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RESTRICTED

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

UNAMIR

TO: FC

FILE NO: 6001/MILOB

THROUGH: COS

DATED: 14 JAN 94

FROM: CMO

SUBJECT: RESTRUCTURAL PROPOSALS FOR UNAMIR MILITARY OBSERVER ESTABLISHMENT

1. Attached please find above.
2. The Organigram Chart and Map illustrating area of responsibility and MILOB distribution is attached as Annex 'A' and 'B' respectively.
3. For your comments and advise.

①
A fresh/updated copy of the subject letter is placed for your kind perusal please.

②
FC

④ COO
I find it difficult to understand certain aspects of the write-up. Some up for discussion if possible with Col TIKOCA.
JG 18/1

RESTRICTED

③
I D TIKOCA
Colonel
CMO

COS
14/1
94

③
D/COS
I have a copy. Please note and I will provide you with my comments today. We must agree the cost for more MILOBs to a basis.
18/1

RESTRUCTURAL PROPOSALS FOR MILITARY OBSERVER ESTABLISHMENT, UNAMIR

General

1. Since the inception of UNAMIR, 01 Nov '93, a progressive study was conducted for effectiveness of MILOBs organization based on the current approved organization and its effectiveness on the ground. For the last two months there has been many internal structural changes that has to be conducted to enable UNAMIR military observer conduct its function effectively. UNAMIR is heading towards completion of phase One and it is imperative now to review the last two months internal restructuring and the projected tasks to be executed for phase two and review the best structure to produce maximum output with very little change as possible from the existing establishment.

Observation

2. Some observations and experience which influence an immediate review of this change are as follows:

a. Escorts provision for Political representatives, Ambassadors, NGO's, VIP's etc were not accommodated in any taskings allocated in the SG's report for MILOBs taskings. Indeed one of the MILOBs taskings is escort but conducted in their own sectoral area. Rwanda is small geographically so one move in a day covering all different sectors which comes under different control. KIGALI being the Capital and centrally located the movement of these above mentioned personnel starts at KIGALI and end usually at KIGALI. These tasks were not foreseen hence not accommodated. The average number of escorts per day is approximately six which means 6 vehicles and 12 x MILOBs if the situation is calm. On tense situation this could be expected to be doubled (escorts done in pairs).

b. Escorts for Members of the BBTG. The current establishment to provide these tasks are 30 x MILOBs and 15 Cars (2 x MILOBs/veh) hence only 15 Ministers can be escorted in one working day. The total number of ministers is 21, but they are not the only one to be provided with escorts but others, for security reasons, such as members of the GCHC and ACHC which plays a very vital role in phase II and III of the Operational (Disengagement/Demobilization and Integration). As experienced to date with the tense situation and high security risks prevailing the demand for escorts as these VIP's moves around executing their role, can not be over emphasised.

c. Appreciating the geographical disposition of the two forces and area they control, RPF territory covers only $\frac{1}{5}$ of the country, DMZ covers $\frac{1}{5}$, and the Government covers the $\frac{5}{5}$ of the country. The 67 observers in RGF is not proportionate to the area they will cover hence rendering the southern part of the country exposed and difficult to control with only 67 observers. The UN presence is paramount in the southern most part of Rwanda where heavy concentration of refugees camp exists and some very important and strategical military bases are located. It is imperative to conduct surveillance, monitoring activities and continual contact with the population and these establishments. This warrants the RGF territory to be further sub-divided in two so UNAMIR could effectively carry out its operation which will demand more additional military observers.

d. UNAMIR is still yet to finalise with both parties the final number of Assembly Points, Cantonment Points, ITC and refugee Centers which will most probably be increased and if so it will pose problem of shortages of observers to attend to these locations. As we are now still experiencing manpower constraints even with 66% of observers on the ground, it is most likely, during phase II and III which involve bulk of the observer tasks, that this will become a constant problem right through the process.

15 the agreement
based on size of
geographical area
critical obligations
that need to be
observed.

RPF 12 1/2 %
DMZ 25 %
Govt 62 1/2 %

**CURRENT STRUCTURE AND PROPOSED MODIFICATION
OF MILITARY OBSERVER ORGANISATION
UNAMIR**

ESTAB UNITS	OPTION 1		OPTION 2		OPTION 3	REMARKS
	APPROVED ESTB PHASE I	PHASE II	RESTRUCTURING EXISTING	ESTB	SUGGESTED PHASE II & III ESTB FOR EFFECTIVENESS	
MILOB GP HQ	20	20	15	-5	* 20	* HQ - 14, HQ MILOB TEAM - 6 (3XTEAM OF 2 MEN EACH FOR ESCORT/INVESTIGATION)
KIGALI SECT	78	42	75	+33	* 81	* a. SECT MILOB CO-ORD CELL - 5 b. SECT MONITOR TEAM - 40 (8 X TEAM OF 5 MEN EACH) c. SECT ESCORT TEAM - 36 (6X TEAM OF 6MEN EACH) MAX ESCORT CAPABILITY 18
DMZ SECT	36	18	30	+12	* 32	* SECTOR MILOB COORD CELL - 2, MILOB MONITOR/PATROL TEAM - 30(5 X TEAM OF 6 MEN EACH)
RGF MILOB SECT		87	67	-20	* 67	* SECT HQ - 7, MILOB MONITOR/PATROL TEAM - 60 (12XTEAM OF 5 MEN EACH)
RPF MILOB SECT		87	67	-20	* 67	* SECT HQ - 7, MILOB MONITOR/PATROL TEAM - 60 (12X TEAM OF 5 MEN EACH)
SOUTHERN MILOB SECT					* 34	* SECT HQ - 4, MILOB MONITOR/PATROL TEAM - 30 (5X TEAM OF 6 MEN EACH)
UNOMUR	77	77	77		* 78	* PRESENT STR - 78
TOTAL	211	331	331		379	
UNAMIR CEILING					331	
ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENT					48	

UN RESTRICTED

CASE STUDY OF THE THREE OPTIONS

4. OPTION ONE (PHASE II)

a. Advantages

- (1) No additional requirement of MILOBs.
- (2) There is room for internal restructuring to accommodate other requirement as seen in option II

b. Disadvantages

- (1) The tasks demand against the strength at KIGALI and DMZ Sector is seriously depleted rendering MILOBs tasks at these area non-effective.
- (2) There is no coordination team to coordinate tasks from sectoral HQs to teams and vise verser. Command Control and supervision is seriously affected.
- (3) There is no provision of manpower to be employed to task requirement highlighted at para 2(a)b(c) and (d) above.

The coordination could be done by radio

5. OPTION TWO

a. Advantages

- (1) Creating coordinating team in KIGALI and DMZ headquarters to foster smooth, affective execution of tasks and sound command and control.
- (2) DMZ patrolling activities will now be conducted by teams of 4 men each with 2 x staff coordinator at DMZ HQ. Security is available as they will be deployed close to the DMZ Bn deployed all over the DMZ.

What is his HQ doing if not command

b. Disadvantages

- (1) Operations RGF/RPF MILOB Sectors will operate at minimal viable level which will affect the MILOB at team level.

(2) The DMZ MILOB team will have to be deployed in some proximity with the DMZ Bn as the teams number is only four as opposed to a six men team would have more flexibility logistically and operationally and with some security to be deployed anywhere as operationally required. (for eg if one vehicle is grounded at least for a 6 member team the two vehicles still support each other and has a capability to continue patrols in pairs).

why?
(3) All tasks highlighted at para 2 above CAN NOT be executed.

6. OPTION 3

a. Advantages

(1) Additional 6 men for MILOB HQ to form a 3 x team of 2 men each with a capability of 3 escorts per day, to cater for tasks stated at para 2(a), support KIGALI sector escorts as and when required, conduct investigation and assist in patrol activities and other unforeseen tasks. The Headquarters MILOB will always have a reserve capability to support other sectors.

(2) An additional 6 men to KIGALI sector to boost up the escort capability to 18 to cater for the BBTG daily demand as described at para 2(b) above.

(3) An additional 34 men with the sub control station base in BUTARE will be sufficient to cater for tasks requirement in the southern part of Rwanda as explained at para 2 (c) above.

?? (4) All tasks stipulated at para 2 above can be BARELY executed.

b. Disadvantage

(1) The reduction of team from 6 to 5 will slightly affect the MILOBs at team level.

(2) Disadvantages seen at option two accept 2b(3) still exist but slightly improved because of availability of reserve team at MILOBs HQ.

(3) The maximum escort MILOB HQ can provide is only 3 per day and not six as described in para 2(a) above.

RECOMMENDATION.


7. In view of the study above the only option which is practical and affective to meet these enormous tasks is option 3. It is therefore strongly recommended that the strength of the MILOBs in UNAMIR be increased as soon as practicably possible to 48.

what is the present str? Is not even more than 48 now

CONCLUSION

8. The southern most part of the country must be attended to as soon as possible as it has various enormous political, military and socio-economic problems. Tension are brewing up every day and it is imperative to immediately address this problem by showing the presence of United Nation in this region and monitor, liaise, investigate all activities at the borders, refugee camps and established daily contact with military and Gendarmerie camps as well as the Government administrative elements. This region could be rated as one of the problem areas UNAMIR will have to encounter as it will certainly create a lot of obstacles to UNAMIR achieving its mission in time.

ANNEX A TO
RESTRUCTURAL PROPOSAL
MILOB ESTABLISHMENT




TOTALS:

* GRAND TOTAL *

379

ANNEX B OF
RESTRUCTURAL PROPOSALS
MILOB ESTABLISHMENT



THE 328 UNMO OPTION

Ser	Sector	Phase II Jan - Apr OLD DMZ	Phase III Apr - Oct NEW DMZ	Phase III Oct - Dec (1)	Phase IV
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
1	MILOB GP HQ	20	20	20	7 + 40 (2)
2	KIGALI Sec	81	26 (3)	48 (4)	0
3	DMZ Sec	32	32	0 (5)	0
4	RGF MILOB Sec	37	67 (6)	32 (7)	0
5	RPF MILOB Sec	37	67	32 (7)	0
6	Southern Sec	34 37	38 37	38 37	38 37
7	UNOMUR	78	78 (8)	0	0
8	SUBTOTAL	319	324	164	81
9	FORCE HQ	9	4	4	0
10	TOTAL	328 331 ✓	328 (9) 331	328 171	328 84 ✓

- (1) Possible limitation of DMZ
- (2) 7 at Force HQ (CMO + Staff), 40 UNMOs (8 teams of 5)
- (3) Need 48 here
- (4) 5 monitoring teams, 3 escort teams
- (5) Eliminate the ITC and DMZ
- (6) Some tasked to jobs in KWSA -> 7
- (7) 5 assembly points needed
- (8) Till Oct
- (9) ~~338~~ + 48 = 379

↑
217 x ✓
Planned

③ COD + CMPO
Take note of the FC's
Comments and directives -
and come out with your
draft by Sat 22 Jan 94
for discussion

CMPO
[Signature]

②
DPC/COS
In comparing the chart on the SG's report
of 24 Sep attached, and the requirement
to do the job, we see an absolute essential
need for 48 more UNMOs for Kigali Sector due
to the destruction of 34 UNMOs to the force there
Sector. There are 140 UNMOs in the force Ha are all temporary (loan).
We must prepare a solid argument for their
use for Phase III (A) from the mid-April to Oct 94 only 6 months.
We can offset the expense by releasing them
sooner than the SG's report - has budgeted
for. CMO to prepare rap with COS support.
Draft by secondary pl. *[Signature]*

18/01/94

10/17
ACMPD
IP

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TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION LIST


File No. MILOB/PERS/2.10

FROM: MILOB HQ

Date: 25 DEC 93

SUBJECT: DEPLOYMENT/POSTING-MILOBs

Deployment/posting of Military Observers as on 25 Dec 93 is forwarded herewith for your necessary action.


A K M AKHTARUL ISLAM
Maj
For CMO

Distribution:

Action:

KIGALI Sec HQ
DMZ Sec HQ
RPF MILOB Sec HQ
RGF MILOB Sec HQ
KSMOC

Information:


F HQ, Pers Br ✓
F HQ, Ops Br
MA To Force Comd

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KIGALI SECTOR


MILOB MONITOR TEAMS 49

KIGALI SECTOR
MILOB COORDINATOR LT COL PURTSCHER(URU)
(KSMOC)



SUMMARY


S/NO	COUNTRY	MILOB	TEAM LDR
1.	AUSTRIA	2	1
2.	BANGLADESH	10	1
3.	CONGO	13	3
4.	SENEGAL	12	1
5.	URUGUAY	10	2
6.	GHANA	2	-
TOTAL		49	8



SUMMARY

1.	BANGLADESH	- 5
2.	GHANA	- 5
3.	MALI	- 2
4.	SENEGAL	- 3

TOTAL	-15
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SUMMARY

1.	BAN	-	3
2.	GHA	-	2
3.	MAL	-	2
4.	SEN	-	1
5.	URU	-	1
TOTAL		-	9

RGF MILOB
SECTOR HQ

9

SECTOR COMD-LT COL AMARA
DOUMBIA(MAL)

DY SECTOR
COMD

-MAJ PV MOIGNY
(CON)

OPS BR

4

PERS BR

1

LOG BR

1

IO- MAJ PKA AWADEY(GHA)

IO- CAPT DIA(SEN)

- CAPT FONTES(URU)

- CAPT N O DANQUAH
(GHA)

SMPO-MAJ ANWAR(BAN)

SLOGO-MAJ BOYEMBE
(CON)

LIAISON BR

1


RRT

SLO-CAPT MODIBO MARIKO(MAL)

SUMMARY

1.	BANGLADESH	- 1
2.	CONGO	- 2
3.	GHANA	- 2
4.	MALI	- 2
5.	SENEGAL	- 1
6.	URUGUAY	- 1


TOTAL		- 9
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SUMMARY


1.	AUS	-	2
2.	BAN	-	4
3.	CON	-	2
4.	GHA	-	4
5.	MAL	-	4
6.	SEN	-	2
7.	URU	-	6

TOTAL	-	24
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SUMMARY

	<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>MILOB</u>	<u>STAFF</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1.	URUGUAY -	1	-	1
2.	BANGLADESH -	1	3	4
3.	GHANA	-	6	6
	TOTAL	2	9	11



SUMMARY

- | | | |
|---------------|---|------------------------------|
| 1. AUSTRIA | - 1 | CLOGO-LT COL PK NYAAKU (GHA) |
| 2. BANGLADESH | - 4 (1 X STAFF) | LOGO-MAJ DOMBY (CON) |
| 3. CONGO | - 6 | LOGO-CAPT ADJE (SEN) |
| 4. FIJI | - 1 | LOGO-CAPT BOUYILA (CON) |
| 5. GHANA | - 1 | |
| 6. SENEGAL | - 7 (INCL CAPT DEME
ATT TO FORCE HQ) | |
| 7. URUGUAY | - 1 | |
| 8. ZIMABWE | - 1 | |

TOTAL: -22 (INCL 1 X STAFF)

HQ MILOB TEAM - A

1. LT CDR ARTHUR (GHA)
2. MAJ GERARDO COSTA (URU)
3. MAJ GANGOUE MAURICE (CON)
4. CAPT SIDY SADY (SEN)
5. CAPT NYANGA (CON)
6. CAPT JS ODOOM MENSÄH (GHA)

HQ MILOB TEAM - B

1. MAJ BAYER (POL)
2. MAJ FAROOQUE (BAN)
3. CAPT ABDOUL BA (SEN)
4. CAPT JB AGYEMANG (GHA)
5. CAPT A BIETERU (GHA)
6. CAPT BAKALA (CON)

SUMMARY

- | | |
|---------------|------------|
| 1. BANGLADESH | - 1 |
| 2. CONGO | - 3 |
| 3. GHANA | - 4 |
| 4. POLLAND | - 1 |
| 5. SENEGAL | - 2 |
| 6. URUGUAY | - 1 |
| ----- | |
| TOTAL | -12 |