

UNAMIR

CORRESPONDENCE

30 NOV 1993 - 18 AUG 1994

R P F

INCOMING

[9 CONFIDENTIAL]

EL/WG MAY 2009

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

UNARCHIVES

SERIES S-1062

BOX 8

FILE 1

ACC. 1998/0282



UNAMIR - MINUAR


UNAMIR HQ
KIGALI

18 August 1994

5000.39(PLANS)

Subject: PROPOSED 500-MAN TRANSIT CAMP

1. It is proposed to construct a transit camp for accommodation of UNAMIR personnel arriving in the mission and for battalion rotation purposes.
 2. The construction site, GR 188827, off the main road to Kanombe Camp has been identified as a suitable site for the construction.
 3. Your approval is therefore requested to use the above area for the project.
- I thank you very much in anticipation of a favourable response. Best regards.


RA DALLAIRE
Major-General
Force Commander

His Excellency,
Major-General Paul Kagame
Vice President and Minister of Defence
Office of the Vice President
KIGALI

Kigali, le 16/8/1994.

A Monsieur le Ministre de la Défense
de la République Rwandaise

①

KIGALI

Objet : Disparition du Frère
CHRIS MANNION

Q HAE
pour action
pleine.

R
1/10

Monsieur le Ministre,

En date du 1/juillet/1994, deux

Frères Maristes RUSHIGAJIKI Joseph et CHRIS MANNION
ont disparu à SAVE-BUTARE.

Nous avons trouvé, à l'entrée du GROUPE SCOLAIRE de
SAVE(G) la voiture calcinée, et au volant, le cadavre
du Frère RUSHIGAJIKI Joseph. Nous avons fait leur corps
une sépulture religieuse dans le cimetière des Frères
Maristes à SAVE.

Mais nous n'avons trouvé, jusqu'à maintenant, nulle
trace du Frère CHRIS MANNION, Conseiller Général des
Frères Maristes, qui pourtant voyageait dans le
même véhicule.

Nous sollicitons votre intervention pour
retrouver notre Frère CHRIS MANNION vivant ou mort.

Pour votre loyale collaboration, nous
vous prions d'agréer Monsieur le Ministre nos respectueuses
salutations.

Les Frères Chargés de la recherche

- Frère DESCARGA JOSE MARTIN

Frère RUGEMA Alexandre

Ci : Monsieur le Ministre de la République Rwandaise à KIGALI

Le Commandant de la MINUAR à KIGALI

1. Notre Apostolique à Kigali.

Disparition du Frère CHRIS MANNION
Conseiller général des Frères Maristes


1. La mission du Fr. Chris était de libérer les Frères et les Postulants de SAVU, qui depuis le ruisseau d'amiel subissaient la terreur des milices et qui à tout moment pouvaient être tués.
2. Le premier juillet à Ganguge il obtient l'aide des Français de Turquoise.
3. Le même jour vers 14^h il quitte Ganguge dans la voiture VW Tetra CB 2241. Au volant l'Fr Joseph RUSHIGATIKI, frère mariste. Derrière probablement deux militaires des FAR.
4. Vers 17^h 18^h il arrive à la colline de SAVU. Il est suivi des éléments de Turquoise. La VW Tetra est attaquée, les Français font demi-tour.


5. Le 30 juillet nous découvrons la voiture calcinée. Fr. Joseph est au volant, carbonisé. Près de lui, le livre de prière et la Bible de Fr. Chris, intacts.
6. Mais aucune trace du corps de Fr. Chris.

N.B. Il est difficile de connaître qui a tiré sur la voiture le 1^{er} juillet. Nous ignorons l'heure exacte de son arrivée.

- a) Le corps du Fr. Chris est probablement resté sur le terrain. c'est-à-dire.
- b) Le livre de prière et la Bible trouvés dans la voiture calcinée, étaient intacts.

fait à Kigali, le 16 août 1994.


Fr. Jean-Marie Demarga



SERVICES DU PREMIER MINISTRE
B.P. 1334 KIGALI

Kigali, le 10 Août 1994.....

N°

1011/94/020

COPY

①

Madame MUKABARALI KAMALI Philomène

B.P. 512

KIGALI.

Réf. N° : 01/MP/94

Annexe :

Objet :

Madame,

Votre lettre n° 01/MP/94 du 27 juillet 1994 concernant une autorisation à visiter votre mari nous est parvenue.

Notre Ministre de la Justice qui nous lit en copie est prié de faire le nécessaire pour que cette visite ait lieu dans les plus brefs délais.

Veuillez agréer, Madame, l'assurance de ma considération distinguée.

Faustin TWAGIRAYUKU,
Premier Ministre.

[Signature]

Copie pour information à :

- Son Excellence Monsieur le Président
de la République Rwandaise
KIGALI.
- Son Excellence Monsieur le Président
du FPR
KIGALI.
- Monsieur le Ministre de la Justice
KIGALI.
- Monsieur KIMU
S.E.S.G. UNAMIR
- Major General D. M. ...
Forces armées rwandaises
KIGALI.

*②.
HAC
you follow up. This is a
new procedure or that part?
Faisance & l'Etat
P.M.
Général
14/8*

Info sent to NY
(Code Cable 1335 of 12/7/94)

R
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F

FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT

F
P
R

Mulindi, le 09 juillet 1994

Monsieur Shahryar M. Khan
Représentant Spécial du
Secrétaire Général des
Nations Unies pour le
Rwanda, KIGALI

Monsieur le Représentant,

J'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception des lettres signées par le Général-Major Roméo DALLAIRE le 4/7/94 et le 3/7/94 relatives aux éléments devant faire partie de la MINUAR II suivant la résolution 925 (1994) adoptée par le Conseil de Sécurité.

Le Front Patriotique Rwandais marque son accord pour le Contingent Ethiopien de 800 (huit cents) hommes devant se joindre à la MINUAR II.

Par contre le FPR a le regret de vous faire part de son opposition aux observateurs en provenance du Congo, de l'Egypte, du Togo et du Sénégal pour leur participation à la MINUAR II du fait qu'il se sont joints à la mission turquoise menée par la France au Rwanda. Leurs pays ont retirés leurs hommes du Rwanda pour rallier la France dans une opération qui, manifestement, devait être menée contre le FPR, même si, dans la suite, le risque a pu être minimisé. Dès lors la fin de la mission turquoise impose le départ du Rwanda de tous ceux qui s'étaient alliés à la France.

Veuillez croire, Monsieur le Représentant Spécial, en l'assurance de notre collaboration.


Alexis Kanyarengwe
Colonel Alexis KANYARENGWE
Président
FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS

Copie pour information au :
Général-Major Roméo Dallaire
Commandant de la MINUAR

COPY



FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT



Lusaka
Pse explain
correlation
attached
S.
ADFC
10/7

Mulindi, le 09 juillet 1994

Monsieur Shahryar M. Khan
Représentant Spécial du
Secrétaire Général des
Nations Unies pour le
Rwanda, KIGALI

Monsieur le Représentant,

J'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception des lettres signées par le Général-Major Roméo DALLAIRE le 4/7/94 et le 3/7/94 relatives aux éléments devant faire partie de la MINUAR II suivant la résolution 925 (1994) adoptée par le Conseil de Sécurité.

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Veillez croire, Monsieur le Représentant Spécial, en l'assurance de notre collaboration.

(2)
SASG
These observers are
in Nairobi and will
be sent home soon.
Hambanda
Colonel Alexis KANYARENGWE
Président
FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS

Copie pour information au :
Général-Major Roméo Dallaire
Commandant de la MINUAR

3, Avenue de L'Observatoire, #8, 1180 Brussels, Belgium. Tel: 32-2-374-5892. Fax: 32-2-374-4600

JUN-18-1994 16:19

UN NYK HQ

P.01

TKF997

UNAMIR

94 JUN 18 20 28

UNITED NATIONS
COMM CENTRE
HEADQUARTERS

OUTGOING FACSIMILE

94 JUN 18 20 04Z

27360

TO: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

FROM: HANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 18 JUNE 1994

NUMBER:

MSF 4243 06

21 8 4

Attached for your information RPF Press Release issued in
Brussels and here dated 17 June 1994.

Regards.

PA [Signature]
2/6

FC

E/D 12



FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT



Le 17.06.94

2/4

COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE

LES VICTIMES DU DOUBLE-JEU FRANCAIS.

Parmi les plus grandes victimes du double-jeu français, il y a lieu de citer : les Nations Unies, le FPR, certains pays de l'Union Européenne et la plupart des pays francophones d'Afrique.

Les Nations-Unies d'abord car elles sont entrain de dérailler suite au marathon français destiné à faire avaliser ses initiatives d'intervention au Rwanda. Comment peut-on expliquer que l'ONU, après autant d'énergie dépensée pour l'application de la Résolution 918 s'écarte aussi rapidement de sa piste au profit d'une initiative française issue d'un cadre inhabituel ?

(En tout cas le FPR se réserve le droit de revoir ses engagements vis-à-vis des Nations Unies, au cas où une quelconque force serait

Le FPR n'a pas été épargné par le double-jeu de la France parce qu'il a suffi d'un entretien informel avec Monsieur Bernard KOUCHNER et Monsieur Géréld LARONDE, Directeur de la Cellule d'Urgence au Ministère Français des Affaires étrangères pour que la France parle de l'ouverture au Nord d'un COULOIR HUMANITAIRE (GATUNGA-BYURABA-XIGALI). Cet axe qui sert depuis plus d'une année de couloir de ravitaillement des populations déplacées est utilisé indistinctement par toutes les organisations d'assistance humanitaire et son fonctionnement ne date pas d'hier.

Quant à certains pays de l'Union Européenne et de l'Afrique francophone, le FPR espère qu'ils sont assez mûrs pour ne pas se laisser entraîner par la France qui, visiblement a des comptes à rendre avec des Rwandais.

La classification apportée hier par Monsieur Alain Juppé ne change rien ni aux intentions de la France ni à la position du FPR vis-à-vis d'elle. Ces enfants, femmes, hommes, orphelins, invalides auxquels la France vole au secours sont nos frères et sœurs. Ils ont été mutilés par les armes que la France a fournies et continue de fournir. Ils sont victimes d'un plan de GÉNOCIDE que la France connaissait apparemment (voir le Soir du 17.06.94)


MSF 4 243 06

3/4

- 2 -

Evénements qu'ils sont avec nous. Nous ne pouvons pas nous en passer.
Que les pays qui sont aujourd'hui mobilisés par la France pour
intervenir au Rwanda sachent avec qui et pourquoi ils s'engagent
car des bruits courent déjà comme quoi il y aurait des soldats
français traqués dans des camps militaires de KIGALI.

Dr. Jacques BIMOAGARA
Membre du Bureau Politique



**FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS
RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT**

Bxi, 18.05.1994

4/4

APPEL A LA MOBILISATION GENERALE.

A tous les Rwandais de l'intérieur du pays et de la diaspora, maintenant vous connaissez la part de la France dans l'élaboration du plan de génocide dont vos parents, frères et sœurs ont été victimes.

Aujourd'hui la France, poursuivant son plan, vole au secours des bourreaux aux abois. Elle réussira, comme dans le passé à tromper l'opinion internationale et avoir son aval, voire même son soutien.

Aux pays africains qui veulent suivre la France dans l'achèvement de son sinistre plan nous disons: "Soyez Prudents". Peut-être que vous avez des dettes à régler à la France mais trouvez d'autres moyens que le sang des Rwandais.

A toute la Communauté internationale, ne vous rendez pas complice d'un projet auquel vous n'avez pas été associé.

Rwandaises et Rwandais, ne vous laissez pas intimider par des déclarations fallacieuses des diplomates français menaçant de répondre par la force à vos actes de légitime défense.

Le sang qui coule dans les veines de leurs soldats est aussi rouge que le vôtre. Mobilisez-vous pour tenir en échec le plan de trahison française. Après tout vous êtes Rwandais, vous devez vivre ou mourir au Rwanda et pas ailleurs. Vous en avez le temps, les moyens et la détermination.

Restez vigilants et pensez toujours à 500.000 Rwandais victimes du machiavélisme français, de ses armes et de ses amis bourreaux. Ils ont été sacrifiés pour que vous retrouviez votre dignité.

Dr Jacques NINDAGANA.
Membre du Bureau Politique.

2, Avenue de l'Observatoire, BP 1189 Bujumbura, Burundi. Tél 252 254 2522, Fax 252 254 2522



FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT



Washington, July 1, 1994

PRESS RELEASE

The Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) regrets to announce that there have been many cases of unidentified aircrafts overflying our territory and violating our air space without permission. These aircrafts do not respond to demands by our Kigali airport control tower to identify themselves.

The Rwandese Patriotic Front has also intercepted communications indicating that the purpose of these flights is to identify the targets of intended bombings raids in RPF territory.

There are clear indications that France aided by certain of its allies, is already exceeding the mandate of a solely impartial and humanitarian mission which resolution 929/1994 of the United Nations security council authorized.

The Rwandese Patriotic Front believes these moves indicate the real motives behind French intervention in Rwanda. The Rwandese Patriotic Front:

1. Wishes to inform the general public, particularly aviation authorities, that aircrafts which overfly RPF territory without permission and fail to identify themselves will be at risk of being attacked as enemy aircrafts.
2. Calls upon the international community to use its influence to restrain France from this course of aggression against the victims of genocide.
3. Reiterates its opposition to the unilateral French intervention in Rwanda to assist the perpetrators of genocide.
4. Reiterates the determination of its members and the Rwandese people at large to resist this French aggression by any means possible.
5. Calls for an immediate withdrawal of French troops from Rwanda and calls upon the U.N. Secretary General, the U.N. Security Council and Member States to expedite the deployment of U.N. Humanitarian force (UNAMIR II) established by resolutions 918 and 926/94.

For the Rwandese Patriotic Front

Gahima


Mr. Gerald Gahima

RPF Special Envoy to the United Nations and USA.


Contact: Tel: 301-588-8566 Fax: 301-588-8649

JUL 1 '94 9:23

703 715 7310 PAGE.001



FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT



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Kigali 24-06-1994

*Mr. Asher
we must ensure
we get the story
straight. The post
of Chief Liaison Officer
will be initiated
over the next few
days.*

SUBJECT : DISTORTION OF MESSAGES BY UNAMIR LOS AND OTHER STAFF
PLUS MISLEADING MEDIA STATEMENTS.

Dear Sir,

1. On a number of occasions your LOs have given you distorted messages from me and have always resulted into unjustified accusations/complaints or misleading Media reports.

I will give examples :


- a. In your letter dated 22.06.94 addressed to the CHC-RPA, you stated that personnel from "BROWN & ROOT" and UNOSOM were denied entry into RWANDA after you had requested clearance for them through me.
- b. In the presence of the DFC you told me that we had refused you to bring in APCs from Uganda when you had asked clearance for them.

In a related development your spokesman said later that we had refused you to bring in the APCs while in actual fact three (03) had already been delivered and clearance had been given for another consignment.

2. Sir, you will recall that after explaining to you (alone or in the presence of DFC) you appreciated that the cases referred to were mishandled by your LOs and/or Spokesman.

3. As you promised therefore, appropriate collective measures should be taken including cross checking information before reacting to it and retracting such media statements if they are so made.


Sincerely Yours


KAMANZI MUSHYO
MAJOR
C/LIASCN OFFR

MAJOR GEN. Roméo DALLAIRE
FORCE COMMANDER UNAMIR.

COPY TO :

- MAJOR GEN. PAUL KAGAME
CHAIRMAN HIGH COMMAND
RWANDESE PATRIOTIC ARMY.



FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT



①
②
CHO
I am still waiting
for the answer of this copy
4/6

Mulindi, 23rd May 1994

Major General Romeo A. Dallaire
Force Commander
UNAMIR
KIGALI

②
CDD
The memo is not from us.
likely from UNOMIN.
Suggest you retrieve
a copy for the FC
STO-milcom.
4/6

Ref: PR/I.5/0047/94 U.g

FC
not seen

Dear Sir,

Our attention has been drawn to a Memorandum CHO/047/94 dated 16th May 1994 written by UNAMIR Acting Chief Military Observer on the subject of Security clearance for UN Agencies and NGOs intending to travel to RPF held zone from Uganda.

In this regard, we wish to point out that the measure is an unnecessary interference and impediment to the work of NGOs who come to our zone for relief and humanitarian assistance to the large number of needy civilian populations. The instructions convey an impression that insecurity prevails in our zone and that the French Envoy was deliberately ambushed. Yet it was an oversight by the UN not to inform those concerned that the envoy will be passing in a fighting zone. It should be noted that NGOs have been operating in the zone without any incident and with all possible care for their security being taken by us.

More seriously, the procedure puts UNAMIR in a position to deny or authorise entry into Rwanda which is a prerogative outside the UNAMIR's mandate. We wish to point out that an assistance mission cannot substitute itself to the constituted or defacto authorities in the country.

We therefore trust that this unnecessary measure will be with- drawn forthwith and NGOs will continue operating in accordance with the Security Guidelines approved during our coordination meeting of 13th May 1994.

Yours sincerely,

④
DEC
Could you clarify
this with Gen Kagame.
4/6

Colonel Alexis KANYARENGE
CHAIRMAN - RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT

③
Sir, the ref
is attached
4/6
STO mincom

3, Avenue de L'Observatoire, #8. 1180 Brussels, Belgium. Tel: 32-2-374-5892, Fax: 32-2-374-4626

UNITED NATIONS

NATIONS UNIES

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR



(UNOMIR)

TO:

Mr. Daniel Melany
UNHCR

DATE: 16 May 1984

REF: OMG/OM/84

FROM:

Colonel Ascarul Haque
Acting Chief Military Observer

SUBJECT:

Clearance Before Entering Inside Rwanda

DCMO

DCGO


CMPO

1. According to the directives of UN/NTK all agencies working/intends to work in Rwanda/RPF held zone must have prior security clearance from United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) HQ before entering Rwanda.
2. Agencies based in Uganda or working from Uganda should get their security clearance through this HQ. To ensure that, this actually will be executed by the agencies, a checking system is required.
3. The necessity of clearance and security measures was proven last weekend when a French envoy was ambushed in the East of Rwanda.
4. Before starting any work in Rwanda an official clearance is to be obtained through this HQ from HQ UNAMIR, only then the agency/personnel of the agency is allowed to operate/enter into Rwanda.
5. In the light of above, you are requested to kindly inform all UN agencies/NGOs to furnish required information (as given in Annex A to this memo) to this HQ 3 days/72 hours prior to commencement of any border crossing.
6. Your cooperation on this subject will be highly appreciated.

None doing prior



FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT



①
②
CNO
I am still waiting
for the answer of this copy
of this. *[Signature]*
FC
4/6

Mulindi, 23rd May 1994

Major General Romeo A. Dallaire
Force Commander
UNAMIR
KIGALI

Ref: PR/1.5/0047/94 U.g

C

Dear Sir,

*not
secure*

Our attention has been drawn to a Memorandum CMO/047/94 dated 16th May 1994 written by UNAMIR Acting Chief Military Observer on the subject of Security clearance for UN Agencies and NGOs intending to travel to RPF held zone from Uganda.

In this regard, we wish to point out that the measure is an unnecessary interference and impediment to the work of NGOs who come to our zone for relief and humanitarian assistance to the large number of needy civilian populations. The instructions convey an impression that insecurity prevails in our zone and that the French Envoy was deliberately ambushed. Yet it was an oversight by the UN not to inform those concerned that the envoy will be passing in a fighting zone. It should be noted that NGOs have been operating in the zone without any incident and with all possible care for their security being taken by us.

C

More seriously, the procedure puts UNAMIR in a position to deny or authorise entry into Rwanda which is a prerogative outside the UNAMIR's mandate. We wish to point out that an assistance mission cannot substitute itself to the constituted or defacto authorities in the country.

We therefore trust that this unnecessary measure will be with- drawn forthwith and NGOs will continue operating in accordance with the Security Guidelines approved during our coordination meeting of 13th May 1994.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]
Colonel Alexis KANYARENGE
CHAIRMAN - RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT

3, Avenue de L'Observatoire, #8. 1180 Brussels, Belgium. Tel: 32-2-374-5892, Fax: 32-2-374-4626

Chairman RPF
Alexis Kanyarengwe
Mulindi
23 MAY 94

Ref: PR/15/0047/May 94 UG

Maj Gen Dallarie

Dear Sir,

Our attention has been drawn to a memorandum CMO/047/94 dated 16 May 94 UNAMIR Acting CMO on the subject of security clearance for UN Agencies and NGOs intending to travel to RPF held zone from Uganda. In this regard, we wish to point out that the measure is an unnecessary interference and impediment to the work of NGOs who come to our zone for relief and humanitarian assistance to the large number of needy civilian population. The instructions conveyed an impression that insecurity prevails in our zone and that the French envoy was deliberately ambushed. Yet it was an oversight by the UN not to inform those concerned that the envoy will be passing in a fighting zone. It should be noted that NGOs have been operating in the zone without any incident and with all possible care for their security being taken by us.

^{More}
~~We are~~ seriously, the procedure puts UNAMIR in a position to deny or authorise entry into Rwanda which is a prerogative outside the UNAMIR's mandate. We wish to point out that an assistance mission cannot substitute itself to the constituted or de facto authorities in the country.

We therefore trust that this unnecessary measure will be withdrawn forthwith and NGOs will continue operating in accordance with the security guidelines approved during our coordination meeting of 13 May 1994.

Yours Sincerely

Colonel Alexis Kanyarengwe
Chairman Rwandese Patriotic Front

② HAC / CMO / Per get copy of memo and speak to me ASAP. 2/6

We received through radio from MULINDI

[Signature] cov 1/6

R
P
F

FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT

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P
R

Mulindi, 21st May 1994.

Major General Romeo A. DALLAIRE
Force Commander
UNAMIR
KIDALI

Our Ref. : PR/X.1/0029/S.B/94/c.u.

Dear General,


Subject : MEETING NGOs AND INTERNATIONAL RELIEF
ORGANISATIONS IN MULINDI

We acknowledge receipt of your letter N° 025/FC dated 14th May 1994 on the above subject. We were however surprised by the information that you had no prior knowledge of this meeting held on 13th May 1994 since we had indeed invited UNAMIR through your resident officers in Mulindi.

We wish to put on record that a UNAMIR Representative in the person of Cdt M. SARR, Deputy Sector Commander at Mulindi, attended the meeting in response to our invitation. Attached is the relevant presence list page on which your representative signed. We assumed that the representative had been delegated by yourself and expected him to have given you a report on the meeting. In case such report has not been prepared for you, we attach a copy of our own report.

We trust that this clears the misunderstanding which developed on this issue from not being properly informed by your officers. On our part, we remain committed to cooperation with UNAMIR in addressing the humanitarian needs of the Rwandese people.

Yours sincerely,


Colonel Alexis KANYARENGWE
CHAIRMAN - RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT

3, Avenue de L'Observatoire, #8. 1180 Brussels, Belgium. Tel: 32-2-374-5892, Fax: 32-2-374-4626

2004/
HAC
Please go through this.
I wish the case to
explain what happened.
[Signature]
F2
21/5

I don't like
1/16/94
of 6.
force

REPORT OF A MEETING HELD BETWEEN THE NGOS, THE UN AGENCIES
WORKING IN AND INTENDING TO WORK IN RPF HELD AREAS
AND THE RPF HUMANITARIAN DEPARTMENT
AT MULINDI ON FRIDAY 13th MAY 1994

AGENDA :

1. Discussion on the general situation of displaced persons' camps.
2. Formulation of requirements and priorities.
3. Evaluation of NGOs participation so far.
4. Presentation of NGOs capacities and commitments.
5. Guidelines for NGOs in RPF controlled area.

(Point 1,2,3 are attached in a separate document).

The respective NGOs took the following commitments :

1. CARITAS - CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES :

They were already working in Rwanda in the Butaro, Kivuye, Cyumba areas. They have a pipeline to cater for food for 80,000 people for six months. They could go up to 120-125,000 people. They had their stock at Muhura and they were still in good shape. CRS and CARITAS Holland are ready to provide sheeting and non-food items like blankets and utensils. CARITAS Holland could provide 800 tones of beans very quickly to be distributed in any area of our choice. MEMISA Holland was assisting an organisation called BUFMA to provide drugs and they will be willing to do it again as soon as we give them a clear identification of the medical needs.

2. COMPASSION INTERNATIONAL :

They were already involved in Child Development Programme in Rwanda in Rwamagana area. They promised to provide supplementary food and cover the medical needs of the orphans. The NGO could cover also KAYONZA and GAHINI but they need more information on these areas. They expect to provide by this week or next week depending on their availability.

3. WORLD VISION :

On 8th May 1994, they delivered non-food items for 8,000 people in BYUMBA. They commended the RPF good cooperation. In this first phase, they targetted 15,000 people in BYUMBA area providing food for children. They also have 10,000 US\$ for medical supply and they

9. OXFAM :

- They will intervene in the Public Health and water areas;
- They will provide water tanks/pipes and pumps;
- They will provide Public Health Education;
- They were to provide 2000 litres of Gas-oil for the urban water system of BYUMBA Town and YARAMBA on 16/05/94;
- They will assist in Public sanitation in KIDAHQ;
- They earmark between 300,000 and 400,000 sterling pounds for their emergency activities.

10. W.F.P :

They have already provided food in the areas of :

- KARAMA for 16,000 people
- GAHINI for 10,000 people
- KAYONZA for 22,000 people

The food was to last between 2 weeks to one month. They will provide food for 130,000 people for the next 3 months.

11. MSF HOLLAND :

- They visited the Health centre at GITARE.
- They will bring a sanitation consultant for about a week to look at the needs;
- By next week, they will establish a mobile clinic if possible;
- If UNICEF could provide them with vaccines and transport they would start vaccination against measles.

12. MSF - BELGIUM :

- They have a surgical team in BYUMBA since 27/04/94;
- They have assessed the camps around BYUMBA and will start medical assistance from Monday in the camps of MANYAGIRO, YARAMBA, KISARO, KIVUYE and KIGALI if possible.

13. GERMAN EMERGENCY DOCTORS :

They used to work in BUTARE and they have a team : surgen, paediatrician, nurses and technicians with medical equipment.

In cooperation with them, the GERMAN MALT CROSS will provide another medical team with a doctor and nurses. They are ready to work anywhere the need arises in two weeks time.

They could participate in immunization programme with other people.

- They appealed to other NGOs to help the orphans at GAHINI because their situation was not good be it in food, medical supply and non-food items;
- The Paeditrician in charge insisted that for the orphans, we should look at the preventive aspects.

18. PHARMACIENS SANS FRONTIERES (PSF) :

- They provide drugs to medecins du monde;
- They were expecting 2 tones of drugs;
- Their target would be to cover the basic medical needs of 230,000 people for three months;
- They wanted RPF to approach EEC and UNICEF to assist them in their endeavour to cover these medical needs.

19. ICRC (RED CROSS) :

- They partitioned between WFP and ICRC to cover the food needs, ICRC to cover BYUMBA and RUHENGIRI, WFP to cover the rest;
- They have food for the displaced people until they are back to their land and produce food. They have an agriculturist coming to that effect;
- In the medical area their aim is to cover the needs until another NGO takes over ;
- They have 30,000 blankets and soap in stock;
- For sanitation they have manpower and are ready. to work with OXFAM in this area.

20. UNHCR :

- Their mandate is not to help the internal displaced people, unless it is approved by headquarters;
- They will help the Rwandese refugees and the returnees who are back in TABAGWE and KARAMA;
- They provided 210 Tones of food for one month in February 1994 for about 12,500.

The meeting discussed a set of guidelines to be respected by NGOs and UN Agencies intending to work in RPF held area. Hereto attached.

The meeting also decided that such a coordination meeting like this one will be held every second Friday of the month.

Christine Umutoni
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND NGO COORDINATOR

OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR NON-GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANISATIONS INTENDING TO OPERATE IN RPF-ZONE

For better collaboration between the RPF and Humanitarian NGOs it is imperative to set up operational principles:

1. The respective NGOs activities must be purely humanitarian;
2. Every NGO must identify itself clearly, state its nature of duties and should also provide a staff list and their job description;
3. The NGOs operating in RPF controlled area, shall recognise that we are working in a war zone, and should therefore, accept advice given by the Front on Security matters. For that matter, RPF shall provide guides and/or armed escorts where necessary.
4. All programmes and priorities should be agreed upon between the NGOs and RPF. Any changes in these programmes should be done in consultation with RPF.
5. In case of any problem in the field or any other information, the NGOs should report to RPF.
6. The local staff to be working for the NGOs in RPF zone must be discussed and agreed upon.
7. For any other official communication.
Contact : RPF Coordination Bureau and RPF Office in
Mulindi;
3, Avenue de L'Observatoire
#8, 1180 Bruxelles - Belgium.
Tel: 32-2-374-5892,
Fax: 32-2-374-4626.
8. All NGOs should have a direct contact with RPF, there is no need to go through another NGO or Organisation for clearance.

3

RPF

DATE	NAME OF ORGANISATION	NAME OF PARTICIPANT	TITTLE	ADDRESS
13 MAY 94	UNHCR/UGANDA	D. BELLAMY	Dep. Rep.	KIGALI
	UNAMIR	CDT. H. SARR	Dep. S. Rep.	Kurundi
	ICRC	D. GROW	Head sub-dept.	Kabale
	ICRC	Dr. J. M. Caloz	Coordination medical	Kabale
	M.D.M	B. MAITRE	Program officers	PARIS
	M.D.M	H. GODON		

3/05/94.

SITUATION IN THE DISPLACED CAMPS

1. POPULATION IN THE CAMPS (10/05/94)

1.1. BYUMBA :

- BYUMBA (Town)	:	17,840	inhab.
- KISARO	:	12,612	"
- MAFUREBO	:	12,079	"
- YARAMBA	:	7,848	"
- KIVUYE	:	7,062	"
- RUSHAKI	:	5,500	"
- RUTARE	:	22,000	"
- MANYAGIRO	:	17,200	"
- GISHAMBACHAYO	:	6,870	"
- MUKARANGE	:	8,841	"
- GAHENERI	:	7	"

1.2. BUGANZA/KIBUNGO/MUTARA

- GAHINI	:	6,000	inhab.
- KAYONZA	:	24,000	"
- RWAMAGANA	:	20,000	"
- KABARONDO	:	1,500	"
- CYASEMAKAMBA (KIBUNGO)	:	5,100	"
- RUSUMO	:	2,000	"
- KIZIGURO	:	20,000	"
- TABAGWE	:	13,044	"
- MUHURA	:	4,500	"
- KARAMBO	:	1,500	"
- RUKUMBERI	:	1,500	"

1.3. RUHENERI

- BURAMBI	:	17,754	inhab.
- CYANIKA	:	1,770	"
- BUTENGA	:	1,776	"
- GITARE	:	7,259	"
- BUTETE	:	3,730	"
- BULERA	:	10,124	"
- SIRWA	:	8,880	"
- BAHITA	:	4,500	"
- BUKARAGATA	:	6,450	"
- MUSAMA	:	5,120	"
- KINGOYI I & II	:	6,310	"
- RULIBA I & II	:	5,500	"
- KINYABADA	:	2,437	"
- RUTOVU	:	1,558	"
- NDAGO	:	7,102	"
- KABONA	:	5,850	"

BYUMBA (Town) : WORD VISION
(17,840 inhab.) :

A s s o r t e d
medecines

Children's toys

2 bales childrens
clothes

Food for children

5 bags of millet
flour

5 b a g s o f
groundnuts

10 Jerrycans of
paraffin

2 boxes of
bathing soap for
children

4 washing soap

50 plastic basins

2500 jerrycans

4 plastic buckets

1000 plastic plates

1000 plastic cups

b. MANYAGIRD : W.F.P. : - 64.58 T maize meal
(17,200 inhab.) - 20.70 T beans

- 4.5 T cooking oil

c. KISARD : W.F.P. : - 40.48 T maize meal
(12,612 inhab.) - 16.02 T beans
- 3.5 T oil

29/4/94 for 15 days

d. RUTARE : RED CROSS - 112 T mixed food
(22.000 inhab.)

b. Medical assistance

All displaced camps of BUGANZA, KIBUNGO and MUTARA need medicines. In some areas, there is even need in basic minimum. E.g. : KABARONDO, RUSUMO, MUHURA, KARAMBO and RUKUMBERI.

c. Domestic and hygienic needs

All camps displaced of BUGANZA, KIBUNGO and MUTARA need basic tools and hygienic materials. E.g. Plates, buckets, jerrycans, hoes, pangas etc.

So given the distance walked to reach water, the urgent need expressed by the population is requisition of jerrycans. In this area, most of displaced have no shelter. A number of people sleeps in the open. E.g.: RWAMAGANA and KAYONZA. They have an immediate need of plastic sheetings to build shelter.

3.3. RUGENGERI

As in other areas, the need expressed by displaced can be summarized as follows :

- Food supplies
 - Medical assistance
 - Domestic and hygienic materials
- E.g. : Blankets, jerrycans, saucepans, plates, plastic sheetings for shelter.

N.B. Given the predominance of vulnerable groups among displaced populations. The NGO's should examine a possibility of a quick supply of supplementary food rations for pregnant women and children like milk and other proteinic foods.

3. MEDECINS DU MONDE PHARMACIEN SAN FRONTIER	GAHINI (6.000 inhabs)	Doctors in GAHINI Hospital: Some medecins	-	-
4. MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES	BYUMBA (17.840 inhabs)	Doctors in BYUMBA Hospital: Some medecins.	-	-
5. WORLD VISION	BYUMBA (17.840 inhabs)	Assorted medecines: Children's toys: 2 bales of children's clothes: Food for children: 5 bags of millet flour: 5 bags of groundnuts.	-	-
6. TOGETHER FOR PEACE FOUNDATION	-	43 orphans and 11 injured children transported in ITALY.	-	-

CONCLUSION

- This board is showing that the rations already distributed are far not enough to cover the needs and also the period with it was supposed to be used is over or very near (close).
- About the health sector, it is very clear that the medecines provides are not enough.
- To the point of domestical material of common use, nothing had be done except for BYUMBA whereby some materials had been furnished by WORLD VISION.
- There is still alot of need for NGOs to give aid.

16/05/1994

STORAGE AND POSSIBLE ROUTES TO CAMPS

COMMUNE	CAMPS	ROUTE (FM)	EST. KMS	DISTRIBUTION CENTRES	STORAGE CAPACITY
<u>BYUMBA :</u>					
01. KIVUYE	KIVUYE GAKUBO	GATUNA-BUTARO "	20 KMS "	KIVUYE-T. CENTRE "	1000 M.T "
02. CYUMBA	MANYAGIRO MAFUREBO YARAMBA	GATUNA-BUTARO " TURN LEFT AT 14KMS (2KM INSIDE)	12 KMS 16 KMS "	CYUMBA C. STORE MUSENDA STORE "	1000 M.T 800 M.T "
03. MUKARANGE	MUKARANGE	MILINDI- MUKARANGE	1/2 KM	JUNCTION STORE	500 M.T
04. KIVOMBE	MURAMBI NYANGE	MULINDI-RUSHAKI "	12 KMS	KABUGA STORE	800 M.T
05. KINYONI	KISARO/ NYANKENKE	BYUMBA-KISARO	08 KMS	KISARO STORE	1000 M.T
06. CYUNGO	KIBOGO	KISARO-KIBOGO	08 KMS	KIBOGO BUILDING	450 M.T
07. RUTARE	RUTARE	RUKOMO-RUTARE	18 KMS	RUTARE MAIN CAMP	1000 M.T
08. BUYOGA	BYUMBA CAMP	RUKOMO-BYUMBA	13 KMS	BYUMBA MAIN CAMP	1000 M.T
<u>NGARAMA :</u>					
01. MUVUMBA	TABAGWE	BOADER-TABAGWE	05 KMS	TABAGWE STORE	800 M.T
02. MUHURA	MUHURA	RUKOMO-MUHURA	21 KMS	MUHURA CAMP	750 M.T
03. MURAMBI	KIZIGURO	(OFF MAIN-ROAD)	02 KMS	KIZIGURO CAMP	850 M.T
<u>RUHENGARI :</u>	CYANIKA BURAMBI SIRWE BUTENGA GITARE	CYANIKA-KIDAHU COMMUNE (Main Road) RUHENGARI ROAD	-	KIDAHU COMMUNE	1000 M.T
01. KIDAHU					
<u>RWAMAGANA :</u>					
01. RUKARA	GAHINI	OFF MAIN ROAD	01 KM	GAHINI CAMP	1000 M.T
02. KAYONZA	KAYONZA	MAIN ROAD	08 KMS	KAYONZA CAMP	1000 M.T
03. RWAMAGANA	RWAMAGANA	OFF MAIN ROAD	01 KM	RWAMAGANA CAMP	1000 M.T

02. KIGARAMA	KABARONDO	MAIN RD-KIBUNGO	-	KABARONDO CAMP	500 M.T
03. RUSUMO	RUSUMO	MAIN RD-RUSUMO	60 KMS	RUSUMO COMMUNE	780 M.T
04. SAKE	CYASEMAKAMBA	NOT YET SURVEYED	-	-	-

N.B : - All camps are closed to it's main distrution centres. The longest distance from each camp is 4 kms.
- Capacity of stores are estimates.
- Other camps of Kigali - information will come later.

Henry RWAGASANA
I/C LOGISTICS - COORDINATION COMMITTEE

c.c. I/C NGOs



FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT



*② Hse
Info
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19/5*

Washington, May 17, 1994

PRESS RELEASE

The Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) welcomes the passage by the Security Council of Resolution 918/1994 authorizing the deployment of a humanitarian U.N. force to protect civilians at risk and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid.

The RPF indeed regrets that the Security Council ever found it necessary to withdraw the original UNAMIR and notes that the proposed deployment of the expanded UNAMIR comes too late for the salvation for the majority of Rwandese people whom the late President Habyarimana, his party MRND and their allies had planned to exterminate.

The RPF wishes to express its profound disappointment that the Security Council has once again refrained from taking the bold and necessary action of categorizing the massacres in Rwanda as genocide.

The RPF further still finds some elements of concept of the proposed U.N. plan (so far as it can be verified) unacceptable:

1. The size of the proposed force is in our view too big for the mission of the force.
2. The proposal that Kigali airport should be treated as a neutral zone under the control of UNAMIR may in our view have to be reconsidered. It should be recalled that when UNAMIR requested the RPF and the Rwandese Government Forces (RGF) last April that Kigali airport be made a neutral zone under its control, RPF accepted the proposal but the RGF rejected it outright.

RPF subsequently proposed that the airport be put under the control of UNAMIR, RGF and itself and RGF again turned down the suggestion.

UNAMIR now gives the impression that the airport is under the joint control of RGF and itself.

The RPF wishes to put the international community on notice that there is an ongoing military struggle for the control of Kigali airport and adjacent areas. The RPF will not agree to the categorisation of Kigali airport as a neutral zone under the control of UNAMIR unless and until the RGF vacates both Kigali airport and the adjacent Kanombe military barracks and relocate at a safe distance. Until that is done, Kigali airport remains a legitimate military target and a dangerous place to base a UNAMIR contingent. The RPF strongly advises the UN forces not to base their contingency planning on the availability of Kigali airport.

CNR 257 P3/3

The RPF strongly urges the UN Secretariat generally and the individual members of the Security Council in particular to seriously consider the use of safer alternative access routes from neighboring countries and airstrips in non contested areas such as Gakiro (RPF areas) and Kamembe and Gisenyi (RDF areas).

The RPF wishes to express its hope that the composition of the proposed UN force will only be determined after full consultation and with the express consent of the two parties to the conflict. There are certain countries whose participation in the expanded UNAMIR RPF very strongly objects to, notably all the neighboring countries without exception and countries which have at one time or another provided military support to the regime of President Habyarimana and its successor.


Lastly the RPF reiterates its position that on account of the reasons which the RPF has already communicated to the U.N. Secretary General in writing, RPF will not cooperate with the United Nations in respect of the implementation of Resolution 571/1994 until Dr. Jacques Roger Booh-Booh, the Special Representative of the Secretary General in Rwanda, is recalled.

For: The Political Bureau of the Rwandese Patriotic Front


Sybilina

Mr. Gerald Gahima

Contact: In Washington
Tel: (703)-553-0452
Fax: (703)-553-0458



FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT



New York, 27 April 1994

PRESS RELEASE

FRANCE RECOGNIZES MURDEROUS AND CRIMINAL REGIME IN RWANDA

Despite a resolution by the EEC to condemn the perpetrators of genocide in Rwanda, it is shocking to learn that a civilised nation like France can, in view of the horrifying massacres of innocent Rwandese people, recognise a criminal and murderous regime set up by the presidential guard. The French action confirms beyond reasonable doubt what many human rights organizations have exposed as complicity between France and the presidential guard. It is important to recall that France was actively involved on the side of the Rwandese army throughout the three year armed conflict.

France's role in the Rwandese conflict has, in particular has been; to supply arms to the Rwandese army; to offer command and logistical support during active combat; to train and arm the presidential guard and the MRND-CDR militia. Given the horrific actions of the presidential guard and the MRND-CDR militia in the past weeks, one can only conclude that they were good students of their French military trainers.

We further wish to inform the International community that, in addition to France's known role in the Rwandese conflict, there are attempts by France to rearm the presidential guard by flying planes into neighbouring Zaire and claiming to be delivering humanitarian aid to Rwanda. What could be more absurd!

The violation of the unilateral ceasefire declared by the RPF and which went into force on Monday at midnight local time, is an indication of the Rwandese army's newly gained confidence as a result of France's moral support and a promise of more military aid. The Rwandese Patriotic Front will hold France, the Rwandese Army and the Rwandese criminal interim government equally responsible for the slaughter of thousands of innocent Rwandan children, women and men.

Claude Dusaldi
Director of External Relations and
RPF Representative at the UN

MESSAGE <i>C</i>		
FOR: POUR : <i>FC</i>		
FROM: DE : <i>MA to FC</i>		
TELEPHONE NO.: NO DE TELEPHONE :	EXTENSION: POSTE :	ROOM NO.: NO DE BUREAU :
RETURNED YOUR CALL	VOUS A RAPPELE(E)	
WILL CALL YOU AGAIN	VOUS RAPPELLERA	
WOULD LIKE YOU TO CALL	VOUDRAIT QUE VOUS L'APPELIEZ	
CAME TO SEE YOU	EST VENU(E) VOUS VOIR	
WOULD LIKE TO SEE YOU	VOUDRAIT VOUS VOIR	
<p><i>Draft letter is put up for your approval, sig - nature please. The RPF was addressed to the SRSG BA. <i>[Signature]</i> H/13/4.</i></p>		
RECEIVED BY - <i>[Signature]</i> DATE		TIME - HEURE
COM-1 (1-90)		

Kigali, le 22 Avril 1994

Roméo Dallaire
Général Major
Commandant de la MINUAR
KIGALI


Objet: Tirs isolés d'armes de petit calibre aux environs
immédiats de l'Etat-Major de la MINUAR

Monsieur le Commandant,

En réponse à votre lettre de ce jour, j'ai l'honneur de vous assurer que nos forces ont pour consigne stricte de ne tirer qu'en cas de nécessité absolue. Vous comprendrez que ces forces ne sauraient rester bras croisés lorsqu'elles sont attaquées sur les positions qu'elles occupent.

Aussi nous proposons que vous demandiez à l'armée adverse de ne pas chercher à regagner le terrain perdu en attaquant les forces stationnées tout près de vos installations. Cela permettra qu'effectivement les armes ne crépitent plus autour de vos édifices et de mieux contrôler ainsi les motivations et les directions des tirs à l'arme lourde. A ce propos nous aimerions rappeler que les obus tirés sur le Stade Amahoro par les FAR ne répondaient à aucune nécessité militaire ou objectif installé tout près du Stade et de l'Etat-Major de la MINUAR.

En vous réitérant notre disposition à coopérer avec vous, nous vous prions de croire, Général, en l'assurance de notre considération distinguée.


Pour le Front Patriotique Rwandais
Le Lt Colonel Charles KAYONGA
Commandant de Bataillon

Kigali, le 22 Avril 1994

Au Général Roméo A. Dallaire
Major Général
Commandant de la MINUAR
KIGALI

Objet : Statut de l'Aéroport International de Kigali


Général,

Suite à votre lettre de ce jour relative à l'objet repris en marge et à notre note manuscrite rapportée par votre officier de Liaison, nous vous confirmons que nous restons entièrement disposés à souscrire à tout arrangement relatif à la neutralité et à la sécurité dans et autour de l'Aéroport International de Kigali.

Dans ce cadre, nous avons discuté le draft du MOU (Memorandum of Understanding for Establishment of UN Neutral Territory at KIA) et donné des observations à propos des articles 15 et 18, du Mémoire; 2 de l'annexe B; 8, 11 et 12 de l'annexe C et il était entendu que nous devions nous revoir pour finaliser notre entendement commun sur tout le texte.

Etant donné l'importance du sujet, nous préférons à nouveau que le document de création de la Zone Neutre autour de l'Aéroport soit un accord tripartite. Sur ce nous restons à votre disposition pour finaliser ce document.

En attendant votre plus prompt réaction, je vous prie de croire, Général, en l'assurance de ma considération distinguée.


Pour le RPR
Lt Colonel Charles KAYONGA
Commandant de Bataillon

Kigali. 22 Avril 1994

Au Général Roméo A. DALLAIRE
Commandant de la MINUAR
KIGALI


Conformément à nos discussions de ce matin, nous vous confirmons notre entendement selon lequel la MINUAR devrait étendre sa présence d'observation (monitoring) aux autres centres et lieux qui hébergent des Rwandais menacés par les massacres en cours dans la ville de Kigali.

Les centres qui nous sont connus à l'heure actuelle sont:

1. Presses Paloti à Gikondo
2. L'Hôpital de Campagne de la Croix Rouge Internationale au siège de la CICR à Kigali.
3. La cathédrale Saint Michel
4. Le Lycée Notre Dame de Citeaux
5. L'Eglise Sainte Famille
6. Le Lycée de Rugunga
7. Le Collège St André
8. L'Ecole Belge de Kigali
9. La Paroisse de Kicukiro.

Nous voudrions souligner l'importance que nous attachons à cet acte d'observation et de monitoring, susceptible de servir d'élément de dissuasion aux Forces Gouvernementales et autres milices qui voudraient massacrer les réfugiés concentrés dans ces camps.

Dans l'attente d'une confirmation de votre déploiement dans ces centres, nous vous prions de croire, Général, en l'assurance de notre considération distinguée.



Pour le FPR
Seth SENDASHONGA
Membre du Bureau Politique

9/17

Kigali, 21th April 94


Major General R.A. Dallaire
Force Commander
UNAMIR

We refer to your letter dated 20th April 94 regarding humanitarian assistance.

In this regard, we are pleased to inform you that we readily accept the proposed "Accord on Facilitation of Humanitarian Assistance."

Looking forward to having a successful cooperation, we remain.

Yours sincerely,


For the Rwandese Patriotic Army
Lt Colonel Charles KAYONGA
Battalion Commander

Facilitation du transfert des personnes
sous protection de la MINUAR à Kigali
=====

1. Depuis la reprise des hostilités entre le FPR et les Forces Armées Rwandaises, un grand nombre de Rwandais, estimé à environ 13.000 personnes, a cherché protection dans les locaux occupés par la MINUAR à Kigali (Hôtel des Mille Collines, Stade AMAHORO, Hôpital Roi Fayçal et autres).
2. Conscient de son devoir de protection de ces Rwandais, le FPR a mené et continuera à mener ses opérations de combat en prenant toutes les dispositions raisonnables afin de pouvoir assurer effectivement la sécurité de tous ces édifices, pour autant que ceux-ci ne soient utilisés par les FAR comme bases de tir ou de protection de ses bases de tir.
3. Par ailleurs, le FPR s'engage à faciliter le transfert, par les soins de la MINUAR ou/et de la Croix Rouge, de ces Rwandais dans d'autres parties de Kigali où ils estiment se sentir plus en sécurité, suivant les modalités suivantes:
 - a) L'opération de transfert se déroulera sur une période de 48 heures à compter de 0700 heures du matin le 20 avril 1994.
 - b) Les convois de la MINUAR et/ou de la Croix Rouge ne seront soumis à aucun barrage routier entre les points de départ et d'arrivée.
 - c) La MINUAR communiquera au FPR, une heure à l'avance, les destinations et les itinéraires empruntés par ces convois ainsi que les durées approximatives des différentes opérations.
 - d) Le FPR permettra le passage des convois dans les zones sous son contrôle et arrêtera toutes les opérations de combat sur le trajet des convois.
 - e) La MINUAR assurera le contrôle du respect par le FPR de cet engagement. Tout incident éventuel sera porté à la connaissance du FPR par les voies les plus rapides.

Pour le FPR
Seth SENDASHONGA
Membre du Bureau Politique

Pour la MINUAR
Le Général Roméo DALLAIRE

Kigali, 20th April 94

Major General R.A DALLAIRE
Force Commander UNAMIR
KIGALI

Dear Sir,


Re : Memorandum of understanding (MOU) establishing the
United Nations Neutral Territory at KIA.

We have considered the draft of the MOU submitted to us for
consideration and approval.

In general, we have no major objection to the text, except
where the word "faction" should be replaced by other words
such as forces, army, party, RPF, RGF. Where we have made
additions to suggest we have done so in the text.

We are looking forward to having a thorough discussion of the
document so that it can be adopted as soon as possible.

Yours sincerely,


Beth SINDASHONGA
Member of the Political Bureau
Rwandese Patriotic Front

9/17

Kigali, le 19 avril 1994

Au Dr Jacques Roger BOOH BOOH
Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire
Général des Nations Unies au Rwanda
Kigali

Monsieur le Représentant Spécial,


Nous accusons réception de votre lettre du 19 avril 1994 relative à la protection et le transfert éventuel de Rwandais placés sous la protection de la MINUAR dans des édifices occupés par celle-ci dans la ville de Kigali.


A cet égard, nous tenons à vous assurer que le FPR a une conscience aigüe de ses obligations au regard des conventions internationales pertinentes sur la protection des civils en temps de guerre et que ses troupes se sont toujours strictement conformées à ces conventions. Les deux incidents enregistrés jusque là, à savoir le tir d'obus sur l'Hôpital Roi Fayçal et sur le Stade AMAHORO, ne sont nullement de la responsabilité du FPR, ainsi que nos collaborateurs ont dû vous le dire.

S'agissant du droit reconnu à chaque Rwandais se trouvant dans vos édifices à Kigali de pouvoir être transféré dans la partie de la ville de Kigali où il estime se sentir plus en sécurité, l'idée nous agréée parfaitement et nous vous remettons un projet d'accord de facilitation de ce transfert, en espérant que l'autre partie pourra signer un arrangement similaire et le respecter.


Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Représentant Spécial, l'expression de nos sentiments les plus distingués.

Colonel Alexis KANYARENGWE
Président du FPR-INKOTANYI





FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT



Kigali, le 17 avril 1994

Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire
Général des Nations Unies au Rwanda
(Kigali).

Monsieur le Représentant Spécial,

J'accuse réception de votre lettre du 14 courant, pour laquelle je vous remercie.

Comme vous le savez fort bien, la réunion prévue ce jour-là n'a pas pu se tenir du fait du non respect des conditions de confidentialité dont vous aviez convenu avec nos représentants au CND.

Vous vous en souviendrez, le décès inopiné du Président de la République dans un accident d'avion dont les causes et les circonstances ne sont pas encore élucidées, a été immédiatement suivie des massacres de populations civiles perpétrés par la Garde Présidentielle, à laquelle se sont joints les éléments des autres Forces Armées Gouvernementales ainsi que des hordes de malfaiteurs issus des milices des partis politiques MRND et CDR. Devant l'inaction des Forces de sécurité et l'incapacité de la MINUAR, débordé par la soldatesque surarmée, à contenir ces actes, le FPR a volé au secours de la population de Kigali dont un grand nombre allait être massacré au Stade AMAHORO où elle avait pris refuge. A cette heure-là, des informations concordantes, et qui se sont malheureusement avérées fondées, faisaient état d'assassinats des leaders des partis politiques et d'autres personnalités importantes dans le pays. C'est dans ces circonstances que le bataillon du FPR cantonné au CND a décidé, sur ordre du commandement du FPR, d'occuper la Garde Présidentielle à combattre d'autres soldats plutôt qu'à massacrer des innocents.

Par ailleurs, vous êtes sans ignorer que dans la nuit du 6 au 7 courant, après que la nouvelle de la mort du Président de la République fût connue et que les massacres eurent commencé à Kigali, nos officiels vous ont contacté par téléphone dans le but d'échanger des informations et étudier ensemble les mesures qui pouvaient être envisagées. Malheureusement, vous ne vous êtes pas montré disposé à prêter attention. De même, pendant la journée, nos officiels ont cherché à contacter DALLAIRE ainsi que le commandement des Forces Armées Gouvernementales dans le même but, mais sans succès. Plus haut, c'est face à la situation de violence que les Forces Armées Gouvernementales ont été contraintes de déclencher cette opération militaire à grande échelle pour chasser les groupes rebelles du territoire national.


massacres. Ce n'est d'ailleurs que cinq jours après le début des événements que vous avez bien voulu envoyer votre Conseiller politique contacter nos officiels résidant au CND. A cette occasion, il vous avait été demandé de vous prononcer sur la reconnaissance ou non par la MINUAR du Président et du Gouvernement auto-proclamés le 8 avril 1994. Malgré la promesse de votre Conseiller politique, cette clarification se fait encore attendre.


Depuis ce premier contact, nous n'avons cessé de souligner l'arrêt des massacres comme préalable à un arrêt éventuel des hostilités. Depuis le 10 avril 1994, nous avons donné au Général DALLAIRE les conditions à communiquer à l'autre partie et à propos desquelles les réponses ont été empreintes de mauvaise foi et de faux fuyants. Moyennant ces préalables, nous restons disposés à entamer d'éventuelles négociations en vue d'un cessez-le-feu. Cependant, le cessez-le-feu le plus urgent est celui qui porterait sur l'arrêt des actes de massacres perpétrés par les Forces Gouvernementales et les milices des partis MRND et CDR contre les populations civiles. C'est à ce premier cessez-le-feu que nous vous demandons de vous employer avec tout le tact et le courage nécessaires et pour lequel nous vous promettons toute la coopération désirée.

Les préconditions à une éventuelle rencontre de discussion d'un cessez-le-feu que nous avons remis au commandement des Forces Gouvernementales le 15 avril 1994 en votre présence constituent, à cet égard, les seules bases sérieuses d'un éventuel cessez-le-feu entre les deux armées.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Représentant Spécial, l'assurance de notre considération distinguée.

Colonel Alexis KANYARENGWE
Président du FPR

fo. 



FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS
RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT



KIGALI Le 12-04-1994

1
2
MA
Please look into this.
12/4

A Monsieur Jacques Roger Booh Booh
Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire
Général des Nations Unies
KIGALI,

Monsieur Le Représentant Spécial,

Le F.P.R.-INKOTANYI voudrait porter à
votre attention un incident qui vient d'avoir
lieu ce 12 avril 1994 à 11h30.

Alors qu'un convoi de la MINUAR évacuait
des ressortissants étrangers vers l'aéroport de KANOMBE,
une camionnette rouge de l'armée gouvernementale
faitait partie du convoi et ses occupants ont
guériement blessé deux de nos soldats qui assuraient
la consigne de cessation de toute opération de combat
sur le passage des convois.

L'incident a eu lieu à la jonction de la
route du Bugesera avec la route de l'Aéroport,
non loin de la société SONATURBS.

Nous protestons vigoureusement en soulignant
que les troupes qui effectuent des évacuations doivent
s'assurer avec la MINUAR que de tels incidents ne
se reproduiront plus. Nous espérons vivement que le
contrôle des convois sera désormais strict et serré
de façon à éviter que les véhicules des forces armées
gouvernementales ne fassent partie des convois.


Dans l'attente d'une réponse rapide nous
communiquant les résultats de vos investigations sur
cet incident, nous vous prions de croire, Monsieur
le Représentant Spécial, en l'assurance de notre
considération distinguée.

Ci Général R. DOLLAYE
Commandant de la MINUAR

Pour le FPR

SETH SENDASHONGA

Membre du Bureau Politique



FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS
RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT



RPA/D9/31m/RW

Mulindi 31.03.1994

MAJOR GENERAL R.A DALLAIRE
UNAMIR FORCE COMMANDER

Dear Sir,

RE: VIOLATION OF OUR ZONAL AIR SPACE BY UNOMUR

On 28th March 1994, a United Nations helicopter aircraft which belongs to UNOMUR overflew our boarder with Uganda into our territory and hovered over for about fifteen minutes without permission.


We would like to remind you that this is a second incident where UNOMUR has entered our territory illegally. You may wish to recall that one time UNOMUR patrols crossed into our territory from Uganda and we held them for some hours.

UNOMUR should be strictly advised not to overfly our airspace again. This should serve as a last warning to avoid their aircraft being shot at.


Yours Sincerely,

Andrew RWIGAMBA
Lt. Colonel
SECRETARY RPA HIGH COMMAND

RECEIVED	
OFFICE OF FC	
Date	2/4/94
No	997
By	SP



FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT



RPA/D7/30m/RWr

①

30.3.1994

Major General P.A. DALLAIRE
UNAMIR Force Commander

Dear Sir,

RE: VIOLATION OF KWSA BY RGF

This is to inform you of the continued violation of KWSA by the RGF and the CDR/MRND militia.

RGF continues to occupy defensive positions within KWSA in violation of the S.O.P document signed by both parties. These positions have mounted weapons. In one particular defense GR 110793, there is a 14.5 mm AAC targeting CND building. Other defenses which have mounted support weapons are:

Mt. REBERO	GS 0779
Mt. KIGALI	GS 0483
Mt. JARI	GS 0488.

We sincerely call upon your indulgence in the matter.

Yours sincerely,

Andrew RWIGAMBA
Lt. Colonel
SECRETARY RPA HIGH COMMAND

②
DPC

We have this checked out and have response made. This is really Kigali letter to sort out.

*no
i.e
2/4*

RECEIVED	
OFFICE OF FC	
Date	2/4/94
No.	994
By	S.P.

R
P
FFRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS
RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONTF
P
R

RPA/D6/30M/RWr

MAJOR GENERAL R.A DALLAIRE
UNAMIR FORCE COMMANDER

Dear Sir,

RE: VIOLENCE AGAINST RPF SUPPORTERS

Mulindi, 30.03.1994

We wish to bring to your attention the increasing violence against RPF supporters by the RGF elements especially soldiers of the Presidential Guard and MRND/CDR militia.

1. On the 19th March 1994, three youngmen while from a visit at CND were intercepted at Kimihurura beaten up and disappeared since then. They are believed to have been killed. Their names are:
 - a. Kalinganire Clement;
 - b. Mulyenzi Aloys;
 - c. Minani Gaspard.
2. On the 20th March 1994 at about 1400hrs three youngmen, on their way to CND were stopped by soldiers of Presidential Guard at Kacyiru round-about and beaten up severely. One of them by name of Niyonshuti Pierre escaped back to CND while two others Ndekezi Alexander and Mukiga Alphonse were whisked away to an unknown destination. They have never been seen since then.
3. On 25th a youngman from Remera called Bamporeze J. was hit on the head and left to die. He was evacuated by UNAMIR.
4. On 26th, two daughters of one Gakwaya from Gikondo were kidnapped and have not been seen up to now.
5. On 26 March 1994, an oldman Ndori was shot dead near Kabuga on Kibungo road.
6. In view of these incidents we would like to suggest the following:
 - (i) Deployment of UNAMIR soldiers at Kimihurura round-about;
 - (ii) Deployment of UNAMIR soldiers near the CDR office and main junction near Hotel Chez Lando.

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF FC

Date 2/4/94

No 995 By SP

②
DPC

There seems to be a pattern evolving here. We must leave a consolidated analysis of this done so we can assess our actions. We should not delay this.

Page 2/4

(iii) Deployment of UNAMIR soldiers around Kacyiru round-about;

(iv) That UNAMIR sends away people who normally come to crowd around the vicinities of CND. These people are believed to be the MRND/CDR militia/informers.

We request that considerable attention be given to this deteriorating situation.

Yours sincerely,



Andrew RWIGAMBA
Lt. Col
SECRETARY RPA HIGH COMMAND

①
Romeo Dallaire
MAJOR GENERAL
FORCE COMMANDER UNAMIR

②
8th March, 1994

*to sit rep
acknowledging
this letter
be made.*
13/3
SUBJECT : BURUNDI VEHICLE TRANSPORTING MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND
INVOLVEMENT OF GENDARMERIE POLICE

Dear Sir,

1. I wish to formally, put to you RPF's disappointment in respect of the "Burundi" vehicle carrying ammunition which crushed near the CND present position of RPA 3rd Bn.; on Sunday 06 March 1994.
2. It has been noted that the vehicle had been seen many times before, parked at the Hotel Village URUGWIRO which is also known to be an extension of President's Office. Indeed the owner of the vehicle is known to be residing at the Village URUGWIRO to this day. The vehicle had been witnessed on several other exercises before without any hinderance whatsoever.
3. UNAMIR Officers were seen at the scene soon after the accident. The Gendarmerie too, came to the site but, as it appeared, both forces did not agree on how to handle the situation. The Gendarmerie wanted to whisk away the culprit still at the site as the other one had already "escaped". It wanted also to take charge of the equipment. This was of course a deliberate attempt on the part of Gendarmerie to destroy evidence whilst appearing to be executing their security responsibilities. A tactic commonly employed by the Gendarmerie in their aiding and abetting of various criminal acts.
4. We are reliably informed that Gendarmerie HQS instructed the Gendarmerie on site to resist any other intervention and ensure that the equipments are moved from the site to the Gendarmerie's own place of choice. This to us is another situation in which the Gendarmerie is seen to use the cover of security responsibilities to actually cover up criminal activities. It is probably time this fact was brought to the Gendarmerie in no unclear language.
5. The Rwandese Patriotic Front would be interested in getting to know how these investigations proceed and what actually becomes of the vehicle, military equipment and the people involved in the incident. This interest is especially based on the nature of the materials involved and the obvious Government involvement in the matter.

6. Sincerely,

RECEIVED	
OFFICE OF FC	
Date	8/3/94
No	802
By	J.P.

Karenzi Karake
KARENZI KARAKE
LT. COLONEL
C/O RPF/UNAMIR

C.C. : - Maj. Gen. Paul KAGAME
Chairman High Command-RPA

FROM : RPF LO, UNAMIR
TO : COO, FORCE HQ
INFO : FC ✓
DFC
CMO - MILOBS..
COMDR - KIGALI SECTOR
COMDR DMZ SECTOR
COMMISSIONER UNCIVPOL
RGF LO, UNAMIR

DATE : 26 FEB 94


SUBJECT : LIASON OFFICERS

Reference


A : Your memorandum file n° 3000/1/OPS/1 of 18 Feb. 1994.

1. Your memorandum spelling out areas that presently require RPF Liason Officers has been received.
2. A number of RPF Officers have been posted/transferred internally as below:

(a) Major Frank KAMANZI	MILOBS
(b) Major Philbert RWIGAMBA	DMZ SECTOR
(c) Capt. Gedeon HODARI	FORCE HQ
(d) Capt. Peter KALIMBA	KIGALI SECTOR
(e) Capt. Damascene SEKAMANA	UNCIVPOL DIV.
(f) Lt. David MURENZI	ENGINEERING CELL.
3. Lt Joseph NDAHIRO and Lt. George RUMANZI will continue to handle communications while I keep at the Force Headquarters and ensure general coordination of the liason Officers' activities.
4. Thanking you for your usual cooperation.


KARENZI KARAKE
Lt. Col.


RPF/UNAMIR LIASON OFFICER



Persons involved are now
with UNAMIR, we are inter-
viewing them, we are confir-
ming their security require-
ments. Should they not accept
Gendarmes support with UNAMIR
civilian police monitoring, then
they may have to be sent to
your zone of responsibility.
Please advise.



FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS
RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT



RECEIVED
OFFICE OF FC
Date 21/1/94 Dear Sir,
No 543 By S.P.
SUBJECT

② DFC
I wish a response to these with my comments and the results to the questions involved.
Kigali 28 January 1994
FC 21/1

RESPONSE - FIRING FROM IN AND AROUND CND BUILDING BY RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES.

② This is not just according to me. There is no reason for firing. I did see so many things to the crowd? What day 100m away?

③ where they beat close? Did we need Gendarmes? I saw them at a distance?

④ we could have read the other side if these meetings were deemed essential over the situation was clear regarding the scale of the demonstrations.

An outright cancellation of all meetings was not necessary and falls in to the hands of the demonstrators. More attention to ways around the demonstrators has been made in the future.

1. Although the shot fired in the air was from behind UNAMIR troops it should be appreciated that it was fired at a safe angle. As is evident, the dividing line between our troops and UNAMIR is just the barbed wire and a mere 5 m distance. The unruly and violent mob was within 10 m of the headquarters and Gendarmerie and UNAMIR had done nothing to stop it. An early warning was deemed necessary in the circumstances.

To our understanding a political demonstration ought to be legal and peaceful. It was also agreed that no such activities should take place within 1.5 Km radius of the CND compound. The gathering demonstration of the 26 Jan. 94 violated all this as it was characterised by beatings and slashing people with pangas and damaging property. All that took place just 50 m from the CND quarterguard. At one time the mob came to within 10 m of the quarterguard. The Gendarmerie failed even to re-direct traffic away from the site of the roadblock.

As a result of unruly behaviour of the mob the following incidences were registered :

- The RPF Chairman was supposed to go to town for a meeting and failed to get UNAMIR escort.
- Two VIPs and an officer from the RPF BN failed to get escort to MULINDI.
- The RPF BN Comdr. could not fulfil an appointment with the Kigali Sector Comdr. at Kigali Sector headquarters.
- The RPF L.O was intercepted at 0800 Hrs at the illegal roadblock and prevented from reporting to office at the UNAMIR headquarters. He could wait and not barging through the demonstration.
- A group which was supposed to attend a World Bank Meeting in the city was stranded at CND despite the request for an escort put in the previous day.

All this showed that the mob had the complicity of Gendarmerie and that it had succeeded in intimidating the UNAMIR.

4. The Force Comdr, summoned the RPF L.O to meet him at his office urgently at 10 00 HRS. At about 10 30 HRS we decided to give him escort of 6 soldiers to enable him meet the Force Comdr, and request the SRSG to come and meet the Chairman who was still stranded at CND. It should be noted that when the L.O was getting out of CND the UNAMIR did nothing to stop him. We assumed they appreciated the urgency of the mission.

(f)
Is there a
correct fact?

5. Like it was correctly put warning shots were fired to gain access through the armed crowd which, under the supervision of the Gendarmerie, blocked the road, hacked people, looted and robbed passers-by and generally blocked all our activities and made it impossible for UNAMIR escorts to perform their usual assistance tasks.

(g)
This is no
issue, they had
no right to force
their way through
the barrier,
is specially without
our consent
and/or escort

6. Whereas RPF soldiers shot in air to scare the mob and gain access, Gendarmerie fired directly at RPF awash nevertheless. Some bullets were directed towards the quarterguard and this was noted by the MILOB.


These incidents serve to emphasize that the government and its Gendarmerie in particular, must assume their responsibility in the implementation of the KWSA accord. Whatever RPF did was in legitimate self-defence.

If these criminals were to succeed in intimidating RPF the UNAMIR mission would be, in our opinion, greatly compromised.

Please rest assured of our usual cooperation.

(h)
This is
not correct
and we
must tell
them instantly
words.

(i)
This is
from
info
that
has not
been raised
before.
Is this
correct?


P.K. MAZIMHAKA
1st Vice-Chairman
R.P.F. - INKOTANYI.

ROUTING SLIP

FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

TO: A:

FC

FROM: DE:

ED

Room No. - No de bureau

Extension - Poste

Date

11/7

FOR ACTION

POUR SUITE A DONNER

FOR APPROVAL

POUR APPROBATION

FOR SIGNATURE

POUR SIGNATURE

FOR COMMENTS

POUR OBSERVATIONS

MAY WE DISCUSS?

POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER ?

YOUR ATTENTION

VOTRE ATTENTION

AS DISCUSSED

COMME CONVENU

AS REQUESTED

SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE

NOTE AND RETURN

NOTER ET RETOURNER


FOR INFORMATION

POUR INFORMATION

The SRS received the
attached response to your
communications of 4/7
and 3/7, at mulinchi
yesterday from the chairman.
I propose we inform
HD accordingly. AMK
ED 11/7



FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT



Kigali, 2nd February 1994

The Force Commander
UNAMIR - KIGALI

Dear Sir,

Re : PUBLIC DEBATE

Further to our letter of 28th January 1994, we write to inform you that the Rwandese Patriotic Front shall hold a press conference this coming Sunday, the 6th February 1994 starting at 10.00 am.

The venue of the conference will be Hotel Diplomat, Kigali. It is still not possible to hold the conferences at the CND complex on account of reasons already communicated to you.


We remain,

Yours faithfully,


Titus Rutaremara
TITO RUTAREMARA
Rwandese Patriotic Front

RECEIVED OFFICE OF FC	
Date	7/2/94
No. 600	By SP

②
Senana
I found this in
my mail tonight.
I don't understand
the RPF = mail system.
Could you talk with RPF = Union
our where to have such
urgent mail in our office
plse.
[Signature]
5/2



FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT



Brigadier General Dallaire
Force Commander
UNAMIR

RE : TREATMENT OF TOGO UNMO IN MULINDI ON 3rd JANUARY 1994

We would like to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 18th Jan. 1994. The letter alleges that on 3rd Jan. 1994 an observer from Togo was harassed by Lt. Col. Ceaser of RPF at Mulindi.

We regret to note that this is not a true description of what took place that day.

1. On 3rd Jan. 1994 Lt. Col. Ceaser met a team of Officers from UNAMIR at Mulindi. He realised to his surprise that among them was a Togolese. Togo is not one of the countries agreed upon by the two parties in accordance with Article 54 of the Protocol on the Integration of the Armed Forces. He took the leader of the team aside and objected to the illegal presence of the Togolese in our Zone and with a team that was going to inspect our Military positions. He was politely advised to take him back before they could proceed with the mission. There was no harassment whatsoever.
2. On the same day in the afternoon when the team was returning from their mission, they met another group of UNAMIR Officers who had brought them a spare tyre from Byumba, one of the officers was a Togolese. It is not clear why this was done, despite what had transpired in the morning at Mulindi over another Togolese. Lt. Col. Ceaser reminded them not to come with Togolese anymore. We contend that this was not an act of shortsightedness but a principled act.
3. In October 1993, RPF representative in Washington (USA) Dr. Charles Murigande did communicate in response to your proposal, that we would not accept Togolese Military personnel in the UNAMIR. The reasons were stated clearly. We would like to refer you to the letter of 6th Jan. 1994 from the Secretary General of RPF to Ambassador Jacques Roger Booh-Booh objecting to the presence of Togolese. Our Liaison Officer with UNAMIR Lt. Col. Karenzi has verbally brought it to the attention of the UNAMIR Force Commander. In one of the meetings I personally brought it to the attention of Brigadier General Dallaire that Togolese Military personnel should not be permitted in the UNAMIR. We are surprised that after all this communication, the Togolese Military personnel are in the same letter referred to as observers.
4. Finally, there was no harsh, insults or any threats of any nature to the team of the Togolese in particular. We wish to bring to your notice UNAMIR's insistence on imposing Togolese on us as observers despite our communication and explanation on the matter.

We shall be guided by the spirit of cooperation in this endeavour.

Yours Sincerely,


Paul Kagame
Major General
CHAIRMAN RPA HIGH COMMAND.

RECEIVED	
OFFICE OF FC	
Date	28/1/94
No	499
By	J.P.

MA TOFC
Take note of the FC's comments
and prepare the letter accordingly
J.P. 28/1/94
DSC/COO


24/1

Reply sent on 29/1/94

I will have the my MA prepare a response to this reminding him that our info on the incident was severe, that the altercation was serious, that harassment continued, that these officers were responded to by the SCSG to the Chairman RPF by letter, and that we will keep these officers away from RPF until they resolve the question with UNHCR w. 7. through their reps. Please pass ASAP to my MA for immediate dial-action.

21/01/1994

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA
U N A M I R

TO : MILOB GP HQ
(Attn : CMO)
Date : 04 Jan 94
File : 10005

FROM : Sector Commander
RPF MILOB Sector

Subj : INCIDENCE REPORT AT MULINDI

1. On 03 Jan 94 a MILOB team of RPF Sector went to MULINDI on routine duties at the newly established RPF MILOB Sector HQ. The Team had an observer from Togo (Maj Tchami UN ID 645). On reaching MULINDI the team was preparing to go for a previously planned recce of own operational area towards KIVUYE 9235 and CYUMBA 0133 to verify RPF deployments.

2. At this stage, an RPF officer (Lt Col Cesar) came to RPF MILOB HQ and saw the UNMO from Togo. The RPF officer immediately went back to his HQ apparently to report about the presence of the Togo officer in MULINDI. After a few minutes he came back and told the MILOB team to send back the Togo UNMO immediately or else he would arrest the concerned UNMO and force the entire MILOB team to go out of the RPF held areas. He also refused the entry of the MILOB team into any other RPF held areas i.e to KIVUYE 9235 and to CYUMBA 0133, if the Togo UNMO was kept in the team. He referred to the Arusha Peace Accord and told that the RPF did not agree to accept Togo as a contributing country in the UN forces in Rwanda.


3. The MILOB team tried to explain that they did not have prior knowledge about the RPF decision of not accepting Togo and that since the same officer had come to MULINDI earlier also, the team be allowed to do their duties. But the RPF officer was so adamant and harsh that the MILOB team had to come back to BYUMBA to drop the Togo UNMO to wait in a local restaurant until the team could complete their task in RPF held areas.

4. Comments


a. From the behaviour of the RPF officer it appeared that the RPF High Command was adamant not to accept Togo in the UNAMIR.

c. The attitude of the concerned RPF officer was insolent and indecent. He showed little or no regards to the MILOB team's requests to allow them to perform their mission.

c. If the RPF do not want to accept Togo in UNAMIR, the matter may be clarified to MILOB teams so that the teams are not harassed or embarrassed while performing their tasks in future.



FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT



18.01.94

Ref. RPA/D3/22/RW

Brigadier General Romeo Dallaire
Force Commander UNAMIR

Dear Sir,

RE: **Security arrangement for NGONDORE during VIP and
TOP Commanders meeting.**

Reference to earlier discussion we had on 17 Jan. 94 with your DMZ sector Commander, we are of the view that since NGONDORE will from time to time be used as a meeting place involving some very top officials from RPF and RGF, the following security arrangements should be made for the smooth running of meetings.

1. At the time of meeting both RPF and RGF soldiers should leave their positions adjacent to the meeting place. However, both parties can deploy themselves but away from the meeting place where observation is not possible. The distance is to be determined by terrain.
2. RGF personnels who are deployed on the immediate hill should leave the position at the time of the meeting and the position be guarded by UNAMIR personnel.
3. Both Roadblocks for RPF and RGF should be equal distance approximately 400 meters or more from the meeting place.
4. At least one platoon (some armed) of UNAMIR should be deployed at NGONDORE prior and during the meeting.
5. After the meeting, both RPF and RGF can reoccupy their original positions.

We believe the putting into practice of the above will ensure the smooth running of the meeting in a conducive and secure atmosphere.

Yours Faithfully,

Andrew RWigamba

Andrew RWIGAMBA
Lt. Col.

Secretary for RPA High Command

465 Rec'd
19/1/94

③ DMZ Sector Command
My comments are on
the draft letter.
Thank you
19/1/94

R
P
F

FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT

F
P
R

Mulindi, 9.01.94

Reply sent
on 24/1/94

Ref. RPA/D3/20 RW

Brigadier-General Dallaire
Force Commander UNAMIR
KIGALI

Dear sir,

Re: NOTE OF PROTEST


We would like to protest against RGF Aircrafts flying over RPF Residence at CND building.
The following incidents in particular, cause us a lot of concern:

1. On 6th Jan. 1994 Government (RGF) light Aircraft over flew RPF residence at CND Building and manouvered over the space above
2. On 8th Jan. at around 1800 HRS unidentified AC-130 Aircraft manouvered over RPF Residence at CND building.

3. These two incidents were done in violations of a notice n° 7128. 91OPS/7 of 4th - Jan. 1994 which referred to restrictions on RGF Aircrafts Flying over Kigali weapon secure Area.

Finally, we request UNAMIR to take action and restrain RGF from future similar incidents which may tempt our patience.


Yours Faithfully,




Andrew RWIGAMBA
LT. COL.
Secretary for RPA High Command.

380 Rec'd
10/1/94

②
Cos
We have prepared
answers properly according
to my directions of
this morning.


10/1



FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT



Mulindi, le 13 Décembre 1993

A Monsieur le Général de
Brigade R.A. DALLAIRE
Commandant de la MINUAR
KIGALI.

CONCERNE : Les Encadreurs Socio-Politico-
Economiques du FPR-INKOTANYI
dans la Zone Démilitarisée.

Monsieur le Général,

En nous référant à notre lettre du 07 décembre 1993,
dont l'objet était "les Activités du F.P.R.-INKOTANYI dans la
Zone délimilitarisée", nous avons l'honneur de vous soumettre
en annexe la liste de nos encadreurs qui mènent les activités
Socio-Politico-Economiques dans la Zone.

Ainsi aimerions-nous être clairs sur deux points y
relatifs:


- 1° Le nombre de nos encadreurs pourrait augmenter
dans la Zone, tout comme il pourrait y avoir des
transferts pour des raisons de service.
- 2° Nous continuerons de vous informer chaque fois
qu'il sera nécessaire d'y opérer de tels
changements.

Nous vous prions d'agréer, Monsieur le Général,
l'expression de notre franche collaboration.

Pour le Front Patriotique Rwandais
Tito RUTAREMARA,
Coordinateur en Chef.

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF FC
Date 28/12/93
No 318 By SP

C.C : Sous Préfet De KINIHIRA
Sous Préfet De KIRAMBO



FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT



Mulindi, le 13 Décembre 1993

A Monsieur le Général de
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Commandant de la MINUAR
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dans la Zone, tout comme il pourrait y avoir des
transferts pour des raisons de service.
- 2° Nous continuerons de vous informer chaque fois
qu'il sera nécessaire d'y opérer de tels
changements.

Nous vous prions d'agréer, Monsieur le Général,
l'expression de notre franche collaboration.

RECEIVED OFFICE OF PC	
Date	24/12/93
No	3/4
By	S.P.

Pour le Front Patriotique Rwandais
Tito Rutaremara
Tito RUTAREMARA,
Coordinateur en Chef.

C.C : Sous Préfet De KINIHIRA
Sous Préfet De KIRAMBO

TO : COMD UNAMIR

From : RPF L.O

⑤ RPF

①

REF :

DATE : 18 DEC. 93

SUBJECT : LIASON FOR SECTOR COMD / KIGALI BN. AND DMZHQ

1. You will recall Sir, that at your advice two RPF Officers Lt Col KARENZI KARAKE and Maj. Frank KAMANZI were attached to UNAMIR FORCE HQ and MILOBHQ respectively.
2. It is evident that there is plenty to do on the Part of the Sector Commander particularly in establishing the Kigali weapon secure Area as well as on the Part of the DMZ commander and his Bn. ?
3. I anticipate also, that at the time of settling and living with the RPF Bn in Kigali there shall be yet another load of work to do.
4. My view is that you consider ways of assisting us to facilitate this liason to the Sector commander (and Kigali bn) as well as to the DMZ Commander.
5. My preferred view would have been to increase the number of RPF liason Officers to UNAMIR.

In the absence of such an option Sir, you could find ways of enlarging our scope of liason.

6. Thank you.

*②
COO (through COS)
I tend to agree that
there is an increased
demand looming for
RPF and RGF liason.
The RPF Bn + VIP + staff
coming to Kigali should
cater for this increased
work load on the RPF side.*

[Signature]
KARENZI KARAKE
Lt Col.
RPF Liason Officer
Force HQ

*By BG
FC 20/12*

202
CWO
15/9/12

RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT

3, Avenue de l'Observatoire, Bte 8
1180 Brussels - BELGIUM

① Prepare my answer
to this meeting my comments:

UNAMIR REPORT : VISIT CAMP KAMI

Furthermore, indicate that they were requested to provide
counter-options and free name. The VIP are to go in the hotel annexed
(RPF COMMENT)

I. GENERAL POINTS

- a. The situation of Camp Kami +10 Km from Kigali city is a long distance considering that the area of work will be Kigali city. The camp is not even in the prefecture of Kigali city. *but some ready to one side ③*
- b. The establishment of the camp in the middle of a basin with dominating hills of 1.700 m that would be difficult to control effectively is strategically disadvantageous. The basin is even infested with malaria. *con. must be of the side*
- c. The access from Kigali to the camp may be good but the roads being murrum can easily be mined. The long stretch (+10 Km) from the camp to the capital is unprotected and can even be ambushed. Forces travelling on the roads in a routine manner would be easy targets. *use p. space for m. p. ④*
- d. The installations may be decent and room sufficient but this is not enough. Security for the VIPs and for the BN should be considered as priority. *⑤ better security for m. p. ⑥*
- e. Camp Kami is isolated and can easily be sabotaged. Power can for instance be deliberately cut off thus affecting water supply, communication even security. *⑦*

II THE BARRACKS

The administrative area, housing for officers and men, and messes, are sufficient but not a priority considerations on the part of RPF. *⑧ info RPF: h. to deliver it. 9/12*

III SECURITY

a. Access

The existance of only two main access to the camp is a limitation since movement of the Bn Forces will be confined to the two murrum roads that can easily be mined. Controlling the roads in normal times from the positions would not be sufficient as the timings of saboteurs would not be known. In times of crisis control would even be more difficult because of the long unprotected stretches. Effectively controlling them would strain the force thus affecting its efficiency in other duties. *very reasonable*

we will
v. out efforts

we will
v. out efforts

one hill - correct

To do what else?

Normal Garrison duties of a BN. That is why it is not a very big support.

b. Far-off security

→ To effectively secure camp Kami would involve controlling the various hill dominating the camp by deploying on them sufficiently. This added to deploying on access, securing the VIP residence in a different location, and the routine escort duties would strain the force seriously affecting its efficiency. It should also be considered that the force will be involved in other duties other than the purely security ones for instance buying food and its preparation etc.

c. Separating the residence of VIPS and the BN

to do what else?

Separating the residence of the VIPS and the BN that is tasked to protect them is problematic in that the strength of the force will be weakened. The force will concentrate on securing two places equally inevitably resulting in strain. In event of aggression the force would be loose and ineffective. The problem becomes bigger when the residences are far apart and with other limitations as in the case of camp Kami. Here aggressors can successfully cut off, siege the main body of the force and do whatever they wish with the VIPS.

That is why we have to do this.

our presence is throughout.


IV CONCLUSION

→ Camp Kami is not suitable for the RPF BN. The BN should be situated in the city of Kigali in the same location with the VIPS it is tasked to protect.


V RECOMMENDATION

→ UNAMIR should bring forward several appropriate proposals and allow RPF to go for recce. This will save time instead of reacting to proposal after proposal.

Do 16 Dec



FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT



Mulindi, 12th December 1993

② Kigali Sector
Civilians (through COS)

Brigadier General R.A. DALLAIRE
Force Commander UNAMIR
KIGALI

Please put these
in a map
and give me
a brief dis-
cription of
each and where
it is occupying it now?

SUBJECT : COUNTER PROPOSALS OF SITES FOR
RPF VIPS AND SECURITY BN

REFERENCE : LETTER TO RPF CHAIRMAN OF 11/12/1993

Dear Sir,

Reference to RPF comments of 9th December 1993 and your letter to the RPF Chairman of 11th December 1993, several reasons were given as to why Camp KAMI was not appropriate. The main reason was because it could not facilitate both the RPF VIPS and the Battalion together, which is very necessary. The location for the BN and RPF VIPS should also be in the Capital KIGALI itself since that is where the major activities of RPF VIPS will be.

Again, counter proposals could not be given because of lack of sufficient information. It was anticipated that after thorough recce UNAMIR would forward to RPF several appropriate proposals from which one would be selected after own recce. Nevertheless, the following are the proposals and selection for the appropriate one will be after recce by RPF :

1. C.N.D. (Conseil National de Développement)
(G.S 1084) Ref. 2721 KIGALI SHEET
2. VILLAGE URUGWIRO (G.S 0786)
3. Camp KIGALI (G.S 0683)
4. Camp KACYIRU (G.S 0686)
5. Camp KIMIHURURA (G.S 0983)

Yours Sincerely,

Andrew Rwigamba
Andrew RWIGAMBA
Senior Officer,
Secretary For RPA HIGH COMMAND

3, Avenue de L'Observatoire, #8. 1180 Brussels, Belgium. Tel: 32-2-374-5892, Fax: 32-2-374-4626

274 Rec'd
14/12

Informa Sommen...
des C. prop.
16/12/93

R
P
FFRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS
RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONTF
P
R

Mulindi, 12th December 1993

② Kigali Sector (through col)
Caird

Brigadier General R.A. DALLAIRE
Force Commander UNAMIR
KIGALI

Place put there

are a map

and give me

a brief des-

crip, this by

end of day today. Got

this, this

for

14/12

SUBJECT : COUNTER PROPOSALS OF SITES FOR
RPF VIPs AND SECURITY BN

REFERENCE : LETTER TO RPF CHAIRMAN OF 11/12/1993

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
Yours Sincerely,

Andrew RWIGAMBA
Andrew RWIGAMBA
Senior Officer,


Secretary For RPA HIGH COMMAND

3, Avenue de L'Observatoire, #8. 1180 Brussels, Belgium. Tel: 32-2-374-5892, Fax: 32-2-374-4626

274 Rec'd
14/12



FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT



Mulindi, 12th December 1993

*Kigali Section (Huzungu col)
Carand*

Brigadier General R.A. DALLAIRE
Force Commander UNAMIR
KIGALI

*Please put these
and a map
and give me
a brief des-
cription by
end of day today. Got
this, this
for
PC
14/12*

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(G.S 1084) Ref. 2721 KIGALI SHEET
2. VILLAGE URUGWIRO (G.S 0786)
3. Camp KIGALI (G.S 0683)
4. Camp KACYIRU (G.S 0686) à voir (cohabitation)
5. Camp KIMIHURURA (G.S 0783) à voir.

Yours Sincerely,

Andrew Rwigamba

Andrew RWIGAMBA
Senior Officer,
Secretary For RPA HIGH COMMAND

3, Avenue de L'Observatoire, #8. 1180 Brussels, Belgium. Tel: 32-2-374-5892, Fax: 32-2-374-4626

*274 Rec'd
14/12*

*Informes Souverainement!
des C. prop.*

Repro. Jencu 16/12/93

②
Cos 15/9/12
Chuo

Reply sent
on 11/12/94

RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT

2, AVENUE DE L'OBSERVATOIRE, 2^{ème} E
1180 BRUSSELS - BELGIUM

① Prepare my answer
to this meeting my comments:

Furthermore, indicate that they were requested to provide
counter-options and I see none. The VIP are to go in the hotel annexed
to the general assembly. Conclude that I do not
support their objectives but am
ready to
hear any
possible
comments
after the
week
with
Kigali's section
closed.
⑤ Letter ready
for my signature
Saturday
morning.
⑥ Info RPF: HQ to
be ready to
deliver it.
⑦ PC
9/12

UNAMIR REPORT : VISIT CAMP KAMI

(RPF COMMENT)

I. GENERAL POINTS

a. The situation of camp Kami +10; Km from Kigali city
is a long distance considering that the area of work
will be Kigali city. The camp is not even in the
prefecture of Kigali city.

it is on a
hilltop →

b. The establishment of the camp in the middle of a
basin with dominating hills of 1.700 m that would be
difficult to control effectively is strategically
disadvantageous. The basin is even infested with
malaria.

we have
excursions with
them.

c. The access from Kigali to the camp may be good but
the roads being murrum can easily be mined. The long
stretch (+10 Km) from the camp to the capital is
unprotected and can even be ambushed. Forces
travelling on the roads in a routine manner would be
easy targets.

Don't plan
to put VIP there
paritly →

d. The installations may be decent and room sufficient
but this is not enough. Security for the VIPs and
for the BN should be considered as priority.

e. Camp Kami is isolated and can easily be sabotaged.
Power can for instance be deliberately cut off thus
affecting water supply, communication even security.

II THE BARRACKS

~

The administrative area, housing for officers and men,
and messes, are sufficient but not a
considerations on the part of RPF.

III SECURITY

a. Access

very reasonable

we will
have excursions
→

not their
jobs →

The existence of only two main access to the camp is a
limitation since movement of the Bn Forces will be
confined to the two murrum roads that can easily be
mined. Controlling the roads in normal times from the
positions would not be sufficient as the timings of
saboteurs would not be known. In times of crisis control
would even be more difficult because of the long
unprotected stretches. Effectively controlling them would
strain the force thus affecting its efficiency in other
duties.

253 Rec'd
8/12

3. KABATWA, COMMUNE MUTURA, GISURU

This morning, and indeed all day long, Radio Rwanda reported an attack on military installations in ~~the~~ MUTURA. It is reported that 17 or 43 civilians died, depending on who is reporting. Unfortunately the military authorities in KIGALI have sought to implicate RPF in that ~~incident~~. One wonders how an attack on a military installation could result in the death of so many civilians with no ~~significant~~ military casualty. We fear this is yet another attempt to cover up massacres perpetrated against civilians.

4. LANDMINE, COMMUNE CYERU

You have by now received the report of the ICRC on this tragic incident. As this incident took place in the ~~the~~ and as the ICRC claims it was a manned device, it is very worrying indeed. It should be investigated to ~~restore~~ confidence in organisations assisting the civilian population. The RPF is well aware of the limitation ~~imposed~~ upon you at the moment by lack of personnel and materials, but we are keenly aware that a repetition of such incidents over such a brief interval is not gratuitous. That is why we feel it is imperative to establish the facts surrounding these incidents in the shortest time possible.

Please remain assured of our collaboration in this and any other matter that would contribute to a successful implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement.

Highest regards,


Col. A. N. NDIRAKOBUCA
CHAIRMAN OF RPF

C.C. : - The Prime Minister
Republic of Rwanda
- The Prime Minister Designate
Kigali

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FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS
RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT

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67 Avenue de l'Observatoire, Bte B
1180 Bruxelles, BELGIQUE
Tel. 32-2-374-5778
Fax 32-2-374-4684

Mulindi, 21 novembre 1993

Monsieur S. Iqbal Riza
Sous-Secrétaire Général aux
Opérations de Maintien de la Paix
NEW YORK 10017

Monsieur le Sous-Secrétaire Général,

Je vous remercie de votre correspondance du 11 novembre 1993 par laquelle vous nous transmettez le document de l'Accord du 5 novembre 1993 entre les Nations Unies et le Gouvernement Rwandais sur le statut de la MINUAR et de son personnel.

Nous accusons donc réception de votre lettre en promettant de coopérer pleinement à la mise en œuvre des dispositions pertinentes de l'Accord.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Sous-Secrétaire Général, l'expression de ma haute considération.


Col. Alexis KANYAREMBE
PRESIDENT DU FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS

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SRSG
for your info. Please return
for my action.
Bo
PC
3/12

FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS
RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT

2, Avenue de l'Observatoire, Box 2
1180 Brussels - BELGIUM

DR KABIA

BRIGADIER GENERAL ROMEO DALLAIRE
Commander UNAMIR
KIGALI

③
PC
Return to
Bo
PC
3/12

Mulindi, 30th November 1993

RE : REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION OF MASSACRES AND OTHER
ACTS OF VIOLENCE IN THE PREFECTURES OF RUHENGARI,
GISENYI AND KIGALI.

④
COS
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COS

Since our last protest note dated 26th November 1993, acts of violence, including murder, continue to be perpetrated against the civilians population in KIGALI, RUHENGARI, and GISENYI Prefectures. The RPF would like to request, through this letter, that investigations be carried out to establish who is responsible for those acts and that measures be taken to protect civilians in these areas.

Bo
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7/12

We would like at the same time to strongly condemn those who believe they can derail the Peace Process by killing civilians. The pattern of violence is all too familiar to the victims and survivors of previous massacres in BUGESERA, BIGOGWE, KIBILIRA etc.

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The RPF specifically requests that the following incidents be a subject of investigations by the UNAMIR in the context of its general mission of implementation of the Peace Agreement.

1. BUGESERA, PREFECTURE KIGALI (RURAL)

Last week eight (08) families were attacked and five (05) members of the families were killed. The Government dismissed this as an act of banditry.

2. BUSOGO-KANAZI, COMMUNE MUKINGO, RUHENGARI

On the 28th November, 1993 there was heavy shooting around the home of ex-Minister NZIRORERA (MRND-CDR), leading to a lot of people fleeing their homes. Previous to this incident, a lot of people are said to have been arrested and detained in military camps allegedly to assist authorities in the investigations of the massacres in NKUMBA and KIDAHU of 17/11/1993.

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3/12

UNITED NATIONS  NATIONS UNIES

NEW YORK 10017

Return Requested

BY POUCH

Maj. Gen. Romeo Dallaire
UNAMIR
Kigali