

consultative services, and to cover the \$900,000 of internal distribution costs of the relief operation in addition. While the basic UN policy is to help the Government to undertake all relief operations itself at the earliest possible moment, it has to be recognized that it will be some months, at best, before this policy can be put into effect. Meanwhile, both the Congolese Government and our most important donor of supplies, the United States, continue to count on direct relief action by UNOC. But direct relief action by UNOC can hardly be considered as technical assistance to the Congolese Government. It is doubtful, therefore, whether the distribution costs of the relief operation are an appropriate charge to the Congo Fund.

- (c) To appeal to governments and/or the international voluntary agencies for contributions of funds for the special purpose of paying the costs of internal distribution for the relief operation. This course of action has the disadvantage of requiring time for execution, and the relief operations in the Congo, which must continue from 1961 into 1962 as a matter of great urgency, are now at a standstill from lack of funds to finance internal distribution.

33. The salaries and administrative costs of the Office of the Relief Coordinator have, during 1961, been borne on the UNOC general budget, and we see no reason to suggest a change in 1962. It was proposed, during the examination of the Congo Fund budget submissions for 1962, that all the costs of the relief operation in 1962 should be covered by an additional credit to continue the 1961 Congo Fund - Refugee Relief Project. For the reasons set out in para 32(b) above,
.../...

we believe that this is not appropriate for the period of direct relief operations by UNCT . Civilian Operations is accordingly not presenting a budget submission against the Congo Fund for the relief operations in the first half of 1962.

Miss Counsell 220
Mrs Landau 221

ORGANISATION MONDIALE
DE LA SANTE

Léopoldville
20 juin 1963

RAPPORT TRIMESTRIEL
JANVIER - FEVRIER - MARS 1963

A. SITUATION POLITIQUE

Au début de l'année, les forces de l'ONU ont poursuivi leur occupation des différentes zones du Katanga jusqu'ici sous le contrôle de la gendarmerie katangaise. Le rattachement des territoires contestés à l'autorité du Gouvernement central s'effectue progressivement.

Le Sud-Kasaï reste encore gravement troublé; une partie importante de la population s'est réfugiée dans la forêt pour échapper aux luttes tribales aggravées par les actes criminels de la "Jeunesse" et des mesures drastiques de l'ANC pour rétablir l'ordre. A la fin du trimestre, la moitié de la population réfugiée était retournée dans les villages.

Des troubles ont été signalés dans certaines régions de la Cuvette centrale, la situation est imprécise. Le médecin de l'OMS de Bolomba a été retiré et il n'a pas été possible d'en placer un à Bumba comme prévu.

A Boma, la situation a été troublée pendant quelques jours à la suite d'incidents survenus entre des éléments de la Force publique et la population.

Le reste du pays jouit d'un calme notable.

B. SITUATION ECONOMIQUE

Dans l'ensemble, il a été noté une amélioration de la situation économique. Le commerce se relève assez vite malheureusement la hausse des prix laisse la population dans une situation aussi difficile qu'avant. Le problème le plus important est la difficulté des communications déjà signalée maintes fois, la détérioration des routes, l'absence de moyens de transport pour évacuer les produits locaux et assurer les secours où cela est nécessaire.

La situation la plus grave est dans le Kasai où dans quelques régions les troubles ont empêché toute activité agricole. La récolte couvrant les besoins pour le deuxième semestre 1963 sera insuffisante.

Dans certaines régions du Kongo central les 30,000 réfugiés d'Angola se trouvent dans une situation précaire.

Les extraits suivants sont tirés des rapports de trois médecins travaillant dans des secteurs différents :

a) "Dans tout le secteur de Kenge, il y a un manque presque total de nourriture; pas seulement de viande et de nourriture en boîtes mais de toutes les denrées alimentaires produites dans la région. Cette situation est similaire dans toute la province du Kwango. Le manioc, base de la nourriture est presque inexistant, le peu qu'on arrive à trouver revient à des prix très au-dessus des moyens de la population. Ce problème est inquiétant. Quand on voyage on ne voit pas de cultures, ce qui annonce l'arrivée de la famine."

b) "La famine sévit de plus en plus même la population plus évoluée, tels que moniteurs d'écoles et infirmiers fuient cette région par manque de nourriture (Feshi)."

c) "En un jour nous avons vu 50 cas de kwashiorkor bien développés et encore 25 cas débutant parmi environ 500 réfugiés d'Angola. Suite au résultat d'un recensement qui vient d'être terminé il y a 10.000 réfugiés dans le secteur de Fidi. Au taux de 10 % cela donne un total de 1000 cas de kwashiorkor dans le secteur de Fidi."

C. SERVICES DE SANTE

1.1 Généralités

L'organisation des ministères de la santé en province progresse très lentement.

1.2 Plusieurs ministres ont annoncé la réorganisation de leurs départements, en créant un certain nombre de postes administratifs confiés aux éléments les plus valables des services techniques.

Les services de santé vivent au jour le jour car dans certaines provinces la répartition budgétaire entre les différents départements n'a pas été faite. Cette situation difficile est aggravée par l'irréalisme des propositions et l'accroissement du nombre des fonctionnaires au sein des ministères.

1.3 La pénurie des médicaments demeure toujours un sérieux handicap. Le Ministre de la Santé a pris de sérieuses mesures en vue d'assurer un ravitaillement adéquat des centres mais en tenant compte de la pénurie des moyens de transport, un délai assez long s'écoulera avant qu'un service régulier de distribution soit rétabli.

2.0 Aide étrangère aux services de santé

2.1 Depuis le dernier rapport, l'accord entre le Gouvernement congolais et le Gouvernement danois a été signé. Il a aussi été décidé que l'équipe danoise assurera, en coopération avec l'équipe suisse, le stage hospitalier pour les élèves de l'Institut d'Enseignement médical.

2.2 L'accord prévu entre le Gouvernement congolais et le Gouvernement belge attend d'être signé.

3.0 Activités de l'OMS

Le Groupe consultatif a continué d'apporter son aide au Gouvernement central ainsi qu'aux autorités provinciales dans une atmosphère de franche collaboration.

En ce qui concerne la santé publique, plusieurs discussions ont eu lieu entre le Ministre de la Santé, le Secrétaire général et le Représentant en Chef sur tous les problèmes importants. Les activités des différents spécialistes sont couvertes dans les chapitres ci-dessous.

3.1 Services hospitaliers

Dans l'ensemble, la situation reste inchangée. Quelques améliorations sont à noter ici et là, mais également quelques détériorations dues au manque de discipline, au délai de paiement des soldes du personnel médical, à l'insuffisance de médicaments et de nourriture.

A la fin du trimestre, il y avait 171 médecins et techniciens de l'OMS qui travaillaient dans 76 hôpitaux et 9 autres institutions (en dehors de l'équipe consultative).

3.2 Services de santé locaux

La situation déplorable de la plupart des dispensaires reste inchangée; cependant les autorités ont été alertées. Les dispensaires dépendant des hôpitaux administrativement, la tendance est de leur envoyer seulement ce qui est disponible après que les besoins d'urgence des hôpitaux aient été comblés. La situation est aggravée par le manque de moyens de transport à un point tel qu'un grand nombre de dispensaires éloignés sont laissés sans approvisionnement et livrés à eux-mêmes, exception faite de ceux tenus par des missions, des sociétés privées ou ceux visités par des médecins de l'OMS. ces derniers sont appelés, compte tenu de la sécurité, à donner une attention particulière au fonctionnement des dispensaires.

A Luluabourg, quatre dispensaires en ville sont supervisés par des médecins de l'OMS et fonctionnent plus ou moins en centres de santé. Dans le Sankuru, des dispensaires ont été construits par la population elle-même.

3.3 Contrôle des maladies transmissibles

Il est impossible dans un rapport de ce genre de tracer un tableau complet des diverses maladies transmissibles vu leur complexité et le manque d'information valable sur leur incidence actuelle. Les services responsables du contrôle des maladies transmissibles, sauf dans quelques régions, sont au stade de "brigades de pompiers" répondant aux nécessités du moment.

3.3.1 La lutte contre le fléau le plus étendu, le paludisme, se résume en traitement de la maladie lorsque les médicaments sont disponibles et par quelques activités sanitaires non-coordonnées. L'expert conseiller de l'OMS est attendu.

3.3.2 Une nouvelle poussée de variole a été signalée en Equateur. Les conditions dans lesquelles certains médecins travaillent sont illustrées par l'extrait suivant du rapport du conseiller provincial :

"Dans le dernier village de la Tribu de Kungu, quelques habitants armés de lances et de machettes ont voulu nous arrêter mais nous avons continué et après avoir traversé une zone marécageuse de 2 à 3 kilomètres nous nous sommes trouvés dans la région de la Tribu Ngombe. Dans le village de Bosogozo nous avons été entourés d'une vingtaine de varioleux à tous les stades d'évolution. L'infirmier du dispensaire qui est dépourvu de tout médicament a compté au mois de janvier 61 morts et dans deux villages proches 40 et 50 décès. Le Père de Prins qui fait tous les jours la visite des villages et que nous avons aussi rencontré à Bosogozo nous confirmait ces faits déplorables. En outre, la population de toute la région n'est plus résistante, ils ont fabriqué des boissons alcooliques avec les dernières provisions de maïs et de manioc et n'ont plus rien à manger maintenant. Toute la population à partir de Kungu était ivre morte dans chaque village que nous avons visité. A notre rentrée à Bugu, notre voiture a été attaquée par une cinquantaine de villageois armés; nous avons pu nous échapper, la tôle de notre voiture étant résistante."

3.3.3 Les cas de maladie du sommeil continuent d'être signalés; le nombre a augmenté durant le dernier trimestre.

3.3.4 La blennorragie est un véritable fléau; la maladie progresse dans tout le pays. Une campagne menée à Coquilhatville a permis d'examiner 9.106 personnes. De 3206 prélèvements 926 ont été positifs.

3.3.5 Une forte épidémie de rougeole a sévi dans la région de Lisala et Ikela.

3.3.6 Peste - Les opérations dans la zone endémique de l'Ituri continuent sans changement.

3.4 Approvisionnement médical

Le Gouvernement aidé du Conseil monétaire est en train de prendre des mesures en vue d'améliorer le stock du DCMP qui est à l'heure actuelle à son niveau le plus bas.

3.4.1 Le tableau ci-après indique les achats effectués par le DCMP durant les dernières années :

1958	-	246 millions de fr. belges
1959	-	209 millions de fr. belges
1960	-	100 millions de fr. belges (pour le 1er semestre)
1961	-	46 millions de fr. congolais
1962	-	79 millions de fr. congolais

3.4.2 Le pharmacien mis à la disposition du Gouvernement par l'OMS continue de collaborer activement en vue d'assurer une distribution rapide des médicaments. Le service des transports de l'ONUC a largement facilité l'expédition rapide des produits réclamés d'urgence. le tableau suivant montre, en quantité et en poids les expéditions faites de 1958 à 1962 :

<u>Année</u>	<u>Colis expédiés</u>	<u>Poids en kilos</u>
1958	64 697	3 366 036
1959	70 111	3 445 992
1960	41 171	2 211 824
1961	18 570	901 513
1962	24 732	1 064 738

Le Ministre de la Santé publique a souligné que
1 ' actuelle pénurie de médicaments est causée par l'utilisation peu rationnelle des articles et médicaments, principalement au niveau des dispensaires et le gaspillage dont le DCMP n'est pas responsable. En province les pharmaciens de l'OMS continuent leurs efforts en vue d'assurer la meilleure distribution du matériel disponible.

3.4.3 La comptabilité du DCMP mérite d'être mise à jour. Un expert comptable sera avant longtemps mis à la disposition du Gouvernement et travaillera en collaboration avec le Conseiller en administration pour la réorganisation et la simplification des activités de cette importante division. Quelques recommandations ont été déjà faites au Gouvernement.

3.5 Protection maternelle et infantile

Les services de PMI ont commencé de fonctionner de façon assez satisfaisante à Stanleyville, Luluabourg et Coquilhatville. Les conseillers de zone manifestent tous le désir d'améliorer leurs services de médecine préventive. Le conseiller de l'OMS a donné une attention particulière au développement des activités du Centre de Santé à Ndjili.

3.6 Soins infirmiers

Au cours du dernier trimestre, le conseiller de l'OMS en soins infirmiers a visité plusieurs services de santé de Léopoldville afin d'étudier le fonctionnement des différents services existants. Plusieurs réunions avec les autorités du Ministère de la Santé ont été organisées afin de décider la nouvelle orientation à donner à cette section.

3.7 Enseignement

3.7.1 En vue de pouvoir mieux planifier le développement de la formation médicale, le Ministère de la Santé a entrepris l'inventaire des écoles paramédicales fonctionnant actuellement au Congo. Ce travail s'exécute sous la supervision de la 5e Direction avec la collaboration d'un membre de l'équipe.

Des données sur les qualifications du personnel et les postes occupés permettront, après analyse, d'établir un plan de travail approprié.

Cette enquête durera plusieurs mois mais elle englobe la centaine d'écoles paramédicales.

3.7.2 Les sept professeurs de l'OMS ont continué d'apporter leur contribution à la Faculté de Médecine et à l'Ecole d'Infirmières de l'Université Lovanium. La prolongation de leurs contrats a été sollicitée par le Recteur de l'Université.

3.7.3 A l'Institut d'Enseignement médical de Léopoldville les membres de l'équipe désignés continuent leurs cours de façon satisfaisante.

A Stanleyville, l'Institut d'Enseignement médical est ouvert; plusieurs médecins de l'OMS collaborent à l'enseignement mais certaines déficiences ont été signalées surtout en ce qui concerne les cours de travaux pratiques.

L'ouverture de l'Institut d'Enseignement médical de Coquilhatville aura lieu dans un proche avenir.

3.7.4 Un cours pour les préparateurs en pharmacie est encore à l'étude.

3.7.5 Dans les Instituts d'Enseignement médical de Léopoldville, Bukavu et Stanleyville, l'enseignement dispensé aux officiers sanitaires a commencé ou se poursuit selon le programme adopté par la 5e Direction du Ministère de la Santé.

A Lovanium, quelques leçons et visites sur des sujets d'assainissement furent données par le personnel sanitaire de l'OMS à l'Ecole d'Infirmières.

3.7.8 Le Centre de Santé et de Démonstration de Ndjili a été inauguré officiellement le 14 février 1963 par le Ministre de la Santé. Un cours d'orientation pour le personnel affecté au centre a débuté le 28 janvier pour se terminer le 9 février avec la collaboration des membres du Ministère de la Santé publique du Gouvernement central, des professeurs de l'Université Lovanium, de l'Institut d'Enseignement médical, des médecins de l'Hôpital Léo-Est et du personnel de l'OMS. Depuis lors, plusieurs consultations ainsi qu'une enquête sanitaire ont pu commencer. L'équipe OMS au Centre est dirigée provisoirement par le Conseiller en FMI en attendant l'arrivée du directeur du centre de Ndjili.

Pendant cette période, le conseiller en FMI s'est presque exclusivement consacrée à ce centre.

3.8 Assainissement

3.8.1 La situation difficile que connaît la Regideso ne s'est pas améliorée pendant ce trimestre. En raison de la baisse constante du stock de réactifs et des produits chimiques, la Regideso a ordonné le 7 mars à toutes les stations de diminuer l'adjonction de réactifs, le pittchlor excepté, afin de pouvoir maintenir un certain standard jusqu'à la prochaine arrivée d'un lot de réactifs. Déjà dans plusieurs villes, on a enregistré des interruptions dans la distribution d'eau.

3.8.2 Marchés et évacuation des ordures - Pas d'amélioration depuis le dernier trimestre, toujours pour les mêmes raisons. L'ONUC, où elle le peut, continue à apporter son aide pour le ramassage des ordures. Certaines compagnies chargées de l'enlèvement des ordures, faute de crédits, menacent de licencier leur personnel.

3.8.3 Hygiène - Presque partout le Service a été fortement handicapé dans son activité par manque de véhicules, de personnel et de produits. La superficie et la population des agglomérations continuent d'augmenter sans que l'efficacité des services publics suive le même rythme.

Les ingénieurs sanitaires de Coquilhatville et de Bukavu ont respectivement pris part aux campagnes antivarioliques dans la région de Kungu et antipesteuse dans le Nord-Kivu.

L'enquête parcellaire à Coquilhatville touche à sa fin. Les inondations à Coquilhatville ont commencer à diminuer à la fin du mois de février, en revanche, à Albertville, l'inquiétude grandit à la vue du niveau du lac qui monte. Des routes sont déjà coupées, des villages inondés et les autorités se préoccupent activement du recensement des populations déjà évacuées ou à évacuer.

ANNEXE I

Mouvement du personnel

Le Directeur général de l'Organisation est arrivé à Léopoldville le 7 mars; il a visité la région du Kasai en compagnie du Représentant en Chef de l'OMS au Congo et a eu plusieurs entretiens avec les autorités du Gouvernement central. Il a quitté le Congo le 15 mars 1963.

Dr Brown, Représentant en Chef adjoint, est parti pour Genève au mois de janvier où il a pris part à un cours de perfectionnement des représentants de l'OMS.

Mlle Hudson, Infirmière en santé publique, est arrivée à l'équipe consultative le 24 janvier 1963.

Mlle Svensson, Infirmière monitrice accoucheuse, est arrivée au Congo le 14 janvier. Elle a été affectée à l'Ecole d'Infirmières de Lovanium.

Les deux médecins suivants ont quitté le Congo : Dr Grenier et Dr Dupin de Beyssat.

Les médecins et techniciens suivants, recrutés par l'OMS, sont arrivés au Congo au cours de ce trimestre: Dr Tunga, Dr Sancho Cirer, Dr Velghe, Dr Zayat, Dr Fassolis, Dr Wachtfeidl, Dr Jezierski, M. Besson, Dr Esquerdo Gomez, Dr Monclus Vela, Dr Nyst, Dr De Lucia, Dr Niklewicz.

Composition et répartition des membres du personnel OMS au Congo au 31 mars 1963

Equipe consultative

Dr Bellerive	Dr Delcos	(Stanleyville)
Dr Brown	M. Jérémie	
Dr Sylvain		
M. Axell	Dr Scalzo	(Luluabourg)
M. Reelfs		
Mme Markovic	Dr Voigtberger	(Coquilhatville)
M. Turner	M. St Victor	
M. Carvin		
M. Tomyska	Dr Doglio	(Bukavu)
Mlle Crettol	M. Valery	
Mlle de Lafontaine		
Mlle Elkington	Dr Nicolas	(Léopoldville)
Mme Galatius		
Mlle Marchon	Dr Ortlieb	(Albertville)

Assistance à l'Université Lovanium

Mlle Guimond
Mlle Mousseau
Mlle Svensson
Dr Charles
Dr Drexler
Dr Gatti
Dr Goetz
Dr Rossetti
Dr Werth

Léopoldville - capitale

M. Kamel	Dr Gallego Garbajosa
M. Philippart	Dr Bruguier
M. Leneutre	Dr Bucci
Mlle Rutledge	Dr Navratil
Dr Toussaint	Dr Podaropoulos
Dr Bastin	Dr Valeri
M. Duriez	Dr Velghe
M. Jolly	Dr Nicolas
M. Vegan	M. Bertoli
M. Maksad	

Province du Kongo central

Dr Bernadotte	Dr Martinez Gomez
Dr Caballe Lancry	Dr Nowicki
Dr Colombetti	Dr Pillet
Dr Dupuis	Dr Rebeck
Mlle Gamba	Mlle Weilland

Province du Kwango

Dr De Lucia
Dr Hazzi
Dr Monclus Vela

Province du Kwilu

Dr Abiad	Dr Sapio
Dr Laufer	Dr Zecaropoulos
Dr Rosowski	

Province de Maïdombe

Dr Petrov
Dr Sousa Lennox
Dr Tunga

Province Cuvette centrale

Dr Aranda Alvarez	Dr Michejda
Dr Bravo-Arenas	Dr Miotto
Dr Christiansen	Dr Paret
Dr Cotonat Garcia	Dr Stolz
Dr Gonzalez Sobaco	Dr Toboso
Dr Horoupian	Dr Zak
Dr Jolibois	Dr Zanotto
Dr Mangen	Dr Zawadowski
Dr Martin Samos	

Province de l'Ubangi

Dr Tappy	Dr Bianchini
Dr Duvalsaint	Dr Mari-Calbet

Province du Moyen-Congo

Dr Islam
Dr Jain

Province de Luluabourg

Dr Asswad	Dr Lahloub
Dr Cabo Ramon	Dr Manning
Dr Colas	Dr Michaly
Mlle Eggs	M. Mulazzani
M. Grimard	Dr Nasser
Dr Kasina	Dr Rubinstein
Dr Karamustakis	Dr Voegeli

Province Unité kasaienne

Dr Aleksandrowicz	Dr Quintana
Dr Lachmann	Dr Sandri
Dr Jezierski	

Province du Sud-Kasaï

Dr Forss	Dr Zayat
Dr Carneiro	

Province du Sankuru

Dr Carsi Pascual	Dr Sternberg
Dr Miller	

Province du Nord-Katanga

Dr Beynet	Dr Estime
M. Besson	Dr Toro
Dr Chalkias	

Province du Kivu central

Dr Adrien	Dr Jodkowski
Dr Czarnecki	Dr Moreno Martinez
Dr Farhi	Dr Ramos Moritan
Dr Fast	M. Rollier
Dr Fleurant	Dr Ruiz Ayuso
Dr Froewys	Dr Sancho Cirer
Dr Fuster Ribo	Dr Schwartz
Dr Herman	Dr Velimirovic
	Dr Walaszewski

Province du Maniema

Dr Chevalier	Dr Triendel
Dr Klausner	Dr Vacher Coponat
Dr Simpson	Dr Zephirin

Province du Nord-Kivu

Dr Dalmau	Dr Borghesi
Dr Fernandez Cartagena	Dr Potor
Dr Garcia Morilla	

Territoire sous referendum (Shabunda)

Dr Teboul
Dr Weiss

Province du Haut-Congo

Dr Caziras	Dr Oziwicz
Dr De Los Santos	Dr Roc
Dr Karaivanov	Dr Robert
Mme Karaivanova	Dr Sanz Gadea
M. Khalil	Dr Valcourt
Dr Martorel Gilart	Dr Wachtfeidl
Dr Fassolis	Dr Grunberg
	Dr Cymak

Province des Uélés

Dr Colombo	Dr Jacoby
Dr Brunet	Dr Nyst
Dr Finken	Dr Sturzenegger
Dr Iriarte Irurzun	Dr Wreszinski

Province du Kibali-Ituri

Dr Cavallo Serra	Dr Maalouf
Dr Esquerdo Gomez	Dr Moubayed
Dr Juan Alladio	Dr Willich

Inter-tribal Fighting and Civil War in Kasai

1. Since it became independent in June 1960, the Republic of the Congo has had to face more than its fair share of problems. One of the most intractable of these has been the resurgence of inter-tribal fighting in the province of Kasai, which broke out on an unprecedented scale and consisted chiefly in the struggle between the rival Lulua and Baluba tribes.

2. In November and December 1960, mass starvation broke out in South Kasai among Baluba refugees who had fled before Lulua persecution; it was estimated that the refugees were dying at the rate of 200 a day. The United Nations moved in with a large-scale relief operation which managed to halt the famine. But the underlying reasons for this tragedy still remain and until some kind of solution can be found to put an end to inter-tribal conflict, disasters of this kind are likely to recur, intensifying present animosities and creating even greater chaos than what has been experienced so far.

3. The importance of Kasai resides in its being at the cross-roads of the Congo - the heart of communications that knit the various provinces of the country into one economic whole. In particular, it provides a vital link between Leopoldville and Katanga in the railway from Port Francqui through Luluabourg and Mwene Ditu to Kamina and Elisabethville. Kasai is also the granary of the Congo and contains some of the richest diamond mines in the south around Bakwanga and Tshikapa. It is a province that cannot be allowed to sink into confusion and stagnation without seriously endangering the economic health and stability of the country as a whole.

4. The roots of the Lulua-Baluba conflict are to be found in the earlier migration of Baluba tribesmen from eastern areas of the country into South Kasai and elsewhere in Kasai province. This is said to have occurred in successive waves since the end of the eighteenth century, but large-scale emigration from the east took place around 1870 as a result of the forays of the slave traders. Later, about the beginning of the twentieth century, Balubas were brought in by the Belgian mining companies. It should be noted that initially Balubas were welcomed peacefully by the Lulus and other tribes of Kasai. Lands were ceded to them by local pacts and later unoccupied lands taken over by the Belgian administration were offered to the newcomers. At no time was the Baluba penetration into Kasai a matter of conquest.

5. The Balubas established themselves chiefly in South-East Kasai, but also became widely dispersed elsewhere in the province forming what became Baluba enclaves. They were adaptable people, lacking roots after their recent wanderings, and easily adjusting themselves to new surroundings. They were responsive to the white man's needs and culture, and became prominent not only in the Belgian mines and administration but also as farmers, providing food for the commercial and industrial centres. They also tended to follow the white man, and so became established in pockets in and around all the main centres of Belgian activity and enterprise.

6. By contrast, the Lulus were a more stable people. Although they were never organized as one homogenous unit, they were firmly established on their own lands where they had developed their own way of life. They were consequently less ready to adapt their ways to the white man's culture, and thereby missed many of its benefits.

7. As a result, the Balubas became predominant in Kasai, occupying the best positions in the administration and economic life of the province. In the town of Luluabourg 95 percent of the skilled labour was Baluba. Numerically the Balubas also began to outnumber the Lulus. The time came when a younger generation of Lulus became aware of being left behind and found that many of the roads to advancement were blocked by the Balubas. They resented Baluba ascendancy and were jealous of their success. The Association Lulua-Frères was formed in the early 1950's to press forward Lulua interests and make up for lost time.

8. With the beginning of political activity in the period preceding independence, the Lulua-Baluba rivalry took a turn for the worse. The Lulus were not slow to realize some of the implications of democracy. They were well aware of being outnumbered by the Balubas; rule by majority was yet another blow to their hopes of making up for lost time. They became alarmed and closed their ranks. In the town of Luluabourg they contested the communal elections of 1958 as a strongly organized group and achieved considerable success in spite of their weaker numerical strength. The Balubas were taken by surprise. They had hitherto remained divided in individual groups but after these elections decided to organize themselves in their turn. They formed the Mouvement Solidaire Muluba^x which acted as a counterpart to the Association Lulua Frères.

9. Further political developments had the effect of increasing tension and widening the gulf between the two tribes. In the struggle for independence, the Balubas under the leadership of Albert Kalondji came to be regarded as the exponents of immediate independence while the Lulus adopted a more cautious attitude. When Kalondji split

^x Muluba= adjective of Baluba.

the Mouvement National Congolais (M.N.C.), in early 1959, forming his own wing of the movement, the Lulua-Baluba conflict became reflected in the struggle between the "M.N.C. Lumumba" and the "M.N.C. Kalondji".

10. This antagonism came to a head after the provincial elections in June 1960, when Lumumba visited Luluabourg and formed a "Front Commun" of all the parties of Kasai excluding the M.N.C. Kalondji, and gained control of 50 out of the 70 seats in the Provincial Assembly. The M.N.C. Kalondji found itself isolated in spite of having polled the highest number of votes, and was thus denied a major part in the formation of the Provincial Government. Instead, it was given only three minor posts. To make matters worse the President of the new government turned out to be Barthelemy Mukenge, head of the Association Lulua-Freres. Secure in power, the Lulus then began to drive out the Balubas.

11. Thenceforth, the Balubas' reply to what they viewed as an all-out Lulua offensive was to demand recognition for a Baluba province (later to be a Baluba state) in South Kasai. In the meantime, events seemed to be justifying their stand, as thousands of Balubas started to move from Luluabourg and other parts of Lulua territory towards Bakwanga.

12. Actual violence first broke out in October 1959 when Lulus attacked Baluba minorities in villages outside Luluabourg. In May 1959, the Lulua chief Kalamba had demanded recognition of the existence of a "Lulua Kingdom" with the sequel that Balubas living in this territory should submit to Lulua authority or else return to their own lands. It is said that these demands were instigated by some Belgian administrators who viewed an assertion of Lulua predominance as a convenient weapon against the rising influence of Kalondji among the Balubas.

13. Whatever the precise origin of Chief Kalamba's initiative, the demands voiced by him became the central theme of the Lulua offensive to gain parity with their more advanced rivals. On 11 January 1960, an agreement was signed at Lake Mukamba between Lulua and Baluba Chiefs and neutral observers by which all Balubas occupying Lulua territory were required to leave this territory within two months unless they submitted to Lulua authority. Exceptions were made of the town of Luluabourg and certain categories of Balubas such as workers. This agreement was immediately denounced by the Balubas although it had been signed by certain of their representatives (reportedly with a view to hastening the creation of a Baluba province in South Kasai). It was condemned as impractical by the then Governor-General who pointed out that to transplant 100,000 Balubas in two months meant moving them at the rate of

1,500 to 2,000 a day. In fact this agreement was never officially put into effect. However its aims were achieved in the course of events.

14. More violence took place in and around Luluabourg in December 1959 and January 1960. A state of emergency was declared on 18 January and a special Commissioner-General appointed for the Kasai. An agreement between the Lulua and Baluba delegates to the Round Table Conference was signed in Brussels at the end of February but did not last long. Serious incidents broke out again at the end of March with attacks from both sides. By this time the exodus of Balubas from Luluabourg and the surrounding country was in full swing. In May 1960 special trains were organized to evacuate Baluba refugees. Soon this exodus spread to other regions, even some regions like Mwaka and Luisa which were not Lulua territory.

15. A remarkable development at this time was the spread of anti-Baluba feeling amongst other tribes in Kasai. The reasons for this may have been analogous to the reasons for Lulua hostility. On the other hand, the conflict may well have spread as a result of the interplay of political forces such as the M.N.C. - Lumumba's Common Front against the M.N.C. - Kalondji. This seems to have been the case at Tshikapa, a kaleidoscope of different tribes brought together by the diamond mines which had attracted Balubas and Lulus to territory occupied by Bapende and Tschokwe. At Tshikapa, however, the Tschokwe became allies of the Balubas as a result of being affiliated with Nguvulu's Parti du Peuple, the M.N.C. - Kalondji's only ally in Kasai. They nursed a particular grievance against the Lumumba Government and consequently turned fiercely on the Lulus, Lumumba's political allies. Tshikapa continued to suffer gravely from inter-tribal conflicts and is an example of the alarming rapidity with which large scale violence spread far beyond its original limits.

16. On 8 August 1960, the "Mining Province" of South Kasai was proclaimed by Kalondji and other Baluba leaders. It was soon to become the "Autonomous State of South Kasai". At the end of August Lumumba launched his offensive against the new State and Bakwanga was occupied by ANC troops. Then followed the massacre of Balubas described by the Secretary-General of the United Nations as having the characteristics of genocide.

17. By this time all 150,000 Balubas had left Luluabourg and Lulua territory and by November 1960 it was reckoned that there were 300,000 Baluba refugees in need of relief in South Kasai. By contrast, Luluabourg became a dead city with economic activity and all the main services at a standstill. Even sections of the police

and the armed forces went over to South Kasai.

18. Unfortunately this was not the end of the story. Lulua aggression and the ANC offensive against South Kasai were followed by retaliation on the part of Kalondji's troops. A series of incidents took place on the borders of South Kasai as Kalondji's troops sought to expand their territory at the expense of neighbouring tribes such as the Basonge and the Kaniokas. Particularly fierce fighting took place between Balubas and Kaniokas at the end of October and November 1960 around Luputa, Mwene Ditu, Kamponde and Kabinda. It was reckoned at this time that the Kalondjist forces comprised several thousand men. Much of the fighting, however, was carried out by young Balubas organized in youth groups. (This was also the case with regard to other tribes.)

19. The presence of the United Nations both through its military forces and its relief operation helped to keep Kasai from disintegrating into uncontrolled slaughter. Its main strategy from the end of 1960 had to be based on some measure of containment of Kalondji who, in a spirit of revenge for Baluba suffering sought to expand his territory at the expense of neighboring tribes who, in their turn, became caught up in the inter-tribal conflict making a future settlement all the more difficult. The Kanioka minority problem vis-a-vis the Balubas, for instance, became almost as intractable as the Lulua-Baluba problem.

20. Tribal fighting continued with varying degrees of intensity into 1961 in spite of United Nations intervention. A new element was added by the incursion of Gizengist troops into North Kasai with the greatly over-dramatized thrust of what proved to be only 150 men to the outskirts of Luluabourg in February 1961. This had the effect of sapping the authority of the Provincial Government and gave added incentive to lawlessness in parts of the province hitherto in some measure loyal to Luluabourg.

21. Gizengist troops remained in North Kasai reaching as far south as Bena-Dibele on the Sankuru river in May 1961 and disrupting river traffic and other economic activity to such an extent that in June 1961, the OTRACO personnel at Bena-Dibele were forced to abandon their posts and take refuge in Port Francqui.

22. A reassessment of U.N. military strategy took place after the Port Francqui incident in May 1961 when a contingent of Ghanaian troops at Port Francqui were attacked and killed by the ANC. The origin of the incident was not wholly clear but it appeared that the Ghanaians gave protection to a Minister from Luluabourg who had severely criticized the local ANC. The Ghanaian

contingent was too weak in numbers to face the ANC and was almost completely eliminated by them. As a result; the U.N. Command decided to regroup its forces in Kasai around Luluabourg. It withdrew its troops from Bakwanga thus seriously jeopardizing the continuation of the relief operation in South Kasai.

23. There were new efforts at reconciliation of the tribal conflict in mid 1961. At the Conference of Coquilhatville it was agreed to place certain disputed territories, notably on the borders of South Kasai, under special commissioners pending a referendum. However this agreement does not seem to have been put into practice and no progress seems to have been made with regard to the territories concerned. On July 21, however, a pact was signed between Albert Kalondji and Chief Kalamba Mangone at Lovanium at the beginning of Parliament in an attempt to bring to an end the longstanding Baluba-Lulua conflict. This pact was celebrated in Leopoldville on August 5 after the end of Parliament, but it remains to be seen how effectively it will be applied in Kasai. Finally it should be noted that with the election of the government of national union which emanated from the meeting of Parliament at Lovanium, there is now a government which in principle has every right and duty to make itself felt throughout the Congo. Whether its writ will run throughout Kasai still remains to be seen.

24. In the meantime, it must be recorded that new incidents of tribal fighting continue to occur. The more recent ones have involved the Luntus at Lake Mukamba, an area coveted by Kalondji forces, and the Luntus again at Kapambwe where their villages were razed and over one hundred and fifty massacred in a retaliatory action by ANC troops from Luluabourg and Lusambo. This action took place as recently as the first week of August. With the withdrawal of U.N. troops from Mwene-Ditu, a potentially dangerous situation exists between the Kalondji troops and the Kaniokas who have declared war on the Balubas. Another potentially dangerous situation exists in East Kasai between Sentery and Kabinda (in Basonge country) where Gizengist troops are infiltrating south from Kivu and Kalondjists are expanding northeast from South Kasai. Tshikapa and Port Francoqui with their medley of tribes concentrated around the centres concerned also provide a breeding ground for trouble where explosions can recur at a moments notice.

25. It must be stressed that Kasai itself is the most diversified tribal area in the Congo. This means that a conflict such as that occurring between Lulus and Balubas can easily spread involving other tribes who either ally themselves with one side or another or find themselves the victims of aggressive forays of the main antagonists, thus precipitating new feuds and retaliatory

actions. This is in fact what has happened in Kasai since the first outbreak of violence between Lulus and Balubas in October 1959. Tribal fighting also differs from other forms of violence in that it cannot easily be brought to an end by the signature of a treaty. It often has to run its course. The effects on the economy of the province have already been mentioned. The Baluba-Kanioka feud will affect the railway passing through Mwene-Ditu, Tielen and Luputa. Further north at Mweka the Bakubas will not allow B.C.K. railway company to employ any Balubas or Lulus who, in effect represent the backbone of their personnel. And as mentioned above, relief action for Balubas in South Kasai or any other group that may be in need is made virtually impossible given the present state of tribal passions.

26. In present circumstances, only active policing by U.N. forces in Kasai can keep a measure of control, thus allowing a minimum of economic activity until such a time as the Congolese authorities themselves can take the matter in hand in a satisfactory manner. A withdrawal of U.N. troops from Kasai at this stage, will, in all probability, lead to more slaughter and chaos.

Leopoldville
21 August 1961

A. Jacobs
Office of Economic
Relief Coordination
ONUC

Dr. Liner, for inf.

Q/SOC 500.

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INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

19 August 1961

A : Mr. R.J.B. Rossborough, Officer in Charge of Civilian Operations
De : Frederick W. Tooby, Economic Relief Coordinator
Objet : More UNOC Troops in Kasai

[Handwritten signature]

1. I am greatly concerned that the reduction of ONUC forces in Kasai will lead to more bloodshed and famine among the people. The attached paper provides an explanation of both the importance of the province in the economy of the Congo and the violence of the forces which still today threaten to reduce it to chaos.

2. I suggest most urgently a recommendation be sent to the Secretary-General that the deployment of ONUC troops in the Congo be again reconsidered in the light of the most recent political developments, with a view to giving the highest possible priority to the policing of Kasai.

CONFIDENTIAL

Report on the expedition for relief
to flood victims along the Congo river
from 22 January to 18 February 1962

by

Joost Kuitenbrouwer
ONUC Social Affairs Officer

Leopoldville, 13 March 1962

1. Since I was asked to act as representative for ONUC on this expedition, my report is first of all an account of the operation itself. I feel however that the events accompanying the operation cannot be properly understood without referring to the planning and preparation of the expedition by the Office of Refugee Relief Coordinator to which I was not associated. Only three days (including a week end) before the expedition started, I met with by Mr. Duncan Smith, special assistant to the Refugee Relief Coordinator who carried out the planning and preparation of the expedition from ONUC's side and I accepted the assignment.

2. Mr. Duncan Smith told me that the first objective of the expedition was maximum publicity. The original purpose of the expedition had lost its purpose since the peak of the floods had already past for some time and the Office of the Refugee Relief Coordinator had decided to cancel the expedition ; but heavy pressure from the American Embassy and insistence by the Central Government which had already chartered a tug, a barge and a passenger boat for 50.000.- C.Frs. a day for a scheduled period of 20 - 30 days made the Refugee Relief Coordinator decide to join in the operation, although word had been received from the ONUC representative in Orientale Province as I learned later that he considered such an expedition unnecessary.

3. While the Central Government represented in the operation by His Excellency the Minister of Social Affairs, Mr. Assumani, committed itself to Otraco to pay the rent for the fleet (50.000.- C.Frs.), ONUC assumed the financial responsibility for paying the loading operations and the restaurant costs incurred during the journey by the four Central Government Representatives and four Congolese Red Cross agents which amount to a total of about 45.000.- C.Frs. ONUC's principal contribution was the cargo, approximately 270 tons of rice, 18 tons of palm oil, 30 tons for infants, 2000 baby rations and 30 large tents. A major part of these supplies had been given by the U.S.A. food relief while the rest had been donated by France.

4. I asked Mr. Duncan Smith for written terms of reference which would define my responsibilities as ONUC representative on the expedition. I did not receive any written terms of

reference but later heard from Mr. Duncan Smith that the Refugee Relief Coordinator, Mr. Fred Tooby had decided that his office ought not to provide me with written terms of reference (which had been prepared according to Mr. Duncan Smith) and had called Prof. R.C. Wilson of the Section of Social Affairs to which I belong and had asked him to provide me with instructions. This surprised me since the Office of the Refugee Relief Coordinator had been responsible for preparing the expedition from ONUC's side. In the meanwhile, Mr. Duncan Smith instructed me that I was as ONUC representative "in charge" of the expedition. My chief, Prof. R.C. Wilson, had a different view and told me that my role was that of an adviser to the Central Government representative without responsibilities with regard to the use of the ship neither decision making with regard to unloading and distribution. As to the first point, I did not have any doubt. It was up to the Central Government representatives on board to give instructions to the captain how to proceed since the Central Government had chartered the convoy. As to the second point, responsibility for unloading and distribution, I was at a loss. On the one hand, I found in the minute of the meeting of 11 January during which the Central Government representatives had discussed the expedition with ONUC and voluntary agencies representatives, the expedition qualified as a joint undertaking but at the same time the minutes indicated that His Excellency Minister Assumani had assumed responsibility for the expedition.

5. No time was left to ask for clarification of my terms of reference but I decided it was anyway my mission to represent as well as possible the interests of ONUC and to do my best to assure that our cargo would be distributed in the most equitable way. The only decision that had been taken was that 50% of the load was destined for Equator Province and 50% for Orientale Province. For the rest I had not received any instructions as to where and to whom and through what channels unloading and distribution should take place. I was told by Mr. Duncan Smith that we were supposed to gather information on our way and plans for unloading and distribution would be worked out between the Central Government representatives, those of the respective provincial governments and the provincial ONUC representatives and myself.

6. I shall not try to give a complete account of all that happened during the expedition since it is not directly relevant although highly significant for the actual political, economic and social climate of the Republic of the Congo. I therefore kept a logbook which contains all the elements for writing a first class tragic comedy.

7. His Excellency, Minister Assumani, had given instructions to his representatives on board to proceed immediately to Coquilhatville without stopping. At our arrival in Coquilhatville on 25 January, I immediately started gathering informations as to the areas in the province most affected by the innundations and where flood victims were concentrated and proposed a provisional plan for unloading and distribution. My informants were a UNESCO Expert, who had widely travelled in the province and has many contacts and sources of information, a secretary of the Office of the ONUC Representative Mr. KAHALE, a central government representative on our ship, originally from the area, the captain of the convoy, also from the area and some local Congolese I happened to meet when our convoy arrived.

8. This provisional plan was prepared with a view to having concrete proposals from our side of the meeting, scheduled in the morning of 26 January, the day after our arrival. In such a way no time would be lost of the Central Government or the Provincial Government would happen not to present their concrete proposals. The plan included that $\frac{1}{4}$ of the load for the province would be discharged at Coquilhatville and distributed in Coquilhatville and surroundings, $\frac{1}{4}$ would be discharged by our convoy along the Congo river. I had in particular in mind the town New Antwerpen where according to various informants flood victims from a number of villages had taken refuge. The other half of the load would be divided in two parts and be brought by two motor launches to regions of the interior where tributaries of the Congo river had caused innundations. I thought particularly of the areas along the Busira river and the regions of Balomba and Bomongo. We had been informed by the office of OTRACO in Coquilhatville that the use of the two motor launches was part of the agreement.

9. I had a meeting with the ONUC representative in Equator Province, Mr. Kahale in which we discussed the position we would take at the meeting next morning between the Central and Provincial Government representatives and us. He first of all showed me a cable, received the same day and signed by Mr.

Rosborough, Deputy Chief of ONUC Civilian Operations saying :
 " Distribution plan is for determination by Minister Assumani on advice local administration and will you help and guidance". This cable eliminated any doubt as to the assignment of responsibility with regard to the supplies. Our expedition could no more be considered as a joint Central Government - ONUC enterprise. I did not feel this the most happy solution since I considered that if ONUC would withdraw from exercising some form of control so as to assure an equitable distribution, the food might not, or not in the most desirable way, reach the people for which it was destined. I had already been informed in the meanwhile that the provincial government would favour unloading the complete cargo destined for the province, at Coquilhatville. Also the ONUC representative, Mr. Kahale told me that he thought it would be the best solution to unload the bulk, 180 tons, at Coquilhatville and to use the rest for a symbolic distribution. Such a symbolic distribution might take place at Bikoro, a village on the border of the lake Tumba not too far from Coquilhatville and we might invite the authorities of the provincial executive and legislative to join the expedition for this purpose. In my own plan I had foreseen inviting also a few members of the provincial government but in particular some representatives from the provincial Ministry of Social Affairs who could take charge of organizing the distribution of the supplies once they had been unloaded. I wanted also to stress in our mission direct unloading and distribution in the places, above indicated, so as to create among people the awareness that the central and provincial government had thought of them in their distressing circumstances and that this might help them to feel that it meant something to be Congolese and to be represented by governments which thought of their interests.

10. At the meeting on 26 January, His Excellency, Minister Assumani, who took the chair, transferred as could have been expected his entire responsibility for the unloading and distribution to the provincial government. He considered apparently that this was in accordance with the division of responsibilities between the central and provincial governments. Moreover he could not allow himself to do otherwise since the provincial government would not have accepted this, their relation with the central government not being too friendly, not to say tense.

The provincial Minister of Social Affairs thanked him and announced that the provincial government had

decided to unload the whole cargo at Coquilhatville and that if there would be any objection to this plan, they would not want to receive the supplies and the convoy could go back to Leo.

Mr. Kahale, the ONUC representative at Coq. then proposed the trip to Bikoro but this proposal did not meet with approval of the Provincial representative. He stated that the provincial government would take care of the whole matter. Moreover, the provincial assembly was just in session and this presented a fine opportunity to deliberate on a plan for distribution. Moreover, he argued that it was not so easy to define which people really were flood victims and that the provincial government could not be held responsible for the security of those participating in a plan to directly unload and distribute the food in some places as I had foreseen in my plan.

Then, without presenting my plan, I explained to the meeting that the purpose of our expedition was to assure the most speedy and equitable distribution of the food. If all food supplies were unloaded at Coq., it might take a long time before they would reach the people. Moreover, this would lead to substantial additional transport costs which could be avoided if a direct use were made of our convoy for which the central government had already spent a great sum of money. Not to use our convoy at all would mean that the expenditures incurred in by the Central Government would have been largely in vain.

As to the argument of insecurity, talks with several people, among whom Mr. Jean Flad, ONUC Officer, who just before had made a number of trips to the interior convinced me that there was no danger whatsoever.

11. My arguments were in vain and the provincial representative repeated that the only thing to be done was the unloading at Coquilhatville.

At the end of the meeting, it was decided that a committee to study distribution be set up by the provincial government and Mr. Kahale was invited to join the committee.

12. The unloading took a long time. OTRACO which had put a crew of 50 men on our convoy alleged that this crew was to be used only along the river on places where OTRACO did not

have its own installations. It became clear that Minister Assumani had never signed any proper contract specifying the obligations of both parties. Then the provincial government signed a contract with OTRACO in which it committed the central government to pay the costs of unloading (60 francs per ton). Minister Assumani however told the provincial government representative that he could never commit the central government. In the meanwhile, the barge remained unloaded and a good deal of the crew had disappeared. OTRACO was not really interested in speeding up the unloading since the convoy had been chartered and each day earned 50.000.- Cfrs.

13. Finally the provincial government got kind of organized. It sent prisoners with a police guard to carry out the unloading but the operation still went slowly since there were only two trucks available. No use was made of ONUC trucks or those of the League of Red Cross Societies which also in this province take care of the distribution of UNICEF Milk. The supplies were transported to a government depot.

14. Our departure from Coquilhatville was delayed for more than two days by the break down of the refrigerator of our passenger ship. The office of the Refugee Relief Coordinator had promised OTRACO to transport spare parts to Coquilhatville from Leopoldville but twice an ONUC plane arrived without them. The first time the pilot informed me that he had not been able to allow the transport of the spare parts since this was against the security regulations and the second time, the pilot did not know everything about the matter. Finally OTRACO added a small ship to our convoy only because of its refrigerator. Thus the convoy which left Coquilhatville on 16 February was composed of four vessels : a tug, a barge, a passenger ship and the small vessel with refrigerator. The refrigerator of our passenger ship was only repaired shortly before we arrived in Coquilhatville on our way back.

15. Since the developments in Coquilhatville were not considered very desirable by Miss Yvette Mayor, expert of the Section of Social Affairs (who had travelled with our expedition up to Coquilhatville, seeing whether she could help the Congolese team on board in organizing themselves to plan and carry out unloading or distribution operations) and myself that ONUC, Leo, should be informed as soon as possible. Since Miss Mayor had decided to return to Leopoldville (her stay on board would no longer be justified in view of the decision of the provincial govern-

ment) she informed immediately after her arrival in Leopoldville Mr. Mahmoud Khiary, Chief of Civilian Operations of ONUC and Mr. Duncan Smith of the events at Coquilhatville so as to assure that a similar development would not repeat itself at Stanleyville.

16. His Excellency, Minister Assumani had given instructions to his representatives on board to proceed directly to Stanleyville without unloading any supplies along the river. The plan for unloading and distribution would be discussed at Stanleyville at a meeting between the provincial government and the ONUC representatives.

17. In the meanwhile, cables from Mr. Khiary and the Refugee Relief Coordinator, Mr. Fred Tooby had been sent to Stanleyville, instructing the ONUC representative to take measures so as to insure an equitable distribution of the supplies destined for the province.

18. Our expedition reached Stanleyville on 8 February. The contrast with our arrival at Coquilhatville was striking. There, a great and festive reception waited us. In Stanleyville we were not welcomed at all and when after some time the ONUC representative showed up, the first thing I was told was : " Why did you come with this food. We do not need it. What we need are roof materials." I was given the unambiguous impression that the mere arrival of our convoy was considered as a nuisance and an embarrassment to the ONUC representatives.

19. The Deputy ONUC representative Mr. Henry Kaufman told me that the day before our arrival, on 7 February, a meeting had taken place between Minister Assumani, the provincial government representatives, himself and the representatives of the League of Red Cross Societies (who had not been invited to the meeting in Coquilhatville). Minister Assumani, who took the chair, had again transferred all his responsibilities to the provincial government representatives who after thanking him asked Mr. Kaufman whether ONUC could assist in the unloading operations and the transport of the supplies to the Government Depot. Mr. Kaufman informed the meeting that ONUC had already arranged for everything and would start unloading as soon as possible, that it had its own crew for the unloading operation and would transport the supplies to the ONUC Supply Depot. The provincial government representatives had asked

whether they would receive the keys of the depot and Mr. Kaufman told them that another meeting would be convened by ONUC with the provincial government representatives and the representative of the League of Red Cross Societies (which in this province seems to have developed a well functioning distribution network) to work out a **plan** for distribution.

20. Directly after our arrival, Ethiopian soldiers arrived to guard our convoy. The same was done at the supply depot. They remained until the unloading was finished.

21. Unloading started on the morning of 9 February. The crew was formed by men employed by the ONUC public works section in Stanleyville. Unloading continued through the week end and was completed on 12 February. On 13 February, our convoy left Stanleyville and after a short stop at Coquilhatville arrived in Leopoldville on 18 February.

22. During our expedition, a number of delays were decided upon by the captain of our convoy on OTRACO authorities and I advised each time the principal government representative, Mr. Philippe ELEBE, Secretary of the Cabinet of his Excellency Minister Assumani to register these delays which would have to result in a reduction of the charter sum. In Coquilhatville, I helped him to draft a document to be signed by the OTRACO representative in which OTRACO recognized that the delay was due to their holding up the convoy for technical reasons but the OTRACO representative was not disposed to sign the document.

23. In both places of unloading, Mr. Elebe prepared a receipt for the supplies which indicates the exact quantities which were unloaded. These receipts of which I transmitted copies to Mr. Duncan Smith, are signed by Mr. Elebe himself, the representative of the two provincial governments and myself.

24. I transmitted also to Mr. Duncan Smith copies of declarations, prepared by me, and undersigned by the maitre d'hotel, the radio operator and myself, indicating the number of meals taken by the government representatives and Red Cross agents during the expedition and the cost of the three cables which I sent as ONUC representative on board.

25. I wish to draw attention to the fact that OTRACO contrary to its promises to Mr. Duncan Smith before the expedition started, decided to increase the daily restaurant charges on board from 220 francs to 300 francs and moreover introduced prices on board which did not correspond to legal requirements. OTRACO may have done this in order to compensate in some way for the fact that the government might not be able to fully pay the bill from OTRACO/ At Coquilhatville, the provincial Ministry of Economic Affairs (many ministers came to our boat to drink beer) started investigations and when we stopped on our way back in Coquilhatville, we heard that a warrant had been issued against the barman. I think that this warrant should be issued to persons in OTRACO, more responsible than the barman.

26. When being at Coquilhatville on our return, Mr. Elebe and myself heard from various sources that foodstuffs coming from the supplies we had unloaded had been sold on the black market. This did not violently surprise us since we had received evidence at our first stay in Coquilhatville that certain government authorities had been involved in similar undertakings before. Mr. Elebe informed me that he would propose to His Excellency, Minister Assumani to send a committee of investigation to Coquilhatville to find out what has happened with the supplies. I fear however that Minister Assumani will never think of sending such a committee after having formally transferred to the provincial government the entire responsibility for the supplies. Moreover, this seems politically impossible. The committee would seriously run the risk of being arrested and this would only worsen relations between the central and provincial government.

27. This is the place to observe that in Equator as well as Stanleyville province there are areas and places where certain basic foodstuffs seems to be seriously lacking which naturally results in the drastic increase of prices. I have however the impression (based on conversation with a number of people) that the lack of foodstuffs in the market is not always or exclusively due to a real absence of these foodstuffs but to the decision of merchants to stock their supplies and by creating scarcity to increase their margin of profits. As to governmental price control system, there is evidence that it exists but the price controllers do not seem always to be competent or capable enough to enforce price regulations.

28.

Final comments

As to the alleged primary objective of the expedition, publicity, there is no doubt that the expedition was a total failure.

Up to Coquilhatville we had on board a representative of the American Embassy, accompanied by two assistants, who insisted on making a documentary film. I had the greatest difficulty in explaining to him that I could not make an independent decision on his request since I felt that the central government representative would have to give his approval. We managed to have the matter postponed up to Coquilhatville while I promised the representative to transmit his request to his Excellency, Minister Assumani. This I did but his Excellency flatly refused permission. Thus our reception at Coquilhatville, filmed by some cameramen, remained the only publicity stunt.

In another way, at least in Equator province, radio announcements about our expedition created discontent. In Lisala and Bumba, the deputy district commissioner and the territory administrator told us they did not believe that their area would ever receive their share of the supplies. At least it might take, I think, some time. At the moment of our arrival in Leopoldville on 18 February, no distribution had yet been started by the provincial government of Equator Province.

29.

According to the information I picked up along the river, I think that, although in many places people suffered from the floods, yet nowhere did famine conditions or conditions close to famine ever developed. People along the Congo river and its tributaries are very mobile and their living and work area is extensive. Although the floods this time were exceptionally high, people are accustomed to change their habitat and shift their cultivations, their hunting grounds and search for forest products and fruits constantly. Moreover, fish, principal provider of proteins remained most of the time available. The two Indian WHO doctors stationed at Lisala, confirmed to us that nutritional diseases are very rare in the area along the river.

30. In retrospect, it seems doubtful if the expedition served a really useful purpose, since the expedition did not touch the crucial problems of the areas concerned, such as the paralysis of economic life, the breakdown of the transport system necessary to move products from the interior and the lack of technical assistance in this field. Publicity for international relief supplies as such is not an adequate basis for action, especially when the operation is undertaken in conjunction with the central and provincial governments concerned with political prestige. If supplies channelled through ONUC are to be distributed through or jointly with government machinery, it seems essential that action should be planned on such a basis that the governments departments concerned should be helped to perceive the difference between economic and social rehabilitation and political advantage.

Finally it might be argued that it remains a primary task of ONUC to advise the government on an intelligent use of its limited budgetary resources although I realize that this is one of ONUC's most delicate and difficult tasks. The assignment of priorities in planning and action is the first element in such an advisory task.

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LULUABOURG

4 April 1961

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 YOUR 484-A STOP THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE PRESENT
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 FOR RELIEF CANNOT BE USED FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES STOP FOR THE
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D. R.

BY :

Drafted by : F.W. Tooby

Authorized : S. Linner

Date :

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FREE DISTRIBUTION STOP CERTAIN OF THE FOOD SUPPLIES IN ONUC
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IN MARKETS IN SUCH PLACES AS LULUABOURG STOP THIS POSSIBILITY
IS NOW UNDER STUDY HERE AND YOU WILL BE ADVISED IN AYE
FEW DAYS

Alga 5684 - 100,000 - 26/10/60

T. O. R.

BY :

Drafted by :

Authorized :

Date :

T. O. D.

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ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES
AU CONGO



UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION
IN THE CONGO

File

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

Stanleyville, November 20 1960

A. Dr. Sture Linner, Chief of Civilian Operations *SL*
DE: S. Brzak, Civilian Operations Officer *SB*
OBJET: Progress Report Province Orientale - 18 November 1960

The Province Orientale occupying the North Eastern part of the Congo is with its area of 530.000 km² the largest and with its population of 2.600.000 the second most populous of Congo's Provinces.

The Chief of the Civilian Mission to the Eastern Province has been in Stanleyville *on* 15 September 1960. He is co-ordinating the work of the following Experts:

WHO	Dr. C. Dambreville	ICAO	Mr. J. La Planeta
	F. Jeremi		Mr. M. Ghariani
	E. Jenni		Mr. A. Ouaghran
	Dr. G. Varieras		
	M.M. Bruneau	WMO	Mr. H. Lesne

ITU Mr. Gabremikael Gabreselassie
Mr. Tewelde Teklehaymandt
Mr. M. Ayelle
Mr. W. Steinmann

PUBLIC WORKS ENGINEERING Mr. K. Arvefors
Mr. T. Pettersson
Mr. S. Jonsson (through 11 November)
Mr. B. Orne (through 16 November)

In addition the following personnel works in the Civilian Mission:

Administrative Officer	Mr. Charles Sermondade	(France)
Finance Officer	Mr. Ernest Pokorny	(Austria)
Air Liaison Officer	Mr. Anthony Hayward	(U.K.)
Procurement Officer	Mr. Rodolphe Krauss	(France)
Accounts Clerk	Mr. Milton Habibis	(U.K.)
Billeting Officer	Mr. Guy Oberweis	(Luxembourg)
Transport Officer	Mr. R.P. Latham	(U.K.)
Secretary	Mlle M. Robiony	France.

.../

As the Orientale is essentially an agricultural Province the slowdown of its economic activities after Independence has been only gradual and not abrupt as it would occur in industry where the technicians have left. Many farmers have, in their initial enthusiasms, failed to plant the crops which they should have, some plantations were abandoned completely, in some other spots however work continues as before. The same varied pattern applies also to the road system: in some places the local cantonniers are still able to maintain the roads in usable condition, in some others trucks get stuck for hours. If you drive a few miles out of Stanleyville you see the situation: Some months ago the road was excellent. Today you would prefer to use a jeep rather than a passenger car. The Eastern Province has also had considerable reserves of goods and equipment, so that even now, after imports had been stopped for five months, instances in which stocks are completely exhausted, are exceptional. Whereas the economic set up in the Province is up to now only partially impaired, it can be said that whole branches of the administrative apparatus have been at a standstill for months. The new civil servant - whether he be a Minister, District Commissioner or Chief of Section may well sit in the same chair, live in the same house and make the same official trips as his predecessor, he is far from being able to perform the same functions. Very often he will be afraid of taking a decision and will find a thousand excuses for not acting. This is of course not the climate in which the economy can prosper.

The political climate in the Province has not been favorable either to the economic life. On several occasions the local Government has decided to break off relations with the Central Government in Leopoldville and this has hampered constantly the flow of goods and money. In addition the ANC in the Province is far from being an element of order. Army units and the Gendarmerie often terrorize whole regions, requisitioning and stealing as they please without any sanctions being taken against them. Most of the incidents are not reported as the communications system functions only erratically.

This is the environment in which the Civilian operations have worked up to now. Individual UN experts have been very successful and details about the work of WHO, ICAO, ITU and WMO experts are being reported by them to their superiors in Leopoldville. They have established excellent relations with their colleagues and have often been successful in training local employees.

.../

Bigger undertakings however such as the UN Public Works programme (road maintenance, agricultural programme, completion of buildings) have encountered far more difficulties. They are based on the idea of entrusting the local authorities and firms with the overall responsibility for planning, direction and execution, the UN contribution being mainly financial. Here the limited competence of the authorities as described above has hampered considerably the execution of the programmes.

One of the UN programmes adopted for the Eastern Province is distribution to unemployed small lots and furnishing them with means of subsistence until the harvest. Despite assurances given by the local government that some 600 hectares of land will be made available, it took nearly two weeks of negotiations to get some 20 hectares at ONUC's disposal.

Work started on this last project on 2 November and some 56 workers under the direction of a UN agricultural engineer are clearing the land which will ultimately accommodate some 120 families. During the first days, the workers who have not had the opportunity of furnishing a physical effort for months, found the work rather hard and they complained. However since they found the joy of working again their performance is fully satisfactory and moreover some able foremen were discovered among them who will be used on similar projects. It seems now that a way has been found for similar projects on a much larger scale which would accommodate well over 1,000 unemployed. Volunteers do not lack and every day hundreds of unemployed are offering their services.

At the same time negotiations are going on with the Ministry of Public Works for a test project in road repairs, in which the UN would provide funds for additional road workers chosen among people presently unemployed and the Ministry would use its existing labor force, matériel, and supervisory personnel. Here again the main difficulty comes from the inertia and diffidence of the local authorities. But it is certainly worthwhile to make an effort to break the ice in that direction, as it is our impression that the local government has the necessary resources, both in manpower and matériel, the problem being only to put them in motion.

