

[6 CONFIDENTIAL]

UNARCHIVES

SERIES 51002

BOX 130

FILE 5

ACC. 1998/0283



UN RESTRICTED

OUTGOING FAX NO. 3938

MIR NO. 1990

MISC NO.

PAGE 1 OF 2


TO: H. Medili Director FALD B. Sevan UN Security Coordinator, Major General Baril UN Headquarters New York	FROM: Major General Toussignant Force Commander and Acting Head of Mission UNAMIR Kigali, Rwanda
FAX NO: 212-963-0383 & 4104 & 9070	DATE: June 6, 1995
INT DISTN: FC, COS, CISS, CSO, DCOS OPS	PHONE : 212-963-3582 Ext. 11221 FAX NO: 212-963-3090
DRAFTED BY: G3 Plans J. Lombardo	If all pages are not received in good order please contact number listed above.
THROUGH: C. Ouziel Chief Administrative Officer	SECTION: Division of Administration and Management
SUBJECT: UNAMIR PROTECTION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL	

A security requirements plan is presently being written by a member of the International Tribunal. While the report is due in the near future, an advance draft copy has raised a number of concerns within UNAMIR.

The draft report identifies a requirement for twelve personnel for close protection (bodyguards). Currently one UNAMIR security officer (with no training in close protection) provides security to the Deputy Prosecutor. This is obviously insufficient to provide 24 hour close protection to the entire Tribunal staff. The military component of UNAMIR does not have the capability to provide personnel trained in close protection.

Three options have been raised to provide personnel the Tribunal will require for close protection:

1. UN hire and train staff in close protection.
2. Request contributing nations to provide police officers already trained in close protection.
3. Request contributing countries to provide military personnel (Special Forces, SAS) who are already trained in close protection.



Handwritten notes and signatures: G3 Plans, For your info, J. Lombardo, 7.6, CAD OHS, DCOS OPS, G3-Plans.

The other requirements identified in the report will mean a 'Company' would be required for protection of the Tribunal office in Kigali (and later on in Arusha, Tanzania) and for the provision of escorts when Tribunal members move outside of the Capital.

Finally, the Tribunal staff currently reside in the Meridien Hotel in Kigali without security. However, if the Tribunal staff move to a building called the 'Chinese Compound' (which they are expected to do in five to six weeks) additional troops will be required. As the Tribunal staff numbers are expected to increase to approximately 40-45 persons in Kigali, more accomodation sites will need to be found and troops allocated to secure them.

These concerns are provided for your information and early action as required.

P2/2
MIR 199D



UNAMIR - MINUAR

File No 5000.1 (PLANS)

To: MILOB GP HQ

From: A/DCOS OPS

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'Am', is written over the 'From' field.

Date: 26 May 95

Subject: COMMUNE POPULATIONS

Reference: A. Your 643/POPU/OPS dated 26 May 95

1. Receipt of Reference A is acknowledged.
2. Please clarify whether the commune listed as MUARIJEMGERO is actually NYARUHENGERRI and note that population figures for the following communes were not provided:
 - a. MBOGO, Sector 1;
 - b. GIKORO, Sector 2;
 - c. MUSASA, Sector 5;
 - d. RUSHASHI, Sector 5;
 - e. SHYORONGI, Sector 5; and
 - f. TARE, Sector 5.
3. Your assistance is most appreciated.

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

MILOB GP HQ

FROM : MILOB GP HQ (OPS)

TO : DCOS (OPS) *26/5*

SUB : POPULATION IN COMMUNES

FILE : 643/POPU/OPS DATED 26 MAY 95

632ms4
For your action
pls
26/5

1. The details of population are enclosed. The population figures of ~~Sector~~ 3B (Kibuye) will be sent once they are received .

2. Best regards.

Harish
(H S Ratnaparkhi)
Maj
SOO
for DCMO

POPULATION FIGURES IN COMMUNES

SER REMARKS	COMMUNE	POPULATION
1. SECTOR 1.		
	BUYOGA	33829
	CYUMBA	36184
	KIBALI	41325
	KIVUYE	22500
	KIYOMBE	37469
	MUKARANGE	40247
	CYUNGO	48000
	RUTARE	35505
	GITI	45000
	MUHURA	46095
	MUVUMBA	60000
	NGARAMA	80511
	KINYAME	42459
	BWISIGE	31643
	GITUZA	46385
	TUMBA	25000
	MURAMBI	76000
	RUTONGO	33845
	MUGAMBAZI	33484

2. SECTOR 2.

BIRENGA	27557
KIGERAMA	31455
KABARONDO	20628
SAKE	38400
MUGESERA	35972
RUKIRA	23992
RUSOMO	62000
KAYONZA	19895
RUTONDE	34000
RUKARA	27364
MUHAZI	32570
GASHORA	58754
NGENDA	103799
KANZENZE	66653
BICUMBI	98500

3. SECTOR 3.

AS ON 23 MAY 95

MUGINA	33277
KIGOMA	55702
RUNDA	35000
NTONGWE	52872
KAYENZI	45521
MUKINGI	36371
NYABIKENKE	47107
BULINGA	38623
TAMBWE	42811
NYAMABUYE	73085
NYAKABANDA	48804
MURAMA	32360
MUSAMBIRA	40765
RUTOBWE	35856
MUSHUBATTI	59993
MASANGO	41671
TABA	55967

4. SECTOR 4A.

KARAMA	20000
KARAMBO	22656
KINYAMAKARA	24402
MUKO	30846
MUSEBEYA	42524
MUSANGE	21770
RUKUNDO	27510
RWAMIKO	19000
MUDASOMWA	60235
MUBUGA	17295
KIVU	33252
NYAMAGABE	35000
NSHILI	44039

5. SECTOR 4B.

MARABA		27704
RUNYINYA		26671
HUYE		20260
NGOMA		25000
MUGUSA		35000
MUYAGA		20081
NTYAZO		42603
MUYIRA		33052
MBAZI		28048
		(6048 FORMER IDPs)
RUHASHYA		26132
		(2984 FORMER IDPs)
RUSATIRA		28600
		1600 FORMER IDPs
NYABISINDU		25000
		1653 FORMER IDPs
GISHAMVU		20579
		9500 FORMER IDPs
NYAKIZU		40125
		23017 FORMER IDPs
NDORA		20000
		400 FORMER IDPs
MUARIJEMGERO	10031	
KIGEMBE		17800
		FIGURE LIKELY TO RISE
		BECAUSE
		OF INCREASED RATE OF
		RETURNEES
		FROM ZAIRE
MUGANZA		13071
		76 FORMER IDPs
		67 FROM BURUNDI

UN RESTRICTED

KIBAYI

9315

PRE WAR POPULATION

40000 MANY HAVE FLED
TO BURUNDI

SHYANDA

39683

6. SECTOR 4C.

VALID AS OF 30 MAR 95

BUGARAMA	42200
CYIMBOGO	15500
GAFUNZO	40200
GATARE	48800
GISHOMA	35800
KAGANO	25700
KAMEMBE	40300
KARENTERA	51200
KIRAMBO	35300
GISUMA	28400
NYAKABUYE	32200
TOTAL	395600

UN RESTRICTED

6. SECTOR 5.

RUBAVU	42847
RWERERE	45025
KANAMA	70753
MUTURA	60543
SATINSYI	68604
NYAMYUMBA	55042
GICIYE	42709
GASEKE	51161
RAMBA	44425
KIBILIRA	49534
KARAGO	48139
KAYOVE	64801
NDUSU	43959
BUTARO	55948
CYERU	78394
KINIGI	52000
CYABINGO	53000
GATONDE	41942
RUHONDO	39738
KIGOMBE	52426
NKUMBA	64158
KIDAHO	45022
NKULI	45000
NYARUTOVU	61862
NYAKINAMA	41222
NYAMUTERA	29402
MUKINGO	32000
NYAMUGALI	34000

5. SECTOR 6.

GIKOMORO	37000
KANOMBE	33000
BUTAMWA	11000
KACYIRU	50000
KICUKIRO	80000
NYARUGENE	80000
RUBUNGO	30100

UN RESTRICTEDTo: A/D COS Ops *D* 18/5

From: SO3 G2

19 May 95

SUBJECT: INDICATORS AND WARNINGS

4. SECTOR 4C, increasing concern (by me) over possible cross border movement. Indicators are increasing but far from conclusive. This gives you early warning of what we're looking at, NOT waiting until we are certain:

A. KAMEMBE (780254): 180910B: LOCAL RPA BATTALION COMMANDER (MAJOR JEAN-BOSCO KAZURA [FROM UGANDA]) IN THE COMPANY OF NINE OTHER OFFICERS AND MEN, WERE OBSERVED DISCUSSING TACTICS NEAR THE UNHCR OFFICES FOR APPROXIMATELY 50 MINUTES. THEIR INTEREST WAS CLEARLY FOCUSSED ON THE BUKAVU APPROACH. COMMENT: WE HAVE SCARCE ENOUGH INFORMATION ON WHAT IS GOING ON ACROSS THE BORDER. WE HAVE SOME INDICATORS WHICH COULD SUGGEST THE POSSIBILITY OF FUTURE OPERATIONS INTO SECTOR 4C FROM ZAIRE, THEY ARE FEW AND INCONCLUSIVE BUT CANNOT BE DISCOUNTED. (REPORTS OF INCREASED ZAIRAN PRESENCE ALONG THE 4C BORDER [COULD BE TO PREVENT RWANDAN ATTACK INTO ZAIRE], WARNINGS FOR UNAMIR NOT TO OVERFLY ZAIRAN BORDER AREA (ANTI RECONNAISSANCE), DIGGING IN BY RPA IN BUGERAMA, AND PRESSURE BY ZAIRAN PARLIAMENT TO REMOVE THE REFUGEE PROBLEM). HOWEVER, THIS INCIDENT IS CONSISTENT WITH PROPER MILITARY OPERATIONS TO REVIEW DEFENSIVE AND CONTINGENCY PLANS. IT IS ALSO KNOWN THAT SOME JUNIOR OFFICER TRAINING HAS BEEN TAKING PLACE IN THE AREA, AND COULD VERY WELL HAVE BEEN A TEWT (TACTICAL EXERCISE WITHOUT TROOPS).

FC,

*As we discussed
yesterday. 4C looks very
attractive to FRGF.*

D
*18/5*UN RESTRICTED

✓ 5000.1 (Plans)

UN RESTRICTED

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

To: FC, DFC and COS through ~~SO1 G3 Plans~~ 10

Info: DCOS Ops
DCOS Sp
DCMO
CO AUSMED
UN HRFOR (Mr Maurice Nyberg)

From: Force PM/SO2 G1 Discipline wali may

Date: 20 Apr 95

Subject: REPORT ON THE SHOOTING OF LOCALS
IN NYABISHINGU ON 14 APR 95

INTRODUCTION

1. It was learnt at HQ UNAMIR on Mon 17 Apr that a shooting had taken place in the area of Nyabishingu on Fri 14 Apr. Subsequently, a team comprising Lt Col Dunn, Lt Col Yella, Maj Pitrie, Capt East, Lt Page, Cpl Lyons (AUSMED Mil Info NCO), Maurice Nyberg (HRFOR Special Investigator) and myself were taken to the scene by a Francophone MILOB from Mali who wore no identification and whose name we did not learn. Some difficulty in collecting evidence was experienced throughout our visit - partly exacerbated by the MILOB's enthusiasm for interpreting French into French for the benefit of the French speakers in our group; the Anglophones, therefore, had extreme difficulty in working out what was being said; for this reason, reliance is placed on the G2 Summary (attached, including the text of the initial MILOB report) for the facts surrounding the case.

AIM

2. The aim of this report is to cover some immediate findings, to consider future action required and to make recommendations; it is not intended to provide G2 analysis of the incident or to repeat the accurate detail of the MILOB report.

THE RESULT OF INVESTIGATIONS

3. We visited the scene of the shooting where we found that the MILOBs' report was broadly accurate. Additionally, we found:

- a. That the bodies had been removed from the river bed (where they had lain for nearly 3 days) only hours earlier. Locals had buried 3 bodies on the bank of the river close by; the remainder had been taken for burial by their families.

b. Including those found earlier by MILOBs, about 20 expended and unexpended rounds (17 x short 7.62mm of which 7 had not been struck, 2 x 5.56mm and 1 x 9mm). They were collected from the side of a track along the far bank (ie., away from Nyabishingu) where we found blood stains and a sandal that had apparently been penetrated by a bullet; this appeared to be the site of the killing.

Local people joined us in our inspection of the site and were cooperative, helpful and curious throughout our visit.

4. We visited Mashasha Hospital to which MILOBs had reported that the survivor had been taken suffering bullet wounds in his arms. We learnt that he had subsequently fled when, about 0400 hrs Sat 15 Apr, 4 members of the RPA raided the hospital, apparently seeking him. Hospital staff were cooperative (doctors described the survivor's injuries) but clearly frightened and believed that they were in need of protection.

5. The father of the survivor approached us to let us know that his son was in hiding and in need of medical attention. Our attention was diverted towards this humanitarian issue and, having confirmed with doctors that in their opinion, the boy would be fit to travel, arranged his evacuation through a very difficult landing site, the only one available nearby. He was taken, thereafter, to AUSMED for treatment (to both arms, one of which is broken and both of which had suffered straight through bullet wounds). Surgeons set the broken bone and debrided the bullet tracks - which had simply been closed by the Rwandan doctors, leaving a great risk of complications from infection.

6. The survivor has been interviewed by a joint MP, G2 and HRFOR team; his story will be the subject of a separate report still in production by G2 staff but it is apparent that:

a. He can identify several of his assailants - between 15 and 20 local RPA soldiers whom he already knew by sight as based in the former cement factory in Nyabishingu.

b. The RPA group was led by at least 2 uniformed officers; a Captain and, apparently, a Lieutenant Colonel plus another wearing no rank but who appeared to be in command.

THE FUTURE

7. Action is now required to:

a. Ensure that the RPA brings the culprits to justice. RPA judicial procedures - which seem to have been effective and swift following the Busanze incident - will depend on their interviewing of the witness. Consideration should be given to assisting and encouraging their investigation, as with Busanze, perhaps taking senior RPA and ministerial representatives to the scene.

UN RESTRICTED

b. Decide how to protect the witness. Obviously, the survivor cannot return to his home safely until the culprits are detained; even with this action, he will almost certainly remain at risk.

8. Photographs of the victims (taken during the initial MILOB visit to the scene) have been produced and are now being further copied; although they are of limited forensic value and do not clearly show the number of victims or their injuries, they will be of importance to any RPA investigation. One important point that emerged from the photographs is that many of the victims died with their arms bound behind their backs. The photographs have been seen by Lt Joseph who has indicated that the RPA COS has ordered an inquiry and dispatched officers to the area of the incident.

RECOMMENDATIONS

9. It is recommended that:

- a. Discussion is initiated with the RPA at an appropriate level.
- b. Arrangements are made for the survivor to be interviewed by RPA representatives
- c. Further support is given to RPA investigations.
- d. Urgent consideration is given to the protection of the witness following the completion of his medical treatment.
- e. Consideration is given to increasing the level of patrolling in the Nyabishingu area and the provision of a temporary security presence at Mashasha hospital.

It is further recommended that the DCMO issues instructions on the prompt notification of incidents such as this in order that investigative teams can be formed and dispatched in a very much more timely fashion than was possible on this occasion.

UN RESTRICTED

To: PM

From: SO3 G2

20 Apr 95

REPORT: MASS KILLING
NYABISHINGU 14 APR 95

1. The following paragraphs are taken from my intsums over past three days. Our foci (yours, mine, Human Rights) differ. Be liberal in wordsmithing it to your own requirements.
2. SECTOR 4C: REPORTS OF A MASS KILLING WERE INVESTIGATED: INITIAL INVESTIGATION INDICATES THE FOLLOWING. ON 14 APR, BETWEEN THE HOURS OF 1300-1530, A GROUP OF APPROXIMATELY 20 RPA SOLDIERS TOOK 17-19 LOCAL MEN FROM THE NYABISHINGU AREA, MARCHED THEM DOWN A TRAIL TO THE BANK OF THE RUBYIRO RIVER UNDER THE PRETEXT OF QUESTIONING THEM ON A BANDIT RAID, THEN ORDERED THEM TO LIE DOWN ON THE SIDE OF THE TRAIL AND SHOT THEM. THEY THEN THREW THE BODIES OVER THE EMBANKMENT INTO THE RIVER. THE RIVER WAS TOO SHALLOW AND THE BODIES WERE NOT CARRIED AWAY. THIS INCIDENT IS APPARENTLY A RETRIBUTION EXECUTION IN RESPONSE TO A REPORTED INCIDENT EARLIER THAT DAY IN WHICH IT WAS REPORTED THAT, BETWEEN 1100 AND 1230B, EIGHT BANDITS ATTACKED 2 RPA SOLDIERS. ONE DIED, ONE WAS WOUNDED. THE SURVIVOR INFORMED HIS COMRADES (PROBABLY THE 15 STRONG RPA SECURITY PLATOON AT THE SIRWA CEMENT FACTORY AT BUGERAMA). SOME OF THE LOCALS WHO INFORMED UNAMIR OF THIS INCIDENT WERE ARRESTED THE NEXT DAY. LOCAL RPA AND THE BOURGEMESTRE OF BUGERAMA HAD PROBABLY INVESTIGATED THE SCENE AS LOCALS WERE ALLOWED TO BURY THE DEAD. COMMENT: THE MILOB REPORT ON THIS INCIDENT WAS A VERY GOOD PIECE OF INVESTIGATIVE WORK HOWEVER IT DID NOT REACH STAFF PRINCIPALS AT THIS HQ UNTIL 17 APRIL. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT TIMELINESS OF REPORTING AT ALL LEVELS BE ADDRESSED
3. SECTOR 4C: THE INCIDENT OF AN RPA SOLDIER BEING KILLED WHICH MAY HAVE PROMPTED THE MASS KILLING AT NYABISHINGU WAS INVESTIGATED ON 18 APRIL BY A HUMAN RIGHTS TEAM (MILOB SECTOR 4C). THE FINDINGS: 141100B, THE GENDARMERIE AT NYABISHINGU WAS INFORMED BY LOCALS OF SUSPICIOUS PERSONS GATHERED AT A HOUSE NEARBY. GENDARMERIE AND RPA RESPONDED. TWO GENDARMES APPROACHED THE HOUSE ORDERING THE OCCUPANTS OUTSIDE. THE OCCUPANTS OPENED FIRE AND ATTEMPTED TO FLEE. RPA AND GENDARMES RETURNED FIRE. ONE GENDARME WAS KILLED, ONE INJURED. THREE OF THE OCCUPANTS WERE KILLED, TWO WOUNDED AND CAPTURED, FOUR ESCAPED INTO THE

1/2

UN RESTRICTED

UN RESTRICTED

NEARBY FOREST. THE OCCUPANTS WERE RWANDESE, ZAIRAN AND BURUNDIAN, LIKELY INTERAHAMWE. TWO AUTOMATIC RIFLES WITH AMMUNITION, SIX GRENADES, A MACHETE AND UNIFORM ITEMS WERE FOUND IN THE HOUSE.

4. SECTOR 4C: NYAMBISHUNGU: FURTHER TO THE MASS KILLING INCIDENT OF 14 APR. G2 IS RECEIVING INCREASED INDICATORS TO SUGGEST THAT THE KILLING WAS NOT THE EMOTIONAL REACTION OF A LOCAL FEW, BUT A CALCULATED INTERNAL SECURITY MEASURE TO DETER LOCALS FROM FUTURE FRGF/INTERAHAMWE ACTIVITY. A SEPARATE BRIEFING NOTE WILL BE FORTHCOMING.

UN RESTRICTED

UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

To: FC, DFC and COS through SO1 G3 Plans

Info: DCOS Ops
DCOS Sp
DCMO
CO AUSMED
UN HRFOR (Mr Maurice Nyberg)

From: Force PM/SO2 G1 Discipline

Date: 20 Apr 95

Subject: REPORT ON THE SHOOTING OF LOCALS
IN NYABISHINGU ON 14 APR 95

Further to my earlier report on the Nyabishingu incident, I attach a copy of the G2 Interview report for your information.

UN RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

INTERVIEW REPORT - YOHANI NTAUNEMYAUMUNSI

General

1. On 17 and 18 Apr 95, Yohani NTAUNEMYAUMUNSI was interviewed by 555491 CPL L.C. LYONS, AUSMED Intelligence Section, at AUSMED Hospital, KIGALI. Mr Maurice NYBERG, a representative of International Human Rights, was present and participated in the interviews. The duration of the interviews was 45 minutes and 90 minutes respectively.

2. The subject was the lone survivor of a massacre in which 17 people were shot. The massacre took place vicinity Nyabishungu (GR 9012). Initial reports indicated that RPA were responsible for the massacre. A UNAMIR team was sent from Kigali to investigate. The subject was identified by the investigation team as a probable survivor, and brought back to the AUSMED Hospital for medical care and detailed interview. The subject had been shot three times: once in the right knee, once in the left forearm and once in the right forearm.

Aim

3. The aims of the interviews was to obtain information of interest to UNAMIR and identify the perpetrators of the massacre.

Assessment of Interviewee

4. The subject is a nineteen year old farmers son. It was obvious he had been through what is considered to be a very traumatic experience. The subject appeared to be in a great deal of pain and very scared of the RPA. The subject was extremely worried that the RPA were out to get him. He appeared to be an honest and forthright individual who answered all questions directed at him.

Information Gained

5. Background. The subject is of Hutu ethnic background, and lives with his father, younger brothers and sisters. He used to work at the local cement factory until it was taken over by Chinese. He claims his family have no relationship with the Former Government or the FRGF. When asked of his involvement during the war and the genocide he stated that he was not involved in either.

6. The subject's older brother, who worked as an accounts clerk at the local rice exporting business, was killed by RPA on 13 Apr 95. The RPA came to the door of his house and told everybody to put their hands in the air. The soldiers singled out his older brother and shot him.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

2

7. The subject offered two options of motivation for the killing of his brother. Firstly, his brother was earning a great deal of money in Rwandan terms. The brother had attended school with local RPA, and they may have been jealous because he, as a Hutu, was earning more money than them. Secondly, a group of people who his brother had attended school with may have been jealous that a Hutu was earning more money than them. They had heard that the RPA were offering money as a bounty for Hutu bandits and subsequently told the RPA that he was such.
8. Situation in Nyambishungu. The subject stated the had war barely touched his part of the country and many people were not aware of the goings on elsewhere in Rwanda. When asked about tensions in the area, he stated not many people had been arrested on accusations of involvement in genocide. He explained there are two hills in the area in which he lives. A massacre had taken place on one of the hills during the period of genocide. People that lived on the same hill as him were suspected of perpetrating the massacre.
9. The subject claimed infiltrators from Zaire had recently killed three people in the local area.
10. Massacre. The subject stated he was about to travel to his brothers burial. He was travelling on a bus when it was stopped by the RPA. The RPA asked him what he was doing. Despite his protest, the RPA made him go with them at gunpoint.
11. The subject walked a short distance with the RPA. During this walk the RPA collected another sixteen people. COMMENT. The entire group is believed to be Hutu males from the age of 13 upwards. COMMENT ENDS. The subject stated the RPA led the group to the Rubyiyo River area. Once in the area, an RPA officer told the men to lie down, and their hands were tied behind their backs. COMMENT. Photographic evidence held by UNAMIR Force Provost Marshall shows the victims had their hands tied behind their backs with either their belts or a piece of clothing. COMMENT ENDS.
12. The subject stated there appeared to be two officers amongst the group. One had two markings on his shoulder. He stated that the marking closest to the neck appeared to be larger than the other and appeared to contain some sort of insignia within the confines of a circle. The two markings appeared to be a different colour from each other. The other possible officer had three markings on his shoulder. COMMENT. These markings appear to be consistent with those of an RPA LTCOL and CAPT. COMMENT END.
13. However, he went on to state that the neither of these people were the ones giving orders. The person giving orders was wearing a different uniform from everyone else and was not wearing any rank insignia. The uniform he was wearing was patchy, not stripped, and he appeared to be carrying a pistol which had something printed in white paint on the hand grip. The subject claimed he was the one who told them to lie down, and was quoted as saying "you will never work with us". COMMENT: This is a tribal saying when one tribe is referring to another inferior class. It means they will never be on the same level as they are. COMMENT ENDS. It was after this quote that the shooting began.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

3

14. The subject claims the RPA stood back approximately 3 - 5 metres and opened fire. The fire was fully automatic. COMMENT. Evidence gathered at the massacre sight included some live and expended ammunition, including 7.62mm x 39mm, 5.56mm x 45mm and 9mm x 13mm. All are common ammunition types known to be used by the RPA, FRGF/Interahamwe, and bandits. COMMENT ENDS.

15. Initially the subject stated that he was the first to be shot. However, he later stated that this was not the case, and he may have been seventh. COMMENT. It is difficult to ascertain how the subject could know when he was shot in relation to other victims, for according to his own claims, the victims were shot en masse. COMMENT ENDS.

16. The subject stated that he fell unconscious when he was shot, and when he came too he was covered with bodies. COMMENT. The bodies were removed from the banana plantation and placed on a small delta in the river. The photographs support this. COMMENT ENDS. His first impression was that they were wounded as he was. After removing the bodies on top of him he realised they were all dead. COMMENT: The RPA appear to have believed that all the men were dead. It could have been the amount of blood covering the subjects body that disguised the fact he was alive when they dumped him on the river bed. COMMENT ENDS.

17. The subject stated that he tried his best to get out of the river bed and head for his home. He only made it a short distance before he collapsed. He believes that some locals may have taken him to his home. He stated that he feared for his life and the RPA would come and find him there. His father took him to the local hospital where he was admitted. He stated that he remained at the hospital until 8pm on the Saturday night, 15 Apr 95.

18. The subject claims the RPA did come looking for him, and his father threw him out of the window to escape them. His father then went around and picked him up. As they were running away the RPA were shouting and fired a shot into the air. His father took him into the bushes where they hid for some time. His father took him back to his house where they hid until a helicopter was heard approaching the town site.

19. The subject stated that he would be able to identify any of the people who conducted the massacre if he ever saw them again. He would only be able to identify them by face as he did not know their names. He claimed he had seen them before at the cement factory. The subject stated that they were definitely RPA Soldiers. COMMENT. The cement factory is located close to the town and is currently operated by the Chinese. The RPA provide security there. COMMENT ENDS. The people were wearing a uniform he described as a light khaki with small brown streaks on them. COMMENT. This pattern of uniform is consistent with East German style uniforms worn by RPA. COMMENT ENDS. The soldiers did not appear to be wearing head dress at the time. He stated that there was a total of between twenty and twenty three soldiers.

20. The subject believes this incident was a revenge killing of Hutu males as a result of earlier attacks from Hutu militia from across the border (see Para 9 above).

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

4

Conclusions

21. Conclusions are as follows:

- a. The subject was a survivor of a massacre that occurred at Nyabishungu (GR 9012), on 14 Apr 95.
- b. It is most probable that RPA perpetrated the massacre.
- c. It is possible that the massacre was overseen by senior RPA officers and/or officials.
- d. The subject, and those who assisted him, are likely to be at risk from the RPA.

Recommendations

22. Recommendations are as follows:

- a. A formal criminal investigation should be conducted to verify the claims made by the subject in these interviews.
- b. The subject should be provided with the protection.
- c. Protection should be provided to the hospital staff who originally treated the subject in his local area, and to the subject's family who remain in the area.

L.C. Lyons

L.C. LYONS
CPL
OP INT

20 Apr 95

RESTRICTED



5000/3 (Plans)

UN SECRET

Minute

sil

From: DCOS Ops

To: COS

Info: G3 Plans
G3 Ops
G3 Air

[Handwritten signature]
16/1

Date: 14 Jan 95

Subject: NI HEL OPS LAKE KIVU

Reference: 3000.3/OPS/1 (Attached)

1. I support the concept and the recommendations made by the G3 Air in the attached paper.
2. Accordingly, it is requested that:
 - a. This conceptual proposal be presented to the FC for approval;
 - b. The G3 Air task Cdn Hls to continue preparations to validate and prepare the FLIR capability;
 - c. Milob HQ be tasked to designate two Milobs to undergo FLIR training commencing approximately 23 Jan 95 for subsequent employment in Sect 4B;
 - d. G3 Plans, G3 Air and G4 staff conduct the required recce for the FOB; and
 - e. You contact the COS RPA to obtain concurrence with this concept.

UN SECRET

UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



UNAMIR - MINUAR

NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

File No 3000.3/OPS/1

To: DCOS Ops

Info: Lt Col G3 Operations
Lt Col G3 Plans

Date: 14 Jan 95

Subject: BORDER SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS ALONG LAKE KIVU

Reference:

A. UN/Canadian Helicopters Limited - Contract PTS/CON/131/94.

1. Background. Following the heightened security situation along the SW Rwanda/Zaire border, G3 Air was asked to consider ways in which UN helicopters might usefully contribute to enhanced UN security operations in the region.

2. Tactical Assessment. The recent attacks by Former Government Forces (FGF) or bandits against civilian targets in Western Rwanda have followed a similar pattern. Raids have been launched from Zaire at night by insurgents using light boats thought to be based on the Lake Kivu island of Idjwi. These islands dominate the lake, enabling motor boats of even modest power to reach all Rwandan coastal targets in less than an hour. To date, the main focus of enemy action has been in the southern portion of the Lake Kivu shoreline, close to the Nyamasheke peninsula; the area lying closest to the Zairian island of Idjwi, and offering the best possibility of a successful lightning raid. In purely military terms, the raids may just be intended for reconnaissance. However, the main enemy motive appears to be banditry, with the objective of seizing food, cash or kidnapping local civilians. There may also be a secondary motive to promote a climate of fear in the area, and to erode public confidence in the abilities of the RPA and UN to protect the Rwandese population. Although the frequency of attacks has mounted steadily over recent weeks, the financial hardship imposed on the Zaire refugee population by the recent Rwandan currency exchange is likely to result in a step increase in activity. If the situation is allowed to escalate further, the resulting destabilisation of the border zone may impede seriously UN attempts to ensure the safe return of refugees from Zaire. It is therefore imperative that decisive cooperative UN and Rwandan Army action be taken to deter further attacks from the Kivu islands.

3. Possible UN Response. The local Rwandese population along the Lake Kivu shore has asked for a greater UN patrolling presence in the area of Nyamasheke. This wish is probably attributable as much to nervousness about the increased presence and belligerence of RPA patrols, as a fear of insurgents. Indeed, there may even be considerable passive local support for the FGF in the region. One solution may be to mount joint UN/RPA patrols in the region, with the aim of creating a more credible deterrent posture. However, the recent regular exchanges of fire between insurgents and the RPA indicate that UN soldiers, operating under the extant Rules of Engagement (ROE), would be placed at an unacceptable risk during such combined operations. Moreover, the alternative of mounting exclusively UN patrols in the region would also lack credibility, as much for the obvious lack of sophisticated night surveillance systems, as for insufficiently robust ROE. Therefore, to have any chance of successfully interdicting the attacks, two aspects are clear. A means must be found to anticipate and deter the incoming raids and, should deterrence fail, a method devised to permit anticipation of attacks for later interdiction by the RPA. The UN is in a position to achieve these objectives by use of its helicopters.

4. The Availability of UN Helicopters for Surveillance and Airborne Command and Control. The extant contract of employment between the UN and Canadian Helicopters Limited (Reference A) expressly makes provision for the use of Forward Looking Infra-Red (FLIR) equipment to aid night operations. Moreover, night reconnaissance flying is included as a prime task within the contract. However, the routine daylight nature of our helicopter operations in Rwanda have resulted in this night capability being unused. In anticipation of a possible requirement for night operations, Canadian Helicopters is arranging for the transport of the FLIR equipment to Kigali (from Nairobi). The equipment will arrive in theatre, at no financial penalty to the UN, by 17 Jan 95. Following equipment installation and functional checks, an operational FLIR capability should be available to the Force Commander by 21 Jan 95.

5. The Capabilities of FLIR Equipment. The Canadian Helicopters FLIR equipment is turret mounted on the outside of the Bell 212 fuselage, and capable of operating through 360 degrees of azimuth, and through the full arc of declination. The imager is capable of generating a high resolution thermal picture of the outside world, and is switchable to show 'hot sources' such as human beings or running outboard motors as either black or white images. There is also a facility to record images on a standard TV quality VHS video recorder for later analysis. We can realistically expect the FLIR imagery to be of particularly high quality over the calm water of Lake Kivu, because of the high diurnal temperature range at this latitude. Moreover, optimum FLIR conditions can be expected at night, with a high probability of acquiring a quality image

over long range. In the Bell 212 aircraft, the thermal image is displayed on a television screen and interpreted by an operator seated in the aircraft cabin. Rearcrew FLIR operation allows both pilots free to concentrate on flying and navigating the aircraft accurately, and able to respond to directions from the FLIR operator. Additionally, the aircraft configuration would permit the carriage of 2 or more liaison officers and a signaller. This crew configuration would allow the aircraft to act as an airborne command and control post if required.

6. Flight Following and Air to Ground Communications.

All deployed UN helicopter operations in Rwanda are 'flight followed' by HF radio from the Presidential hangar at KIA. Additionally, all aircraft are equipped with a VHF radio compatible with Sector Operations Rooms, Motorola Spectra vehicle radios, and with Motorola handhelds. However, the allocation of frequencies and generation of a robust comms plan for the surveillance operation would need to be addressed in a formal signals instruction.

7. The Requirement for a Forward Operating Base (FOB).

To ensure adequate time on surveillance task, and to reduce reaction times, it will be necessary to operate a FOB somewhere on the Lake Kivu shore. Given the extent of the likely operating area, Kibuye is optimally situated as a FOB location. The location has the additional advantage of being equidistant between the main diversion airfields at Kamembe and Goma and a secure centre of UN activity. A specific area for the FOB has been identified on a flat promontory extending West of Kibuye (GR 248 729). This location is a unique and easily identifiable night landing site, with ready road access from HQ Sector 4B. A detailed photographic survey will be undertaken on 14 Jan to ascertain ideal approach and departure paths, locations for a Forward Refuelling Point (FRP) and portable Non-Directional Radio Beacon (also inbound from Nairobi), and considerations of ground defence. Drumstock fuel sufficient for the duration of the operation is available at Kigali, but would need to be prepositioned at Kibuye by road.

8. An Outline Concept of Operations. According to local sources, a major launch base for bandit raiding parties is thought to be the Zairian fishing base on the south end of Idjwi Island (GR 945 497). This area is overlooked from the Rwandan Nyamasheke peninsula to the South. Excellent covert OP positions overlooking the enemy base are at GR 936 455. An ideal plan might involve the pre-positioning of a covert OP in this area, equipped with tactical night imaging equipment (IWS or similar). The OP would be in radio contact with Sector 4B HQ, which can then generate the FLIR equipped helicopter in response to likely raiding activity. The helicopter would carry out a standard departure from its FOB and proceed to a selected surveillance area over Lake Kivu; its task to identify, track and report the movement of enemy boats to the

Sector HQ. The presence of an RPO LO at the HQ would allow any relevant information to be passed to RPA patrols along the Kivu shore. Depending on the preferred outcome, be it successful armed interdiction or pure deterrence, the helicopter could adjust its flight profile as needed. By standing off from the target downwind, and at height, rotor noise could be minimised. This would allow possible raiding parties to be tracked all the way to their intended landing point. Alternatively, rotor noise could be used overtly to deter raiding parties in the vicinity of their port of origin. To ease communications problems between OPs, the Sector HQ, the helicopter and the RPA, it will be necessary to issue a common map of the operating area, specially gridded into surveillance areas. Each area would then be specially labelled for ease of reference on the radio. Patently, such a concept of operations would need to be carefully coordinated between all parties.

9. Flight Safety. The Canadian Helicopters aircrew are civilians, and are not contracted to hazard themselves beyond the normal extent of their duties. Accordingly, all flights for this operation would be purely reconnaissance in nature, and would be flown at heights outside the range of small arms. It should be noted that our helicopter crews have no training or capability to carry out any night tactical support operations whatsoever.

10. Recommendations. It is recommended that:

- a. The outline concept of operations in this paper be approved.
- b. Technical preparations continue to provide a FLIR capability in theatre. Preparations to include airborne validation of capability.
- c. Two UNAMIR officers be identified to act as airborne LOs. Training to include interpretation of FLIR imagery, under direction of Canadian Helicopters staff.
- d. Staff recce be undertaken to Kibuye to review arrangements for helicopter FOB, and investigate requirements of HQ Sector 4B to act as operational focus for this operation.
- e. High level contacts be established with RPA to agree way ahead.



C W DIXON
Sqn Ldr
SO2 G3 Air