

MIR

SITUATION REPORTS

[1 JAN 1994 - 31 DEC 1995]

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

UNCLASSIFIED
EL/WG APR 2009

UNARCHIVES
SERIES 5-1120
BOX 23
FILE 5
ACC. 1998/0278

MILITARY SITUATION

1. The military situation in Rwanda has continued to be stable, however many factors continue to create a sense of insecurity within the country, which is frustrating efforts by both UNAMIR and the BBGNU to bring normality to Rwanda. Notable among these are; lawlessness and indiscipline on the part of some RPA elements, revenge killings, activities of agitators in DP Camps, activities by former government forces, and cross border incidents.

2. Lawlessness by RPA. Many reasons could be attributed to the lawlessness and indiscipline which seem to be prevalent in the ranks of the RPA throughout the country. Some efforts have been made by the RPA hierarchy in the direction of correcting wrong doings by the RPA, but these continue to be inadequate and the BBGNU seems to lack the authority and capability to enforce law and order in the country. Some of the reasons are as follows:

a. The RPA have not been paid in the last 4 months. The high standards of discipline that were prevalent in the RPA in the two months following the war have visibly slackened and RPA soldiers are frequently found drunk while carrying weapons. Some of these soldiers manning the plethora of checkpoints throughout the country frequently ask passing vehicles for a "toll" before allowing them to pass. Reports have been received that people carrying out low level cross border trading on the Burundi/Rwanda border have ceased to use the official border crossing points because the RPA stationed there intimidate them and steal their animals, farm produce and money.

b. Lack of finance and the necessary infrastructure for governance has contributed directly to the lawlessness of the RPA. The BBGNU lacks funds to pay its civil servants and law enforcement agencies and needs help if the security situation in the country is not to deteriorate any further.

c. RPA perceives Displaced Peoples Camps as havens for opponents of the RPA/BBGNU and have on a number of occasions attempted or employed high handed methods to persuade the population of these camps to return home. Violence inevitably has accompanied these clumsy attempts and civilian casualties have been reported on each occasion. These forcible methods have alienated the RPA from the population of the camps and made

the population mistrustful and fearful of the motives of the RPA for wanting them to return to their homes. They see safety in numbers and are afraid of the much rumoured RPA revenge killings.

3. **Revenge Killings.** To date there has been no evidence of a coordinated campaign of revenge killings by the RPA to avenge the genocide which took place in April. Rumours abound that some elements of the RPA are conducting these acts under the eyes of the international community with such skill that no evidence can be found. Although a number of RPA soldiers have undoubtedly killed people whom they believe to be responsible for the deaths of members of their families there is nothing to suggest that the RPA is taking part in systematic slaughter of Hutus. However, the Hutu population in DP camps do not trust the RPA. There have been numerous incidents of the RPA arresting people for no declared reason. This is endemic in Sectors 3 and 4 and does little to reassure the local population of the good intentions of the RPA. Many of those arrested have been taken to undisclosed locations and their whereabouts remain unknown. Stories of murder and retribution circulate freely through the refugee and DP camps strengthening the resolve of those living in the camps to remain there.

5. **Activities of Agitators in Camps.** The militias of the former regime are in control of the vast majority of DP and refugee camps and openly wear their militia berets and insignia. It is the leaders of the militias who control the distribution of food throughout the camps and it is they who have conspired to encourage the lawless conditions endured by those who live in them. Murders are violent and frequent with the victims usually being those who advocate the return to their home communes. There have been a number of attacks launched from within the DP camps in Rwanda and from across the border in Burundi aimed at killing Tutsi and moderate Hutu families. These attacks are aimed at killing the witnesses to and survivors of the genocide. The unstable security situation in the camps in Zaire and Tanzania has led to several NGOs threatening to abandon their relief efforts if nothing is done to improve the situation. There are 6-8 people murdered every night in Mugunga camp in the Goma area of Zaire and the NGOs and UNAMIR are currently powerless to intervene. After a battle for control of the Katale camp, in Goma, the victorious Interahamwe militia faction produced a hit list containing the names of NGOs whom they intended to kill. The NGOs were forced to withdraw from the camp.

6. **Activities by Former Rwandan Government Forces (FRGF).** The FRGF remain

based in the same areas as the refugee population from which they are drawn; namely Goma and Bukavu (in Zaire) and Ngara (in Tanzania). They are assessed to have approximately 30,000 men in the Goma and Bukavu areas and another 12,000 in the Ngara area. Numbers are difficult to predict with any degree of accuracy as they continue to recruit from the camps. Military training is carried out in and around the areas of the camps and there have been several reports that the FRGF have infiltrated men dressed in civilian clothes into the DP camps in the South Western portion of UNAMIR AOR to train the militia. FRGF troops are carrying out reconnaissance of the Zaire/Rwanda border area and monitoring all UNAMIR radio transmissions.

7. Cross Border Incidents. In the most significant incident yet, a cross border raid was launched in the North of Rwanda on 30 October. A total of 36 people were killed in the raid which involved 3 houses, separated by some distance, being attacked simultaneously. It is suspected that the RGF was responsible. The RPA has responded by creating a 1 km buffer zone along the border and reinforcing positions in the area. Local people are allowed to work their fields in the buffer zone during the day and then must return to homes behind the RPA defensive positions at night. FRGF are mounting a constant propaganda campaign to maintain the destabilisation of the area by giving dates for their re-invasion of the country. Both the RPA and FRGF continue to recruit new soldiers to their respective causes. The new recruits to the FRGF are indoctrinated with an intense hatred for the Tutsis and are driven by the desire to recapture their homeland. Neither side views the conflict as over and both appear to be training for the day when the FRGF begins its campaign to recapture Rwanda.

8. In my last report, I predicted a loss of momentum in the reestablishment of security in RWANDA unless reinforcement of UNAMIR continued at a steady rate. I am pleased to report to the Council that troop deployment is nearing (now) completion (complete) with the arrival of the Zambian contingent's main body expected on 26 Nov 94.

9. The reintegration of RPA forces into the South West of the country has precipitated a deterioration of the security situation. RPA activity in this area has been relatively intense and reports of murder, theft and violent clashes with displaced persons are frequent. The denial on the part of the RPA of particular areas to UNAMIR troops has hampered operations. The deteriorating security situation in the South West has forced UNAMIR to concentrate forces there. As a result, UNAMIR's influence and supervision in

the South East is yet to be fully achieved.

10. The current troop deployment is as follows:

Sector 1 (North East). The deployment of the 331 strong Nigerian Independent Company is now complete although the contingent is still awaiting the arrival of its armoured vehicles. UNMOs are currently deployed throughout the Sector.

Sector 2 (South East). In addition to the UNMOs, Sector 2 continues to be occupied only by the 2 ad hoc platoon groups from Ghana and Nigerian. The intention is to reinforce the sector with a Ghanaian Company by end November, and depending on the security situation in Sector 4, to subsequently reinforce to battalion strength.

Sector 3 (South). Until the recent deployment of the 200 strong Mali independent company, the in-place Malawi company of 165 all ranks was over-committed. The deployment of the 2 companies in Sector 3 has facilitated more effective coverage, although operations are restricted due to a continuing shortage of patrol vehicles. UNMOs also continue to patrol the Sector.

Sector 4 (South West). Sector 4A has been subdivided to accommodate progressive reinforcement by the Zambian Battalion (currently 324 ranks). By 30 November, Sector 4A will be occupied by 2 battalions (less one company) in response to the increasing instability emanating from the DP camps. The Franco African Battalion (487 ranks) and the Ethiopian Battalion (801 ranks) continue to conduct operations in Sectors 4B and 4C respectively. Approximately 80 UNMOs are also located in Sector 4.

Sector 5 (North West). Occupation of Sector 5 by the 826 strong Tunisian Battalion is now complete. 2 Field Ambulance (Cda) has withdrawn and UNMOs augment Tunbatt operations.

Sector 6 (Kigali). The advance party of 319 all ranks of the Indian Contingent deployed on 10 November 1994. Deployment is expected to be completed by 16 November 1994. The contingent will fulfil the increasing security requirement in Kigali City as the logistic capability of UNAMIR develops. The Sector remains co-occupied by Force Headquarters, Military Observer Group Headquarters and specialist units for communications, logistics and medical support from Canada, United Kingdom and Australia.

The tasks allocated to troops remain unchanged since my last report.

11. Although a progressive return to normality is still in evidence, the overall security situation is tenuous. Tension between UNAMIR troops and the RPA reduce the opportunity to create a cooperative approach to the provision of protection and security and deny efforts to shift the emphasis to the support of humanitarian aid.

12. Accordingly, the UNAMIR concept of operations remains relatively unchanged. Early realization of significant troop reductions appears unlikely unless programs to restore Rwanda are accelerated. To this end, considerable effort is being made to progress the spirit of Operation RONDAVAL and to identify the practical options which would effectively provide support to proposed operations in Zaire.

13. Operation RONDAVAL is a strategic plan for the partial restoration of Rwanda. It seeks to compliment the existing Emergency Normalization Plan by recognizing the fundamental requirement to establish security conditions in Rwanda which will build confidence among the refugees. Moreover, Operation RONDAVAL identifies the requirement for government funding, equitable land distribution and the imperative of UN, BBGNU, RPA and NGO cooperation. It is expected that a concurrent operation in Zaire would add impetus to Operation RONDAVAL.

110 W/C
File: Military
UNCLASSIFIED

3000.15 (OPS)

02 07 060800 NOV 94 RR RR UUUU

FROM: UNAMIR HQ

TO: GHANBATT
FRAFATT
TUNBATT
ZAMBATT
SECTOR 3 HQ (MALICOY)

INFO: TAC HQ BUTARE
MILOB GP HQ

SUBJ: FRAGO 04

REF: A. OPORD 20 DATED 6 OCT 94.

B. WNG O OF 240800Z OCT 94.

C. FRAGO 03 OF 281400Z OCT 94.

1. SIT.

A. GEN NO CHANGE.

B. UNAMIR FORCES. ZAMBATT ADVANCE FORCES DEPLOYED IN 4A NORTH AND CHAD COY LOC IN 4B.

2. MSN. RESUME AND REDEPLOY WITHIN NEW BOUNDARIES BY 082359B NOV 94.

3. EXECUTION.

A. GENERAL OUTLINE TO BE CONDUCTED IN TWO PHASES.

(1) PHASE 1. RELIEF IN PLACE IN 4A NORTH AND CHAD COY LOC IN 4B.

(2) PHASE 2.

(A) ADOPTION OF NEW BOUNDARIES.

(B) DEPLOYMENT WITHIN NEW BOUNDARIES.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

B. GP AND TASKS.

(1) ZAMBATT.

(A) GP NO CHANGE.

(B) TASKS (PHASE 1). NO CHANGE AS PER REF A, B AND C.

(C) PHASE 2.

(I) DEPLOY AND CONDUCT OPS WITHIN NEW BOUNDARIES.

(II) BE PREPARED TO DEPLOY AS PER REF B.

(2) GHANBATT.

(A) GP. NO CHANGE.

(B) TASKS (PHASE 1). AS PER REF A, B AND C.

(C) PHASE 2.

(I) ADOPT NEW BOUNDARIES.

(II) DEPLOY RELIEVED TROOPS AND CONDUCT OPS WITHIN NEW BDRYS.

(III) BE PREPARED TO DEPLOY AS PER REF B.

(3) FRAFBATT.

(A) GP. NO CHANGE.

(B) TASKS (PHASE 1). NO CHANGE TO REF A, B AND C.

(C) PHASE 2.

(I) ADOPT NEW BOUNDARIES.

(II) DEPLOY RELIEVED TROOPS AND CONDUCT OPS WITHIN NEW BDRYS.

(4) TUNBATT.

(A) GP. NO CHANGE.

(B) TASKS (PHASE 1). NO CHANGE.

UNCLASSIFIED

- (C) PHASE 2.
 - (I) ADOPT NEW BOUNDARIES.
 - (II) DEPLOY AND CONDUCT OPS WITHIN NEW BOUNDARIES.
- (5) SECTOR 3 HQ.
 - (A) GP. NO CHANGE.
 - (B) TASKS (PHASE 1). NO CHANGE.
 - (C) PHASE 2.
 - (I) ADOPT NEW BOUNDARIES.
 - (II) DEPLOY AND CONDUCT OPS WITHIN NEW BOUNDARIES.
- (6) COORD INSTRS.
 - (A) BOUNDARIES. AS PER TRACE SUBMITTED AT OPS OFFRS CONFERENCE ON 07 NOV 94
 - (B) TIMINGS.
 - (I) PHASE 1 ON GOING.
 - (II) PHASE 2 EFFECTIVE 082359B NOV 94.
- 4. ADMIN AND LOG. NO CHANGE.
- 5. COMD AND SIGNALS.
 - A. LOC OF HQ.
 - (1) SECTOR 4A - KARAMA.
 - (2) SECTOR 4B - GIKONGORO.
 - (3) SECTOR 5 - NO CHANGE.
- 6. ACK.

UNCLASSIFIED

LIST A
LIST B
LIST C
ETHIOBATT
MALICOY
TUNBATT



COL J. ARP, DCOS OPS, 11186

UNCLASSIFIED