

UNAMIR

PROGRESS REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL  
TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL

[8 JUNE - 30 NOV 1994]

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**D R A F T**

**PROGRESS REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS  
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA**

**I. INTRODUCTION**

1. Since my last report dated 6 October 1994 (S/1994/1133), on the situation in Rwanda, and especially on progress made by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in the discharge of its mandate, I reported to the Security Council on .... November (S/1994/....) on the specific aspect of security in refugee camps in response to a wish expressed by the Council in its presidential statement of 14 October (S/PRST/1994/59). Furthermore, the Secretariat has provided the Council with oral updates on relevant developments, including information on the deployment and activities of the expanded UNAMIR, the humanitarian situation, the safety of populations at risk, efforts to expedite the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons and progress towards national reconciliation.

2. The present report, which provides a further update on the situation in Rwanda, and especially on developments relating to the work of UNAMIR, is submitted in connection with the Security Council's review of the Mission's mandate which, in accordance with operative paragraph 3 of resolution 925 (1994), ends on 9 December 1994.

**II. POLITICAL ASPECTS**

3. In the period since my last report to the Council, efforts have continued at various levels and in various forms to help normalize the situation in Rwanda with a view, in particular, to realizing durable peace and security in the country. To this end, the Government, as President Bizimungu underlined in his speech before the General Assembly on ... October and reaffirmed in his briefing for members of the Security Council on ... October, has renewed its commitment to the safe return of refugees and displaced persons and to national reconciliation, two pillars on which meaningful progress towards genuine peace hinge.

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4. In its presidential statement of 14 October, the Council welcomed the Government's efforts to facilitate the return of refugees and to begin the difficult process of national reconciliation and reconstruction. My Special Representative and I have also supported as positive and constructive, the Government's assurances and commitments to that end. We have therefore, both in the course of the discussions that I had with President Bizimungu in New York in October and in my Special Representative's meetings and other efforts on the ground in Rwanda, continued to stress the importance of taking concrete measures to build on the political will thus expressed so as to create an atmosphere as well as the practical conditions for the effective implementation of the commitments undertaken.

5. The Government has continued to push ahead with the programmes and other initiatives I described in my report of 6 October, especially with respect to confidence-building and stabilization of the situation inside Rwanda. In this connection, the President, the Vice-President, the Prime Minister and other senior officials have continued to spread the Government's message of tolerance, discipline, reconciliation and respect for the rights of each citizen, during visits and mass rallies in different communities around the country. Provincial and district heads for the country's eleven "préfectures", were named recently, as the process of restoring civil administration advanced. All the new "préfets" are civilian, a development that could contribute to promoting repatriation and reconciliation by helping foster a sense of confidence, especially among refugees and internally displaced persons. As the central administration takes hold, Government policies and decisions are increasingly being promulgated nation-wide, especially over the national radio. This is also helping to increase public knowledge and understanding of the measures being taken to normalize and stabilize Rwandese society.

6. The Government has promised that it would not restrict the press and would instead actively promote freedom of expression throughout Rwanda. In this connection, the Minister of Information recently underlined the Government's determination to reform the Rwandese media so as to turn it from the instrument of hate and violence that it was especially during the civil war, into a new medium for peace and progress. The Government has therefore called on the press to support and promote its national reconciliation objective and thus help build a society in which all Rwandese can live and coexist in harmony.

7. Assistance from United Nations agencies, in particular UNICEF, as well as from other sources, has helped restore and boost the technical capacity of the national radio, even as efforts continue to set up at UNAMIR Headquarters in Kigali a United Nations broadcasting facility. We expect this facility, which would aim at providing the Rwandese public with factual and objective information on developments in or relevant to their country to become fully operational in the near future. We hope the Rwandese authorities will approve soon UNAMIR's request for formal authorization to broadcast and for a frequency allocation. Meanwhile, full-scale test transmissions lasting several hours a day commenced on 12 November, using a small 100-watt FM transmitter currently installed at the UNAMIR compound in Kigali. Through this low-power facility, broadcasts can only be received in Kigali. However, more powerful transmitters are on their way and upon their arrival and installation the United Nations will have, in Kigali, a broadcasting system capable of reaching Rwandese refugee camps in the neighbouring countries

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An experienced staff, both international and local, has been assembled to provide the necessary technical and editorial support, at least during the early phase of operations.

8. Ultimately, the success of information initiatives in Rwanda to create both stability in the country and a climate conducive to the voluntary and safe return of refugees and displaced persons will in part be determined and/or conditioned by the substance and implementation of Government policies on repatriation and reconciliation. On 7 November, on the occasion of the commemoration of the 17<sup>th</sup> African Information Day, the Rwandese Minister of Information, who is also the Government Spokesman, outlined the official position on these issues, highlighting the Government's appeal to all Rwandese refugees to leave the perilous and precarious conditions in refugee camps behind and to return home in safety and dignity. In this connection, he stressed the Government's firm resolve to protect the homes and property of each citizen and to distribute land to new returnees so as to facilitate and help ensure their proper and orderly resettlement. Emphasizing that the wrongful occupation of another person's home and/or property is not only unacceptable but constitutes, above all, a violation of Rwanda's fundamental law, the Minister announced the Government's intention in the near future to put in place, within the framework of the Arusha Peace Accords, the relevant legislative and legal institutions and to complete the process of restoring civil administration by appointing communal and other local leaders.

9. It is clear that growing reports of extra-judicial actions on the part of Government forces, including summary executions, have undermined repatriation and reconciliation efforts. The Government has vigorously denied that it practises a policy of revenge and reprisal. While acknowledging individual and isolated cases of vengeful violence, including killings, by RPA soldiers, senior officials, including the President who has publicly regretted and condemned such acts, categorically refute reports that they are widespread or systematic. These officials recognize that thousands of Rwandese have been put in prison since the Government was formed in July, but they explain that those held are under detention to be tried for involvement in massacres and other atrocities. The authorities have also continued to assure my Special Representative that once identified, perpetrators of extra-judicial or reprisal acts are punished. I also welcome the speed with which the Government responded to allegations of systematic killings and other grave violations of human rights by its forces and for the cooperation that it extended to the Commission of Experts and to the Special Rapporteur in their investigation of these reports. The United Nations is following this matter closely, especially in the light of persisting allegations. I expect to receive the results of the investigations soon and will promptly inform the Council accordingly.

10. At the same time, as I have already reported to the Council, there is overwhelming evidence that acts of violence and intimidation appear to be on the increase in the refugee camps, especially those in Zaire where armed militia elements and members of the former Rwandese Government Forces (RGF) have inter-mingled with the mainstream refugee population. The growing violence, which threatens not only repatriation efforts but also the lives of refugees, relief workers and officials of receiving countries operating in the camps, must be addressed as a matter of utmost importance and urgency and I look forward to the Council's consideration of the proposals and recommendations I recently submitted to it on this issue. In the meantime, I

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would like to commend once again the dedicated efforts of relief workers operating under such risky conditions as well as the generosity and hospitality of the receiving countries for welcoming, hosting and helping to protect the refugees. Effective and prompt action needs to be taken to ensure that the compassion and caring which I appeal to the international community to continue to extend to Rwandese refugees is not misused as a cover to protect human rights violations or to otherwise undercut the vital non-partisan humanitarian objectives which such assistance seeks to promote.

11. Within Rwanda itself, practical efforts have continued with a view to stabilizing the country. As generally agreed, a return to normality could help attract refugees and displaced persons back to their homes and also re-establish the country's capacity to re-absorb and resettle returnees. Emphasis, in this connection, remains directed at the restoration of civil administration and the reconstruction of the country's social and economic infrastructure, but the lack of adequate resources, especially financial means, has severely restricted progress. This critical lack of funds has also created new concerns and problems, especially in the area of public security, thus further compounding an already difficult situation and distracting attention from the urgent tasks of repatriation and reconciliation. As banditry, armed robberies and other incidents of criminal violence, some of them reportedly carried out by RPA soldiers, have escalated, especially in Kigali, there is growing concern that the Government's continued inability to pay the salaries of state employees, in particular members of the armed forces, and to re-establish a credible and effective judiciary system, could have a devastating impact and seriously compromise its ability to maintain or ensure public order. UNAMIR and other United Nations personnel and especially property, have also been affected by the growing insecurity. Recent official pronouncements, including statements in early November by the Vice-President and Minister of Defence, Maj. Gen. Paul Kagame, in which he publicly condemned criminal acts and other wrong doing by some RPA troops and appealed for renewed discipline within the military, could indicate both the Government's acknowledgement of the seriousness of the threat posed and its resolve to try to contain it.

12. A significant even if modest first step towards giving the Government a credible public security force was taken recently when 102 "gendarmes", the first group of the estimated 6,000 police forces the Government says it needs, completed an intensive two-month training programme organized with the assistance of UNAMIR's civilian police (CIVPOL) component. At a passing out ceremony for the 102 gendarmes on 5 November, in Kigali, the Vice-President and Defence Minister, Maj. Gen. Paul Kagame, expressed his Government's gratitude to UNAMIR for helping to stabilize the internal situation in Rwanda through its assistance for the training and re-establishment of a police force. Although UNAMIR's support in this vital sector has continued, it is evident that with its limited manpower and financial resources, the Mission alone cannot, in the foreseeable future, meet all of Rwanda's target requirements.

13. In the course of a recent trip to Europe to participate in the meeting I convened in Geneva on 8 November to consider with my senior advisers the security situation in Rwandese refugee camps, my Special Representative in Rwanda, Mr. Shaharyar M. Khan, also visited a number of European countries to brief them on recent developments in that country. He informed

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senior officials in Bonn, Brussels and London of the continuing humanitarian emergency and the growing security threat in refugee camps. He highlighted the material and financial constraints the Government encountered in its efforts to restore civil administration and begin reconstruction.

14. I welcome the Security Council's endorsement of my call to the Government of Rwanda to maintain an open dialogue with all political interest groups in Rwanda in an effort to achieve genuine reconciliation among all elements of the society, within the frame of reference of the Arusha Peace Agreement. I have, through my Special Representative, reiterated my call to the Government, firmly convinced that only a peaceful political approach that genuinely seeks to embrace the citizenry as a whole, can lead to lasting peace in Rwanda. UNAMIR has deployed political information officers in the six sectors of the country to support the efforts of my Special Representative aimed at assisting the process of restoring civil administration, national reconciliation and peace.

### III. HUMAN RIGHTS ASPECTS

15. The various United Nations human rights mechanisms engaged in the Rwandese situation continued to be active during the period under review. The Special Rapporteur visited Rwanda from 15 to 21 October and also travelled to Tanzania and Zaire. The Commission of Experts, on its part, visited Rwanda from 29 October to 6 November. The human rights field operation in Rwanda launched by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights continued to deploy human rights monitors around the country. By 15 November, about 50 of a planned total of some 147 monitors had arrived in Rwanda.

16. The Special Rapporteur and the Commission of Experts have been pursuing their primary tasks as defined by their respective mandates. With respect to the Commission, it is, in accordance with Security Council resolution 935 (1994), expected to submit its final report to me by 30 November 1994. I also expect to receive a report from the Special Rapporteur and the Commission on their investigations of alleged systematic killings of members of the majority community by RPA forces.

17. It is increasingly recognized that the mere presence and visibility of United Nations human rights personnel has a positive far-reaching effect in the communities where they are deployed, especially as a deterrent against further human rights violations. I therefore share the Security Council's view, reflected in its presidential statement of 14 October, that human rights monitors and their speedy deployment would help foster a climate of confidence and contribute to creating a more secure environment which in turn could encourage refugees to return to their homes in Rwanda. I am grateful for the voluntary contributions that have enabled the United Nations to deploy a third of its estimated target of 147 monitors and I appeal to the international community for sustained and increased assistance to enable the full deployment of the operation and the effective discharge of its important mission in this very complex situation.

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#### IV. INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA

18. With the adoption, on 8 November, of resolution 955 (1994), the Security Council has paved the way for the establishment of the International Tribunal for Rwanda. The Tribunal, originally requested by the Government of Rwanda, is meant to ensure that the perpetrators of genocide and other grave violations of international humanitarian law in the recent conflict are not only brought to justice but that such justice is administered in an impartial manner.

19. It is vital for the international community, as well as for Rwanda, that such justice is administered effectively and as speedily as possible in order to help deter further violations. I therefore intend, as requested by the Council, to pursue, with all the urgency required, the necessary practical arrangements for the effective functioning of the International Tribunal, particularly as regards arrangements for the nomination and election of judges, the appointment of support and administrative staff as well as recommendations of possible locations for the seat of the Tribunal. I am confident that Member States and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations will respond to the Security Council's appeal for contributions, including funds, equipment, staff and other services, to ensure the smooth establishment and functioning of the Tribunal.

20. The Government of Rwanda has indicated its readiness to cooperate fully with the Tribunal. I welcome this assurance as such cooperation would be indispensable in several aspects, particularly with regard to access to evidence and witnesses for the impending trials. Irrespective of the eventual location of the seat of the Tribunal, it is evident that a large portion of its work will have to be done in Rwanda. In this connection, I join the Security Council in appealing to the international community to extend support to Rwanda's efforts to re-establish its judicial system and institutions which are currently nowhere near recovering from the devastation of the civil war. Not only would such assistance help ensure that the Government has the machinery and resources to provide the cooperation and substantive support without which the International Tribunal cannot succeed in its work, it would also contribute to the broader, ongoing effort to restore normality to Rwanda.

21. The horrific human rights atrocities that Rwanda witnessed recently contributed significantly to the convulsions and trauma that continue to hound and polarize the country. I therefore share the Council's belief that the establishment of the International Tribunal will contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace as well as help ensure that such atrocities are effectively redressed.

#### V. MILITARY ASPECTS

22. Since I last reported to the Security Council in October, UNAMIR not only has reached but exceeded its full strength of 5,500 troops authorized under the Council's resolution 918 of 17 May 1994. As at 15 November, following the deployment earlier in the month of an advance unit of the Indian battalion and of additional elements of the remainder of the Zambian battalion, the total UNAMIR force stood at 5,918, deployed as follows:

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Sector 1 (North East with headquarters at Byumba). The deployment of the 331 - strong Nigerian Independent Company is now complete although the contingent is still awaiting the arrival of its armoured vehicles. 40 military observers (MILOBs) are currently deployed throughout the sector.

Sector 2 (South East with headquarters at Kibungo). In addition to 43 MILOBs, Sector 2 continues to be served only by the 2 ad hoc platoon groups from Ghana and Nigerian. The intention is to reinforce the sector with a Ghanaian Company by end November, and depending on the security situation in Sector 4, to subsequently reinforce to battalion strength.

Sector 3 (South with headquarters at Gitarama). Until the recent deployment of the 200-strong Mali independent company, the in-place Malawi company of 165 all ranks was over-committed. The deployment of the 2 companies in Sector 3 has facilitated more effective coverage, although operations are restricted due to a continuing shortage of patrol vehicles. 43 MILOBs also continue to patrol the Sector.

Sector 4 (South West). Sector 4A (with headquarters at Gikongoro) has been subdivided to accommodate progressive reinforcement by the Zambian Battalion (currently 324 ranks). By 30 November, Sector 4A will be occupied by 2 battalions (less one company) in response to the increasing instability, especially in the displaced persons camps in the area. The "Franco-African" Battalion (487 ranks) and the Ethiopian Battalion (801 ranks) continue to conduct operations in Sectors 4B (Kibuye) and 4C (Cyangugu) respectively. Approximately 80 MILOBs are also located in Sector 4.

Sector 5 (North West with headquarters at Gisenyi). Occupation of Sector 5 by the 826-strong Tunisian Battalion is now complete.

Sector 6 (Kigali). The advance party of 319 all ranks of the Indian Contingent deployed on 10 November 1994. Deployment is expected to be completed by 16 November 1994. The contingent will fulfil the increasing security requirement in Kigali City as the logistic capability of UNAMIR develops. The sector remains co-occupied by Force Headquarters, Military Observer Group Headquarters and specialist units for communications, logistics and medical support from Canada, United Kingdom and Australia.

23. As members of the Council are aware, the build-up of the UNAMIR force has, regrettably, been rather irregular. This has affected its efficiency. Apart from the well-known problem, now behind us, of long delays in the arrival of contingents, the force still suffers from inadequate availability of equipment and logistics support, including transportation and communications items, ballistic helmets, flak jackets, tents and night vision facilities. The force's fragile equipment and logistics base is likely to weaken even further when the British and Canadian contingents withdraw, as planned, unless measures are put in place soon to equip and support the force adequately.

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24. Apart from its demoralizing effect on the troops, the shortage of equipment and logistics support has also impaired the full and timely implementation of the mandate provided under resolutions 918 and 925. In particular, inadequate air assets and other transportation equipment has restricted UNAMIR's ability to respond fully and speedily to demands associated with its mandated tasks, especially in the areas of security, protection and transportation.

25. During the period under review, the UNAMIR force continued to assist in transporting returnees and internally displaced Rwandese who expressed a wish to return to their homes and farms, while maintaining protection for populations at risk in various communities and camps in Rwanda. Against the background of escalating incidents of armed confrontations involving RPA elements and local residents, especially in internally displaced person camps, and in view of the possibility of armed insurgency and infiltration, in particular from refugee camps in Goma and Bukavu, UNAMIR troops and observers have intensified their monitoring, observation and patrol duties. The increased pace follows several recent violent incidents, especially in the South-West. On 10 November, 7 displaced persons died and several others were wounded when some RPA elements opened fire and burnt a camp for internally displaced Rwandese in Musange. A further 7 deaths were reported as a result of an RPA confrontation with local residents in Musebeya, the following day. Earlier in the month, 36 people, many of them children, were massacred by unknown assailants at Rutagara, near Gisenyi, in the North-West.

26. The UNAMIR force has also continued to escort humanitarian relief convoys and to assist in the distribution of supplies as well as accompany United Nations human rights monitors and political information officers being deployed in the various sectors. Additional assistance has been provided by the force in the form, *inter alia*, of medical attention for needy Rwandese, bridge repairs and mine clearance. During a recent operation carried out by a unit of the British contingent to repair a bridge about 10 kms from Kigali, a mine exploded injuring two of the British troops, Cpl. Hill and Sapper Copsey, one of them seriously. I would like to convey my deepest sympathies to the injured soldiers and their families and to commend them for their dedicated service in the cause of peace in Rwanda.

27. While details are as yet sketchy as the situation continues to evolve, there is evidence that the former RGF and the RPA are actively recruiting and training new troops, with the former RGF drawing recruits mainly from refugee camps, especially those in Zaire. The former RGF and their armed militia allies, also operating from refugee camps, appear to be intensifying their propaganda campaign against the new Government and in particular the RPA. It is difficult at this stage to estimate the strength of former RGF and RPA forces. Nevertheless, their ongoing activities, including recruitment, training and propaganda would seem to indicate that they are preparing for the possibility of resumed confrontations.

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## VI. CIVILIAN POLICE

28. The civilian police (CIVPOL) component of UNAMIR has, during the period since my last report, concentrated on training activities, to respond to the realities on the ground.

29. In response to a Government request for UNAMIR's assistance in the re-establishment of a police force for Rwanda, CIVPOL is actively engaged in the training of candidates nominated by the Government to serve in the two services that make up Rwanda's police structure, namely the "Gendarmerie Nationale" and the "Police Communale". In this connection, and as mentioned earlier (para. 12 above), CIVPOL has already helped train 102 gendarmes (99 cadets and 3 instructors) who graduated on 5 November and are already deployed around the country. During a sixteen-week intensive programme beginning on 21 November, CIVPOL envisages the training of a further 300 cadets. Subsequently, starting on 3 April 1995, 100 cadets, chosen from those already trained, will undergo a further twelve-week intensive course to qualify as future instructors.

30. CIVPOL believes that it is desirable and feasible to organize officer training programmes alongside the cadet training programmes already started. However, in its view, such officer training programmes require human and material resources which currently are not available at UNAMIR.

31. Arrangements are under way to begin the training of communal police ("Police Communale") units in the near future. A programme for that purpose has been elaborated by CIVPOL and submitted to the Government.

32. The training programmes for the gendarmes and the communal police cover both theoretical and practical aspects of police work and include also courses on human rights, to be taught by United Nations human rights monitors already deployed in Rwanda.

33. CIVPOL is also involved in efforts to restore and reform the penal system within the framework of the implementation of the Rwanda Emergency Normalization Plan which outlines the priority areas for which both technical and financial assistance are required. In this connection and following a request from the judicial authorities concerned, CIVPOL visited Kigali prison during the first week of November to assess the situation. CIVPOL found that that facility, originally built for 2000 inmates, held, as at 8 November, 5040 including 111 women, 35 of them with feeding babies, and 95 children between the ages of 10 and 14. CIVPOL was informed that the average mortality rate is currently 5 a day. CIVPOL further understands that similar conditions prevail in the other two prisons operating in the country, in the cities of Butare and Gitarama. It therefore concludes that the main requirements for the effective restoration of Rwanda's prisons are in the areas of accommodation, health, sanitation, bedding, clothing and security.

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34. As at 15 November, 80 of the 90 police observers authorized for UNAMIR were deployed. CIVPOL is also assisted by 6 UNAMIR military observers who are involved in the training of gendarmes. In order to meet its expanding responsibilities, CIVPOL requires additional French-speaking observers (only 25 of the 80 observers already deployed are French-speaking) as well as financial, material and logistic support, in particular transportation and communications equipment.

#### **VII. HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS**

To be provided by UNREO.

#### **VIII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS**

To be provided by ADMINISTRATION.

#### **IX. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

As I said in my last progress report to the Security Council nearly two months ago, there are signs that the worst may now be behind us and that Rwanda may indeed slowly but steadily be returning to more stable and normal conditions. Ironically, the greatest challenge may now be to try to strike a balance between excessive optimism which could lapse the international community, and above all Rwanda, into complacency, and fatalistic despair which could prevent Rwanda and the world from taking advantage of opportunities that could lead to better days.

Clearly, the situation in Rwanda remains critical and the country continues to face daunting problems, yet I am encouraged enough by the progress that has been made to try to stabilize the situation to be cautiously optimistic about future prospects: the continuing solidarity and compassion of the international community has helped check the massive humanitarian catastrophe that threatened the lives of millions of Rwandese refugees only a few months ago and enabled UNAMIR to put in place a force for the protection and security of persons at risk, including returnees and internally displaced persons in Rwanda itself. In a move that could help deter future violations of human rights and promote peace and national reconciliation, the Security Council has recently voted to establish an International Tribunal to prosecute perpetrators of genocide and other violations of international humanitarian law during the recent conflict in the country. The Government of Rwanda, through my Special Representative, has reassured me of its resolve and determination to promote conditions and a climate conducive to safe and voluntary repatriation and national reconciliation. The Governments of the region as well as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) have intensified their efforts, both among themselves and in cooperation with the United Nations, to find durable solutions to the problems of Rwanda, especially in the regional context. These developments constitute positive achievements which should be built upon to consolidate and move the uneasy and fragile momentum forward.

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I am concerned that new threats and challenges have emerged that complicate further an already complex situation and endanger the limited progress made. This is the case particularly in the refugee camps where the creeping militarization of the camps has created a painful dilemma for the international community which must now consider whether its humanitarian support for the needy is being used to threaten the peace. The humanitarian crisis represented by the plight of the refugees and of the internally displaced persons remains, without a doubt, a matter of utmost concern to the international community. At the same time, not to act to check insecurity in the camps could threaten and undermine the very objective of our humanitarian efforts which aims at protecting refugees to ensure their safe and voluntary repatriation when the appropriate conditions emerge. I have recently submitted some concrete proposals to the Security Council on this subject and I am confident that the Council will treat this matter with the urgency and attention it deserves.

I also believe that it is important for the international community to examine closely the need for assistance for post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction in order both to stabilize and consolidate newly achieved peace and to prevent new conflicts. The efforts underway towards normalizing and stabilizing the situation inside Rwanda could, if successful, help attract refugees and displaced persons back home and thus contribute to the urgent process of national reconciliation. I appeal once again for urgent assistance, in particular financial resources to enable the Government of Rwanda, in cooperation with the United Nations and other organizations, to restore the country's social and economic infrastructure.

If the currently unsettled situation is allowed to persist, I am concerned that the pressures of residual problems and of the new threats emerging not only endanger even the small achievements that have been realized so far, but could push Rwanda backwards once again, reopening the frightening spectre of a renewed conflagration.

I therefore see a need for a concerted strategy which would help not only to consolidate, but above all, to reinforce the present momentum. I believe that through such an integrated and comprehensive approach the international community can focus more cohesively on the priority tasks that need to be addressed. In this connection, I welcome the Statement by the President of the Security Council on 14 October in which the Council stressed the importance it attaches to the role of UNAMIR. I fully share the conviction that UNAMIR's neutral and independent presence is crucial to creating conditions of security which, I continue to believe, are essential for achieving our objective for genuine peace and progress in Rwanda. I therefore feel, especially as the Mission has now reached its full strength, that UNAMIR, as the focal point of the international community's role, is firmly in place to provide the coordinated leadership to help move the overall process for peace and reconciliation forward.

Ultimately, it is the people of Rwanda themselves who are responsible for solving their problems. The international community can only assist. I therefore believe that dialogue among Rwandese as well as close cooperation and coordination on the ground with the United Nations, are indispensable for the success of any initiative to that end. In this connection, I welcome the cooperative relationship already existing between UNAMIR and the Government and people of Rwanda, and call for the continuing strengthening of such ties.

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Taking into account the progress that has been made and the challenges that remain, I would like to recommend for consideration by the Security Council the extension of UNAMIR's mandate for a further six months when the present mandate ends on 9 December 1994, and its expansion to include a good offices role in order to permit the Mission to continue to assist and to facilitate more expeditious movement towards peace and national reconciliation, including broader regional aspects, as appropriate, such as the ongoing consideration for the possible convening of an international conference to look into the problems of the subregion.

## MILITARY SITUATION

1. The military situation in Rwanda has continued to be stable, however many factors continue to create a sense of insecurity within the country, which is frustrating efforts by both UNAMIR and the BBGNU to bring normality to Rwanda. Notable among these are; lawlessness and indiscipline on the part of some RPA elements, revenge killings, activities of agitators in DP Camps, activities by former government forces, and cross border incidents.
2. **Lawlessness by RPA.** Many reasons could be attributed to the lawlessness and indiscipline which seem to be prevalent in the ranks of the RPA throughout the country. Some efforts have been made by the RPA hierarchy in the direction of correcting wrong doings by the RPA, but these continue to be inadequate and the BBGNU seems to lack the authority and capability to enforce law and order in the country. Some of the reasons are as follows:
  - a. The RPA have not been paid in the last 4 months. The high standards of discipline that were prevalent in the RPA in the two months following the war have visibly slackened and RPA soldiers are frequently found drunk while carrying weapons. Some of these soldiers manning the plethora of checkpoints throughout the country frequently ask passing vehicles for a "toll" before allowing them to pass. Reports have been received that people carrying out low level cross border trading on the Burundi/Rwanda border have ceased to use the official border crossing points because the RPA stationed there intimidate them and steal their animals, farm produce and money.
  - b. Lack of finance and the necessary infrastructure for governance has contributed directly to the lawlessness of the RPA. The BBGNU lacks funds to pay its civil servants and law enforcement agencies and needs help if the security situation in the country is not to deteriorate any further.
  - c. RPA perceives Displaced Peoples Camps as havens for opponents of the RPA/BBGNU and have on a number of occasions attempted or employed high handed methods to persuade the population of these camps to return home. Violence inevitably has accompanied these clumsy attempts and civilian casualties have been reported on each occasion. These forcible methods have alienated the RPA from the population of the camps and made



## 6. Activities by Former Rwandan Government Forces (FRGF). The FRGF remain

from the camp. names of NGOs whom they intended to kill. The NGOs were forced to withdraw victorious Interahamwe militia faction produced a hit list containing the to intervene. After a battle for control of the Katale camp, in Goma, the camp in the Goma area of Zaire and the NGOs and UNAMIR are currently powerless improve the situation. There are 6-8 people murdered every night in Mugunga several NGOs threatening to abandon their relief efforts if nothing is done to unstable security situation in the camps in Zaire and Tanzania has led to are aimed at killing the witnesses to and survivors of the genocide. The in Burundi aimed at killing Tutsi and moderate Hutu families. These attacks attacks launched from within the DP camps in Rwanda and from across the border who advocate the return to their home communes. There have been a number of them. Murders are violent and frequent with the victims usually being those conspired to encourage the lawless conditions endured by those who live in control the distribution of food throughout the camps and it is they who have their militia berets and insignia. It is the leaders of the militias who are in control of the vast majority of DP and refugee camps and openly wear

## 5. Activities of Agitators in Camps. The militias of the former regime

camps to remain there. the refugee and DP camps strengthening the resolve of those living in the remain unknown. Stories of murder and retribution circulate freely through those arrested have been taken to undisclosed locations and their whereabouts reassure the local population of the good intentions of the RPA. Many of for no declared reason. This is endemic in Sectors 3 and 4 and does little to trust the RPA. There have been numerous incidents of the RPA arresting people systematic slaughter of Hutus. However, the Hutu population in DP camps do not their families there is nothing to suggest that the RPA is taking part in killed people whom they believe to be responsible for the deaths of members of no evidence can be found. Although a number of RPA soldiers have undoubtedly these acts under the eyes of the international community with such skill that place in April. Rumours abound that some elements of the RPA are conducting campaign of revenge killings by the RPA to avenge the genocide which took

## 3. Revenge Killings. To date there has been no evidence of a coordinated

are afraid of the much rumoured RPA revenge killings. wanting them to return to their homes. They see safety in numbers and the population mistrustful and fearful of the motives of the RPA for

based in the same areas as the refugee population from which they are drawn; namely Goma and Bukavu (in Zaire) and Ngara (in Tanzania). They are assessed to have approximately 30,000 men in the Goma and Bukavu areas and another 12,000 in the Ngara area. Numbers are difficult to predict with any degree of accuracy as they continue to recruit from the camps. Military training is carried out in and around the areas of the camps and there have been several reports that the FRGF have infiltrated men dressed in civilian clothes into the DP camps in the South Western portion of UNAMIR AOR to train the militia. FRGF troops are carrying out reconnaissance of the Zaire/Rwanda border area and monitoring all UNAMIR radio transmissions.

7. Cross Border Incidents. In the most significant incident yet, a cross border raid was launched in the North of Rwanda on 30 October. A total of 36 people were killed in the raid which involved 3 houses, separated by some distance, being attacked simultaneously. It is suspected that the RGF was responsible. The RPA has responded by creating a 1 km buffer zone along the border and reinforcing positions in the area. Local people are allowed to work their fields in the buffer zone during the day and then must return to homes behind the RPA defensive positions at night. FRGF are mounting a constant propaganda campaign to maintain the destabilisation of the area by giving dates for their re-invasion of the country. Both the RPA and FRGF continue to recruit new soldiers to their respective causes. The new recruits to the FRGF are indoctrinated with an intense hatred for the Tutsis and are driven by the desire to recapture their homeland. Neither side views the conflict as over and both appear to be training for the day when the FRGF begins its campaign to recapture Rwanda.

8. In my last report, I predicted a loss of momentum in the reestablishment of security in RWANDA unless reinforcement of UNAMIR continued at a steady rate. I am pleased to report to the Council that troop deployment is nearing (now) completion (complete) with the arrival of the Zambian contingent's main body expected on 26 Nov 94.

9. The reintegration of RPA forces into the South West of the country has precipitated a deterioration of the security situation. RPA activity in this area has been relatively intense and reports of murder, theft and violent clashes with displaced persons are frequent. The denial on the part of the RPA of particular areas to UNAMIR troops has hampered operations. The deteriorating security situation in the South West has forced UNAMIR to concentrate forces there. As a result, UNAMIR's influence and supervision in

the South East is yet to be fully achieved.

10. The current troop deployment is as follows:

Sector 1 (North East). The deployment of the 331 strong Nigerian Independent Company is now complete although the contingent is still awaiting the arrival of its armoured vehicles. UNMOs are currently deployed throughout the Sector.

Sector 2 (South East). In addition to the UNMOs, Sector 2 continues to be occupied only by the 2 ad hoc platoon groups from Ghana and Nigerian. The intention is to reinforce the sector with a Ghanaian Company by end November, and depending on the security situation in Sector 4, to subsequently reinforce to battalion strength.

Sector 3 (South). Until the recent deployment of the 200 strong Mali independent company, the in-place Malawi company of 165 all ranks was over-committed. The deployment of the 2 companies in Sector 3 has facilitated more effective coverage, although operations are restricted due to a continuing shortage of patrol vehicles. UNMOs also continue to patrol the Sector.

Sector 4 (South West). Sector 4A has been subdivided to accommodate progressive reinforcement by the Zambian Battalion (currently 324 ranks). By 30 November, Sector 4A will be occupied by 2 battalions (less one company) in response to the increasing instability emanating from the DP camps. The Franco African Battalion (487 ranks) and the Ethiopian Battalion (801 ranks) continue to conduct operations in Sectors 4B and 4C respectively. Approximately 80 UNMOs are also located in Sector 4.

Sector 5 (North West). Occupation of Sector 5 by the 826 strong Tunisian Battalion is now complete. 2 Field Ambulance (Cda) has withdrawn and UNMOs augment Tunbatt operations.

Sector 6 (Kigali). The advance party of 319 all ranks of the Indian Contingent deployed on 10 November 1994. Deployment is expected to be completed by 16 November 1994. The contingent will fulfil the increasing security requirement in Kigali City as the logistic capability of UNAMIR develops. The Sector remains co-occupied by Force Headquarters, Military Observer Group Headquarters and specialist units for communications, logistics and medical support from Canada, United Kingdom and Australia.

The tasks allocated to troops remain unchanged since my last report.

11. Although a progressive return to normality is still in evidence, the overall security situation is tenuous. Tension between UNAMIR troops and the RPA reduce the opportunity to create a cooperative approach to the provision of protection and security and deny efforts to shift the emphasis to the support of humanitarian aid.

12. Accordingly, the UNAMIR concept of operations remains relatively unchanged. Early realization of significant troop reductions appears unlikely unless programs to restore Rwanda are accelerated. To this end, considerable effort is being made to progress the spirit of Operation RONDAVAL and to identify the practical options which would effectively provide support to proposed operations in Zaire.

13. Operation RONDAVAL is a strategic plan for the partial restoration of Rwanda. It seeks to compliment the existing Emergency Normalization Plan by recognizing the fundamental requirement to establish security conditions in Rwanda which will build confidence among the refugees. Moreover, Operation RONDAVAL identifies the requirement for government funding, equitable land distribution and the imperative of UN, BBGNU, RPA and NGO cooperation. It is expected that a concurrent operation in Zaire would add impetus to Operation RONDAVAL.

#### BRIT STAFF SHOPPING LIST

24 x Blue Towel Rolls

1 x Case Toilet Rolls

3 x Boxes AA Batteries (72 or so)

1 x Box Pusser's Torch Batteries (24 or so)

2 x Tilly Lamps

4 x 12 Packs Candles

5 x Litre Washing up Liquid

20 Litre Clothes Powder/Liquid

Small sized pots, pans (about 4 if possible)

Cooking utensils (flip thingy/spoons/ladel)

Set crockery

Set Cutlery

1 x Broom

1 x Mop

3 x Buckets

2 x Rolls Para cord

3 x rolls Black/Green Bodge Tape

12 x Squeezy Bottles Mozzy Rep

Cleaning materials (J Cloths/Sponges/scouring powder/Brasso etc)

Office supplies:

- 6 x A4 and 6 x A5 Memo pads
- 12 x HMSO secretary notebooks
- 12 x packs Post-it notes
- 12 x black pens

Med supplies:

- Malaria pills for 6 for 3 months
- First aid kit for home use (Band aids/antiseptic/bandages/eye flush/scalpels etc, aspirin, brufin, antihistamine for bites.

Food


- any tinned food
- 6 x trays eggs
- Breakfast cereal
- any cases bottled water
- any compo rations



UNAMIR - MINUAR

**INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM**

To: Executive Director 1000.7(DFC)/G/10

From: DFC/COS/CMO  
Brig Gen HK Anyidoho 

Date: 11<sup>th</sup> November, 1994

Subject: **PROGRESS REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL  
TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON UNAMIR**

1. I refer to your inter office memorandum of 10th November 1994 on the above topic and have the following points to offer.

**INTRODUCTION**

2. UNAMIR's mandate under Security Council Resolutions 918 and 925 of 17 May and 8th June respectively expanded the UNAMIR troop level from 270 to 5,500 to include, the full strength of mechanized battalions, observers and other elements and requested the mission among other things to ensure the following:

- a. Take appropriate steps to ensure security and safety of the operation and personnel engaged in the operation.
- b. To intensify humanitarian assistance to the population.
- c. To ensure the safety of the population at risk.
- d. Security and protection of displaced persons refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda.
- e. To provide security and support for the distribution of relief and humanitarian relief operations.

The points enumerated in para 2 (a - e) summarize what the force component of UNAMIR is basically concerned with.

3. Since the submission of the last Secretary General's report to the Security Council on 6 Oct 94, the following have been the developments on the military front of UNAMIR.

- a. **Troop Deployment.** UNAMIR troop deployment has accelerated after quite a stall. The Tunisian battalion complete of 800 all ranks has deployed to Sector 5 (RUHENGIRI/GISENYI), the Nigerian company of 331 all ranks has deployed to Sector 1 - (BYUMBA), MALI company of 200 all



ranks has deployed to Sector 3 North (GITARAMA/MASANGO/NTOGWE) areas, Zambian battalion of 800 men has just started deployment to Sector 4A North after a long delay and elements of Ghana battalion and Nigerian company have deployed to Sector 2 - REMERA, KIBUNGO and RUSUMO areas. At a glance, the entire troop deployment of formed troops is as follows:

(1)	Sector 1 - North East	-	Nicoy - 331
(2)	Sector 2 - South East	-	Ghana/Nigeria a platoon each.
(3)	Sector 3 - South	-	Malawi/Mali Coy - 165/200
(4)	Sector 4A - South West	-	GHANBATT - 816
(5)	Sector 4A - South West	-	ZAMBATT - 324
(6)	Sector 4B - South West	-	FRANCO AFRICAN BATTALION - 487
(7)	Sector 4C - South West	-	ETHIOBATT - 801
(8)	Sector 5 - North West	-	TUNBATT - 826
(9)	Sector 6 - KIGALI City	-	Indian Contingent
(10)	Australia	-	Medical Support - 302
(11)	UK	-	Engineering/Logistics Medical - 527
(12)	Canada	-	Communication Support - 378

Military observers are at full strength of 320 including those on loan to us from other missions.

4. As at now the troop strength is 5,476. This figure is slightly below the authorized strength of 5,500. However when INDBATT and ZAMBATT fully deploy, the force level would have been exceeded by 933. There have been correspondences about the circumstances leading to the over establishment as at now. However, as the BRITCON begins to withdraw this month to be followed by CANSIGS in January, there will be a level of reduction in the force strength to 5,528 by the end of January 1995 showing only an increase of 28 over and above the authorized of 5,500.

#### PROBLEMS OF DEPLOYMENT

5. The build up of the force has been very irregular and therefore inefficient. Apart from delays in arrival of contingents, there is still not enough equipment and stores for the formed troops. Vehicles are still in short supply, there are no tents, night vision and communication equipment. Logistics support is shaky and troops personal gear such as ballistic helmets and flak jackets are still yet to arrive. It must be borne in mind that promises have been made by the UN to provide these items to the mainly African contingents. The half-hearted approach to equipping the troops has been very demoralizing. The troops are only doing the best to contain the situation. As the BRITCON and CANSIGS prepare to leave the mission and leaving their roles for a civilian contractor the military will certainly be plagued with even more problems.

#### DIFFICULTIES IN IMPLEMENTATION OF UNAMIR MANDATE

6. As stated above, the major problems for the force component have been in the area of logistics support. If vehicles, radios, tents, night vision equipment, basic gear such as flak jackets and ballistic helmets are provided for the troops their morale will improve and efficiency will be enhanced a great deal. As soldiers, they are making do with whatever is available but they could certainly do more if adequately supported. Another area of concern is RPA restriction on movement of UNAMIR troops. There have been many instances when RPA denied troops and MILOBS access to areas that they wished to reach for purposes of investigation. We accordingly forwarded protest letters to the Minister of Defence for the issues to be addressed. We are in the process of establishing routine principal officers weekly meetings with the RPA during which we hope to resolve issues of common concern.

#### ACHIEVEMENTS

7. The UNAMIR force has continued to convey the internal displaced people to their homes on voluntary basis whilst giving protection to those who feel threatened both in their communities and in the displaced peoples camps. Through intensive patrols, there have been accurate reporting on activities of the RPA, the former government forces and the militias. Repair work has been carried out on a number of bridges despite the dangers involved and in conjunction with UN agencies and NGOs, medical support has continued to be provided to the civilian population. In some of the Sectors, contingents have been repairing school blocks through the employment of their inherent artisans and have been helping considerably in distribution of relief aid. UNAMIR troops have also been protecting RPA soldiers from threats of locals whilst offering protection to those localities that feel threatened by RPA, militias or elements of former RGF. Our meagre resources have continued to be willingly shared with the Rwandese Government authorities in terms of air and road transportation where necessary.

#### CURRENT THREAT

8. It is now a common knowledge that insurgency is developing out of the refugee camps in GOMA and BUKAVU both in the North and South KIVU provinces of Zaire.

The situation in the refugee camps is therefore the greatest threat currently to the success of UNAMIR mandate. The situation must be sorted out as quickly as possible else the ripples or quake of an explosion in those camps will cause a further explosion in an unstable situation already existing in Rwanda. Several solutions have been advanced by UNAMIR and other organizations. What is required now is the will power to mount a quick operation to bring the situation under control. It is hoped that the many discussions going on after the submission of the Technical Report will eventually arrived at more practicable solutions to the problem.

#### **RWANDESE PATRIOTIC ARMY (RPA)**

9. Immediately connected with the insecurity situation in the refugee camps in Zaire is the attitude of the RPA in Rwanda. Quite a number of the RPA soldiers are taking the laws into their own hands and committing atrocities. They must be brought under control by the Rwandese government if those in the refugees camps in Zaire and Tanzania are to be encouraged to return. For example, peoples homes and farmlands have been forcibly occupied. UNAMIR vehicles have been seized at gun points. This situation is also a threat to security.

#### **TROOP LEVEL**

10. The current troop level, which begins self-adjusting as the BRITCON begins to pull out soon (17 Nov 94) followed by (CANSIGS) in January, must be retained as we observe developments in the country as a whole. We require the current strength of military observers and formed troops to be able to monitor the entire country since more and more NGOs and Human Rights depend upon us for security in the performance of their duties. French speaking countries should be encouraged to participate in the UNAMIR force for the purpose of balance.

#### **CONCEPT OF OPERATION**

11. We do not see any significant change in the military concept of operation as presently employed in terms of patrolling, monitoring, escorting, provision of guards at vulnerable points, provision of humanitarian assistance, protection of civilians at risk etc. By and large, the internal situation in Rwanda will be dictated by how well the International Community takes care of the situation in the refugee camps in Tanzania and Zaire in particular.

#### **CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS**

12. The Broad Based Government of National Unity (BBGNU) is making genuine efforts to rebuild a nation but it has problems of finance, insecurity and property rights. UNAMIR has written so many reports and presented many verbal requests on the need for the International Community to come to the aid of Rwandese Government. Unless something is done quickly, the acts of banditry and vandalism developing now will gather momentum and internal insecurity will assume unacceptable dimension which will

in turn exacerbate the already fragile situation. If confidence must not be eroded in BBGNU, there is the need for the World Community to come to the aid of Rwanda else food aid and other material assistance being provided now will begin to mean nothing to the people in the long run.

13. UNAMIR on its own needs a strong logistics base with dedicated air assets if our re-action time must be quick and adequately supported.

DR KATBIA

*Per order  
your order*

Attached please find what I have  
been able to prepare in a hurry.  
I have rather a busy weekend with  
the visiting Ghemians and in addition  
I have to be at the MUBS  
Seminar tomorrow at Gikongore  
I hope the points here serve  
a useful purpose or at least  
contribute what force and will  
send to you. *11/11/93 JFC*



## UNAMIR - MINUAR

**To:** Mr. Abdul H. Kabia  
Executive Director

**Date:** Kigali, 14-11-94

**From:** Cheick Oumar Diarra, Colonel  
CIVPOL Commissioner

**Ref:** CIVPOL/MEMO/18/94

**Subject:** CIVPOL Contribution to Progress Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on UNAMIR

- ....
1. Please find attached a note on CIVPOL contribution to Progress Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on UNAMIR.
  2. Regards.

Copy to: Mr. Sammy Kum Buo  
Political Adviser

### Review of CIVPOL activities

As specified in the preliminary report from the Secretary General on the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (S/1994/1333 date 6 October 1994) the activities of the Civilian police has modified its mission to keep pace with the changing situation in Rwanda.

Thus in addition to monitoring the activities of the National Gendarmerie, local police, and civilian authorities as far as human rights violations are concerned, the Civilian Police (CIVPOL) will also aid the Rwandan government in developing a new National Gendarmerie and a new local police through the training of personnel for these 2 (two) police corps. CIVPOL will also aid the military observers and troops in the areas relative to police work.

The training of gendarmes constitutes one of the priorities of the new government so that it may quickly get a handle on the problems of public safety and human rights violations in the country and make the criminal investigative police more efficient. The authorities have renewed this interest on numerous occasions. Given the government's urgent and great need for the training of 6,000 (six thousand) elements in the National Gendarmerie - the principal police force - as provided in the Arusha Accords (Article 85, Section 3, Chapter II), CIVPOL has developed an adapted, progressive, and accelerated training program which may be implemented in the framework of the UNAMIR mandate with contributions from Rwandan. This program comprises of :

- The accelerated training of 103 (one hundred three) gendarmes in 45 days in order to urgently meet the security needs in the city of Kigali.

The graduation ceremony for the class comprised of 99 (ninety-nine) cadets and 3 (three) officers was held on 5 November 1994 in Kigali in the presence of high-ranking Rwandan officials including the Vice-President and Minister of Defense Major-General Paul KAGAME who took this occasion to express his gratitude to UNAMIR for its exemplary assistance and to solicit its continuing assistance.

These new gendarmes were recently deployed throughout the country.

- The training of 300 (three hundred) gendarmes for deployment throughout the country will last 16 (sixteen) weeks and begin as of 21 November 1994.
- The training of 100 (one hundred) instructors to be selected from a pool of 400 (four hundred) gendarmes with some former training will last 12 (twelve) weeks and begin 3 April 1994. Later these instructors will themselves assure the training of gendarme cadets in order to meet the estimated numbers required by the government.

CIVPOL estimates that it could, at the initiative of the Rwandan government, and with the help of third party countries in the framework of a bilateral or multilateral agreement, conduct a training program for gendarmerie officers. Such a training program requires human resources and materials which cannot be provided within the framework of the present



## INPUTS FOR UNAMIR REPORT

### IV. International Tribunal for Rwanda

With the adoption of resolution 955 (1994) of 8 November 1994, the Security Council has paved the way for the establishment of the International Tribunal for Rwanda. The Tribunal, originally requested by the Government of Rwanda, is meant to ensure that the perpetrators of genocide and other grave violations of international humanitarian law in the recent conflict are not only brought to justice, but that such justice is administered in an impartial manner.

It is vital for the international community, as well as for Rwanda, that such justice is administered effectively and as speedily as possible, to serve as a deterrent to any future recurrence of the atrocities we have witnessed in that country. I therefore intend to pursue all the steps necessary for the full establishment and operation of the Tribunal with the urgency required, particularly as regards arrangements for the nomination and election of the judges, and the appointment of a full complement of prosecution and administrative staff. I expect that member States will also provide all the cooperation expected of them to facilitate the establishment and effective operation of the Tribunal.

But, above all, the cooperation of the Government of Rwanda will be indispensable to the work of the Tribunal, particularly with regard to access to evidence and witnesses for the impending trials. Irrespective of where the International Tribunal may have its Headquarters, a large portion of its work will have to be done in Rwanda. The courts of Rwanda will also have to undertake some of the trials of the perpetrators of the atrocities in question under the laws of the Rwanda. In addition the assistance of Rwandese investigators may be necessary in the preparation of cases to be tried by the International Tribunal. And yet the judicial system of Rwanda is currently nowhere near recovering from the devastation of the civil war, which destroyed virtually all Government institutions.

The international community therefore has an important obligation to assist the Government of Rwanda in re-establishing its judicial system, not only as part of the effort to restore normalcy to the country, but also to ensure that the Government has the machinery and resources to provide the cooperation and substantive support without which the International Tribunal cannot succeed in its work.

### Human Rights Observers

Increasing numbers of human rights observers have been deployed throughout Rwanda over the past several months. The main function of these observers is to observe

- ① RENT
- ② S.C. is up to Europe  
campers for aid
- ③ ~~2000~~
- ④ ~~Katana~~ ~~expensive~~ ~~Govt~~ ~~get the~~ ~~work~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~the~~
- ⑤ Tribunal will  
promote national  
reconciliation
- ⑥ Help Rwanda's justice

and report on the human rights situation, particularly with regard to continuing reports of human rights violations in the country. An additional function of their deployment is the expectation that their visibility in all parts of the country may serve as a deterrent to further violations. But their most important function would be to assist in the entrenchment of a culture of respect for human rights in the country.



UNITED NATIONS  
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES  
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

11 November 1994

To: Dr. Abdul H. Kabia  
Executive Director

cc: Mr. Sammy Kum Buo

Fr: Allen Hundley *AH*  
Radio UNAMIR Project Manager

Subject: Progress Report of UNAMIR Radio

#### SUMMARY

Significant progress has been made since the last report to the Secretary General (6 October 1994) in the implementation of a United Nations-operated national radio broadcast system for Rwanda. A staff of three local radio journalists and a broadcast technician has been hired and the production of programming for the station has begun. Full scale test transmissions lasting several hours a day commenced Saturday, 12 November, using the small 100 watt FM transmitter at UNAMIR HQ. The signal can be heard clearly in almost all areas of Kigali.

However, the rest of Rwanda is not reached by UNAMIR Radio nor are the refugees in camps in surrounding countries because most of the studio and transmitting equipment has yet to arrive from the USA and UK. In addition a broadcasting license has not yet been granted by the Government of Rwanda.

The Radio Broadcast Unit is providing to the Mission on a daily basis translations of newscasts broadcast by Radio Rwanda, the official government station.

The Radio Broadcast Unit is working with the Office of the Force Commander in planning how UNAMIR Radio could assist in the event of an emergency requiring a coordinated large scale evacuation of UN personnel.

#### STAFFING

Three experienced Rwandese radio journalists were hired in mid October along with a Rwandan communications technician. All of the journalists speak and read Kinyarwanda, French, and English and are computer literate. At one time or another over the past twenty years each has worked at Radio Rwanda and for various print publications in the country. The technician comes

to UNAMIR Radio with more than ten years of experience at Rwandatel, the national telecommunications authority.

Each of these persons has demonstrated excellent competence and initiative. The programs they have produced are of remarkably high quality given the limited, semi-professional (at best) audio production equipment available and the fact that they have not worked together as a team before.

Editorial control is exercised through a system whereby all scripts are produced in Kinyarwanda and then translated into either English or French for review and approval by international staff. All informational (non-music) programming must receive written approval by UNAMIR station management before it can be broadcast.

The participation of other UN agencies and the NGO community has been solicited in the financial support of the UNAMIR Radio, in the production of radio programs, and in the providing of volunteers to help operate the station. Thus far response has been positive but limited.

#### TECHNICAL SYSTEM

Currently UNAMIR Radio can only be heard in Kigali due to the low power of the existing transmitter and the fact that more powerful transmitters have not arrived yet from the United Kingdom. The latter are currently scheduled to be shipped via UK military transport on 20 September.

A second low power transmitter is in country and was intended to be installed in a location where its signal could reach the refugee camps in Zaire. Installation has been delayed because there is currently no way to relay programming from the Kigali studio to any transmitter site along the Rwanda/Zaire border. A number of technical solutions have been considered by the Radio Project Manager and the Chief Communications Officer and his staff but none has been deemed to be feasible.

It is possible that the arrival and installation of the transmitters from the UK will solve this problem. However it is also possible that a limited amount of specialized satellite communications equipment will have to be purchased and installed to order to relay programming to some of the transmitter sites and make UNAMIR Radio fully functional nationwide. (Cf: memo to SRSG Spokesman Pierre Mehu, 18 Oct 94, and to Wellington Sargent, DKPO/NY, 29 Oct 94).

#### ISSUES REQUIRING RESOLUTION

##### 1. Staffing

In his recent visit to the Mission Mr. Medilli indicated that two hours of informational programming should be broadcast each day. Such a requirement will necessitate a radio staff of at least fifteen (3-4 international, the rest local), assuming

significant contributions in the production of programs by other UN agencies and NGO's, and a staff of at least eighteen if such participation is more limited. This is because informational radio is essentially a journalistic type of enterprise and inherently labor intensive.

At present UNAMIR Radio is awaiting final approval of its budget and staffing from UNHQ/NY.

## 2. Technical

It will be impossible to produce substantial amounts of informational programming on a daily basis until the mobile radio production van arrives from the USA or until certain audio production equipment is transferred from UNISOM. Currently only consumer-grade cassette machines and semi-professional audio mixing equipment is available to the staff. This makes the production of professional sounding programs extremely difficult and slow.

The production van was due to arrive in Kigali in early October but is still not here. The Project Manager requested the transfer of the UNISOM equipment on 13 Oct 94 and again on 8 Nov 94 but was informed that it is not yet available. (Cf. faxes to Duncan Robinson, UNISOM CCO, and response of 8 Nov 94).

In addition it will be necessary to purchase additional field recording equipment since at present the Unit has only two portable recorders and already three reporters, with perhaps several more to be added to the staff in the near future.

UNAMIR Radio was recently asked on short notice to monitor foreign news broadcasts to confirm or deny a report that large scale violence had broken out in the refugee camps in Zaire. The radio unit was able to monitor and record newscasts from several sources which appeared to undermine the credibility of the report and in fact it was later found to be grossly exaggerated. However this is an example of the kind of service UNAMIR Radio could provide to the Mission on a regular basis if additional radio monitoring and recording equipment were provided along with several local staff to man it.

The five transmitters from the UK were to begin arriving the week of 7 Nov but UNAMIR was informed on 4 Nov by BBC Transmission that they will not be shipped until 20 Nov 94. This means another two week delay in the implementation of a national broadcast system. Wellington Sargent at DPKO/NY was informed and indicated he would raise the issue with the UK's Overseas Development Agency, which is funding the equipment in question.

Observations by UNHCR Kigali for the SG's Progress  
Report on UNAMIR

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1. As noted in the previous report, the voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons is critical to the normalization of the situation in Rwanda. Violent harassment and misinformation in refugee camps, especially in Zaire and Tanzania, and increasing incidents of intimidation in the camps for internally displaced persons in the south western part of Rwanda, prevent many bona fide refugees and internally displaced persons from returning home. In addition, however, potential returnees, both in and outside the country, continue to be concerned about their physical safety during and after return, about the possibility in practice to re-possess their homes, and about the availability of food and other material needs in their home areas.
2. In order to enhance security, and to counter misinformation, it is of vital importance that UNAMIR, including its military observers, and the Human Rights Field Mission continue to be given full and unimpeded access to all parts of the country, to monitor the situation and to investigate any occurring incidents of violence and abuses of fundamental human rights.
3. UNAMIR, the Human Rights Field Mission and UNHCR, in cooperation with UNREO, have started making a concerted effort to monitor the treatment of returning refugees and displaced persons, in their home areas. The Rwandan authorities, at the national and district levels, have pledged their cooperation with this endeavour. It is anticipated that positive feedback on successful return and reintegration, through targeted information projects, will induce more people to return. The mobile Military Observers' teams are already making an important contribution to returnee monitoring. However, in order to enhance the impact of their activities, it is considered necessary to equip them with more interpreters.
4. According to relevant international agencies active in Rwanda, it is essential for the Rwandan authorities to provide more clarity, transparency and safeguards, consistent with basic human rights, regarding the procedures of arrest and detention of suspected participants in the events of earlier this year. Allegations of increasing numbers of arbitrary arrests, feed rumors in the camps, and form an important obstacle to return in the minds of bona fide refugees and displaced persons. While recognizing that the Rwandan authorities including the Ministry of Justice are seriously hampered by a lack of resources, it is believed that basic legal safeguards against arbitrary arrest need to be introduced urgently.



5. In recent weeks, the Rwandan army has on several occasions resorted to force in camps for internally displaced persons resulting in the death of at least thirty persons. At times force appears to have been used in self-defense, however on other occasions the objective has been to close the camps and to force the inhabitants to return home. This is a matter of grave concern, as the use of force is not only incompatible with basic human rights standards but also seriously undermines current efforts of confidence building and of facilitating returns in safety and dignity. The majority of the expelled IDP's have moreover fled to other camps in the area. UNAMIR, UNHCR and other agencies have voiced their strong opposition to the actions undertaken by the Rwandan army. UNAMIR has been requested to increase its presence in the camps, in order to provide more security to the displaced populations as well as to humanitarian personnel.

UNHCR Kigali  
15.11.94



To: See Distribution List

From: Abdul H. Kabia *AH Kabia*  
Executive Director

10 November 1994

Subject: Progress Report of the Secretary-General  
to the Security Council on UNAMIR



As you are aware, the present mandate of UNAMIR is scheduled to end on 9 December 1994 and the Secretary-General is expected to report to the Security Council before then on UNAMIR's activities. In this connection, Headquarters has today informed us that it expects our draft of the report to reach New York by 16 November, at the latest. Accordingly, you are kindly requested to submit your contributions covering your respective area(s) of responsibility to me, with a copy to the Political Adviser, Mr. Sammy Kum Buo, no later than **10 a.m. on Monday 14 November**.

Your contributions should cover developments since the Secretary-General's last progress report to the Security Council on 6 October 1994 (Document S/1994/1133), and reflect progress made and/or difficulties encountered in the implementation of the mandate entrusted to UNAMIR under Security Council resolutions 918 and 925 of 17 May and 8 June 1994, respectively. Your contribution should also provide any justification of any adjustments which may, in your view, be required on the current troop and personnel level, deployment or concept of operations. You may also wish to suggest concluding observations on the overall situation in Rwanda and on the assistance the international community should provide to help promote peace and stability in the country. On the basis of the contributions, the Political Adviser should prepare a first draft of the report.

Your immediate attention to this matter would be greatly appreciated.

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|---------------|----|-----------------------------------|
| <u>Action</u> | 1. | Force Commander, UNAMIR           |
|               | 2. | Director, UNREO                   |
|               | 3. | Commissioner, CIVPOL, UNAMIR      |
|               | 4. | Officer-in-Charge, Administration |
|               | 5. | UNAMIR Radar                      |
|               | 6. | Political Adviser, UNAMIR         |

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SUBJECT: Rwanda report	
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Please find attached copies, in English and French, of the Progress report of the Secretary-General which was approved last night and issued this morning as document S/1994/1133. Additional copies in both languages are being pouched to you. Regards.

for the  
information  
of the  
Security Council  
and the  
Committee  
of Experts  
on the  
Rwanda  
situation  
with  
the  
report  
of the  
Secretary-General  
S/1994/1133  
dated 7 October 1994

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**UNITED  
NATIONS****S****Security Council**Distr.  
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6 October 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

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**PROGRESS REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE  
UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA****I. INTRODUCTION**

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of paragraph 17 of Security Council resolution 925 (1994) of 8 June 1994, by which the Council requested me to report by 9 August and by 9 October 1994 on progress made by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in the discharge of its mandate, the safety of populations at risk, the humanitarian situation and progress towards a cease-fire and political reconciliation.

2. Since my last report on the situation in Rwanda, dated 3 August 1994 (S/1994/924), the Secretariat has provided the Security Council with oral updates on relevant developments, especially with regard to the Mission's support for humanitarian operations, efforts to accelerate the return of refugees, progress made in the deployment of the expanded UNAMIR and the UNAMIR take-over from Operation Turquoise.

**II. POLITICAL ASPECTS**

3. As members of the Security Council are aware, since the cease-fire declared on 18 July 1994, the fighting in Rwanda has all but ceased. The Broad-based Government of National Unity (BBGNU), installed at Kigali on 19 July, has established control over the whole of the national territory. While over two million Rwandese refugees remain in the neighbouring countries, the Government has undertaken efforts, in coordination with my Special Representative and other United Nations officials on the ground, to encourage their safe and voluntary return to Rwanda. At the same time, there is steady progress in efforts to normalize the situation inside Rwanda, with the gradual re-establishment of such basic services as water, electricity and communications facilities, particularly at Kigali. The Government has also begun to put civilian administrative structures in place at the central, provincial and local levels. My Special Representative has circulated to donor countries, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations, a Rwanda Emergency Normalization Plan, outlining the priority services for which both technical and financial assistance are required.

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4. While initial progress has been made in normalizing the situation, the Government is faced with the arduous task of rebuilding a country where the social and physical infrastructure has been almost totally destroyed and where a deep mistrust continues to prevail between the various political and ethnic groups that make up Rwandese society. The Government has a difficult road ahead in establishing safety and security for all and in creating a climate where those who have participated in the genocide can be held accountable while others rebuild their lives without fear of revenge or retribution. Furthermore, the Government suffers from a severe lack of basic resources, including cash reserves to pay the salaries of its civil servants, banks having been looted during the fighting. This is a serious problem, as civil servants and the military may turn to other means of ensuring an income.

5. In order to create stability and lasting peace in Rwanda, the Government seems to recognize the need to include all its citizenry, regardless of ethnicity, within its administrative and security structures. The President of Rwanda has assured my Special Representative that efforts are continuing to make the Government more inclusive by inviting some members of the Mouvement républicain national pour le développement (MRND), which is the only major political party not presently represented in the BEGNU, to join the Government. However, these efforts have not yet produced positive results.

6. In a further effort towards national reconciliation, members of the former Rwandese Government Forces (RGF) are being encouraged to join the new national army. These soldiers have the choice of registering at specified centres, set up by the Government, or with UNAMIR personnel deployed in the country. It seems, however, that the response to this government initiative remains limited.

7. In order to promote national reconciliation and assure the population that their civil and human rights will be respected, the Government has continued to organize mass rallies in several cities, including Ruhengeri, Kibungo, Byumba, Kibuye, Gikongoro, Cyangugu and Butare. Through these rallies, the Government has attempted to address the population's concerns with regard to such issues as property rights and the fair treatment by the Rwandese judicial system of those accused of crimes against humanity.

8. During the month of August, members of the Government made several visits to refugee camps in Zaire in an attempt to encourage the refugees to return voluntarily to their places of origin. Those efforts have caused some increase in the numbers of returning refugees. Some 360,000 refugees have returned to Rwanda spontaneously since the cease-fire on 18 July. The Government has expressed its concern about the presence in the camps of elements who continue to incite people to flee from Rwanda and to threaten those in the camps from returning to their homes and farms in Rwanda. In September, reports and preliminary investigations pointed to the possibility that refugees returning to Rwanda might have been subjected to reprisals by government troops; further investigations are in progress (paras. 14 and 15 below).

9. The misinformation propagated during and after the hostilities is considered to have been a major factor in inciting the massacres and subsequent exodus of refugees into neighbouring countries. Information remains an important element in creating both stability in the country and a climate

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conducive to the safe and voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons. Rwanda has no newspapers or television, and radio is the only medium of information. UNAMIR, in association with concerned United Nations agencies, is therefore developing a broadcasting capability in order to provide the Rwandese people with factual information on the situation in their country, to assist in explaining UNAMIR's mandate and to disseminate information on humanitarian programmes. UNAMIR is currently installing at Kigali an FM broadcasting capability with a 20-kilometre range. Additional equipment, which would enable UNAMIR broadcasts to cover the whole country, is being procured and the necessary specialists recruited. UNAMIR has also asked the Rwandese authorities for formal authorization to begin broadcasting and for a frequency allocation. I hope the Government will respond positively to those requests in the near future.

### III. HUMAN RIGHTS ASPECTS

10. A Commission of Experts was established on 26 July 1994 under Security Council resolution 935 (1994) of 1 July 1994 to examine and analyse information concerning grave violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda, including evidence of possible acts of genocide. The Commission started its work on 15 August 1994 and visited Rwanda as well as Burundi, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zaire from 29 August to 17 September. In accordance with resolution 935 (1994), the Commission is to report its findings to me by 30 November 1994. I have, however, asked the Commission to expedite the preparation of its report. Accordingly, the Commission submitted to me on 30 September a preliminary report which I have made available to the Council (S/1994/1125).

11. During the Commission's visit to Rwanda, the Government urged the Commission to conclude its work expeditiously and also urged that an international tribunal, along the lines of that organized for the former Yugoslavia, be created. The Government expressed the view that the trial of those accused of serious breaches of international humanitarian law and acts of genocide by an external impartial body would help promote peace and reconciliation among the parties and contribute to the stabilization of the situation in Rwanda. The Government has given assurances that it will make every effort to prevent summary trials, revenge executions and other acts of violence and that it will arrest those accused of such crimes.

12. On 25 May 1994, the Commission on Human Rights, in its resolution S-3/1, appointed a Special Rapporteur to report on the root causes of the recent atrocities and on the ongoing human rights situation in Rwanda. Under this mandate, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has deployed human rights officers to Rwanda to assist the Special Rapporteur in the implementation of his functions. Following the establishment of the Commission of Experts, I reported to the Security Council, on 26 July 1994 (S/1994/879), that the Commission would be based at Geneva and benefit from the resources of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and, in particular, those already made available to the Special Rapporteur. Subsequently, it became apparent that a much larger number of human rights staff would be required to deal with the extremely complex situation in Rwanda. Therefore, the High Commissioner for

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Human Rights, on 2 August 1994, launched an appeal to the international community for voluntary contributions to expand human rights activities in the field. As at 30 September 1994, the High Commissioner had deployed 31 human rights officers to Rwanda. In accordance with an agreement reached with the Government during his second visit to the country on 19 and 20 August 1994, he intends to increase that number to 147 as soon as possible so as to cover each one of the communes in Rwanda.

13. The objective of the human rights field operation in Rwanda is to carry out investigations into violations of human rights and humanitarian law; to monitor the ongoing human rights situation and, through the presence of human rights officers, help redress existing problems and prevent possible human rights violations from occurring; to cooperate with other international agencies in re-establishing confidence and thus facilitate the return of refugees and displaced persons and the rebuilding of civil society; and to implement programmes of technical cooperation in the field of human rights, particularly in the area of administration of justice. Following a request from the High Commissioner, UNAMIR is providing assistance within its existing resources in order to enable the human rights officers already deployed to become fully operational. That assistance will continue as further human rights staff are deployed.

14. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees sent a mission to Rwanda in August to assess how far conditions existed for the safe return to that country of refugees who had fled to Burundi, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zaire. In the course of its work, the mission of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) obtained certain information that appeared to indicate that soldiers of the RPF might have been engaged in systematic killings of members of the majority community in Rwanda.

15. On 16 September, the High Commissioner briefed senior officials of the United Nations on the matter. On the basis of that briefing, I directed that the allegations should be immediately taken up with the Government of Rwanda. This was done by the Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations, Mr. Kofi Annan, who was in Rwanda on mission at that time, and my Special Representative for Rwanda, Mr. Shaharyar Khan. The Government of Rwanda undertook to investigate the matter urgently and a team consisting of four government ministers, representatives of UNAMIR and UNHCR and a United Nations human rights monitor, paid a visit on 23 September to some of the places where the killings were alleged to have taken place. Those allegations have been reported to the Commission of Experts and to the Special Rapporteur and arrangements are now being made for a thorough investigation to be carried out under the mandate of those two mechanisms.

#### IV. MISSION OF MY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO ZAIRE AND THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

16. The presence of former RGF political leaders, military elements and militia in the Rwandese refugee camps, especially those in Zaire, have had a destabilizing effect on security in the camps and a number of violent incidents have occurred. Refugees suspected of favouring a return to Rwanda have

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frequently been attacked. The humanitarian agencies are reviewing how they can continue to deliver assistance in this insecure environment. There are also signs that ex-RGF troops located in the camps may be preparing to make incursions into Rwanda.

17. In view of that situation, I instructed my Special Representative for Rwanda to undertake a mission to Zaire and the United Republic of Tanzania to explore with the authorities of both countries ways in which the problem can be addressed. Mr. Shaharyar Khan visited Zaire from 12 to 14 September and the United Republic of Tanzania on 16 September. In Zaire, he met with President Mobutu and Prime Minister Kengo Wa Dongo. In the United Republic of Tanzania, he was received by President Mwinyi.

18. My Special Representative has reported that the Government of Zaire expressed its commitment to address the refugee crisis and to improve security in the camps. The Government of the United Republic of Tanzania had already undertaken to move certain unruly elements away from places where refugees were located. On the basis of his discussions with the Governments of Zaire and the United Republic of Tanzania, my Special Representative has recommended that attention be focused, as a matter of priority, on the camps in Zaire where the problems are significantly more acute than in the United Republic of Tanzania.

19. The population of the camps in Zaire fall into the following categories:  
(a) political leaders, estimated at approximately 50 heads of family;  
(b) uniformed military elements of the RGF, estimated at 16,000 and accompanied by their families, bringing the total to approximately 80,000; (c) militia, whose number is unknown since they have mingled with the refugees; and  
(d) ordinary refugees, estimated at about 1 million persons.

20. It was agreed with the Zairian authorities that the only effective way of ensuring the safety of the refugees and their freedom to exercise their right to return to Rwanda would be the separation of those in categories (a), (b) and (c) from the rest of the population of the refugee camps. The militia (category (c)) represent the greatest threat for the refugees. However, their separation from the others would be a difficult and complex undertaking, especially as they would be likely to resist, and incite others to resist, any attempt to relocate them. A strong security mechanism would be needed in order to protect both the refugees and those carrying out the operation. The separation of these persons is, however, the only means of providing security for the refugees and allowing them to choose freely to return to Rwanda.

21. While the Government of Zaire has indicated its desire to address these issues, it has also indicated that it would require substantial assistance from the international community both in financial and logistic support and in the provision of security for such an operation.

22. The Secretariat has examined my Special Representative's recommendations in consultation with UNHCR. In order to address more fully the problems of separating former RGF political leaders, military and militia from the others in the camps, and to evaluate the financial, logistic and security requirements, it was decided, during the visit of my Special Representative to Zaire, to establish a Joint Zairian/United Nations working group. The group, composed of

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representatives of the Government of Zaire, UNAMIR, UNHCR and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), has already begun its work. A technical team from UNAMIR has been sent to Zaire to join the working group and will submit a report to my Special Representative as soon as possible.

#### V. MILITARY ASPECTS

23. Since the 18 July 1994 cease-fire and the formation of the BBGNU a day later, the military situation in Rwanda has been relatively calm. At that time, the armed forces of the new Government, the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA), had established control over the entire country, with the exception of a "humanitarian protection zone" in the south-west. That zone was under the control of Operation Turquoise, the multinational operation launched by the French Government in pursuance of Security Council resolution 929 (1994) of 22 June 1994.

24. UNAMIR maintained close cooperation at all levels with Operation Turquoise and developed a detailed plan for taking over from it on 22 August, the date of its scheduled withdrawal. On 10 August, UNAMIR began deploying troops in the zone and on 21 August it assumed responsibility from Operation Turquoise. Arrangements were made with the French Government for the continuation of logistic support until UNAMIR could assume full responsibility. The French Government has submitted to the Security Council a final report, which has been circulated as document S/1994/1100.

25. UNAMIR troops established a presence throughout the zone, ensuring stability and security and providing support for humanitarian relief operations. The Government of Rwanda also launched a concerted effort to reassure the population. As a result of those efforts, a major exodus of civilians to Zaire was averted.

26. The Government's civilian and military take-over of the south-western zone was fully coordinated with UNAMIR. The civil administration in the zone is being restored as a first priority and RPA troops are gradually being deployed there. The Government installed prefects at Kibuye, Gikongoro and Cyangugu on 6 and 7 September and in cooperation with UNAMIR deployed RPA platoons in each location. Through successive incremental deployments, those elements were increased to company- and battalion-size units. The gradual establishment of the Government's authority in the south-west zone has now been completed without incident.

27. At the same time, former RGF troops in the south-western zone are being encouraged to enlist in the new national army. In addition, a programme was started on 2 September to encourage elements of the local gendarmerie to surrender their arms voluntarily. UNAMIR has collected nearly 600 arms under the programme.

28. The RPA now operates throughout the country, conducting patrols and manning roadblocks and checkpoints to monitor personnel and vehicle movement. Occasionally, it conducts cordon and search operations for weapons or personnel checks. It also protects vital points, such as infrastructure and all major

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border crossings. Additionally, in the absence of a police force, RPA troops perform policing functions to the extent possible.

29. Relations between UNAMIR and the RPA have been cordial and cooperative. However, movement restrictions have sometimes been imposed on UNAMIR troops. The formal understanding between UNAMIR and the BBGNU, particularly with reference to the United Nations Status-of-Forces Agreement with Rwanda, is that there should be no restrictions on the movement or deployment of UNAMIR personnel and vehicles throughout Rwanda. However, as illustrated by the three-week delay in providing clearance to occupy accommodation and concurrently deploy troops in the north-east and south-east (sectors 1 and 2), as well as periodic, local limitations placed on movements of UNAMIR troops in the south and north-west (sectors 3 and 5), the reality on the ground is sometimes different. In addition, some local RPA commanders have sometimes indicated that they are under instructions to deny UNAMIR access to areas where RPA troops are deployed. When such incidents are brought to the attention of senior government officials, they are usually quickly resolved.

30. The rapid reinforcement of UNAMIR in early August has contributed significantly to the improvement of the security situation in Rwanda. In accordance with its mandate, UNAMIR has continued to provide security support to all humanitarian operations in Rwanda. It has also provided support in re-establishing basic services and in the provision of relief supplies. None the less, delays in reaching the full authorized force level are hampering UNAMIR's further efforts in that regard. As at 3 October, UNAMIR's troop strength consisted of 4,270 all ranks (out of its total authorized strength of 5,500). On 19 August, the new Force Commander, Major-General Guy Tousignant (Canada), took over from Major-General Romeo Dallaire (Canada).

31. As noted above, the successful deployment of UNAMIR troops in the former humanitarian protection zone (sector 4) has provided the stability necessary to commence the gradual introduction of RPA forces to the south-west of the country. In order to facilitate that introduction, however, it has been necessary for UNAMIR to concentrate its efforts in this potentially volatile area. Accordingly, the requirement to extend UNAMIR presence throughout Rwanda is yet to be fulfilled.

32. As stability in Rwanda improves, emphasis in UNAMIR activities is shifting from purely military security-related tasks to the support of humanitarian operations aimed at assisting the population in need and facilitating the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes.

33. In the expectation that the remaining troops committed to UNAMIR will be deployed during the coming weeks, the Force Commander plans to deploy the force in six sectors, as indicated on the map annexed to the present report. The current and planned deployment schedules are as follows:

Sector 1 (north-east) Deployment of the Nigerian independent infantry company group is in progress.

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- Sector 2 (south-east) Two platoon groups from Canada and Ghana currently operate in this sector, which presently includes Kigali). Planned deployment in the sector will consist of one infantry battalion (Ghana).
- Sector 3 (south) An independent infantry company from Malawi operates in the sector. Planned deployment will consist of two independent infantry companies, one each from Malawi and Mali.
- Sector 4 (south-west) Current deployment consists of the Ghanaian Battalion, a United Kingdom field ambulance capability, the Ethiopian battalion and the inter-African battalion, composed of troops from Chad, the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, the Niger and Senegal. Planned deployment will consist of three mechanized/motorized infantry battalions (Zambia, Ethiopia and the inter-African contingent).
- Sector 5 (north-west) Although not part of UNAMIR, a Canadian field ambulance capability is currently operating in this sector. Planned deployment will consist of one infantry battalion from Tunisia, which is scheduled to commence deployment in early October.
- Sector 6 (Kigali City) Planned deployment will consist of one composite infantry battalion from India. This battalion is scheduled to be fully deployed by the end of October.

34. The main objective of the UNAMIR deployment schedule is to promote security in all sectors and to create a climate conducive to the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, as well as to support humanitarian operations. The Force Headquarters continues to operate from Kigali along with specialized communications, logistics and medical support units from Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia respectively. The United Kingdom contingent is scheduled to withdraw by 1 December and the Canadian contingent by mid-January.

35. The deployment of UNAMIR has been a difficult process, as many contingents were in need of major equipment items and as the United Nations has neither the resources in stock nor an advance budget which would ensure that the required equipment could be made available in a timely manner. It was for this reason that, in paragraph 24 of my report of 13 May (S/1994/565), I underlined the necessity for Member States to agree to make arrangements on a bilateral basis to provide the troops, equipment and airlift required for UNAMIR. As this did not occur, the Secretariat was required to identify sources of equipment and to arrange for its transport. This was a time-consuming task, which significantly delayed deployment. It also restricted the initial operational capability of UNAMIR, as contingents were in some cases unfamiliar with equipment supplied to them. One way of achieving a more rapid response in such circumstances would be the extension of the standby forces concept to include equipment, whereby a Member State would hold equipment on standby at a high state of readiness for deployment on lease terms.

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36. With the induction of new contingents, the UNAMIR force strength is expected to exceed temporarily the authorized level during the period from November 1994 to January 1995. However, as at February 1995, the expected withdrawal of some contingents and normal rotations will bring it back to its authorized level. The fact that UNAMIR will exceed its authorized strength for a short period will have no financial implications for its budget, as the excess expenditure would be offset by the savings resulting from a force strength below the authorized level up to October 1994.

37. The UNAMIR authorized strength of 320 military observers has been met and military observers are deployed in all sectors. They are engaged primarily in supporting humanitarian activities and liaising with the RPA.

#### VI. CIVILIAN POLICE

38. As indicated in the concept of operations set out in my report of 13 May to the Security Council (S/1994/565, chap. 4), it was initially envisaged that the main task of the civilian police component of the expanded UNAMIR would be to maintain liaison with the local civilian authorities on matters relating to public security, with a total authorized strength of 90 civilian police observers.

39. However, as a result of the civil war and the ensuing collapse of the country's administrative structures, no real police force or gendarmerie remained in place when the new Government was established on 19 July. Police functions were entrusted to an embryonic gendarmerie consisting mainly of RPA soldiers. At the same time, the Government sought the urgent assistance of UNAMIR in establishing a new, integrated, national police force. Given the importance to Rwanda's security and stability of creating a professional national police force, UNAMIR responded positively to that request, within its existing resources. Accordingly, on 16 August, UNAMIR initiated a training programme with 103 students selected by the Government as volunteers from different social and ethnic groups. The aim of the programme is to provide trainees with the basic knowledge of routine and investigative police work, thus enabling them to address the immediate law and order problems at Kigali. I recommend that the Security Council authorize UNAMIR to pursue these efforts.

40. The activities of the UNAMIR civilian police component have thus evolved from liaison with local authorities to assisting the Government in the creation of a new police/gendarmerie. The component is also charged with monitoring the activities of local police and gendarmerie, monitoring the activities of the civil authorities with regard to human rights violations and assisting UNAMIR military observers and troops in dealing with police matters.

41. The headquarters and training activities of the UNAMIR civilian police component are based at Kigali. A two-phase deployment of police observers is being implemented. Under phase I, which has been completed, police observers have been deployed at the civilian police headquarters, training centre and the prefectures of Kigali, Gikongoro, Cyangugu, Kibuye, Gitarama and Butare. Phase II will be executed once the full strength of police observers is reached.

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Under this phase, civilian police monitors will be deployed in all prefectures of the country.

42. To date, the component has a total strength of 30 police observers, with 10 each from Ghana, Mali and Nigeria. More observers are scheduled to be deployed shortly, although the Secretariat is having difficulties in obtaining from Member States a sufficient number of French-speaking police personnel.

#### VII. HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS

43. Current estimates suggest that Rwanda's pre-war population of 7.9 million has fallen to 5 million. Estimates of internally displaced persons range from 800,000 to 2 million. There are more than 2 million refugees in Zaire, the United Republic of Tanzania, Burundi and Uganda. At the same time, it is estimated that more than 200,000 former refugees have returned to Rwanda from Burundi and Uganda. The victims of genocidal slaughter could number as many as 1 million.

44. The humanitarian demands of the Rwandan emergency continue to stretch the capacity of the international community. In addition to the refugee crisis at Goma, the humanitarian community has had to address several crucial issues: the withdrawal of Operation Turquoise from the south-west; assistance to the internally displaced people; the transition from emergency relief to rehabilitation; the humanitarian implications of human rights violations; and the need to examine the Rwanda crisis in a regional context.

45. Prior to the withdrawal of Operation Turquoise, there was extreme concern among the international community that fear of reprisals by the RPA would drive thousands of Hutus across the border into Zaire. With poor road conditions, large distances to the camp-sites and other logistic difficulties, the scenarios were recognized by the humanitarian community as being cataclysmic, with the potential for refugee movement exceeding even that to Goma.

46. Under the coordination of the United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office, the international community adopted a policy of confidence-building in the south-west to encourage the internally displaced not to flee across the borders. At the political level, the RPA agreed not to occupy the south-west until conditions had stabilized. The timely and large-scale influx of United Nations and non-governmental organization resources, combined with the deployment of UNAMIR troops into the area, defused the situation. Some 350,000 people did cross the border into camps around Bukavu in Zaire; however, the majority remained within Rwanda.

47. It is agreed that the return of refugees to Rwanda is the only lasting solution and that it is critical to the resumption of normal economic and social life. However, the intimidation of refugees by former militia and army elements in the camps and the fact that those former soldiers and militia have not been disarmed are serious obstacles to the implementation of a repatriation programme. UNHCR does not feel at the present stage that it is in a position to encourage refugees to return home, partially because of deteriorating security for the returnee candidates in the camps and also because of concerns about

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security conditions in parts of Rwanda. UNHCR is none the less facilitating and assisting the return of spontaneous returnees.

48. As for the internally displaced persons, agreement has been reached among the humanitarian agencies to focus on facilitating their return to their areas of origin. By strengthening community capacity-building, providing rehabilitation support and improving security, the aim is to provide an attractive return option for those in the displaced persons' camps.

49. This policy of voluntary return of the internally displaced is vital. Many camps will become uninhabitable during the rainy season because of contamination of water supplies by sewage, inadequate shelter and poor access for relief convoys. In addition, if people stay in the camps, the fields are untended. Already the harvest has been missed and it is likely that the planting season will also be missed in many areas. This will mean that the international community will have to provide food aid for a second season. The resettlement of the displaced and the resumption of agricultural production are critical to the Government's efforts to rehabilitate the country. The longer people stay in camps, the longer rehabilitation is likely to take. There are now regular convoys carrying those who wish to return from Cyangugu in the south-west to Butare, Gikongoro and Kigali. Between 7 September and 23 September, some 3,337 people were transported home from Cyangugu. Returnees have also been transported from the north-west.

50. As the country strives to return to normalcy, increasing attention must be given to the transition from emergency relief to rehabilitation. The Government faces the huge challenge of rebuilding the country after a devastating war with almost no financial and human resources. It is vital that the international community provide quick and efficient rehabilitation assistance. In that connection, the Special Representative and the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs have distributed among donor countries, agencies and non-governmental organizations the Rwanda Emergency Normalization Plan, which outlines the initial areas requiring both financial and technical assistance. UNDP has begun initial projects to support the capacity-building of government ministries. Other United Nations organizations are contributing to the process in their respective areas of competence. As a result of those efforts, the infrastructure is improving. Essential services such as electricity and water supply have been restored at Kigali and services are being repaired around the country.

51. One major impediment for rehabilitation is the presence of mines. It is believed that there are 50,000 to 60,000 uncleared land-mines in Rwanda, with an average of two civilian mine casualties a day. United Nations de-mining experts have visited Rwanda to assess the scope of the problem. As the security situation stabilizes and de-mining can begin, the United Nations will coordinate with all concerned in providing assistance in that area.

52. Without reconciliation among the various parties to the conflict, it is likely that humanitarian operations will be protracted and difficult and will ultimately require greater commitments from the international community. This is directly linked to the human rights activities discussed in chapter III above.

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53. It is apparent that the Rwanda crisis and its spill-over into neighbouring countries has serious political, economic, social and environmental implications for Burundi, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zaire and Uganda. In order to examine the merits of a broader and more comprehensive regional approach to the Rwanda problem, I appointed Mr. Robert Dillon as my Special Humanitarian Envoy for Rwanda and Burundi. The Special Envoy made a visit to the area from 8 to 22 September and has submitted his recommendations to me.

54. The United Nations Consolidated Appeal for Persons Affected by the Crisis in Rwanda was launched on 22 July 1994. It requested a total of \$435 million to enable United Nations organizations to carry out their humanitarian programmes. This figure was revised upwards in the light of increasing needs to \$552 million. As at 1 September, contributions received amounted to \$384 million, covering 70 per cent of the total requirement. Based on information received by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, bilateral and other direct contributions for the Rwanda crisis, including those in response to the Appeal, bring the total contributions up to \$762 million.

55. The response of the international community to the crisis in Rwanda has been encouraging and has served to avert what could have been a major humanitarian disaster in the south-west. It is essential that this support be maintained as we enter into a delicate period of reconciliation and rehabilitation. For its part, the United Nations will continue its efforts to provide an appropriate framework for coordination of humanitarian assistance and the transition to reconstruction and development.

#### VIII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

56. By its resolution 48/248 of 5 April 1994, the General Assembly authorized me to enter into commitments for UNAMIR, at a rate not to exceed \$9,082,600 gross (\$8,881,000 net) per month for the period from 5 April to 31 October 1994. This authorization was subject to the decision of the Security Council to extend the mandate of the Assistance Mission beyond 4 April 1994. In its resolution 925 (1994) of 8 June 1994, the Council, inter alia, decided to extend the mandate of UNAMIR until 9 December 1994.

57. By its decision 48/479 B of 14 September 1994, the General Assembly authorized me to enter into commitments in the amount of \$37,182,100 gross (\$38,043,200 net) to meet the immediate operational requirements of UNAMIR for the period from 5 April to 30 September 1994, this amount being in addition to the full commitment authority of \$62,367,187 gross (\$60,982,867 net) already provided by resolution 48/248.

58. My report on the financing of UNAMIR to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session includes the cost estimate for the period from 5 April to 9 December 1994 in the amount of \$179.6 million, after taking into consideration voluntary contributions in kind of \$4.5 million pledged by Member States. My report also estimates costs for the period from 10 December 1994 to 9 December 1995 at \$20 million per month, based on the current authorized strength and mandate of UNAMIR. On the basis of this cost estimate, I have requested the Assembly to provide the necessary resources for the maintenance of

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UNAMIR, should the Security Council decide to extend its mandate beyond 9 December 1994.

59. As at 27 September 1994, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNAMIR special account since the inception of the Mission amounted to \$30 million. The total unpaid assessed contributions for all peace-keeping operations at that date amounted to \$1.9 billion.

#### IX. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

60. There are signs that the situation in Rwanda is stabilizing and slowly returning to more normal conditions. Inevitably, there are serious obstacles to be overcome in the long road to recovery from the war and carnage that have devastated the country, inflicted trauma and hardship on its people and destroyed its institutions. The first priority remains the resolution of the massive humanitarian crisis, including the problems faced by the Rwandese refugees in Zaire and the United Republic of Tanzania. Acts of intimidation and violence within the refugee camps have inhibited the refugee population from choosing to return home. The Government is engaged in efforts to find a solution to these problems, with the support of United Nations agencies and programmes on the ground, coordinated by my Special Representative. Determined efforts will have to be made by the Government to create conditions under which the refugees and displaced persons can return to their homes in safety and dignity. Indeed, without the assurance that their human rights will be respected, it is unlikely that the refugees and displaced persons will return. In this regard, I have conveyed to the Government of Rwanda, through my Special Representative, the need to undertake broader efforts towards national reconciliation. I am encouraged that the Government has taken concrete steps in this direction and I urge the international community to support its efforts and encourage it to ensure that these efforts are both genuine and comprehensive.

61. I endorse the recommendation made by the Commission of Experts in its preliminary report that trials of individuals suspected of serious breaches of international humanitarian law, crimes against humanity and acts of genocide be carried out by an international criminal tribunal. The Commission considers it preferable that the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia be expanded to cover international crimes committed in Rwanda from 6 April rather than to create a separate ad hoc international criminal tribunal. It is now for the Security Council to decide on the course of action to be adopted.

62. Among the many tasks facing the new Government and the Rwandese people is the reconstruction of the social and economic infrastructure of the country. Rwanda will require massive amounts of external technical and financial assistance on an urgent basis in order to create stability and re-establish basic services and a functioning economy. Donor agencies have undertaken the initial planning required before assistance can be released for reconstruction projects, and some small-scale rehabilitation of basic infrastructure is taking place. I urge donor Governments and international bodies to ensure that their programmes of assistance for Rwanda are implemented urgently. One aspect that is rapidly assuming the dimensions of an emergency is the Government's total

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lack of funds to re-establish even the most rudimentary administration and pay its employees. It is essential that at least bridging assistance be devised to provide relief bilaterally or by international financial institutions. In that connection, I should like to appeal to bilateral donors to consider ways and means to help the Government resolve the problem of its arrears with the World Bank, so as to secure access to the resources of that institution. I should also like to urge Member States to contribute generously to the Trust Fund which I established on 14 July 1994 in order to finance humanitarian relief and rehabilitation programmes in Rwanda. It would also be helpful if Governments could share with the United Nations information about their bilateral programmes of assistance so that there can be a coordinated response to Rwanda's needs.

63. Long-term peace and stability in Rwanda require genuine reconciliation between all elements of Rwandese society. Refugees and displaced persons must have the opportunity to return to their homes in peace, safety and dignity. The human and civic rights of all Rwandese people must be respected. I urge the new Government to maintain an open dialogue with all other political interest groups in Rwanda, including former government officials, except for individuals who are found, through due process, to have been directly implicated in acts of genocide. This is the only way the country can achieve durable political stability, within the principles of the Arusha Accords.

64. The evolving developments in and around Rwanda strengthen the case for a broader approach to the question of national reconciliation and the other aspects of the crisis. The Council will recall that the Mission it dispatched to Burundi from 13 to 14 August 1994 recommended, *inter alia*, that an international conference be convened to look into the problems of the subregion. I shall continue to consult with all relevant parties with a view to determining how the United Nations could assist in the preparation and convening of such a conference.

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**NATIONS  
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GÉNÉRALES/1994/1133  
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ORIGINAL : ANGLAIS**RAPPORT INTÉIMAIRE DU SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL SUR LA MISSION  
D'ASSISTANCE DES NATIONS UNIES AU RWANDA****I. INTRODUCTION**

1. Le présent rapport est présenté en application du paragraphe 17 de la résolution 925 (1994) du Conseil de sécurité, en date du 8 juin 1994, dans laquelle le Conseil m'a prié de lui faire rapport le 9 août et le 9 octobre 1994 au plus tard sur les progrès accomplis par la Mission des Nations Unies pour l'assistance au Rwanda (MINUAR) dans l'exécution de son mandat, la sécurité des populations en danger, la situation humanitaire et les progrès enregistrés sur la voie d'un cessez-le-feu et de la réconciliation politique.

2. Depuis mon dernier rapport sur la situation au Rwanda daté du 3 août 1994 (S/1994/924), le Secrétariat a tenu le Conseil de sécurité oralement informé de l'évolution de la situation, en particulier en ce qui concerne l'appui apporté par la Mission aux opérations humanitaires, les efforts visant à accélérer le retour des réfugiés, les progrès réalisés dans le déploiement de la MINUAR renforcée et la relève de l'Opération Turquoise par la MINUAR.

**II. PERSPECTIVES POLITIQUES**

3. Comme les membres du Conseil de sécurité le savent, depuis que le cessez-le-feu a été déclaré le 18 juillet 1994, les combats ont pratiquement cessé au Rwanda. Le Gouvernement d'unité nationale à base élargie, installé à Kigali le 19 juillet, contrôle l'ensemble du territoire national. S'il y a toujours plus de 2 millions de réfugiés rwandais dans les pays voisins, le Gouvernement s'efforce, en coordination avec mon Représentant spécial et les autres fonctionnaires des Nations Unies qui sont sur le terrain, de les inciter à revenir au Rwanda dans de bonnes conditions de sécurité. Dans le même temps, les efforts déployés pour normaliser la situation à l'intérieur du pays progressent régulièrement, les services de base tels que l'eau, l'électricité et les communications étant peu à peu rétablis, en particulier à Kigali. Le Gouvernement a également commencé à mettre en place des structures administratives civiles aux niveaux central, provincial et local. Mon Représentant spécial a fait parvenir aux pays donateurs, aux institutions des Nations Unies et aux organisations non gouvernementales un plan d'urgence pour la normalisation au Rwanda indiquant quels sont les services prioritaires nécessitant une assistance tant financière que technique.

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4. Si, dans un premier temps, la normalisation de la situation a progressé, le Gouvernement est confronté à la lourde tâche de reconstruire un pays dans lequel les infrastructures sociales et physiques ont été presque totalement détruites et où une profonde méfiance continue de diviser les divers groupes politiques et ethniques qui constituent la société rwandaise. Il lui sera difficile de garantir la sûreté et la sécurité de chacun et d'instaurer un climat permettant de demander des comptes à ceux qui ont participé au génocide tandis que d'autres recommenceront leur vie sans craindre ni vengeance ni rétribution. En outre, le Gouvernement souffre d'une grave pénurie de ressources de base, notamment des réserves monétaires nécessaires pour payer les traitements de ses fonctionnaires, les banques ayant été pillées pendant les combats. Ce problème est grave, car fonctionnaires et militaires risquent de recourir à d'autres moyens pour s'assurer un revenu.

5. Le Gouvernement semble se rendre compte que pour instaurer la stabilité et une paix durable au Rwanda, il lui est nécessaire de faire participer l'ensemble des citoyens, quelle que soit leur origine ethnique, à ses structures administratives et de sécurité. Le Président du Rwanda a assuré à mon Représentant spécial que les efforts se poursuivaient pour élargir la gamme des composantes du Gouvernement en invitant certains membres du Mouvement républicain national pour le développement (MRND), le seul grand parti politique à n'être pas actuellement représenté au sein du Gouvernement d'unité nationale à base élargie, à entrer au Gouvernement. À ce jour toutefois, ces efforts n'ont pas abouti.

6. Toujours pour promouvoir la réconciliation nationale, les membres des anciennes forces gouvernementales rwandaises (FGR) sont encouragés à rejoindre la nouvelle armée nationale. Ces militaires peuvent se faire enregistrer soit dans des centres créés par le Gouvernement à cet effet, soit auprès des fonctionnaires de la MINUAR déployés dans le pays. Il semble toutefois que le succès de cette initiative du Gouvernement demeure limité.

7. Afin de promouvoir la réconciliation nationale et de convaincre la population que ses droits de l'homme et civils seront respectés, le Gouvernement a continué d'organiser de grands rassemblements dans plusieurs villes dont Ruhengeri, Kibungu, Byumba, Kibuye, Gikongoro, Cyangugu et Butare. Par le biais de ces rassemblements, le Gouvernement s'est efforcé de dissiper les craintes de la population en ce qui concerne des questions telles que les droits de propriété et le traitement équitable par l'appareil judiciaire des personnes accusées de crimes contre l'humanité.

8. Au cours du mois d'août, des membres du Gouvernement se sont rendus à plusieurs reprises dans des camps de réfugiés au Zaïre pour tenter d'encourager les réfugiés à retourner volontairement d'où ils avaient fui. Ces efforts ont eu pour effet d'augmenter quelque peu le nombre des réfugiés qui retournent au Rwanda. Quelque 360 000 réfugiés sont rentrés spontanément au Rwanda depuis l'entrée en vigueur du cessez-le-feu, le 18 juillet. Le Gouvernement s'est déclaré préoccupé par la présence dans les camps d'éléments qui continuent d'inciter les gens à fuir le Rwanda et de menacer ceux qui se trouvent dans les camps pour les dissuader de regagner leurs foyers et leurs fermes au Rwanda. En septembre, des rapports et des investigations préliminaires ont indiqué qu'il

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n'était pas exclu que des réfugiés rentrés au Rwanda aient été victimes de représailles de la part des troupes gouvernementales; les investigations se poursuivent (par. 14 et 15 ci-après).

9. On estime que les campagnes de désinformation menées pendant et après les hostilités ont largement contribué aux massacres et à l'exode de réfugiés vers les pays voisins qui a suivi. L'information demeure un élément important s'agissant d'instaurer dans le pays tant la stabilité qu'un climat propice au retour volontaire et en toute sécurité des réfugiés et des personnes déplacées. Le Rwanda n'a ni journaux ni télévisions, et la radio est le seul moyen d'information. La MINUAR, associée aux institutions des Nations Unies compétentes, est donc en train de mettre en place des installations de radiodiffusion afin de fournir au peuple rwandais des informations factuelles sur la situation dans leur pays, d'expliquer le mandat de la MINUAR et de diffuser des informations sur les programmes humanitaires. La MINUAR installe actuellement à Kigali un émetteur en modulation de fréquence d'une portée de 20 kilomètres. Du matériel supplémentaire, qui permettra aux émissions de la MINUAR de couvrir l'ensemble du pays, est en cours d'achat et les spécialistes nécessaires sont en train d'être recrutés. La MINUAR a aussi demandé aux autorités rwandaises de lui donner une autorisation officielle de commencer à émettre et de lui allouer une fréquence. J'espère que le Gouvernement répondra positivement et rapidement à ces demandes.

### III. DROITS DE L'HOMME

10. Le 26 juillet 1994, par sa résolution 935 (1994), du 1er juillet 1994, le Conseil de sécurité a créé une commission d'experts chargée d'examiner et d'analyser les informations faisant état de graves violations du droit international humanitaire commis sur le territoire du Rwanda, y compris des éléments de preuve concernant d'éventuels actes de génocide. La Commission a commencé ses travaux le 15 août 1994 et s'est rendue au Rwanda ainsi qu'au Burundi, en République-Unie de Tanzanie et au Zaïre du 29 août au 17 septembre. Aux termes de la résolution 935 (1994), la Commission doit me remettre ses conclusions le 30 novembre 1994 au plus tard, mais je lui ai demandé d'accélérer l'établissement de son rapport. La Commission m'a donc soumis le 30 septembre un rapport préliminaire que j'ai transmis au Conseil (S/1994/1125).

11. Alors que la Commission était au Rwanda, le Gouvernement l'a engagée à achever rapidement ses travaux et a aussi demandé instamment qu'un tribunal international, similaire à celui qui a été créé pour l'ex-Yougoslavie, soit créé. Pour le Gouvernement, le jugement des personnes accusées de graves violations du droit international humanitaire et d'actes de génocide par un organe externe impartial contribuerait à promouvoir la paix et la réconciliation des parties et favoriserait la stabilisation de la situation au Rwanda. Le Gouvernement a donné l'assurance qu'il ne ménagerait aucun effort pour empêcher les procès sommaires et les vengeances sous forme d'exécutions et autres actes de violence, et qu'il arrêterait les personnes accusées de tels crimes.

12. Le 25 mai 1994, la Commission des droits de l'homme, par sa résolution S-3/1, a nommé un Rapporteur spécial chargé d'établir un rapport sur les causes fondamentales des atrocités qui se sont produites récemment au Rwanda

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et sur la situation des droits de l'homme dans le pays. En vertu de ce mandat, le Haut Commissaire des Nations Unies aux droits de l'homme a déployé des spécialistes des droits de l'homme au Rwanda pour aider le Rapporteur spécial à s'acquitter de sa mission. À la suite de la création de la Commission d'experts, j'ai informé le Conseil de sécurité, le 29 juillet 1994 (S/1994/879), que la Commission serait basée à Genève et bénéficierait des ressources du Haut Commissaire aux droits de l'homme, en particulier de celles déjà à la disposition du Rapporteur spécial. Ultérieurement, il est apparu qu'il fallait déployer un nombre beaucoup plus important de spécialistes des droits de l'homme pour faire face à la situation extrêmement complexe existant au Rwanda. Le Haut Commissaire aux droits de l'homme a donc, le 2 août 1994, lancé un appel à la communauté internationale afin d'obtenir des contributions volontaires pour étendre les activités relatives aux droits de l'homme sur le terrain. Au 30 septembre 1994, le Haut Commissaire avait déployé 31 spécialistes des droits de l'homme au Rwanda. Il a l'intention, en application d'un accord conclu avec le Gouvernement lors de sa deuxième visite dans le pays les 19 et 29 août 1994, d'en porter le nombre à 147 dès que possible afin qu'il y en ait un dans chacune des communes du Rwanda.

13. Il s'agit, dans le cadre de l'opération menée sur le terrain au Rwanda dans le domaine des droits de l'homme, d'enquêter sur les violations des droits de l'homme et du droit humanitaire; de suivre la situation des droits de l'homme et, par la présence de spécialistes des droits de l'homme, de contribuer à remédier aux problèmes existants et de prévenir d'éventuelles violations des droits de l'homme; de coopérer avec d'autres institutions internationales pour rétablir la confiance et faciliter ainsi le retour des réfugiés et des personnes déplacées et la reconstitution de la société civile; et d'exécuter des programmes de coopération technique dans le domaine des droits de l'homme, en particulier pour ce qui est de l'administration de la justice. En réponse à une demande du Haut Commissaire, la MINUAR fournit une assistance dans la limite des ressources dont elle dispose pour permettre aux spécialistes des droits de l'homme déjà déployés de devenir pleinement opérationnels. Cette assistance se poursuivra durant le déploiement du reste des spécialistes des droits de l'homme.

14. Le Haut Commissaire des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés a envoyé une mission au Rwanda en août pour évaluer dans quelle mesure les conditions permettaient aux réfugiés se trouvant au Burundi, en République-Unie de Tanzanie et au Zaïre de revenir dans le pays en toute sécurité. Durant sa visite, la mission du Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés (HCR) a obtenu certains renseignements selon lesquels des soldats du FPR se seraient livrés à des meurtres systémiques de membres de la communauté majoritaire au Rwanda.

15. Le 16 septembre, le Haut Commissaire a organisé une réunion d'information sur cette question à l'intention de hauts fonctionnaires de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. Sur la base de cette réunion, j'ai ordonné que les allégations en question soient immédiatement portées à la connaissance du Gouvernement rwandais. C'est ce qu'ont fait le Secrétaire général adjoint aux opérations de maintien de la paix, M. Kofi Annan, qui était en mission au Rwanda à cette époque, et mon Représentant spécial au Rwanda, M. Shaharyar Khan. Le Gouvernement rwandais s'est engagé à mener une enquête sans délai. Une équipe

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comprenant quatre ministres, des représentants de la MINUAR et du HCR et un observateur des droits de l'homme de l'ONU s'est rendue le 23 septembre dans certains des lieux où les meurtres auraient été commis. J'ai transmis ces allégations à la Commission d'experts et au Rapporteur spécial et des dispositions sont actuellement prises pour qu'une enquête approfondie soit effectuée dans le cadre du mandat de l'une et de l'autre.

#### IV. LA MISSION DE MON REPRÉSENTANT SPÉCIAL AU ZAÏRE ET EN RÉPUBLIQUE-UNIE DE TANZANIE

16. La présence dans les camps de réfugiés rwandais, surtout au Zaïre, d'anciens dirigeants politiques des forces gouvernementales rwandaises, d'éléments militaires et de miliciens a compromis la sécurité dans ces camps et un certain nombre d'incidents violents s'y sont produits. C'est souvent les réfugiés que l'on soupçonne de souhaiter le retour au Rwanda qui ont été pris à partie. Les organisations humanitaires s'interrogent sur la manière de maintenir leur aide dans un tel climat d'insécurité. Certains signes indiquent d'autre part que d'anciens soldats des forces gouvernementales rwandaises qui se trouvent dans les camps se prépareraient à faire des incursions au Rwanda.

17. Devant cette situation, j'ai prié mon Représentant spécial de se rendre en mission au Zaïre et en République-Unie de Tanzanie pour réfléchir avec les autorités de ces deux pays aux moyens de remédier au problème. M. Shaharyar Khan s'est donc rendu au Zaïre du 12 au 14 septembre, et en République-Unie de Tanzanie le 16 septembre. Au Zaïre il a rencontré le Président Mobutu et le Premier Ministre, M. Kengo Wa Dongo; en République-Unie de Tanzanie, il a été reçu par le Président Mwinyi.

18. Mon Représentant spécial a indiqué que le Gouvernement zaïrois s'était engagé à faire face à la crise dans les camps de réfugiés et à y améliorer la sécurité. Le Gouvernement tanzanien avait déjà commencé de tenir certains éléments incontrôlés à l'écart des lieux où se trouvent les réfugiés. À la suite de ses entretiens avec les Gouvernements zaïrois et tanzanien, mon Représentant spécial a recommandé de concentrer prioritairement l'action sur les camps au Zaïre, où les difficultés sont nettement plus graves qu'en République-Unie de Tanzanie.

19. On peut ranger la population des camps zaïrois dans les catégories suivantes : a) dirigeants politiques, dont le nombre est estimé à une cinquantaine de chefs de famille; b) militaires en tenue des forces gouvernementales rwandaises, dont le nombre est estimé à 16 000, accompagnés des membres de leur famille, ce qui porte le total à environ 80 000 personnes; c) miliciens, dont le nombre reste inconnu car ils se sont mêlés aux réfugiés; d) réfugiés ordinaires, dont le nombre est estimé à un million environ.

20. Les autorités zaïroises ont été d'accord pour conclure que la seule façon de garantir efficacement la sécurité des réfugiés et leur droit à retourner librement au Rwanda consisterait à séparer les personnes des catégories a), b) et c) du reste de la population des camps. Ce sont les miliciens [catégorie c)] qui constituent pour les réfugiés la menace la plus grave. Pourtant, les mettre à part des autres serait une opération difficile et compliquée, d'autant plus

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que les intéressés s'y opposeraient vraisemblablement et inciteraient les autres à résister à toute tentative visant à les installer ailleurs. Il faudrait mettre en place un puissant mécanisme de sécurité pour protéger tant les réfugiés que ceux qui seraient chargés de l'opération. La mise à l'écart des personnes en question reste pourtant la seule façon d'assurer la sécurité des réfugiés et de leur laisser la liberté d'exercer leur droit au retour.

21. Si le Gouvernement zairois s'est déclaré désireux de régler ces questions, il a également indiqué qu'il aurait besoin pour cela d'une aide importante de la communauté internationale, tant sur le plan financier que sur le plan logistique, pour assurer la sécurité de l'opération.

22. Le Secrétariat a examiné avec le HCR les conclusions de mon Représentant spécial. Pour régler plus complètement les problèmes que soulève l'éviction des camps des anciens dirigeants politiques des forces gouvernementales rwandaises, des soldats et des miliciens, et évaluer l'aide financière et logistique nécessaire et les besoins en matière de sécurité, il a été décidé pendant le séjour de mon Représentant spécial au Zaïre de créer un groupe de travail mixte Zaïre/ONU. Ce groupe, composé de représentants du Gouvernement zairois, de la MINUAR, du HCR et du Programme des Nations Unies pour le développement (PNUD), s'est déjà mis au travail. Une équipe technique de la MINUAR a été envoyée au Zaïre pour travailler avec lui et fera dès que possible rapport à mon Représentant spécial.

#### V. ASPECTS MILITAIRES

23. Depuis le cessez-le-feu du 18 juillet 1994 et la formation le lendemain du Gouvernement d'unité nationale à base élargie, la situation militaire est restée relativement calme. À cette date, les forces armées du nouveau Gouvernement, l'Armée patriotique rwandaise (APR), étaient déjà maîtresses de l'ensemble du pays, à l'exception de la "zone humanitaire sûre" dans le sud-ouest. Celle-ci était sous le contrôle de l'Opération Turquoise, opération multinationale lancée par le Gouvernement français en application de la résolution 929 (1994) du Conseil de sécurité, en date du 22 juin 1994.

24. La MINUAR a entretenu des rapports de collaboration étroite à tous les niveaux avec l'Opération Turquoise et a mis au point un plan détaillé pour prendre la relève le 22 août, date où elle se terminerait. Le 10 août, la MINUAR a commencé à mettre des unités militaires en place dans la zone en question et, le 21, elle a pris en charge les responsabilités de l'Opération Turquoise. Des dispositions ont été prises avec le Gouvernement français pour qu'il maintienne le soutien logistique, en attendant que la MINUAR puisse prendre la responsabilité complète des opérations. Le Gouvernement français a présenté au Conseil de sécurité un rapport final qui a été publié sous la cote S/1994/1100.

25. Les troupes de la MINUAR ont établi leur présence dans l'ensemble de la zone, garanti la stabilité et la sécurité et fourni le soutien nécessaire à l'action humanitaire. Le Gouvernement rwandais a d'autre part entrepris un effort concerté pour rassurer la population. Grâce à cet effort, on a pu éviter un exode massif de civils en direction du Zaïre.

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26. La reprise en main du sud-ouest du pays par le Gouvernement sur les plans civil et militaire s'est faite en complète coordination avec la MINUAR. On procède à titre prioritaire à la restauration de l'administration civile du secteur et les troupes de l'APR prennent progressivement position dans la région. Le Gouvernement a installé des préfets à Kibuye, Gikongoro et Cyangugu les 6 et 7 septembre et, en collaboration avec la MINUAR, a déployé des unités de l'APR dans chaque localité. Grâce à plusieurs renforts successifs, ces unités ont atteint la taille de compagnies et de bataillons. Le Gouvernement a pu progressivement établir son autorité, sans incident, dans le secteur sud-ouest.

27. Parallèlement, les anciens soldats des forces gouvernementales rwandaises qui se trouvent dans le secteur sud-ouest sont encouragés à s'engager dans la nouvelle armée nationale. En outre, un programme lancé le 2 septembre incite les éléments de la gendarmerie locale à rendre volontairement leurs armes. Ce programme a permis à la MINUAR d'en récupérer près de 600.

28. L'APR est maintenant opérationnelle dans tout le pays où elle patrouille, installe des barrages routiers et des postes de contrôle pour surveiller la circulation des personnes et des véhicules. Elle procède de temps à autre à des opérations de bouclage et de recherche d'armes et à des contrôles d'identité. Elle assure également la protection des points stratégiques, comme les ouvrages d'art et les principaux passages de frontière. En l'absence d'un corps de police, ce sont aussi les soldats de l'APR qui assurent, dans la mesure du possible, les fonctions de police.

29. Les relations entre la MINUAR et l'APR sont marquées par la cordialité et l'esprit de coopération. Des restrictions ont parfois été imposées aux déplacements des soldats de la MINUAR. Selon les arrangements officiels entre la MINUAR et le Gouvernement d'union nationale, et plus particulièrement selon l'accord Rwanda/ONU sur le statut des forces, la circulation et le déploiement du personnel et des véhicules de la MINUAR ne devraient faire l'objet d'aucune restriction, où que ce soit dans le pays. Mais la réalité sur le terrain est quelque peu différente, comme l'attestent par exemple les trois semaines qu'il a fallu attendre pour obtenir l'autorisation de prendre quartier et de déployer en même temps des troupes dans le nord-est et le sud-est (secteurs 1 et 2), ou encore les restrictions périodiquement imposées sur le plan local aux mouvements des troupes de la MINUAR dans le sud et le nord-ouest (secteurs 3 et 5). D'autre part, des chefs de corps locaux de l'APR ont indiqué, dans certains cas, qu'ils avaient ordre d'empêcher la MINUAR de se rendre dans les secteurs où étaient déployées des unités de l'APR. Quand des incidents de ce genre sont portés à l'attention des hauts fonctionnaires du Gouvernement, ils sont en général promptement résolus.

30. Le renforcement rapide de la MINUAR au début du mois d'août a été un facteur d'amélioration sensible de la sécurité au Rwanda. Conformément à son mandat, la MINUAR a continué d'assurer la sécurité de toutes les opérations humanitaires dans le pays. Elle a également soutenu la remise en marche des services de base et la distribution des secours. Cela dit, le retard que prend le rassemblement du reste de ses effectifs est une entrave à l'action qu'elle poursuit dans ce domaine. Au 3 octobre, la Mission comprend 4 270 militaires de

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tous grades (sur un effectif total autorisé de 5 500 personnes). Le 19 août, le nouveau commandant de la force, le général de division Guy Tousignant (Canada) a pris la relève du général de division Roméo Dallaire (Canada).

31. Comme on l'a indiqué plus haut, le déploiement réussi des soldats de la MINUAR dans l'ancienne zone humanitaire sûre (secteur 4) a assuré la stabilité indispensable à la mise en place progressive des forces de l'APR dans le sud-ouest du pays. Pour faciliter cette mise en place cependant, la MINUAR a dû concentrer ses efforts sur cette région, où la situation est potentiellement menaçante. C'est pourquoi elle n'a pas encore établi sa présence dans tout le pays, comme elle doit le faire.

32. À mesure que les choses se stabilisent au Rwanda, les activités de la MINUAR changent d'orientation principale et passent de fonctions proprement militaires en matière de sécurité au soutien de l'action humanitaire en faveur des populations dans le besoin et à la facilitation du retour dans leurs foyers des réfugiés et des personnes déplacées.

33. En attendant que le reste des contingents affectés aux opérations de la MINUAR se mette en place dans les semaines à venir, le commandant de la force envisage de prendre position dans six secteurs, comme l'indique la carte annexée au présent rapport. La répartition des troupes se présente ou se présentera comme suit :

Secteur 1 (nord-est) : Le déploiement de la compagnie d'infanterie indépendante nigériane est en cours.

Secteur 2 (sud-est) : Deux sections du Canada et du Ghana opèrent actuellement dans le secteur (qui comprend actuellement Kigali). Le déploiement prévu comprend un bataillon d'infanterie (Ghana).

Secteur 3 (sud) : Une compagnie d'infanterie indépendante du Malawi opère dans le secteur. Le déploiement prévu comprend deux compagnies d'infanterie indépendantes, l'une du Malawi, l'autre du Mali.

Secteur 4 (sud-ouest) : Les formations en place comprennent le bataillon guinéen, un service médical de campagne britannique, le bataillon éthiopien, le bataillon interafricain (composé de militaires du Tchad, du Congo, de la Guinée-Bissau, du Niger et du Sénégal). Le déploiement prévu comprend trois bataillons d'infanterie mécanisée/motorisée (Zambie, Éthiopie et contingent interafricain).

Secteur 5 (nord-ouest) : Bien qu'il ne fasse pas partie de la MINUAR, un service médical de campagne canadien opère actuellement dans ce secteur. Le déploiement prévu comprend un bataillon d'infanterie tunisien, qui devrait commencer sa mise en place au début du mois d'octobre.

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Secteur 6 (Kigali) : Le déploiement prévu comprend un bataillon d'infanterie composite indien. Ce bataillon devrait avoir terminé sa mise en place à la fin du mois d'octobre.

34. Ce plan a pour premier objectif d'améliorer la sécurité dans tous les secteurs, d'instaurer un climat propice au retour sans risque des réfugiés et des personnes déplacées et de seconder les opérations humanitaires. Le quartier général de la force continue d'opérer à partir de Kigali, de même que les services spécialisés des transmissions (Canada), de la logistique (Royaume-Uni) et de l'appui médical (Australie). Le contingent britannique devrait s'être retiré au 1er décembre, et le contingent canadien avant la mi-janvier.

35. Le déploiement de la MINUAR ne s'est pas fait sans difficultés, car beaucoup de contingents manquaient de certaines grosses pièces de matériel, l'ONU n'ayant ni les réserves de matériel ni le financement préalable qui lui auraient permis d'équiper ces contingents en temps utile. C'est pour cette raison que j'ai souligné, au paragraphe 24 de mon rapport du 13 mai (S/1994/565), combien il était nécessaire que les États Membres consentent à prendre des dispositions sur le plan bilatéral pour mettre à la disposition de la MINUAR les soldats, le matériel et les moyens aériens dont elle avait besoin. Cela ne s'étant pas produit, le Secrétariat a été obligé de rechercher des sources d'approvisionnement en matériel et de prendre des dispositions pour faire transporter celui-ci. Cette opération a pris du temps, ce qui a nettement retardé la mise en place des troupes. Elle a également diminué la capacité opérationnelle initiale de la Mission, dans la mesure où, dans certains cas, les contingents ne connaissaient pas le matériel qui leur était fourni. Pour que l'on puisse réagir plus rapidement dans les cas de ce genre, l'une des solutions consisterait à étendre au matériel la notion de forces en alerte, c'est-à-dire qu'un État Membre garderait en réserve du matériel prêt à être loué pour utilisation immédiate.

36. Avec la mise en place des nouveaux contingents, l'effectif de la MINUAR devrait dépasser temporairement le niveau autorisé, entre novembre 1994 et janvier 1995. En février 1995 cependant, le retrait prévu de certains contingents et les opérations normales de relève devraient ramener la Mission à l'effectif autorisé. Le fait que la MINUAR se trouvera en sureffectif pendant un bref laps de temps n'aura pas d'incidences financières sur son budget, car le surcroît de dépenses sera compensé par les économies résultant de la situation de sous-effectif de la Mission antérieurement à octobre 1994.

37. Les 320 observateurs militaires prévus pour la MINUAR ont été réunis, et ils ont pris position dans tous les secteurs. Ils s'occupent essentiellement de soutenir les activités humanitaires et d'assurer la liaison avec l'APR.

#### VI. POLICE CIVILE

38. Comme je l'ai indiqué en exposant le principe des opérations dans mon rapport du 13 mai au Conseil de sécurité (S/1994/565, chap. 4), il était initialement prévu que la force de police civile de la MINUAR élargie comprendrait au total 90 observateurs et aurait pour principale tâche de maintenir la liaison avec les autorités civiles locales en ce qui concerne les questions de sécurité publique.

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39. Or, en raison de la guerre civile qui a provoqué l'effondrement des structures administratives du pays, il ne restait pas dans le pays de véritables forces de police ou de gendarmerie lorsque le nouveau gouvernement a été établi le 19 juillet. Les fonctions de police étaient confiées à une gendarmerie embryonnaire composée essentiellement de soldats de l'APR. En même temps, le Gouvernement demandait d'urgence l'assistance de la MINUAR pour établir une nouvelle force de police nationale intégrée. Vu la nécessité de créer une force de police nationale professionnelle pour assurer la sécurité et la stabilité du Rwanda, la MINUAR a répondu positivement à cette demande dans la limite des ressources dont elle disposait. C'est ainsi que, le 16 août, la MINUAR a lancé un programme de formation destiné à 103 étudiants choisis par le Gouvernement parmi des volontaires de différents groupes sociaux et ethniques. Le but de ce programme est de familiariser les participants avec les tâches courantes et le travail d'enquête de la police, pour leur permettre de s'attaquer aux problèmes immédiats posés par le maintien de l'ordre public à Kigali. Je recommande que le Conseil de sécurité autorise la MINUAR à poursuivre ces initiatives.

40. Les activités de la police civile de la MINUAR ont ainsi évolué : elles ne consistent plus seulement à assurer la liaison avec les autorités locales mais à aider le Gouvernement à créer une nouvelle police ou gendarmerie. La police civile est aussi chargée de surveiller les activités de la police et de la gendarmerie locales ainsi que celles des autorités civiles en ce qui concerne les violations des droits de l'homme, et d'aider les observateurs militaires et les soldats de la MINUAR à régler les questions de police.

41. Le siège et les activités de formation de la police civile de la MINUAR sont basés à Kigali. Le déploiement des observateurs de la police s'effectue en deux phases. Au cours de la phase I, qui est maintenant achevée, des observateurs de la police ont été déployés au siège de la police civile, au centre de formation et dans les préfectures de Kigali, Gikongoro, Cyangugu, Kibuye, Gitarama et Butare. La phase II sera exécutée une fois que l'effectif des observateurs de la police sera au complet. Au cours de cette phase, des observateurs de la police civile seront déployés dans toutes les préfectures du pays.

42. À cette date, la police civile compte au total 30 observateurs - 10 Ghanéens, 10 Maliens et 10 Nigériens. D'autres observateurs devraient être déployés prochainement, bien que le Secrétariat ait des difficultés à obtenir des États Membres un nombre suffisant de policiers francophones.

#### VII. ASPECTS HUMANITAIRES

43. Les estimations actuelles semblent indiquer que la population du Rwanda, qui était de 7,9 millions avant la guerre, n'est plus actuellement que de 5 millions. D'après ces estimations, le nombre de personnes déplacées à l'intérieur du pays se situerait entre 800 000 et 2 millions. Il y a plus de 2 millions de réfugiés rwandais au Zaïre, en République-Unie de Tanzanie, au Burundi et en Ouganda. On estime en même temps que plus de 200 000 personnes qui s'étaient réfugiées au Burundi et en Ouganda sont rentrées au Rwanda. Le nombre des victimes du génocide pourrait atteindre 1 million.

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44. La communauté internationale a de la peine à répondre aux besoins humanitaires que continue de créer la situation d'urgence au Rwanda. Outre la crise des réfugiés de Goma, elle doit faire face à plusieurs questions cruciales : le retrait des forces de l'Opération Turquoise dans le sud-ouest; l'aide aux personnes déplacées à l'intérieur du pays; la transition des secours d'urgence à l'aide au relèvement; les incidences humanitaires des violations des droits de l'homme; et la nécessité d'examiner la crise du Rwanda dans un contexte régional.

45. Avant le retrait des forces de l'Opération Turquoise, la communauté internationale craignait que la peur de représailles de la part de l'APR ne pousse des milliers de Hutus à traverser la frontière pour se réfugier au Zaïre. Vu le mauvais état des routes, l'éloignement des camps et autres difficultés logistiques, elle envisageait des scénarios catastrophiques selon lesquels le mouvement de réfugiés pourrait même dépasser en ampleur celui de Goma.

46. Sous la direction du Bureau d'urgence de l'ONU pour le Rwanda, la communauté internationale a adopté une politique consistant à rétablir la confiance dans le sud-ouest pour persuader les personnes déplacées à l'intérieur du pays de ne pas se réfugier de l'autre côté des frontières. Sur le plan politique, l'APR a accepté de ne pas occuper le sud-ouest tant que la situation ne se serait pas stabilisée. L'afflux rapide et massif de ressources fournies par l'ONU et les organisations non gouvernementales ainsi que le déploiement des troupes de la MINUAR dans la région ont permis de désamorcer la crise. Trois cent cinquante mille personnes environ ont bien traversé la frontière pour se réfugier dans des camps près de Bukavu au Zaïre, mais la majorité est restée au Rwanda.

47. Il est admis que le retour des réfugiés au Rwanda est la seule solution durable et qu'il est indispensable à la reprise d'une vie économique et sociale normale. Toutefois, l'intimidation des réfugiés dans les camps par d'anciens éléments des milices et de l'armée et le fait que ces derniers n'aient pas été désarmés constituent de graves obstacles à l'exécution du programme de rapatriement. Le HCR ne se sent pas, au stade actuel, en mesure d'encourager les réfugiés à rentrer chez eux, en partie parce que les candidats au retour ne sont plus en sécurité dans les camps, et aussi à cause des craintes concernant les conditions de sécurité dans certaines parties du Rwanda. Il facilite néanmoins le retour de ceux qui demandent spontanément à rentrer chez eux.

48. Quant aux personnes déplacées à l'intérieur du pays, les organisations humanitaires ont décidé d'un commun accord de s'efforcer de faciliter leur retour dans leur région d'origine. En renforçant les capacités des communautés, en aidant au relèvement et en améliorant la sécurité, on cherche aussi à offrir une autre solution aux personnes déplacées qui se trouvent dans des camps.

49. Cette politique de retour volontaire des personnes déplacées à l'intérieur du pays revêt une importance cruciale. De nombreux camps deviendront inhabitables pendant la saison des pluies à cause de la contamination de l'eau potable par les eaux usées, de l'insuffisance des abris et des difficultés d'accès pour les convois de secours. En outre, si une partie de la population reste dans les camps, les champs ne seront plus cultivés. La récolte a déjà été

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perdue et il est probable que la saison des plantations sera également manquée dans de nombreuses régions. Cela signifie que la communauté internationale devra fournir une aide alimentaire pendant une deuxième saison. La réinstallation des personnes déplacées et la reprise de la production agricole sont indispensables au succès des efforts du Gouvernement pour relever le pays. Plus les Rwandais resteront dans les camps, plus le processus de relèvement sera long. Il y a maintenant des convois réguliers qui transportent de Cyangugu, dans le sud-ouest, à Butare, Gikongoro et Kigali, ceux qui désirent se réinstaller chez eux. Entre le 7 et le 23 septembre, 3 337 personnes environ ont été rapatriées à partir de Cyangugu. D'autres ont été rapatriées à partir du nord-ouest.

50. Maintenant que le pays s'efforce de retourner à la normale, il faut accorder une attention croissante à la transition entre les secours d'urgence et l'aide au relèvement. Le Gouvernement doit faire face à une tâche colossale qui consiste à reconstruire le pays après une guerre dévastatrice avec des ressources financières et humaines presque inexistantes. Il est indispensable que la communauté internationale fournisse une aide au relèvement rapide et efficace. À ce propos, le Représentant spécial du Secrétaire général, Secrétaire général adjoint aux affaires humanitaires, a communiqué aux pays donateurs, aux organismes et aux organisations non gouvernementales le plan de normalisation d'urgence du Rwanda, qui définit les domaines dans lesquels une assistance à la fois financière et technique sera initialement nécessaire. Le PNUD a mis sur pied des projets initiaux destinés à accroître les moyens d'action des ministères. D'autres organismes des Nations Unies participent à ce processus dans leurs domaines de compétence respectifs. Grâce à ces efforts, l'infrastructure s'améliore. Des services essentiels tels que l'alimentation en électricité et en eau ont été rétablis à Kigali et sont en voie de l'être dans le reste du pays.

51. Un des principaux obstacles au relèvement est la présence de mines. On estime qu'il y a au Rwanda entre 50 000 et 60 000 mines terrestres qui font en moyenne deux victimes par jour parmi les civils. Des experts des Nations Unies en matière de déminage se sont rendus au Rwanda pour évaluer l'étendue du problème. Lorsque la situation en matière de sécurité sera stabilisée et que le déminage pourra commencer, l'ONU s'entendra avec tous les intéressés pour fournir une assistance dans ce domaine.

52. Sans une réconciliation entre les différentes parties au conflit, il est probable que les opérations humanitaires traîneront en longueur, seront difficiles et, en fin de compte, exigeront de plus grands efforts de la part de la communauté internationale. Ce point est directement lié aux activités en matière de droits de l'homme examinées dans le chapitre III ci-dessus.

53. Il est évident que la crise du Rwanda et ses répercussions sur les pays voisins a de graves implications politiques, économiques, sociales et environnementales pour le Burundi, la République-Unie de Tanzanie, le Zaïre et l'Ouganda. Pour évaluer les mérites d'une approche régionale plus large et plus globale du problème rwandais, j'ai nommé M. Robert Dillon mon Envoyé humanitaire spécial pour le Rwanda et le Burundi. L'Envoyé spécial s'est rendu dans la région du 8 au 22 septembre et m'a soumis ses recommandations.

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54. L'appel interinstitutions commun des Nations Unies en faveur des personnes touchées par la crise au Rwanda a été lancé le 22 juillet 1994. Au total 435 millions de dollars ont été demandés pour permettre aux organismes des Nations Unies d'exécuter leurs programmes humanitaires. Ce chiffre a été porté à 552 millions de dollars compte tenu de l'augmentation des besoins. Au 1er septembre, les contributions reçues se montaient à 384 millions de dollars, soit 70 % du montant total nécessaire. D'après les informations reçues du Département des affaires humanitaires, les contributions bilatérales et autres contributions directes pour la crise du Rwanda, y compris celles versées en réponse à l'appel, portent le montant total des contributions à 762 millions de dollars.

55. La réaction de la communauté internationale à la crise du Rwanda a été encourageante et a permis d'éviter ce qui aurait pu être un désastre humanitaire majeur dans le sud-ouest. Il est indispensable que ce soutien se maintienne alors que nous entrons dans une période délicate de réconciliation et de relèvement. Pour sa part, l'ONU poursuivra ses efforts pour assurer dans un cadre approprié la coordination de l'assistance humanitaire et la transition vers la reconstruction et le développement.

#### VIII. ASPECTS FINANCIERS

56. Par sa résolution 48/248 du 5 avril 1994, l'Assemblée générale m'a autorisé à engager, pour la MINUAR, des dépenses jusqu'à concurrence d'un montant brut de 9 082 600 dollars (soit un montant net de 8 881 000 dollars) par mois pour la période allant du 5 avril au 31 octobre 1994, sous réserve que le Conseil de sécurité décide de proroger le mandat de la Mission d'assistance au-delà du 4 avril 1994. Par sa résolution 925 (1994) du 8 juin 1994, le Conseil a décidé notamment de proroger le mandat de la MINUAR jusqu'au 9 décembre 1994.

57. Par sa décision 48/479 B du 14 septembre 1994, l'Assemblée générale m'a autorisé à engager des dépenses, pour répondre aux besoins opérationnels immédiats de la MINUAR, jusqu'à concurrence d'un montant brut de 37 182 100 dollars (soit un montant net de 38 043 200 dollars) pour la période allant du 5 avril au 30 septembre 1994, en sus du crédit d'un montant brut total de 62 367 187 dollars (soit un montant net de 60 982 867 dollars) déjà ouvert aux termes de sa résolution 48/248.

58. Le rapport sur le financement de la MINUAR que je dois présenter à l'Assemblée générale à sa quarante-neuvième session indique que le coût des opérations de la MINUAR pour la période allant du 5 avril au 9 décembre 1994 est estimé à 179,6 millions de dollars, compte tenu des contributions volontaires en nature, d'un montant de 4,5 millions de dollars, annoncées par les États Membres. Mon rapport indique également que les prévisions de dépenses pour la période allant du 10 décembre 1994 au 9 décembre 1995 s'élèvent à 20 millions de dollars par mois. Ces prévisions sont fondées sur les décisions actuelles concernant les effectifs et le mandat de la MINUAR. Sur la base de ces prévisions de dépenses, j'ai demandé à l'Assemblée de fournir les ressources nécessaires pour le maintien de la MINUAR, au cas où le Conseil de sécurité déciderait de proroger le mandat de la Mission au-delà du 9 décembre 1994.

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59. Au 27 septembre 1994, les contributions non acquittées au compte spécial de la MINUAR depuis le début de la Mission se montaient à 30 millions de dollars. Le montant des contributions non acquittées pour toutes les opérations de maintien de la paix à cette date s'élevaient à 1,9 milliard de dollars.

#### IX. OBSERVATIONS ET RECOMMANDATIONS

60. Certains signes indiquent que la situation au Rwanda se stabilise et revient lentement à la normale. Il y a évidemment de sérieux obstacles à surmonter sur la longue route menant de la guerre et de carnage qui ont dévasté le pays, traumatisé et éprouvé sa population, et détruit ses institutions, jusqu'à son relèvement. La tâche la plus urgente est toujours de résoudre la crise humanitaire massive, et notamment les problèmes auxquels sont confrontés les réfugiés rwandais au Zaïre et en République-Unie de Tanzanie. Les actes d'intimidation et de violence qui se sont produits dans les camps de réfugiés ont empêché la population de réfugiés de choisir de regagner ses foyers. Le Gouvernement s'efforce de trouver une solution à ces problèmes, avec l'appui des organismes et des programmes des Nations Unies sur le terrain, coordonnés par mon Représentant spécial. Il devra déployer des efforts résolus afin de créer les conditions permettant aux réfugiés et aux personnes déplacées de regagner leurs foyers dans la sécurité et la dignité. En fait, si l'assurance ne leur est pas donnée que leurs droits fondamentaux seront respectés, il est peu probable qu'ils rentreront chez eux. À ce sujet, j'ai indiqué au Gouvernement rwandais, par l'intermédiaire de mon Représentant spécial, qu'il était nécessaire d'élargir les efforts en vue de la réconciliation nationale. Je suis encouragé par le fait que le Gouvernement a pris des mesures concrètes dans cette voie et demande instamment à la communauté internationale d'appuyer ses efforts et de l'encourager afin de faire en sorte que son action soit à la fois sincère et globale.

61. Je souscris à la recommandation faite par la Commission d'experts dans son rapport préliminaire, tendant à ce que les personnes soupçonnées d'infractions graves au droit international humanitaire, de crimes contre l'humanité et d'actes de génocide soient jugées par un tribunal pénal international. La Commission juge préférable d'élargir la juridiction du Tribunal pénal international pour l'ex-Yougoslavie, afin qu'il ait compétence pour les crimes internationaux commis au Rwanda à partir du 6 avril, plutôt que de créer un tribunal international spécial. Il appartient maintenant au Conseil de sécurité de décider de la ligne d'action à adopter.

62. La reconstruction des infrastructures sociales et économiques du pays figure parmi les nombreuses tâches auxquelles sont confrontés le nouveau Gouvernement et le peuple rwandais. Le Rwanda devra recevoir d'urgence une assistance technique et financière extérieure massive, afin de créer la stabilité, de rétablir les services de base et de remettre l'économie en état. Les organismes donateurs ont effectué la planification initiale requise avant qu'une assistance puisse être fournie pour les projets de reconstruction et les infrastructures de base commencent à être remises en état. Je demande donc instamment aux gouvernements donateurs et aux organismes internationaux d'assurer d'urgence la mise en oeuvre de leurs programmes d'assistance au Rwanda. Un aspect qui prend rapidement un caractère d'urgence est le fait que

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le Gouvernement ne dispose d'aucun fonds pour rétablir ne serait-ce que l'administration la plus rudimentaire et rémunérer ses fonctionnaires. Il est indispensable d'organiser au moins une assistance de soudure afin de fournir des secours par des voies bilatérales ou par l'intermédiaire des institutions financières internationales. Dans ce contexte, je demande aux donateurs bilatéraux d'examiner les moyens d'aider le Gouvernement à régler le problème de ses arriérés avec la Banque mondiale, de sorte qu'il puisse avoir accès aux ressources de cette institution. Je demande aussi instamment aux États Membres de verser des contributions généreuses au Fonds d'affectation spéciale que j'ai créé le 14 juillet 1994, afin de financer les programmes d'aide humanitaire et de relèvement à mettre en oeuvre au Rwanda. Il serait également utile que les gouvernements communiquent à l'ONU des informations sur leurs programmes d'assistance bilatéraux, de manière à coordonner les actions menées afin de répondre aux besoins du Rwanda.

63. L'établissement d'une paix et d'une stabilité durables au Rwanda exige une véritable réconciliation entre tous les éléments de la société rwandaise. Les réfugiés et les personnes déplacées doivent avoir la possibilité de regagner leurs foyers dans la paix, la sécurité et la dignité. Les droits de l'homme et les droits civiques de tous les Rwandais doivent être respectés. Je demande instamment au nouveau gouvernement de maintenir le dialogue avec tous les autres groupes politiques au Rwanda, y compris les membres de l'ancien gouvernement, à l'exception des personnes sur lesquelles des éléments de preuve ont été réunis, qui permettent d'établir, suivant la procédure prévue par la loi, qu'elles ont participé directement à des actes de génocide. C'est le seul moyen pour le pays de parvenir à une stabilité politique durable dans le respect des principes des Accords d'Arusha.

64. L'évolution de la situation au Rwanda et alentour justifie l'adoption d'une approche élargie de la question de la réconciliation nationale et des autres aspects de la crise. Le Conseil se rappellera que la Mission qu'il a dépêchée au Burundi, les 13 et 14 août 1994, a notamment recommandé de convoquer une conférence internationale afin d'examiner les problèmes de la sous-région. Je continuerai de consulter toutes les parties intéressées, afin de déterminer de quelle manière l'ONU pourrait contribuer à la préparation et à la convocation d'une telle conférence.

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# ROUTING SLIP

TO:

A:

*Sammy*

FROM:

DE:

*Kristen*

Date

*25 SEPT*

Room No. - No de bureau

Extension - Poste

FOR ACTION

FOR APPROVAL

FOR SIGNATURE

FOR COMMENTS

MAY WE DISCUSS?

YOUR ATTENTION

AS DISCUSSED

AS REQUESTED

NOTE AND RETURN

FOR INFORMATION

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*Proposed intro  
report*

## INTRODUCTION

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3.

The situation evolved from one in which the RGF, as the Government force/national army, resisted attacks by the RPF, a rebel force, and during which the two forces struggled to reach an equilibrium. One side prevailed, and the situation evolved and even reversed itself, the RPF evolving into the Government force/national army, and the RGF into the rebel force.

The situation developed from one in which two forces struggled for power to one in which there was one power base that remained. The option of negotiating a bilateral cease-fire in mid-July represented an excellent opportunity for the RPF to make a very important step towards national reconciliation. A bilateral, negotiated cease-fire would have created a more stable atmosphere and a more durable political solution in Rwanda. Unfortunately, the RGF was forced to flee Rwanda, and half a million refugees took flight in fear, creating a humanitarian, and later, a security and political crisis in Zaire. The security problem in Zaire has not been addressed and, as a result, it has engendered even more serious and more complicated dilemmas. During my Special Representative's meeting with President Museveni in Kampala during the first week of August, President Museveni advised the following:

-The first and immediate step should be to go into the Zairean camps and "arrest the criminals." If they cannot be arrested or detained, at least the people in the camps should be separated into: a) those who are suspected of massacres; b) RGF troops; and c) general population. The first step, he said, was to catch the criminals. Until that is done, he said there can be no political reconciliation nor any durable peace.

-The problems of power-sharing and ethnic division must be resolved immediately in Rwanda. If they are not, these problems may infect neighbouring countries and expand the conflict to regional proportions. The international community and the UN should not wait for the Hutus in Burundi to create their "RPF".

4. Operation Prevention: Finding itself with a humanitarian crisis in Goma with 20,000 deaths, UNAMIR concentrated its efforts in the first weeks of August on stabilizing Sector 4 in order to prevent a second humanitarian exodus to Bukavu. Operation Prevention functioned on the following three levels:

-Military: The Military worked, in coordination with the U.S. Government and with troop donor countries, to airlift and deploy troops rapidly before the departure of Operation Turquoise.

## ROUTING SLIP

## FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

TO: A: <i>Sammy Buo</i>		
FROM: DE: <i>Kristen Scott</i>		
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*Draft Political Section  
of SG Report to S-C*

*For your review*

Draft

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL  
TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL

POLITICAL

1. The Arusha Peace Agreement:

The Arusha Peace Agreement (see A/48/824-S/26915) was signed on 4 August 1993 in an effort to find a durable solution to the Rwandese situation through the pluralistic approach of a multi-party transitional government which would govern until the organization of free elections. The resistance of the Habyarimana regime to implement Arusha in its entirety could give rise to the theory that the Arusha Peace Agreement was not signed willingly. Perhaps some of its signatories were pressured into signing the agreement and thus did not sign in good faith. Whether this theory is accurate or not, it is evident that there were extremist elements whose objective it was to derail and even destroy the Arusha peace process. The death of President Habyarimana on 6 April was certainly a violent departure from the spirit of compromise and reconciliation that had characterized the Arusha process.

2. The Broad-Based Government of National Unity:

The Broad-Based Government of National Unity (BBGNU) was installed in Kigali on 19 July 1994. The Government, which has granted itself a mandate of five years, is composed of the following party affiliations:

- FPR: Front Patriotique Rwandais (Rwandan Patriotic Front)
- MDR: Mouvement democratique republicain (Democratic Republican Movement)
- PSD: Parti socialiste democrate (Social Democrat Party)
- PDC: Parti democrate chretien (Christian Democrat Party)
- PL : Parti liberal (Liberal Party).

The Government excludes the former governing party, the Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le developpement (MRND), as well as an openly anti-Tutsi party, the Coalition pour la defense de la Republique (CDR). The BBGNU has informed my Special Representative, however, that it has offered several cabinet posts to members of MRND who have refused the offers. Of the top four portfolios (ministerial posts), three of the four are RPF members. Also out of the top four posts, three of the four are from the Hutu ethnic group.

The Government, since taking office, has encouraged refugees and displaced people to return home by giving the following assurances:

- (a) Refugees need not fear reprisals. Refugees returning home from Goma will not be screened.
- (b) Refugees and displaced persons can return to their homes, properties, farms, etc. If these have been occupied by others, unauthorized occupants will be forcibly ejected.
- (c) Criminals should be prosecuted according to a process of law. The Commission of Experts should begin their work immediately.
- (d) The Government is encouraging civilian officials to return to their previous posts and encouraging ex-RGF members to present themselves for registration and integration into the national army.
- (e) The Government will give full cooperation to United Nations efforts to encourage refugee return by working in close coordination with UNAMIR regarding: the transport of returnees; the rehabilitation of infrastructure (electricity, etc.); and by facilitating the freedom of movement for United Nations personnel carrying out their functions.

In order to project these assurances to the population of Sector 4, the Government undertook the following missions, in coordination with my Special Representative, as part of a confidence-building political initiative:

1. 14 August: Kibuye: The Ministers of Interior, Rehabilitation and Public Works travelled to Kibuye to address the population's concerns and provide reassurance. The reception was positive, though in Kibuye Stadium there were elements whom the Government officials believed were extremists (even Interahamwe) sent expressly to disrupt the meeting and express dissent. In the audience, there was some positive response, however, there was also some hostility and tension.
2. 16 August: Gikongoro: This time, the reception was more positive than it had been in Kibuye. The Ministers of Interior, of Rehabilitation and Social Integration, of Public Works and of Agriculture were in attendance. The first meeting was held with a group of civilian administrators (bourgmestres and prefets) who requested information about returning to their posts.

The Government has since taken steps to facilitate the return of these administrators to their former posts in Sector 4. The second meeting was held at the market of Gikongoro. There were at least 3000 people in attendance, and the audience again asked difficult, frank questions regarding the judicial process for those accused of massacres, the recuperation of private property and the security situation in general.

3. 18 August: Cyangugu: The Rwandan Government visited Cyangugu as part of their "confidence-building" effort. They explained that the forces of intimidation who are inciting and threatening people to flee are, in fact, murderers who are responsible for massacres and who robbed the state before fleeing to Zaire. They explained that they did not understand why people would heed the advice of such criminal elements. The questions from the audience, were, obviously, very direct, and the Government responded accordingly and convincingly.

The results of these missions were very positive. We know that many people returned as a direct result of these Government visits.

Despite the positive efforts described above, the Government, in reference to the above-listed assurances, must make more of an effort to match their words with action on the ground. The most telling example of this lack of action on the ground is the fact that many returnees are returning to find their property and businesses occupied. There is currently no legal process in place nor any effort made to restore property to owners. This represents a serious practical impediment to the return of refugees, and, equally important, it casts doubt on the credibility of the Government's assurances.

### 3. Human Rights:

Though many leaders, including President Museveni, were sounding warnings long ago that it was critical that immediate steps be taken to catch the perpetrators of the massacres, thus far, no concrete progress has been made in this regard. There has thus far been no attempt to identify suspects who may be hiding in Zairean refugee camps, nor has there been any progress towards the formation of an international tribunal. The international community is beginning to show concern about the present human rights situation in Rwanda; the newly-appointed Coordinator for Human Rights Operations and his staff are tasked to investigate allegations of reprisals, disappearances and other extra-judicial incidents which may surface on a daily basis.

The Government is justifiably disillusioned and disappointed by what they perceive is an unbalanced approach to the human rights situation in Rwanda.

The Government's position is that it is imperative that criminals be punished for their crimes. If criminals are allowed to go unpunished, and indeed, continue to participate in murder and banditry, it will most probably lead to extra-judicial reprisals against those suspected of crimes, against their family members and perhaps even against those of the same ethnic group. Thus, the lack of rapid and decisive action on the part of the international community regarding the punishment of the perpetrators of the massacres, in the opinion of the Government, has engendered and even encouraged extra-judicial reprisals in Rwanda.

#### 4. Zaire and Tanzania:

The Government of Zaire, in a joint communique with the Rwandese Government and on several other occasions, has said the following: a) Zairean territory will not be used to destabilize Rwanda; and b) Zaire will facilitate the return of refugees.

Despite these assurances, UNAMIR continues to receive reports of banditry, extortion and intimidation in refugee camps in Goma by Zairean soldiers, ex-RGF elements and other extremist elements. President Bizimungu has asked UNHCR to do all it can to curb the intimidation and banditry in the camps, however, UNHCR is not mandated to provide security in this manner.

I therefore requested my Special Representative to undertake a mission to Zaire and Tanzania. This mission produced the following results:

- in Zaire, it was agreed that teams comprising representatives of UNAMIR, the Zairean Government and UNHCR, will visit Zaire, hopefully in the coming week, to identify potential sites for the relocation of RGF soldiers. These teams would also make an assessment of logistical and financial requirements. The Zairean President also was receptive to the suggestion of UNAMIR security in the camps.
- in Tanzania, my Special Representative held parallel discussions with President Mwinyi regarding the camps in his country. The President answered that he would study the question and consult members of his Cabinet before giving his response.



#### 5. Political reconciliation:

Political reconciliation is the most important element in a durable solution for peace in Rwanda. Humanitarian efforts, reconstruction and development, and the establishment of a police force to maintain security can only provide limited stability to Rwanda. Some leaders of the former regime are still active in the border areas of Zaire, and rumors continue that some elements are reportedly planning border incursions and guerilla activity. The Rwandese government must make efforts at reconciliation and to stimulate the return of all refugees. Such efforts might be long, arduous and would require concerted efforts by the international community and the United Nations, however, this process is vital to any durable solution in Rwanda.

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Security Council

Distr.  
GENERAL

S/1994/.....  
.... August 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

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**PROGRESS REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE EXPANDED  
UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA**

**INTRODUCTION**

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of operative paragraphs 17 and 11 of Security Council resolutions 925 (1994) of 8 June and 929 (1994) of 22 June, respectively, by which the Council requested the Secretary-General to report to it by 9 August on the progress made by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in the discharge of its mandate, including progress towards a cease-fire and the resumption of the political settlement process, the deployment of the expanded UNAMIR and the humanitarian situation.

2. Since the adoption of the above-mentioned resolutions, the Secretary-General

to that battered country. The principles and goals that the Council has outlined towards that end, and which have guided the efforts of the United Nations, have included the reaffirmation of the unity and territorial integrity of Rwanda, recommitment to the Arusha Peace Agreement as the basis for a political solution, cooperation with regional leaders and institutions, agreement on a cease-fire, humanitarian assistance and protection for all Rwandese in need, including condemnation of genocide and punishment of its perpetrators.

6. Since the civil war resumed and the peace process broke down in the wake of the tragic events of 6 April, the Security Council, from the very beginning, emphasized the priority need for an immediate cease-fire. Stopping the killings, including the wanton violence and carnage affecting civilians that so much horrified and shocked the world, was conceived not as the only objective of a cease-fire but as an effective way towards containing the humanitarian crisis and contributing to the creation of a more propitious climate in which efforts to revive the peace process could be pursued. Consequently, upon his arrival in Rwanda on 4 July to assume his duties as my new Special Representative, Mr. Shaharyar M. Khan, in his dealings with the civilian and military leadership of the belligerent parties, focused his immediate attention on efforts to secure their agreement to a cease-fire.

7. Following the Security Council's demand on 14 July for an immediate and unconditional cease-fire and its invitation to the parties to report to the Force Commander of UNAMIR on their actions in this respect, Mr. Khan and the Force Commander, Major General Romeo Dallaire, met on 15 July in Kigali with Major General Paul Kagame, the then Chief of Staff of the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA), who indicated that the RPF would declare "tonight or tomorrow" a unilateral cease-fire with conditions. The following day, on 16 July, General Dallaire met in Goma (Zaire), with Major General Augustin Bizimungu, the Chief of Staff of the RGF, to ascertain the RGF's position on the Security Council's demand and on the RPF's intention to announce a unilateral cease-fire with conditions, though the conditions

were unspecified. General Bizimungu informed General Dallaire that the RGF was ready to accept an immediate and unconditional cease-fire as called for by the Council. He was however concerned about the response of the RPA which had reiterated its plan to declare a unilateral and conditional cease-fire. He said that although he did not regard a unilateral and conditional cease-fire as constituting a genuine cease-fire, the RGF would be prepared, in the interest of bringing hostilities to an end, to welcome the RPF's unilateral cease-fire declaration and to take up separately with UNAMIR, the issue of the implementation of the conditions that were expected to accompany the declaration.

8. It is regrettable that the Security Council's 14 July call was not heeded and that the unilateral cease-fire declaration the RPA promised to make on 15 or 16 July also did not come when expected. Had these measures been taken, perhaps the humanitarian catastrophe that began to unfold on 13 July when over a million Rwandese refugees started crossing their western border into Zaire, might have been averted or, at least minimized. As the Security Council observed in its presidential statement of 14 July, the continued fighting in Rwanda "is causing a massive exodus of the population", contributing to a situation which "may lead very quickly to a further humanitarian disaster and endanger the stability of the region since the flow of these refugees is seriously affecting the neighbouring countries".

9. In one of the many tragic twists of the Rwandese conflict, the deadlocked peace process, which a cease-fire was expected to help revive was, at the same time, a major impediment to progress in securing a cease-fire. With the RPF maintaining its refusal to recognize or to meet with the Interim Government installed on 9 April despite its many offers for negotiations and a cease-fire, efforts spearheaded largely by UNAMIR to negotiate a cease-fire accord were severely impaired. Although UNAMIR succeeded in convening, under its auspices, discussions with the military delegations of the two parties to consider technical modalities for a cease-fire, these efforts eventually proved inconclusive and of limited value in the absence of a political accord

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on the cease-fire itself.

10. Despite the intensive intermediary initiatives and other efforts undertaken by my Special Representative with a view to drawing the two parties closer towards an agreement to halt hostilities and to resume the peace process, the continuation of the fighting, generating and sustaining a momentum of its own, seemed to make it even more difficult to get the protagonists to agree to stop and to begin dialogue. Even their commitment to the Arusha Peace Agreement which both of them had signed barely a year ago as the framework for peace in Rwanda, became more nuanced than categorical. In discussions that my Special Representative held with their respective leaders, both signatories reaffirmed their commitment in principle to the Agreement but called for revisions to be made to it. The RPF wanted the Agreement updated to reflect the new realities on the ground, such as its dominant military position, and the changes that had taken place in the year since the accord was signed. The Interim Government, for its part, wanted the Arusha agreement renegotiated to include two new elements, namely the "ethnic problem in Rwanda" and Uganda's alleged "aggression" against Rwanda in support of the RPF. For the interim authorities, Rwanda's crisis was fundamentally ethnic in origin as shown by the fact that millions of Hutus, the majority ethnic group, had fled and continued to flee to neighbouring countries as refugees away from the advancing forces of the Tutsi-dominated RPF. Any proposed solution that did not recognize that situation, they underlined, would be unrealistic and hence unimplementable.

11. While both signatories called for revision to the Arusha peace accords, agreement could not be found on the procedures for doing so since one party, the RPF, continued to refuse to negotiate with the Interim Government. Consequently, the peace stalemate and the war continued.

12. Meanwhile, as the RPA continued to advance on the battlefield and the RGF continued to suffer setbacks, some stirrings of political activity began to be felt in

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Kigali following its capture by the RPA on 4 July. Subsequently, Mr Faustin Twagiramungu, named in the Arusha Peace Agreement as Prime Minister Designate of a future Broad-Based Transitional Government (BBTG), informed my Special Representative that he planned to arrive in Kigali on 14 July to begin consultations with various political parties and forces with a view to putting in place a Government.

13. Upon his arrival in Kigali on 14 July, Mr. Twagiramungu held discussions with my Special Representative shortly thereafter and has met with him several times since then. From my Special Representative's discussions with him and with the RPF leadership, it began to emerge, by 16 July, that the Arusha peace process, both in form and in substance, would be adjusted. Significantly, the centre-stage in the political process would no longer be reserved for the two parties to the Arusha Peace Agreement. Rather, one of them, the Interim Government and its dominant political party, the MRND, would be excluded from the new political dispensation being put together by the other political parties that had been in opposition to the MRND, namely RPF, MDR, PSD, PDC and PL.

14. The political orientation of the militarily victorious RPF and its political allies became clearer on 18 July when the RPF announced over national radio the main elements of the thinking and government structure they planned to implement including:

- Attachment to the basic principles of the Arusha Peace Agreement, including the rule of law, the formation of a national army and the installation of a Broad-Based Transitional Government based on the principle of power sharing.
- Installation of a broad-based transitional government of national unity to be headed by Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu, comprising the same number of ministerial posts assigned in the Arusha Peace Agreement to a future BBTG, but including a new post of Vice-President which would be held cumulatively with a

ministerial portfolio.

- The post of President of the Republic reserved for the MRND party in the Arusha accords, would be given to the RPF, in the person of Mr. Pasteur Bizimungu.
- The Legislative Assembly (parliament) would be put in place within a month of the installation of the Government and its members shall be nominated by the parties recognised in the Arusha accords, excluding those parties banned by the RPF (MRND, CDR, etc) because of their alleged involvement in massacres.
- The transitional period shall last five years.
- In accordance with the Arusha Peace Agreement, a national army shall be formed to carry out the tasks defined in the Agreement. Unlike in the Arusha accords, RGF elements would not automatically qualify for integration because of their continued service in support of the Interim Government. However, interested RGF members would be carefully screened individually to determine their suitability for integration.

15. The Broad-Based Transitional Government of National Unity was officially installed in Kigali on 19 July. Mr. Pasteur Bizimungu took the oath of office as President with Major General Paul Kagame as Vice President, a post he would hold concurrently with that of Minister of Defence. In announcing the composition of the Government, the Prime Minister, Mr. Faustin Twagiramungu, announced also the appointment of Colonel Alexis Kanyarengwe, the RPF Chairman, as Deputy Prime Minister, a position he would exercise cumulatively with his cabinet portfolio as Minister of the Public Service. (The distribution of the ..... cabinet positions by political party is as follows:)

16. Among observers at the installation ceremony was a Ugandan Government



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delegation headed by the Prime Minister. My Special Representative in Rwanda, Mr. Shaharyar Khan, represented me and read my message in which I stressed the imperative need for peace, justice, harmony, unity and, above all, reconciliation if Rwanda was to leave forever behind the nightmare of yesterday and rise to the dawn of a new and more hopeful future. In this connection, I stated that the Arusha accords provide the framework for the restoration of peace and democracy in a spirit of mutual accommodation and understanding.

17. The objectives of the United Nations in Rwanda are to promote the restoration of peace and to help provide humanitarian relief and protection for Rwandese in need and/or at risk. My Special Representative and I are following closely all the important developments taking place in this continually evolving situation. In this connection, my Special Representative has already met with senior officials of the new administration in Kigali, to.....

## II. MILITARY ASPECTS

18. As was mentioned, earlier, above, the RPA appears to have taken control of all but the westernmost parts of Rwanda and is currently advancing along a line running approximately from 30 km east of Gisenyi in the north to the general area of Gikongoro in the south. The RGF continues to have difficulty both in mounting offensive operations and in repulsing attacks against its positions. Consequently, it has consistently withdrawn in the face of RPF attacks.

19. With RPA's capture of Kigali, the capital and largest city on 4 July and Butare, the second largest city, on 5 July, there was a noticeable lull in the fighting on most fronts over a few days, followed by renewed RPF offensive operations in the northeast, around the city of Ruhengeri which fell to the Front on 14 July. With its loss of Ruhengeri, the RGF withdrew and concentrated its forces in and around Gisenyi in the north-west, eventually appearing to pull back to Kibuye in the centre,

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as the RPA began advancing towards Gisenyi. The RGF is now believed to have established a line bulging out eastwards, towards Kabaya although their hold in Gisenyi is tenuous as the RPA have all but surrounded it.

20. With the declaration by the RPA on 18 July of a unilateral cease-fire, the military positions of the belligerent forces have settled into uneasy stability. What is certain, however, is that the RGF has very little fighting capacity left and is keen to maintain the present cease-fire. The RGF Chief of Staff has indicated that his forces are virtually out of ammunition, a situation he has blamed on the arms embargo imposed by the Security Council. In his view, the embargo favoured the RPA since the Front was able to continue to receive massive military support from Uganda. In terms of personnel, the RPA is reported to be attracting large numbers of recruits with relative ease while the RGF, on the other hand, is said to be experiencing a rising rate of desertions. The RGF's medical resources are also stretched beyond its capacity.

21. Both sides have indicated that they would like UNAMIR to monitor the cease-fire. Although such a task would certainly fall within the framework of its expanded mandate, I am concerned that UNAMIR, at the present stage, may not be in a position to discharge that aspect of its mandate effectively, due to a continuing shortage of military personnel and equipment. It would be deeply regrettable if the cease-fire that the international community, and Rwanda in particular, have waited for such a long time were to be hampered in its implementation by the international community itself through its failure to bring the expanded UNAMIR force up to the level approved by the Security Council more than ten weeks ago. Fewer than twenty per cent of the total number of 5,500 forces authorized by the Council for the expanded UNAMIR, have been deployed so far. This is a critical shortfall and one that severely limits the ability of the Mission to discharge its mandate effectively. I wish therefore to join the Security Council in appealing once again to Member States to respond urgently to the requests I have made and reiterated on several occasions for resources, including troops, equipment and logistical support, to help bring the expanded UNAMIR up to

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the authorized strength.

### **III. COORDINATION AND LIAISON WITH THE MULTINATIONAL HUMANITARIAN OPERATION**

22. Since it launched its activities in Rwanda nearly six weeks ago, the French-led multinational humanitarian operation ("Operation Turquoise") has continued and indeed intensified its cooperation with UNAMIR. To facilitate such cooperation, appropriate coordination mechanisms have been set up. These comprise UNAMIR liaison team of six military observers attached to the Operation's command headquarters at Goma (Zaire) to follow also its activities in northern Rwanda, and a UNAMIR liaison team of 6 observers deployed at the Operation's southern base in Bukavu (Zaire), to monitor activities in southern Rwanda, including in particular the humanitarian protection zone established in southwestern Rwanda, around the city of Gikongoro. The multinational operation has, on its part, set up a six-member liaison unit at UNAMIR Headquarters in Kigali.

23. A leading role in enhancing coordination and liaison activities between Operation Turquoise and UNAMIR continues to be played by the respective Force Commanders, Brigadier General Lafourcade and Major General Dallaire. The two Commanders meet often and are also on almost daily telephone and telefax contact with each other. In this way, they consult on ongoing or planned activities and update each other on issues or developments of mutual interest. One such issue has been the continuing build-up of UNAMIR's expanded force. Since UNAMIR is expected to take over the activities of Operation Turquoise after its Security Council - approved two-month mission ends on or around 22 August, the UNAMIR Force Commander keeps the Commander of Operation Turquoise regularly informed of build-up progress, so as to facilitate a smooth handover operation. In this connection, the UNAMIR Force Commander has recently indicated to the Commander of Operation Turquoise that due to the slow pace of UNAMIR's force build-up, it will not be in a

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position to take over from the multinational force before the latter part of the handover phase. Nevertheless, the two Commanders have agreed that a small group of UNAMIR military officers can begin patrolling in Operation Turquoise-held areas in the southwest, and under its protection, in order to carry out a complete operational assessment, including security and logistic aspects, of the requirements UNAMIR would be expected to meet when it takes over.

#### IV. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

24. The already catastrophic humanitarian situation that has made the Rwandese case one of the most unprecedented in recent memory has continued to deteriorate as the fighting has continued. With the intensified fighting in recent weeks that preceded and followed the fall of large cities and towns such as Kigali, Butare, Ruhengeri and Gisenyi, millions of additional Rwandese refugees and displaced persons have recently joined the previous major wave of their fellow citizens who fled in April/May. Particularly dramatic was the in flow into Zaire of an estimated one million Rwandese refugees in a period of a few days, beginning on 13 July. The magnitude and suddenness of the arrivals overwhelmed their generous hosts and may even have caught the international community, especially the humanitarian agencies, largely unprepared.

25. One of the tragic ironies of Rwanda's plight is the fact that the wanton, widespread and brutal nature of the crisis may have created such anarchic conditions of insecurity as to discourage or keep out humanitarian relief operations just when they were most needed.

26. Through the sustained and often graphic coverage the media has given to the story, the humanitarian tragedy in Rwanda has reached and touched the four corners of our common planet. I therefore join the appeals made by the Security Council for generous assistance to help meet the enormous requirements for coping with this

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gigantic challenge to the international community. I hope also that Member States will respond more rapidly to my requests for resources in terms of troops, equipment and logistic support so that the expanded UNAMIR can soon be brought up to its full strength to enable it to discharge more effectively its humanitarian mandate in Rwanda. I salute the dedicated and courageous staff of the French-led multinational humanitarian operation for the critical role they have played and continue to play in saving and protecting people at risk, often under extremely dangerous conditions. I would also like to pay special tribute to those countries, especially the neighbouring states, which have welcomed, protected and made the suffering Rwandese refugees feel wanted. Their generosity and hospitality has made a difference between life and death, hope and despair for millions of fellow human-beings in need. I hope that international humanitarian agencies will continue to share the heavy responsibility by providing the resources needed.

**SG's appeal for Rwanda: Headquarters to provide text.**

**Violence in refugee camps: Headquarters to provide text.**

## **V. ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE**

Headquarters to provide text.

## **VI. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS**

27. Current indications are that the military part of the bitter and brutal Rwandese civil war is virtually over. This is good news, especially for Rwanda's citizens who, through the immense and unspeakable pain and suffering they have gone through and continue to experience, have borne the brunt of this most cruel episode, in their country's modern historical evolution. With the end of the war, the fighting and other acts of violence, especially against the civilian population, should cease. The recent installation of a Broad-Based Transitional Government of National Unity should serve as an opportunity for consolidating the process of restoring tranquillity and order

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which the ending of hostilities has launched. In concrete terms, the restoration of order should contribute to creating the necessary conditions for the safe return home of millions of Rwandese refugees and displaced people. I am pleased to note that the repatriation of displaced people and refugees figures prominently in the priorities announced by the leadership in Kigali.

28. The important achievements realized in bringing hostilities to an end and beginning the process of reconstruction, constitute positive steps towards the revival of Rwanda's shattered society. But the country remains a troubled land. The structural, infrastructural and institutional destruction as well as the emotional scars resulting from three horrible months of brutal violence are deep. Large numbers of citizens continue to seek refuge in foreign lands. Immediate and long-term prospects relating to the Arusha peace process are unclear. As I said in my message on the occasion of the installation of the Broad-Based Transitional Government of National Unity, the United Nations and indeed the international community as a whole will help Rwanda to consolidate peace, seek harmony and reconciliation, rebuild its infrastructure and establish itself as a country where the rule of law as well as basic human rights and fundamental freedoms are recognized and respect. However, it is the people of Rwanda and their leaders who must bear the primary responsibility in this process.

29. I consider unity and national reconciliation as indispensable and invaluable building blocks if progress is to be made towards constructing a new and more enduring Rwandese national ethos and identity. No challenge seems more compelling and no task more urgent, especially after such a bruising and polarizing civil war, if Rwanda is to leave the painful past behind and to move forward with the confidence that comes from knowing that the people as a whole are aboard the same train and heading in the same direction.

30. Reconciliation can be seen as the glue that holds the pieces together. But it

must be backed by assurances of justice and fairness if the pieces are to stay glued. Those who perpetrated crimes against humanity by participating in the genocide in Rwanda, must be brought to justice. I welcome, in this connection, the active involvement of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and in particular the important steps taken by the Security Council, through the adoption of resolution 935, to set up the necessary mechanisms and procedures towards bringing those responsible to justice. It is therefore essential for Rwandese to refrain from retributive actions outside the framework of the proper judicial process.

31. I remain concerned about the overall political situation, as potentially destabilizing fractures and uncertainties persist. I continue to share the Security Council's conviction that the Arusha peace process provides the appropriate framework for an enduring solution. I have therefore instructed my Special Representative to intensify his efforts within the country and in the region and to this end to consult closely with the Facilitator, the OAU and other regional leaders who continue to play a constructive role in trying to promote a peaceful resolution of the crisis. I call on the Rwandese themselves to demonstrate, in a spirit of national reconciliation and unity, the determination and compromise needed needed to achieve a conclusive breakthrough to lasting peace.

32. In the light of the still evolving situation in Rwanda, I believe UNAMIR's role remains vital, and indeed even more critical than ever. Accordingly, I would like to reiterate yet again my request for contributions of troops, equipment and logistic support to bring UNAMIR up to the necessary strength in order to enable it to discharge more effectively its important mandate.

**Recommendation regarding take-over from Turquoise?**





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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE SITUATION IN RWANDA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of paragraphs 17 and 11 of Security Council resolutions 925 (1994) of 8 June 1994 and 929 (1994) of 22 June 1994 respectively, by which the Council requested the Secretary-General to report to it by 9 August on the progress made by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in the discharge of its mandate, the safety of the population at risk, the humanitarian situation and progress towards a cease-fire and political reconciliation, as well as the deployment of the expanded UNAMIR. The Secretariat presented an oral report to the Council on 7 July pursuant to paragraph 10 of resolution 929 (1994), when the Council was also informed of the arrival at Kigali on 4 July of my new Special Representative, Mr. Shaharyar Khan. Members of the Council have also seen my letter of 1 August 1994 to the President of the Council (S/1994/923) about UNAMIR'S requirements for additional troops and equipment. The present report is based on information available to the Secretariat up to 1 August 1994.

2. Since the adoption of resolutions 925 (1994) and 929 (1994), the situation in Rwanda has been transformed. The Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) has established military control over most of the country. About 1.5 million Rwandese sought refuge in Zaire over a two-week period in July creating a humanitarian crisis of catastrophic proportions. The former "interim Government" fled and on 19 July a broad-based Government of national unity was formed.

II. MILITARY SITUATION

3. The RPF forces took full control of Kigali, the capital, on 4 July, of Butare, the second largest city, on 5 July, and of the former Government's stronghold, Ruhengeri, on 14 July. The retreating Rwandese Government forces concentrated in and around Gisenyi in the north-west, soon withdrawing into Zaire. On 17 July RPF took Gisenyi and on 18 July it unilaterally declared a cease-fire, effectively ending the civil war which had broken out immediately after the death of the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi in a suspicious crash, on 6 April, which led to country-wide massacres of the Hutu population.

and intelligentsia, as well as members of the Tutsi minority and other RPF supporters.

4. As the Security Council is aware, the foremost priority of UNAMIR since the start of the crisis was to bring about a cease-fire and a halt to the carnage. The Force Commander, Major-General Romeo Dallaire, had intensified those efforts since early June, when the two sides initiated cease-fire talks at the military level under UNAMIR's auspices. My new Special Representative made this his first priority upon his arrival at Kigali, establishing direct contact with the leadership of both parties and emphasizing the importance of achieving an immediate cease-fire, especially with a view to preventing further exacerbation of the humanitarian crisis. However, cease-fire negotiations remained stalled until the fall of Gisenyi on 17 July, by which time over a million Rwandese refugees had crossed into Zaire.

5. Although the Deputy Force Commander, Brigadier General Henry Anyidoho had previously succeeded in bringing the two sides together on most of the requirements for a cease-fire, their insistence on including rigid conditions prevented the conclusion of an agreement. On the side of the Rwandese government forces, guarantees were demanded that RPF was not willing to give, while RPF insisted on prior measures to halt the continuing massacres, which the Rwandese government forces professed themselves unable to take. There was also a strong indication that RPF was not prepared for a cease-fire until it had secured its military goals. While at first these appeared to be the control of as much territory as it could secure, the crumbling of the fighting capacity of the Rwandese government forces from late June onwards evidently encouraged RPF to intensify its offensive and take control not only of the capital, but also of the rear areas of the Rwandese government forces up to the Zairian border. Only the "humanitarian protected zone" established by the French task force, "Operation Turquoise" (see para. 7 below), did not come under the control of RPF.

6. The swift RPF advance had the effect of causing large numbers of civilians to take flight from the areas of combat. This displacement of the population might well have been containable, had not panic been caused by deliberately inflammatory broadcasts from radio stations controlled by the "interim Government". These provoked a massive stampede of refugees across the border into Zaire in the north-west, overwhelming humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) whose preparations had anticipated the simultaneous movement of refugees further south. Virtually all the Rwandese government forces retreated in disarray into Zaire, where they no longer comprise an organized fighting force, most of the personnel reportedly having been disarmed by the Zairian authorities, though there are disturbing reports that they are trying to prevent refugees from returning to Rwanda. Thus, for the present, the fighting in Rwanda has ended, with no significant military operations being reported since 18 July.

7. In the course of these events, the Government of France announced on 20 June 1994 its intention to dispatch a force to the region based in Zaire, operating inside Rwanda, to provide protection to the large number of people uprooted from their homes by the fighting, many of whom had fled to Zaire. This operation was authorized by the Security Council.

Charter of the United Nations, in resolution 929 (1994). On 2 July, France announced that Operation Turquoise would establish a "humanitarian protected zone" in the Cyangugu-Kibuye-Gikongoro triangle in south-western Rwanda, covering about one fifth of Rwandese territory. While expressing its strong opposition to the French move, RPF did not seek confrontation with French forces which, on their side, avoided provocation. From the start, close cooperation at all levels was established between UNAMIR and Operation Turquoise with frequent contact between both force commanders. UNAMIR liaison officers were immediately stationed at the headquarters of the French force at Goma, Zaire, with a French liaison office later being established at UNAMIR headquarters at Kigali. Resolution 929 (1994) had authorized the deployment of the French force until 21 August 1994, and, on 11 July, the Prime Minister of France informed the Council and me of the French Government's decision to commence its withdrawal by 31 July.

### III. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

8. The protracted violence in Rwanda has created an almost unprecedented humanitarian crisis. Of a total population of approximately 7 million, as many as 500,000 people have been killed, 3 million displaced internally and more than 2 million have fled to neighbouring countries. Although the flight of people seems to have slowed, the situation remains volatile and extremely fluid. Of particular concern is the possibility of another massive outflow from the humanitarian protected zone in south-west Rwanda when the French forces withdraw.

9. The international community is confronted with four basic humanitarian challenges: to respond to the immediate life-saving needs of refugees; to facilitate the early return of those who have fled their homes; to restore basic infrastructure in Rwanda; and to ensure a smooth transition in the humanitarian protected zone established by French forces.

10. It is hard to describe the horrors faced by those who have fled Rwanda, many of them inspired by propaganda radio broadcasts whose purpose has been to spread fear among the population. The pace of developments and the sheer number of people overwhelmed the capacities of the humanitarian organizations, which were striving valiantly against impossible odds. An outbreak of cholera has already claimed as many as 20,000 lives and remains a continuing threat. Thousands of corpses remain unburied, posing health hazards and endangering ground water sources in the area. The logistics of arranging the daily supply and distribution of 30 million litres of drinking water and 1,000 tons of food are daunting.

11. There is consensus on the necessity of promoting and facilitating the early return of Rwandese to their homes. This is essential given the conditions in the refugee camps and the need within the next two weeks to harvest the crops which traditionally supply 60 per cent of Rwanda's yearly caloric intake. It will require confidence-building measures among the refugees, the establishment of transit depots and the prepositioning of humanitarian supplies, all of which are disturbed by reports that persons and groups from the former "Interim Government" and the Rwandese government forces are intimidating refugees.

Goma camps to prevent them from returning to Rwanda by telling them that they face torture and death at the hands of RPF troops if they do so.

12. The civil conflict in Rwanda has destroyed the country's infrastructure. Short- and medium-term rehabilitation is essential for the absorption of the returnee population as well as the resettlement of the internally displaced. The restoration of electricity, the water supply and telecommunications are the minimum actions needed. It is also important to restore the capacity of the Government to carry out its responsibilities.

13. It is estimated that there are as many as 2 million internally displaced persons in the humanitarian protected zone in south-west Rwanda. An outflow of this group into Zaire would eclipse the current horrors of Goma. To prevent this from happening, it is necessary to ensure the capacity of UNAMIR to take over responsibility in this area and to increase the humanitarian presence and activities there.

14. The actions outlined above must be pursued simultaneously. Failure to respond adequately in any one area of need will weaken the effectiveness of actions in the other interrelated areas.

15. To respond to this complex situation, the United Nations humanitarian organizations, under the leadership of the United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office, have prepared a United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Persons Affected by the Crisis in Rwanda covering emergency and rehabilitation needs until the end of the current year. To support these urgent activities US\$ 434.8 million are required. In launching this appeal on 22 July, I urged the international community to contribute generously and in a timely manner to ensure that vital humanitarian programmes could be implemented. A pledging conference was convened in Geneva on 2 August. I am encouraged by the initial positive response from Governments and, indeed, from ordinary people willing to help, and would like to thank those countries that have already made significant contributions.

16. At my request, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Mr. Peter Hansen, undertook a mission to Rwanda and to the neighbouring region from 24 to 28 July. He was accompanied by senior representatives of all principal United Nations humanitarian organizations as well as from the NGO community. During his mission, Mr. Hansen carried out an assessment of the humanitarian situation and took a number of measures to ensure that the necessary coordination arrangements were in place. These include a clear division of responsibilities among the organizations of the United Nations system, an overall strategy to meet this extraordinary humanitarian challenge as well as a decision to move the headquarters of the United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office from Nairobi to Kigali.

17. Along with my Special Representative in Rwanda, Mr. Hansen met with President Kagame and other senior officials of the new Government in Rwanda to discuss how humanitarian aid could be delivered to all parts of the country, the urgent steps required to re-establish a climate conducive to the return of refugees and displaced persons. It is reassuring that the new Government has indicated its commitment to encourage people to return to Rwanda to ensure

their protection and to permit full access to all those in need throughout the country. Refugees have already started to return to Rwanda.

18. I should like to express my appreciation to all the relief personnel who are working in extremely difficult conditions to meet a humanitarian challenge of this scale. The courageous staff of UNAMIR and the French-led multinational force have played and continue to play a critical role in saving lives and protecting people. I would also like to pay tribute to those neighbouring countries that have accepted and protected Rwandese refugees. Their generosity has made a difference between life and death for millions of fellow human beings in need. At this time, it is essential that the international community mobilize the necessary resources to enable humanitarian organizations to maintain and increase deliveries of urgently needed assistance.

#### IV REVISED OPERATIONAL PLANS OF UNAMIR

19. I have already informed the Council in my letter of 1 August of the deplorable delays in the reinforcement of UNAMIR as authorized by resolution 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994. I shall not repeat my comments beyond stressing that the failure of Member States to reinforce the military component of UNAMIR with the necessary speed severely limited its capacity to reduce the human suffering that accompanied the civil conflict and the deliberate massacres of civilians mainly members of the Hutu opposition and supporters of RPF.

20. With the situation on the ground in Rwanda having changed radically over the past few weeks, UNAMIR has adjusted its operational plans to cope with the altered circumstances within the framework of the mandate established by the Security Council in its resolution 925 (1994). UNAMIR's principal tasks are now as follows:

- (a) To ensure stability and security in the north-western and south-western regions of Rwanda;
- (b) To stabilize and monitor the situation in all regions of Rwanda in order to encourage the return of refugees and the displaced population;
- (c) To provide security and support for humanitarian assistance operations inside Rwanda as humanitarian organizations arrange the return of refugees;
- (d) To promote, through mediation and good offices, national reconciliation in Rwanda.

21. Even with the severely limited resources possessed by UNAMIR, the Mission has already taken action. It has deployed a company along the border near Goma, Zaire as well as a number of observers in that region and in the zone controlled by Operation Turquoise. In the expectation that UNAMIR will eventually receive the 5,500 troops authorized by the Security Council, the Mission is planning deployment in five sectors, as indicated in the present report and as follows:

include the numerous parties that had emerged, leading to elections. Both the "interim Government", established immediately after the death of President Habyarimana on 6 April, as well as RPF, professed some commitment to the principles of the Arusha agreement. However, the "interim Government" took the position that the agreement was based on the fallacious premise that the historic ethnic animosity between the majority Hutu and the minority Tutsi could be resolved by a political formula; the only solution would be an arrangement which could guarantee the rights not only of the minority but also of the majority so that one would not fear domination by the other; this could be achieved neither through military means nor through simple elections. For its part, RPF maintained that while it remained committed to the Arusha principles of a pluralist political compromise, the deliberate subversion of the Arusha process by extremist Hutu elements and their planned and deliberate massacres of Tutsi and moderate Hutu called for changes in the Arusha formula to ensure that this could not occur again.

26. For the present, RPF has not only military but also political control of the country, other than the area controlled by Operation Turquoise, and it installed a broad-based Government of National Unity on 19 July 1994 for a transitional period of five years. It has excluded the former governing party the Mouvement révolutionnaire national pour le développement, as well as an openly anti-Tutsi party the Coalition pour la défense de la République, which was not included in the transitional government established by the Arusha agreement. In the present transitional Government, the post of President, reserved for the Mouvement révolutionnaire national pour le développement in the Arusha agreement, has been allocated to Mr. Pasteur Bizimungu of RPF, and the post of Vice President, not provided for in the Arusha agreement, has been allocated to Major-General Paul Kagame, military commander of RPF who is also Minister of Defence. The Prime Minister is Mr. Faustin Twagiramungu of the Mouvement démocratique républicain and the Deputy Prime Minister is Colonel Alexis Kanyarengwe of RPF. Other portfolios have been allocated to these two parties as well as the Parti socialiste démocrate, the Parti démocrate chrétien and the Parti libéral, all of which were members of the previous transitional Government.

27. Since taking office, President Bizimungu has met with President Mobutu of Zaire, President Mwinyi of Tanzania, President Museveni of Uganda and the Interim President of Burundi, Mr. Ntibantunganya. The Rwandese leadership is encouraging refugees to return to Rwanda by publicizing the following assurances:

(a) Refugees need not fear persecution or reprisals. Refugees returning from Goma will not be screened;

(b) Refugees and displaced persons can return to their homes, property, farms, etc. If these have been occupied by others, unauthorized occupants be forcibly ejected. Uganda-based refugees returning to Rwanda have no assert their claims by dispossessing Rwandese of their legal rights.

(c) Criminals will be prosecuted according to a plan. United Nations should appoint the Commission of Experts and resolution 935 (1994), which should urgently begin to implement.

(d) The Government is encouraging civilian officials and army personnel to return;

(e) The Government will give full cooperation to United Nations efforts to encourage refugee return by reopening Kigali airport, permitting the establishment of a United Nations radio station and facilitating freedom of movement for United Nations personnel carrying out their functions.

28. It is evident that the highest priority at the moment is the resolution of the massive humanitarian crisis caused by the refugees in Zaire and the displaced persons in Rwanda and the establishment of conditions of security and normalcy to encourage and enable these unfortunate people to return to their homes. Only then can the new Government ensure stable conditions in the country. Political discussions with moderate elements of the Mouvement révolutionnaire national pour le développement to work out political arrangements for the long-term stability of Rwanda should, however, begin as soon as possible.

#### VI OBSERVATIONS

29. The agony of a small country which is having to endure the massacre of a substantial portion of its population and the displacement of half the survivors is one of the most hideous events in recent times. It is all the more tragic that the international community hesitated for so long to intervene, despite the fact that most of its Member States have signed the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. As I remarked in my report of 31 May (S/1994/640), by our failure we have acquiesced in the horrifying loss of human life and the suffering of an entire people. To make amends, the international community, at the very least, must ensure that, through the efforts of the Commission on Human Rights, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Commission of Experts established by Security Council resolution 935 (1994) of 1 July 1994, those individuals responsible in their personal and official capacities for unleashing and instigating this cataclysm are brought to justice.

30. As regards the Commission of Experts, my report of 26 July 1994 (S/1994/879) set out its mandate. I have requested it to provide me, not later than 30 November 1994, with its conclusions on evidence of specific violations of international humanitarian law and acts of genocide, on the basis of which identification of the persons responsible for those violations could be made. The Commission is also empowered to examine the question of the jurisdiction, international or national, before which such persons should be brought to trial. I have appointed the following persons to serve as members of the Commission: Mr. Atsu-Koffi Amega, Chairman (Togo), Mrs. Habi Dieng (Guinea) and Mr. Salifou Fomba (Mali).

31. It is incumbent upon the international community to do everything in its power to alleviate the appalling human suffering in the refugee camps, as well as in Tanzania, Uganda and Burundi, and to enable refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes or other safe areas. In connection with this connection, I am grateful to those Governments that have decided to



troops to Rwanda and/or Zaire in order to provide critically needed logistic support to the humanitarian effort. At the same time, I am becoming concerned by the problems of coordination that will arise if several foreign forces under national command are working along side UNAMIR, which is under United Nations command, and the forces loyal to the new Government. Ideally, all foreign forces engaged in support of the humanitarian effort should be part of UNAMIR. If this is not possible, I would urge that the deployment of the foreign forces should be authorized by the Security Council, even if their mandate is purely humanitarian, and that formal liaison arrangements should be established between them and UNAMIR, as has been the case with Operation Turquoise.


32. Governments which possess the necessary resources are also urged to apply them toward the reconstruction and rehabilitation needed to bring Rwanda to its feet again. I commend those Governments that are already beginning to provide these forms of tangible assistance.

33. The recently installed Government in Rwanda also bears responsibility for bringing its people together again in national reconciliation. Even in the wake of the tragedy that it has confronted, it must show magnanimity and not allow its military success to create a desire for permanent dominance. It must ensure that there are no reprisals. It must enable families to regain their homes and individuals to return to their professions and livelihoods. It must accept in the national army those soldiers of the former armed forces and gendarmerie who did not deliberately engage in wanton killings. It must install an equitable and transparent system of justice to try those suspected of instigating or participating in the massacres of their compatriots.

34. These are overwhelming tasks for a fledgling Government which has taken power in a wrecked and devastated country. In addition to the urgent humanitarian needs and help in reconstruction and rehabilitation, the Government will also require assistance in re-establishing systems of administration, justice, police, finance, education and health and all the other responsibilities a Government must discharge. I hope that Governments will make this available on a bilateral basis or through the United Nations system. But ultimately, it is the Rwandese who must assume these tasks, and this can only be done if the Government commits itself to genuine and full reconciliation.

35. The ultimate political aim must be the installation of a broad-based system of government that will give all elements of society, irrespective of ethnic origin or social level, a sense of security and a stake in the country. The Arusha agreement still provides principles and a broad framework for establishing such a system. The Organization of African Unity and the United Republic of Tanzania, which were instrumental in the negotiation of the Arusha agreement, will have a special role to play. Rwanda's four neighbours also have a special responsibility to promote stability in this recuperating country and to ensure that their territories are not used for further destabilization. It is gratifying to note that the new Government has established cordial contact with all four neighbours. All countries in the region must be alert to the repercussions of the crisis in Rwanda, as any further escalation could destabilize the entire region.

36. In conclusion, I should like to commend my former Special Representative, Mr. Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, and my new Special Representative, Mr. Shaharyar Khan, as well as the personnel of UNAMIR, who have worked with dedication under the most demanding conditions. I must especially commend the Force Commander, Major-General Dallaire, for his outstanding leadership. In ending, I extend on my own behalf and on behalf of all members of the United Nations our heartfelt condolences to all in Rwanda who have lost members of their families in what would have been a nightmare had it not actually come to pass



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PROGRESS REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL  
ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MULTINATIONAL  
HUMANITARIAN OPERATION IN RWANDA

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of operative paragraph 10 of Security Council resolution 929 (1994) of 22 June 1994 which requested the States concerned and the Secretary-General, as appropriate, to report within fifteen days on the implementation of the multinational humanitarian operation in Rwanda and the progress made towards the fulfilment of the objectives referred to in operative paragraphs 2 and 3 of the resolution.

2. It is to be recalled that, under operative paragraph 2, the Security Council welcomed the offer by Member States to cooperate with the Secretary-General in order to achieve the objectives of the United Nations in Rwanda through the establishment of a temporary operation under national command and control aimed at contributing, in an impartial way, to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda. Under operative paragraph 3, the Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United

Nations, authorized the Member States cooperating with the Secretary-General to conduct the said operation using all necessary means to achieve the humanitarian objectives outlined in paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) of resolution 925 (1994). It is to be recalled, furthermore, that the objectives set out in paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) of Security Council resolution 925 comprise the following: to contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas, and to provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations.

3. In accordance with resolution 929 which approved the multinational operation to function under national command and control and requested the Member States concerned to report thereon to the Security Council, it is noted that France, which leads the operation, has submitted a report on the subject to the Security Council (S/1994/.....). The present report therefore focuses on the follow-up action taken in response to operative paragraph 8 of the same resolution which, among other things, requested the Secretary-General to set up coordination mechanisms between UNAMIR and the multinational operation.

4. I wish from the outset to commend the States concerned for the swift action they have taken in response to Security Council resolution 929 to put in place the operation code-name

"Operation Turquoise", designed to achieve the humanitarian objectives of the United Nations in Rwanda. As members of the Council are aware, the already catastrophic humanitarian situation in Rwanda, which the Security Council has determined is a threat to peace and security in the region, continues to deteriorate as the war and the killings of innocent civilians have not ceased. However, from initial reports through the close links of coordination being built up between the multinational operation and the United Nations, it is beginning to emerge that even at this rather early stage of its deployment, the operation has started to generate a positive impact by responding effectively to the humanitarian needs of civilians at risk in areas inside Rwanda where the operation has deployed and begun its work. As the operation continues with its deployment to enable it to reach all civilians in need in Rwanda, I wish also to join the Security Council in appealing once again to Member States to respond urgently to the requests I have recently made and reiterated on a number of occasions for resources, including troops, equipment and logistical support, to enable the expanded UNAMIR to fulfil its mandate effectively as soon as possible. At the same time, I wish to reaffirm my conviction that the most effective way to halt the worsening humanitarian situation and to begin to restore stability in Rwanda is to end the massacres, stop the fighting and observe a cease-fire with a view to resuming the peace process. To this end, my new Special Representative for Rwanda, Mr Shakaryar Khan, who has recently arrived in Kigali to take up his assignment,

will be pursuing all possible efforts with a view to relaunching the peace process.

5. As members of the Security Council are aware, the objectives of the United Nations in Rwanda, as reflected for instance in the mandate entrusted to UNAMIR under the Council's resolutions 918 and 925, are currently focused largely on humanitarian concerns in view, in particular, of the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis confronting Rwanda and the threat the crisis poses to peace and security, not only to the country but to the region as a whole. As intensive efforts continue to bring the expanded UNAMIR up to the necessary strength to enable it to meet the tasks assigned to it under the said resolutions, the French-led multinational operation has started actively to conduct the same mandated humanitarian activities, within the specific context of resolution 929. Meanwhile, UNAMIR is continuing to fulfil, to the extent permitted by the resources made available to it, its mandated responsibilities in and around Kigali and at the airport. In this connection, the Security Council's request in resolution 929 to Member States participating in the multinational operation to coordinate closely with UNAMIR assumes particular significance and relevance. Not only would such coordination help eliminate wasteful duplication, it would also assist in focusing international attention on the urgent need to aid civilians at risk.

6. Following the adoption, on 22 June, of resolution 929, the United Nations Secretariat, and in particular UNAMIR, have been working on the modalities of setting up appropriate coordination mechanisms, as requested by the Security Council. A leading role in these efforts has been played by the Force Commanders of the multinational operation and UNAMIR, with both of them bearing in mind that unlike UNAMIR, the multinational operation was authorized under Chapter VII of the Chapter. To that end, the Force Commander of UNAMIR, Major-General Roméo A. Dallaire, travelled on 30 June to Goma (Zaire), where the command headquarters of the multinational operation is located, for his first meeting with the Commander of "Operation Turquoise", Brigadier-General Lafourcade.

7. The two commanders held detailed discussions in the course of which they underlined the vital importance of close coordination between UNAMIR and the multinational operation in order to advance the achievement of the objectives of the United Nations in Rwanda. Specifically, to that end, they agreed in particular to set up, with immediate effect, a liaison unit from UNAMIR at the "Operation Turquoise" command headquarters to help ensure, on a continuous basis, effective communication and coordination. Noting that both missions were operating under specific Security Council resolutions that had entrusted them with a similar mandate, Generals Dallaire and Lafourcade stressed the complementary nature of their operations aimed at promoting a common humanitarian objective in favour of all Rwandese at risk and/or in need.



8. Emphasizing that "Operation Turquoise" constituted a unique case necessitated by the fact that UNAMIR was still building up its resources, General Lafourcade reaffirmed that his mission would operate as the temporary, impartial and humanitarian operation called for under resolution 929. He stressed that "Operation Turquoise" was determined, while carrying out its mandated tasks, to avoid armed confrontations. In this connection, it was felt that close liaison and coordination between the multinational operation and UNAMIR could play a particularly positive role with UNAMIR, in view of its experience and knowledge of the Rwandese situation, serving as a confidence-building bridge and as an intermediary between "Operation Turquoise" and the warring parties. General Lafourcade further indicated that in order to avoid confrontation with the parties, the multinational operation would consult with UNAMIR before deploying or launching activities farther into the country. As members of the Security Council are aware, "Operation Turquoise" began its deployments inside Rwanda from both the northwestern and the southwestern parts of the country, where many of its activities are still largely concentrated, and has been progressing in response to identified humanitarian needs.

9. As "Operation Turquoise" expands, the importance of the liaison and coordination arrangements initiated at the 30 June meeting between Generals Dallaire and Lafourcade has already become apparent as both UNAMIR and the multinational operation are closely and increasingly engaged in intensive

consultations, both through the UNAMIR liaison team at Goma and directly through frequent telephone communication between the two Force Commanders. UNAMIR is increasingly playing an intermediary role, to prevent misunderstandings that could provoke or lead to confrontations as the multinational operation advances to respond to growing needs arising from the widening war and the potential of continued massacres.

10. The liaison and coordination arrangements currently in place comprise, in particular, a UNAMIR liaison team of four military observers assigned to "Operation Turquoise" command headquarters at Goma. Arrangements and modalities for the setting up, at UNAMIR headquarters in Kigali, of a liaison unit of the multinational operation are being examined and discussed with the parties concerned, including the two warring sides which still confront each other in Kigali. At United Nations Headquarters in New York, France, on behalf of the Member States participating in "Operation Turquoise", maintains close coordination with the United Nations Secretariat which, in turn, and as appropriate, interlinks with UNAMIR. I must, in this connection, stress the importance of integrating operational developments, on the ground, with policy debates or discussions in the appropriate legislative organs as well as at senior levels in the Secretariat so as to permit the emergence of coherent policies or decisions that respond appropriately to the challenges at hand. In view, in particular, of the rapid pace of developments in the Rwandese situation, both operational and

at the policy/political levels, continued reinforcement of the close coordination that has already begun among the various entities concerned could further enhance the collective capacity of the international community to discharge effectively the urgent humanitarian mandate set out by the Security Council in resolutions 918, 925 and 929.

(Proposed humanitarian protection zone: Headquarters to provide text.)

11. Meanwhile, on the ground in Rwanda, the situation remains worrying as the fighting and the killings continue. While the French-led multinational operation, which has been welcomed by Rwanda's Interim Government and opposed by the RPF, has begun deploying inside the country in order to contribute to providing security, protection and relief supplies to civilians in need, as mandated by the Security Council, its humanitarian activities are still confined and limited to a relatively small part of the country principally in areas to the west, as heavy fighting rages in other parts.

12. Although the war continues, with RPF forces largely maintaining their offensive momentum against RGF positions in Kigali and on several other fronts, it does appear, nevertheless, that overall, in the constantly evolving and volatile situation in Rwanda, the intensity of fighting, in terms of the exchange of mortar, artillery and small arms fire, has decreased somewhat in recent days. The exchange of

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fire is much more sporadic than was the case a few weeks ago, with most of the heavy fighting concentrated in specific battle fronts. In Kigali, after heavy fighting, the city has seemingly fallen into RPF hands. Elsewhere in the country, the most significant new operation by either side has taken place in the southwestern part of the country, as RPF forces are on the outskirts of Rwanda's second biggest city, Butare, which is still controlled by RGF. The RPF have also cut the road to Gikongoro, about 7 kms west of the city. As the war proceeds and the RPF offensive continues, the country remains effectively divided in two parts, with the RPF controlling at least sixty per cent of the national territory so far and the RGF the rest.

13. With offensive activities continuing and counter-attacks being planned and initiated, and with both warring parties actively recruiting, training and deploying new troops, the frightening prospect emerges of a drawn-out war of attrition which would prolong the suffering of the Rwandese people and contribute to the further destabilization of the region as a whole as more and more Rwandese join the flood of refugees fleeing for safety in the neighbouring countries, especially Burundi, Tanzania and Zaire which already host thousands of Rwandese refugees with all the socio-economic, political and security implications that large refugee inflows imply.

14. The current tense and increasingly uncertain situation recently took on a particularly worrying dimension when, as a

result of the launching of the Security Council-approved French-led multinational operation, seemingly retaliatory restrictions were imposed by the RPF on the movements of UNAMIR personnel in Rwanda. Consequently, about forty UNAMIR military observers from countries seen as participating in or otherwise supporting "Operation Turquoise", were recently evacuated from Rwanda out of consideration for their security. Not only have the Security Council and the General Assembly condemned and called for an end to all threats or attacks against United Nations peace-keeping personnel who daily risk their lives in the service of peace, the present case is especially disturbing as it comes at a time when the United Nations is engaged in hectic, indeed desperate attempts to bring the expanded UNAMIR force up to the strength recently approved by the Security Council to enable it to respond more effectively to the dramatic humanitarian crisis confronting Rwanda. I therefore call on the parties to the Rwandese conflict to refrain from any attack or threat of attack against United Nations personnel in Rwanda and to take all necessary measures to ensure their safety and security and to facilitate their movements in the course of the discharge of their duties. I call also on both sides to take immediate, concrete steps to halt the fighting, to stop the killings of civilians, including an end to massacres and attacks against civilian targets such as religious installations, schools and markets, and to respect a cease-fire, thus allowing the States concerned to implement fully the multinational humanitarian mission approved under resolution 929.

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file: 1) military  
2) Security Council

INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

To: A/Executive Director  
Mr Pier Mehu

From: DFC/COS  
Brig Gen HK Anyidoho

Date: 15 June, 1994

Subject: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL  
ON THE SITUATION IN RWANDA

1000.7(DFC)/1/A

Reference:

A. Your Inter-Office memorandum dated 2 Jun 94.

1. Since our last report of 2nd May 1994, the UNAMIR Residual Force has relentlessly continued to provide Humanitarian Assistance to the Rwandese people. Significantly, the small force planned and executed the evacuation of displaced people to their places of choice. This exercise and escort to relief convoys are all on-going. However, UNAMIR continues to operate under very hazardous and risky situations in Rwanda. Working with a reduced force level of a little over 500 (formed troops and UNMOs inclusive), the force is virtually helpless in preventing the massacres which have become a daily occurrence.

2. The exercise started a few weeks ago, to evacuate civilians caught up in the middle of fighting, had to be suspended because both sides did not honour their words not to fire on these convoys.

3. The distribution of the little humanitarian relief items left in the warehouses in Kigali has also had to be suspended due to a number of reasons:

a. The warehouses have become targets of the warring factions anytime an attempt is made to take items from them.

b. The personnel of the NGOs or/and the troops escorting them come under fire anytime they make attempts to move to these warehouses.

c. The Kigali International Airport has been closed due to shelling during landing and take-off of UN aircraft.

4. Both sides have on different occasions denied movement to UNMOs/formed troops within and behind their lines. This action which is very frustrating, prevents UNAMIR from monitoring what is really going on. Meanwhile the callous acts of killing

innocent civilians including babies continue unabated and from all indications this is not likely to be stopped now. On 14 June 1994 while the cease-fire talks continued, massacre took place at St Paul Church, in the city of Kigali.

5. Apart from convoys/escorts being fired on, the UNAMIR HQ building has also become a target for the factions. Earlier on, indirect fire weapons were being used, but of late the HQ has received direct hits from an anti-aircraft gun fire and a canon. This new trend raises eyebrows about the defensive capability of the force at the present level.

6. Another factor is the intransigence on the part of the belligerents despite the efforts being made to reach a cease fire agreement. Even though the cease-fire discussions are progressing, both parties seem to be receiving re-supply of ammunition of all natures. The neighboring countries are facilitating this re-supply despite the Arms embargo and their denials of offering help to the warring parties.

7. The inability of UNAMIR to offer any meaningful assistance in the circumstance is also having an adverse effect on troops morale which does not augur well for the force. Under such circumstances, the arrival of the expanded force is the obvious answer. It must be pointed out that, the delays in expanding the force is leading to overtasking of the personnel on the ground at the moment, and the attendant frustration is becoming visible in the eyes of the troops. Meanwhile it has not been possible to send on even a short break, all the officers and men that have operated under these severe conditions for the past two months. Some have been working without a break since November last year.

8. The closure of the Kigali Airport as a result of the present security situation with the RGF shelling the tarmac on 5 Jun 94 and both sides not willing to make the airport UN controlled area is creating a big logistics problem in respect of supplies and personnel having to move through UGANDA to KIGALI. This new procedure has put UNAMIR at the mercy of the RPF and should they (RPF) decide to impose restrictions on our movements, the ensuing problems could be disastrous for the force. This route is also long and winding and therefore time-consuming with its attendant insecurity.

#### CONCLUSION


9. UNAMIR troops have operated under very harzadous and risky conditions since the Rwandese crisis started on 6 April 94. The warring factions remain intransigent despite the efforts being made to achieve a cease fire and continue harassing UNAMIR in different ways.

10. Delays in the implementation of Resolution 918/925 is leading to frustration on the part of troops as they are unable

to spread out to all the areas and premises under threat and save lives. The residual force of UNAMIR is becoming demoralised and apprehensive as opportunities arise to save more lives but due to the meagre resources (both personnel and equipment), these lives are lost. An early implementation of Resolution 918/925 will definitely save more lives than the Residual Force is achieving.

RECOMMENDATIONS

11. It is strongly recommended that all efforts be made to practically expand the force as soon as possible while international pressure is mounted on both parties to stop the wanton killings and negotiate for peace.



HK ANYIDHOHO  
Brig Gen  
DFC/COS



U R G E N T  
F A X   T R A N S M I S S I O N

To: Mr. Pierre MEHU  
OIC/OSRSG  
UNAMIR, Kigali (Rwanda)

Fax No.: 212 963 3090

From: Sammy Kum BUO  
UNAMIR, Nairobi (Kenya)

Fax No.: 254-2-622668

Date: 8 June 1994

With reference to your fax and our telephone conversation earlier today regarding the UNOMUR report, please find attached my revised text for paragraphs 15 to 18.

In preparing the text, I have taken into account, in particular, the FC's comments regarding my original para. 15 of 6 June.

You will note that I have avoided any reference to the possible monitoring or surveillance of all of Rwanda's borders as I do not believe that the Security Council, specifically resolution 918, has either explicitly or implicitly called for that at this stage. However, should the FC believe that such monitoring of all the borders is necessary, he may wish to include a specific recommendation to that effect.

I hope the attached text is helpful.

Please contact me if you have any comments or questions.

Best regards.

15. However, as a result of the dramatically changed situation in the Rwandese conflict, both the priorities and requirements of the international community for dealing with that conflict have also evolved and may have invalidated the raison d'être of UNOMUR. In this connection, it is to be recalled in particular that the Security Council by its resolution 918 (1994) of 17 May, decided to expand the United Nations' role in Rwanda by emphasizing additional humanitarian tasks and furthermore decided to impose an embargo on the delivery of arms, ammunition and related matériel to Rwanda. To meet UNAMIR's expanded mandate, additional resources in terms of personnel and equipment are urgently required. Furthermore, as the arms embargo required the cooperation of all states, there is no justifiable reason for continuing to monitor, as UNOMUR has been doing, only one of Rwanda's borders and not the others. I therefore believe that it would be more cost effective and logical to concentrate on meeting the current priorities for Rwanda set out recently by the Council.

16. Consequently, I would like to recommend to the Security Council that the mandate of UNOMUR be renewed for further two months, but at a reduced scale of operations, concentrating on monitoring the principal crossing points of the border. This two-month extension would also enable the Secretariat to undertake a comprehensive review and assessment of the concrete implications and consequences for the Mission of the new situation that has arisen in the operational area as a result of recent developments in Rwanda and the bordering areas. It would also allow us to prepare the necessary contingency plans for the prompt and effective implementation of whatever decision regarding the future of UNOMUR the Security Council may wish to take at the end of the present recommended extension period.

17. In the meantime, should the Council agree with my recommendation for a two-month extension at a reduced scale of operations, a phased transfer of some of UNOMUR's resources, in particular its helicopters and other material resources, to reinforce the expanded UNAMIR, could begin as soon as possible to help meet the urgent and extensive monitoring and humanitarian security tasks assigned to UNAMIR under Security Council resolution 918. The possible reassignment to UNAMIR of some of UNOMUR's personnel resources, both military and civilian, would depend on clearly identified need and, with respect to military personnel, would obviously be subject to the prior approval of the respective contributing countries.

18. In recommending the above a step-by-step and phased approach, I am guided by the need to proceed in a manner consistent with the spirit of mutual confidence and cooperation that has marked relations between the United Nations and the Governments of Uganda and Rwanda, as well as the RPF, since the beginning of UNOMUR's operations, and, above all, with the fundamental objective of maintaining peace and security in *Rwanda and the region.*

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UNAMIR

194 JUN -8 09 17

KMF073  
MISC 847

IMMEDIATE (please pass to Mr. Buo urgently)

TO: Mr. Sammy K. Buo  
Senior Political Officer  
UNAMIR, Nairobi, Kenya

FROM: *for* P. Mchur, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 8 June 1994

NO. OF PAGES: 3

SUBJECT: UNOMUR Report

1. I have tried to contact you on phone but without success. Kindly draft a note on the attached points. You can fax it handwritten in case you have difficulties in getting it typed.
2. Thank you and best regards.

has been particularly critical in recent months as UNOMUR has striven to defuse tensions associated with developments since hostilities resumed in April.

15. However, as a result of the dramatically changed situation in the Rwandese conflict, both the priorities and requirements of the international community for dealing with that conflict have also evolved and may have invalidated the raison d'être of UNOMUR. In this connection, it is to be recalled in particular that the Security Council by its resolution 918 (1994) of 17 May, decided to expand the United Nations' role Rwanda by emphasizing additional humanitarian tasks and furthermore decided to impose an embargo on the delivery of arms, ammunition and related material to Rwanda. To meet UNAMIR's expanded mandate, additional resources in terms of personnel and equipment are urgently required. Furthermore, as the arms embargo requires the cooperation of all states, there is no justifiable reason for continuing to monitor, as UNOMUR has been doing, only one of Rwanda's borders and not the others. I therefore believe that it would be more cost effective and logical to concentrate on meeting the current priorities for Rwanda set out recently by the Council which do encompass a surveillance, security task along all principal border areas.

16. Consequently, I would like to recommend to the Security Council that the mandate of UNOMUR be renewed for another 2 months but at a reduced scale of operations, concentrating on the principal crossing points of the border and reassess the resources being used for patrolling between the local check points, including their helicopters be transferred urgently to UNAMIR for its extensive monitoring and humanitarian security tasks. The mandate given to UNAMIR is to encompass monitoring the activities along the borders of Rwanda and all the neighbouring countries. The UNOMUR HQ in Kabale will be reduced proportionally but be given the task of coordinating the logistics, humanitarian activities of UNAMIR assets through the Kabale transit sides.

17. The closing down of UNOMUR should be done the end of another 2-month period, with the remaining assets moved to UNAMIR for incorporation into its Phase 3 plan. The Kabale regulating HQ can be closed down when the Kigali HQ is fully organized and operating at a steady pace.

Mr. Mehu - we have got to redo this completely to reflect the following:

- a) Embargo - yes but presence is important as we continue negotiations of ceasefire, so we delay reduction for 2 months.
- b) The verification at the Uganda/Rwanda border should be incorporated in the UNAMIR mandate for all other borders. What I mean is that we do monitoring of the other borders also as we were doing before the war.
- c) We can reduce UNOMUR after the 2 months in phases (patrols/HQ first), then the check points.
- d) Incorporating the people will depend on their availability, our urgent needs before the end of UNOMUR.
- e) A statement somewhere in the text that reflects our concern on the political front, that simply taking the mission away may be perceived by the RGF as supporting, helping the RPF to get material in. That is why a phased reduction, at least because we do not even have a ceasefire.

Sammy  
Thanks for  
your assistance.  
BKiro

3/3.

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RKiruj