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Reception: Inst. on Man
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Fri. 22/V/70 38th.

Columbia University in the City of New York | *New York, N. Y. 10027*

SCHOOL OF LAW

435 West 116th Street

June 2, 1970

8/5/70

His Excellency,
U Thant
Secretary-General
United Nations
New York, N.Y. 10017

Dear Mr. Secretary-General:

Thank you so much for your kind note of May 21, and particularly for your gracious words of thanks about my assistance on your statement to the conference of the Institute on Man and Science.

I was more than happy to be of some small assistance in this connection. Actually, it is we who must thank you for your generosity in addressing the conference once again this year. It meant ever so much to all of us.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

Richard N. Gardner

Richard N. Gardner
Henry L. Moses Professor of Law
and International Organization

RNG/ljs

21 May 1970

Dear Professor Gardner,

I wish to thank you for the copy of your address to the Panel Discussion on the Control of Violence and the Achievement of Justice at the Hilton Hotel and of your testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on the Genocide Convention. I have read them with much interest.

I am also most grateful to you for your assistance in the preparation of my statement before the opening meeting of the Institute on Man and Science tomorrow.

With warm personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

U Thant

Professor Richard M. Gardner
Henry L. Moses Professor of
Law and International Organization
Columbia Law School
435 West 116th Street
New York, N.Y. 10027

cc - Mr. Narasimhan
Mr. Lemieux ✓

UNITED NATIONS

Press Services
Office of Public Information
United Nations, N.Y.

(FOR USE OF INFORMATION MEDIA — NOT AN OFFICIAL RECORD)

Press Release SC/1746
21 May 1970

SECRETARY-GENERAL WILL OPEN NON-GOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE
ON 'POLITICS OF DISARMAMENT' ON 22 MAY

The Secretary-General, U Thant, will address the opening meeting of a conference on "The Politics of Disarmament-- Proposals for the 1970s", sponsored by the Institute on Man and Science of Rensselaerville, New York, tomorrow morning, 22 May at United Nations Headquarters.

There will also be introductory statements by Lord Chalfont, Permanent United Kingdom Representative to the Council of the Western European Union, with responsibility for disarmament; Lev Isaakovich Mendelevich, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union to the United Nations; Joao Augusto de Araujo Castro, Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations; Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet, Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations; Joseph S. Clark, President, United World Federalists; and Sule Kolo, Nigerian representative to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, Geneva.

The Chairman will be Philip C. Jessup, former Judge of the International Court of Justice. He will be introduced by C.V. Narasimhan, Chef de Cabinet and Deputy Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme, who presided over the previous three conferences on problems facing the United Nations, sponsored annually by the Institute. Professor Richard N. Gardner, of Columbia Law School and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, will act as Rapporteur.

The 36 participants, who will attend in their private capacity, include United Nations ambassadors and officials, educators and scientists, with extensive knowledge and experience in the problems of disarmament.

(more)

Among those attending the session will be: Dr. Harrison Brown of California Institute of Technology; Lord Caradon, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations; Earl W. Foell of the Los Angeles Times; Morton Halperin of the Brookings Institution; Edvard Hambro, Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations; T.T.B. Koh, Permanent Representative of Singapore to the United Nations; Vernon Johnson Mwaanga, Permanent Representative of Zambia to the United Nations; Christopher H. Phillips, Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States on the Security Council; Andrew Pierre of the Council of Foreign Relations; Samar Sen, Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations; Agha Shahi, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations; Piero Vinci, Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations; and Uli Vorontsov of the Embassy of the USSR.

An informal exchange of ideas will deal with such key questions as (1) strategic arms control and disarmament; (2) European security and arms control; (3) conventional arms control in the "third world"; (4) United Nations and other disarmament initiatives.

The Institute is a non-profit educational organization which has sponsored many conferences on vital world issues. Its President is Everett R. Clinchy. Conference meetings will continue over the week-end at the Institute's rural campus in Rensselaerville, Albany County, New York.

* *** *

5 May 1970

Professor Gardner of The Institute on Man and Science - phone 280-2642 - called regarding the following arrangements for the Conference at the UN on 22 May. -

1. A conference room to be reserved between 10 am and 12 noon on 22 May - to accommodate 40 people.
2. The press were not invited to the Conference last year but they would like to allow press this year.
3. The Secretary-General to address Conference on morning of 22 May.
4. The Secretary-General to give a reception for members of the Conference at 12 noon on 22 May.
5. A private dining room to be reserved for luncheon in DDR - approximately 30 to 35 people but exact number could be given the day before.

*Noted
agreed.
5/4*

nt

I informed Mr. Gardner that Conference Room 8 was reserved for meeting - and private dining room reserved for luncheon.

*10. am.
SG speech*

Mr. Gardner will forward a guest list for SG's reception - approximately 35 people.

5/4

nt

cc - Mr. Lemieux ✓

CWN/CC

cc: Professor Gardner
Miss Rodney
Mrs. Mira

20 February 1970

Dear Everett,


Thank you for your kind letter inviting me to join the conference convened by the Institute on Man and Science on May 22-24 on "The Politics of Disarmament -- Proposals for the 1970's". I shall certainly be with the Secretary-General to greet the participants on the morning of Friday, May 22. However, as I have explained to Professor Gardner, I will not be able to join you at the meetings in Rensselaerville. I hope, however, you will have a very successful session.

With kindest regards,

Yours sincerely,

C.V. Narasimhan
Chef de Cabinet

Dr. Everett R. Clinchy
President
Institute on Man and Science
Rensselaerville
New York 12147



THE INSTITUTE ON MAN AND SCIENCE / RENSSELAERVILLE, NEW YORK 12147 / (518) 797-3477

The Honorable C. V. Narasimhan
Chef de Cabinet
United Nations
New York, New York 10017

My dear C. V.,

Under the chairmanship of Judge Philip C. Jessup, The Institute on Man and Science will convene a conference May 22 - 24 on "The Politics of Disarmament -- Proposals for the 1970's". The conference is one of a continuing series conducted by The Institute in cooperation with the United Nations on topics of concern to the world organization.

The conference this year will emphasize the political implications of current and prospective efforts at arms control and disarmament. We propose to examine the implications of the SALT negotiations for Soviet-American relations, for Europe, and for the Third World -- and also to examine how the United Nations and countries other than the super-powers can play a useful role in arms control. In addition, we intend to examine possibilities for nuclear non-proliferation, European security arrangements, and regional arms limitation in other areas.

United Nations Secretary-General U Thant will address the opening session of the conference at UN Headquarters the morning of Friday May 22, and will be host at an informal reception after the opening meeting. Members of the conference will lunch at the UN, and will then be transported to Rensselaerville by car for sessions ending at noon Sunday May 24. Rensselaerville is a three-hour drive from the UN, and about a fifty minute drive from Albany. The Institute will, of course, provide hospitality at Rensselaerville, and will pay expenses of your trip to New York and your trip home from Rensselaerville.

In addition to Judge Jessup as chairman, we have asked Professor Richard N. Gardner of Columbia University's Law School, to be conference rapporteur. An outline he is preparing will serve as a basis for discussion. As in previous years, planning for the 1970 conference is going forward under the guidance of a special committee which includes UN Secretary-General U Thant; C. V. Narasimhan, Chef de Cabinet; Lord Caradon, Ambassador of the United Kingdom to the UN; Edvard Hambro, Norwegian Ambassador to the UN; and Chief Simeon Adebo, Executive Director of the UN Institute for Training and Research.

I hope very much that you can participate in the seminar. I know your contribution could be of very great value to us, and I believe the exchange between diplomats, scientists and scholars will prove useful to all who attend.

The Honorable C. V. Narasimhan

Page 2

Please let me know at your earliest convenience whether you can accept our invitation. I am enclosing a list of the other invitees, and a report of one of our earlier conferences. If you accept the invitation, more details will follow.

Sincerely,




Everett R. Clinchy
President

ERC:hb

Enclosures

February 5, 1970

THE INSTITUTE ON MAN AND SCIENCE / RENSSELAERVILLE, NEW YORK
PROGRAM OFFICE 325 EAST 41ST STREET, NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10017/ (212) 687-3650



Memo to Participants:

The Politics Of Disarmament -- Proposals For The 1970's

The enclosed materials are sent to you for background reading in connection with the Seminar at the UN and in Rensselaerville, New York May 22 - 24, 1970 when Judge Philip Jessup will preside, Professor Richard N. Gardner will serve as Rapporteur, and Secretary General U Thant will give the Keynote.

Everett R. Clinchy
The Institute On Man And Science

May 13, 1970

an Article from

**SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN**

JANUARY, 1970 VOL. 222, NO. 1

The Limitation of Strategic Arms

The long-term prospects for the strategic-arms-limitation talks would be greatly enhanced by an early agreement to ban further tests of multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV's)

by G. W. Rathjens and G. B. Kistiakowsky

The preliminary phase of the strategic-arms-limitation talks ("SALT") between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. was conducted in a convivial atmosphere and with a refreshing lack of familiar rhetoric. The road ahead for the negotiations nonetheless remains a steep and slippery one. The fact that the talks were delayed for as long as they were by both sides is not an encouraging sign. The initial unwillingness of the Russian leadership to negotiate because of the American involvement in Vietnam and the subsequent unwillingness of the American leadership to negotiate because of the Russian intervention in Czechoslovakia both reflect a failure to perceive the extraordinary and possibly fleeting nature of the opportunity presented at this particular juncture in the arms race and a failure to recognize that the strategic-arms confrontation can and should be largely decoupled from other sources of conflict between the two superpowers. More recent delays, first by the U.S. and then by the U.S.S.R., reinforce the view that on both sides there has been a fundamental failure in the ordering of priorities—a failure to recognize that the dangers to national security associated with arms-control agreements can be far less than those inherent in the ongoing arms race.

As the substantive phase of the arms talks is about to begin, it is still not obvious that policy-making circles of the two superpowers have consonant views about such basic questions as what ob-


jectives strategic forces serve, what relative roles offensive and defensive strategic forces play and what the desired effects of limitations on such forces are. If it should develop that there is no agreement on these points, it may not be possible to negotiate any meaningful limitation on strategic forces.

This article is written in the hope that by stimulating discussion of these questions the differences between the two powers may become more clearly understood and in time narrowed. Even if the talks fail to produce significant agreement, a better grasp of the issues involved will be in the ultimate interest of everyone.

A number of recent developments make the prospects for successful negotiations seem to be more favorable now than they might have been some years ago. Advances in the strategic reconnaissance capabilities of the superpowers (chiefly in the area of surveillance by artificial satellites) are steadily reducing the need for intrusive inspection to establish the degree of compliance with possible future agreements. Thus the thorny issue of verification may be less of a barrier to agreed arms limitation than it has been in the past. In addition the rapid growth of Russian offensive-missile forces has effectively erased a disparity with the U.S. that existed in the past, thereby making an arms-limitation agreement a more realistic possibility. Finally, there is the growing pop-

ular realization—at least in the U.S. and presumably also in the U.S.S.R.—that each side already has an enormous "over-kill" capacity with respect to the other, and that further escalation in strategic-force levels would entail tremendous costs and new dangers at a time when both countries are confronted with a host of other pressing demands on their resources.

Although these developments would seem to favor successful negotiations, they are possibly outweighed by developments on the other side of the ledger. The most troublesome items are two emerging technical capabilities: multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV's) and anti-ballistic-missile (ABM) defenses. It is frequently argued that the development and deployment of either (or particularly both) of these systems by one superpower could lead to a situation in which a decision to attempt a preemptive attack against the other's strategic forces might be considered rational. Indeed, some strategic planners contend that the threat is so great that offsetting actions must be started even before it is clear whether or not the adversary intends to acquire either a MIRV or an ABM capability. It is our belief that such arguments are largely fallacious and are made without real appreciation of the fact that a thermonuclear war between the superpowers, considering the vulnerability of the two societies, is a totally irrational policy choice. No combination of tactics and



weapons, offensive and defensive, could provide either power with sufficient assurance that at least a small fraction of its adversary's weapons would not be successfully delivered, thus inflicting in retaliation damage that would be clearly unacceptable.

We are confronted here, however, with a paradox that will haunt the rest of this discussion. Unilateral decisions regarding the development and procurement of strategic-weapons systems, and hence planning for arms-control negotiations, have been and will continue to be greatly influenced by a fundamentally simpleminded, although often exceedingly refined, form of military analysis. This approach, sometimes characterized as "worst-case analysis," invariably ascribes to one's adversary not only capabilities that one would not count on for one's own forces but also imputes to him a willingness to take risks that would seem insane if imputed to one's own political leadership. Thus the U.S. will react to Russian MIRV and ABM programs, and vice versa, whether or not national security demands it. Even if the reaction is totally irrational, it nonetheless becomes as much a part of reality as if the decision were genuinely required to preserve a stable strategic balance. We reluctantly accept the fact that in both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. policy will be influenced excessively by those military planners and their civilian allies who persist in behaving as if a thermonuclear war could be "won," and in asserting that responsible political leaders on the other side may initiate it on that assumption.

The development of a strategic nuclear capability by lesser powers, particularly China, seems also destined to complicate efforts to curtail the strategic-

STRATEGIC BALANCE between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. is shown at left in terms of the numbers of separately targetable strategic nuclear warheads already deployed and the numbers projected for 1975 if present plans to deploy multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV's) go into effect. The symbols indicate the means of delivery; the numbers give the actual total of deliverable warheads in each category. The scale at right suggests the enormous "overkill" capacity possessed by each side in either circumstance; it is calibrated in units of 250—a highly conservative estimate of the number of nuclear warheads required to devastate the 50 largest cities on each side. The chart includes only strategic (that is, intercontinental) nuclear warheads, not tactical or intermediate-range nuclear weapons.

arms race between the superpowers. Here there are essentially two problems. First, what was said earlier about the unacceptability of nuclear war between the superpowers may be less applicable to conflicts between emerging nuclear powers, because their political leadership will be less knowledgeable about the effects of nuclear warfare and because the nuclear stockpiles involved will, at least initially, not be large enough to ensure the destruction of entire societies. Thus, with proliferation, the probability of thermonuclear war is likely to increase, and the superpowers will have a real basis for concern about their becoming involved. Second, a phenomenon not unlike the much discussed action-reaction effects of ABM defenses and MIRV's is likely to come into play. Nuclear proliferation may complicate Russian-American efforts to curtail the strategic-arms race even more than the objective facts warrant, as each superpower overreacts not only to the development of new centers of nuclear power but also to the other's reaction to them.

In fact, the rising threat of nuclear proliferation is already increasing the pressure in the U.S. (and probably in the U.S.S.R.) to develop defenses that might be effective at least for a few years against emergent nuclear powers. The enthusiasts talk about neutralizing completely the effects of such developments; the realists propose measures aimed at reducing the damage that might be inflicted in the unlikely event of a nuclear attack by a smaller power. Unfortunately the capabilities that might prove effective, for instance an ABM system adequate to cope with first-generation Chinese missiles, would probably lead the other superpower to expand or qualitatively improve its strategic forces.

The other major considerations that will have a bearing on the prospects for SALT are domestic. As the failure of American policy in Southeast Asia and its implications become apparent, it seems likely that there will be a sharp reaction in an important segment of American society, with the polarization of attitudes proceeding even further than it has in the past year or two. It will be a difficult time for arms-control negotiations. Indeed, the strategic-arms-limitation talks are likely to be a divisive factor in the same way that the recent debate on the Safeguard ABM system was.

The situation in the U.S.S.R., although less clear, seems no more promising. The controversy between China and the U.S.S.R. might lead one to expect that accommodation and cooperation with

the West would be increasingly attractive to the Russian leadership. But that controversy, like the recent Russian difficulties in eastern Europe, is also likely to be a factor in reinforcing the trend toward orthodoxy and conservatism within the U.S.S.R., which is hardly a favorable augury for an arms-control agreement.

Thus for SALT to be successful will require not only that the two governments be sincere in approaching the talks but also that they be prepared to display leadership and steadfastness of purpose in dealing with domestic opposition. On both sides there will have to be a rejection of many of the premises on which military policy has been at least partially based for two decades, for example the importance of "superiority" in strategic strength, the concept of "winning" a thermonuclear war, and the view that one can build meaningful defenses against a thermonuclear attack. The leadership in each nation will be confronted with arguments about the great risks inherent in various kinds of agreement—barely feasible (or at least not provably unfeasible) developments that might be taken advantage of by an adversary. Such arguments will undoubtedly resemble those to which the Kennedy Administration had to respond, when in connection with the nuclear-test-ban treaty it was asserted that the U.S.S.R. might conduct nuclear tests behind the moon or behind the sun to our great disadvantage. If agreement is to be reached, such arguments will have to be judged for what they are: nightmares of people who have focused so narrowly on such problems that they simply lack the perspective for weighing the risks of agreement against the risks implicit in continuing the arms race without any agreed constraints.

In the case of the U.S. the President will have a special problem and a formidable challenge, perhaps the greatest faced by any American leader since President Wilson's effort at the end of World War I to gain acceptance for his views regarding the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations. Although most Americans, including probably a majority of those who supported President Nixon in his campaign for the Presidency, would support him in his efforts to reach an arms-control agreement, almost certainly the conservative wing of the President's political supporters will counsel him to exercise extreme caution in approaching SALT. In so doing this latter group will give unwarranted weight to the technical and military risks that might be involved in

any agreement under consideration. It is equally certain that the military will attempt to influence him with similar arguments, both through its direct channels and through its Congressional allies.

It is inconceivable that any meaningful agreement can be reached if the views of these groups should prevail. They need not, of course. Exercising broader judgment, the President can reject such advice and, as suggested above, draw on very substantial nationwide support for an agreement. Should he choose to do so, he will be in a better position to make his decision politically acceptable than would have been the case for any of his recent predecessors, or for that matter for his opponent in the last election. There is almost certainly a sizable segment of the American body politic that could accept a decision by President Nixon to conclude a very far-reaching agreement as a result of SALT that would not accept a similar position were it offered by, say, a liberal Democratic president.

President Nixon's prospects for such an achievement will be enhanced if the SALT negotiators make substantial progress in the next few months. With momentum established as a result of some limited agreement, and with the prospects of broader agreements before them, both the American and the Russian leadership might well make the judgment that it would be worthwhile to expend the political capital that might be required to effect broader agreements. If, on the other hand, the talks bog down in procedural discussions or in defense of obviously non-negotiable positions, the political leadership in both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. will be in a weakened position in dealing with those who are most skeptical and fearful of an agreement. Thus the importance of early limited agreement in connection with SALT cannot be overestimated.

In what areas might such limited agreement be immediately feasible? In order to answer this question we must first examine some of the technical realities of the present strategic balance. We believe that for the foreseeable future technological considerations will continue to make nuclear offensive forces dominant over nuclear defensive forces. In other words, we assert that, as has been the case since the initial deployment of thermonuclear weapons, it will be easier to destroy a technologically advanced society than to defend one. What can and should be done both in structuring strategic forces in the absence of agreement and in agreeing to limitations is critically

dependent on whether or not this judgment is correct. There is some dispute about its correctness in the U.S. For example, some assert that with recent developments in ABM technology it may be possible to offset the effects of an incremental expenditure on offensive capabilities by a similar or even lesser expenditure on defenses. Nonetheless, we share the prevailing view that defense of population, at least against a determined adversary with comparable resources, is essentially hopeless.

To facilitate discussion we shall now define two terms that have come to be applied to strategic forces and to their uses. By "damage limitation" we mean the prevention of damage to industry and population in a nuclear war or the reduction of such damage to below the levels that might be expected without the use of certain damage-limiting measures or systems. Antiaircraft or ABM defenses of cities would be categorized as being damage-limiting systems. The use of civil defense measures such as population shelters or evacuation of threatened cities would be regarded as damage-limiting measures. So would be attempts to limit the adversary's ability to inflict damage by preemptively attacking any component of his offensive strategic forces. By "assured destruction" we mean the destruction with high confidence of the adversary's society. Measures to achieve such destruction, or systems that might be used for the purpose, would be characterized as assured-destruction measures or systems. They include the use of offensive missiles and bombers against civilian targets, as distinguished from strictly military targets.

With these definitions we recast our earlier statement about the relative roles of offensive and defensive strategic weapons to assert: *In the superpower confrontation any attempt to build significant damage-limiting capabilities can be offset by changes in the adversary's assured-destruction capabilities.* To take a specific example, attempts to limit and reduce the damage to American society by deploying ABM defenses (including appropriate civil defense measures) can be offset by qualitative and quantitative improvements in the adversary's offensive capabilities at a cost to him certainly no greater than the cost of the damage-limiting measures taken. What is more, we believe that by and large such responses will occur, in spite of the fact that realistic security considerations do not necessarily require a response. Even a very large-scale and technically sophisticated American ABM system could not be counted on to prevent totally unac-

ceptable destruction in the U.S. by a Russian attack—even by an attack launched in retaliation after the Russian forces had already been preemptively struck. Such an American ABM system would in no way make our strategic forces more useful as political instruments, and hence no Russian response would really be required to preserve the effectiveness of the U.S.S.R.'s assured-destruction forces. Because of fear, conservatism and uncertainty, however, it seems a foregone conclusion that a fully compensating buildup in Russian strength would follow.

There may, of course, be circumstances in which damage-limiting efforts will be effective. Each of the superpowers would temporarily be able to maintain a strategic posture that might greatly limit the damage to it in a conflict with a lesser nuclear power such as China. This will be particularly true if a preemptive, or "counterforce," attack against the lesser power's strategic nuclear forces is not excluded.


Moreover, if a nuclear exchange between the two superpowers should ever occur, parts of the strategic forces in being at that time probably would be used for active defense or in attacks on the strategic forces of the opponent. Thus they would be used in a damage-limiting role. Their effect would not be great, however, simply because the overkill capacity of each superpower's assured-destruction capabilities is so enormous. Both superpowers almost certainly now have the ability to destroy at least half of the adversary's population and three-quarters of his industrial capacity in spite of any damage-limiting measures that might be undertaken by the other. This situation has come about as a result of two factors. A strategic doctrine has developed, at least in the U.S., that has called for the maintenance of a very great assured-destruction capability under all conceivable circumstances. The doctrine has been one that could be easily implemented simply because thermonuclear weapons and strategic delivery systems are cheap in terms of the damage they can inflict on civilian targets.

This tremendous buildup of offensive forces means that the effectiveness of the last weapons used in destroying another society (in fact, the effectiveness of something like the last 90 percent of all weapons used) would be relatively small, since those already expended would have left so little to destroy. The amount of life and property saved by damage-limiting efforts would be dwarfed by the amount destroyed by weapons whose delivery could not be prevented.

We believe this situation will not change significantly in the near future. Any realistic approach to limitations on strategic armaments in the near future must almost certainly be in the context of the maintenance of very great assured-destruction capabilities. Agreements that would embody quite different strategic balances might result if any of several changes were to occur: technological breakthroughs that would lead to the dominance of the defense over the offense, the development of a high degree of trust between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., the willingness of both nations to accept intrusive inspection, or an increased appreciation that strategic forces designed to inflict much lower damage levels would also serve effectively as a deterrent. We do not see any of these changes as short-term possibilities.

Because the assured-destruction, or damage-inflicting, capabilities of the two superpowers are so large and so varied, the present strategic balance is remarkably insensitive to either qualitative or quantitative changes in strategic forces. Even major changes in force levels, including the neutralization of entire systems (for example all bomber aircraft), would not be likely to have major effects on the damage levels one would expect each of the superpowers to suffer in a nuclear war. Worldwide radioactive fallout might be reduced significantly, but as far as the superpowers are concerned, cross-targeting with other systems would ensure that all major population and industrial centers would continue to be in jeopardy. When considered in the framework of the virtually certain collapse of an entire society, changes of a few percent in fatalities, which is all one might expect with foreseeable changes in strategic-force levels, are not likely to affect political decisions. Although it may have been correct some years ago to characterize the balance of terror as a "delicate" one, it is not so today, nor is it likely to be so in the foreseeable future. It will not be easily upset. Opponents of the Safeguard ABM decision have argued with some effect (although obviously not with complete success) that the U.S. deterrent was most unlikely to be in jeopardy at any time in the near future simply because of its diversity and because of the improbability of the U.S.S.R.'s being able to develop damage-limiting capabilities and tactics that would effectively neutralize all the deterrent's components.

We have argued so far that one general premise on whose acceptance a successful SALT outcome depends is



RELATIVE DESTRUCTIVENESS of several currently deployed thermonuclear weapons is illustrated here in relation to the damage caused by the nuclear bomb that was exploded over Hiroshima on May 8, 1945. The colored circles superposed on the map denote each weapon's "lethal area": the area within which the number of survivors equals the number of fatalities outside the circle. For a

perfectly uniform population distribution the lethal area times the population density gives the total number of people killed in the explosion. At present most of the strategic warheads deployed by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are in the megaton range or larger. Even after MIRVing all the strategic warheads on both sides will exceed the estimated 15-kiloton explosive yield of the Hiroshima bomb.

that the offense will continue to dominate the defense for the foreseeable future. A second technical generalization that may be equally important is: *The uncertainty about the effectiveness of damage-limiting capabilities will be considerably greater than about assured-destruction capabilities.* This statement can be supported by a number of arguments. First, the characteristics of the target against which assured-destruction capabilities would be used (population and industry) will be known with some precision and will change only slowly with time. On the other hand, the characteristics of the systems (and the environment) against which damage-limiting capabilities must operate (adversary's warheads, delivery vehicles and launch facilities) will be generally less well known and more susceptible to rapid variation, both in quality and in number, at the option of the adversary. Second, some of the damage-limiting systems (such as ABM defenses, antiaircraft defenses and under some circumstances antisubmarine warfare, or ASW, systems) must function at the time chosen by the adversary for his offensive, whereas for assured destruction there is


a much bigger "time window" during which performance will be acceptable. The effectiveness of submarine-launched missiles in destroying cities will not depend much on the instant of launch. Third, damage limitation generally will involve the use of more intimately coupled systems (for example the radars, computers and missiles of an ABM system), inviting the possibility of "catastrophic" technical failures. All these factors tend to make the advance estimates of the effectiveness of assured-destruction systems far more reliable than estimates of damage-limiting systems.

The inherent uncertainty in effectiveness that characterizes the performance of damage-limiting systems has been of profound importance in the Russian-American strategic-arms race. Each side has reacted to the development, or even the possible development, by the other of damage-limiting capabilities by greatly strengthening its offensive forces—to the point of overreaction because of the conservative assumption that the adversary's damage-limiting forces will be far more effective than they are in fact likely to be. For example, the uncertainty about the possible deployment and ef-

fectiveness of a large-scale Russian ABM defense has provided the primary rationale for the U.S. decision to introduce MIRV's into both land-based and sea-based missile forces, the net effect being a severalfold increase in the number of warheads these forces will be able to deliver. Barring unforeseeable technical developments, we must expect that the great uncertainty that characterizes the performance of damage-limiting systems will continue, and we must base our approach to SALT on that assumption.

If one accepts the judgments we have made about the relative effectiveness of defense and offense, about the insensitivity of assured-destruction capability to changes in force levels and about the uncertainty that characterizes damage-limiting efforts, one is led to some possibly useful generalizations about the forthcoming substantive phase of SALT.

First, the level of damage that each of the superpowers can inflict on the other is not likely to be altered significantly in the near future. Measures that might possibly be agreed on could change the level of damage that each side could inflict on the other by at most



FUTILITY of seeking to mitigate the consequences of a full-scale nuclear exchange between the two superpowers by negotiating modest reductions in strategic-force levels or by resorting to moderately effective "damage-limiting" measures is illustrated in this graph, in which the expected fatalities in the U.S.S.R. are plotted as a function of the number of U.S. megaton-range warheads de-

livered. The solid curve indicates the immediate, easily calculable fatalities; the shading represents the fact that the total fatalities would probably be much larger. In either case, because of the very large number of deployed weapons, the effects of small changes in the total of delivered weapons would be negligible. The expected effects of a Russian attack against the U.S. would be similar.

a few percent. Therefore the problem of the reduction in damage in the event of war should probably be given low priority as a short-term negotiation objective. More realistic objectives of the negotiations could be to lower the level of tension between the superpowers and so reduce the probability of nuclear war.

Second, apart from possible worldwide fallout effects and domestic political considerations, neither side need be much concerned about the possibility of modest, or even substantial, expansions in the strategic offensive forces of the other side, nor about precise limitations on those forces, as long as the other side does not have a damage-limiting capability. Because of the large overkill capacities discussed above, even large increases in strategic forces will have little military effect.

Third, measures to constrain the introduction or improvement of damage-limiting systems, particularly those whose performance is expected to be highly uncertain, merit high priority. The introduction or improvement of damage-limiting capabilities by either side is likely to result, as we have noted, in an excessive reaction by the other. Because of the insensitivity of the strategic balance to modest changes in force levels, a move toward the development of a narrowly circumscribed damage-limiting capability by one side could in principle be tolerated without undue concern by the other. Such a move might be perceived, however, as an indicator of the adversary's intent to develop an across-the-board damage-limiting capability. (Witness Secretary of Defense Goldwater's public reaction to a possible Soviet SS-9 MIRV capability.) This, coupled with the fact that a development of damage-limiting capabilities can be offset rather quickly and cheaply, virtually ensures a reaction. The overall effect of such an action-reaction cycle on the ability of each side to inflict damage on the other is likely to be small, but the expenditures of both sides on strategic armaments are likely to be much increased, as will be the tensions between them.

Fourth, owing to the large uncertainty that characterizes the effectiveness of damage-limiting systems and tactics, the two superpowers will face a very troublesome dilemma if, on the one hand, they try to develop effective damage-limiting capabilities with respect to emerging nuclear powers and, on the other, they attempt to limit the strategic arms race between themselves. With a few exceptions, such as a deployment of Russian intermediate-range ballistic mis-

siles (IRBM's) in Siberia, the measures that could have long-term effectiveness against a third country's nuclear strength would appear to the other superpower to foreshadow an erosion in its own assured-destruction, or deterrent, capability. This creates an authentic problem of conflicting desires. We would hope that in efforts to deal with this problem the usefulness of damage-limiting capabilities with respect to the lesser nuclear powers would not be overrated. Although such damage-limiting capabilities probably would be effective in reducing damage in the event that a lesser power attempted a nuclear attack against one of the superpowers, we question whether either superpower would ever be willing to take action against a lesser power on the assumption that damage-limiting efforts would be 100 percent effective, that is, on the assumption that "damage denial" with respect to a lesser power could be achieved. Considering one's inability to have high confidence in the effectiveness of damage-limiting measures, and considering the effects of even a single thermonuclear weapon on a large American or Russian city, we doubt that efforts to develop damage-limiting capabilities with respect to the smaller powers would materially increase the options the superpowers would have available for dealing with these powers.

With this background in mind one would be in a good position to evaluate the relative desirability of limiting various strategic systems if each were unambiguously useful only for damage limitation or assured destruction. Unfortunately many existing or prospective strategic systems may play several roles, a factor that greatly complicates the problem.

Of all the ambiguous developments now under way none is more troublesome than MIRV. The development of a MIRV capability may facilitate the maintenance of an assured-destruction capability by providing high assurance that ABM defenses of industry and population can be penetrated. Given sufficient accuracy, reliability and yield, however, MIRV's may also make it possible for a small number of missiles to destroy a larger number of fixed offensive facilities, even if they are "hardened" against the effects of nuclear weapons.

Although the effectiveness of a given missile force in a damage-limiting preemptive attack against an adversary's intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force might be much increased through

the use of such MIRV's, it does not necessarily follow that the deployment of the MIRV's would make such a strike more likely. As we have noted, in the context of a confrontation between superpowers such an attack would surely be irrational, no matter how severe the crisis, simply because no responsible political leader could ever have high confidence in the effectiveness of the attack and in the effectiveness of the other damage-limiting measures that would be required to keep the damage from a retaliatory response down to acceptable levels. Although MIRV's are not likely to have much actual effect on the willingness or ability of nations to use strategic nuclear forces to attain political objectives, we must accept the fact that arms policies will, to a substantial degree, be based on the assumption that they might be so used.

Beyond that, there is the problem of the impact of MIRV's on events if a crisis should ever escalate to the point where limited numbers of nuclear weapons will have been employed by the superpowers against each other. At some point in the process of escalation it is likely that one or both powers would initiate counterforce attacks against the other's remaining offensive forces. Such an attack would probably come earlier if one or both sides had counterforce-effective MIRV's than if neither did.

Because of what we regard as unwarranted, but nevertheless real, concern about MIRV's being used in a preemptive counterforce attack, and because of more legitimate concern that once a thermonuclear exchange has begun MIRV's may make further escalation more likely, MIRV development may well have a critical impact on the outcome of SALT, and for that matter on the force levels of the two sides independent of the talks. It is generally, although not universally, accepted that the tests of MIRV's have not yet gone far enough for one to have confidence that their reliability and accuracy would be sufficient to assure their effectiveness in a counterforce role against hardened ICBM's. On the other hand, the MIRV principle is now demonstrated, and the expectation is common that with perhaps the second generation of such systems, if not with the first, MIRV's will be effective as counterforce weapons.

If no constraints are put on the development of MIRV's, it is likely that each superpower will go ahead with such development and (in the case of the U.S. at least) an early deployment program. This will be regarded as particularly urgent if ABM deployment

continues, or even if there continues to be evidence of significant research and development that might later lead to ABM deployment. Assuming that MIRV programs do continue, each superpower will perceive in the other's deployment a possible threat to its fixed-base ICBM's and will react to counter that threat. The U.S. has already begun to do so in deciding to go ahead with an active ABM defense of Minuteman sites: the Safeguard program. Acceleration in the U.S.S.R.'s missile-launching submarine program and a possible mobile-ICBM program are plausible reactions to the U.S. MIRV programs.

We anticipate that in the absence of agreements the technological race will go much further. It seems likely that the arguments to "do something" about the vulnerability of fixed ICBM's will increase in tempo and will carry the day in both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Super-hardening alone will be perceived to be a losing game, considering how easily any moves in that direction could be offset by further improvements in missile accuracy. A defense of the Safeguard type will probably also be judged to be a losing proposition. A very heavy de-

fense with components specifically optimized for the defense of hardened ICBM's might be one response. There is likely to be even further reliance on mobile systems: missile-launching submarines, new strategic bombers and, in the case of the U.S.S.R., probably mobile ICBM's. It is conceivable that fixed ICBM's may be given up altogether, although the arguments we have advanced against the acceptability of attacking them preemptively would still be valid.


It is also likely in the absence of agreements that one or the other of the superpowers will deploy ABM systems that will provide more extensive and effective defense of population and industry than either the present Russian defenses around Moscow or the projected Phase II of Safeguard. Defense against a Chinese missile capability may be the rationale, but it is to be expected that the other superpower will respond to any such deployment both by emulation and by increasing its strategic offensive capabilities.

Whereas the strategic-forces budget of the U.S. now amounts to about \$9 billion per year (excluding some rather large items for nuclear warheads, re-

search and development, command and control, communications and intelligence activities), outlays for strategic systems could well double by the mid-1970's. Continuing large expenditures on strategic systems are probably also to be expected in the U.S.S.R.

As we have stated, there appears to be no basis for expecting SALT to lead to significant reductions in the assured-destruction capabilities of the superpowers. Therefore other objectives must command our attention. The most important objective is of course to reduce the probability that a thermonuclear exchange will ever take place.

The major factors affecting that probability are likely not to be simply technical but to be largely political. They involve the degree of tension that will exist between the superpowers based on international political considerations, on domestic politics in each country and in an important sense on the strategic-arms race itself. We believe that in contrast to some previous eras, when the motivations for continuing arms races were largely political and economic conflicts, the strategic-arms race now has a life of



PROJECTED EFFECTS associated with three possible outcomes of the strategic-arms-limitation talks are expressed in the graphs on these two pages in terms of the number of U.S. strategic offensive warheads (*left*) and the U.S. budget for strategic forces (*right*). With no agreement (*A*) the number of weapons and the strategic-forces budget are likely to grow with no obvious limit. A SALT agreement that included a prohibition on the development and de-

ployment of MIRV's (*B*) could lead to stability in strategic forces and a reduction in the budget to a level required to maintain them. With an agreement that did not constrain MIRV's (*C*) there would certainly be an increase in the strategic-forces budget for a few years as the composition of these forces changed, probably accompanied by the replacement of some fixed-base offensive missiles by mobile systems (either land-based or sea-based) or possibly by

its own. For instance, the strategic-weapons programs of each superpower are more dependent on the programs of the other than on the levels of tension between the two countries. If this race can be attenuated, it would have a number of effects that would result in a diminution of tensions and hence in a reduction in the risk of war. That is perhaps the major reason for the urgency of a serious SALT effort. Keeping budgets for strategic forces at low levels is desirable in its own right in that significant resources, both financial and intellectual, will be freed for more constructive purposes. More important, in the U.S. lower military budgets will diminish the role of what President Eisenhower termed the military-industrial complex: those who have a propensity for, and in some cases obviously a vested interest in, the acquisition of more armaments and in exciting and maintaining often unwarranted attitude of alarm and suspicion regarding an adversary's intentions. Lower military budgets in the U.S.S.R. would almost certainly have a similar desirable effect.


A poorly designed agreement could of course prove to be a vehicle for increas-

ing suspicion and tension. Venturing into the realm of unprovable value judgments, however, we assert that it is not beyond the wit of man to design agreements that would result in there being less objective cause for concern than if the strategic-arms race continues unabated. In general, it would seem that any understanding that slowed the rate of development and change of strategic systems would have an effect in the right direction.

Beyond affecting the probability of a nuclear exchange's beginning, one would like to see strategic forces structured so that there would be at least some possibility that, if an exchange started, it would not have to run its course. A necessary but of course not sufficient condition for this is that there be no particular advantage to be gained from precipitate launch of more nuclear weapons after a few have been dispatched. By this criterion vulnerable ICBM's would seem to be the quintessence of undesirability. If both sides have them, each will recognize that if they are withheld, they may be destroyed.


Whether or not MIRV development and deployment will be controlled may not be a question for the SALT negotiators to consider, because of the inability of one side or the other to decide in a timely fashion the position it wishes to take on the issue. The rate of MIRV development is so rapid that the question may thus be settled before the substantive phase of the talks is well advanced. If such development is still in doubt, however, either because the talks get to such substantive issues very quickly or because of a moratorium on MIRV testing, MIRV limitation should be an issue of the highest priority.

The arguments for preventing deployment of MIRV's advanced enough to be effective counterforce weapons are persuasive. They have been made at great length elsewhere (for example in public hearings before committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives). We simply summarize here by pointing out that if MIRV deployment is prevented, it may be possible to freeze the strategic balance at something approximating its present level. Most of the incentive to defend hardened ICBM's or to replace them with mobile systems will



"superhardening" and heavy specialized ABM defense of missile sites. Assuming under case C that a large-scale ABM defense of population is prohibited, there would be little military rationale for either side to acquire large additional numbers of offensive warheads. Nonetheless, the numbers might increase significantly with the implementation of present plans to deploy MIRV's. Future Russian strategic-forces levels would probably display

similar trends, but budget projections would differ somewhat. The Russian budget for strategic weapons is possibly at an unprecedentedly high level now, considering the present rapid rate of growth in their strategic systems. Thus in case B the drop in the strategic-forces budget for the U.S.S.R. might be sharper than for the U.S., and in the two other cases there would be a less pronounced increase. Estimates are in constant-value 1969 dollars.



DIMINISHING UTILITY OF fixed-base intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) as a component of the U.S. "assured-destruction" forces would result from further development and deployment of MIRV's, even in the event of a SALT agreement that freezes the number of missiles on both sides. In preparing this graph it was assumed that in a preemptive, or counterforce, strike against the U.S. the U.S.S.R. would target its SS-9 missile force (estimated to be frozen at 280 missiles) at the U.S. Minuteman-Titan force. The numbers of surviving U.S. ICBM's are based on the assumption that each SS-9 will carry one 25-megaton warhead in 1970, three five-megaton warheads in 1975, nine 500-kiloton warheads in 1980 and 25 50-kiloton warheads in 1985; delivery accuracies are assumed to improve by a factor of two every five years. Curve A assumes that no additional measures are taken to protect the already "hardened" U.S. ICBM force. Curve B assumes that the blast resistance of the ICBM sites is improved by "superhardening" so that by 1972 they can withstand three times the overpressure sustainable in 1970. Curve C assumes full operational capability (and a generous estimate of performance) of the Safeguard ABM system by 1978. It is apparent that neither superhardening nor active defense (unless many times more effective than Safeguard) is likely to extend the period of invulnerability for U.S. ICBM's by very much. (The number of surviving submarine-launched missiles is based on the assumption that a third of the Polaris-Poseidon force is destroyed in port by the Russian preemptive attack.)

have been reduced, if not eliminated.

The arguments for continuing MIRV testing and then deployment because MIRV's may someday be required to penetrate an adversary's ABM defenses are not convincing. There is little doubt that currently designed U.S. MIRV's could be deployed on a time scale short compared with that required for deployment of any significant Russian ABM defenses. Accordingly there is no need for any MIRV deployment pending firm evidence that the U.S.S.R. is beginning the construction of such defenses. And there is no need for further research and development tests unless a counterforce capability is intended. For similar reasons the U.S.S.R. should also abstain from further multiple-warhead tests and deployment, which it can do at no great risk to its security.

Essential to the survival of an agreement not to test MIRV's would be a prohibition of large-scale ABM deployment. If ABM systems were deployed, the pressures to deploy MIRV's and to test them frequently in order to maintain confidence in their reliability would be overwhelming. Furthermore, there would undoubtedly be great domestic pressures to develop and test more sophisticated penetration aids. Under such circumstances neither side could have any confidence that the other was not developing counterforce-effective MIRV's. An ABM freeze would be a logically required companion measure to any agreement prohibiting MIRV's.

Assuming that ABM deployment and MIRV testing are both frozen, the other important component of a strategic-arms-limitation agreement would be an understanding to maintain something like parity in ICBM-force levels by freezing these levels or preferably reducing them, and if necessary permitting replacement of fixed-base ICBM's by mobile systems whose levels could be verified by unilateral means. In the absence of such a measure there would be the possibility of one side's gaining such a superiority in missile strength that, with improved accuracies and even without MIRV's, would enable it to knock out a large fraction of its adversary's forces by delivering a counterforce attack against them. The reasons for concern about such a possibility have been identified above: the probability of arms-race escalation and the reduction in whatever small chance there may be of a nuclear exchange's being terminated short of running its suicidal course.

If the development of MIRV's that are perceived by the adversary to have counterforce capability cannot be pre-

vented (and we are pessimistic about preventing it), the relative importance of some of the measures discussed above will be changed materially. A prohibition on large-scale ABM deployment would still be desirable, but it would be less important; it would not in this case prevent the MIRV genie from escaping the bottle. Moreover, continuing development and deployment of MIRV's would make a large-scale ABM defense unattractive simply on cost-effectiveness grounds.

A provision permitting the replacement of fixed ICBM's by mobile systems would seem virtually unavoidable because of concern about the vulnerability of the ICBM's to counterforce attack. Indeed, in the interest of stabilizing arms at low levels, and to minimize concern about damage-limiting strikes, agreements could probably include measures that would enhance the viability of mobile systems. An area of agreement that would seem to merit serious consideration would be prohibition on certain improvements in antisubmarine warfare capabilities. Actually the possibility of breakthroughs in antisubmarine warfare is extremely remote. It is probable that through noise reduction, extension of missile range and other techniques the gap between ASW capability and the capability of the missile-launching submarine to escape detection and destruction will widen rather than narrow. Yet it seems likely from recent debate in the U.S. that the present American leadership, and presumably the leadership of the U.S.S.R. as well, would be reluctant to rely solely on a missile-launching submarine force for deterrence, given the possibility of further ASW development by its adversary. Constraints on ASW such as a limitation on the number of hunter-killer submarines would increase the acceptability to both sides of relying more heavily on missile-launching submarines for deterrence.

Similar arguments might be made for limitations on or curtailment of air defense. Such moves would seem less realistic on three counts. First, compliance with limitations on air-defense capabilities could probably not be verified with unilateral procedures as well as could limitations on ASW systems, or for that matter on ABM systems. Intelligence on short-range antiaircraft systems is likely to be poorer than on hunter-killer submarines, specialized ASW aircraft or large-sized components of ABM systems. Second, the overlap between tactical and strategic antiaircraft capabilities is con-

siderable, and neither superpower is likely to be willing to greatly reduce tactical antiaircraft capabilities in the context of SALT. ASW capabilities (except for destroyers) would, on the other hand, have little role other than attack against an adversary's missile-launching submarines. This is far truer now than it was a few years ago because the realization is more widespread that a major war involving large antishipping campaigns is extremely unlikely. Third, neither the U.S. nor the U.S.S.R. is likely to have enough confidence in bombers to rely much on them in a missile age even if air defenses are constrained, whereas both superpowers obviously are prepared to rely heavily on submarine-launched missiles.

Finally, if counterforce-effective MIRV's were a reality, and if as a consequence both sides were to place reliance very largely on mobile systems, additional offensive weapons on one side could not be used effectively to limit the other side's ability to retaliate. Considering this fact and the fact that since strategic-force levels are already at least an order of magnitude larger than is rationally required for deterrence, there would be little incentive for either side to acquire additional offensive capabilities. Also in this situation it would hardly matter if either side were to introduce new assured-destruction systems such as, for example, small mobile ICBM's that could not be easily counted.

Even this incomplete discussion shows that the strategic balance between the superpowers is likely to be very different depending on whether or not MIRV development and ABM deployment are allowed to continue. Both possibilities will have a serious impact on future strategic postures, but with respect to ABM deployment nothing much is going to happen overnight. Dealing with the issue of MIRV development, although perhaps no more important, is far more urgent. That is why it is the watershed issue for SALT. If counterforce-effective MIRV's (and large-scale ABM deployment) can be stopped, the present strategic balance of force levels may endure for some time. If such MIRV's are deployed, the balance will unavoidably change in qualitative ways. How large an escalation in the arms race will result will depend on whether agreement to constrain or cut back other strategic systems could still be negotiated.

We have attempted here to present an objective analysis of the prospects for various agreements to limit

strategic armaments. In so doing we are aware that many of our readers will be dismayed that our discussion has been in the context of each superpower's preserving the capability of destroying the other. This has been so not because we ourselves favor the continuing retention of huge stocks of thermonuclear weapons but because we have tried to be realistic. The distrust that exists between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. will induce both to preserve the capability of destroying the other; such a capability, as we have noted, is unfortunately easier to attain than an effective defense of one's own society, whether or not there are agreements on strategic armaments. Both superpowers will preserve this capability because they see it as the only effective deterrent to the war that neither wants or could win.

The most that can reasonably be expected of the forthcoming talks is a move toward a strategic balance where (1) uncertainties about the adversary are reduced and with them some of the tensions; (2) each side can inflict a level of damage on the other sufficient to destroy its society but neither feels a need to maintain a great overkill capability as a hedge against possible damage-limiting efforts by the other; (3) there will be an improved chance that a thermonuclear exchange, should one begin, would be terminated short of running its course, and (4) the levels of expenditure on strategic armaments are lower, so that larger fractions of the resources available to each society can be used for more constructive endeavors.

We believe that the realization of these objectives would be a tremendous accomplishment and one that is possible without the solution of the deep-seated political problems of the Russian-American confrontation. To go further will require dealing with those problems. We do not believe, however, that the superpowers can afford to delay attacking the strategic-arms race while trying to solve political differences. Regrettably the situation with respect to technical developments (MIRV's, ABM defenses and nuclear proliferation), and quite possibly with respect to domestic politics as well, will probably make strategic-arms-limitation negotiations less likely to be successful several years hence than now. Time is of the essence, and we write with a feeling of urgency. Although our tone is pessimistic, we do not despair. We are convinced that latent public support for an agreement could be exploited by effective political leadership on both sides to reverse the trends we have lived with for two decades.

2

THE INSTITUTE OF MAN AND SCIENCE
UNITED NATIONS SEMINAR ON THE POLITICS OF DISARMAMENT

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT BY
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DISARMAMENT IN THE '70'S

- Semantics and Politics. Disarmament and Arms Control.
- NPT and GCD
- A process of devaluation
- Power and the freezing of Power, 1945 and 1967.
Overkill and Over-overkill.
- Back to Resolution 1722 (XVI)
- Disarmament and Peace
- Challenge and Response

New York, 22 May 1970.

SEMANTICS AND POLITICS. DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL.

It might prove pertinent and useful to enquire and delve briefly into a problem of semantics, which may have a very direct bearing on a world problem of paramount importance, viz. the problem of Disarmament. We have made quite recently the point that, in the lexicon of the Super-Powers, the word "Disarmament" is being, slowly and gradually, superseded by the expression "arms control". Recent and current events have proved that, most unfortunately, this semantic approach is indicative of a new political attitude, on the part of the Super-Powers, as regards the problem of General and Complete Disarmament, and, consequently, the proceedings and scope of the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Since the inception of its work, in 1962, the Committee, under the name of the Eighteen-Nations Disarmament Committee, has found it advisable to concentrate a considerable part of its efforts and time on the pursuit of collateral measures, such as non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other measures of non-armament, such as the elaboration of a draft Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the sea-bed and the ocean floor. The records of the

Conference on Disarmament will show that, in pursuing the collateral, the Conference has lost track and sight of the essential, namely the negotiations which might lead to a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament under strict and effective international control, as recommended by Resolution 1722(XVI), which endorsed and ratified the Joint Statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations submitted on 20 September 1961 by the USSR and the United States of America.

NPT AND GCD.

Nothing could be more telling and more revealing, in this context, than the very terms of the over-heralded Non Proliferation Treaty. The Treaty is intended for a minimum initial period of twenty-five years, with the provision for extension for another twenty-five years. This is a clear indication of the fact that those who negotiate the Treaty proceeded on the assumption that, for all that long period, the problem of nuclear disarmament will not have received an adequate settlement and that mankind will hopefully coexist with weapons and devices which constantly threaten and jeopardize its own survival. This simple consideration makes it quite transparent that, at heart, we have despaired of Disarmament, just as we appear to have despaired of

of Peace.

A PROCESS OF DEVALUATION

As a matter of fact, we in the United Nations have become silent witnesses to a general and most alarming phenomenon of the progressive - or should we say regressive? - downgrading of the high objectives of the Organization. We appear to have despaired of the grand designs of Peace and Security and to be content to concentrate on the so-called "new tasks", such as the preservation of the environment, population, science and technology et coetera. Disarmament has faded away into "arms control" or "limitation of armaments". We dare no longer speak of Peace; we have toned down our ambitions to the point of being satisfied with "détente" or "relaxation of tensions". We dare no longer speak of "political settlements"; we aim at "cease-fires" and "armistices". We appear to have given up the search for collective security; we now speak of "security assurances". We live in a world where men perish daily in open warfare; yet we are preparing to comfort ourselves and the world with the fallacious notion that the United Nations has managed to preserve world peace in these last twenty-five years. What has happened in the

the effort towards Disarmament is really a reflection of the scaling-down of expectations in other areas. And all this process of downgrading and devaluation is being carried out in the name of realism, which, in diplomatic jargon, has come to mean the passive acceptance of Power as the only yardstick to gauge the acts of Men and the actions of nations.

POWER AND THE FREEZING OF POWER, OVERKILL AND OVER-OVERKILL.

The main reason why "disarmament" dissolved into "arms control" and "limitation of armament" lies in the fact that the two Super-Powers, in their current negotiations, do not aim at the suppression of Power as a valid means for the pursuit and attainment of political objectives but rather at a stabilization of Power on the basis of two arbitrary historical dates - 1945, year of the signing of the United Nations Charter, with its plank of Five Permanent Members, endowed with special rights and prerogatives, and 1967, deadline for nations to qualify as nuclear-weapon States, under the terms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The current SALT negotiations appear to be conducted on the premise that both Super-Powers will retain their "overkill" capability. It seems to be taken for granted that both Super-Powers are entitled to retain this capacity forever, or at least until doomsday.

The objective of the talks is reportedly to explore the possibility of negotiating the elimination of that amount of strategical weapons which may exceed and transcend the normal levels of overkill, or, in other words, the possibility of eliminating the over-overkill. However, we do not in any way minimize the importance of such SALT negotiations. We earnestly hope that they will bear fruit and ultimately be successful as a first step towards the limitation of nuclear armaments and as a landmark in the process of détente. Even if they are not decisive in the field of Disarmament, they may prove significant in the field of Peace and understanding among nations.

BACK TO RESOLUTION 1722(XVI)

If the effort in the Disarmament field is to amount to anything more significant than a mere endeavour towards the stabilization of power on the current levels of overkill, we should revert to the spirit of 1961, and to the terms of resolution 1722 (XVI) and of the "Joint Statement" of 20 September 1961. Arms control may, at best, be a stage of, but never a substitute for, Disarmament. It should be pointed out that the twenty-fourth Regular Session of the General Assembly had a strong reaction against the current semantic game and took a positive stand in favour of the pursuit of General and Complete Disarmament.

This was largely due to the efforts of Medium and Small nations, which felt called upon to set forth their views, thus preventing decisions on matters of disarmament from being left exclusively to the discretion of a co-chairmanship exercised by the two Super-Powers. By Resolution 2606(XXIV)E, the General Assembly declared the Decade of the 70's as a Disarmament Decade, called upon Governments to concentrate efforts towards the negotiation of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament under strict and effective international control and requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to resume its work as soon as possible "bearing in mind that the ultimate goal is General and Complete Disarmament".

The stand taken by the General Assembly on this matter is one of the high points of the last Regular Session, which contrary to a blatant pessimism in the press, may yet come to be considered a turning point in the life and history of the Organization, because of the more affirmative position of the Smaller States on the important matters of Peace, Security, Disarmament and Development.

It is imperative for the current proceedings of the CCD to reflect the directives clearly set forth by the General Assembly, lest we

come to the conclusion that the rulings of the two co-Chairmen are more cogent and binding than the decisions and recommendations of 126 Members of the community of nations. We are not contending that we should ignore the possibility and desirability of any effective measure of arms control. Our firm view is that any effort in this field should be inserted into the framework of the United Nations responsibility in the field of General and Complete Disarmament. That is why we hold to the opinion that the Super-Powers should make every effort to keep the CCD informed of the conduct of SALT negotiations. This could be done by the Co-Chairmen of the CCD, through the presentation of periodical progress reports, as often as political circumstances make it possible and desirable.

DISARMAMENT AND PEACE

We have stated in another forum that, compared to Disarmament, any other international problem is relatively simple to settle, since in any given settlement the Parties have a rough idea of what each is giving and taking, yielding and acquiring. And a solution reached today may be altered tomorrow if one Party keeps or is capable of developing the military means

adequate to secure a change in the status quo. World history has always been a reflection of the vicissitudes of Power and military force. In the field of Disarmament, however, any false step may be irreversible, since it strikes at the very roots of Power.

That is why we are convinced that we cannot successfully deal with this problem of Disarmament if we try to settle it in the abstract, i.e., detached from the problem of Peace and from the problem created by the prevalence of the use of Force in international affairs. Let us have the courage to face it: no significant progress will be achieved on this all pervasive question of Disarmament as long as Power and Force are used, in a free and unhampered manner, to foster and secure the settlement of political or territorial claims and objectives. No nation will disarm in the middle of a war and as long as the use of naked force pays dividends, defensive or offensive.

If the present trend continues, if Force continues to be used, the world arms race will be accelerated, and we may well achieve General and Complete Annihilation before we come to

anything resembling General and Complete Disarmament. It is a delusion to think that Disarmament can be negotiated on a battlefield.

CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE

We can reconcile ourselves neither to the idea of a "tolerable state of warfare" as a substitute for Peace, nor to the idea of a "tolerable arms race" as a substitute for Disarmament. If the challenge is so ominous as to coincide with the very survival of Mankind, we should respond with something more than "political realism", which implies the passive acceptance of Power. We should respond with imagination, creativeness and bold new ideas. And Disarmament is one of those bold new ideas, still untried and still not put to the test.

It will take a good deal of courage and determination to transform it into reality. But it cannot be argued with any degree of validity that it will take more courage to face Peace and Disarmament than to face War and ultimate Annihilation.

Luncheon: Mr. Narasimhan
Thurs. 21/V/70 38th

SG luncheon for Mr. Narasimhan, Thursday, 21 May 1970, 1.15 p.m., 38th floor

✓ cards sent 17.4.70 K

✓ Mr. Narasimhan

The Secretary-General

no ~~Chief Adebo~~ (previous engagement)

no ~~Dr. Dunche~~ (previous engagement)

no ~~Mr. de Seynes~~ (previous engagement)

✓ M. Djermakoye

✓ M. Gherab

✓ Mr. Hamid

✓ Mr. Hill

✓ Mr. Hoffman

✓ Dr. Hoo

no ~~Dr. Kutsakev~~ (away)

✓ Mr. Labouisse

no ~~Mr. Neseck~~ (away)

✓ Mr. Rolz-Bennett

no ~~Mr. Stark~~ (previous engagement)

✓ Mr. Stavropoulos

✓ Mr. Turner

no ~~Mr. Vaughan~~ (previous engagement)

Reception: Commission to
Study Organization of Peace
Wed. 20/V/70 Lib. Penthouse

Reception for the members of the
Commission to Study the Organization of Peace
Wednesday, May 20, 1970
6 to 7 p.m.
Library Penthouse

✓ Cards mailed 28/11/70

Members of the Commission

- ✓ Mr. Nelson Bengston (and Mrs.)
200 East 36th Street
New York, N.Y. 10016
- ✓ Mr. Donald Blaisdell (and Mrs.)
50 Morningside Drive
New York, N.Y. 10027
- ✓ Mr. Jacob Blaustein (and Mrs.)
The Blaustein Building
One North Charles Street
Baltimore, Maryland 21203
- NO ✓ Dr. Harrison Brown
2100 Pennsylvania Avenue
Room 214
Washington, D.C.
- ✓ Mr. John Carey (and Mrs.)
Coudert Brothers
200 Park Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10017
- 2/2 ✓ Mr. Benjamin V. Cohen
1727 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
- NO ✓ Mr. Norman Cousins (and Mrs.)
Saturday Review
380 Madison Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10017 *making a speech*
- NO ✓ Mr. Thomas Curtis
1609 Bolton Street
2/2 Baltimore, Maryland 21217
- ✓ Mr. Clark M. Eichelberger (and Mrs.)
139 East 33rd Street
New York, N.Y. 10016
- ✓ Dr. Luther H. Evans (and Mrs.)
Butler Library - Room 210
Columbia University
New York, N.Y. 10027

- ✓ Dr. Richard A. Falk
Center for Advanced Studies
2/2 Princeton, New Jersey *Dept. of Int. Law
Princeton U
Princeton, N.J.*
- ✓ Dr. Wolfgang Friedmann
Law School
Columbia University
New York, N.Y. 10027
- 2/2 ✓ Reverend Donald S. Harrington (and Mrs.)
Community Church of New York
40 East 35th Street
New York, N.Y. 10016
- NO ✓ Dr. Arthur W. Holcombe (and Mrs.)
The Kenilworth - Apt. 1404
2/2 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19144
- ✓ Mrs. Edward W. McVitty (and Mr.)
41 West 10th Street
New York, N.Y. 10011
- ✓ Dr. Gerard Mangone
Conwell Hall
Temple University
2/2 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19122
- ✓ Mr. Raymond D. Nasher (and Mrs.)
35th floor
Republic National Bank Tower
2/2 Dallas, Texas 75201
- ✓ Mr. Leslie Paffrath (and Mrs.)
The Johnson Foundation
33 East Four Mile Road
2/2 Racine, Wisconsin 53401
- ✓ Mr. Walter Reuther (and Mrs.)
Solidarity House
8000 East Jefferson
2/2 Detroit, Michigan 48214
- ✓ Mr. Philip Schaum
Bankers Trust Company
750 Third Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10017
- ✓ Mr. Hugh Moore
24th and Dixie
2/2 Easton, Pennsylvania 18042

Total: 108 (actual attendance 66)

Members of the Commission (continued)

✓ Dr. Louis B. Sohn (and Mrs.)
Apt. D-810
2440 Virginia Avenue, N.W.
212 Washington, D.C. 20037

✓ Dr. Richard N. Swift
72 Barrow Street
New York, N.Y.

✓ Dr. Quincy Wright (and Mrs.)
906 Fendal Terrace
212 Charlottesville, Virginia 22903

Commission Associates and Guests

✓ Mr. Malcolm Andresen
140 Broadway
New York, N.Y.

✓ Mr. and Mrs. Dana C. Backus
1158 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10028

✓ Mrs. Ruth Bishop
460 Park Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022

✓ Mr. and Mrs. John Briscoe
Silent Meadow Farm
212 Lakeville, Connecticut 06039

✓ Mr. and Mrs. Benjamin Bittenwieser
450 East 52 Street
New York, N.Y. 10022

✓ Miss Bonnie Cashin
866 United Nations Plaza
New York, N.Y. 10017

NO ✓ Mr. and Mrs. Arthur H. Dean
10 Gracie Square
New York, N.Y.

NO ✓ Mrs. Raymond Emerson
Estabrook Road
212 Concord, Massachusetts

✓ Mrs. Marshall Field
136 East 79th Street
NO New York, N.Y. 10021

✓ Mr. and Mrs. John French
144 East 38th Street
New York, N.Y. 10016

NO ✓ Mr. and Mrs. Robert Gilmore
39 West 11th Street
New York, N.Y.

NO ✓ Mr. and Mrs. Seth Glickenhau
100 Dorchester Road
212 Scarsdale, New York

NO ✓ Mrs. S.B. Grimson
203 East 72nd Street
New York, N.Y. 10021

412 ✓ Dr. Claude E. Hawley
5 Tudor City Place
New York, N.Y. 10017

✓ Mrs. Bess Horowitz
50 Riverside Drive
New York, N.Y.

✓ Mrs. Amie Joseph
60 Sutton Place South
New York, N.Y. 10022

✓ Mrs. Lucy B. Lemann
525 Park Avenue
New York, N.Y.

✓ Mr. Lawrence Mayers, Jr.
307 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y.

✓ Miss Myrna Loy
425 East 63rd Street
New York, N.Y. 10021

NO ✓ Mrs. Edward R. Murrow
Glen Alden Farm
212 Pawling, New York

✓ Mr. and Mrs. John Musser
260 Salem Church Road
212 St. Paul, Minnesota

NO ✓ Mrs. Maurice Pate
330 East 49th Street
New York, N.Y. 10017

✓ Mr. Andrew Norman
Chelsea House Publishers
70 West 40th Street
New York, N.Y.

✓ Mr. Miles Pennybacker
Box 306
212 Westport, Connecticut

✓ Mr. Charles H. Prange
10 Park Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10016

✓ Dr. James Read
The Charles F. Kettering Foundation
42 North Main Street
212 Dayton, Ohio 45402

✓ No Mr. and Mrs. Rodman Rockefeller
1 East 87th Street
New York, N.Y. 10028

✓ No Mr. and Mrs. John A. Roosevelt
430 East 57th Street
New York, N.Y. 10022

✓ Mr. Harvey C. Russell
Pepsico International
500 Park Avenue
New York, N.Y.

✓ Mr. and Mrs. William Scheinman
Mack, Bushnell & Edelman, Inc.
110 East 59th Street
New York, N.Y. 10022

✓ Dr. and Mrs. Hugh Smythe
345 Eighth Avenue
New York, N.Y.

✓ No Mrs. James P. Warburg
Bydale
212 Greenwich, Connecticut

✓ Mr. Peter Weiss
880 Third Avenue
New York, N.Y.

✓ Mr. ~~Walter~~ Wheeler, Jr.
Sound View Avenue
212 Stamford, Connecticut

✓ Mr. and Mrs. Robert Wiener
132 East 35th Street
New York, N.Y. 10016

✓ No Mr. George F. Sprague
Executive Director
Reader's Digest Foundation
212 Pleasantville, New York 10570

no ✓ Mr. Joseph C. Wilson (and Mrs.) (previous engagement)
1550 Clover Street
212 Rochester, New York 14610

no ✓ Mr. Henry Hunter
Olin Corporation
120 Long Ridge Road
212 Stamford, Connecticut 06905

no ✓ Representative Peter Frelinghuysen
House Office Building
212 Washington, D.C.

yes ✓ Mr. Earl D. Osborn
11 West 42nd Street
New York, N.Y.

no ✓ Mr. Victor Reuther
United Automobile Workers of America
1126 Sixteenth Street, N.W.
212 Washington, D.C.

no ✓ Mr. and Mrs. Arthur Lipper III
Hickory Hill
Sycamore Lane
212 White Plains, New York 10605

in Europe

✓ Mr. and Mrs. Whitney Young, Jr.
55 East 52nd Street
New York, N.Y. 10022

no ✓ Mr. and Mrs. William Strawbridge
Sycamore Lane
212 White Plains, New York 10605

(continued)

✓ Dr. Roger Revelle
Center for Population Studies
9 Bowdoin Street
212 Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

No ✓ Mr. Jacob Potofsky
15 Union Square
New York, New York

✓ Mr. York Langton
4425 Chowen Avenue South
212 Minneapolis, Minnesota 55410

X ✓ Mr. Douglas Fairbanks
Blackstone Hotel
No 50 East 58th Street
New York, New York

✓ Mr. and Mrs. John Branch
65 Broad Street
2 Rochester, New York 14614

✓ Mrs. Arthur Connerton
55 St. Paul Street
212 Rochester, New York

✓ Mr. and Mrs. Aaron Danzig
350 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10001

✓ Professor and Mrs. Richard N. Gardner
School of Law
Columbia University
New York, N.Y. 10027

✓ Dr. Thomas Frank
Center for International Studies
New York University
Washington Square
New York, N.Y. 10003

✓ Mr. Howard Effron
30 East 42nd Street
New York, N.Y. 10017

✓ Dr. Vernon Ferwerda
20 Brunswick Road
Troy, New York 12180

(continued)

Under/Assistant Secretaries-General:

- NO ✓ ~~Chief and Mrs. Adebo~~
✓ Dr. and Mrs. Bunche
- NO ✓ ~~Mr. and Mrs. Myer Cohen~~
✓ Mr. and Mrs. Rajendra Coomaraswamy
✓ M. de Seynes
✓ Mr. and Mrs. Djermakoye
✓ Mr. and Mrs. Gherab
✓ Mr. and Mrs. Hamid
- NO ✓ ~~Mr. and Mrs. Paul-Marc Henry~~
✓ Mr. and Mrs. Hill
✓ Mr. and Mrs. Hoffman
✓ Dr. Hoo
✓ Dr. and Mrs. Kutakov
- NO ✓ ~~Mr. and Mrs. Labouisse (away)~~
✓ Mr. and Mrs. Narasimhan
- NO ✓ ~~Mr. and Mrs. Nosek (away)~~
✓ Mr. and Mrs. Rolz-Bennett
✓ Mr. and Mrs. Stark
✓ Mr. and Mrs. Stavropoulos
✓ Mr. and Mrs. Turner
✓ Mr. and Mrs. Vaughan

The Secretary-General
✓ Mr. and Mrs. Korle

COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE

866 UNITED NATIONS PLAZA — NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10017

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ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE (1955-1964)
CLARK M. EICHELBERGER (1964-1968)
LOUIS B. SOHN (1968-1971, on leave 1970)

Telephone: (212) 688-4665
Cable Address: COSTORPE

Chairman Ad Interim (1970)

RICHARD N. SWIFT

April 27, 1970

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CLARK M. EICHELBERGER

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PHILLIP SCHAUM

Secretary

MARGARET OLSON


The Secretary-General to the
United Nations
United Nations
New York, New York 10017

Dear Mr. Secretary-General:

I cannot tell you how deeply we appreciate your extending the invitation for May 20th. I have given a suggested guest list to Mr. Lemieux which contains members of the Commission, its supporters and other internationally minded people whose interest we wish to enlist.

About the program, we had planned to speak briefly of the last two Reports of the Commission, particularly "The United Nations: The Next Twenty-five Years" which fits in so well with the plans for the observance of the twenty-fifth anniversary. Would it be possible for you to say a word of the significance of the anniversary, and possibly call on one of us, Luther Evans, Richard Swift or myself to speak briefly of the substance of our Report? We had not planned any other presentation or speeches.

Faithfully yours,


Clark M. Eichelberger

CME/sc

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COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE**

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Harris Wofford
Richard R. Wood
Quincy Wright

Mr. C. informed on 20/4
6.

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Secretary

MARGARET OLSON

Telephone: (212) 688-4665

Cable Address: COSTORPE

*What about my
giving them a reception on
the 22nd from 6 to 7.00 p.m.
on Wednesday, 20th May?
Pl. get the appropriate
number to be invited. *Lucien*
18/4*

April 15, 1970

Mr. Lucien Lemieux
Executive Office of the Secretary-General
United Nations
New York, New York 10017

Dear Mr. Lemieux:

When I saw the Secretary-General on March 23rd, he generously accepted our invitation to attend a reception given by the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace for some members of the Commission Associates and guests. I was to consult you as to the date as soon as we had some detailed arrangements made. I did not realize that you were going abroad with the Secretary-General.

The reception will last from five o'clock to seven o'clock, thus making it possible for the Secretary-General to come at five-thirty for a brief period. The reception will be at the home of Mrs. Maurice Pate, 330 East 49th Street. She has an attractive penthouse.

The Secretary-General said it would be convenient for him to attend a reception the first week of May, but inasmuch as more time had elapsed than anticipated, it would be easier to make the arrangements for the second or third week of May than the first week. Would it be possible for him to make one of the later dates? If not, we shall make the arrangements for the first week of May.

Because of the temptation of weekends in the country, it might be better to avoid Mondays or Fridays. The only date which I could not keep myself would be on Wednesday, May 13th, when I am delivering an address in Minneapolis. After we get the details set, I shall call you to talk over the details for the program. But I think the Secretary-General, from our conversation, understands that it is to discuss the two reports of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace this year; "The United Nations: The Next Twenty-five Years" and "The United Nations and the Bed of the Sea," both of which he is familiar.

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Waldor Chamberlin

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Urban G. Whitaker, Jr.

Francis O. Wilcox

Harris Wofford

Richard R. Wood

Quincy Wright

Mr. Lemieux


-2-

April 15, 1970

You know how grateful we are that the Secretary-General will be present.

With all best wishes,

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Clark M. Eichelberger", with a long, sweeping flourish extending to the right.

Clark M. Eichelberger

COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE

866 UNITED NATIONS PLAZA — NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10017

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RICHARD R. WOOD
QUINCY WRIGHT

May 14, 1970

Mrs. Estella Mira
Room 3800C
United Nations
New York, New York 10017

My dear Mrs. Mira:

Executive Director

CLARK M. EICHELBERGER

Treasurer

PHILLIP SCHAUM

Secretary

MARGARET OLSON

I would appreciate invitations being sent to
Mr. Howard Effron, 30 East 42nd Street, New York,
New York and Dr. Vernon Ferwerda, 20 Brunswick Road,
Troy, New York 12180.

Thank you very much,
Faithfully,

Clark M. Eichelberger
Clark M. Eichelberger

*listed on
p. 4 of list
ew.*

CME/sc

Members of the COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE

Honorary Members

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Telephone: (212) 688-4665

Cable Address: COSTORPE

Chairman Ad Interim (1970)

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May 7, 1970

Executive Committee

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URBAN G. WHITAKER, JR.
RICHARD R. WOOD
QUINCY WRIGHT

Executive Director

CLARK M. EICHELBERGER

Treasurer

PHILLIP SCHAUM

Secretary

MARGARET OLSON

Dear Mr. Lemieux:

If it is not an inconvenience, the following members of the Commission might receive invitations for May 20th:

✓ Mr. and Mrs. Aaron Danzig
350 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10001

✓ Professor and Mrs. Richard N. Gardner
School of Law
Columbia University
New York, N.Y. 10027

✓ Dr. Thomas Frank
Center for International Studies
New York University
Washington Square
New York, N.Y. 10003

Thank you very much.

Faithfully yours,

Clark M. Eichelberger
Clark M. Eichelberger

Mr. Lucien Lemieux
Office of the Secretary-General
United Nations
New York

*listed
on page 4
of list*

*R. Lemieux
8/4
Lucien
Eichelberger*

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Francis O. Wilcox
Harris Wofford
Richard R. Wood
Quincy Wright



To promote through education
support of the United Nations . . .

and a wider knowledge of the
need and means of securing peace

INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ORDER

and under its auspices The World Law Fund

ELEVEN WEST FORTY-SECOND STREET • NEW YORK, N. Y. 10036 • WISCONSIN 7-2723

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Executive Secretary

May 7, 1970

The Secretary-General
United Nations
New York, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Mr. Earl D. Osborn gratefully accepts your kind invitation
to attend the reception for members of the Commission to Study the
Organization of Peace on Wednesday, the 20th of May.

*noted
em*

Cordially yours,

Anita Kaye
Anita Kaye

STREET
Mr. Arthur N. Holcombe
The Kenilworth, Apt. 1404
Philadelphia, Pa. 19144
PENNSYLVANIA

May 5, 1970

Arthur N. Holcombe regrets
that he is unable to accept the
kind invitation of the Secretary-
General of the United Nations to
attend a reception on Wednesday May 20
at the Library Penthouse in New York City

Noted
em

Luncheon: U Hla Maung
Sun. 17/V/70 Riverdale

U and Mrs. Thant luncheon, Sunday, 17 May 1970, 1.00 p.m., Riverdale

✓ Cards mailed 7/17/70 em.

- ✓ U and Mrs. Hla Maung (222-7231)
- ✓ Mr. Kevin Hla Maung
- ✓ H.E. U Soe Tin and Mrs. Soe Tin
- ✓ H.E. U San Maung, Ambassador of the Union of Burma to the USA (card sent in care of H.E. U Soe Tin)
- ✓ U and Mrs. Shwe Mra
- ✓ U and Mrs. Richard Paw U
- ✓ Mr. and Mrs. Alain Y. Morvan
- ✓ U and Mrs. Thaung Lwin (Deputy Permanent Representative of Burma)
- ✓ Mr. and Mrs. James Barrington (211 Inwood Avenue, Upper Montclair, N.J. 07043 201 744-2368)

U and Mrs. Thant

Luncheon: Mr. Cousins
Mon. 11/V/70 38th

Luncheon given by the Secretary-General
on 11 May 1970

Mr. Fleisher

x

Mr. de Bynes x

x Mr. Volkmar

Mr. Cousins x


x The Secretary-General

Chief Adebo x

x Mr. Hollister

x

Mr. Muller



SG luncheon, Monday, 11 May 1970, 1.15 p.m., 38th floor

✓ Cards sent by hand 8/11/70

- ✓ Mr. Norman Cousins, Editor, Saturday Review
- ✓ Mr. John Volkmar, Associate Quaker Representative, Quaker UN Program,
345 East 46th Street
- ✓ Mr. Barrett Hollister, Director, Quaker UN Program
- ✓ Mr. Robert Fleisher, Senior Vice President, Ruder and Finn,
110 East 59th Street

The Secretary-General

no Dr. - Bunche

no Mr. - Roiz-Bennett

✓ M. de Seynes

✓ Chief Adebo

✓ Mr. Muller

Luncheon: Mr. Benjamin
Fri. 8/V/70 38th

Luncheon given by the Secretary-General
on 8 May 1970

Mr. Stark x

x Mr. Krim

Mr. Benjamin x

x The Secretary-General

Dr. Dunche x

x Miss Henderson



Steve

Krim

Bob

S.G.

Bernice

Julia



SG luncheon, Friday, 8 May 1970, 1.15 p.m., 38th floor

✓ cards sent by hand 4/11/70

- ✓ Mr. Robert S. Benjamin
- ✓ Mr. Arthur Krim

The Secretary-General

- ✓ Dr. Bunche
- ✓ Miss Henderson
- ✓ Mr. Stark

cc: George

Luncheon: Mr. Amjad Ali
Wed. 6/V/70 38th

Luncheon given by the Secretary-General
on 6 May 1970

Mr. Hamid x

x H.E. Mr. Shahi

H.E. Syed Anjad Ali x

x The Secretary-General

Mr. Turner x

x Mr. Osmany

windows

Hamid


Pak P.R.

A. Ali

S. G.

Turner.

A. S. 2 Pak.



SG luncheon, Wednesday, 6 May 1970, 1.15 p.m., 38th floor

✓ cards sent 28/IV/70

✓ H.E. Syed Amjad Ali (Chairman, Committee on Contributions - card sent
care of Miss Petersen, Room 3763, 28 April)

by hand ✓ H.E. Mr. Agha Shahi - Pakistan

✓ Mr. A.I. Osmany (Chairman, Board of Auditors, Room 1833)

The Secretary-General

no Dr. - Bunche

✓ Mr. Hamid

✓ Mr. Turner

cc: George

Luncheon: Amb. Oulid Daddah
Tues. 5/V/70 38th

4 May 1970

The Secretary-General's luncheon
to bid farewell to H.E. M. Abdallahi Ould Daddah
Tuesday, 5 May 1970, 1:15 p.m., 38th floor

	Mr. Muller x	Mr. Hildyard x	
M. Dahmouche	x		x Sr. Rolz-Bennett
Dr. Bunche	x		x H.E. M. Boye
H.E. M. Ghorra	x		x H.E. M. Kosciusko-Morizet
<u>H.E. M. Ould Daddah</u>	x		x <u>The Secretary-General</u>
H.E. Mr. Malik	x		x H.E. U Soe Tin
H.E. Mr. Farah	x		x H.E. Mr. Mojsov
H.E. Mr. Buffum	x		x Mr. Hamid
		x	
		Mr. Korle	

SG luncheon to bid farewell to His Excellency Monsieur Abdallahi Ould Daddah,
Tuesday, 5 May 1970, 1.15 p.m., 38th floor

*✓ Cards sent by hand 28/10/70
em.*

- ✓ H.E. M. Abdallahi Ould Daddah - Mauritania
- no ~~H.E. Mr. Charles W. Yest~~ --- USA (hosting luncheon)
- ✓ H.E. Mr. William B. Buffum - USA
- ✓ H.E. Mr. Y.A. Malik - USSR
- ✓ H.E. M. Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet - France
- no ~~H.E. Lord Caraden~~ --- UK (hosting luncheon) (Amb. Warner away)
- ✓ Mr. David H.T. Hildyard, C.M.G., D.F.C. - UK
- ✓ H.E. M. Ibrahima Boye - Senegal
- ✓ H.E. M. Edouard Ghorra - Lebanon
- ✓ H.E. Mr. Abdulrahim Abby Farah - Somalia
- ✓ Monsieur Amar Dahmouche - Algeria (Chargé d'Affaires)
- no ~~H.E. Mr. Milke Tarabanov~~ --- Bulgaria (away)
- ✓ H.E. U Soe Tin - Burma
- no ~~H.E. Mr. Sverker G. Astrom~~ --- Sweden (away)
- ✓ H.E. Mr. Lazar Mojsov - Yugoslavia

The Secretary-General

- ✓ Dr. Bunche
- no ~~Mr. Kutakov~~ (away)
- no ~~Mr. Djermakoye~~ (away)
- ✓ Mr. Rolz-Bennett
- ✓ Mr. Korle
- no ~~Mr. de-Seynes~~
- ✓ Mr. Hamid
- ✓ Mr. Muller

Luncheon: Mr. W. Inspeare
Thurs. 30/IV/70 38th

Luncheon given by the Secretary-General
on 30 April 1970

Mr. Jensen x

x Dr. Bunche


Mr. Winspeare x

x The Secretary-General

Mr. Urquhart x

x Mr. Liu

Windows.



Luncheon: PM of Denmark
Fri. 17/IV/70 38th

16 April 1970

SAK/md

Luncheon given by the Secretary-General
in honour of H.E. Mr. Hilmar Baunsgaard, Prime Minister of Denmark
on Friday, 17 April 1970

H.E. Mr. Warner Mr. Hansen Mr. Narasimhan
X X X

Dr. Kutakov X Mr. Hoffman

H.E. Mr. Fischer X H.E. Mr. Ogbu

H.E. Mr. Yost X H.E. Mr. Malik

H.E. Mr. Baunsgaard X The Secretary-General

H.E. M. Kosciusko-Morizet X H.E. Mr. Borch

Mr. Hambro X H.E. M. de Araujo Castro

Dr. Bunch X M. Djermakoye

X X X
M. Korle Mr. Melbin Mr. Jorgensen

PROGRAMME FOR THE VISIT OF H.E. MR. HILMAR BAUNSGAARD,
PRIME MINISTER OF DENMARK
TO THE UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS ON FRIDAY, 17 APRIL 1970

12:40 p.m. H.E. Mr. Hilmar Baunsgaard, Prime Minister of Denmark, accompanied by H.E. Mr. Otto Borch, Permanent Representative; the Permanent Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Permanent Under-Secretary of the Prime Minister's Office; Mr. Skjold Mellbin, Deputy Permanent Representative; and a member of the Permanent Mission, will arrive at the Secretariat Entrance where the Prime Minister and his party will be met by the Chief of Protocol, who will escort the Prime Minister by special elevator to the 38th floor.

12:45 p.m. The Secretary-General will meet the Prime Minister at the exit of the elevators on the 38th floor and will escort him to his office where they will have a private conversation.

Arrangements have been made to have the official photograph taken prior to the conversation.

1:15 p.m. At the conclusion of the conversation, the Secretary-General will escort the Prime Minister into his conference room on the 38th floor.

The Chief of Protocol will introduce the guests already assembled.

1:30 p.m. Luncheon will be served.

2:40 p.m. Luncheon will be concluded.

The Secretary-General will escort the Prime Minister and the members of his party to the elevators on the 38th floor where he will take leave of the party.

The Chief of Protocol will escort the Prime Minister and the members of his party down to the first floor.

2:45 p.m. The Prime Minister and the members of his party will leave Headquarters from the Secretariat Entrance.

✓
UNITED NATIONS

Press Services
Office of Public Information
United Nations, N.Y.

(FOR USE OF INFORMATION MEDIA — NOT AN OFFICIAL RECORD)

Note No. 3600
15 April 1970

NOTE TO CORRESPONDENTS

The Prime Minister of Denmark, Hilmar Baunsgaard, will pay an official visit to United Nations Headquarters on Friday, 17 April, and will be guest of honour at a luncheon given by the Secretary-General, U Thant.

The Prime Minister will arrive at the Secretariat entrance at 12:40 p.m., accompanied by Otto Borch, Permanent Representative of Denmark to the United Nations; Paul Fischer, the Permanent Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Eigil Joergensen, the Permanent Under-Secretary of the Prime Minister's Office, and Skjold Mellbin, Deputy Permanent Representative of Denmark.

The Prime Minister and his party will be met at the entrance by the United Nations Chief of Protocol, Sinan A. Korle, and will be met by the Secretary-General on the thirty-eighth floor. The two officials will hold a private conversation in the Secretary-General's office.

At 1:30 p.m., luncheon will be served to the Prime Minister and his party in the Secretary-General's thirty-eighth floor conference room. After the luncheon, the Prime Minister and his party will leave Headquarters from the Secretariat entrance at 2:45 p.m.

* * * * *

Reception: P. Casals
Fri. 17/IV/70 38th



MAESTRO PABLO CASALS AND MRS. CASALS visited Headquarters on 17 April to attend a reception given in their honour by the Secretary-General. The occasion was "Salud Casals" a benefit concert in which the Maestro conducted 100 celli in his own composition "La Sardana" at Philharmonic Hall; the UN International School and the American Symphony Orchestra's free concerts for children were the beneficiaries. On the same day, Dr. and Mrs. Murray Fuhrman (Mrs. Fuhrman is a member of the School's Board of Trustees) gave a luncheon for the Casals. Among the guests were Miss Julia Henderson, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of UNIS; Mr. R. K. Basu, Secretary of the Board; Mr. Desmond Cole, Director, UNIS; Mr. Leonardo Balada, Head of the UNIS Music Department; Mr. and Mrs. Albert Kahn (Mr. Kahn is the co-author of "Joys and Sorrows"); Mrs. Arthur Smadbeck, President of the Heckscher Foundation for Children; Mrs. John Loeb, NYC Commissioner to the UN. The photo at the left was taken prior to the luncheon. The one at the right was taken on the 38th floor; in the foreground, from the left, are: Maestro Casals, Mrs. Casals, U Thant and Maestro Leopold Stokowski, Founder and Director of the American Symphony Orchestra.

At the reception, Maestro Casals said: "It is for me a great pleasure and honour to be once more at the United Nations and in the company of my dear friend, Secretary-General Thant and his most esteemed colleagues. I have long believed that the United Nations represents the most important hope for peace on our troubled earth. I am sorrowfully mindful of the agonies that men and women and children are suffering in the jungles and villages of Viet-Nam and in the tortured areas of the Near East and in other parts of the world. I am conscious of the hunger, oppression and tyranny that continue to torment every continent. I grieve over the fact that, like savages, we fear our neighbours and that we arm against them and they arm against us. If we are to become accustomed to the fact that we are human beings, if we are to make meaningful the knowledge that love should not stop at the border, then indeed it is through the United Nations that we of all lands must act together to achieve a world in which we and our children will live in harmony and happiness.

"The thought of children in all their beauty and innocence is constantly with me, and it has had a special significance for me these last few days. The concert and exhibition with which I have been associated here in New York City have had as their goal the rendering of aid to the United Nations International School and to a series of free concerts for children. What nobler purpose could there be than that of bringing learning and music - and therefore joy - to many children of many nations. Children and young people are our greatest treasure. When we speak of them we speak of the future of the world. Together with the people of all lands we must work to protect that common treasure. And more than that. We must nurture that richness.

Pablo Casals

April 30, 1970.

His Excellency U Thant
Secretary General
United Nations
New York, New York.

Dear Mr. Secretary General,

Please excuse my delay in thanking you for the great honor you made me in offering me the friendly reception at the United Nations on April 17th. It was a memorable occasion that has meant so much to me ! Your generous words - which I do not pretend to deserve - moved me deeply; but most of all I am grateful for the friendship you have shown me. These enlightening encounters with great men, as you, make me feel, even more, my responsibility towards my fellow men.

I have followed your important activities throughout these years with great admiration. Your depth of insight, your discipline and dedication, your spirit and integrity and your concern for human dignity have always been evident in your leadership of the United Nations.

Please accept my heartiest wishes and my affection. May God Bless you !

In high esteem,

Pablo Casals

Pablo Casals

8
8/4/70



His Excellency U Thant
Secretary General
The United Nations
New York, N. Y.

PABLO CASALS
ISLA VERDE K2 H9
SANTURCE. PUERTO RICO

UNITED NATIONS

Press Services
Office of Public Information
United Nations, N.Y.

(FOR USE OF INFORMATION MEDIA -- NOT AN OFFICIAL RECORD)

Press Release M/1842
17 April 1970

STATEMENT BY PABLO CASALS AT RECEPTION GIVEN BY SECRETARY-GENERAL

Following is the text of a statement made by Pablo Casals at a reception given by the Secretary-General, U Thant, in his suite on the 38th floor of United Nations Headquarters at 11:30 a.m. on 17 April:

It is for me a great pleasure and honour to be once more at the United Nations and in the company of my dear friend, Secretary-General Thant and his most esteemed colleagues. I have long believed that the United Nations represents the most important hope for peace on our troubled earth. I am sorrowfully mindful of the agonies that men and women and children are suffering in the jungles and villages of Viet-Nam and in the tortured areas of the Near East and in other parts of the world. I am conscious of the hunger, oppression and tyranny that continue to torment every continent. I grieve over the fact that, like savages, we fear our neighbours and that we arm against them and they arm against us. If we are to become accustomed to the fact that we are human beings, if we are to make meaningful the knowledge that love should not stop at the border, then indeed it is through the United Nations that we of all lands must act together to achieve a world in which we and our children will live in harmony and happiness.

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(more)

Press Release M/1842
17 April 1970

Together with the people of all lands we must work to protect that common treasure. And more than that. We must nurture that richness.

In the book that I have recently concluded, Joys and Sorrows, I have expressed my feelings in these words: "Each second we live in a new and unique moment of the universe, a moment that never was before and will never be again. And what do we teach our children in school? We teach them that two and two make four, and that Paris is the capital of France. When will we also teach them what they are? We should say to each of them: Do you know what you are? You are a marvel. You are unique. In all of the world there is no other child exactly like you. In the millions of years that have passed there has never been another child like you. And look at your body -- what a wonder it is! your legs, your arms, your cunning fingers, the way you move! You may become a Shakespeare, a Michelangelo, a Beethoven. You have the capacity for anything. Yes, you are a marvel. And when you grow up, can you then harm another who is, like you, a marvel? You must cherish one another. You must work -- we all must work -- to make this world worthy of its children."

* *** *

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Office of Public Information
United Nations, N.Y.

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(more)

Press Release M/1842
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* *** *

27
UNITED NATIONS

Press Services
Office of Public Information
United Nations, N.Y.

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(more)

Press Release M/1842
17 April 1970

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* * * * *

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

TO: Mr. L. Lemieux
A: Office of the Secretary-General

DATE: 8 April 1970

REFERENCE: _____

THROUGH:
S/C DE:

FROM: Mrs. Murray Fuhrman, Member
DE: Board of Trustees, UNIS

SJF

SUBJECT: Reception for Pablo Casals.
OBJET: 17th April, 11:30 a.m.

The attached list of guests to be invited to the Reception honouring Pablo Casals is incomplete. However, Mr. Narasimhan suggested these invitations be sent now. When Maestro Casals gives me his personal list, I will immediately forward it to you.

All USG's & ASG's -

*38th floor list - Vlesorovski,
VM - Miller & V - right out -*

LIST FOR SECRETARY-GENERAL'S RECEPTION FOR PABLO CASALS, 17th APRIL, 11:30 a.m.:
38th floor

UNIS Board of Trustees:

- cards
sent
by
hand
10/11/70*
- ✓ Miss Julia Henderson, UN, Room 2527
- ✓ Mr. Bruce R. Turner, UN, Room 3727
- ✓ Mr. A. A. Stark, UN, Room 3721
- ✓ Mr. R. K. Basu, UN, Room 2545
- no* ✓ ~~Mr. Karl Erik Hansson, UN, Room 2325 (away)~~
- ✓ Dr. Paulina B. Fernandez: 73-27 178th St., Fresh Meadows, Queens 11366
- ✓ *EVAN MARTIN WITKOWSKI, alternate to ans. Berard*
~~H.E. M. Armand Berard, Permanent Representative of France to the U.N.~~
4 E. 79th St. *Permanent Mission of France*
New York, N.Y. 10021
- ✓ H.E. Dr. Wahbi El-Bouri, Permanent Representative of Libya to the U.N.
866 United Nations Plaza
New York, N. Y. 10017
- no* ✓ ~~H.E. Mr. Charles W. Yost, Permanent Representative of the United States to the U.N.~~
799 United Nations Plaza
New York, N. Y. 10017
- ✓ Mr. W. H. Ziehl *(3727C)*
~~United States Mission to the United Nations~~
~~799 United Nations Plaza~~
~~New York, N. Y. 10017~~
- away* ✓ ~~MR. TAKESHI NAITO~~
~~H.E. Mr. Senjin Tsuruoka, Permanent Representative of Japan to the U.N.~~
866 United Nations Plaza, 2nd floor
New York, N. Y. 10017
- ✓ Hon. Mr. Tore Tallroth, Consul General of Sweden
61 E. 64th St.
New York, N. Y. 10021
- ✓ H.E. Mr. Eugeniusz Kulaga, Permanent Representative of the Polish People's
Republic to the United Nations
9 East 66th St.
New York, N. Y. 10021
- no* ✓ Mr. William W. Cox, UN, Room 809
- ✓ ~~Mr. Paul Faber, UN, Room 2668 (away)~~
- ✓ ~~Mrs. Mary Elizabeth, UN, Room 820 (listed on p.2)~~
- ✓ Mr. Guy Gresford, UN, Room 3227
- ✓ Mrs. Derek Lovejoy: 166-04 81st Avenue, Jamaica, N. Y.
- by hand* ✓ Mr. Abraham Tamir, UN, Room 546
- ✓ Mr. Desmond Cole, Director, UNIS
418 E. 54th St.
New York, N. Y. 10022

(continued)

TOTAL: 87

SG reception
17 April 1970

2.

✓ cards mailed 9/14/70

- No* ✓ Mr. and Mrs. Joel I. Berson
180 East End Avenue
New York, N. Y. 10028
- ✓ Mr. and Mrs. Richard Coulson
940 Park Avenue
New York, N. Y. 10028
- ✓ Mrs. Cornelius Crane
9 East 79th Street
New York, N. Y. 10021
- Sp. del.* ✓ Mr. and Mrs. Arthur Hendrick
4639 Kenmore Drive NW
Washington, D. C.
- ✓ Mrs. Jane Bagley Lehman
941 Park Avenue
New York, N. Y. 10028
- ✓ Mr. and Mrs. David Tishman
930 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10028
- No* ✓ Mr. Stewart Mott
800 Park Avenue
New York, N. Y. 10021
- ✓ Mr. and Mrs. Ralph E. Ablon
778 Park Avenue
New York, N. Y. 10021
- No* ✓ Mrs. Werner Josten
944 Fifth Avenue
New York, N. Y. 10021
- ✓ Mr. and Mrs. C. Carter Walker, Jr.
925 Park Avenue
New York, N. Y. 10028
- ✓ Mr. and Mrs. Edwin Thorne, Jr.
1100 Park Avenue
New York, N. Y. 10028
- No* ✓ Mr. and Mrs. Reed Rubin
135 Central Park West
New York, N. Y. 10023
- ✓ Miss Christine Donovan
205 E. 77th Street
New York, N. Y. 10021
- ✓ Maestro Leopold Stokowski
1067 Fifth Avenue
New York, N. Y. 10028
- No* ✓ Mr. and Mrs. Samuel Rubin
9 East 64th Street
New York, N. Y. 10021
- ✓ Dr. and Mrs. Murray Fuhrman
115-18 Mayfair Road
Kew Gardens, N. Y. 11418
- ✓ Mr. Alvin Bernstein
Sperry & Hutchinson Foundation Inc.
The Sperry & Hutchinson Bldg.
330 Madison Avenue
New York, N. Y. 10017
- No* ✓ Mr. and Mrs. Hans von Brockhusen
300 East 33rd Street
Apartment 14J
New York, N.Y. 10016
- No* ✓ ^{*yes*} ~~Mr. and Mrs.~~ Arthur Smadbeck
52 Vanderbilt Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10017

(continued)

SG reception
17 April 1970

UNDER/ASSISTANT SECRETARIES-GENERAL:

✓ Cards sent 10/14/70

No ✓ ~~Chief Adabo (away)~~
✓ Dr. Bunche
✓ Mr. Myer Cohen
✓ Mr. Rajendra Coomaraswamy

No ✓ ~~M. de Seynes (away)~~
✓ M. Djermakoye
✓ M. Gherab
✓ Mr. Hamid
✓ M. Paul-Marc Henry

No ✓ ~~Mr. Hill (away)~~
✓ Mr. Hoffman

No ✓ ~~Dr. Hoo (away)~~
✓ Dr. Kutakov
✓ Mr. Labouisse
✓ Mr. Narasimhan
✓ Mr. Nosek

No ✓ ~~Mr. Rolz-Bennett~~

No ✓ ~~Mr. Stark (away)~~
✓ Mr. Stavropoulos
✓ Mr. Turner
✓ Mr. Vaughan

38th FLOOR:

✓ Mr. Lessiovski
✓ Mr. Muller
No ✓ ~~Mr. Urquhart~~

The Secretary-General

by hand ✓ Miss Angie E. Brooks (Roger Smith Hotel, Lexington Avenue at 47th Street)
✓ Mr. William Powell
✓ Mr. Ramses Nassif
✓ Mr. William Oatis, President of UNCA

(continued)

LIST FOR SECRETARY-GENERAL'S RECEPTION - 11:30 A.M., 17 APRIL 1970

GUESTS OF PABLO CASALS

(to be distributed by Mrs. Casals via Mrs. Fuhrman):

Maestro and Mrs. Pablo Casals

Dr. and Mrs. Jorge Acevedo

Dr. and Mrs. Carlos Collignon

Mr. and Mrs. Ricardo Betancourt

Mr. and Mrs. Louis Cueto Coll

Mr. and Mrs. Achilles Montenez

Mr. and Mrs. Enrico Jimeno

Miss Nora Press

Mr. Bartolome Bover (probably will not come)

Mr. and Mrs. Albert Kahn

Mrs. Isaac Stern

Mrs. John Loeb

(to be mailed):

✓ Mr. Eugene Isotomin

Mayflower Hotel

Central Park West and 61st Street

New York, N. Y.

✓ Dr. and Mrs. Luis Muñoz Marín

23 Pine Drive

Roosevelt, New Jersey

✓ Mr. and Mrs. Maurice Eisenberg

13 Cypress Street

Milburn, New Jersey

✓ Miss Millie Stamfield

13 Cypress Street

Milburn, New Jersey

✓ Mr. and Mrs. Herbert Kirk

233 East 69th Street

New York, N. Y. 10021

✓ Miss Cathy French

179 West Clinton Avenue

Bergenfield, New Jersey

*Cards
handed
to
Mrs. Fuhrman
13/14/70*

*Cards
mailed
Sp. delivery
13/14/70
em.*

No

unation 62456

wui 22 f ny 57 7 1924est ungovt=

etat

maestro pablo casals

isle verde

k2-h3 santurce 00913

sanjuan (puerto rico)=

many thanks your telegram 31 march. i am advancing time of
reception to 11.30 a.m. on 17 april to give us some time together.
hope this is convenient. look forward to receiving you 17 april.
warmest regards meanwhile=

u thant secretary-general united nations+

col k2-h3 00913 31 11.30 17 17+

SG reception at 11:30
1 Pri. 17/4/20
3800 fl.

343/70

RCA POSN 19 0

UNATION 222422/RDC6/KE

ZCZC PTU5952 RMB0371 PCY0397 300109 222422

URPW HL PTSJ 030

ANJUANPR 30 30 610PM

INDEXING
COPY
FILE NO.
ACTION
TO NARASIMHAN

LT

SECRETARY GENERAL U THANT UNITED NATIONS NEWYORKNY

GREATLY HONORED BY YOUR INVITATION ON APRIL 17TH I GRATEFULLY

CEPT LOOKING FORWARD TO BEING WITH YOU AGAIN CORDIALLY YOURS

PABLO CASALS

COLL LT 17TH

RCA POSN 19 @

UNATION 222422/RDC6/KE

ZCZC PTU5952 RMB0371 POY0397 300109 222422

URPW HL PTSJ 030

LANJUANPR 30 30 610PM

LT

SECRETARY GENERAL U THANT UNITED NATIONS NEWYORKNY

GREATLY HONORED BY YOUR INVITATION ON APRIL 17TH I GRATEFULLY

CEPT LOOKING FORWARD TO BEING WITH YOU AGAIN CORDIALLY YOURS

PABLO CASALS

cc

Mrs. A. Starks

Miss J. Henderson

Mrs. S. Furman

Mrs. L. Hennrich ✓

COLL LT 17TH

●VN/CC

cc: Mr. Narasimhan
Mr. Lemieux

20 March 1970

Dear Mr. Schwed,

Thank you for your very kind letter of March 17. I am most grateful to you for your thoughtfulness in sending me an advance copy of Pablo Casals' book "Joys and Sorrows". I am looking forward to reading it with the greatest interest. I am also hoping to be able to receive Maitre Casals at the United Nations on 17 April.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

U Thant

Mr. Peter Schwed
Publisher
Simon and Schuster
Rockefeller Center
630 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10020



PETER SCHWED
PUBLISHER

6

SIMON
AND
SCHUSTER

Rockefeller Center, 630 Fifth Avenue
New York, N. Y. 10020
Telephone 212 Circle 5-6400

March 17, 1970

Honorable U Thant
Secretary-General
United Nations
United Nations Headquarters
New York, New York 10017

Dear Mr. Thant:

At the suggestion of Leopold Stokowski, I am sending you the accompanying advance copy of Pablo Casals' book, JOYS AND SORROWS.

As one of the sponsors of the approaching Salud Casals Concert -- one purpose of which is, as you know, to commemorate the publication of Casals' first book - I think you will find it of special interest. I might say that we at Simon and Schuster are particularly proud to be the publishers of this book.

We'd very much appreciate hearing from you about the book if you care to give us a quote.

Sincerely yours,

Peter Schwed

PS:jd'a
enc.

11 March 1970

Dear Maestro Casals,

It is with the greatest pleasure that I learn from Mrs. Fuhrman that it may be possible for you to accept an invitation to a reception in your honour which I would like to have around 12 noon on Friday 17 April. I hope that you will be able to come and that you will be able to bring with you members of your family and of your personal party. If I could know their names I can arrange for invitations to be sent to them.

I am well aware of your dedication to the principles of international understanding and co-operation which are represented by the United Nations. It is therefore with great pleasure and eager anticipation that I look forward to receiving you here on 17 April.

I also wish you a very successful concert on the night of 15 April. It is a great pity that I will not be able to attend this concert as I am due to return only that night from Tokyo.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

U Thant

Maestro Pablo Casals
Isle Verde
R2-H3 Santurce 00913
San Juan, Puerto Rico

cc - Mr. Narasimhan
Mr. Stark
Miss Henderson
Mrs. Fuhrman
Mr. Lemieux ✓

6 March 1970

Mrs. Murray Fuhrman, Member
Board of Trustees, UNIS

Mr. Andrew A. Stark, Under-Secretary-
General for Administration and Management

C. V. Narasimhan, Chef de Cabinet

Reception for Pablo Casals

The Secretary-General gladly accepts the postponement of the reception for Maestro Casals to 17 April. We shall be writing to Maestro Casals shortly with a copy to you.

cc - Miss Henderson
Mr. Lemieux



INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

TO: Mr. C. V. Narasimhan
A: Chef de Cabinet

THROUGH: Mr. Andrew A. Stark, *AdS* Under-Secretary-General
S/C DE: for Administration and Management

FROM: Sylvia Howard Fuhrman, Member *Sfuhrman*
DE: Board of Trustees, UNIS

SUBJECT: Reception for Pablo Casals.
OBJET:

DATE: 5 March 1970

REFERENCE: _____

It was kind of you indeed to intercede on behalf of the United Nations International School in requesting the Secretary-General to invite Maestro Casals to a reception on 16 April.

I was informed a few minutes ago that the Maestro's physician forbids him to attend so soon after his performance late the night before. Maestro Casals therefore has respectfully requested that the reception be held at noon the following day, 17 April. If that is possible, he will be most pleased to change his plans and remain in New York an additional day.

If the change of date is suitable, we gratefully accept your gracious offer to arrange for a formal invitation from the Secretary-General to Maestro Casals.

CVY/nt

4 March 1970

Mrs. Murray Fuhrman
Development Office, UNIS

Mr. Andrew A. Stark, Under-Secretary-General
for Administration and Management

C. V. Narasimhan
Chef de Cabinet

*noted
5/13/70*

Reception for Pablo Casals

With regard to your memorandum dated 24 February on the above subject, the Secretary-General would be delighted to offer Maestro Casals a champagne reception on the thirty-eighth floor at 12 noon on Thursday 16 April. I hope that this will be convenient to the Maestro.

If it is your wish that the Secretary-General should address a formal invitation to Maestro Casals, I shall be glad to arrange for this.

cc - Miss Henderson
Mr. Lemieux

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

TO: Mr. C. V. Narasimhan, Chef de Cabinet
A: *AS*

THROUGH: Mr. A. A. Stark, Under-Secretary-General
S/C DE: for Administration and Management

FROM: Mrs. Murray Fuhrman *M. Fuhrman*
DE: Development Office, UNIS

SUBJECT: Reception for Pablo Casals
OBJET:

DATE: 24 February 1970

REFERENCE: _____

Thank you so much for your excellent advice when we spoke informally the other day about the "Salud Casals" benefit concert on 15 April.

In accordance with your suggestion, would you be good enough to use your good offices to ask the Secretary-General if he would be willing to invite Pablo Casals to a reception in his honour on 16 April at either 12 noon or any other hour that is convenient. It is estimated that there would be approximately fifty guests. Maestro Casals can be reached at:

Isle Verde
K2-H3 Santurce 00913
San Juan, Puerto Rico

Plans for the Benefit evening are proceeding very well indeed. Although the invitations have not yet been sent, there has been much enthusiasm, interest and even some ticket sales.

The border is a highly detailed woodcut-style illustration. At the top, a cherub holds a scroll with a checkmark. The left and right sides feature standing female figures, likely personifications of Music and Poetry, holding lyres and surrounded by fruit. The bottom section contains two cherubs playing lutes, a central oval medallion showing a seated figure at a desk, and another cherub playing a harp. The entire border is filled with intricate scrollwork and floral motifs.

SALUD CASALS



Each second we live in a new and unique moment of the universe, a moment that never was before and will never be again. And what do we teach our children in school? We teach them that two and two make four, and that Paris is the capital of France. When will we also teach them what they are? We should say to each of them: Do you know what you are? You are a marvel. You are unique. In all of the world there is no other child exactly like you. In the millions of years that have passed there has never been another child like you. And look at your body—what a wonder it is! your legs, your arms, your cunning fingers, the way you move! You may become a Shakespeare, a Michelangelo, a Beethoven. You have the capacity for anything. Yes, you are a marvel. And when you grow up, can you then harm another who is, like you, a marvel? You must cherish one another. You must work—we all must work—to make this world worthy of its children.

from *Joys and Sorrows, Reflections* by Pablo Casals, as told to Albert E. Kahn
(to be published in April 1970)

*For the benefit of
the American Symphony Free Concerts for Children
and the United Nations International School*

Proceeds from your participation in SALUD CASALS will be shared by the American Symphony Free Concerts for Children and the United Nations International School. They will ensure the continuation of this educational series of free concerts which has reached 325,000 public school children, and will enable the United Nations International School to accept many worthy students in need of scholarship assistance.

*In recognition of Pablo Casals' superlative artistry
and uncompromising humanism, we*

U THANT • LEOPOLD STOKOWSKI

ANSEL ADAMS • MARIAN ANDERSON • W. H. AUDEN • ROGER BALDWIN • SAMUEL BARBER
SIR JOHN BARBIROLLI • LEONARD BERNSTEIN • EUGENE CARSON BLAKE • NADIA BOULANGER
SIR ADRIAN BOULT • ANGIE BROOKS • ROBERT MCAFEE BROWN • RALPH BUNCHE
MARC CHAGALL • CHARLES CHAPLIN • SIR KENNETH CLARK • HENRY STEELE COMMAGER
AARON COPLAND • NORMAN COUSINS • RALPH ELLISON • FEDERICO FELLINI • LUIS A. FERRE
MARGOT FONTEYN • CHRISTOPHER FRY • BUCKMINSTER FULLER • SIR JOHN GIELGUD
ROBERT GRAVES • LILLIAN HELLMAN • ABRAHAM HESCHEL • THOR HEYERDAHL
MIECZYSLAW HORSZOWSKI • PETER L. KAPITZA • YOUSEF KARSH • ROCKWELL KENT
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ALICE ROOSEVELT LONGWORTH • ARCHIBALD MACLEISH • NORMAN MAILER
LUIS MUÑOZ MARIN • PETER MENNIN • YEHUDI MENUHIN • HENRY MOORE
ALBERTO MORAVIA • SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON • LEWIS MUMFORD • PABLO NERUDA
ALWIN NIKOLAIS • DAVID OISTRAKH • GEORGIA O'KEEFFE • MRS. GEORGE ORWELL
GREGOR PIATIGORSKY • JEAN RENOIR • RICHARD RODGERS • ANDRÉS SEGOVIA
ALEXANDER SCHNEIDER • DMITRI SHOSTAKOVICH • C. P. SNOW • EDWARD STEICHEN
ISAAC STERN • GEORGE SZELL • VIRGIL THOMSON • JULIO ALVAREZ DEL VAYO • ROY WILKINS

cordially invite you to

SALUD CASALS

A Concert by the American Symphony Orchestra

LEOPOLD STOKOWSKI, *conducting*

BEVERLY SILLS, *soprano* • RUDOLF SERKIN, *pianist*

PROGRAM

BEETHOVEN	Leonore Overture No. 3
ROSSINI, BELLINI, DONIZETTI	Arias
	Beverly Sills, <i>soprano</i>
BACH	Toccat and Fugue in D minor
BEETHOVEN	Piano Concerto No. 5
	Rudolf Serkin, <i>pianist</i>
CASALS	O Vos Omnes
CASALS	Sardana

Maestro Casals has graciously consented to conduct
100 invited 'cellists in this performance

*the fifteenth of April, nineteen hundred seventy
Wednesday evening, eight o'clock
Philharmonic Hall, New York*

PLEASE RESPOND. CARD ENCLOSED

BLACK TIE SUGGESTED

"Friends of Pablo Casals"

Mr. & Mrs. Ralph E. Ablon
Mr. & Mrs. Joel I. Berson
Mr. & Mrs. Richard Coulson
Mrs. Cornelius Crane
Mrs. Henry Ford II
Dr. & Mrs. Murray Fuhrman

Mr. & Mrs. Skitch Henderson
Mrs. Arthur Hendrick
Mrs. Edward M. Kennedy
Mr. & Mrs. John E. Kilgore, Jr.
Mrs. Albert D. Lasker
Mrs. Jane Bagley Lehman

Mr. Stewart R. Mott
Mrs. Aristotle Onassis
Mr. & Mrs. Samuel Rubin
Mr. & Mrs. Jack Rudin
Mr. & Mrs. David Tishman
Miss Alice Tully

Mrs. Lydia Bickford
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Mrs. William T. Copper
Arnold de Vignier Copper
Mrs. Georgina D. Childs
Mrs. Zita Davisson
Princess Diane R. Eristavi
Mr. & Mrs. Norris Harkness
Hon. & Mrs. August Heckscher
Mr. & Mrs. Hans Hoffmann
Mrs. Werner Josten
Mr. & Mrs. Harvey Karp
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Mrs. Dorothy Parker
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Mr. & Mrs. George Washburn
Mr. & Mrs. Stanley Weintraub
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Mr. & Mrs. Charles S. Bullock, Jr.
Mr. & Mrs. William T. Comfort
Miss Christine Donovan

Mr. & Mrs. Robert Bruce Gimbel
Mrs. James L. Goldman
Mr. Charles Livingston Grimes
Dr. & Mrs. William Hamilton
Mr. & Mrs. James Harpel

Mr. & Mrs. Hal B. Howard
Mr. & Mrs. Alexis Ladas
Mr. & Mrs. Kermit Roosevelt, Jr.
Mr. & Mrs. A. Albert Sack

1

The exhibition, "Century of Casals," at The Juilliard School will mark the establishment of a collection of memorabilia concerning Maestro Casals and photographs of Casals by Albert E. Kahn.

1

SALUD CASALS Donors and Patrons will be invited to the opening of the exhibition and a reception in honor of Pablo Casals immediately following the concert.

SALUD CASALS

200 West 57th Street, Suite 1408, New York, N.Y. 10019 tel.: (212) 581-1640

SALUD CASALS

200 West 57th Street

Suite 1408

New York, N.Y. 10019

SALUD CASALS

*A Benefit for the American Symphony Free Concerts for Children
and the United Nations International School*

Wednesday evening, April 15, 1970 at 8:00, Philharmonic Hall

Please accept my order for:

<i>Number of Seats</i>		<i>Total Benefit Price</i>	<i>Tax Deductible Contribution</i>	<i>Box Office Price</i>
.....	Orchestra; Loge Arms	\$125.00	\$115.00	\$10.00
.....	Orchestra; Loge; 1st Terrace Arms	75.00	67.50	7.50
.....	Orchestra; Loge; 1st Terrace	50.00	44.00	6.00
.....	Orchestra; 1st Terrace; 2nd Terrace Arms	25.00	20.00	5.00

Preferred location..... Second choice.....

I enclose my check in the amount of \$.....

Name.....

Address..... City.....

State..... Zip..... Telephone.....

☐ I cannot attend, but wish to support Salud Casals. I enclose my contribution of \$.....
(tax deductible)

Seats will be allocated in the order in which reservations are received.

Kindly make checks payable to SALUD CASALS and enclose a self-addressed stamped envelope with your order.

SALUD CASALS 200 West 77 Street, Suite 1408, New York, N.Y. 10019 tel. (212) 581-1640

Reception: Japanese and
Philippine correspondents
Mon. 6/IV/70 38th

19 March 1970

Reception given by the Secretary-General on Monday, 6 April 1970, at 5 p.m., 38th floor

Japanese Correspondents

✓ cards sent 26/4/70
em.

✓ Risuke Hayashi	Asahi Shimbun	98-30 57th Avenue Apt. 4-L Lefrak City, N.Y. 11368 Tel: 271-5433
✓ Toyo Tanaka	Asahi Shimbun	104-40 Queens Boulevard Apt. 2-D Forest Hills, N.Y.
✓ Chuichi Yone	Jiji Tsushin	Beaux Arts Hotel Room K-South 310 East 44th Street New York, N.Y. 10017 Tel: MU9-3800
✓ Kuniiji Oguro	Jiji Tsushin	c/o Jiji Press 660 First Avenue New York, N.Y. 10016 Tel: MU4-2580
✓ Michiomi Suwabe	Kyodo Tsushin	133-22 Blossom Avenue Flushing, N.Y. 11355 Tel: 762-0033
✓ Ichiro Saida	Kyodo Tsushin	Room 522 Associated Press Building Rockefeller Plaza New York, N.Y. 10020 Tel: JU6-0152
✓ Isao Hirano	Mainichi Shimbun	46-22 Union Street Flushing, N.Y. 11355 Tel: 762-4338
✓ Hajime Seki	Mainichi Shimbun	100 River Road Cos Cob, Conn. 06807 Tel: (203)661-4565
✓ Hisao Yoshimura	Nihon Keizai Shimbun	53-11 90th Street Apt. 7H Elmhurst, N.Y. 11373 Tel: 592-7661
✓ Sho Onodera	Sankei Shimbun Nihon Kogyo Shimbun	605 West 111th Street New York, N.Y. 10025 Tel: UN5-8904

/.....

TOTAL: 46

✓	Shinsuke Yoshimura	Tokyo Shimbun Chubu Nippon Shimbun	144-70 41st Avenue Apt. 1K Flushing, N.Y. 11355 Tel: 353-5197
✓	Akitaka Hirata	Yomiuri Shimbun	51-33 Codwise Place Elmhurst, N.Y. 11373 Tel: 457-8969
✓	Tatsuji Ogane	Yomiuri Shimbun	Room 532 50 Rockefeller Plaza New York, N.Y. 10020 Tel: JU2-5827
✓	Koji Yagi	Chubu Nippon Hoso	Room 8-K 225 East 63rd Street New York, N.Y. 10021 Tel: 593-1822
✓	Motoyuki Ariizumi	Fuji Telecasting Co.	57-22 Van Doren Street Corona, New York 11368 Tel: 592-3582
No	✓ Atsushi Nagatsuma (left for Japan)	Mainichi Broadcasting System	61-10 Alderton Street Rego Park, N.Y. 11374 Tel: 478-7805
No	✓ Kin-ya Takanashi (away)	Mainichi Broadcasting System	41-67 Judge Street Elmhurst, N.Y. 11373 Tel: 672-4092
✓	Kazuto Yoshida	N.H.K.	Room 350 Graybar Building 420 Lexington Avenue New York, N.Y. 10017 Tel: MU2-6280
✓	Takashi Suetsune	N.H.K.	108-50 62nd Drive Apt. 2B North Forest Hills, N.Y. 11375 Tel: 275-8821
No	✓ Yasubumi Hiyoshi	N.E.T. Television	420 East 72nd Street New York, N.Y. 10021 Tel: 249-9273
✓	Kazuo Gomi	Nippon Television Network Corp (NTV)	500 East 77th Street Apt. 3115 New York, N.Y. 10021 Tel: 249-7415

✓ Tadayuki Matsumura	Nippon Television Network Corp (NTV)	370 East 76th Street Apt. B-306 New York, N.Y. 10021 Tel: 249-1950
✓ Yasuo Aomi	Tokyo Hoso	102-30 66th Road Apt. 24D Forest Hills, N.Y. 11375 Tel: 897-7857
✓ Hideo Masuko	Tokyo Hoso	181 East 73rd Street Apt. 10-B New York, N.Y. 10021 Tel: 861-8176

Philippino Correspondent

✓ Libertito Pelayo	Manila Times	83-45 Vietor Avenue Amhurst, N.Y. 11373
--------------------	--------------	--

Permanent Mission of the Philippines

By hand

✓	H.E. Mr. Privado G. Jimenez, Deputy Permanent Representative
✓	H.E. Mr. <u>Emilio D. Bejasa</u> , Deputy Permanent Representative
✓	Mr. Alejandro D. Yango, Minister
✓	Mr. Iluminado G. Torres, Minister

Permanent Mission of Japan:

By hand

no ✓	H.E. Mr. Senjin Tsuruoka, Permanent Representative
no ✓	H.E. Mr. Isao Abe, Deputy Permanent Representative (in Geneva)
✓	Mr. Takeshi Naito, Counsellor
✓	Mr. Hideo Kagami, Counsellor
✓	Mr. Nagao Yoshida, Minister
✓	The Honourable Pacifico Evangelista, Consul General of the Philippines (15 E. 66th St.)
✓	The Honourable Hiroshi Ushida, Consul General of Japan (235 East 42nd Street)

/.....

The Secretary-General

- ✓ Dr. Bunche
- ✓ Mr. Rolz-Bennett
- ✓ Mr. Narasimhan
- ✓ Mr. Urquhart
- ✓ Mr. Muller
- ✓ Mr. Lessiovski
- ✓ Mrs. Bautista
- no ✓ ~~Mr. Akashi~~
- ✓ Mr. Hamid
- ✓ Mr. d'Arcy
- no ✓ ~~Mr. Obhrai~~ (away)
- ✓ Mr. Pavlichenko
- ✓ Mr. Powell
- ✓ Mr. Nassif
- ✓ Mr. Ortiz-Tinoco
- ✓ Mr. Oatis (President of UNCA)

46

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

TO: Mr. C.V. Narasimhan
A: Chef de Cabinet

DATE: 19 March 1970

THROUGH:
S/C DE:

REFERENCE: _____

FROM: Y. Akashi *Akashi*
DE:

SUBJECT: Reception in connexion with the Secretary-General's
OBJET: visit to the Far East

Please find attached a list of the names of Japanese ✓
correspondents as well as that of a Philippino correspondent
residing in New York who might be invited to the reception
to be given by the Secretary-General on 6 April at 5.00 p.m.

In reality there is not a single Philippino ✓
accredited to the United Nations, but the name of a corres-
pondent associated with the Manila Times was given to me
through Ambassador Jimenez.

With regard to Japanese correspondents, there are
actually about twice as many as those listed. After consulta-
tion with some of them I have extracted the heads of New York
branches of each newspaper, television or broadcasting company
and, where applicable, the ones assigned particularly to the
United Nations.

In addition to the above, the Secretary-General may wish ✓
to invite at least the Permanent Representatives of the Philippines
and Japan ✓ and their Deputies. In the case of Japan, it might
be suggested that, if possible, the number three and number four,
Mr. Naito and Mr. Kagami, who have been in charge of the
Secretary-General's visit to Japan, might be invited. The
same consideration may apply of course to the Philippine Mission.

✓ The Consuls-General of the two countries may also be invited.

Please add : ✓ Ralph

✓ Jose

✓ C.V.

✓ Brian

✓ Miller

✓ Victor

✓ Mrs. Batista

NO ✓ Akashin

✓ Hamid

Three Directors of OPI

✓ Bill Pined

✓ Ramon

867 ✓ Caesar Otis (OPI)

452 ✓ Bill Otis (UNICA) *Thayer*

11/4/70

✓ J'arcy
✓ Oburai 1027
✓ PAULICHENKO 1037

1061

Luncheon: Amb. Csatorday
Fri. 3/IV/70 38th

2 April 1970

The Secretary-General's luncheon
to bid farewell to H.E. Mr. Károly Csatorday
Friday, 3 April 1970, 1:15 p.m., 38th floor

Q/14

Sr. Rolz-Bennett

Dr. Bunche	x	x H.E. Mr. Hambro
H.E. Mr. Ogbu	x	x H.E. Mr. Yost
H.E. Lord Caradon	x	x H.E. Mr. Jakobson
<u>H.E. Mr. Csatorday</u>	X	X <u>The Secretary-General</u>
H.E. M. Kosciusko-Morizet	x	x H.E. Mr. Malik
H. Mr. Tarabanov	x	x H.E. Mr. Sen
Mr. Nosek	x	x H.E. Sr. Solano Lopez

x
Mr. Korle

SG luncheon to bid farewell to H.E. Mr. Károly Csatorday,
Friday, 3 April 1970, 1.15 p.m., 38th floor

*Cards sent by hand 24/IV/70
em.*

- ✓ H.E. Mr. Károly Csatorday - Hungary
- ✓ H.E. Mr. Y.A. Malik - USSR
- ✓ H.E. The Rt.Hon. The Lord Caradon - UK
- ✓ H.E. Mr. Milko Tarabanov - Bulgaria
- ✓ H.E. Mr. Max Jakobson - Finland
- no ~~H.E. Dr. Wanbi El-Bouri - Libya~~ (away)
- ✓ H.E. Mr. Edwin Ogebe Ogbu - Nigeria
- ✓ H.E. Mr. Edvard Hambro - Norway
- no ~~H.E. Mr. Hamilton Shirley Amerasinghe - Ceylon~~ (away)
- no ~~H.E. Dr. Francisco Guevas Caneine - Mexico~~ (away)
- no ~~H.E. Mr. Eugeniusz Kulaga - Poland~~ (away)
- ✓ H.E. Mr. Charles W. Yost - USA
- ✓ H.E. M. Jacques Kosciusko - Morizet - France
- ✓ H.E. Mr. Samar Sen - India
- no ✓ ~~H.E. Mr. Agha Shahi - Pakistan~~ (away)
- ✓ H.E. Sr. Miguel Solano Lopez - Paraguay
- no ~~H.E. Mr. Mangalya Dagarsuren - Mongolia~~ (in Geneva)

The Secretary-General

- ✓ Mr. Nosek
- no ~~Mr. Kutakov~~ (away)
- ✓ Mr. Rolz-Bennett
- no ~~Mr. Narasimhan~~
- ✓ Dr. Bunche
- ✓ Mr. Korle

MM 16

cc: Mr. Korle
Don

Luncheon: Mr. Benjamin
Thurs. 26/III/70 38th

Luncheon given by the Secretary-General
on 26 March 1970

Mr. Holz-Bennett x

x Mr. Benjamin


H.E. Mr. Jarring x

x The Secretary-General

Dr. Bunche x

x Mr. Wechsler

Windows



SG luncheon, Thursday, 26 March 1970, 1.15 p.m., 38th floor

/Cards sent by hand 24/12/70 em

✓ Mr. Robert S. Benjamin (Chairman of the Board, United Artists Corporation)

✓ Mr. James A. Wechsler (Editorial Page Editor, NEW YORK POST)

The Secretary-General

no Mr. --Narasimhan

✓ Dr. Bunche

✓ Mr. Rolz-Bennett

✓ H.E. Mr. Jarring

Luncheon: Amb. Shaw
Tues. 24/III/70 38th

PROCESSED BY 1121300
23 March 1970

The Secretary-General's luncheon
to bid farewell to H.E. Mr. Patrick Shaw, C.B.E.
Tuesday, 24 March 1970, 1:15 p.m., 38th floor

29/3

M. Chayet

H.E. Mr. Warner

Sr. Rolz-Bennett

x

x

Dr. Bunche

H.E. M. de Araujo Castro

x

x

H.E. Mr. Sen

H.E. Mr. Beaulne

x

x

H.E. Mr. Malik

H.E. Mr. Shaw

x

x

The Secretary-General

H.E. Mr. Yost

x

x

H.E. U Soe Tin

H.E. Mr. Johnson

x

x

H.E. Mr. Tsuruoka

M. Djermaoye

x

x

Mr. Narasimhan

M. Korle

Mr. Turner

SG luncheon to bid farewell to H.E. Mr. Patrick Shaw, C.B.E.,
Tuesday, 24 March 1970, 1.15 p.m., 38th floor

*✓ cards sent by hand 4/10/70
em.*

- ✓ H.E. Mr. Patrick Shaw, C.B.E. - Australia
- ✓ H.E. Mr. Charles W. Yost - USA
- ✓ H.E. Mr. Y.A. Malik - USSR
- no ~~H.E. The Rt. Hon. The Lord Caradon~~ --- UK (away)
- ✓ H.E. Mr. Frederick Archibald Warner, C.M.G. - UK
- no ~~H.E. M. Armand Béraud~~ --- France (left NY 20 March)
- ✓ M. Claude Chayet - France
- no ~~H.E. Mr. J.V. Seett~~ --- New Zealand (away)
- ✓ H.E. Mr. Senjin Tsuruoka - Japan
- ✓ H.E. U Soe Tin - Burma
- ✓ H.E. Mr. Yvon Beaulne - Canada
- no ~~H.E. Mr. T.T.B. Koh~~ --- Singapore
- ✓ H.E. M. Joao Augusto de Araujo Castro - Brazil
- ✓ H.E. Mr. Keith Johnson - Jamaica
- no ~~H.E. Dr. Davidson S.H.W. Nicol, C.M.G.~~ --- Sierra Leone (away)
- ✓ H.E. Mr. Samar Sen - India
- no ~~H.E. Major-General Padma Bahadur Khatri~~ --- Nepal (away)

The Secretary-General

- ✓ Mr. Bruce R. Turner
- ✓ Mr. Narasimhan
- ✓ Dr. Bunche
- ✓ Mr. Rolz-Bennett
- ✓ Mr. Korle
- ✓ M. Djermakoye



AUSTRALIAN MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

NEW YORK

27/2/70
c.v.
27th February, 1970.

My dear Secretary-General,

At our meeting on Monday, 9th February, 1970, I mentioned to you the plans of the Australian Government for changes in overseas appointments which involved my impending re-posting from New York.

It is with mixed feelings that I now have to confirm this information. I have been informed that the Government of India has given its agrément to my appointment as High Commissioner for Australia in India. An announcement to this effect will be made in Canberra on 1st March.

I should let you know confidentially at this stage that agrément is being sought to my acceptance as Australian Ambassador to Nepal.

The Australian Government has announced that my replacement as Australian Permanent Representative to the United Nations will be Sir Laurence McIntyre, C.B.E., who is at present Deputy Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, Canberra.

Our travel arrangements have not been completed, but my wife and I expect to leave New York probably on 7th April, and my successor should arrive here shortly thereafter.

yes. / I understand from Mr. Sinan Korle, Chief of Protocol, that you have been gracious enough to offer to entertain me at lunch on Tuesday, 24th March. I greatly appreciate this gesture and look forward to being with you on that occasion.

Yours sincerely,

Patricia Shaw

Permanent Representative

Reception: Members of Congress

Fri. 20/III/70

38th

cc: Mr. Narasimhan
Mr. Muller
Mr. Lemieux ✓
Registry

RM/fp

March 31, 1970

Dear Mr. Morse,

I wish to thank you for your kind letter of March 26, 1970. It was a great pleasure and privilege to meet with you and with other members of the Congress For Peace Through Law.

I was grateful to note your deep concern for the issues confronting the Organization in this 25th anniversary year and I look forward to continue such meetings.

With my best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

U Thant

Mr. F. Bradford Morse
Chairman
Members of Congress For Peace
Through Law
Suite 210/201 Massachusetts Avenue Ne
Washington, D.C. 20002

Members of Congress For Peace Through Law

SUITE 210/201 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE NE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20002 202/544-4250

STEERING COMMITTEE

March 26th 1970

Joseph S. Clark
Honorary Chairman

F. Bradford Morse
Chairman

George McGovern
Vice Chairman

Mark Hatfield
Vice Chairman

Robert W. Kastenmeyer
Secretary - Treasurer

U. S. SENATE

Edward W. Brooke
Phillip A. Hart
Walter F. Mondale
Richard S. Schweiker

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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John R. Dellenback
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Paul N. McCloskey, Jr.
Benjamin S. Rosenthal
Morris K. Udall
Charles W. Whalen, Jr.

Jan L. McKinney
Executive Director

H.E. Mr. U Thant
Secretary-General of the United Nations
The United Nations
New York, New York 10017

Dear Mr. Secretary-General:

On behalf of the members of Members of Congress for Peace Through Law who were privileged to meet with you at your informal reception last Friday at the United Nations, our deepest appreciation for your having taken the time from your busy schedule to meet with us. We are grateful to have had this opportunity to share our deep concern for the issues which confront all of us in our individual capacities. In this 25th Anniversary Year of the U.N., we hope to utilize the insights we gained from you in our efforts in the Congress.

We sincerely hope that we will be able to continue the dialogue which was initiated at our meeting as we all strive for our common goal of world peace under law.

Again, our warmest thanks.

With high regard,

Sincerely,

F. Bradford Morse

F. Bradford Morse
Chairman

*Pl. ack. I will sign.
I have forwarded to
continue our meetings.
JL
3/28*

SG reception for Members of Congress for Peace Through Law,
Friday, 20 March 1970, 4.15 p.m., 38th floor

Members of Congress for Peace Through Law plus wives (36)

The Secretary-General

Mr. Narasimhan

Dr. Bunche

Mr. Rolz-Bennett

7 Mr. Hoffman

no ~~Mr. Labouisse~~ (away)

Mr. Vaughan

Mr. Kutakov

Mr. Urquhart

Mr. Powell

Mr. Nassif

UNITED STATES MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

March 19, 1970

TO : Mr. Lucien Lemieux *SC/EXEC OFF*
FROM : T.P. Schottke, Jr. *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: Members of Congress for Peace Through Law - Guest List for
the Secretary-General's Reception - March 20, 1970

The following persons will be attending:

U.S. Senators

- 1 Honorable Alan Cranston (California)
- 2 Honorable Robert W. Packwood (Oregon)
- 3 Honorable Claiborne Pell (Rhode Island)
- 4 Honorable Richard S. Schweiker (Pennsylvania)

U.S. Representatives

- 5 Honorable Brock Adams (Washington)
- 6 Honorable Jonathan B. Bingham (New York)
- 7 Honorable Peter H.B. Frelinghuysen (New Jersey)
- 8 Honorable Seymour Halpern (New York)
- 9 Honorable Robert W. Kastenmeier (Wisconsin)
- 10 Honorable & Mrs. Clark MacGregor (Minnesota)
- 11 Honorable Paul N. McCloskey (California)
- 12 Honorable Abner J. Mikva (Illinois)
- 13 Honorable Patsy T. Mink (Hawaii)
- 14 Honorable Bradford F. Morse (Massachusetts)
- 15 Honorable & Mrs. Charles A. Mosher (Ohio)
- 16 Honorable Bertram L. Podell (New York)
- 17 Honorable Charles W. Whalen, Jr. (Ohio)

MCPL Guests

- 18 Dr. James Billington
- 19 Dr. Thomas Franck
- 20 Dr. Richard Gardner
- 21 Prof. & Mrs. Covey Oliver
- 22 Mr. & Mrs. Robert F. Meyerhoff
- 23 Honorable & Mrs. Joseph F. Clark
(former Senator from Pennsylvania)

MCPL Staff

29 Mr. Larry Koegel
30 Miss Phyllis Kotite
31 Dr. Thomas Manton
32 Miss Joan McKinney
33 Mr. & Mrs. Bill Montwieler
34 Mr. Stanford Z. Persons
35 Miss Susan Smith
36 Mr. Ronald Tammen

SG
RTB
JRB
Hoffman
Vareylan
H. Manton
~~Lehmann~~ (Cowan)

42

cc: Mr. Andrew Stark-SG/OUSG/ADM/MGT
Mr. Paul Hoffman-UNDP

CVN:CC

cc: Perm. Rep. USD
Mr. Narasimhan
Mr. Hoffman
Mr. Stark
Mr. Lemieux ✓

6 March 1970

Gentlemen,

In continuation of my letter of 12 February I wish to inform you that I have arranged a reception for all of you and your wives on the 38th floor at 4.15 p.m. on Friday, 20 March. This will enable us to meet in an informal atmosphere but also provide opportunities for an exchange of views.

I am looking forward to meeting you in two weeks time.

Meanwhile, I remain, with kindest regards,

Yours sincerely,

U Thant

Messrs. Bradford Morse, Alan Cranston
and Jonathan Ringham
Members of Congress for Peace Through Law
201 Massachusetts Avenue, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002

- CWR
- AOB
- JRB
- PGH

NO ~~H.L.~~ (away)
• D.B.V.
m. Kitchner

To be returned
to Mr. Lemieux

CS/WG

2 March 1970

My dear Ambassador,

I had recently received a letter from the representatives of the Members of Congress for Peace through Law, informing me of their plans to visit the United Nations on Friday, 20 March 1970, and that they would like to meet with me informally for a short time on that date. I have written to them that I would be very pleased indeed to see them in my office between 4.15 and 5.00 p.m. on 20 March. I intend to arrange a very simple reception for the visiting Congressmen and their wives and I very much hope that you will be able to accompany this group when they come to visit me. I shall also be pleased to receive likewise any other members of the United States Mission who may wish to join the visiting dignitaries.

Yes

Yours sincerely,

U Thant

His Excellency
Mr. Charles W. Foat
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of the United States
of America to the United Nations
799 United Nations Plaza
New York, N.Y. 10017

cc. Mr. Narasimhan
Dr. Bunche
Mr. Vaughan
Mr. Muller
Mr. Lemieux ✓

12 February 1970

Gentlemen,

I wish to thank you most kindly for your letter of 5 February. It is a source of great comfort to me that such a large group of distinguished members of the United States Congress and Senate are making a special effort to come to New York to be briefed about the United Nations during this crucial year of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Organization.

I am fully conscious of the significance of such a visit and therefore it shall be my pleasure to meet you and to share some thoughts with you on Friday 20 March. I have accordingly set aside from 4.15 to 5 p.m. on that day in order to be with you.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

U Thant

Messrs. Bradford Morse, Alan Cranston
and Jonathan Bingham
Members of Congress for Peace Through Law
201 Massachusetts Avenue, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002

cc - Perm. Rep. USA
Mr. Narasimhan
Mr. Hoffman
Mr. Stark
Mr. Lemieux ✓
Registry - OR 521 GEN

Members of Congress For Peace Through Law

SUITE 210/201 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE NE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20002 202/544-4250

FEB 6 1970

February 5, 1970

STEERING COMMITTEE

Joseph S. Clark
Honorary Chairman

F. Bradford Morse
Chairman

George McGovern
Vice Chairman

Mark Hatfield
Vice Chairman

Robert W. Kastenmeier
Secretary - Treasurer

U. S. SENATE

Ward W. Brooke
Philip A. Hart
Walter F. Mondale
Richard S. Schweiker

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John R. Dellenback
Paul Findley
Paul N. McCloskey, Jr.
Benjamin S. Rosenthal
Morris K. Udall
Charles W. Whalen, Jr.

Joan L. McKinney
Executive Director

Honorable U Thant
Secretary-General of the United Nations
The United Nations
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Secretary-General:

We write on behalf of the 24 Senators and 69 Congressmen who belong to Members of Congress for Peace Through Law, a private bipartisan and bicameral group of Members of the United States Congress working to promote a peaceful world under law.

On Friday, March 20, we are planning to bring a number of our members and their wives to the United Nations. Our members would be honored to meet informally with you on that date. We have planned our program so as to keep the period from 4:15 to 5:00 PM clear in the hope that you will be able to meet with us.

Our plans are to arrive that morning to attend a briefing by Ambassador Yost at the U.S. Mission, to lunch with the Ambassadors on the Security Council, and to be briefed by Andrew Stark and Paul Hoffman during the afternoon.

We are deeply aware that this year marks the 25th Anniversary of the United Nations and we want to do all that we can to contribute to substantive consideration of how the organization can be even more effective in the years ahead.

We very much appreciate your willingness in the past to meet with Senators and Congressmen representing informal groups such as MCPL and hope that your schedule will permit you to see us on March 20.

We look forward to your favorable reply.

Sincerely,

F. Bradford Morse
Chairman

Alan Cranston
Co-Chairmen, United Nations Committee

Jonathan Bingham

1. Mr. Thant
2.
3.
☐ - Notice Completed
☒ - Acknowledged
☐ - No Action Required
INITIALS [initials]

OR 521 Gd

Y's
O.K.
8/10/70

UNITED STATES MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

March 19, 1970

TO : Mr. Lucien Lemieux - SG/EXEC OFF
FROM : T.P. Schottke, Jr.
SUBJECT: Members of Congress for Peace Through Law - Guest List for
the Secretary-General's Reception - March 20, 1970

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- ✓ Honorable Seymour Halpern (New York)
- ✓ Honorable Robert W. Kastenmeier (Wisconsin)
- ✓ Honorable & Mrs. Clark MacGregor (Minnesota)
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- ✓ Honorable Patsy T. Mink (Hawaii)
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- 31 Dr. Thomas Manton
- 32 Miss Joan McKinney
- 33 Mr. & Mrs. Bill Montwieler
- 34 Mr. Stanford Z. Persons
- 35 Miss Susan Smith
- 36 Mr. Ronald Tammen

SG

RTB

JRB

W. H. H. H.

Vancouver

H. H. H. H.

~~Belmont~~ (away)

42

cc: Mr. Andrew Stark-SG/OUSG/ADM/MGT
Mr. Paul Hoffman-UNDP

✓

MEMBERS OF CONGRESS FOR PEACE THROUGH LAW

Committee on U.S. - China Relations

Rep. Patsy Mink, Chairman

Papers Prepared for the Committee

and

Speakers Invited for Commentary

March 18 United States - China Relations
Administration Position

Hon. Elliot Richardson
Undersecretary of State

March 26 Superpower Triangle

Cong. Paul Findley

Mr. Harrison Salisbury
Assistant Managing Editor
New York Times

April 15 United States - China Trade

Sen. Walter Mondale

Hon. Alvin Hamilton
Former Canadian Minister
of Agriculture
Negotiator of Sino-Canadian
Wheat Agreement

April 22 Communication and Travel with
China

Cong. Charles Whalen

-Mr. Najeeb Halaby, President (invited)
Pan American World Airways

April 29 U.S. Defense in East Asia

Cong. Morris Udall

Professor Jerome A. Cohen
Harvard Law School

May 13 The ABM: Threat from China?

Sen. Mark Hatfield

Dr. Jeremy Stone
Federation of American Scientists

May 27 China and the United Nations

Cong. Jonathan Bingham

June 3 U.S. - China Relations: An Overview
and Policy Recommendations

Cong. Patsy Mink

U.S. - China Relations Committee Meeting
to determine Committee recommendations
and final disposition of the report.

Staff Consultant - Dr. Thomas B. Manton

Revised draft

COMMITTEE FOR NEW CHINA POLICY
ROOM 9H
777 UNITED NATIONS PLAZA
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10017

CONFIDENTIAL
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

DRAFT POLICY STATEMENT

The Committee for New China Policy advocates a new United States policy toward China which recognizes that the People's Republic of China is the sole legitimate government of China. We will work for a United States policy of peace, understanding, and cooperation with the People's Republic of China, acknowledging that such a policy must be part of a changed approach by the United States toward Asia as a whole.

We believe that such a policy requires that our government:

- 1) Return to the policy followed by the United States prior to the Korean War, which recognizes Taiwan as Chinese territory; and accept the position that, whatever the complexities of transition from the present political situation, the United States has no responsibility for determining the future status of Taiwan.
- 2) Cease intervention in China's civil war by withdrawing American forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan strait and terminate all military and economic aid to the Chiang Kai-shek government.
- 3) Abandon the current policy of military encirclement, economic blockade and violation of China's territorial integrity.
- 4) Acknowledge that the government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legitimate representative of China in the United Nations and in all other international organizations.
- 5) Establish economic, social, cultural, and diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual respect, and non-intervention in each other's affairs.

Adopted in principle - March 16, 1970.

2
COMMITTEE FOR NEW CHINA POLICY / *st draft*
ROOM 9H
777 UNITED NATIONS PLAZA
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10017

CONFIDENTIAL
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

DRAFT POLICY STATEMENT

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- 1) Cease intervention in China's civil war by withdrawing American forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan strait and terminate all aid to the Chiang Kai-shek regime.
- 2) Abandon the current policy of military encirclement, economic blockade and violation of China's territorial integrity.
- 3) Acknowledge that the government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legitimate representative of China in the United Nations and in all other international organizations.
- 4) Establish economic, social, cultural, and diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual respect, and non-intervention in each other's affairs.
- 5) Return to the policy followed by the United States prior to the Korean War, under which it is recognized that Taiwan is Chinese territory and that, whatever the complexities of transition from the present political situation, the United States has no role in determining the status of Taiwan within the People's Republic of China.

Recommendation of Seminar Group Meeting in Canada
March 5 - 7, 1970

At West Point, a Counterattack

By JOE FEUREY

WEST POINT, N.Y.—“What the people of this country don't understand,” said the 22-year-old West Pointer, “is that the Oriental people have no regard for human life.”

“That's why when you fight them you can't use conventional means. To win you have to fight the same way they do.”

The cadet's classmates stood near the parade ground and nodded in agreement. Then cadet Arthur Schmidt from Virginia continued his explanation of how the press had “overemphasized” the My Lai massacre.

Just about everyone here at the U.S. Military Academy was talking about the massacre yesterday after the school's

superintendent, Maj. Gen. Samuel W. Koster, announced he would leave in the wake of Army Dept. charges that he was derelict in an investigation of the massacre two years ago.

Koster had informed the 3700 cadets while they lunched in the Academy mess hall that he had requested a transfer to “separate West Point from the continuing flow of public announcements or any other connection with the alleged events which took place in Vietnam involving elements of my former command.”

Koster was commanding general of the Americal Division, a parent unit of the Task Force that swept through the My Lai area



GEN. KOSTER

Cadets to his defense.

Continued on Page 54

Post - Mar 18 - 70
p. 4.

Continued from Page 4
on March 16, 1968.

The cadets gave their commander a two-minute ovation. And throughout the afternoon and into the evening, in barracks and on the campus walks, they continued to praise and defend him.

Cadet Bill Goodrich of Vermont said of Koster: “He was a good officer and a good leader. We liked him here. He was tall and had a lot of medals. He wore all those medals on his uniform and anyone who saw those medals would realize he was a good officer and a great American. You have a respect a man like that.”

Goodrich said civilians

really could not understand the Vietnam war or know how to fight it.

“The American press only prints one side of the war,” the cadet insisted. “The VC commit atrocities too.” He said he had heard that the Viet Cong had killed an American soldier by putting his head in a rat's cage.

He couldn't remember exactly where he had heard that story, and made no comparison to a similar incident in George Orwell's “1984.”

Cadet Charles Wilson of Pennsylvania said Koster could not be responsible for a company-level action.

“But when you're out there in combat, especially with those Orientals, you have to

get edgy. You have to shoot anything that moves, even if it's just a bush.

“We talked about this in class yesterday and our instructor told us that the My-Lai soldiers had been out on patrol for 40 days and had suffered 50 per cent casualties.

“They really can't be blamed for what happened out there. And it's a shame that there's so much trouble over such a minor incident.”

The incident, according to the Army investigation which ended yesterday, was the murder of at least 102 civilians, old men, women, children, and infants.

Koster, a 1942 graduate of the Point, was born in West

Liberty, Iowa, Dec. 29, 1919, and went to school there.

During the war he rose to regimental executive officer and was assigned, in 1946, to the Far East commanding general's headquarters in Tokyo. He returned to the Point in 1949 as a tactical officer.

During the Korean war he served as the Eighth Army's director of the guerrilla war effort against the North Koreans. His next assignment was to SHAPE, in Paris, as secretary of staff.

After service in Georgia and again in Korea, he took command of Task Force Oregon in Vietnam in 1967. The force was later officially called the Americal Division.

NEWS RELEASE

For Release: A.M. Friday
November 7, 1969

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10/3
For Further Information contact:

Sandy Persons - 544-4250

Thirteen Senators and 44 Members of the House from both parties have written Secretary of State William P. Rogers urging United States support for free U.N. use of INTELSAT facilities for rapid and direct world-wide communication. The letter was initiated in the United Nations Subcommittee of Members of Congress for Peace Through Law co-chaired by Senator Alan Cranston (D-Cal.) and Representative Jonathan Bingham (D-N.Y.). The text of the letter and list of signers follows:

November 6, 1969

The Honorable William P. Rogers
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We, the undersigned Members of Congress, give our fullest backing to the recommendation of the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the Committee on Foreign Affairs that "the United States should support reasonable requests by the Secretary General of the United Nations for free use of INTELSAT facilities."

It is vitally important for the United Nations to have free access to the best facilities for rapid and direct world-wide communication, if it is to be able to fulfill the mandate entrusted to it by the Member Nations and their peoples under the U.N. Charter. Not only would this service improve the operations of the U.N., for example, in Cyprus and the Middle East, but it would help to accomplish the urgent task of bringing the U.N. closer to the peoples of the world. It is our understanding that there is ample precedent, logic, and merit to warrant the immediate granting of free usage to the United Nations. Such privileged treatment for the U.N. would give concrete practical expression to the injunction of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty that this international resource shall be used "in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation and understanding."

We strongly urge that the United States press for favorable action on this request at the Preparatory Committee sessions of the Conference on Definitive Arrangements for the International Satellite Consortium and on every appropriate occasion.

Sincerely,

IN THE SENATE:

Edward W. Brooke
Alan Cranston
Charles E. Goodell
Philip Hart
Harold Hughes

George McGovern
Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.
Walter Mondale
Frank Moss

Robert W. Packwood
Richard S. Schweiker
Harrison A. Williams, Jr.
Stephen M. Young

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

John B. Anderson
Jonathan B. Bingham
Edward P. Boland
George E. Brown, Jr.
Daniel E. Button
Silvio O. Conte
John Conyers, Jr.
James C. Corman
John R. Dellenback
Don Edwards
Joshua Eilberg
Paul Findley
Donald M. Fraser
Peter H.B. Frelinghuysen
James G. Fulton

Cornelius E. Gallagher
William J. Green
Gilvert Gude
Seymour Halpern
Augustus F. Hawkins
Henry Helstoski
Frank Horton
Edward I. Koch
Robert L. Leggett
Allard K. Lowenstein
Richard D. McCarthy
Paul N. McCloskey, Jr.
Abner J. Mikva
Patsy T. Mink
William S. Moorhead

F. Bradford Morse
John E. Moss
Richard L. Ottinger
Claude Pepper
Thomas M. Rees
Ogden R. Reid
Donald W. Riegle, Jr.
Benjamin S. Rosenthal
Edward R. Roybal
William F. Ryan
James H. Scheuer
William St. Onge
Morris K. Udall
Charles W. Whalen, Jr.

Luncheon: W. L. J. P. Mann
Fri. 20/III/70 38th

Luncheon given by the Secretary-General
on 20 March 1970

Mr. Urquhart x

x Mrs. Lippmann


Mr. Lippmann x

x The Secretary-General

Mrs. Friendly x

x Mr. Friendly

windows



SG luncheon, Friday, 20 March 1970, 1.15 p.m., 38th floor

✓ Mr. and Mrs. Walter Lippmann (Hotel Lowell, 28 East 63rd Street)
(Card mailed 10/III/70)

✓ Mr. and Mrs. Fred Friendly (Columbia University, 280-1754
card mailed 16 March 1970 to
Ford Foundation, 320 East 43rd Street, NY 10017)

The Secretary-General

✓ ~~Mr. and Mrs.~~^{no} Urquhart

no ~~Dr.~~^{no} Bunche

no ~~Mr.~~^{no} Narasimhan

no ~~Mr.~~^{no} Reiz-Bennett

Reception: UNCA
Thurs. 19/III/70 38th

ROUTING SLIP


FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

TO: The Secretary-General

A:

FOR ACTION		POUR SUITE A DONNER
FOR APPROVAL		POUR APPROBATION
FOR SIGNATURE		POUR SIGNATURE
PREPARE DRAFT		PROJET A REDIGER
FOR COMMENTS		POUR OBSERVATIONS
MAY WE CONFER?		POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER?
YOUR ATTENTION		VOTRE ATTENTION
AS DISCUSSED		COMME CONVENU
AS REQUESTED		SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE
NOTE AND FILE		NOTER ET CLASSER
NOTE AND RETURN		NOTER ET RETOURNER
FOR INFORMATION		POUR INFORMATION

Attached is the guest list for your reception in honour of the Executive Committee of UNCA on 19 March (6-7 p.m.) -- For your approval.

 add
 Brian
 Victor
 Robinson
 Estelle
 Lucien
 Kate

(45)

Aug 12/70
 12/70

Ramses

Date:
3 March 1970

FROM:
DE: Ramses Nassif

CR.13 (11-64)

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UNCA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE FOR 1970.

WILLIAM N. OATIS (ASSOCIATED PRESS)
LOUIS FOY (FRANCE PRESSE)
THEODORE MORELLO (PAKISTAN TIMES)
ZVONIMIR KRISTL ("VJESNIK" ZAGREB)
FRANCOIS GIULIANI (REUTERS)
KAY RAINEY GRAY (GREENWICH, CONN. TIME)
ANNE WEILL-TUCKERMAN (FRANCE PRESSE)
MICHAEL LITTLEJOHNS (REUTERS -- PAST PRESIDENT)
IVAN ZVERINA (UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL)
JOHN CAPPELLI (IL PAESE-PAESE SERA, ROME)
FRANCISCO PORTELA (PRENSA LATINA)
RUDOLPH HAFTER (NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG)
ROBERT REFORD (MONTREAL STAR)
INGE GALTUND (MORGENBLADET-OSLO)
EDWARD BASKAKOV (TASS)

PAST PRESIDENTS

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FRANCIS W. CARPENTER (ASSOCIATED PRESS)
MAX HARRELSON (ASSOCIATED PRESS)
JOHN W. HEFFERNAN (REUTERS)
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PAUL SANDERS (HET PAROOL, AMSTERDAM)
GEORGES R. WOLFF (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE)
JOHN MacVANE (AMERICAN BROADCASTING CO.)
CHAKRAVARTI RAGHAVAN (PRESS TRUST OF INDIA)
EARL W. FOELL (LOS ANGELES TIMES)

SECRETARIAT

C.V. NARASIMHAN
RALPH J. BUNCHE
JOSE ROLZ-BENNETT
AGHA ABDUL HAMID
VLADIMIR P. PAVLICHENKO
REINHOLDT ERIKSEN
JEAN d'ARCY
CESAR ORTIZ-TINOCO
DAVID RITCHIE
MICHAEL HAYWARD
WILLIAM C. POWELL
JOSEPHINE BLACKLOCK
RAMSES NASSIF