters relating to security of UNAMIR installations.
4. Please accept for your information and future guidance.

② DFC/COS/CMO.

The removal of These bags was carried out by the Camp Comdt, who intends to replace the burlap bags with plastic, apparently for both sanitary and aesthetic reasons. The Division of Administration was not involved in this matter.

Press
2/11.

③
DCOS OPS
See the reply from the
building management office.
Li
02/11
DFC/COS

G-8

MEMORANDUM


9350-2 (Sig Ops)

1 Nov 93

Distribution List

FORCE CO-ORD NET (CH 7) CALLSIGNS

1. The following attachment is a list of callsigns for the Force co-ord net channel 7. Please report any missing callsigns to Sig Ops so that list can be kept up to date.


J.E.B. Savard
MWO
Ch Comm Op
2012

Seen
+ Di
02/11
DFC/WS

Distribution List

Action

List A
List B
HQ Mil Obs Gp
UN Civ Pol
AUSMED
BRITCON
CANCON

C8
SB
5/11/94

FORCE CO-ORD NET CALLSIGNS (CH 7)

<u>FUNCTION</u>	<u>CALLSIGNS</u>
FORCE HQ CP	0
FORCE COMMANDER (FC)	9
MA TO FC	Z9
AMA TO FC	Z9B
ADC TO FC	Z9D
DRIVER FC	Z9E
BODYGUARD FC	Z9F
DEPUTY FORCE COMMANDER (DFC)	9A
MA TO DFC	Z9A
ADC TO DFC	Z9C
D COS OPS	9B
COO	93A
C PLANS	93B
G3 PLANS 3	93L
SENIOR DUTY O (SDO)	93C
DUTY O	93F
DUTY O	93G
DUTY O	93J
DUTY O	93K
MILITARY INT O	92
FORCE AIR O	93H
AIRPORT OPERATIONS	H0
FORCE SIGNAL O	96
FORCE ENGR O	E9
EOD	E1
FORCE PROVOST MARSHALL	P9
FORCE MEDICAL O	M9
FORCE MED OPS	M93
D COS SP	98
CMPO	91
C LOG O	94
CHIEF LO	93D
UNAMIR LO TO RPA	93E
FORCE SIGNAL OPERATIONS	96A
MILOB GP HQ	C0
CHIEF MILITARY OBSERVER	C9
HUMANITARIAN HQ	MP0
CHIEF HUMANITARIAN O	MP9
AUSTRALIAN CONTINGENT HQ	AS0
AUSTRALIAN CONTINGENT COMDR	AS9
AUS RAPID REACTION FORCE	RRF
BRITISH CONTINGENT HQ	BR0
BRITISH CONTINGENT COMDR	BR9
CANADIAN CONTINGENT HQ	CN0
MOVCON	94G
CANADIAN HELICOPTER	CANADA 1
	CANADA 2
	CANADA 3
UNREO	UNREO BASE
SUSANA	SUSANA

TO : FORCE HQ (DCOS OPS)
MILOB GP HQ
TAC HQ

DATE: 31 OCT 94

File 152

FROM : SECTOR 3 HQ

REF : SEC3/OPS/5

SUBJECT: MONTHLY SITUATION REPORT FOR OCTOBER 1994INTRODUCTION

1. a. Generally unstable month. Several multiple murder and grenade incidents , bearing hallmarks of Interhamwe. Agric and commercial life improving, yet in general a state of fear and insecurity exists. RPA reacting with massive arrests and detentions as well as probable killings.
- b. No significant political activities.
- c. UNAMIR, UN Agencies and NGOs continue humanitarian assistance, with some irregularities reported, ie relief aid on sale.
- d. RPA commanders have expressed grave concern about deteriorating security situation. Want more UNAMIR involvement but on well-discussed modalities.

SECURITY SITUATIONTHE THREAT

2. Categories. The security threats can be categorised into three:
 - a. Militia of E government (Interahamwe).

CB
SB
9/11/94

b. Bandits.

c. RPA themselves.

3. Activities. Threat activities include:

a. Homicides. Victims range in numbers from between 1 and 10 per incident. Weapons used include firearms, spears, machetes etc. Victims have included HUTUS, TUTSIS and expatriates. Two suspects arrested so far. Generally, evidence points to the Interahamwe coming from across the BURUNDI border and from DPCs in sector 4A. The possibility of RPA involvement in some incidents cannot be ruled out.

b. Banditry. The forceful taking away of property, accompanied with murder. No culprits arrested. Suspicion is as for the perpetrators of homicides.

c. Grenade Throwing. A couple of grenade incidents have resulted in deaths to RPA.

d. Arrests/Harassments/Torture/Detention. These are done by the RPA troops, individually and severally, authorised and unauthorised. Scores, if not hundreds, have been arrested during the month. Most arrests seem to be prompted by allegations by neighbours that certain individuals were involved in killings and looting during the past war. Detention camps/prisons exist in the BUTARE and GITARAMA Prefectures as well as in the commune centres.

e. Mass Killings. At least one case was reported at CYMVUZO (8237). Though it probably happened in Aug/Sep 94, it was reported this month. No proof of who did it, but fingers point at the RPA.

f. Stealing. Stealing of UN property has began In the

sector, 2 UN flags were stolen in BUTARE and a vehicle-mount radio antenna was stolen in GITARAMA. Also an engine and parts were removed from an accident UN Landcruiser (UNAMIR 1260), loaded on a tractor and taken away in the full view of UNAMIR troops whose preventive efforts were threatened away. RPA was responsible for this stealing. They are prime suspects in the antenna incident too.

5. Areas. Areas most affected by these threat activities are those contiguous to the BURUNDI border in the very south and to the boundary of Sector 4A where DPCs abound. Most likely, the criminals cross from these DPCs and from refugee camps in BURUNDI, carry out their attacks mostly at night and withdraw swiftly.

6. Specific Incidents. See Annex A.

7. Investigations. MILOBS and CIVPOL investigations have commenced into most of these incidents. A few have been completed. Some will have to be further investigated by the Human Rights Organisations or other agencies, especially where the RPA are suspected of mass killings and arrests.

8. Effects on the People. The negative effects on the returnees and on those still in refugee camps and DPCs are serious.

a. Returnees. ie those who have returned to the two prefectures:

(1) Urban Drift. Away from the BURUNDI border, and Sector 4A boundaries. Concentration of population in BUTARE, RUHANGO, and commune centres. This affords them sense of security in their numbers and from the presence of the RPA in those areas.

(2) Internal Displaced Camps. Have sprung up.

(3) Less Farming. Though going on, could have been more extensive. More pressure on less land area.

(4) Return to DPCs. Some unsure of their security even with the RPA, have fled back to the DPCs in Sector 4A.

(5) Sense of Frustration/Low Morale. Some left DPCs because of fear of Interahmwe. Back home, not happy with Interahamwe incursions and with RPA arbitrary arrests.

b. Refugees and DPS

(1) Unwillingness. Unwillingness to leave refugee camps and DPS to return home.

(2) Entrenchment. Entrenchment of DPS in Sector 4A.

(3) Mandate. Likely prolongation of UANMIR mandate.

(4) Expenditure. More expenditure on relief aid for unproductive refugees and DPS.

(5) Stalled Peace Process. Will affect re-integration of the people, peace process and national reconstruction.

(6) Government/RPA Frustration. The security forces are stretched to the limit in deployment and operations. Have threatened to use force to close down DPCs and have indeed started in Sector 4B.

SECURITY FORCES REACTIONS

9. Reaction of the BBGNU to counter the threats of internal

security have been characterised by :

- a. Minimal or no political programme.
- b. Little or no progress in training and deployment of police forces.
- c. Intensive and extensive military operations.

10. Political Programme. Little or no political activity has been witnessed in the sector in October.

11. Gendarmerie. In BUTARE township, a handful of gendarmes have been deployed. They are just RPA troops given some police training and employed on police duties. With their RPA background, there is not much to be expected of them in these early stages by way of humane handling of suspects. MILOBS in BUTARE attempted to hand over a genocide suspect to them. They had wanted to keep him in jail even though the man was in hospital with serious injuries from beatings.

12. RPA Operations. As would be expected, the RPA has been trying to maintain internal security, law and order. But the external threat from former RGF in ZAIRE has forced it to deplete its forces in Sector 3 and concentrate it on the ZAIRE Border. The two brigades which used to operate in GITARAMA and BUTARE Prefecture have now extended their AO to CYANGUGU and KIBUYE Prefectures, with the HQs re-located to those respective capitals. RPA operations in Sector 3 in October have been dictated by the threat activities of supposed Interahamwe and bandits as well as by the government policy of arrests and detentions of suspected war criminals. The operations include:

- a. Redeployment. Redeployment and adjustment of boundaries of 2 X Bns in BUTARE and 2 X Bns in GITARAMA.

- (1) GITIARAMA - 101 Bn & 31 Bn.
- (2) BUTARE - 15 Bn & unknown bn.

Troops are thin on the ground.

b. Patrols. Patrols are intensified in urban areas and on main axis. Both day and night, mobile and static.

c. Snap Check Points. In rural areas, patrolling is combined with snap road blocks to reduce the effect of depleted manpower. Movement of these rural patrols and check points are in reaction to the incidents of murder and banditry.

d. Permanent Check Points/Road Blocks. Thorough security searches are conducted at the BURUNDI border at KANYARU-HAUT and at KIZI, the main entry point from sector 4A, on returnees. Several suspects have been arrested in such operations.

e. Cordon and Search Operations. Company size or larger units cordon off areas and search for arms, ammunition, suspected bandits and suspected war criminals.

f. Arrests/Detentions. As a result of these operations, hundreds of suspects have been arrested by the RPA. many are being detained in jails in the sector while others have been transferred to KIGALI. Records kept at jail are found to be incomplete ie not all arrests have been documented. Neither UNAMIR nor any other UN agency is informed of the arrests. However RPA authorities have expressed willingness to allow access to jails.

g. Restriction of UN Movement. Even though RPA have frequently assured UNAMIR of freedom of movement, in practice they continue to restrict it. This is apparently because they

perceive UNAMIR to be a stumbling block in their bid to cleanse the country of those they are told are war criminals. At least 5 movement restrictions were reported during the month.

(1) KARAMA (GR 6011) - 1 Oct 94. MILOB escorts and human rights officers were denied access. RPA troops at check point wanted to know reason for MILOBs going to KARAMA. When they saw a camera (belonging to HR officer), they became angry and asked who authorised the taking of photographs. (None had been taken). They accused the group of trying to make the RPA look foolish. They asked if the group consisted of intelligence officers.

(2) BUTARE - 6 Oct 94. Field Services Team was to install lights in the petrol filling station opposite Tac HQ. Permission had been given by the PREFECT. But an RPA soldier at the nearby check point pointed a weapon at the team, cocked it and asked them to stop the installation.

(3) NDORA (GR 8112) - 10 Oct 94. MALAWICOY soldiers were escorting BUTARE Education officers to deliver school supplies. They were not allowed to proceed south of NDORA without an RPA escort. On reaching KABAYI (8497) with RPA escort, the RPA prevented the locals from speaking to the group.

(4) KARAMBI (GR 6153) - 10 Oct 94. At a check point, access was denied to GITARAMA MILOBs who were conducting recce of the route for Op HOMEWARD. After protest through the LO, access was allowed the following day.

(5) GITARAMA - 15 Oct 94. MALICOY OC, in company of Sec Comd was disarmed of his pistol before they could

enter the RPA Bde Comd's residence to pay courtesy call on him.

(6) BURUNDI Border (GR 630916) - 18 Oct 94. Access was denied Brown and Root Company escorted by MILOB Team. B & R engineers were on inspection of damaged bridges, one of which was just beyond the RPA check point.

13. Comments. The deteriorating security situation in Sector 3 could have been avoided if:

- a. RPA were more transparent in their arrest and detention operations by inviting UNAMIR and UN agencies to witness and monitor them.
- b. RPA were less wholesale in the scale of arrests.
- c. RPA were less suspicious of UNAMIR motives and allowed total freedom of movement.
- d. BBGNU political programmes were intensified and geared toward countering the Ex-Government's propaganda.
- e. UNAMIR were more mobile and omnipresent.
- f. Well-trained and communal police programme were in place.

HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS

14. General. The humanitarian situation in Sector 3 has improved considerably from what it was two months ago. But the situation is far from normal.

15. Displaced Persons/ Refugees.

- a. Virtually no DPs in Sector 3 now.
- b. Using MALAWICOY transport 365 persons have been moved to their home areas in October alone.
- c. DPs live in commune/ secteur HQs with relatives/friends.
- d. Relief aid deliverance has improved.
- e. Major problem now hoes. ICRC has promised to deliver.
- f. Medical aid also not adequate. MILOBs are now liaising for improvement. Govt has introduced 50 francs fee in hospitals for identity cards.

16. Orphans/Unaccompanied Children.

- a. 8 orphanages in number with total of 2322 orphans. All run by NGOs.
- b. Some NGOs give aid to families caring for unaccompanied children in their homes.
- c. Virtually no problems. Those that arise are quickly solved by MILOBs in liaison with UNICEF.

17. NGOs. Some 8 NGOs operating in the sector. Between them they are sharing the humanitarian aid burden quite adequately now. Prefect of GITARAMA has taken up the fortnightly NGOs conference from MILOBs. Conference is very useful.

18. Mass Graves/Burials.

- a. More mass graves have been discovered. Details already forwarded.
- b. More and more unburied dead bodies discovered. Some

buried, after prompting of Bourgemestres.

19. Water.

a. Situation in GITARAMA has improved considerably. Water runs in town as well as KABGAYI Mission area. Not always but very adequate. MILOBs are the managers.

b. RUHANGO. Still no joy. UNAMIR ready to install generator. lacking is motor to run pump. An NGO has promised to supply one.


c. BUTARE. Still yet to be rehabilitated. Problem is generator.

20. Electricity.

a. Not yet rehabilitated.

b. Western grid to be rehabilitated in 2 weeks.

c. MALAWICOY will provide transport to lift ELECTROGAZ workers and stores for repairs.



BK GBORGLAH

Lt Col

Sec Comd

SERIOUS INCIDENTS IN SECTOR 3 - OCT 94

ANNEX A TO
SEC3/OPS/5
DATED OCT 94

SRL	LOC	DATE/TIME	INCIDENT/CASUALTIES	REMARKS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
1.	KIGEMBE (7093)	NI 8/9 OCT 94	CONSEILLE & FAMILY (TOTAL 8) KILLED BY AK 47 RIFLE SHOTS	SUSPECTS:RWANDESE INTERAHWE FROM BURUNDI. NO ARREST.
2.	KIGEMBE	NI 8/9 OCT 94	HOUSEHOLD ATTACKED HEAD KILLED BY SPEAR. SON WOUNDED. (HEAD- OPINION LEADER)	SUSPECT LOCAL BANDITS (15 NO) NO ARREST
3.	RUYENZI (8132)	NI 17/18 OCT 94	REV FATHER CLAUDE SIMARD (CANADIAN) KILLED.	NO ARREST INV IN PROGRESS- MILOB/CIVPOL/RPA.
4.	GASARA (5512)	NI 20/21 OCT 94	10 KILLED, 2 INJURED (MAN & WIFE)WIFE DIED 22 OCT 94.	SUSPECTS- INTERAHAMWE. ARREST:1. MILOB/CIVPOL INV IN PROG RPA INV IN PROGRESS
5.	KIGEMBE (675957)	NI 21/22 OCT 94 2300 HRS	4 KILLED, 1 INJURED	SUSPECTS: LOCALS. NAMES SUBMITTED TO RPA NO ARRESTS.
6.	MUYIRA. SECTEUR NYAMYAGA (8441)	22 OCT 94 0800 HRS	3 KILLED	
7.	GISHAMVU (6416)	NI 26/27 OCT 94	2 KILLED	4 SUSPECTS. 1 ARRESTED KUBWIMANA ALPHONSE

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
8.	BUBUMBANO	NI 27/28 OCT 94	4 KILLED	1 SUSPECT IDENTIFIED BUT ESCAPED; (MR BUBINGO)
9.	SHEKE (6303)	NI 27/28 OCT 94	3 KILLED	NO SUSPECTS

68

STAFF COMMENTS
ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION IN RWANDA

1. The atrocities by the RPA in the aftermath of the April war as outlined in the report have also been amply published by the recent Human Rights report on Rwanda.
2. This has further refuelled the already unstable situation in the country. Insecurity as a result of RPA activities in various sectors and restriction of free movement of UNAMIR personnel in these sectors are well known.
3. What the BBGNU needs to do in order to propel its political objectives, is to suppress or restrict the freedom and activities of the RPA. This could be achieved through purposeful and effective training.
4. However, the lack of funds and even the right calibre of personnel to re-train these former insurgents do not exist. The immediate solution therefore is for the RPA top hierarchy to institute tough disciplinary measures to control their 'boys'.
5. The long term solution would be to seek assistance elsewhere to train a few soldiers and officers who would form the nucleus for the Training Institution for the new Rwandese Army.

MH
Hold on file
for me to
discuss later on
with the appropriate
authorities.
3/10
DFC/L



UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

Force Commander's Memorandum**From: Maj Gen GC Tousignant****To: SRSG****Date: 23 Oct 94****Subject: FORCEABLE CLOSURE OF DP CAMPS**

1. A prompt UNAMIR initiative is required in this issue to convince the BBGNU that precipitous action in the forceable clearance of DPs would be counterproductive to their aims.
 - a. It would alienate RPA from the very population it should be fostering.
 - b. It would receive a hostile response from donor govts and NGOs, which could delay or stop aid to the BBGNU.
2. My military concern is that, should the RPA initiate their plan of forceable camp closure, I may be forced to place my troops into a confrontational position between DPs and the RPA. I have already given instruction to my troops to increase their activity in DP camps, to provide reassurance and gain information. My staff is developing contingency options should the RPA begin their action, and I have alerted UNHQNY of the situation.
3. I request that you bring this issue to the BBGNU's attention tomorrow 24 Oct.

Information:

DFC
DCos Ops

Seen
HJ
27/10
DFC / cos

91
24/10



File No 5000.11(G3 PLANS)

To: FC

From: DCOS Ops

Info: SO2 G2

Date: 22 Oct 94

SUBJECT: RPA ACTIONS TO CLEAR DP CAMPS

1. On 20 Oct BRITCON reported that the RPA are conducting a coordinated campaign of direct action to move DPs from Sector 4 to their home areas. This has involved burning down or destroying temporary shelters and houses in the following areas.

- a. Shororo Camp area - (GR 4594).
- b. Cyanhinda Camp area - (GR 5596).
- c. Gasasa Area - (GR 5699).
- d. Kamana area - (GR 5196).

The information came from a source rated as B2. (usually reliable source, probably correct info)

2. Three hundred DPs in Birambo Camp (4763) in Sector 4B have been warned to vacate their camp by 25 Oct 94.

3. On 18 Oct 94 RPA troops cordoned off Ndaba DP Camp (GR 4572) in order that the local RPA Bn Comd could address the camp population. The people refused to assemble and at 1150 hrs the RPA opened fire and wounded 4 people. The population of the camp was forced to flee and the camp was burned by the RPA who then stole any personal belongings left behind.

4. On 18 Oct 94, during a meeting between Tac HQ and the RPA, the RPA stated that they were concerned about the reluctance of the DPs to return home.

5. On 20 Oct, the FC was told by the Prefect of Gikongoro that there was "no future" for the people occupying the camps in the Gikongoro Prefecture. The Prefect said that he intends to create a "hostile environment".

6. The Interahamwe attack on the village of Gasasa (GR 556125) on the night of 20 Oct 94 has been blamed, by RPA on Interahamwe operating from camps in the area (connect Para 1c.).


7. It is highly probable that the RPA are conducting a coordinated campaign to forcibly relocate the DPs. This campaign is, in all probability directed by two main concerns:

a. The primary concern is the normalization of the country and the wish to demonstrate to the outside world that the RPA is capable of effectively governing a country without prejudice (which the existence of the camps shows otherwise).

b. The secondary concern is to reduce the effectiveness of the Interahamwe by denying them a large and anonymous operating base.

8. On 21 October, the Prefect of Gikongoro met UNREO, NGO and MILOB representatives. It was agreed that the use of force to move DPs out of the camps was inappropriate.

9. The Government should now be closely questioned on its intentions and made aware that any such moves would result in negative international sentiment.



J ARP
Col
DCOS Ops

68

FROM : TUNBATT
TO : DFC/COS
NO : 45/G1
DATE : 23 OCTOBER 94
SUBJECT : TUNBATT ORBATS
REF : FILE NO 1000.7 (DFC/COS)

CMPO
Take note and
keep on file

HJ
26/10
DFC/COS


Rh per
JL
me



Col. Major TOUMIA Abdelaziz
Cdt. le Contingent Tunisien
au Rwanda

SB
24/10/94

TUNBATT, SECTOR 5



G8

PAAUZYUW UCCVVDB0009 2952324-UUUU--UCCVVDA.

ZNR UUUUU

P 221902Z OCT 94

FM UN TAC HQ BUTAR

TO UNAMIT HQ KIGALI/OPS//DFC//HAC//

BT

UNCLAS OPS 146 SECTION 4 OO 4

8.MSC.

A. POLICY/GUIDELINE REQUIRED FOR ESCORTS BETWEEN BUTARE AND YANGUD. MILOBS LACK VEHICLES AND PERFORMING ROUTE DUTY REDUCES PATROLLING CAPABILITY. GIVEN THE DIRECTION TO REDUCE PATROLLING VS ACTIVITY IN SECTOR 3 AND POSSIBLY A SIMILAR NEED IN SECTOR 4, TASKS MUST BE REDUCED AND ESCORT DUTIES APPEAR TO BE THE LEAST ALTERNATIVE.

B. 2 CIVPOL OFFICERS ARRIVED IN BUTARE ON 22 OCT 94. THEY ARE LIVING AND WORKING WITH THE MILOBS IN BUTARE.

BT

#0000

Received 10-23-1994 07:44:01

G 3 OPS
Speake

fgw

See

26/10
DFC/EO3

in copy made for
G3 OPS

9
27/

G/8

MA/DFC & CAS
NOV 93
23

Operation Branch
Force HQ, UNAMIR
Kigali, Rwanda

18 October 1994

3000.4/OPS/KIA/1

See Distribution

SUBJECT: ACCESS TO KIGALI AIRPORT HELICOPTER HANGAR

1. A recent meeting was held between Air Ops and the Airport Commandant, Mr Busingye, about access to the Canadian Helicopter site. Also present at the meeting was the RPA officer in charge of airport security. The following was agreed.
2. The difficulties experienced in getting UNAMIR vehicles and their passengers across the airfield can be resolved by using an access gate on the southern side of the airfield. The gate is apparently manned 24 hours a day and access will be available to any traffic destined for the Canadian Helicopter site.
3. Attached is a map of the access road to the gate. There are 2 RPA checkpoints on the road, the gate is on a sharp right-hand bend and quite obvious. Once inside the perimeter fence, vehicles must drive across a small aircraft dispersal and in front of the fire station before turning right into the helicopter dispersal.
4. Airfield access permits are issued by the Airport commandant's office on a strictly limited basis. They will only be issued to specific people or posts within an organization, a not unreasonable limitation for an airport. Therefore any personnel in vehicles not in possession of an airfield access permit must use the southern access gate to get to the helicopter hangar.

MA/ADC
I need this permit now?
+ JLC
19/10
DFC/601

J D Janiurek

J D JANIUREK
Sqn Ldr
For Force Commander

Annex A: Map of access road to helicopter dispersal.

Distribution:

Action:

List A B and C

68
my/4/94

2
A/10



1165

2

3077 *P. stewarti*

6/8

MEMORANDUM

18 Oct 94

Distribution List

ANTI-TANK MINE DATA BROCHURE DISTRIBUTION

1. Please find attached a brochure containing pictures and data on anti-tank mines which could be found in UNAMIR AO, for your information and vast distribution. It must be emphasized that the neutralization/disarming instructions are designed only for EOD qualified personnel; unqualified personnel should be instructed to mark mines/UXO for subsequent disposal.

J. App
COL
D COS OPS

DISTRIBUTION LIST

<u>Action</u>	<u>Info</u>
LIST C	DFC/COS

DCOS OPS

This is excellent... I hope they will make use of the information
Thank you.
J. App

19/10
DFC/COS

200 File
de
MA
20/10

9
19/10

* 72* code # 70 - subscribers

9-8

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



UNAMIR - MINUAR

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

TO: THE FORCE COMMANDER
FHQ

REF: MILOBS/6420.1

FROM: MILOBS GP HQ

DATE: 16 October 1994

INFO: DCOS (OPS), FHQ

SUBJECT: HIJACKING OF UN VEHICLE UNAMIR 1016

1. Reference voice communication between DCMO and Duty Officer FHQ on 16 Oct 94 at 0015 hrs. It is formally reported that UN vehicle No. UNAMIR 1016 assigned to MILOB Gp HQ was forcibly taken at gun point from Maj SM Kaiser Rizvi (UNID 505) at 2345 hrs on 15 Oct 94 around the vicinity of Kigali Night Club. A copy of the officer's statement on the incident is attached.

2. This incident pre-supposes that apart from the several vehicles that got into the hands of the RPA soldiers during the war, these soldiers would still like to get more UN vehicles. With the prevailing peaceful atmosphere, these soldiers are likely to continue hijacking UN vehicles.

3. From the statement given by Maj Rizvi, RPA soldiers might even go to the extent of even killing UN personnel in order to achieve their aim. If this situation is not checked by the Government of Rwanda, the lives of all UN personnel would be in danger.

4. It is therefore requested that a strongly worded protest note is sent to the Government of Rwanda and RPA High Command on the above mentioned incidence. Furthermore, the Government should retrieve the vehicle and hand it over to the UN. The UN should also be assured the such incident would not recur.

A UDDIN MOEEN
Col
DCMO

DFC

DCMO
I need to see
the statement of the
officer.

19/10
DFC/LOS

19/10