UNAMIR G3 OPERATIONS / PLANS - TACTICAL HEADQUARTERS 8 AUG - 18 OCT 1994

OPERATIONS

[4 CONFIDENTIAL]

EL/WG JUNE 2009

PLEASE RETAIN ORIGINAL ORDER

Tac HQ

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

File No 5000.45(G3 PLANS)

5/249 9525-1
9820-1

500 21/10

Rwanda FDe
FDe
Dist Dist.
COO
G3
Sgt O

To: List A
List B

From: DCOS Ops

Info: SO2 Legal AUSMED

Date: 18 Oct 94

Subject: UNAMIR CONDUCT, DRESS AND WEAPON CARRIAGE POLICY

Reference: Draft 5000.45(G3 Plans) attached.

1. Please find enclosed the UNAMIR Conduct, Dress and Weapon Carriage Policy in Draft.

2. The legal content has been cleared by SO2 Legal AUSMED.

3. Addressees are asked to provide written comment on the document by Close Of Play Mon 24 Oct 94, after which a nil return will be assumed.

J ARP
Col
DCOS Ops

TAC HQ

Operation Branch
Force HQ, UNAMIR
Kigali, Rwanda

18 October 1994

6/249 9750-1
9100-3
SDO 21/10

3000.4/OPS/KIA/1

See Distribution

SUBJECT: <u>ACCESS TO KIGALI AIRPORT HELICOPTER HANGAR</u>

1. A recent meeting was held between Air Ops and the Airport Commandant, Mr Busingye, about access to the Canadian Helicopter site. Also present at the meeting was the RPA officer in charge of airport security. The following was agreed.

2. The difficulties experienced in getting UNAMIR vehicles and their passengers across the airfield can be resolved by using an access gate on the southern side of the airfield. The gate is apparently manned 24 hours a day and access will be available to any traffic destined for the Canadian Helicopter site.

3. Attached is a map of the access road to the gate. There are 2 RPA checkpoints on the road, the gate is on a sharp right-hand bend and quite obvious. Once inside the perimeter fence, vehicles must drive across a small aircraft dispersal and in front of the fire station before turning right into the helicopter dispersal.

4. Airfield access permits are issued by the Airport commandant's office on a strictly limited basis. They will only be issued to specific people or posts within an organization, a not unreasonable limitation for an airport. Therefore any personnel in vehicles not in possession of an airfield access permit must use the southern access gate to get to the helicopter hangar.

J D JANIUREK
Sqn Ldr
For Force Commander

Annex A: Map of access road to helicopter dispersal.

Distribution:

Action:

List A B and C

FCo
Dist
COO
C3
C4

Annex A to
3000.4/OPS/KIA/1
Dated 18 Oct 94



Tae H2

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

From: Colonel K P O'Kelly
Deputy Chief of Staff (Support)

UNAMIR Force Headquarters
Kigali
Rwanda

4/249 9100-1
SDO 21/10

2000.1/CMPO/DISC

See Distribution

18 Oct 94

DISCIPLINE - CAR PARKING OUTSIDE SECURE LOCATIONS

Reference:

A. 2000.1/CMPO\DISC dated 17 Oct 94.

1. Further to Reference A, it has been brought to my attention that United Nations Field Operations Manual Chapter 12 makes provision for the driver to be held financially responsible in the event of loss or damage of a vehicle.

2. In the case of accidents which occur while the vehicle is being used for official travel, the driver will normally only be held responsible as a result of gross negligence on his part and the liability will not normally exceed 50% of the value of the vehicle or, in the case of an accident, 50% of the cost of repair.

3. When the vehicle is being used for non-official travel - liberty journeys - the situation is viewed more seriously. The driver is held financially responsible for any loss arising as a result of his negligence - whether gross or not. Assessments may be up to the full cost of replacing the vehicle or, in the case of an accident, the full cost of repair.

4. In the context covered by Reference A, it would be difficult to consider a social visit to a night club to be official travel. Personnel should be warned that, in the event of the loss of a vehicle, they may be held personally financially liable for that loss, to the full replacement value of the vehicle.

5. DFC/COS has remarked that individuals might take greater care of UN vehicles if they had paid for those vehicles themselves.

Reading File
File
Dist List
COS
G3
Sigs O

Some individuals may be paying for vehicles but, by then, they will have been deprived of their use. This should be a powerful factor in considering whether a particular location is a safe place to leave a car.

K P O'KELLY
Col
DCOS (Sp)

Distribution:

Action:

Lists A, B and D
Force Provost Marshal

Information:

Office of SRSG
Oi/c Administration
Chief Security Officer

Tac HQ

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

From: Colonel K P O'Kelly
Deputy Chief of Staff (Support)

UNAMIR Force Headquarters
Kigali
Rwanda

2000.1/CMPO/DISC

See Distribution

17 Oct 94

DISCIPLINE - CAR PARKING OUTSIDE SECURE LOCATIONS

1. There have been a number of instances of attempted and actual taking and driving away of UNAMIR vehicles. In most cases, the vehicles have been removed, late at night, from car parks associated with premises where it is known that trouble is likely to occur; this fact gives particular cause for concern.

2. DCOS (Ops)'s staff will, I understand, shortly be issuing policy guidance on personal security for members of UNAMIR, both off and on duty; it is not the purpose of this letter to pre-empt that advice but, rather, to express the considerable concern felt within the Headquarters that valuable assets are being lost through thoughtlessness or, at worst, wanton lack of responsiblity.

3. It is a well known fact that the UNAMIR vehicle fleet is woefully below the size that it should be and we cannot afford to lose vehicles by theft or, for that matter, traffic accidents, poor maintenance or any other reason than fair wear and tear. Personnel who are allocated vehicles, permanently or temporarily for some particular purpose, will be held responsible for the safety and security of those vehicles, in accordance with standard practice in most armies.

4. If vehicles are used, particularly after dark, and have to be parked, great care must be given to ensuring their security. This extends beyond simply locking the vehicle as it is well known that almost all vehicles can be entered in a few moments. It may, perhaps, be appropriate to immobilize the vehicle in some way.

5. But the single most important factor is consderation of where the vehicle will be left. Ideally, cars will not be left outside a guarded compound but this is not always practicable; in these cases thought must be given to the matter. Experience demonstrates that the car parks of the night clubs now opening around Kigali are not safe places to leave a car - and, in the light of that experience, no one can be surprised, or expect a sympathetic reception from this Headquarters, if his car disappears from one. It is necessary to consider the risks most carefully before parking

a car anywhere and all personnel should remember that they may be called upon to explain why they decided to leave a car where they did.

6. Looking to wider issues, it may then be pertinent to ask oneself 'if my car is not going to be safe here, am I?'

7. Contingent commanders, branch heads etc are to disseminate the contents of this letter to all personnel who hold a United Nations driving permit.

K P O'KELLY
Col
DCOS (Sp)

Distribution:

Action:

Lists A, B and D
Force Provost Marshal

Information:

Office of SRSG
Oi/c Administration
Chief Security Officer

TAC HQ COO.

5000.1 (PLANS)

HQ UNAMIR
KIGALI

15 October 1994

Distribution List

FORCE COMMANDER'S DIRECTIVE ON MASS GRAVES AND
ALLEGED MASSACRE SITE REGISTRATION, INVESTIGATION AND HANDLING.

GENERAL

1. Instances of widespread killing during the recent civil war in RWANDA are well known. The development of a strategy to investigate these occurrences is in progress. However, a comprehensive database on mass graves is required to focus the Human Rights Committee investigation and to provide the BBGNU with limited assistance from NGOs and UNAMIR to deal with the situation in a dignified manner.

2. Additionally, it has been revealed in recent reports that a number of mass graves discovered to date present a health hazard to the neighbouring population.

AIM

3. The aim of this directive is to outline the UNAMIR policy on registration and handling of mass graves.

PROCEDURE

4. Reports of mass graves and alleged massacre sites are random and do not identify a trend. The recording of relevant data has been equally sporadic. Accordingly, a database is to be established at HQ UNAMIR by the MILINFO cell in Operations Branch.

5. Reporting. Action addressees are to report the discovery of mass graves to HQ UNAMIR. Reports are to include the following details:

a. Location.

(1) map coordinates (8 figures).

(2) nearest town, village, commune or camp.

b. General description.

(1) dimensions.

(2) condition.

(a) sealed.

(b) unsealed.

(3) proximity to water source.

(4) proximity to population concentration.

(5) approximate age.

(6) estimated number of persons buried therein.

(7) cause of death where discernable.

c. Remarks.

6. Recording. MILINFO cell, HQ UNAMIR is to record mass grave reports in a format which will be useful to military, government departments, UN agencies and NGOs. Cooperation amongst all parties will ensure that maximum information is collectively made available. Accordingly, the MILINFO cell is to gather from and share information with all available sources.

7. Investigation. Investigation of all the circumstances surrounding mass graves and alleged massacres is the responsibility of Human Rights and the BBGNU of RWANDA. The involvement of UNAMIR personnel will be specifically ordered when necessary.

8. Handling. FMO staff is to inspect reported mass graves to ascertain the health risk if any. If a clear health risk to the civilian population and/or UNAMIR personnel is identified, the FMO inspection report, including recommendations to the Government on the appropriate procedure to effectively address the matter, is to be submitted to Operations Branch. Due to the limited resources currently at the government's disposal, UNAMIR is to be prepared to provide the resources and expertise required. Requests to provide such resources are to be approved by DCOS OPS in consultation with the FMO and DCOS SP.

CONCLUSION

9. The handling of mass graves has legal, moral and memorial implications which are properly the responsibility of the BBGNU of RWANDA to address. UNAMIR personnel are to treat mass grave issues with appropriate sensitivity and are to limit their involvement to the essential requirements of reporting unless specifically ordered otherwise.

G.C. Tousignant
MGen
Force Commander

Distribution List: (page 3)

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

File No 5000.8 (PLANS)

1/249 9300-3
500 21/10

To: DISTRIBUTION LIST

From: FC

Date: 14 Oct 94

Subject: AMENDMENT TO RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Reference: A. HQUNAMIR OPDIR NO. 2 ROE dated 6 Oct 94

---

1. Please find enclosed, for your review and action, an amendment to the Rules of Engagement (ROE) which rationalizes the escalation of force procedures with the concept of minimum force. You are directed to remove the appropriate page and insert the amended page into the Reference. The affected change pertains to the proper sequencing of Sub-paragraphs 14c and 14d.

2. Commanders at all levels are required to:

   a. Have this directive translated and disseminated to every subordinate under their command if other than English/French; and

   b. Ensure that every subordinate under their commands understands the changes to this document.

G.C. Tousignant
Major-General
Force Commander

Enclosures: 2

Distribution List

Action

MA/FC
MA/DFC & COS
DCOS Ops
DCOS Sp
MAC
Tac HQ
List B
List D

File
CURRENT OPDIRS

Dist.
Co
G3
Sigs O

10. Authority to Detain. Individuals shall only be detained if they commit a hostile act, display hostile intent or carry out any activity which would require that force be used against them under paragraph 8.

11. Once detained, only minimal non-deadly force is authorized to prevent the escape of a detainee, unless there is a necessity to act in self-defence, in which case minimum force, up to and including deadly force, is authorized. However, if the individuals flee and the threat of their use of force has thus been removed, further force of any kind shall not be employed to apprehend them.

12. Any individual detained shall be turned over as soon as possible to appropriate civilian police authorities as designated by the Force Commander. Any weapons seized from detainees shall be confiscated or rendered militarily ineffective.

13. Detainees shall not be subject to intimidation, deprivation or humiliation. Medical care and the attention of medical personnel will be provided when required. Detainees will be given rations and shelter equivalent to that of UNAMIR personnel.

CHALLENGE AND ESCALATION PROCEDURES

14. Except where a response is required in accordance with paragraph 15, the following procedures are to be followed:

a. Verbal or Visual Warning. Warn the aggressor to stop the activity, which in normal circumstances, should follow the following sequence:

(1) depending on the circumstances, a warning may be given orally, by a sign or by illumination (ie, hand-held red flares, search-lights, etc.). The issuance of a warning should also be passed up the chain of command with continuous Situation Reports;

(2) repeat the verbal or visual warning as many times as is necessary to ensure understanding or compliance;

b. Charge Weapons. If authorized under State B of ROE No.2 (paragraph 15 refers);

c. Non-Deadly Force. If warnings are ignored, employ minimal non-deadly force;

d. Warning Shots. If the threat continues, employ aimed warning shots in a safe direction so that there is no danger of personal injury or collateral damage;

e. Deadly Force. If minimal non-deadly force is either not feasible or fails, on order and under the control of a superior, minimal deadly force, such as single aimed shots, may be used until the threat is removed;

f. Escalation of Deadly Force. Escalatory weapons fire with other weapons systems shall only be on the order of the appropriate commander in accordance with paragraph 6.

b. Charger les armes. Sur autorisation dans la situation B du Règlement d'Engagement N°.2(référence au paragraphe 15);

c. Force non-mortelle. Si les avertissements sont ignorés, employer le minimum de force non-mortelle;

d. Tirs d'avertissement. Si la menace persiste, utiliser des tirs d'avertissement diriger dans une direction certaine afin de ne pas se faire mal ou de causer des dégâts secondaires.;

e. Force mortelle. Si un minimum de force non-mortelle n'est pas applicable ou n'a pas d'effet, sur ordre et sous le contrôl d'un supérieur, on peut recourir à une force minimale mortelle, notamment des tirs non-automatiques diriger, jusqu'à ce que la menace soit écartée;

f. Escalade de la force mortelle. L'escalade des armes à feu avec d'autre systèmes d'armes sera placée sous les ordres du seul commandant habilité en conformité avec le paragraphe 6.

TIR SANS AVERTISSEMENT OU ESCALADE.

15. Le seul moment où il est permis de faire usage de force mortelle sans avertissement ou escalade est quand une attaque par un agresseur vient de façon si inattendue que même un petit retard pourrait:

a. causer la mort ou un dommage grave au personnel de la MINUAR ou à tout autre personnel militaire ou civil autorisé par les Nations unies;

b. causer la mort ou un dommage grave à des personnes placées sous la protection de la MINUAR; ou

c. conduire à un dommage ou destruction immédiate des biens de la MINUAR dans les circonstances décrites au paragraphe 8.b(2).

PROCEDURE DANS LE PROCESSUS D'OUVRIR LE FEU.

16. Tout usage d'armes à feu comme moyen d'exercer une force mortelle consistera en des tirs ciblés, càd viser au milieu de la masse visible de la cible. Les tirs doivent être contrôlés pour ne pas tirer aveuglément. Les tirs automatiques ainsi que l'emploi des armes de support ne seront utilisés qu'en dernier ressort et seulement sur autorisation tel que mentionné au paragraphe 6. Les tirs ciblés continueront aussi longtemps qu'il sera nécessaire pour atteindre le but immédiat. A travers des ordres pour contrôler les

TAC HQ

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

POSTAL ADDRESS- ADRESSE POSTALE UNITED NATIONS, N.Y. 10017
CABLE ADDRESS—ADRESSE TELEGRAPHIQUE UNATIONS NEWYORK

25 August 1994

REFERENCE

10/269 8000-1
SNO 26/9/94

TO: Major General Guy Tousignant
Force Commander
UNAMIR

COO
C3
For your info.

FROM: Kofi A. Annan
Under-Secretary-General
for Peace Keeping Operations

General Guidelines for the Force Commander

1. Please accept my heartiest congratulations on your appointment as the Force Commander in which capacity you will head the Military Division of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). As the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Keeping Operations, I would like to convey to you general guidelines for your mission.

Authorization and Mandate

2. UNAMIR is a subsidiary organ of the United Nations, established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993. UNAMIR's mandate was established in operative paragraphs 2 and 3 of Security Council Resolution 872 (1993), adjusted vide paragraph 8 of Security Council Resolution 912 (1994) and expanded vide paragraph 3 of Security Council Resolution 918 (1994). The mandate was reaffirmed and extended up to 9 December 1994 vide Security Council Resolution 925 (1994). Due to the situation on the ground having rapidly changed the Secretary General's report of 3 August 1994 adapted UNAMIR's principal tasks within the framework of Security Council Resolution 925 (1994) and this was welcomed by the Security Council in the Statement by the President of the Security Council of 10 August 1994. The various resolutions of the Security Council on UNAMIR and other relevant references are listed at Annex A.

Terms of Reference

3. The mandate of UNAMIR specified in Security Council Resolution 912 (sub-paragraph a to c below) and Security Council Resolution 918 (sub-paragraph d and e below) is:

a. To act as an intermediary between the parties in an attempt to secure their agreement to a cease-fire;

b. To assist in the resumption of humanitarian relief operations to the extent feasible;

c. To monitor and report on developments in Rwanda, including the safety and security of the civilians who sought refuge with UNAMIR;

d. To contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas, and

e. To provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations.

4. Within the framework of Security Council Resolution 925 (1994), UNAMIR is now performing the following tasks:

a. To ensure stability and security in the north-western and south-western regions of Rwanda;

b. To stabilize and monitor the situation in all regions of Rwanda in order to encourage the return of refugees and displaced population;

c. To provide security and support for humanitarian assistance operations inside Rwanda as humanitarian organizations arrange the return of refugees;

d. To promote, through mediation and good offices, national reconciliation in Rwanda.

Chain of Command between UNAMIR and UN HQ

5. As you are aware, Mr Shahrayar Khan is the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) for Rwanda and as such has overall responsibility for United Nations operations in Rwanda. You will therefore report through the SRSG on all matters

concerning the functioning of the military personnel of UNAMIR.

6. You will maintain the closest possible working relationship with SRSG, and Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) and keep them fully informed about the organization, deployment and operations of the Military Division.

7. You will consult the SRSG in advance about any decisions of yours which have political implications, and on matters of policy, you will report through him to this headquarters. On purely military and technical matters, you may report directly to me, while keeping the SRSG fully informed.

Reporting

8. The Secretary-General reports to the Security Council about UNAMIR when appropriate, but not necessarily at regular intervals. Any matters which might affect the nature of the continued effective functioning of the mission should be referred to the Council for its decision. On military and technical matters, you may report directly to me, while keeping the Military Advisor in DPKO fully informed.

9. You will keep me fully informed of the developments relating to the functioning of the mission along the lines specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 above. All matters which may affect the nature or the continued effectiveness of UNAMIR will be referred to this headquarters for decision, as will all matters likely to affect the United Nations' relations with the Parties or the troop contributing governments. In this connection, you are asked to prepare and submit to me a weekly and a monthly report reviewing the over all military situation as it affects the work of the mission, and on internal matters including personnel, administration and logistics. You should also submit ad hoc reports on any developments of special importance occurring in the interval between these reports.

Responsibilities of the Force Commander UNAMIR

10. Your responsibilities as Force Commander are as follows :

a. You will be responsible, under the authority and supervision of the Secretary-General, for the organization and smooth functioning of the Military Division of UNAMIR;

b. All military personnel authorized to UNAMIR will be under your command and they will be directly answerable to you for the conduct and performance of their duties;

c. You will have full and exclusive authority with respect to the assignment of members of your Headquarters Staff, except for the Deputy Force Commander (DFC), the Chief Military Observer (CMO) and the Chief of Staff (COS), who will be designated by myself, in consultation with you, on a rotational basis amongst contributing countries. When selecting officers for staff positions in your headquarters, you should make every effort to ensure that all contingents are, to the extent possible, represented;

d. You will have full and exclusive authority with respect to the operational deployment of all military personnel under your command;

e. You will establish a chain of command for UNAMIR, making use of the officers of your Headquarters staff and the commanders of the national contingents made available by the participating governments. You may delegate your authority through the chain of command;

f. As indicated in the notes prepared for the guidance of military personnel, officers shall, during the term of their appointment, carry out their duties and regulate their conduct solely with the interests of the United Nations in view. They shall not seek or receive instructions in the performance of their duties, from any government or any other authority external to the United Nations. They shall exercise the utmost discretion in respect of all matters of official business. They shall not communicate to any person any information known to them by reason of their official position which has not been made public, except as required in the course of their duties or by authorization of the Force Commander. Nor shall they, at any time, use such information to private advantage;

g. You are asked to inform me immediately if it comes to your knowledge that any of the participating governments is attempting to issue orders to its personnel on matters related to their UNAMIR duties or is communicating with them directly on questions of UNAMIR policy;

h. You are required to submit performance evaluation reports on military personnel. Such reports will be forwarded through me to the national authorities concerned;

i. You will be responsible for the good order and discipline within UNAMIR. You may make investigations, conduct inquiries and require information, reports and consultations for the purpose of discharging this responsibility. Responsibility for disciplinary action in national contingents of UNAMIR rests with the commanders of the national contingents. If you consider it necessary, in the interest of the Mission to repatriate military personnel, you should so recommend to me and I will take the

matter up with the Government concerned.

11. In the performance of your duties as Force Commander you will be assisted by :

a. 320 Military Observers.
b. 90 Civilian Police Observers.
c. 5,500 troops and staff.

Organization

12. UNAMIR is headed by the SRSG. The Military Division is headed by the Force Commander. So far the following countries have been approved by the Security Council to contribute to the military component of UNAMIR :

Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bangladesh
* Belgium
Canada
Chad
Congo
Ecuador
* Egypt
Ethiopia
Fiji
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea Bisseau
Ireland
Jordan
Kenya
Malawi
Mali
Niger
Nigeria
Pakistan
Romania
Russian Federation
Senegal
Sweden
Tanzania
Togo
Tunisia
United Kingdom
Uruguay
Zimbabwe

* Presently not contributing

13. UNAMIR headquarters will continue to remain at Kigali with the minimum units required for protection, along with specialized units for communications and logistics, as well as the field hospital. It is envisaged that the area of responsibility will be divided into five sectors with the deployment of troops as shown:

a. Sector I (north-east): one reinforced company with engineer elements;

b. Sector II (south-east): one reinforced company;

c. Sector III (south): one reinforced company;

d. Sector IV (south-west): three infantry battalions;

e. Sector V (north-west): one infantry battalion.

Standard Operating Procedures

14. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) based on the guideline SOP have been drawn up and should be adhered to.

Communications with Contributing Governments

15. The channel for communications between the United Nations and the participating governments concerning their contingents or UNAMIR itself shall be between the United Nations Headquarters in New York and their Permanent Missions to the organization. It is not permitted that matters of policy or administration be taken up directly between UNAMIR Headquarters and the participating governments.

The Chief Administrative Officer

16. In the exercise of your administrative responsibilities, you will be assisted by the CAO. Under the overall authority of the SRSG, the CAO shall be responsible for:

a. all administrative functions and all general and technical services relating to the mission's activities, and for providing the requisite administrative support for carrying out the substantive work of the mission effectively and economically;

b. all administrative and financial certification;

c. the proper implementation of the rules, regulations and instructions issued by the Department of Peace keeping Operations (Field Administration and Logistics Division) with respect to the administration and finance of the mission;

d. the CAO will be assisted by a small number of administrative/finance officers, field services officers and other international and local staff as required;

e. on administrative and financial matters, UNAMIR communicates directly with the Field Administration and Logistics Division. This is normally done by the CAO. However, you may also bring to my attention administrative matters when they have important operational implications.

17. Should you encounter any difficulties relating to administrative matters, you are to refer those matters to me.

Respect for Local Laws

18. It is the duty of members of UNAMIR to respect the laws and regulations of the Host States and to refrain from any activity of a political character in the Host States or other action incompatible with the international nature of their duties. They shall conduct themselves, at all times, in a manner befitting their status as members of UNAMIR.

19. Members of UNAMIR are entitled to the legal protection of the United Nations, pursuant to the applicable provisions of the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

Visits to UNAMIR

20. Visits to the Mission by officials of the governments contributing military personnel to UNAMIR shall be arranged with you through United Nations Headquarters in New York.

Media Coverage of UNAMIR

21. UNAMIR will be the object of media attention. It is desirable that its work be known and well understood by the public, subject to the information policy laid down by the Secretary-General. You should therefore facilitate the work of

Annexure A

UNAMIR - SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES

A. Security Council Resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993.

B. Security Council Resolution 891 (1993) of 20 December 1993.

C. Security Council Resolution 893 (1994) of 6 January 1994.

D. Security Council Resolution 909 (1994) of 5 April 1994.

E. Security Council Resolution 912 (1994) of 21 April 1994.

F. Security Council Resolution 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994.

G. Security Council Resolution 925 (1994) of 8 June 1994.

H. Security Council Resolution 928 (1994) of 20 June 1994.

I. Security Council Resolution 929 (1994) of 22 June 1994.

J. Security Council Resolution 935 (1994) of 1 July 1994.

K. Report of the Secretary General of 3 August 1994.

L. Statement by the President of the Security Council of 10 August 1994.

journalists wishing to report about UNAMIR's activities and be accessible to them yourself.

Conclusion

22. The forgoing guidelines are not exhaustive. I hope, however, that you will find them useful, especially at the beginning of your work.

UNAMIR

LIST OF STAFF OFFICERS ENTITTLED TO $30 DAILY MEAL ALLOWANCE

S/NO	RANK	NAME	UNID	APPT	RKS
1.	BGEN	ANYIDOHO	M0001	DFC/COS	
2.	COL	ARP	M1412	DCOS OPS	
3.	COL	O'KELLY	SE2392	DCOS SP	
4.	COL	RAMSEY	M796	FMO	
5.	COL	OSAE-ADDAE	M1215	G3 TAC HQ	
6.	LT COL	HADDOW	M1878	MA TO FC	
7.	LT COL	APONGAN YELLA	M723	G3 OPS	
8.	LT COL	GETACHEW TEFFERRA	M1536	G1	
9.	LT COL	BRIMELOW	M958	G3 PLANS	
10.	LT COL	CHABIR AHMED	M2316	G4	
11.	MAJ	VKM COOPER	M718	G1(TAC HQ)	
12.	MAJ	HW NICHOLSON	M957	G4 SP	
13.	MAJ	SENAY NEGA	M1538	G6/FSO	
14.	MAJ	KAMANGE	M1885	G2/INT	
15.	MAJ	S MOORE	M1957	SO2 TPT	
16.	MAJ	AK MOORE	M1540	G4 MAINT	
17.	MAJ	RJ CRAWFORD	M795	SO MED OPS	
18.	MAJ	SV PRESS	M1531	SO MED LOG	
19.	MAJ	TESFAYE	M1956	DC PLANS	
20.	MAJ	METHNANI	M2315	G3 OPS3	
21.	MAJ	TAP MULLARKEY	M2391	G3 PLANS 3	
22.	CAPT	DESALENN	M1537	G4 ENGR	
23.	CAPT	JJ FREWEN	M993	MED OPS(TC HQ)	
24.	CAPT	IG JOHNSON	M2004	SO3 MED OPS	
25.	CAPT	M BURGESS	M 957	G4 SP 2	
26.	CAPT	C RHODES	M1953	SO3 MOVCON	
27.	CAPT	MOORHOUSE	M2459	G2/INFO 2	
28.	LT(NN)	DANAGUNDI	M2625	SO PERS	
29.	CAPT	ANOUAR	M2318	LO 3	
30.	WOI	GYENIAW	M720	CLERK PLANS	

31.	WOII	WHITE SP	M1530	CLERK MED	
32.	S/SGT	ARTHUR HE	M722	CLERK HAC	
33.	S/SGT	ASAMANI	M0043	CLERK(DFC/COS)	
34.	SGT	ADJEI	M0041	DRV FC	
35.	SGT	AZINADAGA	M0042	BODY GUARD FC	
36.	SGT	NAZIR HOSSAIN	M0039	CLERK (OPS)	
37.	SGT	GYAN BENARD	M1567	CLERK	
38.	SGT	OPOKU D	M1213	CLERK	
39.	SGT	DEBRA IO	M0036	CLERK (LOG)	
40.	S/SGT	MAHMOUD	M2317	LO ASST	
41.	CPL	ANDHO AW	M719	CLERK (OPS)	
42.	CPL	NORVIHOHO LY	M0040	DRV(DFC/COS)	
43.	LCPL	SOSAH M	M0046	RUNNER FC	

CASUALTY EVACUATION

General

1. Casualty evacuation CASEVAC is the process of moving any person who is wounded, injured or diseased to and or between medical treatment facilities. It includes surface evacuation and aeromedical evacuation (AME) .

2. The purpose of this SOP is to define the casualty evacuation process and to describe the procedures to be followed in the evacuation of all casualties.

Evacuation Priorities

3. All cas and especially those with major injuries require special consideration of their individual treatment and evacuation needs. Consequently the following priorities are assigned to cover this requirement:

a. Priority one. Pri one cas are those whose life is immediately threatened. Rapid evacuation, urgent resuscitation and or surgery are required.

b. Priority two. Pri two cas are those whose life or limb is in serious jeopardy. Evacuation to allow early resuscitation and or surgery is required.

c. Priority three. pri three cas are those for whom neither life nor limb are in serious jeopardy. Evacuation should be as soon as possible.

Types of Evacuation

4. Aeromedical evacuation (AME). AME is the movement of patients to a medical facility by air transportation. It may be by fixed wing or rotary wing aircraft. AME is the preferred means of evacuation for all priority one and two casualties.

5. Road evacuation. Is the movement of patients to a medical facility by any road means. Road evacuation should be used for all prio three casualties, the preferred road means is a dedicated ambulance.

Casualty Regulation

6. Casualty regulation in the AO is necessary to ensure that the most appropriate evacuation assets are used. The control of casualty evacuation also ensures that the casualty is transported to the most appropriate medical facility.

CASEVAC Procedures

7. Request for CASEVAC. All CASEVAC requests will be transmitted on the command net and should be in the message format described at Annex A. This format is to be repeated in all unit SOP.

8. Casualty Regulation. All requests for CASEVAC will be transmitted to Ops Br HQ UNAMIR. Casualty regulation will be conducted by Medical Branch, HQ UNAMIR. Ops staff will consult Medical Branch for advice on the most suitable means of evacuation and the destination of the casualty. The use of AME dedicated aircraft will be authorised by the CMedO or his representative. The use of other aircraft requires authorisation by COO on the advice of CMedO. Ops Br procedures with respect to CASEVAC are outlined at Annex B.

9 AME. If AME is the preferred means of evacuation then the:

a. AME medical team will be drawn from AUS Med Spt Force (AUS MSF) and CANSIG med elements; the team will be dispatched from CANSIG (Amahoro Stadium) to KIGALI airfield;

b. Aircrew will be notified of the CASEVAC request by Air Ops staff;

c. Air Ops staff should also advise the control tower at KIGALI Airport and gain clearance for the AME team to approach the CASEVAC aircraft: and

d. Receiving medical facility will be notified of incoming cas by Ops Br.

10. Road Evac. Will be used for all pri three cas and all cas that occur in the KIGALI area. The process of arranging road evac will be:

a. Road evac from RAP to AUS MSF facilities will be provided by AUS MSF assets; and

b. AUS MSF will be tasked by Ops Br to conduct road evac on advice of Med Br.

11. Reporting. The receiving medical facility is to notify Ops Br on the completion of the CASEVAC task.

Annex:

A. CASEVAC REQUEST PROFORMA

B. Ops Br CASEVAC procedures

ANNEX A TO
CASEVAC SOP

CASEVAC REQUEST

Purpose

1. The purpose of this form is to standardise the format of CASEVAC requests.

All requests are to be titled CASEVAC REQUEST and are to include the following serials

Serial	Description of Serial	Example
A.	UNIT NAME	A. GHANBATT
B.	CALLSIGN AND FREQUENCY OF UNIT	B. GOLF OA, FREQ 3830
C.	PRIORITY OF CASUALTIES	C.ONE X PRI 1, TWO X PRI 3
D.	NUMBER OF CASUALTIES- LYING	D. TWO
E.	NUMBER OF CASUALTIES- WALKING	E. ONE
F.	NATURE OF INJURY OR ILLNESS	F. GUNSHOT WOUND TO CHEST, FRACTURED ARM, LACERATED FACE
G.	GRID REFERENCE AND DESCRIPTION OF LOCATION OF CASUALTY	G. GR 123456, BUTARE GIKONGORO ROAD JUNCTION
H.	REQUIREMENT FOR SPECIAL EQUIPMENT	H. NIL
I.	TACTICAL SECURITY AT PICKUP POINT	I. SECURE
J.	ANY ADDITIONAL REMARKS INCLUDING MARKING AND APPROACH TO LZ	J. RED CROSS PANEL MARKER. APPROACH FROM NORTH

UNAMIR II MEDICAL SOP -CASUALTY EVACUATION

ANNEX B TO
CASEVAC SOP

OPS BR CASEVAC PROCEDURES

1 Monitor comd net for CASEVAC request.

2. On receipt of CASEVAC request, notify Medical Branch.(Medical Branch advises on means of evacuation and the destination of the casualty)

3. AME:

a. Task AME team located at CANSIG to move to airfield. Tasking is to include all details of CASEVAC request. You should allocate the CASEVAC a tasking number. For AME the number should start with an A and be sequential eg. A01, A02 .....

b. Notify AirOps to task aircraft.

c. Notify receiving medical facility of CASEVAC.

4. ROAD EVAC:

a. Task AUS MSF to conduct road evac. Tasking is to include all details of CASEVAC request. You should allocate the CASEVAC a tasking number. For road evac the number should start with an R and be sequential eg. R01, R02.....

5. Reporting:

a. Inform FC on commencement of CASEVAC

b. Report to Med Br at completion of CASEVAC.

DRAFT 2

SECTOR 4 - HUMANITARIAN PROTECTED ZONE

CEASEFIRE AND DEMILITARIZED ZONE

IMPLEMENTATION AND PROCEDURES

Refs: A. Army Field Manual - Wider Peacekeeping (Fourth Draft)

B. UNAMIR Ceasefire SOPs (Second Draft)

C. Kinihira Agreement 30 May 1993

General

1. A ceasefire has been established along the line illustrated at Annex A. The area west of this line is known as Sector Four and as the Humanitarian Protected Zone (HPZ). The HPZ in currently controlled by the French Coalition Forces which includes a presence by UNAMIR Military Observers. During the upcoming weeks UNAMIR will relieve the Coalition forces in place and over time control all activities within the HPZ.

2. To aid the ceasefire process within the HPZ it is paramount to ensure the security and effective monitoring of the ceasefire line. In addition procedures must be implemented to begin the process to stabilize and to facilitate the return to normalancy within the HPZ. The HPZ is to be treated as a demilitarized zone secured and monitored by UNAMIR, with the assistance of the local Rwandian authorities.

3. The aim of the ceasefire and the implementation of a demilitarized zone is to:

a. to ensure that the ceasefire is honoured;

b. to contone and monitor all ex-RGF and Gendarmerie either in the zone or entering it.

c. to disarm the civilian population including the self - defence groups;

d. to allow humanitarian relief operations for the refugees and displaced persons;

e. to create safe conditions for those people who are trying to protect themselves from random attacks, massacres and retribution;

f. to prevent a massive migration of the population to Zaire and Burundi;

h. to create the conditions which will encourage Rwandese citizens to return to their homes within the country;

j. to encourage and aid in the re-establishment of prefecture, commune and cell administrations;

k. to assist in the running of normal political activity and;

1. to create proper conditions for the return to law and order.

4. This document will be divided into two parts:

Part I. SOPs for monitoring the ceasefire line; and

Part II. Procedures for the Administration of the Demilitarized Zone.

Part I - STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR THE MONITORING OF THE CEASEFIRE

5. In geographical terms, a ceasefire may be delineated using the following elements:

a. Ceasefire line. The ceasefire line marks the forward limit of the positions occupied by opposing factions. In this case the line marks the agreed forward positions of the RPA and either French Coalition Forces or UNAMIR Armed troops. This line also marks the boundary of the HPZ;

b. Buffer zone. A two kilometre buffer zone inside the HPZ is in effect now and will be maintained.

6. Management of Ceasefire. The effective management of a

ceasefire will require numerous observers and liaison teams with independent, reliable and round-the-clock communications to sector as well as UNIMAR Force HQ and to all parties concerned. The management procedure will include:

a. investigation of alleged breaches of the ceasefire;

b. attribution of blame to transgressors; and

c. retribution against offenders; ordinarily carried out by the parent factions of the guilty parties concerned.

7. Commanders should rehearse their management procedures and ensure that they remain in close contact with all parties involved. A prompt, firm and fair reaction to breaches of the ceasefire agreement is essential. Delayed and inappropriate reactions will prejudice the ceasefire's credibility and risk a rapid overall degeneration of the general security environment. It may be possible to mount joint patrols as such action will act with RPA/Gendarmerie as a confidence - building measure for the population.

Responsibility

8. Political Leaders and Commanders of both the RPA/BBG and the UNAMIR will bear political and military responsibility for compliance with the ceasefire agreement.

9. UNAMIR will be responsible for monitoring the ceasefire agreement through the use of deployed forces, UNMOs, CIVPOL and surveillance devices.

Role of Rwandese Patriotic Army for the Ceasefire

10. To keep UNAMIR informed of the ceasefire violations and progress in disarming the civilian population by prefectures, subprefectures and sectors in areas controlled by both forces and under their responsibility.

11. To report atrocities committed.

12. To refrain from taking unilateral actions.

13. To use negotiations as a primary means of solving problems with the opposite force.

14. To send a liaison officer to the UNAMIR FHQ and the sector headquarters.

15. To keep a close relation with the FHQ and the sector headquarters.

Definitions Related to the Ceasefire

16. Weapon. Any lethal object which can be used to cause

physical harm to an individual. This includes fire arms, machetes, bows and arrows, knives, swords, bayonets, spears, batons, clubs etc.

17. Observation Posts. Specially selected points throughout the country which allow for the best visibility of surrounding area in terrain held by one or both opposing forces and used primarily to monitor any military troop movements, reinforcing of positions or ceasefire violations. The distance between individual OPs should not be greater than 10 km. OPs are to be manned 24 hrs a day and 7 days a week. OPs should be equipped with binoculars, night-vision devices, maps, compass and radio and line communication with HQ.

a. Type of OPs. There may be the following type of OPs, depending on terrain conditions and intensity of operation:

(1) Permanent;

(2) Temporary; and

(3) Unmanned.

18. Secured Area. An area such as a refugee camp, where access of the opposing forces would be controlled and regulated by UNAMIR forces. Within the secured area there must be sufficient security for UNAMIR military and civilian components.

19. UN Installations. All UNAMIR military and civilian camps and equipment, deployed on Rwandese territory, belonging to the mission and necessary to fulfil its mandate. The UN Installations will be guarded by UNAMIR assigned elements. Access to these areas is restricted and access is controlled by separate UNAMIR regulations.

20. Refugee/Displaced Persons Camp Guards. In order to provide protection to refugee camps against acts of lawlessness, particulary acts of ethnic cleansing, UNAMIR units will be responsible for the required security arrangements.

21. Check Points. A manned point used as a means of controlling movement and checking vehicle and pedestrians in order to enforce control measures, orders and regulations pertinent to the ceasefire agreement. These may be static or mobile;

a. Static Check Points. Troops/UNMOs are permanently located at fixed points. These will be normally be on important road junctions, at the entrances/exits to controlled area etc. A static check point is manned on a permanent basis. It must have both radio and line communication with their HQ.

b. Mobile Check Points. Static check points may not be

enough to cover an area of operation. In this case, mobile check points are necessary. It will have a minimum of a section strength (10 men) with two UN vehicles. It is established at varying times and at varying places based on an irregular schedule. It must have radio communication with a base/unit's HQ.

22. Road Block. A static or mobile check point which closes the road for vehicle movement. A road block must have signs reading "Road Block" in English, French and Kinyarwanda and be clearly visible from, a distance by an approaching vehicle.

23. Search. A search operation is necessary to eliminate infiltration, however it causes harassment and inconvenience to the population. This operation, therefore, must be quick, methodical, accurate, involve correct behaviour and be based on solid drills by the soldiers carrying out a search mission. Search operations would be conducted in coordination with local authorities. Following principle should be employed during search operation:

a. due care must be taken to avoid damage to any vehicle or property being searched;

b. coffins carrying funeral convoys should not be searched;

c. all unauthorized arms, ammunition and explosives found are to be confiscated and receipt given to individuals. The confiscation form found as Annex N to Part III of UNAMIR SOPs is to be used;

d. Vehicle Search. Each time a vehicle is searched, the search party must systematically search the trunk, engine compartment, the driver/passenger areas, the chassis etc. Suspicious vehicles must be thoroughly searched.

e. Personal Search. If the situation warrants, the unit commander may authorize a personal search which is to be carried out in a dignified manner taking care not to cause any public embarrassment to the individual. Women will only be searched with ferromagnetic metals' detectors and will NOT be physically searched. If however they have to be searched, women must be used; and

f. Area Search. Area searches are aimed at locating non-official weapons and ammunition stores etc. Such actions will only be done in conjunction with a cordon operation. During an area search, locals should be segregated. A house or a shop shall be searched in the presence of its owner.

24. Cordon. UNAMIR may have to carry out cordon operations to search for weapons, ammunition or explosives. Prior permission from UNAMIR FHQ is needed to carry out a cordon and search operation. Cordon must be done with sufficient troops and a reserve. Care must be taken to ensure that the area is not mined or booby-trapped, therefore engineer EOD should be attached for all cordon operations.

25. Patrolling. Patrolling will form an essential part of the cease-fire. This will be done by UNAMIR forces, UNMOs, and local authorities.

a. Types of patrols. There may be the following types of patrols depending on terrain conditions and the complexity of operation:

(1) Foot patrol;

(2) Vehicle/APC mounted patrol;

(3) Air patrol;

(4) River/lake patrol; and

(5) Border patrols.

b. Aim of Patrolling.

(1) to show a UN presence;

(2) to confirm/verify/supervise an incident, agreement or ceasefire violation;

(3) to obtain information about terrain, topography etc;

(4) to locate and confiscate arms, ammunition, explosives etc;

(5) to provide protection for NGOs or the population, and in particular for displaced persons;

(6) to prevent infiltration of unwanted elements into selected and controlled area/zone; and

(7) to monitor the arms embargo along the borders.

(8) to monitor the return of the refugees.

c. Strength. In no circumstances should a foot patrol be less than section strength (10 men), while a vehicle patrol or river/lake patrol should be no less than two vehicles or boats.

d. Security. Security of UN patrols depends on how much they know about an area of their operation. However following aspects need consideration:

(1) Patrol routes should be free of mines. Only

routes known to be absolutely free from mines may be patrolled. DO NOT undertake patrolling in suspected mined areas; and

(2) Ensure that UN signs/marks in the form of UN flag and UN head-gear are clearly visible during patrolling.

26. Escort. In UNAMIR elements two types of escort will be used:

a. UNMO Escort. this will be unarmed escort composed of military observers. In case of any suspicion of danger the escort shall be augmented by an armed escort from a UNAMIR unit. Unarmed escorts shall be normally provided to VIPs, NGOs and another visiting persons, provided that there is no threat;

b. Armed Escorts. Armed escorts will be composed of soldiers from a UNAMIR unit. They will be provided to humanitarian relief operations convoys, UN convoys or to VIPs as required; and

c. Authority of Detailing Escorts. FHQ/Sector HQ's shall have the authority to detail escorts.

27. UN Convoys. UN Convoys will be conducted for UNAMIR

deployment and is necessary for fulfilment of its mandated tasks in an area of operation assigned.

28. Investigation Teams (IT). ITs are composed of UNMO and UN CIV POLs and will be employed to clarify all cases of cease fire violations and will submit relevant reports to Sector HQ's for onward transmission to FHQ.

29. Committees for Civic Matters. Committees comprising specially selected groups of staff personnel from UNAMIR components designated for humanitarian may be detailed to help to solve important civic matters in cooperation with the local civilian infrastructure.

30. Humanitarian Recce Teams. Personnel of UNAMIR units and UNMOs will be tasked for collecting all data regarding displaced persons concentrations as well as refugee camps and road infrastructure to be used for food transportation purposes.

Concept of Operation

31. UNAMIR military component and UNMOs must at all times ensure that preconditions set out in the foregoing paragraphs are implemented/adhered to.

32. To establish conditions necessary for monitoring of the ceasefire agreement, both the UNAMIR military component and UNMOs

should carry out, the following operations:

a. Establishment of Observation Posts. OPs should be established at vantage points that ensure the best possible visibility even in difficult weather conditions and at night, observation posts should allow for the maximum of information regarding movement of troops, weapons, etc, if any, and other observable proof of the ceasefire violation.

b. Refugee Camp Guards. Protection of this kind should be set up in all displaced persons camps, where a threat to those persons exists;

c. Establishment of Check Points. Both mobile and static check points should be established on all major road junctions, and entry and exit points into an area. Static check points must be established in the entry/exit point of troop position;

d. Road Blocks. In conjunction with check points, road blocks will be set up especially during night;

e. Search. Search operations should be carried out in all mobile and static check points. It should be done at irregular intervals;

f. Patrolling. Schedule of patrolling, elaborated for both for patrols from UNAMIR units and UNMOs shall cover all major roads, tracks of sensitive areas of operational importance. UNMOs shall always be accompanied by armed escorts while patrolling at night;

g. Cordon. this will be carried out on specific information related to discovery of non-official stores of weapons, ammunition or explosives. Cordon operation shall be avoided at night. Cordon operations would be undertaken in conjunction with local authorities;

h. Investigation Teams. Special groups of UNMOs and UN CIV POLs designated for investigation, clarifying and reporting all cases of ceasefire violations;

i. Committees for Civic Matters. UNAMIR will participate in committees for civic matters to help solve all important civil matters regarding humanitarian activity in towns; and

j. Humanitarian Recce Teams. These groups will be tasked for the collection of all data regarding displaced persons camp, location and recommending options for humanitarian assistance delivery by road.

Rules of Engagement

j. Humanitarian Recce Teams. These groups will be tasked for the collection of all data regarding displaced persons camp, location and recommending options for humanitarian assistance delivery by road.

Rules of Engagement

33. ROE as per Section 2, OP directive 9. UNAMIR Rules of Engagement.

PART 2 - PROCEDURES FOR DEMILITARIZED ZONE (HPZ)

34. Following a ceasefire, demobilization operations will require the coordinated disengagement and withdrawal of belligerents. The aim of this stage will be to move combatants away from the sustaining environment of their base areas and assemble them in secured locations where they can safely disarm. This process is likely to require a large number of troops and commanders will need to consider redeployment and reinforcement as a preparatory measure. Because of a shortage of manpower, the operation may have to be sequenced, one small (but mutually balanced) area at a time. Once the contonement areas are activated, the RGF, Gendarmerie and militia's will need to be accounted for and controlled. They will also require

sustainment, including medical care. It may be appropriate to locate contonement areas adjacent to civil infrastructure facilities so that these groups may be offered gainful employment in reconstructing and developing those facilities. Relocation and contonement may also be required for vulnerable elements of the population.

35. Disarming the RGF, Gendarmerie and militia's is likely to prove the most difficult and dangerous stage of demobilization. If done prematurely, the whole theatre of operations may be destabilized. As UNAMIR disarms the local population they will be obliged to guarantee the security of the local population. This task is likely to prove demanding and manpower intensive. Successful disarming will depend as well on their trust of UNAMIR - both in terms of their impartiality as well as their region wide credibility. The latter will depend on the public perception of the UNAMIR force's military capability and will to carry through the demobilization process, maintain the peace and punish transgressors. Besides collecting weapons from combatants and militias, disarming will include the collection of war supplies from stockpiles and caches. UNAMIR will also interdict supply routes from neighbouring states. The custody and accurate accounting of weapons and war supplies will play a vital part is verifying the completion of the process. Industrial resources that could have a military application (for example - diesel) may also need to be controlled.

36. The final stage is the dispersal and rehabilitation of the belligerents. This stage is principally the responsibility of the civil authority and therefore leads into the next category (Military Assistance). It is at this stage that military and civil responsibilities will overlap and careful judgement will be required to time the transition from one authority to the other. This stage may be carried out in conjunction with the reconstitution and reform of the civil authority's police and defence forces which could well include former RGF, Gendarmerie forces who might be re-armed, regrouped and placed under new authority. The planning and supervision of such reform might become the responsibility of a specified element of UNAMIR.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

37. Military assistance refers to all form of mandated assistance by UNAMIR, to the Civil authority. In the absence of any effective government, military assistance will take the form of direct help given to civil communities. The principle of impartiality will still govern military actions. Force may be used. The overall security situation must be relatively stable.

LAW AND ORDER

38. UNAMIR military assistance operations will contribute to the overall aim of maintaining law and order - a responsibility that rests in the first place with the civil police. The maintenance of law and order constitutes the framework for all operational action and is essential to the

successful establishment of civil authority. If law and order is failing the aim of military assistance will be to restore the situation to the point where the police can once again "effectively enforce the law". In Sector 4, the UNCIUPOL will play a key role until the Gendarmerie ran be reconstituted and deployed.

PRINCIPLES

39. Popular Support. Military assistance operations will be impossible without a substantial degree of popular support. A principle purpose underlying every UNAMIR activity will therefore be the acquisition and fostering of popular support. Effective civil affairs programmes ("hearts and minds' campaigns) will be critical in this respect. The policy of the civil administration will be to establish controls and protective measures as necessary to gain public confidence and enhance society`s support. Commanders should reinforce this aim at every opportunity and avoid using their troops in an unnecessarily provocative fashion where there is a risk of confrontation with the local population. Whenever possible the populace should be encouraged to play an ever increasing role in their own protection. In addition to civil affairs programmes, commanders should also consider the potential for planning lower level community projects jointly with the local authorities. Such projects should meet a genuine need, involve the overt participation of the UNAMIR contingent and be directed at all sections of the community.

MINIMUM FORCE

40. In a military assistance situation, the involvement and likely close proximity of the local population makes the principle of minimum force particularly important to observe. The commander should never use more force than is necessary and reasonable to achieve his immediate military aim. All members of UNAMIR must be aware of the constraints which the law imposes on the use of force. Failure to observe the law will lead to a risk of prosecution, and possibly to civil proceedings for damages. Breaches of the law will also serve to alienate the law abiding members of the local population, and respect for the rule of law framework on which the entire military assistance campaign will be taking place will be weakened if it appears that the law is being flouted by those whose task it is to uphold it.

LEGALITY

41. UNAMIR will be under obligation to strictly observe the relevant provisions of the national laws of Rwanda. Commanders will be held responsible for their actions and must therefore check the legality of planned operations with the FHQ, so that their soldiers are not exposed to the uncertainties of legal interpretation. This is properly a function of forward staff planning.

COORDINATION AND COOPERATION

42. The successful conduct of operations depends on the effective coordination of civil and military effort. This

coordination applies particularly to military and public information, security, planning, public safety, and operational direction. Such coordination is best achieved through centralized planning meeting in which UNAMIR and civil administration are drawn together in order to formulate policy and implement it in a coordinated fashion at all levels. At the higher level, this coordination will be attained through the medium of a series of formally constituted committees. At lower levels centralized direction and control will be achieved through liaison, regular meetings and the use of joint operations rooms at each level of command. Centralized coordination will result in effective cooperation between the civil authority and UNAMIR. Such cooperation will be essential to emphasize the mutual confidence between them and to ensure that the conduct of operations is coherent and contributes directly to the achievement of government aims. Effective cooperation should be demonstrated at the earliest opportunity by the joint operation of UNAMIR and local security forces. To facilitate centralized direction and control, the boundaries of police and UNAMIR forces should coincide.

CONCENTRATION OF FORCE

43. The principle of minimum necessary force does not imply `minimum necessary troops'. A large element of UNAMIR speedily deployed at a critical location will demonstrate `clout' and credibility and may enable a commander to use less force than he might otherwise have done or even, by encouraging a peaceful

resolution, to avoid using any force at all. Commanders must bear in mind, however, that a potentially peaceful situation can become hostile because of a provocative display of an over-large force.

MILITARY INFORMATION

44. At each level, commanders should seek to establish a single, integrated military information organization. Ideally, the information and security elements of the civil administration and local security forces should be incorporated. The commander should task his military information organization with specific requirements to provide the timely information he needs.

USE OF LOCAL SECURITY FORCES

45. Local security forces in a military assistance situation are likely to be in need of support and encouragement, and they should be afforded, whenever possible, the opportunity of playing a useful and constructive part in operations. The following local forces will have much to offer UNAMIR in terms of local knowledge and expertise, although they lack adequate resources at this time.

a. RESERVE FORCES. Local reserve, part-time or paramilitary forces should be employed on duties where their local knowledge and links with the community can be used to the full without exposing them to unreasonable pressures which could compromise their security.

b. HOME GUARDS AND WARDENS. Depending on the security situation it may be possible to establish locally recruited home guards or wardens to protect life and property in their own local areas. This would require them to be suitably armed and trained in order to perform static home guard duties, basic patrol tasks or act as wardens responsible of liaison with the people living in their sectors. They could prove extremely valuable in reporting information affecting local security to the authorities.

c. BORDER GUARDS, CUSTOMS AND IMMIGRATION. The expertise and resources of border guards, customs and immigration may be harnessed by UNAMIR in military assistance operations to provide surveillance and information as well as control the passage of both supplies and people. Whenever possible, local security forces should operate with or alongside UNAMIR. As areas are brought restored to order, local forces should assume control as part of the important transition process towards the civil authority regaining full responsibility.

46. PUBLIC INFORMATION. Through an effective public information programme commanders should seek to foster and maintain a good public image for their forces wherever they are deployed. This will be particularly important in the demilitarized zone. The local populace must be kept in touch with government intentions by means of public information activities. Through this means, it will be possible for UNAMIR

to explain the need for some of the restrictions being imposed and publicize other items of information that may prove helpful to both the public and military authorities. Hostile propaganda may be countered and the local population kept fully informed of government aims and policies. Every formation headquarters should have its own public information officer and staff with a press office open 24 hours a day. There should also be a press officer in each unit.

47. BRIEFING. Commanders must ensure that they and their soldiers have received comprehensive briefings covering the background to the conflict and all aspects of the civil authority's activities and intentions. All UNAMIR personnel must be aware of the political aims of the government and of the measures devised to implement them. This will enable commanders to plan operations which are in accord with the civil administration's intentions and it will ensure that all ranks understand the reasons behind what they are doing and will react to unexpected situations appropriately.

MILITARY OPERATIONS

48. CATEGORIES. UNAMIR tasks can be grouped in the following categories reflecting the purpose for which such tasks might be undertaken:

a. SUPERVISION;

b. ADMINISTRATION;

c. PROTECTION;

d. REACTION;

e. CONTROL; and

f. COORDINATION.

49. Each category of tasks is considered separately below.

SUPERVISION

50. There are a number of important supervisory tasks that UNAMIR might be required to carry out in a military assistance role:

a. a transition of authority (possibly preceded by providing security for an election);

b. reforming local security forces including the provision of training, logistic and administrative support;

c. the relocation and rehabilitation of refugees and other elements of a displaced population;

d. the location, clearance and disposal of unexploded ordnance including mines (many of which may be unmarked) and improvised explosive devices. This task may prove an important contribution to the civil affairs programme and could conclude such things as the training of local nationals in mine clearance.

Each of the above supervisory tasks will require specialist personnel and resources which will need to be tailored to the particular situation faced.

ADMINISTRATION

51. Civil Administration. When assistance to a civil authority is requested, it is likely that at least part of the government's administrative machinery will have broken down. The consequences of that administrative breakdown are likely eventually to affect the life of the entire community. When public services cease to function, rents and taxes fail to be collected, local authorities decline in effectiveness and subsequent disruptions can lead to rising unemployment and widespread dissatisfaction. In these circumstances UNAMIR may be invited to give additional assistance in the area of civil administration. This might range from liaison at one extreme to a military government at the other.

52. Public Utilities. The supply of power, water, public transport, communications and health and hygiene services are an essential part of the fabric of life in a modern state and their disruption is consequently critical. UNAMIR will have much to offer in contributing to the maintenance and repair/reconstruction of such essential services. Engineer resources will be particularly useful in lending practical assistance, offering advice or giving direction. Similarly, in remoter areas, special forces may be able to provide guidance and coordinate assistance to the civil administration. If committed to such a role, commanders should seek to retain as much of the civil labour force as possible, especially the skilled labour, although this may mean providing protection.

PROTECTION

53. Introduction. Protective tasks include the safeguarding of individuals, communities and installation. Protective measures will tend to use up manpower. Commanders must be mindful of the need to balance protective requirements against the need for more active operational measures.

54. Individuals. Government officials, prominent citizens, members of UNAMIR or associated relief agencies and their families are at risk in the demilitarized zone. The scale and extent of precautionary measure (such as the employment of close protection) should be related to the threat, but contingency plans should be made for and increase in the threat. Commanders must make a thorough assessment of the problem and implement appropriate measures. Individuals may often be at their most vulnerable whilst travelling. Movement, by any means including road(in individual vehicles or by convoy) should be protected by a combination of:

a. precautionary measures (including basic security safeguards);

b. tactical measures (for example escorts, OPs and check points); and

c. contingency measures (possibly including such things as airmobile reserve forces).

55. PROTECTED AREAS. The aim of establishing protected areas is to create the conditions in a defined area within which a community will be able to respect and observe he law, and which will be protected from outside interference and attack. A protected area will be a region where, ultimately, the civil adminstration works and where the civil community is able to go about its business and live freely without fear. Having established such areas, the controlling authorities will aim to expand them in size and link them up.

The pursuit of civil affairs programmes and lower level community projects will therefore be critical to success in establishing protected areas. The development and participation of the civil administration is necessary if a protected area is going to have any chance of long-term success. Generally speaking, the establishment and maintenance of protected areas is fraught with difficulty since they will often cause friction, threaten the perceived impartiality of UNAMIR and demand large amounts of manpower.

56. INSTALLATIONS. Responsibility for guarding all civil installations rest with the civil police. Military assistance may be required to supplement the police or take over from them if weapons or techniques are required which only the military can supply. Installations should be classified according to their status and commanders should view critically all requests to provide guards. Classification of installations and guard commitments should be regularly reviewed.

57. REACTION. The ability of UNAMIR to react is essential to remaining balanced and regaining control over events. In all operations commanders should have reserves and contingency plans to assist the civil authority if required in dealing with outbreaks of violence including terrorism and riotous assemblies. The commander will normally be guided by these authorities, but he must make his own judgement as to what form or military assistance is appropriate, and he will remain accountable for his actions.

58. CONTROL MEASURES. Commanders may be called upon to enforce collective control measures. Prohibitions and restrictions are always distasteful to the general public and the imposition of extra controls is likely to be particularly unpopular. Consequently such measures must be carefully planned. The need for them should be made clear, and they should be fairly and equitably applied. Control measures which affect the civil population must be conducted within the law and no restriction should be placed on the movement or general freedom of civilians unless there is legal power or authority to do so.

AIMS

59. The aims of applying controls will include:

a. Improving the ability of the local security forces to enforce the law, thus increasing public confidence in government;

b. Deterring violent or criminal activity;

c. Restricting the potential for riotous assemblies;

d. Limiting the illegal traffic of war supplies or contraband;

e. Apprehending wanted persons; and

f. Detecting patterns of activity and gaining information.

APPLICATION

60. Control measures should be planned and directed on a joint police/military basis with the fullest cooperation at every level. Ineffective control will undermine public confidence in the security forces and measures should be applied firmly but with understanding. Whenever possible, explanations should be given to the public for actions taken. Controls should not be exercised for any longer than necessary. They may include road blocks, checkpoints, curfews, searches and patrols.

COORDINATION.

61. UNAMIR will be required to assist the civil authority in coordination humanitarian relief efforts. This aspect is covered in more detail in the next section. Coordination tasks could include the investigation of war crimes and human rights abuses.

TIMING FORCE WITHDRAWAL.

62. At a local level, commanders should continually review opportunities for returning responsibility to the civil authority. In general, the criterion for deciding whether to

withdraw from a particular miliary assistance function will be whether or not that function can be protected and exercised by the civil authority without further assistance. Such decisions are sensitive and will require careful judgement. Too early a withdrawal may prove disastrous, but over prolonged military commitment, may prove nearly as harmful. Accordingly, the withdrawal of UNAMIR commitments within a military assistance operation should be flexible, taking account of the need to respond rapidly to political developments. There may even be a need to recommit military forces. In general, commanders should therefore consider withdrawal from particular military commitments in three possible ways:

a. Rapidly (if the prospect of success seems assured);

b. Gradually (in phases which can be slowed down or speeded up). Such phases may relate to functions or geographical regions; and

c. Partially (by changing the role of UNAMIR from direct to indirect assistance).

HUMANITARIAN RELIEF

SCOPE

63. Humanitarian relief operations are the focus for attention within the UNAMIR mandate and may exert a profound influence on the overall course of events. In certain circumstances, they may also be used as a tool by the commander

to reward the compliance of belligerent factions.

LEGAL BASIS

64. In a situation of internal conflict there are certain provisions of international law that apply to the granting of humanitarian relief. For example, Article 3 of each of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 relating to the Protection of War Victims lays down certain minimum humanitarian standards which are to be adopted in cases of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of a party to the Conventions.

CONTEXT

65. Humanitarian relief operations will be carried out in conjunction with other UNAMIR tasks. In the Rwanda relief situation, there are a broad variety of international civil agencies that are involved; including the UN, and the government, non-government and private voluntary organizations. Some of these humanitarian relief operations will therefore occur under different guidance, authority and conditions of other operations going on in the same area. UNAMIR should be wary of lending direct support to non-accredited aid agencies which may be involved in illegal activities (such as the movement of weapons) and could thus, by association, prejudice the contingent's legitimacy.

TARGETS OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF.

DISPLACED PERSONS AND REFUGEES.

66. The migration of displaced persons (those forced to leave their homes) and refugees (those forced to leave their countries) are a common feature of Rwanda. The departure or removal of such people from their native support environments has put them direly in need of humanitarian relief. The numbers of those requiring help has been estimated at approximately 2 million.

RESIDENTS

67. Humanitarian relief may also be required for resident communities which are at risk from the activities of militias, the lack of food, water and medical supplies. Disease is also a factor.

PHASE OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS

68. UNAMIR will become involved in two particular phases of humanitarian relief operations:

a. EMERGENCY PHASE. The aim of the emergency phase is to save lives; It will therefore entail the provision of vital services and the distribution in the basic requirements for survival, namely food, water, fuel, shelter and medical care. Emphasis will be on the assembly and rescue of victims and, if necessary, transporting them away

from a life-threatening environment. Emergency medical care will be crucial component of this phase.

b. ADMINISTRATION PHASE. When the targets of humanitarian relief are no longer in immediate danger, the emphasis of the operation will shift to continuing the administration of those rescued and setting in hand arrangements for their subsequent rehabilitation and the reconstruction of public services.

PRINCIPLES OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS

LIAISON AND COORDINATION

69. Community leaders will always have much to offer in terms of influence, information and linguistic skills. Commanders should therefore always seek to liaise with and gain the support of community leaders to enlist their cooperation and improve the coordination of relief activity. To this end, local leaders should be involved as much as possible in the planning and supervision of activities. If feasible, they should be taken on reconnaissance trips and also included in such things as briefings, orders and advance parties.

SECURITY

70. Whenever possible, commanders should place priority on demobilizing and securing the area within which humanitarian

operations are to be mounted. The benefit of humanitarian operation will be minimized if they are not conducted with an effective security framework. There will be little long-term utility, for example, in providing humanitarian relief to communities who are in imminent danger of extermination from militias. A secure environment also provides better protection for humanitarian convoys than isolated escorts.

TIMELINESS

71. Timeliness is a critical facto to the success of humanitarian relief operations. Information, intelligence, reconnaissance, mobility, speed of reaction and effective planning and staff work are all aspects of activity that will contribute to humanitarian operations being mounted in a timely fashion.

PRIORITIES

72. The planning and execution of humanitarian relief operations should always reflect a careful prioritization of the targets and their needs. This prioritization will be reflected in the composition, equipment and supplies of relief teams. The movement of relief personnel and supplies to the target area should also be prioritized to meet the most urgent needs first.

UNIFIED COMMAND

73. Whenever possible, commanders should encourage the establishment of unified commands in which all appropriate agencies are represented. The commands should be supported by widespread liaison and reliable communications.

MILITARY TASKS

74. Military tasks pertaining to humanitarian relief are likely to fall into the following categories:

a. Protection of delivery and relief workers (against conflicting parties to a conflict of criminal elements);

b. Establishment, support and protection of regional safe havens and protected areas;

c. Administrative tasks, including the coordination of relief agencies and distribution supplies. Special forces are particularly suited to this task;

d. Engineer support, including road construction and maintenance, bridging and infrastructure engineering; and

e. Sustainment, including transportation, supply, maintenance and medical support.

CONCLUSION:

75. The implementation of the ceasefire SOP`S and the procedures, programs identified as required in the demilitarized

zone will greatly increase the likelihood of UNAMIR success in helping to restore normally in Sector 4 and Rwanda in general. It cannot be over emphasized that Humanitarian effort must be closely coordinated, with close cooperation of the Government and local leaders. In addition the proactive involvement UNAMIR commanders, contingents and military observers will be the key to success.