

UNAMDR

MINUTES OF MEETINGS AND NOTES  
FOR THE FILE

12 DEC 1993 - 12 OCT 1994

PLEASE RETAIN  
ORIGINAL ORDER

UNCLASSIFIED  
RHWG APR 2009

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES	<u>S-1120</u>
BOX	<u>46</u>
FILE	<u>1</u>
ACC.	<u>1998/0278</u>

3. Govt then takes currency & distribute it. But inflationary

~~UNICEF~~ UNICEF Chief in Kigali

- Wd like Govt to give an indication of how much (\$30/mth) to pay public servants, etc until situation normalizes.

FD (UNICEF)

- Ideally the approach shd be holistic.

\*

Like The Problem faced by Arafat

All donors giving aid how does Arafat pay salaries?

Now SASC

No cracks - no cold war  
\* No Belgium & France can pump money.

People are saying (Nurses & other hospital staff) if you don't pay salaries, we are going.

When people ask:

Why can't the finance Minister go to Brussels, Washington, Paris? But who's going to pay?

What form? Symbolic of the successful operation. & the revenue & logi Annex might come.

- Not more than 2 hrs, taking cognisance of the cosmopolitan character of the troops & personnel here.

Lunch may be too much. So from 2<sup>30</sup> - 4<sup>30</sup> perhaps

Q4 Logistics? What are we for a lot from here's closing down?

Q3: Useful to have maybe one (1) observer or (2) at border?

General says that they've thought about the ceremony & what the SRSG is thinking now, is very congruent. SRSG to send his invites, ambass of countries represented - Brazil, Zimbabwe

Asking lifeless body to give responses that it cannot give until the body is alive.

Is Minister (but no ministry) of Finance.

have to be invited. Netherlands, Slovakia.  
The Hungarians rep to be invited. Kamp

- a) Local dignitaries - Governor
- b) At least 7 among those with whom security has hot-nobbed places in Kabale.

ED (UPICKF)

Traditional Cold-war situation?  
2 or 3 things, will happen!

- 1) a cash advance
- 2) to bring in missing commodities - either bring in the food & sell them or sell the foreign exchange licence, etc.

(Note: The private sector has  
collapsed)

There are two traditional ways  
of doing this; giving (the flexibility  
of) the kind of aid.

- 1) some cash advance, yes!

Sector 1 could <sup>6</sup>

Citizens in Sector - new refugees.

4187  
17 Countries represented

The Main are:-

•	Ang med	
	Brit Cou	314
	Can sig	500
	Ethio batt	407
	Ghan batt	800
		820
•	Malawi Coy	166
	Zambatt	107
	Fratt batt	488
	Tunisia	26
	Nigeria	

all will bring total military strength

to close to '6000 - Thoutoung,  
Reporting.

\* Count

Q In the SW, when the French were  
there, I assume there was a semblance  
of the old Civil Administration.  
What's happened to that; -

A Under Op. Tuguoie - 209  
Gendarme were appointed ~~by~~ <sup>in</sup>  
Cynghu by the French.  
Before French left, Min Int. visited

Cynghu and spoke to acting Pref.  
Now, Gov. appointed a new Pref.  
Gov. asked old Gendarme to super-  
viser Arms and re-apply to join the  
new Administration.

F/c

Military Think: What is the threat?

The threat of 2) To those that are  
hoping to come back

3) The threat to the various agencies  
so that they don't become targets - resources  
are limited.

\* A series of Risks, 48 \*

Inside the country, RGF, 'Fear of the un-  
known.

Unanimous: Observe, Monitor, Assess.  
No Civilian Police/Gendarmes  
Law and order - Security Agents.

During the conflict, RGF withdrew into  
Tanzania } it's about 8-10,000 in SW  
Burundi } even more in NW  
Zaire }



Task?

Unamiir to deploy a show of  
force. Invasion to be unattractive.

Converbatung - SW - unknown to  
Unamiir until 27, August.

Deployed - 3 Battalions (unamiir) •

to show presence.

Section 3 - Size of a Company  
(MICOB)

" 2 - Very weak - only MICOB.

" 5 - fairly stable - We know  
more about infrastructure of a logistic  
type - Can Hospital & MICOB.

No troops

" 1 : Some as such  
Engineers & RPA battalions

Various techniques:

People in the countryside knew they would not be taxed, all the hoarding stopped.

Some collective approach is required.

How

• WFF / UNICE / UNHCR  $\Rightarrow$  Everything you give is dependent upon the money capital left. So everybody should chip in. But how?  
Should sit <sup>with them</sup> on the table to discuss what's a fair share. What's the final decision on the margin. Ed could sell this in a week or N/Y.

DE (UNICEF) The good thing about  
- thousands is, disaster is complete  
There is a, financial cut

sympathy for the regime, so  
this is true for innovation.

So at some level (DHA) etc  
or in those days (Lead Africa)  
in Cambodia - Major rice  
shortage - UNICEF brought in

large quantities - all civil servants  
paid twice their needs in  
rice. No CS can pay others with rice.  
Govt - no rice tax in villages.

So, rice just enough!

Russians - provided all the rice  
that the Army needed.

Q If you have a UN Rwanda  
radio specifically addressed to the  
Rwandese, some problems of this  
radio is obviously so.  
But and include a communication  
addressing the UN troops (who are in  
all parts of the country in  
Goma & Bukavu) then UNAMIR  
will have the legal justification  
to operate (even though there is a  
Govt. in Kigali). This can always  
be justified on the grounds that  
UNAMIR is addressing its troops.

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In Holland  
money has been  
raised for Radio to Rwanda.

In Ghana, <sup>1</sup>Gold Mining?  
with (Road to work)

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### 3 Radio;

In the last week, UNATHIR has an excellent Report from the man who set up the Imfoobur's Radio Station.

UNATHIR no tint, no color.

Baroness Chatter came: she promised to help with Radio. Yes, the British, but our shortfall arise? UNICAF, UNHCR and others who want base this radio station and make up to this shortfall.

SR 34

① 11 am

- Try to concentrate on real issues.
- visit is an environment to UNAMIR & he'd like to underline the co-operation of Agencies & all (UNICEF included).
- Political background

• Up to April 6, 1994, UNAMIR trying to find an equilibrium. After that, military situation.

19 July - RPF in full control of Rwanda except SW (path). Military victory. Temporary solution which has seen one party emerge.

• 1) RPF has a cabinet which reflects national character. Hutus/Tutsis - No! Rwandans, Y8.

2) RFA is saying all the right things: Reconciliation, participation, individual process - even for criminals.

Summary Justice, no! Even RPA soldiers  
b's are disciplined (2 killed).

Refugees occupying others houses?  
Kigame: Yes old refugees deserve to be  
compensated; not out of the rights  
of other Rwandese.

Three days ago, Butere Rally

Q: I am a refugee from Burundi.  
Now, I have taken land/property. Owners  
have now asked me to vacate. Yes,  
Tension.

RPA cannot find an audience in  
the camps. Only milk collecting.

UNAMIR has no radio job to find  
the facts.

There are way stations, water, shelter,  
seed. This is an attraction

Most people ~~do~~ not appreciate  
the degree of dislocation: - Liberia,  
Afghanistan;

A: Not the kind of massacre in Rwanda  
because the Radio (Mill-Coll) tells  
them so. The degree of defilement is

- so complete that ~~the~~ <sup>4</sup> only, SSS,  
could not see a soul, only soldiers.  
Kigali.  
Stadium - 20,000 people - Health / sanitation  
hazard.

- Light was horrific.

Contrast with Afghanistan, Rwanda  
was not so on.

By the entire effort UNAMIR is working  
at is to get the heart-beating, by  
you ask him to still working.  
democracy??



2

UNICEF & el have fixed water. But no light.

Tele Cams, banks & Canadians, ok. from yesterday.

Radio Kipali can now reach the whole station & Relay stations all over.

note: as of yesterday.

Rwanda is a radio - culture country.

That's why Radio Nkya Collins has been able to work here after April 2.

So UNAMIR Radio a must.

note

The people will come back when promises are not / fulfilled.

P. 7.0

## 2 Syndromes

### Prevention Syndrome

— French leaving — Another going?

Good God, no trouble. The exodus  
to Bulgaria was not catastrophic.

Reason: — Close co-operation from all

- Africa & N. Africa. Wholehearted  
planning by all. Then UNATRA  
exudes confidence

### Cure Syndrome

normalisation. Trying to let  
people de-traumatise — getting  
them back to work.

•

So, degree, of unsafety required.  
RENP

Airport? and if  
~~unres~~  
 Electricity - \$2m Then all the  
 hard work that Afering / NCOs  
 have done will be fulfilled

Alternative: Generators ???

Telecoms Radio, Water etc.

Short Term

1. Airport
2. Power + Elec
3. Water
4. Radio
5. Telecom
6. Harvest - FAO - ex-director - Camp <sup>next week</sup>
7. Hospitals
8. Security - Council

Medium-Term

1. Police Force
  2. Prison System
  3. Central Bank - Currency
  4. Schools - Child Care
  5. Administrative codes
  6. Repair of Govt. buildings
  7. Municipal services
  8. De-mining
  9. Roads + Bridges
  10. Transport
- (All the good work done so far might be lost)

1b  
If we know that insecurity is threaten-  
ing the camp, then we shall forgo or  
strengthen the security.

\* This letter should be one of the terms of  
Ref. of the SRSC (to Zaire) - to mention!  
ED to bring to SRSC's notice.  
Issue should be discussed at the Inter-Dis-  
tributed levels.

UNHCR cannot separate Ref/Inter-hamwe.  
Yes. But SRSC to talk to UNHCR-Rep.  
Within Rwanda, CIVIL.

• Insecurity internally?

Not necessarily Ref/Inter-hamwe.  
RFA to e.p. killing of priest ~~in~~ Gikwama.  
When we know that this is RPF's, then  
we send a letter of protest.

DFC | C. Staff | Corridors have been not established  
①

- H.E.'s letter
- Safe Corridors to be established?
- \* NGOs to provide the info - since we have to depend on reliable info in the creation of safe corridors.

⑥ need for verification of refugee flow!!

⑦ Note: Rwandan pop. is Rural based  
Way Stations? Cyangugu to Kigali - Way Station at Butarū.

Gisenyi, — Kibungu — Kigali.

East-End refugees: The reason why refugees are not coming is that WATNIK is not facilitating their return. Or perhaps, the refugees have stayed in Eastern frontier.

\* The President's principal concern is the security of camp outside Rwanda - Tanzania, Zaire.

But Technocrats should be paid! Or else, <sup>non-</sup>starter!  
- Govt. assuming greater responsibility.  
- Request for increased security in sector, maintenance etc. Sector 4 will be a crucial

4061

UNDP / NGO's meeting - find out when?

UNDP - Res

HCR  
UNICEF

~~Tuesday / Friday~~ : CH 15  
~~8 pm~~ ⇒ 84 NGOs  
Mr. A. Henin


10 am, Tuesday 6-9-94

Alma Rhaizoni

UN Res Rep

Esq

Res Rep



820 m

820 m

UN Inter-Agency Meeting

Monday - Weds - Fridays

8 am

13

WB is coming on the 14<sup>th</sup>.

If Agencies so wish, adjust to  
get power back, WB will co-operate.  
Only \$2 m needs. Each Agency  
to contribute.

Power is a Catalyst!! for  
things to come back to normal.

Note:

- ED will be willing to lend his  
endorsement to SRS's

With regards to the Cash-  
flow, there is a need to get over  
this. Yes, CF & light, we are over  
the hill.



Q ED

Is there a need to bring food to make up for the loss in harvest?

EA

1.5 m people foodless.

In Butare, violence & hunger and not have not. Starvation & famine!

Harvesting, according to UNICEF Kigali <sup>Director</sup> is partial.

ED UNICEF

Somebody should estimate the impact needs of Rwanda. Urgently package:

1) Food for work 2) Cambodia example, etc.

Note F.C.

12

" If you do not control the  
Afenda, you will be controlled  
by the Afenda."

So radio trap is in priority.

• Q:

SHSC's assessment of RAF's  
(and ALIS') intentions required  
by the EDUNARIA

A:

SITREPs everyday state through  
that UNCONFIRMED reports about  
possible invasion.

Assessment

1. RAF do not have the capability  
of big hit now.

SRSG: now mandated to go to Zaire  
to talk to them (Tanzanians also)  
to separate the <sup>inter-humans</sup> militia from the common man.  
i.e. To separate the wolf from the  
sheep.

\* This Govt. was engaged in the  
process of a broader base of  
reconciliation. Not all the former  
men were murderers, some were  
swept along with the tide.

Q ED UNICEF

Bukavu - problem of substantial  
of children in army camps i.e.  
650,000. Proposal is to get them  
discharged into civilian life.  
In UGANDA, this happened.

ETHIOBAT & MILOB have noticed war-  
pons coming across the border.  
Violence if RGF are asked to sur-  
render weapons.

Butare - 114 RGF gave themselves up.

### Sector I

- Normalisation - farmers complaint  
1) - no matches

BUKAVU - Difficult

Major McNair

Convey from Gungah  
Gifford Pick them up

Conveys to Life HAC by leaving

Seeds < MINAGRIC co-ordinating

\* chaperoning the civilian  
administration in Sector 4.

Normalization Plan

1. World Bank loan \$200
2. Hospital

## UFP

Seeds - \$12m repore senting \$86m  
Inamps. With transport costs -  
Savings will be over \$100m

(Mombasa  $\rightarrow$  Goma)

Rains - People will work

Food: Direct food requirements \$10.5m  
Quasi (Schools, etc) \$4.5m

ION : Int'l Organization for Migration

\* Transporting about 1000 a day returns.  
\* Working closely with UNHCR

\* 60% of people displaced. ION responding

\* UNHCR / UNHCR. Non-travellers ensemble

\* It is a Regional Responsibility \*

Rwanda

Burundi

Zaire

Tanzania

} not just money

Kagera basin / Kivu from

Mr. URASA - UNHCR

Ch 8 Unami

Call Sgt. Kilo Hotel 1

Major McNair

Returnees brought in -

\* UNAMIR to feed??

SRGG - UNRZO/UNDP

NGOs do as they please.

\* Now, no more

Deliver food

Provide blankets

Exchange money

Now: WFP/IOH/ICRC

Co-ordination can not happen as an imposed thing. It is a voluntary process through proper Information Management System.

Everybody should have access to info so that co-ordination can just happen by itself.

HA Cells were formed and chaired by The Human Office of The Provincial level on a very regular basis. Here, detailed info gathering was done.



But is The Arusha Declaration <sup>still</sup> alive?

Ok; only some elements of Arusha.

What is Gollo's plan after Umma,  
Dec 9?

---

Humanitarian Assistance?

2 years minimum!!

What about rehabilitation?

Perhaps decides.

a co-ordination arrangement  
mechanism which is substantive  
enough, strong enough cannot be  
funded by IDA or just any Agency.  
Short-term memory :- No con-  
tinuity! etc.

Wednesday - 21st Aug 94

Visit of Australian Sec Minister  
to meet with SAS C, RPA, FLC  
and HAC, Atterton Heim.

At the moment, all NGO meet-  
ings are held with UNRWO.

Note:

The incidents re matchetting  
and sporadic shooting/killing  
in Sector 4. This were incidents  
which happened just before the war.  
So, watch-out. Any outbreak?  
● BURUNDI  
Tension is rife.

Southern part of Gitarama  
is extremely worrying.

\* A whole lot of local staff working  
with NGOs are disappearing. Gov't to  
be approached on this!

Prefect of Butwe + Gitarama / Rubenguri  
Gisenyi. Doing well.

Maj McNeil

300 displaced + 300 Brit Con from  
Gugugu into Butwe.

Kibuye displaced - In Kigali - much to do -

protected from UNAMIR. With 200 vehicles,  
an aid agency is always around to  
accommodate them. Perhaps the returnees  
should be told that all The Military &  
UNAMIR would do is to bring them here  
& nothing else.

Perhaps the MICROBS should slow down.  
Give UNHCR (& others) to play the key role  
with all their buses.

Since end of ceasefire, about 12,000 people  
have been moved into legal or Refuges.

Information Flow - is terribly important to  
a proper data-base.

Distinguish x Information & Speculation

Info is what is actually observed.

IFC - observation

Drinking? Carelessly moving about?  
Money exchange?

DRAFT

As a follow-up to Security Council Resolution 872 of 5 October 1993, UNAMIR has now established an office for the co-ordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Rwanda with the appointment of a Humanitarian Assistance Officer (HAO) to "oversee and co-ordinate the humanitarian assistance efforts of UN Agencies, bi-lateral donors, non-governmental and other concerned institutions."

As the Humanitarian situation remains worrisome and central in the overall ops of UNAMIR, The Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) has understandably given a high priority to humanitarian questions in Rwanda.

INTERIM ARRANGEMENT:

Obviously, there is an overwhelming need for UNAMIR to provide an intensified and co-ordinated activity at the policy level to address the serious humanitarian concerns in Rwanda with the main aim of helping those in need; thereby improving the political and security situation in the country.

The UN Dept. of Humanitarian Affairs, supported by UNDP, has set up the UN Rwanda Emergency Relief Office in Nairobi, with sub-offices in Kigali and Kabale. According to UNREO, a broad understanding was reached on the allocation of responsibilities among UN Agencies for the Rwanda Emergency at a recent meeting (involving UNCHR Ms. Sadako Ogata, WFP Executive Director Ms. Catherine Bertini, UNICEF Deputy Executive Director Karin Sham Poo, UNDP Assistant Administrator and Director of the Regional Bureau of Africa Ms. E. Johnson-Sirleaf and the DHA Director and Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Mr. Peter Hansen) wherein UNREO/DHA was charged with the following responsibilities:

1. Co-ordination of humanitarian relief assistance in Rwanda
2. Elaboration of strategies and contingency plans
3. Field monitoring, situation and needs assessment
4. Interaction with local authorities
5. Liaising with military contingent Commanders & UNAMIR FC
6. Security procedures and communications.

As an emergency relief measure, the above scope of authority and area of responsibility of UNREO should be appreciated and acknowledged; of course, pending the establishment of the UNAMIR Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Assistance. With the establishment of The HAO now, the office of The SRSG would expect to see an enhanced co-operation between UNAMIR and UNDP -- which is traditionally charged with the responsibility of co-ordinating humanitarian relief activities in Rwanda --with a view to ensuring a more effective and rational utilization of the resources of the various humanitarian agencies operating in the country.

2/2

Engadana Kibungu areas, are fairly empty.

Ministry of Rehabilitation Rep

Report all cases of Govt KPA accidents!  
From Accident - All

1. 1000 RPA Govt. wants NAOs to help in  
 and the job back to the

Frank has asked that I should be a little bit more like a

in their location when want to be transported when

3. Part 1: Gantt chart used places as Rigat for references.

1) Bismarck (P. H. ... + 9.30 am tomorrow:

1. What is the main purpose of the study?

2) USDP - For Rehabilitation Dep. R. Rep - unknown

21 Sept 1964

SHD DEP. Monday 9:30 am.

of WNC Radio Station, Duluth, Minn.

& UNB 1000 and in Review 89 & In local language.

5, but Radios/batteries shd be in the Camps (in groups).

Customs 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 70,000 80,000 90,000 100,000 110,000 120,000 130,000 140,000 150,000 160,000 170,000 180,000 190,000 200,000 210,000 220,000 230,000 240,000 250,000 260,000 270,000 280,000 290,000 300,000 310,000 320,000 330,000 340,000 350,000 360,000 370,000 380,000 390,000 400,000 410,000 420,000 430,000 440,000 450,000 460,000 470,000 480,000 490,000 500,000 510,000 520,000 530,000 540,000 550,000 560,000 570,000 580,000 590,000 600,000 610,000 620,000 630,000 640,000 650,000 660,000 670,000 680,000 690,000 700,000 710,000 720,000 730,000 740,000 750,000 760,000 770,000 780,000 790,000 800,000 810,000 820,000 830,000 840,000 850,000 860,000 870,000 880,000 890,000 900,000 910,000 920,000 930,000 940,000 950,000 960,000 970,000 980,000 990,000 1,000,000

May 1901. 1st year of class at Lodi

May 1901. 1st year of class at Lodi

11 p Head of Agency Meeting  
Monday, Wednesday, Friday

PROPOSED ARRANGEMENT:


As the overall Humanitarian Assistance Co-ordinating body in Rwanda, UNAMIR should create a centralized, integrated Policy Unit to plan and co-ordinate UNAMIR's role and activities in the overall humanitarian assistance effort in the country. To be effective, UNAMIR's HAO should, in particular, liaise closely with the following two(2) institutions which have contributed immensely in humanitarian work in the country; albeit in an ad hoc\temporary basis thus far under UNREO :

- (i) The UNAMIR Military contingent which has been providing escorts for delivery convoys and security protection for distribution centres and storage depots and
- (ii) The UNDP\UNREO and various relief agencies including ICRC, UNHCR, UNICEF, FAO/WFP, WHO, etc.

MODUS OPERANDI:

To ensure a smooth co-ordination arrangement under the auspices of UNAMIR, a meeting should be held with UNDP, UNAMIR's Military and key relief agencies under the chairmanship of The SRSG or the Executive Director to emphasize the need for co-operation with The HAO. Since the HAO is expected to be submitting Humanitarian Reports to the SRSG through the Executive Director on a regular basis, the obvious need for relief agencies to submit their work plan(s) and status report(s) without delay cannot be over-emphasized. UNDP\UNREO should also be encouraged to co-operate within the context and import of this endeavour. In a bid to establish an effective co-ordination arrangement at the policy level with immediate effect, UNAMIR should, as a guide, give priority to institutions and relief agencies that co-operate and collaborate with UNAMIR's overall co-ordinating arrangement.

Submitted please.

  
Abu Bakarr Sidique Dao  
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OFFICER

28th Aug, 1994

670000  
50-51-0000  
2000

200000  
200000

50-51-0000  
200000

# Meeting UNREC / NGOs

UNDP Res Rep

What is happening in corridor of Gisenyi / etc.  
13 humanitarian orgs. are working in the corridor

Q: around 1000 Refugees returning per day (MILOB)

MILOB is looking into possible exactions because refugees also coming from Road / Forest.

NGOMA: Now there is improvement. Sick people now have beds. Yes Hospitals and Clinics formerly, NO!

BUT The situation in Goma is bad. Rainy season - Volcano still.

What is new in GOMA? \* We are returning only if "our Govt." is returning with us.

\* Intimidation / Incident - RCF / RPA / Zairean Troop.

1st - Time last Friday - UNHCR was able to repatriate 40 people previously, NO!!

Ex RCF / Families: ICRC + UNHCR to help officials from Rwanda + Zaire are discussing. Yes, RENP by SASG:

## Regional Reports

NE: \* MINACRIE will take up seeds issue. UNREC serving as Secretariat.

\* Need for a vet NGO to get in touch with Africa

SW: Incident x uniformed armed men!! Of all info that situation is calm. Case load is reducing. No need to open other cases. Gikongoro - calm. M...

PLAN DE REDACTION DU RAPPORT DE LA MISSION  
CONJOINTE GOUVERNEMENT/NATIONS UNIES SUR  
L'EVALUATION DU COUT DE RAPATRIEMENT ET  
D'ELOIGNEMENT DES REFUGIES RWANDAIS.

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I. Préambule / Introduction :

- Termes de référence

II. Rapport de mission :

- II.1. Etapes d'investigations

- a. Etat d'esprit population
- b. Considérations sur le rapatriement et éloignement
- c. Réfugiés : . Civiles
  - . Dignitaires de l'ex gouvernement
  - . militaires des FAR
- d. Autorités locales
- e. Conclusions : conditions (retour et éloignement).

- II.2. Phase de l'évaluation technique

II.2.1. Rapatriement :

- a. - Identification des volontaires au retour
- b. - Situation des camps par rapport aux frontières
- c. - Encadrement, escorte et transport.

II.2.2. Eloignement :

- a. - Identification des groupes à éloigner
- b. - Identification des camps et lieux de résidence des groupes à éloigner
- c. - Situation camps de résidence par rapport aux sites d'hébergement
- d. - Encadrement, escorte et transport.

II.2.3. Sites d'hébergement :

- a. - Site de Kongolo
  - \* Etat des lieux données géographiques
  - \* Etat psycho-social
  - \* Infrastructures d'accueil
  - \* Equipements

.../...



JOINT ZAIRE/UN COMMISSION ON THE SITUATION  
IN THE  
RWANDESE REFUGEES CAMPS IN ZAIRE

MISSION REPORT

BACKGROUND

1. It was agreed that a joint working party would be formed and meet in order to assess the logistic/financial framework of the operation of transferring the Rwandan army in exile and former political leaders to new sites more removed from the border, the location of sites, the capital and running costs of the camps and the security requirements of the move. Also, the Rwandese government should be urged to create conditions favourable to voluntary repatriation of the majority of the Rwandan refugees and commence an enhanced, public campaign for reconciliation and reassurance for returning refugees. Recognizing UNHCR's primary responsibility for the voluntary repatriation of refugees, UNAMIR should play a central and visible role in providing reassurance at key points (eg. at borders) and to organise humanitarian relief for the returning refugees.

COMPOSITION OF THE COMMISSION

2. The mission is composed of the following members:

a. UNAMIR

- (1) Brig Gen H. Anyidoho, Head of Mission;
- (2) Mr. A.B. Sidique Dao, OIC Humanitarian Assistance Department;
- (3) Lt Col P. Desnoyers, Military Logistic Advisor;
- (4) Mr. G Briere, Civilian Logistic Advisor;

b. UNDP - Mr. Stanislaus Nkwain, Deputy Resident Representative;

c. UNHCR - Mr. Jiddo Van Drunen, Head of Operations Special Unit for Rwanda and Burundi;

d. ZAIRE Authorities

- (1) Mr. Mutiri-wa-Bashara, Prime Minister's Head of Mission;
- (2) Col Mag Mbidi Nikeni, Principal Advisor for the Ministry of National Defence;
- (3) Medical Col Kabanda Kurhenga, Commandant of the Medical Corps ZAF;

## **SITES VISITED**

### **GENERAL INTRODUCTION**

For the installation/relocation of the FAR currently living under difficulty circumstances in North and South Kivu the Government of Zaïre proposed four sites all of which are military installations.

The entire Commission visited the military camps of Kongolo (Shaba Region) and Lokando (Maniema). For logistic reasons only four out of the 14 members who went to Mbandaka visited the camp of Irebu (Equateur Region). There was no need to visit the military camp in Buta (Haut Zaïre) for two main reasons that the Commission only discovered on arrival in the town of Buta :

- a) that the camp was occupied by the local police for whom no alternative accomodation could be found ;
- b) that camp can only house 120 people.

All three sites visited are rather far from North and South Kivu (from 700 Km to 1.500 Km away). Access to two of the sites (Lokando and Irebu) for the near future will demand the use of river transport (very slow and potentially hazardous because of sand bars). It should be pointed out though that Lokando will be accessible by land from Kindu airport if an existing 60 Km road is repaired.

Government of Zaïre officials have suggested that all the military and their dependents to be transferred (estimated at 30,000 to 50,000) should be distributed to as many Regions as possible to reduce the political impact. This will argue for our using all three available military camps proposed.

I believe though that for several reasons, if we could use the better two sites (Irebu and Lokando) instead of all three sites (to include Kongolo), it will be advantageous for all. Arrangements of policing/securing the camps, administering them, as well as medical/water/other common facilities will be more cost effective if we could use two sites : Lokando for the 10,000 to 12,000 in the South Kivu area and Irebu for the estimated up to 18,000 military and their dependents in the Goma area.

As a negotiation position vis-à-vis the Zairean authorities, we could argue that we have gone into 2 out of the 3 potential regions that could hold the military group to repair/revitalise those military installations. Furthermore, the local economy will receive an injection of external funds and other resources with the UN presence. Also, wherever possible we can improve the local infrastructure with a relatively small outlay to the satisfaction of the local population (60 km road Kindu/Lokando to be repaired, airports at Kindu and Mbandaka already made of tarmac can be improved further if necessary,

medical and potable water facilities for FAR military and their families will be shared with the Zaireans in the immediate environs of the camps). Finally, the Zairean military personnel in the selected sites may have a role in the policing of the camps, alongside the UN military contingents.

### **KONGOLO, SHABA REGION**

#### **ACCESS**

The military camp is part of the town of Kongolo which has 60,000 inhabitants. This means that on landing at the air strip of the town the military to be transferred will only travel over less than 3 Kilometres to reach the camp. The air strip is however of laterite and there is some uncertainty as to its capacity to receive large planes. Whereas the local airport officials suggest that the air strip can take planes that can carry 500 people at a time, the UN logistics experts on the Commission maintain that it cannot take planes that will carry more than 80 to 100 people at a time.

Currently it takes about a week to reach Bukavu or Lubumbashi by road. The train comes to the town once every three months, due to shortage of fuel. This means that if fuel is made available the train can reach the town more often.

#### **CURRENT USE OF CAMP**

The camp is currently occupied by 170 Zairean military with their families.

#### **STATE OF STRUCTURES**

The camp has probably more buildings than the other two camps of Lokando and Irebu. Single rooms with covered verandahs alone amount to 1,040. In addition, there are many other structures, Kitchens, officers' houses (maison de cadres), dispensaries, maternity, large school bloc, offices, 4 dining halls (refectoirs) and other structures. Originally the camp was planned for a battalion.

Unfortunately, many of the roofing sheets have disappeared ; possibly some 40 percent of the structures have no roofing sheets.

The camp is very spacious and if selected there will be no difficulty in finding space to construct semi-permanent structures or erect tents.

#### **INFRASTRUCTURE**

**WATER** : the camp is on the banks of the Zaire river. It will therefore be possible to pump the river water, and treat it for human consumption. However the local authorities seem to expect that the town's water system (for its 60,000 inhabitants) should be rehabilitated with the coming of the Rwandese military. This will involve replacing much of the town's piping system, repairing the pumping machine (80 horse power) and above all providing fuel and chemicals for running the system.

**ELECTRICITY** : Since the camp is in the town it will be difficult to provide the Rwandese a generator for lighting Whereas the townsfolk stay in darkness at night. The town had electricity once ; to rehabilitated it will demand replacing most of the cables (installed in the 1950s many stolen), replacing the large generator which used to supply electricity to the town and, once again, provide on a continuing basis fuel to power the generator. We were informed that the 270 house power thermal plant the town had cannot be repaired and that to provide adequate capacity the town needed a 500 horse power capacity engine.

**HEALTH** : There is a large medical facility in the town. Only part of the buildings are in use. If we could reserve UN support to the community to only one sector we will recommend the full rehabilitation and provision of medical equipment and other resources to the medical centre so that it can be used by both the Rwandese and the local people instead of creating a separate medical facility exclusively for the inhabitants of the military camp. Incidentally the camp is less than half a kilometre from the town hospital.

#### GENERAL CONCLUSION

Logistically, Kongolo is to my mind the most daunting of the three potential sites.

Furthermore, as was reported earlier, there was an orderly demonstration at the airport against any transfer (with placards) on our arrival. The population only concurred with the delegation when it was explained to them that they would receive benefits with Rwandese's arrival in their town.

Despite all of the above, it should be noted that if it is decided to use this camp, it can host more than 15,000 without any difficulty.

## IREBU CAMP, EQUATEUR REGION

### ACCESS

Irebu can be reached entirely by the Zaire river, from Mbandaka over a distance of some 130 Kilometres. That was the mode of transport the mission uses on 11 October. The level of the water was very high and there was therefore not much danger of sand bars. We were informed that except for the peak of the dry season (June to August) the river can be navigated all year round, by large barges that can carry up to 500 people. We saw some of these large boats/barges at the ports loading people and goods. (With a speed boat we did the journey in 1 3/4 hours downstream and 1 hour 50 minutes upstream)

The colonel in charge of the camp also advised us that there was once an air strip (1000 metres by 60 metres) but it was now completely overgrown. Any repair of the air strip would require heavy machinery to be brought in from Mbandaka or elsewhere by boat.

### CURRENT USE

The camp was originally built by the Belgians in the 1920s. Additional buildings were added to it up to the 1940s. It was closed in 1960 and reopened in 1979. Since its reopening it has been used as a Naval Training Centre. 375 military personnel (men and women) currently live in the camp.

The buildings were generally in good condition, certainly the best maintained of the three camps we visited. Among the buildings some 10 blocks (each divided into two) can be turned into dormitories to house up to 100 people each. In addition there were some 54 two room self-contained buildings meant for the more senior non-commissioned officers and almost all in use today.

### SHELTER

The colonel estimated that up to 3,000 people could be housed in the existing buildings.

Almost all the buildings had their roofs in tact and in reasonably good shape. Even though we are in the rainy season, we did not see any leakages in the buildings which were not in use. The larger blocks, which are mostly not being used, will need to have windows, doors and mosquito netting installed before people can be made to live in them. I would also suggest that in several of the buildings the cement floor be re-done.

Naturally to house more than 3,000 people, additional structures (tents, semi-permanent buildings or other) will have to be erected.

The camp is very spacious and can carry the anticipated 10,000 to 15,000 people without any difficulty.

#### **OTHER FACILITIES**

**WATER :** The camp is on the banks of the Zaire river. Since there is no large population group near the site there was no evidence of the river water being polluted. The preferred mode of potable water supply should be the OXFAM method of pumping river water into large metallic containers, filtering/purifying the water, and then providing public stand-pipes. We were also advised that there was a spring which was some five Kilometres from the camp.

● **HEALTH :** There is a functioning dispensary in the camp, with three nurses two of whom we met during our visit. The building in which they were operating can be used to set up a clinic, to include admission facilities.\*

**SANITATION :** Latrines will have to be built.

**COOKING FACILITIES :** Kitchens will have to be built.

#### **GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS**

● The local population is said to be very small, probably under 3,000. The nearest village is not within sight of the camp. The authorities at Mbandaka were clearly enthusiastic about the military coming (it is the President's home region). With the difficulty of access to the area there are no local population groups to put any up objection to their presence. The camp however is in a very pleasant setting and with the right frame of mind the military, if taken there, can engage in sporting and large scale agricultural activities.

The initial transfer of the military will be by air up to Mbandaka (Good tarmac airport) to be followed by boat up to Irebu. The airstrip in Irebu will however have to be repaired for the purposes of rapid access (medical evacuation, for instance) or urgent resupply (Drugs etc.).

AIRLIFT REQUIREMENTS (WITH 3 X C130)

ACTIVITIES	BUKAVU to KONGOLO	GOMA to KINDU	GOMA to MBANDAKA
Pers to move	10,000	10,000	11,200
Req'd chaks	167	167	187
Total chaks	210	210	235
Loading time	1	1	1
Flying time	1	1	3
Unloading time	1	1	1
Flying time	3	1	3
Total time	6	4	8
Chaks/day/ plane	2	3	1
Days req'd for 1 X C130	105	70	235
Days req'd with reassigned C 130's	105	70	70 35 (X 2 = 70) 32 (X 3 = 96) Total = 137 days/20 weeks

1. 60 pax/plane.
2. 80% availability of aircraft flying time.
3. BUKAVU to KONGOLO return flying time includes refuelling in GOMA.
4. Chaks/day is based on 12 hours day light flying time.

AIRLIFT REQUIREMENTS (WITH 6 X C130)

ACTIVITIES	BUKAVU to KONGOLO	GOMA to KINDU	GOMA to MBANDAKA
Pers to move	10,000	10,000	11,200
Req'd chalks	167	167	187
Total chalks	210	210	235
Loading time	1	1	1
Flying time	1	1	3
Unloading time	1	1	1
Flying time	3	1	3
Total time	6	4	8
Chalks/day/ plane	2	3	1
Days req'd for 2 X C130	53	35	118
Days req'd with reassigned C 130's	53	35	35 18 16 total = 69 days/10 weeks

1. 60 pax/plane.
2. 80% availability of aircraft flying time.
3. BUKAVU to KONGOLO return flying time includes refuelling in GOMA.
4. Chalks/day is based on 12 hours day light flying time.



PROTECTION LOGISTICS IMPLICATIONS COSTS

SITES/MODE OF TRANSPORT	VOLUNTARY		INVOLUNTARY	
	RESOURCES PERSONS	COSTS/ MONTH US \$K	RESOURCES PERSONS	COSTS/ MONTH US \$K
Current sites (ZAF)				
Transport (North Kivu)	0	0	20	60
Transport (South Kivu)	0	0	20	60
Transport (Air - GOMA to KINDU)	0	0	4	12
Transport (Air - GOMA to MBANDAKA)	0	0	4	12
Transport (Air - BUKAVU to KONGOLO)	0	0	4	12
Transit site (GOMA)	0	0	120	360
Transit site (BUKAVU)	0	0	120	360
Transit site (KINDU)	0	0	120	360
Transit site (MBANDAKA)	0	0	120	360
Transport (road - KINDU)	0	0	10	30
Transport (boat - KINDU to LOKANDU)	0	0	20	60
Transport (road - MBANDAKA)	0	0	10	30
Transport (boat - MBANDAKA to IREBU)	0	0	20	60
Transport (road - KONGOLO)	0	0	10	30
New sites (Political leaders)	0	0	800	2,400
New site (LOKANDU)	12	42	800	2,400
New site (IREBU)	12	42	800	2,400
New site (KONGOLO)	12	42	800	2,400
Total cost/month	36	126	3,812	11,436

1. \$3,000.00 is the estimated monthly cost of one military not on MSA includes: monthly contribution paid to the country,

deployment/redeployment, sustainment (food, water), other costs (fuel, spare parts, R&R, medical, dental...)

2. It is estimated that those in receipt of MSA will cost monthly \$3,500.00 (MSA + transport)

TRANSPORTATION COSTS (WITH 3 X C130)

SITES/MODE OF TRANSPORT	RESOURCES	COSTS US \$K
Current sites (ZAF)		
Transport (North Kivu)	4 X bus 8 X trucks	440
Transport (South Kivu)	3 X bus 6 X trucks	330
Transport (Air - GOMA to KINDU) - 1 X C130 at 3 chalks/day	334 flying hrs	1670
Transport (Air - GOMA to MBANDAKA) 1 X C130 at 1 chalk/day	1002 flying hrs	5010
Transport (Air - BUKAVU to KONGOLO) 1 X C130 at 2 chalks/day	500 flying hrs	2500
Transit site (KINDU)	1 X bus 1 X truck	80
Transit site (MBANDAKA)	1 X bus 1 X truck	80
Transport (boat - KINDU to LOKANDU) at 180 persons/day for 55 days	1 X boat	82.5
Transport (boat - MBANDAKA to IREBU) at 60 persons/day for 167 days	1 X boat	250.5
Transport (road - KONGOLO)	1 X bus 1 X truck	80
Total	10 X bus 17 X trucks 2 X boats 1,836 FH	10,523

1. Estimated costs:

1 X flying hour (FH)	= \$5,000.00
1 X bus (purchase)	= \$50,000.00
1 X 3 T truck (")	= \$30,000.00

TRANSPORTATION COSTS (WITH 6 X C130)

SITES/MODE OF TRANSPORT	RESOURCES	COSTS US \$K
Current sites (ZAF)		
Transport (North Kivu)	8 X bus 16 X trucks	880
Transport (South Kivu)	6 X bus 12 X trucks	660
Transport (Air - GOMA to KINDU) - 2 X C130 at 3 chalks/day/each	334 flying hrs	1670
Transport (Air - GOMA to MBANDAKA) 2 X C130 at 1 chalk/day/each	1002 flying hrs	5010
Transport (Air - BUKAVU to KONGOLO) 2 X C130 at 2 chalks/day/each	500 flying hrs	2500
Transit site (KINDU)	2 X bus 2 X truck	160
Transit site (MBANDAKA)	2 X bus 2 X truck	160
Transport (boat - KINDU to LOKANDU) at 180 persons/day for 55 days	1 X boat	82.5
Transport (boat - MBANDAKA to IREBU) at 60 persons/day for 167 days	1 X boat	250.5
Transport (road - KONGOLO)	2 X bus 2 X truck	160
Total	20 X bus 34X trucks 2 X boats 1,836 FH	11,533

1. Estimated costs:
- 1 X flying hour (FH) = \$5,000.00
  - 1 X bus (purchase) = \$50,000.00
  - 1 X 3 T truck (") = \$30,000.00
  - 1 X boat (rental per day) = \$1,500.00

SITES PREPARATION COSTS - KONGOLO

ACTIVITIES	VOLUNTARY US \$K	INVOLUNTARY US \$K
Time req'd to move		
Movement costs - Security forces		
Movement costs - Eqpt/Mat		
Acquisition costs Eqpt/Mat		
Building repair costs		
Acquisition costs Defence stores		
Total		

SITES PREPARATION COSTS - LOKANDO

ACTIVITIES	VOLUNTARY US \$K	INVOLUNTARY US \$K
Time req'd to move		
Movement costs - Security forces		
Movement costs - Eqpt/Mat		
Acquisition costs Eqpt/Mat		
Building repair costs		
Acquisition costs Defence stores		
Total		

SITES PREPARATION COSTS - MBANDAKA

ACTIVITIES	VOLUNTARY US \$K	INVOLUNTARY US \$K
Time req'd to move		
Movement costs - Security forces		
Movement costs - Eqpt/Mat		
Acquisition costs Eqpt/Mat		
Building repair costs		
Acquisition costs Defence stores		
Total		

SITES PREPARATION COSTS - IREBU

ACTIVITIES	VOLUNTARY US \$K	INVOLUNTARY US \$K
Time req'd to move		
Movement costs - Security forces		
Movement costs - Eqpt/Mat		
Acquisition costs Eqpt/Mat		
Building repair costs		
Acquisition costs Defence stores		
Total		



SITE SUSTAINMENT COSTS - ALL SITES

ACTIVITIES	VOLUNTARY US \$K	INVOLUNTARY US \$K
Transportation costs - KONGOLO		
Transportation costs - LOKANDO		
Transportation costs - MBANDAKA		
Transportation costs - IREBU		
Refugees all sites		
Total costs		

RECAPITULATION TABLE OF ALL COSTS

FACTORS	VOLUNTARY US K\$	INVOLUNTARY US K\$
Security/Month	126	11,436
Security/year	1,512	137,232
Movement (3 X C130)	10,523	10,523
Site preparation - KONGOLO		
Site preparation - LOKANDO		
Site preparation - MBANDAKA		
Site preparation - IREBU		
Site sustainment/Month		
Site sustainment/year		
Total costs/Month		
Total costs/year		

## OUTLINE PLAN

### GENERAL

5.7 The joint UN/Zairian Commission undertook a thorough reconnaissance of refugee camps in the North and South Kivu provinces of Zaïre. The commission also visited sites proposed by the Zairian Government in Kongolo (Shaba Province), Lokando (Maniema Province), Irebu (Equator Province). During all the visits the commission met and held discussions with Zairian government and military authorities and representatives by UNHCR, ICRC, NGOs, Refugee Leaders and Military Leaders of the former Rwandese Government Forces (RGF). At the end of the visits and discussions, it was possible to arrive at various courses opened to the commission or option plans with specific aim on the mission assigned to us. The various factors bearing on the situation having been very carefully considered. What ever plan is proposed here also takes cognizance of the fact that the current Rwandese Government positively and transparently pursues reconciliation with a guarantee security and return of property to rightful owners whilst the trial of those that committed the genocide are brought is speedy trial.

are to

### AIM

5.8 THE AIM OF THE COMMISSION IS TO CAREFULLY STUDY THE RWANDESE REFUGEE SITUATION IN NORTH AND SOUTH KIVU PROVINCES OF ZAIRE WITH THE VIEW TO IDENTIFYING THE MEMBERS OF THE FORMER RWANDESE GOVERNMENT FORCES AND FAMILIES FOR RELOCATION BEARING IN MIND THE COSTS AND LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS.

### TASKS

5.9 In order to accomplish the AIM, the following tasks must be undertaken.

- a) Identification of the various categories in the camps ie Political Leaders, Military Personnel, militias to include especially INTERAHIMWE.
- b) Security of Refugees in the existing camps
- c) Security of RGF in the new camps to be created
- d) Security for Humanitarian Aid Workers
- e) Recovery of arms from the Militia in the existing camps;

*political leaders and the*

- f) Movement of the RGF elements and their families from the camps and providing security for their movement.
- g) Demobilization of the RGF
- h) Provision of spiritual material and Health needs of the people in the camps.
- i) Sanitation in the Camps
- j) Capital cost of creating the new camps
- l) Assess the possibility of integration the former RGF into the national Army of Rwanda.
- m) What type and size of force will be required.
- n) Support and sustainment of the force both military and civilian personnel.

### STRUCTURE

6.0 The mission, after all deliberations, assessed that in order to achieve its good, there are minimum requirements that must be put in place. *5 1?*

- a) A multinational Force/A coalition force led by a country with credible Armed Forces + resources.
- b) A credible National/International Police component capable of policing the camps. *component*
- c) Civil/military Engineering component. *on*
- d) Adequate Health Component.

### CAPABILITIES OF THE FORCE

6.1 To be able to conduct the above stated tasks, the force must have the following capabilities.

- a) Command and control The force must come under a strong multinational or a coalition lead force commander who can take decision and influence the situation free from beurocratic tendencies.

- b) Deterrence The force should be aggressive to deter any aggression from RGF or militia
- d) Speed in deployment When a decision is taken, the force must deploy with minimum delay in order to achieve its objectives in the shortest possible time.
- e) Engineering capability Because of the amount of work involved, the force should have a strong engineering component.

**6.2. PHASES OF OPERATION** The operation will be carried out in four phases.

- a) Phase one Improvement of the existing camps to accommodate the RGF and their families. This phase requires total cooperation of the local authorities and UNHCR in particular because of the agencies experience in other places.
- b) Phase two The existing camps must be secured in order to carry out identification of the various groups. This phase will be perhaps dangerous and needs very careful planning. As stated in the report if the RGF has a voluntary attitude towards the relocation, there should be very little to worry about. If however, they offer resistance, then force must be applied.
- c) Phase three The actual movement of the people to the new sites. This phase will be sub-divided in such a way to avoid confusion and ensure maximum security. Care must be exercised to ensure family cohesiveness.
- d) Phase four The actual running of the camps which includes security, resources to support the ex soldiers and their families, motivating them to return home whilst teaching them to undertake Agriculture Ventures to help themselves.

**6.3. OPTIONS** Rather than listing a list of options only to shoot them down, the commission considered only two options that it considered credible.

**A. OPTION ONE :** A United Nations Force operating under Chapter VII and under different mandate from that of UNAMIR.

(1) Advantages The advantages of this option are :

- a✶ It will have a mandate that will enable it face any eventualities.
- b✶ A Force under UN banner will be considered neutral and therefore acceptable.

(2) Disadvantages The disadvantages are

- a✧ Owing to its very nature, the UN force will take sometime to assemble and vital time will be lost.
- b✧ Owing to national directives, even though such a force will operate under Chepter VII, there is bound to be hesitation when action has to taken.
- c✧ It is not certain whether the Zarian government will accept chepter VII in this operation.

B. OPTION TWO A multinational condition led force led by a country with strong armed Forces and credible resources.

(1) Advantages The advantages are :

- a✧ Speed in deployment
- b✧ Decisive in nature
- c✧ Total commitment


(2) Disadvantages The disadvantages of this option are

- a✧ if the operation should go wrong the blame is shared is shaved by only that country that leeds the coalition forces.
- b✧ the difficulty in getting a nation to head such a force.

6.4 CONCLUSIONS ON OPTIONS The two options presented could achieve the aim. However option two (2) is most likely to achieve the desired goal with minimum delay in order to get the refugee problem sorted out as quickly as possible.

6.5 RECOMMANDATION The commission assessed OPTION TWO as the one that has a greater degree of success and has the capabilities of bringing the situation under control with a minimum delay.

6.6 FORCE LEVEL Judging from the threat analysis in the existing camps, a force level of a commando brigade group will be required to undertake the task. This force will have in addition zarian security forces to undertake some police duties, the structure of such a force will be such that it has control over the existing and the new camp sites with emphasis on security of the refugees.



- 6.7. **CONCEPT OF OPERATION** The concept of the coalition led force will be that of deployment of commando units in the existing camps the new sites in such a manner as to isolate the RGF, Political and militia elements from the ordinary refugees and ensure security by undertaking the tasks detailed in the outline plan
- 6.8. **THREAT** The main threat in the existing camps as stated in the analysis of the various groups is that of the militia and to some extent the militant elements of the RGF.
- 6.9. **EMPLOYMENT** The commando battalions should be organized into Battalion Headquarters and three commando tasks organized companies. Which will sort out the RGF for relocation in the new camps and the militia to be put under control in police concentration centres or under Zairian military authority.
- 6.10. **ENGINEER SQUADRON** This unit should be organised into squadron Headquarters and should have two construction troops a plant troops and a technical unit. This squadron must be capable within its own organisation to undertake the following task.
- a) Repair and maintenance of existing air fields
  - b) Expansion of existing camp sites
  - c) Repairing and constructing bridges up to medium and heavy class
  - d) Repairing existing roads
  - e) Providing potable water to the force and the refugees even though UNHCR may be in position to undertake this task.
  - f) Repairing existing buildings and construction of new ones
  - g) ~~Efficient~~ in river transportation and watermanship.
  - h) Explosive ordinance disposal in the existing refugee camps.
- 7.1. **AIR TRANSPORT SQUADRON** The transport squadron attached to the force many must be military with its own inherent capabilities of transport, air recce and air traffic control. The ground forces could provide air field security. Failure to get a typical air transport squadron, a civilian constructor may be assigned but this second option may result in inefficiency as experienced elsewhere it must be borne in mind that speed of execution is of essence, the Air squadron will undertake the following tasks
- a✧ Transportation of the refugees
  - b✧ Resupply of troops and refugees
  - c✧ Air reconnaissance
  - d✧ Casualty evacuation
  - e✧ Transportation of reserve or rapid reaction teams
  - f✧ Liaison between zairian government and other agencies.

7.2 **MEDICAL SUPPORT UNIT** The Medical Support Unit should be of an expanded Field medical Company with the capability of surgery and trandling of tropical diseases. Among other health needs the medical company will undertake the following.

- a⊗ Co-ordination aero-medical evacuation
- b⊗ Supervision of Sanitation in the camps
- c⊗ Minor and major sugery to the troops and refugees
- d⊗ medical support to the local population
- e⊗ Ambulance service
- f⊗ Put in place a forty-bed ward facility.

7.3 **LOGISTICS COMPANY** This must be equipped to carry out the following tasks :

- a⊗ overland transportation resupply items from airfields and river banks to the troops and refugees at the various camp sites.
- b⊗ stockpiling of ration, petrol oil and Lubricants (POL) and Spare parts.
- c⊗ distribution of POL to Unit locations
- d⊗ Transportation of refugees over-land
- e⊗ Repair and recovery 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> Line.

7.4 **COMMUNICATION TROOP** There is virtually no existing telecommunication system in the areas where the new camps are to be sited therefore the need for the force to have its own inherent communication system to undertake the following.

- a⊗ VHF and HF communication network within and outside the camps
- b⊗ Facsimile
- c⊗ Telephone - IMASAT + CELLULAR
- d⊗ Air dispatch services
- e⊗ Postal Services to troops + refugees
- f⊗ Radio Broadcast facility.



# FAITES CONNAITRE ET SOUTENEZ "ACTION POUR LA RECONCILIATION NATIONALE AU RWANDA (ARNR)"

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Depuis le 01 Octobre 1990, le Rwanda a connu une guerre sans précédent qui a décimé près d'un septième (1/7) de sa population et détruit les bases de son économie.

Tout au long de cette guerre des milliers de personnes innocentes ont été massacrées aussi bien dans la zone contrôlée par le Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR) que dans celle des Forces Gouvernementales.

La victoire militaire du FPR a contraint près de quatre millions d'individus à se réfugier à l'extérieur du pays où ils vivent dans des conditions inhumaines pendant que les anciens réfugiés des années 60 et 70 rentraient au Rwanda.

Cette situation résulte de l'accumulation des rancœurs et des haines de toutes sortes entre les communautés ethniques ou entre les groupes sociaux.

En effet, depuis la période précoloniale, l'exercice du pouvoir politique et économique a été fondé sur l'exclusion de l'une ou l'autre communauté ethnique et, au sein même de la communauté dirigeante, sur le monopole de l'essentiel du pouvoir par un groupe très restreint.

L'ampleur du récent désastre a montré que la solution militaire au problème politique rwandais n'a fait qu'exacerber les haines et les tensions sociales et a créé les conditions favorables pour d'autres conflits futurs encore plus destructeurs.

La réconciliation nationale est donc une condition incontournable pour l'établissement d'une paix durable et la reconstruction du pays.

Action pour la Réconciliation Nationale au Rwanda (ARNR) invite tout homme épris de vérité et oeuvrant pour un avenir meilleur du Rwanda et des autres pays de la région à contribuer à la réalisation de cet objectif.

Action pour la Réconciliation Nationale au Rwanda se propose de:

- promouvoir l'esprit de dialogue, de tolérance, d'ouverture et d'acceptation mutuelle entre les différentes communautés ethniques et entre les groupes sociaux;
- éclairer la communauté internationale sur les réalités socio-politiques du Rwanda et leur évolution;
- travailler pour un retour rapide et pacifique des réfugiés rwandais;
- oeuvrer à la prévention des conflits au Rwanda et dans la région.

Action pour la Réconciliation Nationale au Rwanda est une organisation agissant indépendamment de toute institution politique. Elle est ouverte à toute personne désireuse de contribuer à la prévention des conflits et à la réconciliation nationale au Rwanda.

Fait à Bukavu, le 01 Septembre 1994

Le Comité d'initiative,

MUSONERA Venant,	MUSHIMUTUMA Joram,	NYILIMANA Sylvestre,
KARERA Augustin,	KANYAMANZA André,	KAREKEZI Jean de Dieu
MUNYABIKARI Claude,	Dr BUTARE Innocent,	HABIYAMBERE Zacharie,
MUZIRAKUGISHA J. Damascène,		RWABUKWISI Alexis

work in earnest on Monday, 26 September 1994 at the UNDP headquarters in Kinshasa and concluded the field/site tours on Tuesday, 11 October before undertaking to write this report.

## **2. MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION**

The Commission was composed of the following members:

- a. **UNAMIR**
  - i. Brig Gen H. Anyidoho, Head of Mission;
  - ii. Mr. A.B. Sidique Dao, OIC Humanitarian Assistance Department;
  - iii. Lt Col P. Desnoyers, Military Logistic Advisor;
  - iv. Major P Lancaster;
  - v. Mr. G Briere, Civilian Logistic Advisor;
- b. **UNDP** - Mr. Stanislaus Nkwain, Deputy Resident Representative;
- c. **UNHCR** - Mr. Jiddo Van Drunen, Head of Operations Special Unit for Rwanda and Burundi;  
- Mr. Collins Asare, Senior Programme Officer
- d. **ZAIRE Authorities**
  - i. Mr. Mutiri-wa-Bashara, Prime Minister's Head of Mission;
  - ii. Col Mag Mbidi Nikeni, Principal Advisor for the Ministry of National Defence;
  - iii. Medical Col Kabanda Kurhenga, Commandant of the Medical Corps ZAF;
  - iv. Mr. Yenyi Olungu Victor, Advocate-General of the Republic and representative of the Ministry of Justice;
  - v. Mr. Mutoke Mupompa, PP Advisor for Social Affairs;
  - vi. Mr. Rumashana Bajoje-Ngwete, Deputy Executive Assistant and representative for EPSP;
  - vii. Mr. Kabwika Mbayo, Pharmaceutical Advisor and representative for Public Health and Family;
  - viii. Mr. Damien Ipaka, Representative for Ministry of the Interior;

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The Rwandese conflict created one of the largest and fastest exodus of refugees in modern history as 1 to 1.2 million people are estimated to have fled their country, Rwanda, and crossed into the Kivu Region (Goma and Bukavu) in four (4) days. The dramatic effect and experience of this large concentration of refugees in Zaire have been quite challenging for the UN Agencies and NGO's who responded promptly; and traumatic for the host country population and, of course, the multitude of the Rwandese refugees themselves.

Largely overcrowded and chaotic, camp conditions continue to be exceptionally difficult for the Refugee population while adversely affecting their host population by exacerbating the economic, socio-political and environmental degradation of the Kivu Region of Zaire.

Even though hostilities in Rwanda are believed to have now ebbed, voluntary repatriation continues to be very slow because of **fear** on the part of the refugees to return home to unknown circumstances; and principally due to the absence of security within the camps and **the intimidation of refugees advocating or wishing to return to Rwanda by militant elements within the camps**. The result is that a paltry **250,000** refugees have reportedly returned by September while the overall situation continues to deteriorate/worsen.

The United Nations Secretary-General, sharing the preoccupation of the Zairean government authorities about this very unsatisfactory state of affairs, despatched his Special Representative- UNAMIR, Ambassador Shaharyar Khan, to hold discussions with **top** Zairean government officials between Monday, 12th September and Wednesday, 14th September, 1994.

While generally agreeing that the voluntary and spontaneous repatriation of refugees in peace and dignity represented the best solution, Ambassador Khan and the Zairean authorities agreed, inter alia, on the need for additional refugee camps in Zaire at an appropriate distance from the border to accommodate ex- army units (and their families). The cost of opening these new camps and the logistical support for the transfer and the running costs would be borne by the United Nations.

It was further agreed that a Joint Commission be formed by The United Nations on one hand and the Zairean Government on the other in order to assess the logistical framework of the operation, the location of the sites, the capital and running costs of the camps and the security requirements of the exercise.

This Joint Commission, comprising of ten (10) Zairean government officials and seven (7) United Nations staff members ( UNAMIR-5; UNHCR-1 and UNDP-1 ), commenced work in earnest on Monday, 26th September at the UNDP Headquarters in Kinshasha and concluded the field/site tours on Tuesday, 11th October, 1994 before undertaking to write this Report.

## 2. METHODOLOGY

The Commission visited the provinces of North and South Kivu and held discussions with the different partners involved in handling the refugee crisis, notably the local authorities, UN agencies, and humanitarian organizations. Through these discussions, it was able to obtain a clear picture of the refugee situation within the camps, and of the different categories of refugees whose relocation or repatriation is being envisaged. It also met with three of the main categories, namely the refugee population in the camps, the political leaders, and the military hierarchy. For practical reasons, it was not possible to meet with one of the key components of refugees, namely the militant youth groups. Nonetheless, information on the latter was obtained from those officials on the spot who are in daily contact with the refugees. The Commission then visited the relocation sites proposed by the Zairean government in order to assess the logistical, operational/security, humanitarian, socio-political, and financial implications of this exercise, as well as envisage a realistic plan for its eventual implementation.

The present report provides a synthesis of the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Commission. It attempts to identify the categories and numbers of refugees involved, assesses the possible reasons for the present stall in the voluntary repatriation that had reached its peak in August 1994, examines the relevant issues concerning the separation, relocation or repatriation of the various categories, and makes recommendations concerning the implementation of this exercise, as well as other relevant matters. It comprises a number of annexes including an appraisal of the proposed relocation sites.

## 3. CATEGORIES OF REFUGEES TO BE MOVED

### 3.1 Interahamwe

Although insecurity in the camps is of different kinds, ranging from ordinary banditry and extortion to gang wars between rival groups fighting for control of the camps, the most crucial security threat both for the refugees and for the local population is posed by the militant activities of militiamen otherwise known as **Interahamwe**. This category of refugees on whom most of the mass killings in Rwanda in April and May 1994 have been blamed, is the most complex and difficult to physically identify. Unlike soldiers, they neither wear uniform nor carry any outward signs or symbols that can distinguish them from the rest of the civilian refugee population. They are reported to be in possession of firearms and grenades, and are equipped with vehicles and radio communication equipment which enables them to listen in on UNHCR security communications. They have also set up an effective coordination structure within the camps similar to the one they had during the mass killings in Rwanda in April and May 1994.

On the day the Commission arrived, fighting between the **Interahamwe** militiamen and a security group set up by the former Rwandese Scouts Association (with UNHCR help), left at least two people dead and about five wounded. On the following day, this group took over the entire camp sealing it off temporarily. Eye witness reports from the camps talked

of some 150 men patrolling the camps in search of two CARE workers.

Although the **Interahamwe** are known to be present in all civilian camps in North and South Kivu, they are much more active in North Kivu where they are known to control all access into and out of the camps, and to consider the more moderate scouts association as well as any other group that either encourages or is indifferent to voluntary repatriation as pro-RPF. According to some members of the former government, one reason for the massive presence of these militiamen in Goma is the fact that Goma was nearer to Gisenyi and Ruhengeri than Bukavu, and these two towns had been the strongholds of the late President's MRND party, of which **Interahamwe** was the youth wing. Also, since the former government left through the Goma area and where protected by the Interahamwe, they followed them. The militiamen have succeeded in creating an atmosphere of terror in the camps, making it virtually impossible for the refugees, NGOs and the UN agencies to even raise any issues relating to repatriation, relocation, or the separation of the militia from the rest of the refugees.

No one seems to know exactly how many of these militiamen are in the camps. UNHCR has estimated that in Mugunga camp in North Kivu about 80% of the youth belong to **Interahamwe**. During one of the meetings with the Rwandese former Minister of Information, he revised the UNHCR estimate downwards to about 60%. In spite of the wide variation between these figures, they indicate one thing, namely, that the **Interahamwe** boasts a significant presence in all camps in the Goma area, and that their influence is fast spreading to Bukavu where several incidents of violence and intimidation have been reported by both UNHCR and its operational partners.

### 3.2 The Political Leaders

The mission also found it difficult to obtain accurate figures on the numbers of former Rwandese leaders such as ministers, senior government and military officials, members of parliament, and other political personalities. The official position of the Zairean provincial authorities was that ever since the dignitaries had been advised to leave, they had stopped all contacts with the Zairean authorities, thus making it impossible for the Government to know how many of this category of refugees still resided in the North and South Kivu provinces. Since news of the politicians' envisaged relocation had preceded the arrival of the Commission, the dignitaries with whom the Commission met were rather reluctant to provide such information. In the end, however, it was possible to obtain from the military and political hierarchy in Bukavu<sup>1</sup> the following figures on the political leaders presently sheltering in Zaire: **1 former Head of State, 21 former ministers, 54 members of parliament, 9 Senior Divisional Officers, 126 Mayors, and 18 officials of political parties.** These figures add up to a total number of **228 political leaders** to be moved. From this figure, the Commission estimates that in case of relocation, an appropriate working figure, including dependents would be around **1,200**.

In spite of the official position of the provincial authorities, the Commission learnt from the dignitaries themselves that they continue to be in constant contact with the

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<sup>1</sup> Figures provided to the Commission on request.

authorities.

### 3.3 The Army

The situation of this category of refugees is equally unclear, be it in terms of physical identification, location, numbers or status. It is true that many of the soldiers still wear uniform. However, the military commanders with whom the Commission met all confirmed that they were actively encouraging the soldiers to seek their own means of survival. One outcome of this recommendation from the military hierarchy has been soldiers swapping their uniforms for civilian clothes and mingling with the civilian refugees in the latter's camps. In all the camps visited by the Commission there were visible signs of the presence of the military. At INERA camp for instance, where the refugee leaders and CARITAS denied the presence of any soldiers of the former army, a Zairean army captain in the Commission recognized a Rwandese army officer in civilian clothes with whom he had studied in the Royal Military Academy in Belgium. This means that a number of the soldiers have meshed-in the civilian population making the identification of the military difficult

In terms of the physical location of the soldiers, the situation in North Kivu is different from that in South Kivu. In North Kivu, there is no separate camp reserved exclusively for the military. Mugunga camp located at 10km outside Goma had been initially intended for the military, but once opened, was occupied by civilian refugees, and is now occupied indistinctly by both soldiers and civilians. In South Kivu, on the other hand, the physical location of the soldiers is more organized. There are two military camps, one in Pansi, just outside Bukavu town, and the other in Bulonge further away. Pansi camp houses mostly married soldiers and their families, as well as the sick and handicapped, while Bulonge is reserved for the able-bodied and single soldiers.

The figures obtained from UNHCR and the Rwandese military hierarchy do not seem to add up. While UNHCR puts the number of soldiers in North Kivu at **between 22,000 and 25,000**, the former RGF Chief of Staff based in Goma, General Augustin Bizimungu, estimates that there are **11,000 soldiers** and some **4,460 dependents** based in Goma. In Bukavu, the most senior officer in Pansi camp, Colonel Théonase Nyilimanzu, put the total number of soldiers in South Kivu at **10,000** of whom 4,000 were at Pansi and 6,000 at Bulonge. He estimated the number of dependents at 6,000. This would make a total of **16,000** for South Kivu including dependents. Colonel Nyilimanzu also indicated that the former **Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR)** had a total of **30,000** men before the latest civil war. At a final meeting with the former FAR Deputy Chief of Staff and Head of Operations, General Gratien Kabirigi, yet other figures came up suggesting a total force of **31,000**, of whom 20,000 are based in North Kivu, and 11,000 in South Kivu. To this figure would be added some **19,000 dependents**. Based on all these figures and on information gathered informally, the Commission estimates that a realistic figure of RGF soldiers and their dependents present in Zaire could be put at **50,000**. This figure includes **2 Generals and 86 other senior officials**.<sup>2</sup> In the event of relocation, however, a realistic working figure would have to take account of desertions, resistance to relocation, and those who might be

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<sup>2</sup> Figures provided by General Gratien Kabirigi to the Head of the UN Delegation on the Commission on request.



encouraged to move elsewhere to avoid being transferred. This could leave about **30,000** people to be moved, including dependents.

It should be pointed out that during the mission, no official information was obtained from the Zairean authorities with regard to the former Rwandese presidential guard. For their part, the RGF officers in Bukavu estimated the number of soldiers in this category at one battalion (about 800 men), based in Goma and Bukavu. They further denied information gathered informally in Goma and Bukavu that this category of soldiers are camped together at a location around Goma, with their weaponry intact. If this information were confirmed, it would seem to indicate that this category of soldiers are being treated specially. Officially, however, the Zairean authorities have declared that all Rwandese troops who sought refuge in Zaire in July 1994 have been disarmed, although they do not rule out the possibility that, given the chaos that characterized the arrival of the troops, the disarming exercise might not have been effective. This is borne out by the number of violent incidents reported in the camps involving firearms. It is also corroborated by UNHCR reports of continued military activity along the border involving some 325 Rwandese soldiers in Kanganiro and some 600 in Kamanyola. A Rwandese colonel has been constantly seen moving between Kamanyola, Luvungi and Kanganiro, and movement of RGF officers between Mugunga in North Kivu and Bukavu has recently increased. In spite of this activity, UNHCR and NGOs assisting refugees in the camps believe that the military have not so far constituted as much a significant factor of insecurity in the camps as have the **Interahamwe**.

The international **status** of the soldiers has remained confused since their arrival in Zaire. Following UNHCR's criteria for classifying refugees they are not considered as refugees, because they are soldiers in uniform. On the other hand, they do not fall under ICRC's mandate, because they are no longer in a situation of war, and are consequently not in need of protection from immediate danger. The result has been that apart from the little support provided by CARITAS and CARE in Pansi camp, the military have not been receiving any relief assistance, except for those that have mingled with the civilian refugee population. Discussions within the Commission led it to conclude that the closest the international community could come towards resolving the status issue would be to adopt Frédéric de Mulinen's proposal of what could obtain in such instances, and **assimilate the soldiers to prisoners of war** (since they remain soldiers according to the Zairean military code) thus bringing them under the mandate of the ICRC. The ICRC Chief of Sub-Delegation in Bukavu confirmed this possibility to the Commission, further adding that it would be entirely up to the Zairean government to confirm the prisoners-of-war status of these soldiers before ICRC intervention could be envisaged.

### **3.4 The Civilian Refugee Population**

This category of refugees constitutes the bulk of the total Rwandese refugee population. They are presently sheltered in camps run by UNHCR and other operational partners in North and South Kivu. UNHCR presently estimates that there are **850,000** refugees in North Kivu, in the Mugunga, Kibumba and Katale areas, and **336,736** in South Kivu, of whom 281,912 are spread over 28 sites around Bukavu and around 54,824 in 18 camps in and around Uvira. Although life in these camps has greatly improved in comparison with the situation in July and August 1994, living conditions are still extremely

difficult, with refugees having to make do with about one third of what is considered as the normal daily calorie requirement.

Life in the camps is presently relatively well organized. Leaders have been selected and other structures created, often with UNHCR support, to facilitate the distribution of supplies and ensure security. Although the leaders selected by the refugees are different from the former political leaders, the latter continue to influence opinion in the camps. The camp leaders believe that their fate is tied to that of the political leaders and the military, and consult with them on a regular basis on all important matters, including voluntary repatriation. Opinion in the camps is, however, greatly influenced by the **Interahamwe**, using physical threats and even murder to impose its views.

#### **4. REASONS FOR THE PRESENT STALL IN REPATRIATION**

From its discussions with representatives of the different categories of the refugees, the provincial authorities, UN Agencies and humanitarian organizations, the Commission was able to discern three phases in the movement of the refugee population since July. First, there was the massive influx in mid-July 1994 brought about by a real or perceived fear of revenge killings by the RPF. Then came the expressed will of the refugees to return, and the actual **return of an estimated 200,000** refugees confirmed by UNHCR in August and the beginning of September. This second phase was visibly characterized on the one hand by the militant activity of militiamen and the political leaders opposed to voluntary repatriation and, on the other hand, by the readiness of UNHCR to promote and assist voluntary repatriation. The third phase, which is actually the present phase, is characterized by a drastic cut-back in the number of voluntary returnees. Through its discussions in and outside the camps, the Commission was able to establish the following main reasons for the significant cut-back in the numbers of voluntary returnees:

##### **4.1 UNHCR Reports of Systematic Killings**

The Commission noted the readiness of the political leaders and those representing the refugees in the camps to believe UNHCR reports of systematic killings by the Rwandese government, while admitting that they did not have concrete proof to corroborate such reports, and to dismiss UNAMIR's appraisal of the situation which had questioned such reports on the grounds of insufficient proof<sup>3</sup>. In all the camps visited, and during all discussions held with Rwandese refugee leaders, UNHCR reports were cited as sufficient reason to rule out any encouragement by these leaders of voluntary repatriation of the refugees. While the Commission was not in a position to determine quite clearly the extent to which the UNHCR reports had actually contributed in curbing voluntary repatriation among the ordinary refugees, it however established that the said reports had strengthened the hand of those leaders who had already been opposed to voluntary repatriation and who influence opinion in the camps.

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<sup>3</sup>Upon request by the Commission, however, the ex politicians in BUKAVU presented a list of Randese persons that have been reportedly killed by the RPA in Rwanda and asked that this matter be taken up with the present authorities in Rwanda.



#### 4.2 Eye witness reports of systematic killings

Refugees who had opted for voluntary repatriation are known to have returned to tell the stories of revenge killings by the RPA. Although the Commission cannot confirm the systematic authentication of these accounts by neutral sources, some of the witnesses quoted would seem to have no reason to blow any of such stories out of proportion. The Vice-Governor of South Kivu, for instance, told the story of four Catholic Sisters, two Hutu and two Tutsi, who had left for Rwanda a couple of weeks before the arrival of the Commission, and of whom only the two Tutsis, had returned to Bukavu to report on the disappearance of their Hutu companions. This and other accounts had greatly contributed towards the stall in voluntary repatriation.

#### 4.3 Lack of confidence in the new Rwandese Government

The departure of the French forces from Rwanda and the refugees' lack of confidence in UNAMIR and the Rwandese government have also emerged as some of the reasons contributing towards the present stall in the voluntary repatriation process. Even in South Kivu where the **Interahamwe** are not very active, ordinary refugees are known to express distrust of the new Government, demanding either that security be guaranteed by a neutral body, or that their own leaders be seen to participate in the new government as a prerequisite to their return.

The refugee reluctance to return to their homes is exacerbated by the present lack of certainty of property rights. On the one hand the present government has expressed the desire that refugees return to their homes yet the latter have no confidence in the government to guarantee them ownership of the properties that they left. If the present government is truly anxious to see the refugees return, then this matter should be given serious and prompt attention. The situation is further complicated by the government having already given some deserted properties to members of the victorious army. Few refugees could be expected to be willing to confront armed military personnel living in their former homes.

#### 4.4 Role of the political leaders

Throughout its discussions with the refugee leadership at the camps, as well as with the military and political leaders, the Commission noted a conscious attempt on the part of its interlocutors to deny any deliberate effort on their part to influence the attitudes of the refugees towards repatriation. At Mugunga camp, the camp **Prefects** denied having had any contacts with the political leaders over the two previous months, while at Katale, the camp leaders described their role in purely social and humanitarian terms. For their part, the politicians informed the Commission during discussions held at Bukavu of the difficulties they encountered as a result of the Zairean Government's ban on political activity by the refugees.

In spite of the above claims, the Commission was able to establish through both formal and informal contacts that members of the former Rwandese Government were in constant contact with the refugee leaders in the camps who, in turn, appeared to be in effective control of public opinion among the refugees. One of the possible consequences (mentioned by the political leaders themselves) of their transfer out of Goma would be the

possibility of easily convincing the refugee population to return to Rwanda under risky conditions. Furthermore, the leaders continually referred to the fact that the presence of the majority of the Rwandese population outside the country was ample proof of the credibility and legitimacy of the leadership-in-exile, thus implying an interest in keeping the refugee population in neighbouring countries as a bargaining counter. It is worth noting that while the camp leaders consistently referred to refugee welfare problems in the camps, at no point did the political and military leaders refer to the humanitarian predicament of the ordinary refugees in the camps as a key factor in considering a speedy resolution of the crisis. Those political and military leaders do not live in camps. They reportedly live in hotels in GOMA and BUKAVU in very good conditions. Desperation will develop when they run out of resources and that could develop some hidden attitude.

The long history of horrific acts of brutality by both sides in the Rwandan conflict appears to have set in motion a dynamic of its own. Fear of what the other might do has consistently driven each side to act preemptively to remove the threat they believe they face. Though not wishing in any way to apologize for or excuse the Hutu atrocities in the most recent crisis, the Tutsi massacre of several hundred thousand Hutu in 1972 in Burundi and their ruthlessness in the 1990 crisis go a long way to explain the current level of fear in the minds of the refugee population. The refugee's army has been defeated by the very enemy they have feared for centuries and they naturally feel vulnerable. Whether it is rational or not, the fear is very real in their minds. Of course, hatred and fear are close cousins when emotions are as strong as they are in Rwanda. This may help to understand the apparently unreasonable demands of leaders on both sides of the conflict. The international community ought to strive, as its first priority in Rwanda, to help establish a balance of the vulnerability and fears present in the current situation. To this end, steps that increase the feelings of exposure by either side ought to be very carefully considered as the very feeling of vulnerability will play into the hands of those with extreme solutions to their problems in mind. One should not forget the ease with which the Nazi regime manipulated fear of the Jews with such horrible results. One could understand the activities of the MRND in the same light. If this is understood it follows that whether the former RGF is a credible force in the minds of the RPA is immaterial if their proximity reduces the feelings of vulnerability in the minds of the refugees.

#### **4.5 Role of the Military leaders**

The Commission was also able to establish the fact that the military hierarchy was working in a coordinated manner within the provinces of North and South Kivu. The insistence of the refugee leaders, particularly in the camps in North Kivu, to return to Rwanda only if their own army would be willing to return to protect them, and the established presence of both disarmed and armed military personnel in the camps were further proof of the fact the RGF presence in North and South Kivu is of significant importance to the refugee situation there. The role of the RGF leadership in opposing voluntary repatriation is very similar to that of the politicians. The presence of the top military officers at the meeting arranged by the Commission to discuss with the political leaders, and the presence of political leaders at the Commission's discussions with the military, are proof of the coordination that exists between these two categories of refugees, of the common aims goals being pursued, and of the similarity of their influence on the refugee population.

#### **4.6 Role of Interahamwe**

As mentioned earlier in this report, militant youth groups, believed to be made up mostly of **Interahamwe** militiamen, strictly regulate public opinion among the refugees, particularly in North Kivu, and are known to be opposed to voluntary repatriation. Given their familiar violent methods, the Commission is convinced that the only way of enabling the refugee population to make its own judgment on the opportuneness of voluntary repatriation would be to separate the **Interahamwe** from the rest of the population. Nonetheless, the fact that the **Interahamwe** and other militant groups have to use force to control public opinion in this respect is proof of the fact that there is a trend, however insignificant it may be, towards voluntary repatriation. This trend is borne out by a UNHCR report to the Commission on cases of refugees voluntarily leaving the camps to settle closer to the border with Rwanda as a possible prelude to voluntary repatriation. UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations' reports indicate that the militant actions of this group have constituted the single most effective factor in checking such voluntary repatriation initiatives.

#### **4.7 Public pronouncements of the Rwandese Government**

It was clear from listening to the different categories of refugees that the Commission was able to meet, that some public declarations of the new Rwandese government have not helped to mobilize opinion in the camps in favour of voluntary repatriation<sup>4</sup>. Many political leaders cited remarks made by government officials during the victory celebrations staged by the Kigali government, and which did not seem to have augured well for a speedy resumption of dialogue between the rival parties. Some of these declarations are being used by those opposed to voluntary repatriation to buttress their arguments. The refugees expressed the desire to communicate with the KIGALI government.

#### **4.8 Role of the Zairean Government**

It was obvious in the Commission's discussions with the political and military leaders that in spite of some of the restrictive measures taken against them by the Zairean Government, they are fully confident of either Zaire's support, or, at the very least, its sympathy for whatever goals they may be seeking to achieve in Rwanda. The military leaders spoke with confidence, sometimes making thinly veiled threats against the new Rwandese Government. The Commission feels that with this attitude it is unlikely that the political and military leadership would be able to fully measure the urgency of the refugee situation especially as it relates to the sacrifices imposed on the local Zairean population by the continued presence of the refugees.

### **5. KEY ISSUES AFFECTING SEPARATION, RELOCATION AND REPATRIATION**

In light of the above analysis of the causes for the slow-down in the voluntary repatriation process, and based on its belief that any eventual separation, relocation and/or repatriation of the refugees would have to be linked to the prospects for an overall settlement of not only the refugee crisis but also the Rwandese crisis as a whole, the Commission

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<sup>4</sup>As an example, the KIGALI government announced their intention to try 30,000 persons said to have participated in the genocides.

examined some preliminary issues that would be crucial in deciding on any of these three, or any other additional, options. These issues include **i)** assumptions on which the decision to separate or relocate was based; **ii)** the attitudes of the different parties in the present crisis with regard to the options being referred to; **iii)** political implications; **iv)** humanitarian implications; **v)** logistical implications; **vi)** security and operational implications; and **v)** financial implications.

### 5.1 Assumptions

The decision to separate the militant youth groups from the rest of the refugee population and to relocate the political leaders and the military further inland is predicated on a number of assumptions among which is the fact that this will lead, sooner or later, to the voluntary repatriation of the vast majority of the refugees. While this is possible in principle, it should be pointed out that a number of imponderables remain. First, the effective separation of the **Interahamwe** from the rest of the population, will be fraught with difficulties such as the effective identification of the members of these groups, and the guarantees that there will be sufficient policing to ensure that infiltrations will not occur afterwards. Without this positive identification and policing guarantees, the separation of the militant groups from the population cannot be effective. It must be emphasized that no ordinary refugee will be willing to point out **Interahamwe**.

Secondly, for the relocation of the political leaders to serve as an effective deterrent to the present manipulation of the population, it will also be necessary to identify and penetrate parallel communication networks that presently link the leaders to the camps. Furthermore, it needs to be proven (and the Commission was not in a position to do so) that the degree of control that the leaders presently have over the population is weak enough for the vast majority of the refugee population to readily designate or accept new leaders.

Thirdly, and with regard to the relocation of the military, the Commission was able to establish that while their presence in the Goma and Bukavu area had an influence on the attitude of the refugees towards repatriation, this presence was not necessarily the most urgent influential factor in this regard. UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations actually confirmed that the most urgent danger came from **Interahamwe**. On the other hand, the soldiers that would easily be identified for relocation would be those who are now settled in the Mugonga, Pansi and Bulonge camps, whereas those soldiers, armed or unarmed, who presently have a direct influence on the refugee population are those who no longer wear uniforms, and who have successfully mingled with the civilian population in virtually all the camps. Not only will this latter category not be identified, they will actually be entitled to UNHCR assistance.

In light of the above, the Commission believes that the basic assumptions would have to be re-examined before final action is taken regarding separation of militant groups from the population and relocation of the politicians and the military. If this is not done, the relocation exercise could end up actually strengthening, inadvertently, the assertions of the political leaders that they have no hand in the present stall in the voluntary repatriation process. It is however clear that, at best, these actions can only be undertaken in conjunction with other political initiatives aimed at reassuring the population from within Rwanda, and reaching agreement between the parties concerned on a negotiations agenda.

## 5.2 Attitudes towards separation, relocation and repatriation

The importance of this factor lies in the fact that no matter which of the above actions will be emphasized, it will be necessary, as a first step, to ensure, and eventually enlist, the collaboration of the key partners involved, including the categories of refugees to be moved. The partners whose attitudes towards these various options will be crucial in implementing the decisions to be made are the refugees themselves, the political leaders, the military, the militant extremist groups, the Zairean authorities, the Rwandese government and the host population at the selected relocation sites. Following are the views of each of these categories as they emerged during their discussions with the Commission:

### 5.2.1 The Refugee population

As stated earlier, due to the tense situation in most of the camps visited by the Commission, it was not possible to obtain directly the view of the ordinary refugees with regard to any of these options. Furthermore, the plan to separate the militiamen from the rest of the refugee population, and relocate political and military leaders had not been discussed with the population prior to the arrival of the Commission. As far as voluntary repatriation is concerned, however, the estimated 200,000 voluntary returnees to date<sup>5</sup>, and the continued trickle of returnees into Rwanda in spite of threats from the militants and an extremely effective dissuasion mechanism set up by the political leaders, are proof that there is a continued urge among the refugees to return. This view is confirmed by UNHCR reports from Mugunga camp in North Kivu, and by reports from other camps in South Kivu of increased inquiries of late by the refugee population on the possibilities of UNHCR assisting voluntary repatriation. It is however impossible to determine with any accuracy the motivations that lie at the root of the voluntary repatriation urge, or the conditions under which the vast majority of the refugee population would agree to voluntary repatriation. Contacts with one national NGO in Bukavu<sup>6</sup> which is working closely with the refugees and with Rwandese NGOs indicated that in the camps in Bukavu, a significant percentage of the refugees is willing to return if some recognized Hutu leaders who are known **not** to have participated in the recent massacres return to Rwanda and invite them to do same.<sup>7</sup>

### 5.2.3 The Politicians, Military Leaders, and Interahamwe

**Interahamwe**, the political leaders and the RGF military hierarchy in Zaire are implacably opposed to either their removal from the Goma and Bukavu area, the separation of the **Interahamwe** from the rest of the refugee population, the relocation of the military into more remote parts of the country, or the repatriation of the refugee population prior to an overall settlement of the conflict. It is however premature at this stage for the

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<sup>5</sup> UNHCR estimates as at end September. This figure is based on an actual head count of 120,000 and estimates of uncoordinated border crossings.

<sup>6</sup> IRED/Grands Lacs, led by Mr. Zihindula Ngombe Ya Mwami, P.O. Box 2375, Bukavu

<sup>7</sup> According to this NGO, the names of former Prime Minister **Dismas Nsengiyaremye** and former Defence Minister Mr. **James Gasana** are being cited.



Commission to determine exactly to what extent these groups would go to actually resist attempts to move them away from the border area. This eventuality must however be seriously considered in any actual or contingency plans to be developed, so as to determine the human resources and the logistics required for the operation.

Although there were some slight variations in the views expressed by the **FAR** hierarchy in Goma and in Bukavu, a common element emerged from the Commission's discussions with the former Rwandese military authorities, namely, the strong urge and the intention to regain power in Kigali. **They are therefore opposed to the kind of relocation that would jeopardize this goal.** In Bukavu, the Commission learnt from local military sources who are in permanent contact with the local **RGF** hierarchy that the latter had attempted to initiate dialogue with the Zairean authorities aimed at obtaining relocation to enable regrouping and retraining in view of continuing the war. The Commission also noticed the remarkable confidence of the **RGF** hierarchy, particularly in the Goma area, that they could count on the Zairean support to regain power in Rwanda.

One important element worth noting with regard to the views of the military is the fact that throughout the Commission's visit, the only time someone among the refugees referred to the possibility of designating new leaders to negotiate with the RPF was in the military camp in Pansi. The Commission noted that this was the only camp visited where the **Interahamwe** was not and could not be active, and where the politicians could not easily impose their will. This fact only served to strengthen the Commission's belief that the separation of the militiamen and the politicians from the rest of the population is imperative, provided it is meticulous and is implemented in conjunction with other political initiatives.

#### **5.2.4 The Zairean authorities and the host population**

At the highest level of the State, and in accordance with the transitional constitution of the country which defines national security and issues of military importance as areas of shared responsibility between the Government and the Head of State, it can be considered that the decision has been taken by the Zairean authorities to relocate the politicians and the military from the border towns. It has also been agreed to separate the militiamen and armed elements in the camps from the rest of the population. This was echoed by the provincial authorities who also laid emphasis on the sacrifices being made by Zaire as a whole and by the population of North and South Kivu in particular, and on the willingness of the population in the selected sites to help in cushioning the effect of the refugee influx in the country by accepting the transfer of some of the refugees to their respective provinces.

Following its visits to the proposed sites, the Commission was able to notice a reasonable level of tolerance on the part of the local population around the selected sites vis-à-vis the refugees. It can therefore be said that there is a reasonable chance that the population would accept the arrival of Rwandese soldiers of the **RGF** without much trouble. However, it should be noted that the argument used at every location to convince the local population was that the international community (i.e. the United Nations) would rehabilitate abandoned and sometimes decaying infrastructure at the sites for the refugees, from which the local population would benefit both during and after the relocation exercise. This of course implies that the failure to rehabilitate such infrastructure before or during the relocation could result in the hostility of the host population in the medium term. The degree of this conviction on the part of the local population can be fully appreciated by the fact that

some sections of the local population that had been initially hostile to the idea of hosting Rwandese refugees prior to the arrival of the Commission<sup>8</sup> were actually pleading with members of the Commission later on to select their location as one of those to receive refugees.

One noteworthy option put forth by the Vice-Governor of North Kivu of what should be done in case no immediate solution for relocation or repatriation could be found was the setting up of a buffer zone within Rwanda under international control, where the refugees would be temporarily repatriated while awaiting a longer-term solution. Although members of the former government seemed to rule out this possibility, the former RGF Head of Operations, General Gratien Kabirigi, clearly stated that the senior officers would prefer such a solution to being relocated further inside Zaire. However, the RPA having now been fully introduced in the south west of Rwanda, it will be extremely difficult to create such a buffer zone.

#### 5.2.5 The United Nations

Considering the terms of reference of the mission such as agreed during the visit to Zaire of the Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Rwanda, it is clear that the United Nations was part of the decision to encourage voluntary repatriation by undertaking the relocation of political and military leaders from the Zairean border and the separation of **Interahamwe** and other militant groups from the rest of the population. Nonetheless, issues of funding, agency responsibility and inter-agency harmonization are yet to be addressed, particularly between the **United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR)**, and **UNHCR**. Apart from disagreeing on the present security situation within Rwanda, it emerged from the Commission's discussions with UNHCR officials in Goma that, instead of relocation, UNHCR favors an approach that would seek to slowly undermine the credibility of the political leaders and the militant groups in the camps by creating an alternative leadership structure.

#### 5.3 Political implications

The political implications of the separation, relocation and repatriation exercise are varied. The most important however are the implications that the exercise will have on the prospects for a durable solution of the Rwandese problem. One accusation that kept recurring during the Commissions meetings with the different categories of refugees was that the international community had not fully understood the **real** political problem in Rwanda. They stressed the fact that it had taken 400 years of ethnic domination to bring the country to its present predicament, and that to focus on the return of the refugees and ignore the more fundamental problem that divided the Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda would be to treat the symptoms and ignore the disease.

As the Commission found out, the level of anti-Tutsi feeling among representatives of the refugees in the Goma and Bukavu area is such that at no point during its discussions

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<sup>8</sup>In Kongolo (North East Shaba Province) the Commission was greeted on arrival by protests by political movements in the Division.

with these leaders was there a feeling of remorse for the recent genocidal acts in the country. This seems to imply that even among many people who might not have participated in the genocide, this feeling is equally strong, and will not necessarily go away even if the separation and relocation exercise was perfectly implemented and voluntary repatriation took place.

### **5.3.1 Political conditions for repatriation**

Since the main concern of the international community is to ensure that the refugees get back home voluntarily, their presence or departure from Zaire has now become the main subject of envisaged negotiations. In this light, the Commission sought and obtained from the political and military leaders a number of conditions which, if met, should, in principle, enable the refugees to return home. Their conditions can be summarized as follows:

- Negotiations with the new government;
- Revival of acceptable elements of Arusha Accords;
- Power sharing;
- Security guarantees;
- Involvement of the exiled leadership in all negotiation processes;
- Setting up of an international tribunal that will also deal with alleged massacres committed by RPF forces since 1990;
- The organization of early elections (and not after 5 years as presently envisaged by the new government);
- Involvement of the United Nations, in a form that is different from UNAMIR as it is presently structured, to facilitate negotiations between the new Government and the leadership-in-exile, and to provide security guarantees for the safe return of all refugees;
- Guarantees of re-possession by the refugees of their property presently taken over by either the government or other individuals.

While it has been clear to the Commission that the political leaders are using the absence of the majority of the Rwandese population from the country as a bargaining counter, it is equally reasonable to believe that if all the refugees could voluntarily return today, the new Government would have even less reason to negotiate. Since the emphasis on most of these conditions is on **negotiations**, the present focus on separation of different groups of refugees and the relocation of others could be seen to confirm the persistent accusations of the political leaders that the UN is leaning towards the new Government in Kigali.

### **5.3.2 Political implications for Zaire**



In spite of the overall feeling of tolerance that the Commission was able to discern from its limited contacts with the host populations concerned, it also received letters of protest from human rights, political and other civil society pressure groups which will certainly turn the exercise into a political issue which will not necessarily be easy for the government to manage in an election year.

It will also be required that Zaire show proof of political will to carry through the envisaged operations once they are designed and agreed upon. Given the present state of relations between the local authorities in the Goma and Bukavu areas, it will be necessary that written accords be signed and respected between all parties concerned, particularly with regard to policing the movement of certain categories of refugees to be relocated.

### **5.3.3 Political implications for the United Nations**

Throughout its contacts with representatives of the refugees, the Commission noticed a deep level of distrust vis-à-vis the United Nations, particularly UNAMIR and its Canadian contingent led at the time of the civil war by General Dallaire. It also registered their hope that a different UN structure, or a restructured UNAMIR would handle the security guarantees and the political negotiation component of the operation. This would certainly imply the involvement of the Security Council.

On the other hand, the conditions and wishes of the representatives of the refugees would not necessarily be those of the new Government in Kigali. It would therefore also be the task of the United Nations, speaking with one voice, to reconcile the differences that could stand in the way of a negotiation *ag enda*.

## **5.4 Humanitarian Implications (SIDIQUE DAO)**

### **5.5 Logistical Implications**

The deliberation of the Commission have provided two main options to be analyzed logistically either the relocation would be voluntary or involuntary. Both options would consist of moving 30,000 persons simultaneously to three new sites - KONGOLO, LOKANDU and IREBU - each with a forecast of 10,000 persons. Other options can also be considered using varying quantities of transportation resources

The following assumptions were made:

- a. the KONGOLO airport would be improved to receive C130 aircrafts after a technical assessment has been completed;
- b. communications would be made available at all sites (two airports of embarkation and three airports of disembarkation);
- c. transition camps would be set up in KINDU and MBANDAKA (48 hours transition camps) and in GOMA and BUKAVU (less than 12 hours);

- d. all military persons and their families in BUKAVU would be moved to KONGOLO whereas those in GOMA will be moved equally to LOKANDU and IREBU;
- e. the political leaders with their families (1,200) would be moved to a site selected by the Zairian authorities in the western part of the country. MBANDAKA is used for the purpose of this estimate;
- f. all construction costs estimated by the Zairian engineer advisor are accurate within Zaire and consider complete refurbishment of all sites;
- g. all movements to LOKANDU and IREBU would be by boats initially; and
- h. Zairian Forces would ensure the security at the current camps in North and South KIVU as well as identifying and gathering the political leaders, the military forces and their families.

#### **5.5.1 The Logistics Implications related to Protection**

The cost related to the protection factor of this operation are attached. The logistics implications related to this factor include:

- a. the military forces required to be deployed in the North and South KIVU areas to perform the task of separating the political leaders and the military forces from the ordinary refugees will be provided by the Zairian Forces but will be supported logistically by the UN. These costs will include the deployment and sustainment costs of all military forces deployed in these areas for these tasks. The sites that must be considered include at least the camps of MUGUNGU (11,000), PANZI (4,000) and BULONGE (6,000) and any other camps that may have ex-military personnel (up to 9,000) as well as the locations, in North and South Kivu, of the political leaders (1,200) which must be confirmed;
- b. the military forces required, during the movement phase of this operation, to ensure the security of the Zairian population, the persons (political leaders and military) being moved would be provided by UN Forces. These requirements must be considered under two different conditions whether the refugees being moved are doing so voluntary (no protection requirement) or involuntary (four Companies at transition camps and guards on transportation modes); and
- c. the military forces required to provide the security at the relocation sites for both the refugees and the Zairian local population would be provided by UN Forces. These costs would include both the cost of deploying these soldiers and their sustainment. Also, the living standard conditions, willingness of the refugees to be in these new camps and the anticipated duration of the task could significantly affect the cost of this factor (36 Military Observers if voluntary or four infantry battalions if involuntary).

### 5.5.2 Movement Implications

The costs related to moving the selected persons to the new sites are attached. The movement implications include:

- a. the actual mode of transportation will consist of a combination of air, road, and maritime for each of the sites selected. There will be a requirement to move the persons initially by road transport, buses and trucks, from their current sites to the airports of embarkation (APOE) and in the case of KONGOLO from the airport of disembarkation (APOD) to the new site. The mode of transport from the APOE to APOD would be by C130 whereas from the APOD in KINDU and MBANDAKA to the new sites the mode of transportation would be by boat. The detailed requirements and costs are attached as a table;
- b. the types and quantities of resources available within Zaire, such as vehicles, boats or planes must be determined as well as the rental/purchase costs. The remainder of the required resources will have to be identified in accordance with the specific limitations of each site selected. The duration of these requirement for the movement and for the sustainment portion must be determined; and
- c. the costs related to preparing or improving the embarkation and disembarkation areas depending on the available mode of transport. The known requirements at this time are:
  - (1) landing strips (none of these have any aviation fuel available on site) -
    - (a) GOMA - excellent conditions,
    - (b) BUKAVU - can take a C130 to be improved for larger aircrafts with no night facilities,
    - (c) KONGOLO - CN235 (max 14 tons) gravel runway, with no tower, that must be improved for larger aircrafts,
    - (d) KINDU - can take a C130 and has a tower with landing lights,
    - (e) LOKANDU - no facility,
    - (f) BUTA - can take a C130 but the runway is in bad condition (broken asphalt),
    - (g) MBANDAKA - can take a C130 and has a tower with landing lights, and
    - (h) IREBU - has an abandoned dirt runway with vegetation

growing on it;

- (2) Roads. Most roads in Zaire are very difficult and the time required to cover the distances between the current refugee camps and the proposed sites range from a minimum of four days to a few weeks. The following road conditions must be considered for this operation:
  - (a) BUKAVU - roads are in bad condition particularly along Lake Kivu,
  - (b) KINDU to LOKANDU - 60 km of road repairs are required including 12 bridges, and
  - (c) MBANDAKA to IREBU - no existing road (132 km by river);
- (3) Waterways. Travelling on water is a major mode of travel in Zaire though very slow and limited for access during dry seasons and in the quantity of people that can be moved simultaneously. The following proposed sites can only be reached by river from the nearest city that has an airport, at this time:
  - (a) LOKANDU to KINDU is 60 km, and
  - (b) IREBU to MBANDAKA is 132 km.

### 5.5.3 Site Preparation

The site preparation costs include the deployment of the UN forces required to ensure the security of the sites as well as the build up of the administrative requirements; the details of these costs are attached as a table. The two options are considered in the case of the site preparation: voluntary and involuntary. The site preparation implications include:

- a. The costs related to renovating completely or simply doing basic repairs to the current infrastructures;
- b. The costs related to building new infrastructures;
- c. The time required to deploy both the security forces as well as the administrative resources;
- d. The purchase/rental costs and the transportation costs of the plant equipment required to perform all the construction engineering tasks as there is none of these equipment available locally;
- e. The defensive stores requirements in the case of an involuntary relocation;
- f. The acquisition and transportation costs of all the materiel required as there is practically no materiel available locally; and

- g. The costs related to improve, repair and replace/build local facilities such as power and water plants, local roads and other resources.

#### **5.5.4 Site Sustainment**

The site sustainment costs will vary depending on whether the relocation is voluntary (minimum security is required) or involuntary (where four infantry battalions must also be sustained); these are attached as a table. The site sustainment implications include:

- A. Which organization, depending on the status decided on, will have the responsibility for sustaining the relocated political leaders, the military personnel and their families;
- B. The level of support expected to sustain the relocated elements;
- C. The actual costs of sustaining the relocated elements.

#### **5.6 Security and Operational implications (Maj. Phil Lancaster)**

#### **5.7 Financial implications**

### **6 RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **ANNEXES**

- **Assessment of sites visited (Collins ASARE)**
- **List of persons met**
- **Minutes of meetings**
- **List of Commission members**
- **Terms of Reference of Mission**

PROCES-VERBAL DE LA SEANCE DE TRAVAIL EFFECTUEE  
CE LUNDI 10/10/94 A MBANDAKA

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Une séance de travail regroupant les autorités locales de la région de l'Equateur et la mission conjointe gouvernement du Zaïre/ONU a été présidée par le Vice-Gouverneur chargé des questions politiques et administratives, Monsieur MONDOMBO. Ce lundi 10 octobre 1994, dans le salon d'honneur de l'aéroport de Mbandaka.

Après avoir souhaité la bienvenue et le séjour agréable à la délégation, le Vice-Gouverneur a présenté la carte postale de la région de l'Equateur. Oasis de paix, cette région a une population de 4.500.000 habitants. Elle compte plusieurs partis politiques toutes tendances confondues.

Au niveau régional, les problèmes majeurs sont d'ordre administratifs engendrés par plusieurs mois d'impaiement de salaire des fonctionnaires et agents de l'Etat. Mais de façon générale, l'esprit de la population est bon.

Concernant l'hébergement des réfugiés rwandais, un message du Vice-Premier Ministre et Ministre de l'Intérieur a été envoyé aux autorités de la région pour préparer l'arrivée de la mission conjointe. La région de l'Equateur a dit le Vice-Gouverneur, est favorable à cet hébergement et voudrait faciliter la tâche du Gouvernement en lui apportant le soutien voulu.

Prenant à son tour la parole, le Colonel Magistrat MBIDI a présenté les membres de la délégation mixte ainsi que l'objet de la mission. Pour la région de l'Equateur, 2 sites ont été retenus par le Gouvernement pour l'hébergement des réfugiés : il s'agit de Mbandaka pour les hommes politiques et Irebu pour les militaires. Le Colonel a rappelé qu'à Kongolo, la délégation a été mal reçue à l'aéroport par la population suite à une mauvaise information. Après explications, le retour a été très heureux et la compatibilité totale.

Dans les termes de référence, il a été clairement souligné que dans l'installation des réfugiés, les intérêts socio-économiques des populations hôtes doivent être pris en compte. La protection et la sécurité des réfugiés seront assurées par les Casques Bleus de l'ONU.

Compte tenu de la réduction du nombre de places disponibles dans la pirogue pour la descente à Irebu, une équipe restreinte constituée des personnes ci-après s'est rendue sur le site. Il s'agit de :

- Mr STANISLAS NKWAIN et Mr COLLINS ASARE pour la partie ONU
- Le Lt Colonel KAYUMBA et le Capitaine KABAMBA pour la partie gouvernementale.

Les constats ci-après ont été faits sur les lieux :

- Irebu est actuellement habité par +/- 100 personnes.

- L'infrastructure en place est en bon état mais, certains blocs sont envahis par la forêt par manque d'entretien.
- De 1960 à 1969, le camp a été abandonné. Ce n'est qu'à partir de 1969 que des gens y ont été logés.
- Il existe un centre médical avec 8 bâtiments en bon état, sans matériel ni médicaments. Néanmoins, 3 infirmiers y assurent la permanence.
- On a noté l'existence d'une piste d'aviation de 1.000 m de long, mais située en pleine forêt ; d'un groupe électrogène en bon état mais ne fonctionnant pas par manque de gaz-oil et de plusieurs puits d'eau à aménager pour le traitement de l'eau.

Concernant les bâtiments, on trouve 16 maisons pour officiers, 56 à une seule chambre et salon dont 40 sont encore habitables. Pour le logement des troupes, il y a 12 blocs qui peuvent loger +/- 100 personnes par bloc ; 6 d'entre eux demandent une réhabilitation. 30 blocs de 25 m sur 7 servent de dortoirs. On trouve également 6 dépôts qui peuvent être transformés en blocs.

A l'heure actuelle, le camp a une capacité d'accueil de +/- 3.000 personnes. Le sol est fertile et il y a suffisamment d'espace pour l'agriculture. Pour accéder à ce site, seule la voie fluviale est possible.

Concernant la ville de Mbandaka, une seconde équipe a été constituée et a fait la ronde des différents logements proposés par les autorités locales, pour les hommes politiques rwandais. Cette équipe était constituée des personnalités ci-après :

- Mr SIDIQUE DAO et Major PHIL LANCASTER, pour la partie ONU
- Lt Colonel LEPELE et pharmacien KABWIKI, pour le gouvernement du Zaïre.

Au total, 4 bâtiments ont été visités dont le premier est le couloir 2 de l'hôtel Afrique de Mbandaka qui a 28 chambres disponibles contenant chacune 1 lit en double, 1 table de travail, 1 petit salon et une garde-robe. Le téléphone est non fonctionnel suite à l'absence de l'électricité, l'eau y est en permanence. Ce cadre est habitable moyennant des retouches sommaires par ci par là.

Le second cadre est une extension de l'Afrique Hôtel comprenant 17 appartements abandonnés. L'occupation de ces locaux exige une réhabilitation.

Le troisième cadre est constitué de 11 chambres au total dont 7 sont sans mobilier, sans plafond avec toilettes et douches communes en délabrement. 4 parmi ces chambres sont occupées partiellement et gardent encore un état convenable. Mais les installations sanitaires n'inspirent pas confiance, il faudrait alors les réaménager.

Le quatrième cadre est un vieux hôtel situé au bord du fleuve, il est aussi une extension d'Afrique Hôtel et a une capacité d'accueil d'au moins 30 chambres. Cet hôtel a été visité simplement de l'extérieur par manque de voie d'accès. Il présente un état de délabrement très avancé et exige également une réhabilitation profonde.

Nous avons au total 69 chambres disponibles pour l'hébergement des hommes politiques rwandais dans la ville de Mbandaka.

Fait à Kinshasa, le 12 octobre 1994

Le Rapporteur

Pharmacien KABWIKI MBAYO,  
Conseiller



# WEEKLY ATTENDANCE RECORD

NAME:

SECTION:

REMARKS: PLEASE RETURN THIS FORM,  
DULY COMPLETED AND SIGNED  
DIRECTLY TO PERSONNEL SECTION  
ON A WEEKLY BASIS

MONTH _____ 1994																															
ATTENDANCE	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
FULL DAY																															
HALF DAY																															

TOTAL DAYS WORKED \_\_\_\_\_

LEGEND:

- A/L: ANNUAL LEAVE
- S/L: SICK LEAVE
- CTO: COMPENSATORY TIME OFF
- P/K: PRESENCE IN KIGALI
- P/N: PRESENCE IN NAIROBI
- H: OFFICIAL HOLIDAY

CHIEF OF SECTION \_\_\_\_\_

PROCES-VERBAL DES SEANCES DE TRAVAIL EFFECTUEES  
A KONGOLO CE MERCREDI 4 OCTOBRE 1994

Arrivée à Kongolo ce mercredi 4 octobre 1994 à 13H20', la délégation conjointe ONU/gouvernement du Zaïre à été accueillie à l'aéroport par les autorités administratives et coutumières de la zone.

Aussitôt après, une séance de travail a eu lieu avec les autorités locales à la résidence du Commissaire de Zone, Monsieur NSANGO WA MPEZYA. Elle a été présidée par le Colonel Magistrat MBIDI NIKENI, Chef de la délégation.

Les points essentiels retenus sont les suivants :

- Présentation de la délégation par le Colonel Magistrat MBIDI.
- Briefing du Colonel sur l'objet de la mission qui consiste à évaluer le coût du rapatriement et de l'éloignement des réfugiés rwandais. Avant d'évaluer, il sera d'abord procédé à la visite des infrastructures en place en vue d'apprécier ce qui est faisable dans le sens d'aménagement ou de réhabilitation. Cet aménagement a poursuivi le Colonel, profitera aussi à la population hôte car le gouvernement du Zaïre a demandé à l'ONU que soient pris en compte les intérêts socio-économiques de cette population. En effet, les écoles, les foyers sociaux et les centres médicaux qui seront réhabilités profiteront aussi à la population de Kongolo qui a tout intérêt à accueillir ces réfugiés.
- Réponse du Commissaire de zone qui a d'abord remercié le Colonel MBIDI ainsi que toute la délégation lui souhaitant la bienvenue et le séjour agréable à Kongolo. Ensuite, le Commissaire de Zone a informé la délégation que les autorités locales ont accepté la mission mais la population était très mal informée sur son objet et croyait qu'on venait lui apporter un lot de malheurs et tout un tas de problèmes. La population locale et ses autorités observent l'évolution de la situation et pourront l'apprécier à partir des faits qui en découleront a conclu le Commissaire de zone.

Avant que cette séance, qui a duré 20 minutes, puisse être clôturée, l'Avocat Général de la République, Me YENYI, est intervenu pour éclairer le Commissaire de zone et sa suite sur le fait qu'en dehors de Kongolo, trois autres sites ont été choisis par le gouvernement à savoir Lokandu, Buta et Irebu ; Kongolo ne sera donc pas submergé.

Deux autres séances de travail se sont déroulées l'après-midi de 15H00' à 18H00' d'abord avec les responsables militaires du camp de Kongolo ensuite avec les représentants de la population et ce, sous la présidence du Colonel Magistrat MBIDI.

PROCES-VERBAL DE LA SEANCE DE TRAVAIL AVEC LA COMMISSION  
SOCIALE DES REFUGIES A KIWANJA/RUTSHURU  
CE SAMEDI 1er OCTOBRE 1994 DE 15H10' A 17H15'

Présidée conjointement par Monsieur MUTIRI WA BASHARA, chargé de mission du Premier Ministre et le Général le Brigade H. ANYIDOH, commandant adjoint de la MINUAR, une séance de travail regroupant la mission ONU/Gouvernement du Zaïre et la Commission Sociale des Réfugiés dont les membres issus des différents sites créés dans la zone de Rutshuru, a eu lieu ce samedi 1er octobre 1994 dans le salon de l'hôtel GREFAMU à Kiwanja, zone de Rutshuru.

Il est à noter que cette séance de travail a été précédée par celle tenue par Monsieur KAHANYA, Gouverneur de région a.i. entouré de quelques uns de ses collaborateurs régionaux et locaux à l'intention de la même commission sociale des réfugiés afin de s'enquérir du climat social qui règne dans leurs différents sites et plus spécialement dans celui de Katale où une tension dirigée contre deux agents de l'organisation "CARE" se faisait manifester.

Dans son mot d'introduction après la présentation de toutes les parties, le Chef de mission côté délégation gouvernementale, Mr MUTIRI WA BASHARA, a fait comprendre aux participants que la mission conjointe ONU/gouvernement du Zaïre venait s'enquérir à la source de la situation globale qui prévaut dans les sites des réfugiés en ce qui concerne leur sécurité, leur séjour au Zaïre, dont en stigmatisant que le drame rwandais devenu désormais drame zaïrois doit trouver des solutions avec le concours des réfugiés rwandais en premier lieu. D'où la nécessité d'exprimer leurs souhaits et leurs différentes considérations sur leur retour au pays.

Emboitant le pas à Mr MUTIRI, le Général H. ANYIDOH, Chef de mission côté ONU, a rappelé aux participants que la mission première de la MINUAR est de faire en sorte qu'il y ait la paix au Rwanda et que le souci majeur de la MINUAR est de voir les réfugiés rwandais regagner leur pays. C'est dans ce cadre qu'il a invité la Commission Sociale des réfugiés rwandais de s'exprimer ouvertement afin de faire savoir leurs sentiments, leurs souhaits et différents problèmes à porter à la connaissance de la communauté internationale.

Après ces deux mots d'introduction qui ont mérité les remerciements sincères de cette Commission Sociale des réfugiés composée du reste des anciens préfets de Kigali, des anciens fonctionnaires et d'autres couches sociales, les membres de cette commission ont pris la parole tout à tour pour exprimer leurs idées, sentiments souhaits et problèmes liés à leur état de réfugiés. De leurs interventions, les éléments suivants ont retenu l'attention de la mission conjointe ONU/gouvernement zaïrois :

A/ Au niveau des considérations:

Les membres de la Commission Sociale des réfugiés ont reconnu :

\* que le drame rwandais a commencé en octobre 1990 par la première attaque du FPR à majorité Tutsi en provenance de l'Uganda, et que ce drame est devenu réellement drame zaïrois ;

\* que les accords d'Arusha avaient été conclus mais violés par l'attaque du FPR en avril 1994 ayant occasionné la mort des Présidents HABYARIMANA et NTARYAMIRA ainsi que de leur suite ;

\* que la communauté internationale avait pris des solutions inappropriées au drame rwandais, en assistant à la fuite massive de la population rwandaise vers d'autres pays jusqu'à voir le FPR prendre leur pays ;

\* que les affinités issues du mariage entre hutu et tutsi n'étaient que de l'opportunisme ;

\* que le gouvernement actuel du Rwanda composé essentiellement des tutsi ne résout pas le problème rwandais ;

\* qu'il est inadmissible que toute une population puisse fuir le pays ce fait constituant l'incrédibilité du gouvernement actuel ;

\* que la MINUAR est souvent partielle, soutenant beaucoup le FPR au lieu d'être neutre ;

\* qu'une insécurité notoire règne au Rwanda et se concrétise par les exactions à plusieurs hutu qui rentrent au pays ;

\* qu'il n'y a pas de gens dans les camps qui empêchent les autres à rentrer au pays.

A toutes les allégations contre la MINUAR, le Général de Brigade H. ANYIDOHU a réagit en disant que la mission des Nations Unies au Rwanda veut la paix, une paix durable dans ce pays et que même les vies humaines de ses troupes ont été perdues pour cette cause. Il a ajouté que pour améliorer et renforcer son efficacité, certains changements ont été opérés parmi ses troupes. Ainsi, d'autres propositions dans ce sens seraient les bienvenues.

Il a souligné que si les rwandais veulent la paix, il faut qu'il y ait une réconciliation. Et le gouvernement actuel de Kigali accepte de partager le pouvoir même s'il n'y a pas un document officiel. Dans tous les cas, il faut la volonté des deux parties pour une paix durable.

#### B/ Au niveau de la préoccupation de l'ensemble des réfugiés:

Les membres de la Commission Sociale des réfugiés ont souligné que leur préoccupation principale est de rentrer au pays, qu'ils ne peuvent pas rester éternellement à l'extérieur considérant que quitter son pays est un malheur. Mais comment rentrer avec l'insécurité qui règne au Rwanda et la politique de sélection que le gouvernement actuel est en train de prôner ? Pourquoi centralise-t-on le drame rwandais par les tueries des tutsi alors que tout a commencé par la guerre du FPR. Qui n'a pas tué ?

C/ Au niveau des souhaits pour le rapatriement:

Parmi les divers souhaits aux fins d'une paix durable au Rwanda, les membres de la Commission Sociale des réfugiés ont émis notamment :

- qu'une sécurité soit garantie par le gouvernement actuel ;
- que les accords d'Arusha soient d'application ou que de nouvelles négociations auxquelles doivent prendre part toutes les composantes des réfugiés (armée, classe politique, parlement, etc..) puissent avoir lieu ;
- que ces négociations puissent avoir lieu entre leaders hutu et leaders tutsi. Il faut éviter les cas comme ceux de PASTEUR BIZIMUNGU et autres qui n'étaient que des boucliers cachant les véritables préoccupations des tutsi ;
- qu'en attendant la formation d'une armée nationale, l'armée du FPR soit désarmée et qu'une force internationale maintienne la paix ;
- que la MINUAR soit réformée ;
- que l'embargo à l'information pris contre les réfugiés hutu soit levé pour qu'ils puissent s'exprimer librement et expliquer à la face du monde le vrai problème rwandais ;
- que le retour des réfugiés hutu soit organisé sans les auspices de la communauté internationale ;
- que l'on ne cherche pas à dissocier les civils des militaires, les civils des leaders politiques et vice-versa puisqu'ils forment tous un tout cohérent.

Dans la conclusion, la Commission Sociale des réfugiés a réitéré leur souhait de rentrer dans leur pays sous deux alternatives et aux conditions suivantes :

a) Pour les alternatives :

- que la communauté internationale leur donne des armes pour reconquérir le pays de la même manière qu'elle a aidé le FPR à s'installer ; ou bien
- que la communauté internationale facilite les négociations entre les deux parties (gouvernement actuel de Kigali et la populations actuelle en refuge par le biais de leurs représentants), pour régler ensemble les questions du maintien de la paix, du partage du pouvoir et de la reconstruction nationale.

b) Pour les conditions:

- que la sécurité au Rwanda puisse être garantie pour le simple fait que le FPR ne leur a jamais inspiré confiance ;

- qu'il leur soit possible de participer à la gestion du pays ;
- qu'il soit mis en place une armée nationale et représentative mais qu'en attendant, il y ait une réelle force internationale pour le maintien de la paix.

Pour sa part, le Chef de la délégation zaïroise a précisé que dans le règlement du drame rwandais, le Zaïre voudrait contribuer aux solutions dans les limites des droits relatifs aux conventions internationales sur les réfugiés. D'où le Zaïre ne pourrait pas accepter que les droits politiques des réfugiés s'exercent à l'intérieur de ce pays et qu'une guerre soit attaquée à partir de son territoire.

Il a poursuivi en leur demandant de se comporter dignement dans ce pays pour ne pas abuser de l'hospitalité légendaire du peuple zaïrois et qu'ils fassent un effort pour libérer toutes les écoles encore occupées par les réfugiés pour entrevoir la rentrée scolaire fixée officiellement au 10 octobre prochain par le gouvernement zaïrois.

La séance de travail s'est déroulée dans une sérénité totale et à la satisfaction de tous les participants.

Commencée à 15H10', elle a pris fin à 17H15'.

Fait à Goma, le 1er octobre 1994

P.O. le Rapporteur du jour

MUMASHANA BAJOJE  
Représentant de l'EPSP

PROCES-VERBAL DE TOUTES LES SEANCES DE TRAVAIL  
EFFECTUEES DANS LA REGION DU MANIEMA DU  
6 AU 8 OCTOBRE 1994

I. Journée du jeudi 6 octobre 1994

Le Vice-Gouverneur de la région du Maniema, Monsieur ISSAYA, a présidé dans son Cabinet de travail, une réunion regroupant les représentants de la délégation conjointe ONU/gouvernement du Zaïre et différents services spécialisés de la région en vue de permettre à la délégation d'obtenir le plus possible d'informations non pas seulement sur le site à visiter, mais aussi sur la position du Maniema concernant l'hébergement des réfugiés rwandais à Lokandu.

Après avoir présenté les membres de la délégation, le Vice-Gouverneur a rappelé à l'assistance que l'arrivée de cette délégation a été annoncée par le Vice-Premier Ministre et Ministre de l'Intérieur, Monsieur GUSTAVE MALUMBA MBANGULA.

"Le Zaïre a connu les affres de la guerre et le problème des réfugiés n'est pas nouveau" dit le Gouverneur. Plusieurs étrangers sont hébergés au Zaïre parmi lesquels certains ont changé de nationalité sans être naturalisés ; le cas des angolais, des cabindais en dit long. La région du Maniema souhaite que la paix puisse régner et que les rwandais retournent chez eux. Mais pour alléger le fardeau que constitue le problème rwandais, la région du Maniema bien que enclavée, prêterait main forte à la communauté internationale et au gouvernement du Zaïre pour que des solutions appropriées soient trouvées. C'est ainsi qu'en apprenant que la délégation arriverait à Kindu, dit le Gouverneur, nous avons effectué une mission de reconnaissance à Lokandu le dimanche 2 octobre 1994 pour voir ce qu'il est devenu ; un ingénieur en construction faisait partie de l'équipe et a préparé une carte sur le site ainsi que l'état de la route permettant d'y accéder.

Après l'intervention du Vice-Gouverneur, l'assistance a eu à suivre successivement les exposés du Commandant CIRCO et de Mr l'Ingénieur.

Intervenant le premier, le Commandant CIRCO a présenté la situation générale du site. En effet, le camp militaire de Lokandu est situé à 60 Kms sur le fleuve au Nord de Kindu. Il est bordé à l'Est par le fleuve Zaïre ; à l'Ouest par la Collectivité de Balanga

au Sud par la Collectivité de Bangengele. Construit en 1936 par la colonie belge, ce camp était destiné à la formation de jeunes militaires congolais jusqu'en 1953. En 1968, le camp de Lokandu fut occupé par le Père BUFFALO, comme lieu d'encadrement des jeunes désœuvrés.

Possibilités et voies d'accès:

- par route (60 Kms de route parsemée de +/- 12 ponts)
- par voie maritime, le fleuve est navigable

- et par air, pas de piste d'atterrissage, mais un hélicoptère peut bien y atterrir.

#### Infrastructure en place:

Le camp compte 122 maisons dont 17 villas pour les cadres, 66 blocs à capacité d'accueil différentes, c'est-à-dire 4, 6 ou 8 portes ; 39 maisons pour les services administratifs notamment les bureaux, les hangars, magasins, ateliers, foyer social, église, dispensaire etc.. En dehors du camp, se trouvent la cathédrale, deux écoles primaires et 1 couvent de soeurs abandonnés depuis 1964. Il existe aussi deux vieux groupes électrogènes presque déclassés, un puits d'épuration d'eau mais sans machine de pompage et un vieux barrage pour la fourniture d'énergie électrique. La camp est non électrifié et sans eau, il est néanmoins habitable et demande des travaux de réhabilitation a conclu le Commandant CIRCO.

L'Ingénieur du Service National des Routes de Desserte Agricole en signe SNRDA du Ministère de l'Intérieur a fait à son tour un exposé sur l'état de la route qui relie Kindu à Lokandu ainsi que l'évaluation physique de ce tronçon et du site de Lokandu. Dans l'ensemble, dit l'Ingénieur, les 60 Kms de route entre Kindu et Lokandu connaissent des interventions sommaires d'entretien mais pour le moment, ce trajet est impraticable. Les 60 Kms sont répartis en 30 Kms de forêt et 30 Kms de savane, la rive gauche est impraticable suite à un mauvais état des ponts, à des endroits défectueux par manque d'assainissement, à la présence des troncs d'arbres sur la route qui a pour conséquence la couverture de la chaussée par des branches et le non ensoleillement de la route. La digue devient plus basse par rapport à la route. La réhabilitation peut donc être complète ou partielle ; elle consistera à arranger les pentes qui mènent vers les ponts ; à rehausser le niveau des digues ; à dégager les troncs d'arbres ; à abattre les grands arbres qui couvrent la chaussée (déforestation) et à la reconstruction des ouvrages d'art et d'assainissement (reconstruction des caniveaux). Parmi les 14 ponts trouvables sur cette route, 4 sont plus importants et exigent un patelage ; c'est-à-dire un remplacement. La rive droite par contre - Lokandu, Eliba et Kayilo - longtemps abandonnée, demande une réhabilitation complète. Les travaux sont difficiles à entrevoir par manque de village le long de cette route. En effet, on peut parcourir 10 à 15 Kms sans rencontrer un village.

#### Evaluation physique et financière

A lère vue, l'ossature des bâtiments de Lokandu est en bon état selon l'appréciation de l'Ingénieur. Pour les maisons visitées, les travaux de menuiserie et de charpenterie sont envisageables. Les estimations de coût n'ont pas été communiquées par l'Ingénieur.

Reprenant la parole, le Vice-Gouverneur a fait une présentation sommaire de Lokandu qui est une partie de la zone de Kailo qui compte 78.000 âmes selon le recensement effectué au deuxième trimestre. La zone de Kailo est divisée en 4 collectivités rurales à savoir : Katakombé, Balanga sur la rive gauche et la collectivité chefferie de Bangengele dans laquelle se trouve Lokandu. La population est faite des Bangengele appartenant à la tribu Mongo, Wetsu et les Wasongola sur la rive droite. Il existe au sein de cette population, quelques immigrants comme les Banyatuku venus du Haut-Zaïre. On trouve également une partie d'arabisés appartenant au groupe de Mukoko en amont. Ces populations ont sur les plans historique et socio-culturel des liens de parenté avec les populations tanzaniennes, c'est donc une population hétérogène.



Cette séance, qui a commencé à 16H55' a pris fin à 17H30', heure à laquelle les équipes ont été constituées par secteur en vue d'échanger avec les services publics concernés de la place.

Journée du 7/10/1994

Partie de Kindu à 11H30', la délégation est arrivée à Lokandu à 16H45' où elle a été accueillie avec faste par la population.

Une séance d'animation politique a été effectuée par la jeunesse du MPR/Lokandu suivi du mot de circonstance du Vice-Gouverneur qui a expliqué l'objet de la mission conjointe en présentant les responsables des deux parties à savoir l'ONU et le gouvernement du Zaïre.

Aussitôt après, une équipe s'est rendue sur le terrain pour la visite du camp qui se poursuivra le samedi matin avant de retourner à Kindu. La traversée sur le fleuve a pris 5 heures à l'aller et 10 heures au retour.

Avant de quitter Kindu, le dimanche 9 octobre 1994 dans la matinée, une déclaration écrite de la société civile du Maniema nous a été remise. Elle est relative à la protestation contre la décision d'hébergement à Lokandu des militaires des ex-FAR.

Fait à Kisangani, le 9 octobre 1994

Le Rapporteur  
Pharmacien KABWIKI MBAYO,  
Conseiller

PROCES VERBAL/SYNTHESE DE TOUTES LES SEANCES DE TRAVAIL DE LA JOURNEE DU  
VENDREDI 30/9/1994

La mission conjointe Gouvernement du Zaïre/Nations Unies a eu trois séances de travail ce Vendredi 30 Septembre 1994 d'abord avec les représentants du HCR ensuite avec les autorités locales et enfin avec les réfugiés du camp de Mugunga.

I. Séance de travail avec les représentants du HCR

Au cours de cette séance, les représentants du HCR ont fait à l'intention de la mission un briefing sur la situation générale des réfugiés dans le Nord-Kivu . Les faits les plus importants qui ont été soulignés sont les suivants:

- Le déplacement des réfugiés de la frontière ne semble pas être une solution mais une simple transposition du problème et même un mauvais signal car on ne connaît pas le nombre de ceux des réfugiés voulant réellement retourner au Rwanda.
- La difficulté du HCR de coopérer avec la milice qu'avec les FAR
- Préconiser l'arrivée des casques bleus pour favoriser le retour et même garantir la sécurité des réfugiés.
- L'objectif du HCR est de garder les réfugiés et leur garantir la protection et le retour mais le problème de la sécurité ne relève pas de sa responsabilité.
- Dans les camps, les réfugiés ont des structures bien organisées de chez eux et les ont tout simplement transposées au Zaïre.
- Les réfugiés sont très solidaires et unis pour un même objectif et sont contrôlés par une certaine hiérarchie.
- La rumeur constitue un aspect très important chez les réfugiés
- le HCR entretient d'excellents rapports de collaboration avec les autorités locales.
- Les anciennes FAR ont recruté et habillé beaucoup de jeunes faux militaires.
- A Mugunga 80% des jeunes sont miliciens
- Il ya une demande formelle de la population pour savoir comment elle va rentrer au Rwanda. Elle n'est pas libre de décider suite à l'influence des leaders politiques.
- Actuellement les statistiques des réfugiés se présentent approximativement de la manière suivante:

Camp de Kibumba: Plus ou moins 200.000 personnes

Camp de Katale : 250.000 personnes

Camp de Kahindo : 35.000 personnes

Camp de Mugunga : 200.000 personnes

Il ya au moins 100.000 réfugiés éparpillés à travers la région, plus ou moins 70.000 au Nord de Katale et environ 30.000 le long de la presqu'île.

Pour Goma, il ya 22 à 24.000 militaires réfugiés.

- Que les autorités zaïroises offrent un contre poids à la milice pour l'empêcher de s'imposer et de devenir importante.
- Les FAR ne sont pas totalement désarmées

- Le nombre de retour journalier est en baisse. A ce jour plus ou moins 200.000 personnes sont déjà rentrées au Rwanda.

En ce qui concerne la rentrée scolaire, la partie zaïroise a estimé que chaque jour qui passe constitue un temps perdu; cette rentrée scolaire est l'une des priorités qui doit s'organiser le plus vite possible.

Le HCR a révélé à ce sujet que dans la zone de Rutshuru près de 50 écoles sont encore occupées par des réfugiés (22.800 personnes) tandis que dans la zone de Masisi, 13 écoles sont occupées dont 2 partiellement, ce qui risque de compromettre la rentrée. A ce sujet Monsieur MUTIRI, chargé de mission du premier ministre, a informé l'assistance de l'arrivée prochaine du Ministre de l'Enseignement Primaire, Secondaire et Professionnelle (EPSP) à Goma.

Cette séance a duré 1h30' et avant de la terminer, le HCR a informé l'assistance qu'une marche de colère organisée par l'ancienne milice du Rwanda se déroulait au camp de Katale suite à l'assassinat d'un bandit qui s'était produit la veille. Leurs hommes en poste seraient descendus à Rutshuru pour raisons de sécurité.

## II. Séance de travail effectuée au Gouvernorat

Avant la tenue de cette séance, la partie zaïroise a rendu de 10h25 à 10h45 une visite de courtoisie au Commandant 2nd de la 4ème région militaire à Katindo, le Colonel KISEMPIA qui représentait son titulaire empêché. Au cours de cette visite, le Chargé de mission du premier ministre, Monsieur MUTIRI wa BASHARA a expliqué à l'intention du Commandant, l'objectif de la mission conjointe gouvernement/Nations Unies dans la région du Nord-Kivu. Il a également abordé l'aspect sécurité qui doit entourer cette mission et a sollicité le concours du Commandant pour qu'une escorte soit organisée au cours de la visite des camps de réfugiés. Répondant à cette préoccupation, le Commandant second en a pris acte et a promis de rencontrer le Général pour lui en faire part. C'est par un mot de remerciement réciproque entre les visiteurs et leur hôte que cette visite s'est terminée.

De 11h à 12h35', le Gouverneur intérimaire, Monsieur KAHANYA, a présidé une séance de travail regroupant la mission conjointe Gouvernement/Nations Unies. quelques représentants du HCR/GOMA ainsi que les différents services techniques compétents de la région.

Après avoir souhaité la bienvenue à l'assistance, il a été procédé à une présentation rapide de tous les participants. Ne voulant pas revenir sur les événements vécus lors de l'arrivée massive des Rwandais à Goma, le Gouverneur intérimaire en a du moins donné les lourdes conséquences qui s'en sont suivies notamment :

- Les dégâts sur le plan écologique par la destruction de la nature et de son environnement

- Les dégâts sanitaires suite aux épidémies causant plusieurs milliers de morts aussi bien chez les réfugiés que parmi la population hôte.
- Les dégâts économiques suite à l'hébergement des milliers de consommateurs dans une ville dont la capacité d'accueil est d'environ 200.000 personnes. Ce phénomène a fait que tout le stock stratégique soit consommé entraînant ainsi une multiplication sensible des prix.
- Toutes les infrastructures de la ville étaient touchées: les écoles, les Eglises, la voirie, les câbles téléphoniques ...
- Sur le plan de la sécurité, on a connu une recrudescence de la criminalité suite à la présence des armes et munitions apportées par les réfugiés. Beaucoup de morts ont été enregistrés pendant cette période. Entre temps, le comportement des réfugiés reste extrémiste dans les camps où ils se permettent de barricader les routes, de faire la police et d'extorquer la population.

Le gouverneur a demandé à la communauté internationale de se pencher sérieusement sur le dossier relatif à l'évacuation des réfugiés suite à des multiples contraintes dont: la rentrée scolaire, les campagnes agricoles, la saison de pluie pouvant encore entraîner des épidémies, les échéances électorales: Identification et enrôlement.

Que la communauté internationale prenne en compte le devenir de la communauté hôte. Le Gouverneur a souhaité que tenant compte de l'existence des conflits inter-ethniques entre rwandais, les sites d'hébergement des réfugiés soient en dehors de la région. L'éloignement des réfugiés n'est pas une solution au problème, l'idéal serait le retour au Rwanda en prévoyant la mise en place d'une zone tampon de sécurité où des conditions seraient favorables aux réfugiés.

Concernant la sécurité dans les camps, les efforts sont menés conjointement entre les organismes internationaux et les autorités locales afin que les éléments des Forces Armées Zaïroises y soient implantées. Depuis la prise de cette décision, la situation s'est améliorée.

Pour la visite au camp de Mugunga, il a été convenu que toutes les questions liées au rapatriement volontaire et à l'éloignement soient abordées avec délicatesse tenant compte de l'état psychologique des réfugiés et pour éviter d'éventuels échauffements. La stratégie consistera à faire parler plus les représentants des réfugiés en commençant par les questions liées à la sécurité, aux soins de santé et à la distribution des vivres.

Compte tenu du fait qu'au niveau des camps les meneurs sont difficilement identifiables et généralement non dénoncés, il a été convenu du déploiement d'une force envers laquelle la population aurait confiance, et qui pourrait maîtriser les agitateurs et saper leur intimidation. Cette action permettrait de détacher le noyau dur du reste de la population. Il a aussi été évoqué le fait que certains liens existeraient entre les réfugiés et le gouvernement actuel de Kigali.

Pour terminer, le représentant résident adjoint du PNUD à Kinshasa, Monsieur Stanislaus NKWAIN, a informé les autorités locales de l'arrivée prochaine à Goma de 2 consultants internationaux qui pourront se joindre aux experts zaïrois de la place pour un travail sur l'environnement de Goma. Il a invité l'autorité locale et le gouvernement du Zaïre à apporter un appui conséquent pour permettre à cette équipe de bien remplir sa mission.

### III. Séance de travail au camp de Mugunga

En début de l'après midi, une autre séance de travail introduite par Monsieur Joel BOUTROUE, Chef d'Equipe UNHCR/Goma, a eu lieu dans le camp des réfugiés de Mugunga. Elle a regroupé la délégation conjointe Gouvernement du Zaïre/Nations Unies, les représentants du HCR/Goma, le Commissaire urbain de Goma, les conseillers politiques du Gouverneur et les représentants des réfugiés.

Le commissaire urbain de Goma, Monsieur MASHAKO MAMBA, a d'abord procédé à la présentation des membres de la mission conjointe Gouvernement/ONU. Il a ensuite informé les représentants des réfugiés, avant de leur accorder la parole, que la mission était parmi eux pour s'enquérir de leurs conditions de sécurité, des soins de santé, des conditions alimentaires, et voudrait recueillir leurs avis et considérations ainsi que leurs propositions.

Prenant la parole au nom du groupe, le président des préfets a remercié la délégation pour sa visite tout en soulignant qu'elle était une surprise pour eux, étant donné qu'ils n'ont été informés que quelques heures avant.

Il a souligné qu'ils n'étaient que des préfets de fortune et leur rôle se limite à aider les ONG pour la distribution des vivres et les soins de santé administrés dans les camps; ce rôle est purement humanitaire. Il a rappelé que l'organisation mise en place tire ses origines du Rwanda et a été simplement transposée au Zaïre. Concernant leurs préoccupations, il a déclaré qu'ils étaient disposés à les livrer volontiers à la délégation.

Concernant leur sécurité, il a été entendu que les réfugiés civils ne savent pas où se trouvent leurs militaires. Il revenait à la délégation de chercher à les localiser.

Au camp, vivent plus de 200.000 personnes parmi lesquelles on retrouve plusieurs couches, notamment les anciens fonctionnaires de l'Etat, les anciens militaires, les bandits civils et militaires, les anciens prisonniers... C'est donc une population mixte difficile à contrôler.

Avant l'exode, Goma était constitué d'au moins 200.000 personnes; or dans le seul camp de Mugunga la population dépasse les 200.000 personnes. Cela pose problème sur le plan de la sécurité, étant donné qu'il n'existe ni gendarmerie ni justice pour régler les conflits. Mais la presse dramatise en amplifiant le degré d'insécurité qui règne dans le camp.

Un projet d'implantation d'une commission chargée de la sécurité dans le camp est à l'étude, mais bien que non officialisée, elle est déjà opérationnelle et des résultats palpables sont enregistrés.

Le Général ANYIDHO de la MINUAR a souhaité rencontrer quelques membres de cette commission pour échange de vues.

Le Colonel médecin KABANDA KURHENGGA a demandé aux représentants des réfugiés de faire, à l'attention de la délégation un briefing sur la sécurité au plan général; c'est-à-dire sur le plan social, médical, sécurité de l'avenir...

Répondant à cette préoccupation, un représentant des réfugiés a informé la mission que la sécurité est excellente sur les plans sanitaire et alimentaire malgré la monotonie des vivres tandis que sur le plan de l'avenir, du bonheur futur, les réfugiés sont en insécurité. En effet, quelle que soit la qualité des vivres et des soins médicaux reçus, le fait de se retrouver sur un sol étranger constitue une insécurité. "Nous sommes obligés de rester ici dans cette situation" a déclaré ce représentant.

Quant aux motifs empêchant leur retour au Rwanda, les réfugiés ont déclaré que les conditions actuelles au niveau de leur pays ne sont pas de nature à encourager ce retour. En effet, certains réfugiés qui retournent au Rwanda sont tués, d'autres ont les yeux crevés. "Des témoignages éloquentes peuvent vous être donnés si vous le désirez". Une grande forêt se trouvant à Gitarama et à Muchinji sert de lieu de persécution des réfugiés. Si les conditions pouvant garantir la sécurité sont réunies tous les réfugiés retourneront au Rwanda même, à pieds. A ce sujet, les réfugiés ont lancé une invitation à la communauté internationale en vue du désarmement de l'ennemi et de l'application des accords d'Arusha. Leur retour est conditionné par celui des militaires et de leurs leaders politiques, Il risque éventuellement de se compliquer et de durer plusieurs années.

Sur place, les contacts avec leur leaders politiques sont facilités par une commission sociale servant de relais entre les deux groupes.

Au sein de cette commission, existent des sous commissions, notamment celle chargée du patrimoine, de l'économie et de l'hygiène.

Les réfugiés ont révélé que le véritable problème rwandais n'est pas politique, mais **ETHNIQUE**, et que la communauté internationale devrait s'y pencher en vue d'une éventuelle solution.

Quant à savoir comment le résoudre, "cette question ne peut être posée qu'au Secrétaire général de l'ONU", a déclaré un représentant des réfugiés. Le problème rwandais est de taille, car jamais l'histoire n'a connu un si important exode à part celui de la 2ème guerre mondiale.

Le Général ANYIDHO, Commandant adjoint de la MINUAR, a rappelé à l'attention des représentants des réfugiés que les Nations Unies ont été invitées au Rwanda après la signature des accords d'Arusha pour leur concrétisation. Les négociations n'ont pas marché et la guerre a éclaté.

Pendant la période de négociation, les Nations Unies ont perdu beaucoup de leurs hommes qui ont été assassinés. Au début de la guerre, il existait un comité de crise constitué des membres de tous les deux gouvernements. A ce jour, le FPR déclare qu'il est disposé à composer avec les FAR.

Les Nations Unies espèrent arriver à une réconciliation au Rwanda, ce qui explique leur présence à toutes les négociations. "Le FPR fait partie des Nations Unies", a déclaré le Général ANYIDHO, tout en souhaitant entendre des représentants des réfugiés, des suggestions réalistes permettant de trouver rapidement la solution à leurs problèmes.

Un représentant des réfugiés a relevé le fait que, dans la matinée, une ONG dénommée AFRICA WATCH aurait diffusé des informations contraires à celles livrées par le HCR. Cela traduit la partialité avec laquelle certains organes de l'ONU apprécient les problèmes rwandais. Ceci explique la méfiance actuelle des réfugiés rwandais vis à vis de l'ONU.

Concernant la scolarité de leurs enfants, le président des représentants des réfugiés a informé l'assistance que des endroits ont été aménagés pour l'encadrement de ceux-ci, qui étudient pour le moment à ciel ouvert.

Quant aux dommages causés à la population de Goma et à son environnement, les réfugiés ont souligné qu'ils reconnaissent l'hospitalité leur accordée par cette population et voudraient que cette dernière continue à les supporter jusqu'à leur retour au Rwanda.

Se sentant chez soi quoique résident sur le territoire zaïrois, c'est par un mot de remerciement que la communauté rwandaise a terminé son intervention.

Prenant enfin la parole, Monsieur MUTIRI wa BASHARA, chargé de mission du Premier Ministre, a remercié la délégation rwandaise pour sa disponibilité ainsi que toute l'assistance pour sa contribution.

Commencée à 14h15, la rencontre a pris fin à 16h20

Ont participé aux séances de travail ci-haut énumérées, les personnalités dont les noms suivent:

Pour les Nations Unies:

1. Le Général de Brigade, H.ANYIDHOHO, Commandant Adjoint de la MINUAR
2. *M. A. B. SIDIQUE DAO, Responsable de l'Aide Humanitaire, MINUAR*  
Mr. Stanislaus NKWAIN, Représentant Résident Adjoint du PNUD KINSHASA
3. Lt Colonel DESNOYERS de la MINUAR
4. Mr. Jiddo VAN DRUNEN, Chef de l'Unité Spéciale Burundi-Rwanda HCR/GENEVE
5. Mr. Gilles BRIERE, Assistant en Logistique de la MINUAR
6. Mr. Joel BOUTROUE, Chef d'Equipe UNHCR/GOMA
7. Mr. Yvan STURN, Senior Field Officer/MUGUNGA

Pour le Gouvernement du Zaïre:

1. Mr. MUTIRI wa BASHARA, Chargé de Mission du Premier Ministre
2. Colonel Magistrat MBIDI NIKENI, Conseiller Principal au Ministère de la Défense Nationale
3. Colonel Médecin KABANDA KURHENGHA, Commandant du corps médical des FAZ
4. Lt Colonel KAYUMBI, Chargé de la Logistique
5. Mr Victor YENYI, Avocat Général de la République, Représentant du Ministère de la Justice
6. Mr. IPAKA Damien, Directeur de Cabinet Adjoint, Représentant du Ministère de l'Intérieur



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7. Mr. MUTOKE MUPOMBA, Conseiller Psycho-Pédagogique, Représentant du Ministère des Affaires Sociales
8. Mr. RUMASHANA BAJOJE, Directeur de Cabinet Adjoint, Représentant du Ministère de l'EPSP
9. Capitaine KABAMBA, Représentant du Corps du Génie
10. Mr. KABWIKI MBAYO, Conseiller Pharmaceutique, Représentant du Ministère de la santé Publique et Famille

Pour les autorités locales

1. Mr. KAHANIA, Directeur de Région du Nord Kivu, Représentant du Gouverneur
2. Mr. MASHAKO MAMBA, Commissaire Urbain de Goma
3. Mr. TSHIBANGU MPIANA, Procureur Général
4. Mr. PERO KUMAKETH, Directeur Régional du SNIP/DI a.i
5. Mr. MAUTU BOLEKE, Directeur Régional Adjoint du SNIP/DI-MP
6. Colonel KANENGELE, Commandant de la 8e circonscription militaire
7. Mr. MALI HASEME Jean, Conseiller Politique du Gouverneur du Nord-Kivu
8. Dr. NGAHEMBA Maximin, Conseiller Principal du Gouverneur du Nord-Kivu
9. Dr. MUKENGESHAYI, Médecin Inspecteur Régional
10. Mr. BIKUBA KABAMBI, Chef de Division de l'Enseignement Primaire et Secondaire + Représentants des réfugiés rwandais dont les noms seront communiqués ultérieurement.

Fait à Goma, le 1 Octobre 1994

Le Rapporteur



Pharmacien KABWIKI MBAYO, Conseiller



**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS HELD IN  
KINSHASA, ZAIRE  
ON 12 - 14TH SEPTEMBER 1994  
ON RWANDESE REFUGEE CAMPS IN ZAIRE.**

The following is a summary of the main points discussed with the President Marshal Mobutu Sese Seko, Prime Minister Kengo Wa Ndondo and Ministers of the Zairian government, concerning the situation of Rwandese refugees in Goma and Bukavu.

1. In response to requests made by the Zairian government the UN Secretary-General had instructed his Special Representative for Rwanda Ambassador Shaharyar M. Khan to undertake a mission to Zaire. Ambassador Shaharyar Khan was accompanied by Mr. Michel Moussali UNHCR's Special Representative to Rwanda, Brig. Henry Anyidoho Deputy Force Commander UNAMIR, Ms. Isel Rivero, Senior Political Adviser, UNAMIR.
2. The UN Secretary General shared the preoccupation of the Zairian Government concerning security inside the camps and the deterioration of the Zaire's infrastructure in Goma and Bukavu. The Secretary General was concerned at the economic and environmental degradation that the refugee problems represented for Zaire. It was generally agreed that the voluntary return of Rwandese refugees to their homes in peace and dignity represented the best solution to the problem.
3. It was agreed that, in order to alleviate the pressure on the infrastructure and ecology of the border areas, additional refugee camps would need to be opened in Zaire at an appropriate distance from the border. These sites needed to be identified and the cost of transfer assessed in terms of logistic and financial support.
4. The Rwandese army units, along with their families, transferred to the camps would be required to disarm and to wear civilian clothes. The UN would assist in seeking asylum for senior political leaders of the former government in other countries (preferably French-speaking African countries). The cost of opening new camps, the logistic support for the transfer and the running costs would be borne by the international community and the UN.
5. The Rwandese government would continue its efforts for national reconciliation. The guarantees for fair and humane treatment to returning refugees would be conveyed to the refugees in the camps. Visits to camps by senior Rwandese officials to directly convey their government's policies would be considered.
6. UN would provide support to returning refugees by providing camps, food, water, healthcare and transport. UN would also ensure its presence at key points to provide visible reassurance to returning refugees.

7. UN and Zaire government would consider providing security in the transfer to new camps and in ensuring that refugees in existing camps are free from intimidation. While refugees may be encouraged to return home, they must be free to make the decision voluntarily, without harassment from either side.

8. It was agreed that a joint working party would be formed and meet in Kinshasa in the week commencing 19th September 1994, in order to assess the logistic framework of the operation, the location of the sites, the capital and running costs of the camps and the security requirements of the move. The working party would visit the sites involved and submit its report expeditiously.

9. There was a general agreement that the operation of transferring refugees to new sites should be started as early as possible in order to avoid the hardship of the rainy season and to encourage refugees to return to their lands for the next harvest.

10. After the report of the joint working group is received, the issue would be considered by the UN Secretary-General and by the Security Council in New York.

Misc 4507

OUTGOING C

**KISHANSHA, ZAIRE**

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, SRSG, UNAMIR

TEL No: (212) 963 3093

**SUBJECT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS HELD IN ZAIRE**

1. Please find attached herewith executive summary of discussions held in Kinshasa with the President, Prime Minister, Ministers and also the Ambassadors of USA, France and Belgium.
2. It would be highly appreciated if this summary could be made available to all the above mentioned persons.
4. Best wishes

**Procès-Verbal de la séance de travail de ce mercredi, 21 septembre 94**  
**relative à la préparation de la mission mixte Gouvernement/ONU**  
**chargée d'évaluer le coût des opérations de rapatriement et**  
**d'éloignement des réfugiés rwandais.**

Introduite par le Chargé du Bureau du PNUD à Kinshasa, Mr Aliou M. Diallo, une séance de travail relative à la préparation de la mission mixte Gouvernement/ONU, chargée d'évaluer le coût des opérations de rapatriement et d'éloignement des réfugiés rwandais a eu lieu dans la salle de conférence du PNUD à Kinshasa, ce mercredi 21 septembre 1994 sous la présidence de Monsieur Mutiri wa Bashara, chargé de mission du Premier Ministre.

Prenant la parole, le Chargé du Bureau du PNUD à Kinshasa, Monsieur Aliou M. Diallo, a souligné le caractère important de cette mission compte tenu de l'ampleur du travail à abattre et tenant compte des déclarations enregistrées par ci par là à travers le monde. Il a précisé que la mission bénéficiera d'un support logistique du PNUD et que les aspects techniques et financiers seront à charge de la MINUAR.

Avant de se retirer de la salle, Monsieur Aliou M. Diallo a proposé Monsieur Mutiri wa Bashara comme Président de séance compte tenu du fait que cette mission est gouvernementale. Deux observations ont été faites en rapport avec la participation du Ministère de la Défense Nationale à la mission et la zone de Kongolo, site d'hébergement situé au Nord du Shaba. Le Chargé du Bureau du PNUD à Kinshasa a relevé l'aspect militaire assez important de cette mission et a émis le vœu de voir le Ministère de la Défense Nationale déléguer au moins 3 membres pour participer aux travaux. Concernant le site de Kongolo, Monsieur Diallo a présenté à l'intention de l'assistance, la position de certains membres du gouvernement originaires du Shaba qui estiment que la cohabitation entre la population locale et les réfugiés serait impossible étant donné que cette population est généralement agressive et qu'il existerait parmi elle certains descendants des tutsi. L'assistance a décidé à l'unanimité que ces questions pouvaient faire l'objet d'un débat au Conseil des Ministres et qu'à son niveau il était difficile de prendre position. Néanmoins, la hiérarchie devrait en être informée pour dispositions à prendre.

La séance du jour avait pour but la définition des termes de référence devant permettre à la délégation d'atteindre l'objectif lui assigné par le gouvernement à savoir l'évaluation du coût des opérations de rapatriement volontaire et d'éloignement des réfugiés rwandais.

Il a été convenu que la délégation partirait des termes de référence de la mission de l'ambassadeur KHAN afin de les concrétiser. En effet, ces termes de références permettront à l'équipe de définir les objectifs spécifiques de sa mission, le travail à accomplir sur terrain, les rapports à produire, l'itinéraire à suivre ainsi que la durée de la mission.

Après échange de vue, le projet d'itinéraire ci-après a été proposé :  
Kinshasa - Goma (3 jours) - Bukavu (3 jours) - Kindu (2 jours) - Kongolo (2 jours) - Goma (1 jour pour faire le point) - Irebu (3 jours) - Kinshasa - Bas-Zaïre (2 jours) - Kinshasa - Bandundu (2 jours) - Kinshasa.

*Faire le point ⇒ To discuss among yourselves*

La mission pourrait durer 21 jours et il faudrait au cours de celle-ci, entrevoir la

possibilité de location des véhicules pouvant permettre à l'équipe d'accéder à certains sites de l'intérieur des régions et ce, avec le concours des églises et des autorités locales. Tenant aussi compte des intempéries et du fait que certains aéroports du pays ne bénéficient pas d'aide normale à la navigation, l'équipe pourra faire confiance pour des raisons de sécurité, aux pilotes locaux notamment ceux de la compagnie TMK exploitant les lignes Goma-Bukavu-Kindu.

Sur terrain, la stratégie consisterait à rencontrer les autorités locales, les encadreurs sociaux (coordination des ONGs), à visiter les camps et sites d'hébergement.

Pour le Nord-Kivu, on visitera les sites de Mugunga, Kibumba et Katale ; pour le Maniema, le site de Lukandu ; pour le Shaba, le site de Kongolo ; pour l'Equateur, le site d'Irebu.

Pour le gouvernement zaïrois, il y a 3 catégories de réfugiés à héberger dont les statistiques nous seront fournies par le HCR ; il s'agit de la population civile, des militaires et des leaders politiques.

Monsieur Mutiri wa Bashara a rappelé à l'intention de l'assistance que lors de la dernière réunion mixte Zaïre/Rwanda, il a été entendu que s'il y a réticence dans le retour volontaire des rwandais, cela est dû au fait que quelques hommes politiques les manipulent. Compte tenu de cette situation, le gouvernement du Zaïre tient à éloigner ces leaders du reste des réfugiés.

Pour clôturer la séance, la délégation a souhaité que le Vice Premier Ministre et Ministre de l'Intérieur prenne déjà contact avec les autorités régionales et locales afin que les dispositions soient prises pour l'accueil de la mission. Le PNUD quant à lui, a promis de contacter Kigali pour l'en informer dès que possible.

Enfin, il a été convenu qu'en attendant l'arrivée de la délégation de l'ONU à Kinshasa, l'équipe se retrouve ce jeudi 22 septembre 1994 à 16 heures au même lieu pour une autre séance de travail. Il a été demandé à Monsieur Jiddo Van Drunen, Chef de l'unité spéciale du HCR pour le Burundi et le Rwanda, d'apprêter les copies des conventions relatives au statut des réfugiés.

Ont participé à la réunion, les personnalités ci-après :

- 1° Mr MUTIRI WA BASHARA : Chargé de mission du Premier Ministre
- 2° Mr STANISLAUS NKWAIN : Représentant Résident Adjoint du PNUD à Kinshasa
- 3° Mr Jiddo Van Drunen : Chef de l'Unité Spéciale Burundi/Rwanda-HCR Genève
- 4° Mr YENYI OLUNGU VICTOR : Avocat Général de la République et Représentant du Ministère de la Justice
- 5° Mr MUTOKE MUPOMPA : Conseiller psycho-pédagogique aux Affaires Sociales
- 6° Mr RUMASHANA BAJOJE-NGWETE : Directeur de Cabinet Adjoint et Représentant de l'EPSP
- 7° Mr KABWIKI MBAYO : Conseiller pharmaceutique et Représentant de la Santé Publique et Famille.

Commencée à 10H15', la réunion a pris fin à 12H30'.

Fait à Kinshasa, le 22 septembre 1994

Le rapporteur,

Pharmacien KABWIKI MBAYO, Conseiller



Kinshasa, le 20 septembre 1994

N° CPM/ 0250 /94.

A Monsieur le Représentant/résident  
du PNUD  
à KINSHASA.

Concerne : Mission mixte gouvernement/ONU chargée  
d'évaluer le coût des opérations  
de rapatriement et d'éloignement des  
réfugiés rwandais.

Monsieur le Représentant,

Me référant à la séance de travail que vous avez  
eue avec M. MUTIRI-wa-BASHARA, chargé de mission du Premier  
Ministre, les personnes ci-après feront partie de la délégation  
gouvernementale qui accompagnera les experts de l'O.N.U. dans  
les régions du Nord-Kivu, du Sud-Kivu, du Shaba, du Bas-Zaïre  
et de l'Equateur.

1. Cabinet du Premier Ministre : MUTIRI-wa-BASHARA, Chargé de  
mission du Premier Ministre.
2. Ministère de la Défense Nationale : Un représentant.
3. Ministère de l'Intérieur : Damien IPAKA.
4. Ministère de la Justice : Victor YENYI, Avocat Général de la  
République.
5. Ministère des Affaires Sociales : MUTOKE MUPOMPA.
6. Ministère de l'Enseignement Primaire, Secondaire  
et Professionnel : RUMASHANA BAJOJE, Directeur de  
Cabinet Adjoint.
7. Ministère de la Santé et Famille : KABWIKI MBAYU.

Le gouvernement souhaite voir l'évaluation du coût  
de rapatriement et d'éloignement des réfugiés rwandais tenir  
compte des préalables suivants :

1. Minorer l'impact budgétaire pour le Zaïre ;

.../...



2. L'hébergement des réfugiés rwandais ne devra pas perturber la vie normale (éducation - soins de santé primaire - campagnes agricoles - nourriture...) des populations hôtes, afin que les localités d'hébergement ne se transforment en foyers de tension ;
3. L'aide humanitaire tiendra compte de la préoccupation du gouvernement à relancer le secteur productif national (recours à l'expertise locale et aux secteurs industriel, pharmaceutique, alimentaire et des services) ;
4. Concernant les militaires, outre le logement et les soins de santé, prévoir l'habillement et la réhabilitation des camps d'instruction devant les héberger.

Veillez croire, Monsieur le Représentant,  
en l'assurance de ma parfaite considération.

LE CHEF DE CABINET,

M. NUNGA.

MEETING WITH THE ACTING PRIME MINISTER  
DISCUSSION POINTS - 27 SEPTEMBER 1994

INTRODUCTION

1. The initial welcome by the Acting Prime Minister included his desire to see the Zairian Forces participate actively in the execution of the proposed operation that would alleviate the problem created by political leaders and armed elements among the Rwandese Refugees currently in camps within Zaire. Brig Gen Anyidoho then stated that one of the objectives of the mission was one of "fact finding" with regard to the proposed roles of Zairean and UN forces.

2. The Acting Prime Minister then presented three options, with regard to the participating forces, that could be considered:

- a. UN-only forces - this option could be very expensive for the UN;
- b. Zairean-only forces - this option would be difficult from a logistics point of view as Zairean resources are very limited;
- c. UN/Zaire forces - this is the preferred option as it takes advantage of the currently deployed Zairean Forces in the area and the UN logistical assets.

COMMISSION'S FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS

3. Brig Gen Anyidoho stated that UNHQ in New York had approved the financial support of six Commission members from Zaire for a period of five days outside of KINSHASA. The Acting Prime Minister stated that Zaire had already greatly suffered as a result of the Rwandese that had established themselves as refugees in Zaire. This situation was not Zaire's fault but created a situation of instability in the areas of North and South KIVU. Zaire requires the international community to assist them to resolve this situation. As regards to the number of Government of Zaire participants in the mission, the 10-Zaire members identified all have a specific role to play in the resolution of the current problem. Brig Gen Anyidoho mentioned that he would bring to the UN authorities these Zaire wishes to have a greater representation during the visits to be conducted by the Commission.

CURRENT REFUGEE STATUS WITH REGARD TO NEW SITES

4. Mr. Van Drunen, UNHCR rep, mentioned that hopefully the situation in Rwanda will stabilize shortly to allow the return of most of the refugees currently in Zaire, including the ex-members of the Rwanda Government Forces interested in returning to Rwanda. To displace a substantial number of the refugees much further from

the border would be very expensive, might be logistically and financially impossible and reduce the possibility of their early return to Rwanda. The greater the distances the longer the operation will take.

5. The Acting Prime Minister mentioned that although some sites such as KONGOLO could be seen as geographically appropriate, other considerations such as the reluctance of the local population (there are already 30,000 Rwandese in this area) to accept the move of these refugees in their area could be significant. A closer look at the map of Zaire then followed and the site of BUNIA, 500 kms north east of GOMA, was proposed as the preferred site to visit during the week. The roads leading to this area are also significantly better than other sectors in the south and west.

#### REFUGEES WILLINGNESS TO MOVE

6. Brig Gen Anyidoho mentioned that it would not be possible to move the Rwandan military and political leaders against their will unless force is used. Therefore it is essential that contact be established with them to obtain their cooperation with regard to the planned operations. The Acting Prime Minister voiced his concern that if the leaders of the refugee camps are approached as official representatives they could use these official contacts as a legitimization of their status of a government in exile. The government of Zaire does not support or recognize this position.

7. Brig Gen Anyidoho reiterated that the international community must support a "voluntary" move. To this point, Mr. Van Drunen mentioned that the OAU Convention specifically precludes refugees from undertaking political and/or subversive activities against their country of origin at the risk of being excluded from refugee status (Art III of the OAU Convention). With regard to the move of the political leaders from Zaire to a third country he stressed that the Government of Zaire should play a major role in finding such third countries through bilateral contacts. There was some discussion on the UN/UNHCR's role in this regard. UNHCR's position would be further clarified (see attached response).

#### CLOSURE OF ZAIRE BORDER TO UNAMIR TROOPS

8. Brig Gen Anyidoho questioned why the Zaire border with Rwanda had been closed to UNAMIR troops. The Acting Prime Minister mentioned that restrictions had been required because of the experience in GOMA and the anticipation of an even greater influx of people from the French Protection Zone when the French were to withdraw. The influx would have been too much for the BUKAVU area. After the precision about UNAMIR troops been interdicted access to Zaire, the Acting Prime Minister mentioned that that restriction could be lifted. Secretarial Note: a memo was sent to the Zaire authorities to formalise the requirement for UNAMIR troops to cross the border with Zaire as part of their normal responsibilities.

LOGISTIC COOPERATION - UN/ZAIRE FORCES

9. The Medical Corps Commandant mentioned that the problems encountered in the GOMA area should not be generalised as other nations have had similar problems in other missions such as in SOMALIA and HAITI. The logistic assistance that the UN could provide to the Zaire forces would greatly reduce the problems within that area while reducing the total cost that the UN would have to pay if a UN-only force would be used. Brig Gen Anyidoho mentioned that the upcoming visit would assist in formulizing a solution that will integrate the Zaire and UN forces. He also mentioned that it is essential to include the Rwandan authorities in any solution being considered by the Commission.

10. This meeting was concluded at 1030 hrs.

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Tue 27.09.94 19:15:03 to: HCZREKI from: HCRWAKI msg: ZRE0066.MSG  
zczc

.kigali (unhcr) 29sep94 1844z  
rwa/zre/hcr/0066

To UNHCR Kinshasa, Attn J. Van Drunen (o/m)  
From UNHCR Kigali, J. McCallin

Re your message, no repeat no commitment made by UNHCR during  
Zaire-Rwandan talks about resettlement political leaders. Only  
UNHCR engagement was to prepare appropriate tri-partite  
repatriation agreement. Your understanding was correct, i.e.  
Dept of Political Affairs will handle upon receipt of a list to  
be submitted by PM - this latter decided during SRSG  
Khan/Moussalli mission to Zaire 12-14 September. Phone me when  
you get to Goma.  
Best regards.  
(unhcr kigali)

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**MISSION CONJOINTE GOUVERNEMENT DU ZAIRE/NATION UNIES SUR LES  
MESURES DE SECURITE EN FAVEUR DE LA POPULATION ZAIROISE  
ET DES REFUGIES RWANDAIS DANS LES REGIONS  
DU NORD ET SUD KIVU  
REPUBLIQUE DU ZAIRE**

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TERMES DE REFERENCE

**I. PREAMBULE**

**CONSIDERANT** le communiqué conjoint signé à Grand Baie à l'Ile Maurice le 26 juillet 1994 entre le Président Mobutu du Zaïre et le Président Bizimungu du Rwanda;

**CONSIDERANT** le communiqué conjoint de la réunion ministérielle zaïro-rwandaise tenue le 1er septembre 1994 à Goma et à laquelle le HCR a été représenté;

**CONSIDERANT** la demande du Gouvernement du Zaïre aux Nations-Unies d'aider à résoudre les problèmes de sécurité posés par la présence des réfugiés, d'**éléments armés** et des **leaders politiques** rwandais dans les régions du Nord et du Sud-Kivu;

**CONSIDERANT** la décision du Gouvernement du Zaïre d'éloigner ces éléments des zones où se trouvent les réfugiés, **et de prendre les dispositions nécessaires** en vue d'assurer la sécurité de la population zaïroise hôte, des réfugiés, des fonctionnaires des Nations Unies et des travailleurs des ONGs en poste dans ces zones en recourant au financement et à l'assistance des Nations Unies;

**CONSIDERANT** les discussions entre d'une part, le Président de la République et d'autre part le Gouvernement du Zaïre, et la Mission envoyée par le Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies conduite par son Représentant Spécial, Mr Shaharyar Khan, du 12 au 14 septembre 1994 **sur la requête du gouvernement**;

**CONSIDERANT** les accords de principe conclus lors de ces entretiens ;

**CONSIDERANT** la nécessité pressante de concrétiser ces accords:

**IL A ETE CONVENU** qu'une mission conjointe aurait lieu dans les plus brefs délais, avec la participation d'une part, pour le gouvernement du Zaïre, des Représentants du **Cabinet du Premier Ministre et des Ministères clefs** pour la mise en oeuvre des accords, et d'autre part, pour les Nations Unies des Représentants de la **Mission des Nations Unies pour l'Assistance au Rwanda (MINUAR)**, du **Programme des Nations Unies pour le Développement (PNUD)**, et du **Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les Réfugiés (UNHCR)**.

## II OBJECTIFS DE LA MISSION

LA MISSION FERA DES RECOMMANDATIONS CONJOINTES AU GOUVERNEMENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU ZAIRE ET AU SECRETAIRE GENERAL DES NATIONS UNIES SUR LES QUESTIONS SUIVANTES:

1. les catégories et groupes de personnes à éloigner des régions du Nord Kivu et du Sud Kivu ;
2. les sites situés, par rapport à la frontière zaïroise-rwandaise, à des distances conformes à l'article 2 alinéa 6 de la Convention de l'OUA régissant les aspects propres aux problèmes des réfugiés en Afrique ;
3. la mobilisation des ressources nécessaires à toutes les opérations d'aménagement des sites, ainsi que de transfert, d'installation et de prises en charge des réfugiés, en tenant compte de l'impossibilité pour le Gouvernement Zaïrois d'y contribuer financièrement;
4. la prise en compte, pendant et après l'installation des réfugiés, des intérêts économiques et sociaux des populations hôtes;
5. le calendrier le plus réaliste pour la préparation des sites d'accueil et les transferts en tenant compte du souhait conjoint que les dits transferts aient lieu dans les meilleurs délais compte tenu des contraintes suivantes:
  - a. campagnes agricoles,
  - b. rentrée scolaire,
  - c. risque d'épidémie durant la saison des pluies,
  - d. organisation des élections,
6. les mesures à prendre pour assurer la sécurité de la population zaïroise, des réfugiés, des fonctionnaires des Nations Unies, et le personnel des organismes humanitaires et tout autre partenaire en poste dans les régions concernées par ces opérations.

## III TRAVAIL A EFFECTUER PAR LA MISSION

La mission identifiera les réfugiés ou groupes de réfugiés à éloigner de la frontière et évaluera les coûts de transport, de l'escorte et de l'hébergement y afférents. Elle évaluera également les coûts relatifs au rapatriement des réfugiés désireux de rentrer au Rwanda. Elle élaborera un calendrier réaliste pour la mise en oeuvre de ses recommandations.

Pour ce faire, la mission se rendra dans les régions où sont concentrés les réfugiés rwandais, à savoir, le Nord-Kivu et le Sud-Kivu, et dans celles où des sites d'installations potentiels ont été identifiés par le Gouvernement. Elle prendra contact et discutera avec tous

ceux susceptibles de leur fournir les informations dont elle aura besoin pour accomplir sa mission, et en particulier avec les autorités locales, les Agences du Système des Nations Unies et les organisations humanitaires.

#### **IV. RAPPORT A PRODUIRE**

La mission produira, **une semaine après la fin du travail sur le terrain**, un rapport contenant i) une brève analyse de la situation actuelle des réfugiés rwandais dans les provinces du Nord Kivu et du Sud-Kivu; ii) des recommandations en matière de leur rapatriement et éloignement de la frontière zaïro-rwandaise, tel que prévu dans la partie I des présents termes de référence; iii) une analyse des possibilités offertes par les sites sélectionnés par la mission; iv) les estimations des coûts des différentes opérations; et v) un calendrier réaliste des opérations prévues;

#### **V. COMPOSITION DE LA MISSION**

La mission est composée de 10 (dix) représentants du Gouvernement, 4 (quatre) représentants de la MINUAR, un représentant du PNUD, et un représentant du HCR.

#### **VI. FINANCEMENT DE LA MISSION**

Les Nations Unies prendront en charge les frais de déplacement et de séjour des membres de la mission dans les villes autres que Kinshasa, dans la limite des indemnités de déplacement prévus à cet effet par la réglementation des Nations Unies.

#### **VII. ITINERAIRE ET CALENDRIER DE LA MISSION**

Un itinéraire de la mission est joint en annexe couvrant toute sa durée ainsi que les dates prévues pour les visites dans les régions concernées.



## II. OBJECTIFS DE LA MISSION

LA MISSION FERA DES RECOMMANDATIONS CONJOINTES AU GOUVERNEMENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU ZAIRE ET AU SECRETAIRE GENERAL DES NATIONS UNIES SUR LES QUESTIONS SUIVANTES :

1. les catégories et groupes de personnes à éloigner des régions du Nord Kivu et du Sud Kivu: les éléments de l'armée rwandaise en exil, les dignitaires de l'ancien gouvernement du Rwanda, et les rwandais hostiles au rapatriement volontaire; *2*
2. les sites situés, par rapport à la frontière zaïro-rwandaise, à des distances conformes aux conventions internationales en matière d'accueil de réfugiés, et pouvant accueillir des réfugiés préalablement identifiés; *as agreed before*
- X* 3. la prise en charge des personnes à transférer dans les sites identifiés; *The responsibility of persons to be transferred*
4. la prise en compte, pendant et après l'installation des réfugiés, des intérêts économiques et sociaux des populations; *after hoster*
- 3* 5. la mobilisation des ressources nécessaires à toutes les opérations d'aménagement des sites, ainsi que de transfert, d'installation et de prise charge des réfugiés, en tenant compte de l'impossibilité pour le Gouvernement zaïrois d'y contribuer financièrement; *Identifying the required resources*
6. le calendrier le plus réaliste pour la préparation des sites d'accueil et les transferts, en tenant compte du souhait conjoint que lesdits transferts aient lieu dans des délais ne dépassant pas trois mois; *Need to conduct exercise seriously. School, Agriculture, health risks (rain) & elections!*
7. les mesures à prendre pour assurer la sécurité de la population zaïroise, des réfugiés, des fonctionnaires des Nations Unies, et le personnel des organismes humanitaires, et tout autre partenaire en poste dans ces Régions et participant aux opérations;
- X* les modalités de collaboration entre les Gouvernements du Zaïre et du Rwanda, et les Nations Unies pour permettre la réalisation des engagements pris de part et d'autre;

## III. TRAVAIL A EFFECTUER PAR LA MISSION

La mission identifiera les réfugiés ou groupes de réfugiés à éloigner de la frontière, évaluera les coûts de transport de l'escorte à partir des sites actuels jusqu'au Rwanda pour les réfugiés désireux de rentrer volontairement dans leurs pays. Elle évaluera également les coûts de transport, de l'escorte, et d'hébergement pour ceux appelés à être éloignés de la frontière. Elle élaborera un calendrier réaliste pour la mise en oeuvre de ses recommandations, ainsi qu'un cadre de collaboration tripartite entre les gouvernements zaïrois et rwandais, et les Nations Unies. *(to be done)*

Pour ce faire, la mission se rendra dans les régions où sont concentrés les réfugiés rwandais, à savoir, le Nord-Kivu et le Sud-Kivu, et dans celles où des sites d'installations potentiels ont été identifiés par le Gouvernement. Elle prendra contact et discutera avec tous ceux susceptibles de leur fournir les informations dont elle aura besoin pour accomplir sa

mission, et en particulier avec les autorités locales, les Agences du Système des Nations Unies, les organisations humanitaires, et les représentants des réfugiés.

#### IV. RAPPORTS A PRODUIRE

La mission produira, **une semaine après la fin du travail sur le terrain**, un rapport contenant i) une brève analyse de la situation actuelle des réfugiés rwandais dans les provinces du Nord Kivu et du Sud-Kivu; ii) des recommandations en matière de leur rapatriement et éloignement de la frontière zaïro-rwandaise, tel que prévu dans la partie I des présents termes de référence; iii) une analyse des possibilités offertes par les sites sélectionnés par la mission; iv) les estimations des coûts des différentes opérations; v) un calendrier réaliste des opérations prévues; et vi) un projet d'accord tripartite à soumettre aux Gouvernements zaïrois et rwandais, et aux Nations Unies, pour examen et signature, et portant, entre autres, sur les garanties de sécurité en faveur des réfugiés rwandais rentrés volontairement chez eux. X  
X  
X

#### V. COMPOSITION DE LA MISSION

La mission est composée de 10 (dix) représentants du Gouvernement, 4 (quatre) représentants de la MINUAR, un représentant du PNUD, et un représentant du HCR.

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Les Nations Unies prendront en charge les frais de déplacement et de séjour des membres de la mission dans les villes autres que Kinshasa, dans la limite des indemnités de déplacement prévus à cet effet par la réglementation des Nations Unies.

#### VII. ITINERAIRE ET CALENDRIER DE LA MISSION

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NOTE FOR THE FILE

MEETING OF THE SRSG WITH THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF UNICEF  
ON FRIDAY, 9th SEPTEMBER, 1994 at 11:30 a.m.

Expressing a hearty welcome to The Executive Director of UNICEF Mr. James Grant, The SRSG, Mr Shaharyar M. Khan said that Mr. Grant's visit is an encouragement to UNAMIR while publicly acknowledging the cooperation of all UN agencies- including UNICEF- and the NGOs. Continuing his remarks, The SRSG said:

UNAMIR had been trying to find a political equilibrium in Rwanda until April 6 when hell went loose; and anarchy, mayhem, massacres, genocide and war gripped the country.

19 July 1994, The RPF took full control of all but part of South-west of Rwanda where the French established a Humanitarian Protection Zone until August 21, 1994. But the country was already a total wreck; in human, physical and material terms i.e. in everything conceivable.

Realising though that a military victory is by itself just a temporary solution, The RPF set up a government which reflects a national character. Moreover, they have been saying the right things; i.e. reconciliation, accomodation, pacification, rule of law, due process, etc. etc. Even RPF who fall out of line and are found guilty of felonies are severely punished; while old refugees\returnees are made to respect property and other rights of fellow Rwandese, irrespective of their political persuasion and\or circumstances.

The SRSG expressed regret though that all the effort of the international community- bilateral and multilateral aid agencies, UNagencies and NGOs alike, would come to naught if critical elements and the real issues involved in resuscitating Rwanda are not addressed. These had already been compiled into a Rwanda Emergency Relief Programme (RENP) tabulated as follows:

**SHORT TERM**

1. Airport
2. Power & Electricity
3. Water
4. Radio
5. Telecommunications
6. Harvest
7. Hospitals
8. Security

**MEDIUM TERM**

- Police Force & Prison System
- Central Bank-- Currency
- Schools- Child Care
- Administrative Cadres
- Repair of Govt. Buildings
- Municipal Services
- De-mining
- Roads\Bridges & Transport

The SRSG observed that while some of the above - like the Airport, Radio Rwanda, Telecommunications and Hospitals are (begining to be ) operational, key utilities like Power & Electricity, Money & Banking and Radio UNAMIR, which have a catalytic role on the operations of other vital areas (like Water and relief\rehabilitation services necessary for the creation of an enduring political and social environment in Rwanda have been largely ignored. Thus, lamented The SRSG, all the effort of the entire International Community, including UNICEF and UNAMIR,

would be lost should these vital services remain unattended.

Emphasizing the need to jointly consider the Prevention Syndrome and the Cure Syndrome in addressing the Rwandese situation, The SRSG implored Executive Director Grant to use his good offices to assist in providing finance for the restoration of power\electricity and the establishment of Radio UNAMIR. Ambassador Khan suggested that the UN Agencies could each be encouraged to contribute a fraction towards meeting the cost of these essential services against the arrival of the World Bank team next week, September 14, 1994. The Rwandese problem, The SRSG concluded, is further compounded by The World Bank "which is asking a lifeless body i.e. Rwanda to give responses that it just cannot give."

#### THE FORCE COMMANDER

Giving the Troop(s) strength size, Gen. Tossignant emphasized the need for UNAMIR to show a true military presence all over Rwanda and stressed that the distribution of UNAMIR Forces to the various sectors of the country has largely accomplished the military objective of addressing on the ground, the perceived threat posed by the Rwandese phenomenon. The General further informed Director Grant that the RPA is gradually being made to assume its traditional role as The National Army with the responsibility of securing the four corners of all the sectors of Rwanda. The FC supported in full The SRSG and observed that there is no impending threat to the security of the country in the foreseeable future.

#### UNICEF EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

In a traditional cold war situation, there are three ways to handle an emergency in a country that has been thoroughly incapacitated\ decimated like Rwanda:

- 1) A Cash Advance
- 2) Bringing in missing commodities
- 3) Payment of Public Servants\Officials in kind as obtained in Cambodia where there was a major rice shortage.

In addressing the Rwandese phenomenon, Mr. Grant advised a hollistic approach; innovative enough at a time like this when there is (a) general international sympathy for the government and people of Rwanda.

Executive Director Grant unequivocally endorsed The SRSG, H.E. Khan's request when he promised to provide through UNICEF, substantial financial resources (both from the World Bank allocation\grant and within UNICEF) to facilitate the implementation of the \$2 million Electricity Project and the \$600000 UNAMIR Radio Project within the earliest possible time.

The SRSG thanked the UNICEF Executive Director warmly for his cooperation and promised assistance before the meeting ended at 1:30 p.m.

Abu Bakarr Sidique Dao, OIC, Humanitarian Affairs/ O S R S G

LIST OF PERSONALITIES PRESENT

NAMES	INSTITUTION
H.E. Shaharyar M. Khan	SRSG UNAMIR
Mr. James Grant	UNICEF ED
Maj Gen J. G. Tuosignant	FC UNAMIR
Dr. A. H. Kabia	ED UNAMIR
Mr. N. Fisher	UNICEF REP
Mr. A. Roberfroid	UNICEF REP
Mr. D. Toole	UNICEF
Mr. A. Golo	UNAMIR
Mr. P. Mehu	UNAMIR
Mr. B. P. Dessande	UNAMIR
Abu Bakarr Sidique Dao	UNAMIR

NOTE FOR THE FILE

MINUTES OF THE MILOBS COMMAND AND STAFF CONFERENCE AT  
SECTOR 3 HEADQUARTERS - GITARAMA ON FRIDAY, 02 SEPTEMBER 1994

Welcoming all the Sector Commanders present at the first post-war command and control weekly meeting, the Chief MILOBS Officer, Colonel Ticoka, reminded everybody present that MILOBS were the military's "ears and eyes"; emphasizing that their operations were essential for strategic planning; which is a sine qua non for the achievement of the (UNAMIR) mission objective. These sentiments were endorsed by the Deputy Force Commander who briefly attended the meeting on his way to Gikongoro (BRITCON); exhorting participants to appreciate the importance of such weekly meetings as a forum for free and fair exchange of ideas. Sector Commanders were then requested to make their respective presentations starting with Sector 4C.

**SECTOR 4C**

Sector 4c, according to the Sector Commander, was generally calm after the French left the former Humanitarian Protection Zone (HPZ) on August 22 this year. However, the situation is slowly inviting cause for concern as the number of people, particularly suspected hardliners and extremists in the zone, keeps increasing. Consequently, banditry is escalating. This is exacerbated by the ominous spectacle of gun-toting gendarmes, forest rangers and civilians roaming all over the place with apparently little regard for the peace-keeping operations of UNAMIR troops. Moreover, NGOs are being threatened with violence whenever they insist on taking refugees or displaced people away. The Zairean border guards are reportedly demanding some 500 Rwandese Francs from each refugee who wants to return to Rwanda, thus making repatriation more unattractive for them. The role of the Ethiopian Battalion would need to be re-examined as they are perceived to look like Tutsis, albeit wrongly. Secondly, as most of them could neither speak French nor English, their performance on the ground is likely to be impaired. Perhaps it may not be out of place to deploy a second battalion (like the Tunisians) in Sector 4C which is clearly considered the most volatile in the region. Bugarama town in the south, for example, is considered a haven for extremists. Moreover, the fact that the Motorola Handsets that are being used cannot transmit beyond 20 km does not help the situation either.

**SECTOR 4A**

According to the Sector Commander, there are 11 refugee camps in the north and 17 in the south. The situation here is less volatile and, infact, there is an appreciable degree of co-operation between the security forces and the NGOs who meet on Saturdays and Wednesdays to coordinate the latter's activities. The activities of the RPA are also closely monitored in the Sector and its environs while the British Field Ambulance is reported to be of tremendous assistance, particularly in the south.

With regards to law and order though, GHANBATT has arrested quite a few criminals that should face the long arm of the law. However, in the absence of the appropriate structures, these suspects are being held and fed by GHANBATT, much to their discomfiture. It has been suggested that as a deterrent, these criminal suspects should be held in Butare Prison and the Red Cross is ready to look after them in there.

As a means to facilitate repatriation, the SectorComm conducts frequent confidence-building tours by taking some camp leaders to see for themselves that life is normalizing. This would give refugees the urge to return home. It is suggested, however, that human rights observers and perhaps NGOs should follow-up on these repatriation exercises.

The RPA has reportedly given orders for people to surrender their guns; failing which, they would be forced to jump in.

It is suggested that food should be supplied to security personnel, including MILOBS, in the Sector since food is not easily available there.

#### SECTOR 5

This Sector is reportedly relatively peaceful as there are no incidents. The NGOs are quite active in Ruhengeri particularly; and infact, The Red Cross is running a water plant in Gissenyi while the Canadians maintain an operating theatre in the Sector. Electricity is coming on in spurts and the brewery is to open as soon as the light situation improves. There is no restriction in UNAMIR troop movements whilst the fields are being tilled.

However, accross Gissenyi, there are 600 French troops who appear to be sympathetic to the RGF. They are concerned that Rwanda is losing its French identity. Zairean guards, too, are harassing and intimidating refugees who want to come back; and this is not particularly helpful.

Even though the MERIDIAN is now running at half mast, the consensus is that, at least, the supply of drinking water should not be cut off by the authorities.

#### SECTOR 3

Generally calm, but the military situation is tense as the RPA is constantly on high alert, allegedly haunting ex-RGF and Interhamwe.

There are reports of RGF returnees though. But the question is, how does the RPA treat them? Perhaps the office of the SRSG may want to enquire from the government authorities.

There are also reports that the Gitarama Prison and the Butare Prison have been sealed off by the RPA. The suspicion is that Interhamwe suspects or accused are being systematically executed in there. This too should be investigated.

Otherwise, life in Gitarama, Ruhango and Butare is getting normal with Butare slowly becoming a commercial centre for trade with Burundi. Agriculture is taking root while the markets have been opened.

Humanitarian assistance is reportedly wanting in this Sector as aid is not coordinated. Food, water, medication and non-food items are in very short supply. The situation appears serious as the humanitarian effort is reportedly concentrated in Sector 4.



In this Sector alone, there are over six (6) orphanages. There is ample need therefore to coordinate the flow of humanitarian assistance among the sectors. Farming inputs and building materials are equally in short supply. It is generally agreed that MILOBS, being the most credible, should be sending regular SITREPs to enable the Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Assistance work more effectively within the office of the SRSG for the realisation of the humanitarian assistance objective.

#### SECTOR 1

Located in the north-east of Rwanda, this Sector is reportedly calm. The RPA and the Prefet are working closely with the UNAMIR personnel who are always in touch with the NGOs and the HAC. The only discernible problem here is with mines in the south-west of Byumba.

#### SECTOR 2

This is the Kigali area, the heart of Rwanda. Life is gradually returning to normalcy. UNAMIR headquarters is located here and the RPA is most visible on all fours. Work on basic utilities- i.e. light, water and telephones- is progressing, as the airport becomes fully operational. This is all part of the Rwanda Emergency Normalization Plan enunciated by the SRSG which I explained in detail to the Commanders present.

In the area of humanitarian assistance, it is observed that the government should take responsibility of receiving those returnees who come to Kigali and not leave them to the various UNAMIR vehicles/trucks that bring them in. The government could approach one of the many NGOs operating in the sector for assistance in this regard.

The proposal to establish an independent UNAMIR Radio Station to give welcome news indeed while attempts to give Radio Rwanda country-wide coverage with transmission to reach every nook and corner of this country should be encouraged.

To facilitate the flow of vehicular traffic both by NGOs and the public at large in the north of the Sector, however, the Bugassera bridge should be repaired and made motorable again.

The meeting was adjourned at 5:45 p.m. with an indication by the CMO that the next meeting is scheduled to take place in Cyangugu next Friday, September 9, 1994.

Abu Bakarr Sidique Dao  
OIC  
Humanitarian Affairs\ OSRSG  
2nd September 1994



THE BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY  
(as of 7 August 1994)

1. President:	Pasteur Bizimungu	FPR
2. Vice President & Min. of Defense	Paul Kagame	FPR
3. Prime Minister:	Faustin Twagiramungu	MDR
4. Vice Prime Minister & Min. of Public Service:	Col. Alexis Kanyarengwe	FPR
5. Min. of Foreign Affairs:	Jean Marie Vianney NDAGIJIMANA	MDR
6. Min. of Interior:	Seth SENDASHONGA	FPR
7. Min. of Justice:	Alphonse NKUBITO	*
8. Min. of Primary Education	Pierre Claver RWIGEMA	MDR
9. Min. of Superior Education & University:	Dr. Joseph NSENGIMANA	PL
10. Min. of Finance	Marc RUGENERA	PSD
11. Min. of Industry	Prosper HIGIRO	PL
12. Min. of Health	Col. Dr. Joseph KALEMERA	FPR
13. Min. of Transport & Telecommunication	Mrs. Imaculee KAYUMBA	FPR
14. Min. of Social Affairs	P. MUGABO	PL
15. Min. of Environment & Tourism	Jean NEPOMUCENE	PDC
16. Min. of Public Works	Charles NTAKIRUTINKA	PSD
17. Min. of Women Affairs:	Ms. Aloyisia INYUMBA	FPR
18. Min. of Youth & Sports:	Patrick MAZIMHAKA	FPR
19. Min. of Rehabilitation	Dr. Jacques BIHOZAGARA	FPR
20. Min. of Information:	Dr. JMV HIGRO	MDR
21. Min. of Agriculture:	Dr. Augustin IYAMUREMYE	PSD
22. Min. of Planning:	to be named	

\*no affiliation

FPR: Front Patriotique Rwandais/Rwandan Patriotic Front

MDR: Mouvement democratique Republicain/Democratic Rep. Movement

PSD: Parti social democrate/Social Democrat Party

PDC: Parti democrate chretien/Christian Democrat Party

PL: Parti liberal/Liberal Party

UN INTER-AGENCY MEETING HELD ON WEDNESDAY, 7 SEPTEMBER 1994.

The meeting was chaired by Mr. Hein who introduced the Minister for the Interior of Rwanda. Also present at the meeting were two representatives from DHA/New York, a representative of UNHCR/Geneva and the Director of the Swedish Relief Agency, and other representatives from other agencies.

The Minister for the Interior thanked all present for the efforts that have been made since the war and expressed his concern over the issues of reconstruction and rehabilitation, which he said were very urgent. He said that the problem of resources could be dealt with only when there is peace and stability. He further assured all the agencies of his Government's full cooperation.

Mr. Hein spoke of the dramatic way ministers and high-ranking officials of the Government have been working - delapidated buildings, no electricity, no water, etc. UNDP had therefore decided to donate generators, typewriters and other office equipment to the Government.

The representative from the International Migration Office in Geneva said that they intend donating 100 trucks to help bring back refugees. However, he expressed his concern that in July more refugees were willing to return to Rwanda than now; and added that according to rumours, an impediment to the return of the refugees was the question of security.

In reply, the Minister for the Interior said he would gladly welcome to Rwanda, leaders from all over the world and would make sure they visit refugee camps so that they could judge for themselves whether the so-called atrocities the Government was supposed to be committing was founded. Those who commit crimes should be punished; his Government cannot offer blanket amnesty. Pardon will come but definitely not now.... He went on to say that it was difficult for crimes to be committed seeing that UNAMIR, UNHCR and NGOs were on every square metre in Rwanda. Sympathizers of the former Government are using all possible means of preventing refugees, even physically, from returning to Rwanda. He agreed with the concern expressed by the IMO representative concerning the reduced numbers of refugees/returnees during the month of July and at present. He admitted that there were isolated cases of the revenge by the present army and made mention of a soldier who killed ten people recently. He was sorry that this had happened and assured the meeting that his Government was vigilant and would definitely punish such acts. Every death that does not occur from natural causes was a death too much, he added.

..\\...

Mr. Hein said that he was confident that the visit of the SRSG and Ambassador Dillon to the camps next week would help in reassuring the refugees to return home.

The UNHCR representative from Geneva said that since his arrival he had visited several camps, and it was encouraging to see refugees/returnees from Goma returning to Rwanda - although not through the normal roads - but at least they were returning home. The same applied to returnees in the Cyangugu area. He said that both the civilians and military have definitely got a grip on the refugees. He congratulated the Government for the exemplary behaviour of most of its army officers. He regretted that the presence of UNAMIR and NGOs in the eastern part of the country was VERY THIN, and informed the meeting that UNHCR and DHA will be addressing a meeting on the rehabilitation of the refugees very soon.

The Minister left the meeting at 08.45 hours.

Mr. Hein informed all present that Security Phase 3 was in force. He expressed his concern regarding the security of UN personnel - not UNAMIR. He said that a Circular had been sent out informing all UN personnel, both international and local, that they were not allowed to travel at night. Clearances for travel within Rwanda especially the South East - Sector 4 - needs assessment by UNAMIR. He informed the meeting of the death of a WFP local personnel who was killed on 30 August 1994. As soon as instructions are received from UNAMIR regarding security, this will be communicated to all the agencies. He emphasised that all incidents, even arrests, should be reported immediately for onward transmission to UNAMIR. He demanded, urgently, a list of all UN personnel (both international and local), their addresses both in and outside Kigali. This list was required for security reasons. He expressed the importance of having stickers and flags on all UN vehicles and vehicles used by all UN personnel.

In closing, Mr. Hein informed the meeting that from next Friday, the Minister for Rehabilitation will attend all Friday meetings.

Felixtina Forster  
Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Assistance  
UNAMIR

### Note For the File

#### Meeting Between Mr. Ahmed Rhazaoui UNDP Resident Representative, SRSG's Political Affairs Officer and SRSG's Officer in Charge of Humanitarian Affairs on 3 September 1994

1. Mr. Rhazaoui began by welcoming the UNAMIR officers and by inquiring about the purpose of the inter-agency meeting that had been called by the SRSG.

2. Political Affairs Officer Scott responded that the meeting had been called to discuss the allocation and use of the \$20 million grant from the World Bank.

3. Mr. Rhazaoui said that the money had already been earmarked, and that the concerned agencies had been discussing the allocation of this funding with the World Bank for several weeks.

4. He then outlined the allocation of the funding as follows:

- UNICEF: \$10 and one half million, of which:

- \$4 million would be allocated for health (UNICEF plans to rehabilitate 150 health centres which would cover 70-75% of the entire health system of Rwanda);

- \$3 million would be allocated for water (UNICEF would repair 11 water networks including pumps and water purification systems;

- \$3 million would be allocated for nutrition (to provide seeds and supplementary food for schools and hospitals.

- (Note: one half-million is unaccounted for);

- WHO: \$ 1 and a half million (for 3 health projects);

- UNHCR: \$4 million, of which:

- 1 million would be allocated for health in coordination with WHO;

- the remaining 3 million would be allocated for the repatriation of refugees and the rehabilitation of two hospitals;

- FAO: \$4 million (for seeds, no further details)

5. Political Affairs Officer Scott said that, since SRSG Khan was designated as the overall coordinator for all humanitarian relief efforts in Rwanda by the Secretary-General, he would like to communicate what he feels are the priorities for funding right now in Rwanda.

6. Mr. Rhazaoui said that the SRSG, of course, has the authority to do this, and added that UNAMIR is not considered a development agency and that is perhaps why it was not chosen as a recipient of the World Bank Grant.

7. PAO Scott responded that there are priority projects which must be undertaken urgently and which have not been addressed within the current allocation of the World Bank funding. She added that this is a critical period in Rwanda and the Government must have funds to function.

8. Mr. Rhazaoui informed the UNAMIR officers that UN agencies are not authorized to provide funds to pay salaries. This type of funding can only be donated bilaterally.

9. He said that this World Bank grant was only the second in its history (the first was for Somalia). When asked by Humanitarian Affairs Officer Dao about other possible sources of funding for RENP priority projects, he said the following:

- UNDP has a UNCDF (UN Capital Development Fund), but it is becoming smaller with time (cannot be accessed for this purpose). UNDP gives only grants, not loans.

- He expressed surprise that the U.S. and Canada had not begun working to repair the infrastructure (electricity) in Rwanda.

- He said that the French have always played a key role in Rwanda in terms of Governmental support and said that it was unfortunate that this Government does not currently have France as a friend and benefactor. He added, however, that he feels that Mr. Jacques Courbain, the Chef d'Antenne Diplomatique has been sent here to repair relations with the current Government. He said that it would be in this Government's interest to develop a friendship with France.

- He also said that Belgium should fund some of these important projects such as electricity because of their special relationship with Rwanda.

10. He said that the UNDP will be undertaking the following:

- the financing of 20 to 27 UN Volunteers who will work as air traffic controllers and customs officials at the airport. UNDP is coordinating with ICAO on this project. (in this connection, they would also provide technical assistance in fund accumulation, i.e., airport tax and customs specialists.

- a Round-Table Conference before the end of the year to mobilize funds for Rwanda.

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11. Mr. Rhazaoui said that UNDP planned to offer vehicles to Rwandan Government ministries, though there was no clear budget item for vehicles.

12. PAO Scott responded that this was an example of how mandates are flexible, and how funding can be channelled to meet priority needs. She added, "Where there is a will, there is a way."

13. Mr. Rhazaoui said that a number of important visitors are coming to Kigali:

- Mr. Jim Grant of UNICEF;
- the Director-General of WHO; and
- a World Bank Mission arriving on 6 September (Mr. Gamba)

14. Mr. Rhazaoui said that, with the rehabilitation of hospitals, UNICEF would of course power the hospitals with generators.

15. The PAO responded that this was a quick-fix solution, and that, as was indicated in the data sheet, the permanent repair of the power grid was more time efficient and more cost-effective.

16. The UNAMIR officers thanked Mr. Rhazaoui for his time and for his suggestions. The meeting was held in a friendly and constructive atmosphere and lasted approximately one hour.

Kristen Scott  
Political Affairs Officer  
3 September 1994

NOTE FOR THE FILE

MEETING OF THE SRSG WITH HEADS OF UN AGENCIES  
ON TUESDAY, 6th SEPT. 1994 AT UNAMIR HEADQUARTERS

The SRSG opened the meeting by apologising for his inability to attend Saturday's inter-agency meeting owing to his invitation by the government to attend a function with the President of Rwanda in Butare on that very Saturday.

Continuing, The SRSG said that he convened this meeting specifically to seek UN inter-agency cooperation on the following issues:

- i) To work out a strategy as to how best the Rwandan refugee crisis could be addressed in Zaire
- ii) To inform the meeting about the proposed visit of many VVIPs to Rwanda including Mr Grant whose visit, the SRSG said, should be utilised to the maximum benefit of all
- iii) To see how best to utilise the \$20 million World Bank grant to Rwanda through various UN Agencies i.e. WHO, UNICEF, UNHCR and FAO

**THE ZAIREAN PROBLEM**

The UN Secretary-General has mandated the SRSG to lead a team (to include UNHCR and other Humanitarian groups) to Zaire on Monday, 12th September 1994 to discuss ways of addressing the refugee problem in Zaire; so that the refugees in Zaire may voluntarily opt to return to Rwanda, free from intimidation and duress, particularly from ex-RGF (political and extremist) forces. Secondly, the Presidents of Rwanda and Zaire recently signed a Protocol in Mauritius stating, inter alia, that the territory of one state cannot be used by detractors to destabilise another. Consequently, the Zairean authorities will be expected to remove the "politicized refugees" from the commonfolk. Refugee movement must, however, be spontaneous, voluntary and free.

**THE WORLD BANK \$20 MILLION GRANT**

The SRSG acknowledged the humanitarian role of various UN Agencies, against the background of the decimation that Rwanda suffered during the war and thanked the World Bank for donating \$20 million to Rwanda through the following agencies:

UNICEF	\$10.5 million
UNHCR	\$ 4.0 million
WHO	\$ 1.5 million
FAO	\$ 4.0 million

The SRSG expressed the belief that he had every reason to believe that Rwanda will be better off with this \$20 million World Bank grant.

Emphasizing the urgent need to revive the "body" of Rwanda which he likened to a heart patient, however, the SRSG exhorted The World Bank and the UN agencies to take cognisance of Rwanda's immediate problems of electricity, water, absence of a banking system, de-mining, etc. as indicated in the Rwanda Emergency Normalisation Plan (RENP) and urged the latter to spare no effort in working to save the body politic of Rwanda. The SRSG admonished the institutions to consider aspects of The RENP whilst implementing their respective programmes.

The UNDP Res Rep/HAC, Mr Arturo Hein, re-echoed the sentiments of the SRSG adding that the government of Rwanda should strive to combine humanitarian/relief work and rehabilitation cum development work simultaneously. Commenting further, the ResRep reminded the meeting that the idea is to support not to substitute the Rwandese government in the humanitarian cum development endeavour stressing the need to put people to work at the macro-economic level.

Introducing members of his team, the World Bank Resident Representative in Kigali, Mr. Julio Gamba, admonished that it was up to the Agencies to decide to incorporate (aspects of) The RENP in their individual packages; cautioning though that any such modification should be forwarded to The Bank for approval since this grant does not envisage any government participation.

The World Bank Rep applauded The RENP while exhorting the new government to reorganize itself into a lean government. He further admonished the government to endeavour to pay the arrears of \$4 million to the Bank; failing which, the bank will not disburse the \$240 million due Rwanda in outstanding project funds; emphasizing that the World Bank's is a non-bureaucratic practical approach. Mr. Gamba suggested that the government could seek the assistance of Agencies to determine, at field level, whether the country's existing projects should be continued. To date, the government can neither tell the Bank how much money was taken out of the country, nor could it give a detailed status report of the Rwandese economy. Infact, if the government cooperates with the Bank, then \$35 million will be made available immediately; assuming of course that the government can convincingly show that it has the absorbtive capacity to utilize this amount economically.

Talking on the need for good governance, Mr Gamba extolled the importance of coordination so that human, financial and material resources are not wasted through unnecessary duplication and/or overlapping stressing that the World Bank's expectation can only be gratified by conditions associated with the improvement of the operational capacity of Rwanda.

On the matter of outstanding government commitments, the World Bank Rep emphatically said that the World Bank\IMF cannot and will not pay salaries of Rwandese public servants; adding that bi-lateral assistance could be explored. Whilst negative actions associated with imports, code of behaviour and tarriffs are to be avoided, the government should come up with an acceptable public expenditure (and investment) programme i.e.



a budget, in order to qualify for World Bank funding against December 31, 1994 latest.

At this juncture, the SRSG reminded everybody that, at this material point in time, the government lacks the appropriate human resource endowment with the technical competence to meet the schedules, information needs and reporting requirements of the World Bank. "In the name of stability and arising out of the fact that Rwanda suffered total war, total massacre and total breakdown with hardly any public servants to man the offices," the SRSG concluded, "a great deal of directing, and perhaps spoonfeeding, may have to be undertaken by the Bank if we are not to lose all the investment(s) made so far in Rwanda."

Responding to the Executive Director, the World Bank Rep intimated that he has already explained to the Prime Minister of Rwanda that the government can request a bridging loan of \$4 million from prime commercial banks with implicit World Bank\IMF guarantees so that the country will avail itself of the \$240 million waiting out there in Washington.

Concluding, Mr. Gamba suggested that it is even possible that that the government of Rwanda has access to the previous government's accounts which could be tapped to repay all or sum of the \$4 million outstanding to the World Bank.

The UNICEF Rep, Mr. Andre Roberfroid, in his contribution said that UNICEF's goal is to reestablish health at the national level with a Central Pharmaceutical Store and a Central Cold Room to cover the whole country. In addition, UNICEF is rehabilitating 150 Health Centres located all over the country. 11 urban and semi-urban water centres will also be rehabilitated in six (6) months. In the area of nutrition, Mr. Roberfroid observed that up to 50000 orphans will be provided for .

In his contribution, the UNHCR chief said that his Agency will concentrate on providing complementary inputs like non-food items; and also engage extensively in identifying lands for relocating "old refugees" in particular; as the need for the provision of human settlements using appropriate technology schemes takes centre stage. The SRSG fully endorses the importance of the UHCHR programme.

The FAO Rep submitted that his agency has evolved a Technical Assistance package with the Ministry of Agriculture; emphasizing diversification as a strategy; using other smaller NGOs to reach the divers farmer(s) in the field with obvious results. He said that the FAO had appointed a representative for Rwanda and acknowledged that before the outbreak of the civil war, FAO had about \$8.9 million in on-going projects which would be resuscitated. He added that the \$4 million grant that has been made available to FAO by the IBRD will be used for projects approved by The Bank.

Abu Bakarr Sidique Dao  
OIC, HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, OSRSG

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

NAME	ORGANIZATION
H.E. Sharyar Khan	SRSG, UNAMIR
Dr. Abdul Hamid Kabia	ED, UNAMIR
Mr. Arturo Hein	UNDP REP/HAC
Mr. Julio Gamba	WORLD BANK REP
Mr. Steven Hotttyner	WORLD BANK
Mr. Paul Doons	WORLD BANK
Mr. Francois Munyantwali	WORLD BANK
Mr. Kaba Ibrahima	FAO
Mr. Andre Roberfroid	UNICEF
Mr. J. Paul Menu	WHO
Mr. Janvier de Riedmatten	UNHCR
Mr. Antonio Donini	DHA/NY
Ms. Norah Niland	DHA/NY
Ms. Isel Rivero	UNAMIR
Col. C. B. Yaache	UNAMIR
 Mr. A. B. Sidique Dao	 UNAMIR

NOTE FOR THE FILE

MEETING OF THE SRSG WITH THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF UNICEF  
ON FRIDAY, 9th SEPTEMBER, 1994 at 11:30 a.m.

Expressing a hearty welcome to The Executive Director of UNICEF Mr. James Grant, The SRSG, Mr Shaharyar M. Khan said that Mr. Grant's visit is an encouragement to UNAMIR while publicly acknowledging the cooperation of all UN agencies- including UNICEF- and the NGOs.

UNAMIR had been trying to find a political equilibrium in Rwanda until April 6 when hell ~~went~~ loose; and anarchy, mayhem, massacres, genocide and war gripped the country.

19 July 1994, The RPF took full control of all but part of the South-west of Rwanda where the French established a Humanitarian Protection Zone until August 21, 1994. But the country was already a total wreck; in human, physical and material terms i.e. in everything conceivable.

Realising though that a military victory is by itself just a temporary solution, The RPF set up a government which reflects a national character. Moreover, they have been saying the right things; i.e. reconciliation, accomodation, pacification, rule of law, due process, etc. etc. Even RPF who fall out of line and are found guilty of felonies are severely punished; while old refugees/returnees are made to respect property and other rights of fellow Rwandese, irrespective of their political persuasion and/or circumstances.

The SRSG expressed regret though that all the efforts of the international community- bilateral and multilateral aid agencies, UN agencies and NGOs alike, would come to naught if critical elements and the real issues involved in resuscitating Rwanda are not addressed. These had already been compiled into a Rwanda Emergency Relief Programme (RENP) tabulated as follows:

**SHORT TERM**

1. Airport
2. Power & Electricity
3. Water
4. Radio
5. Telecommunications
6. Harvest
7. Hospitals
8. Security

**MEDIUM TERM**

- Police Force & Prison System
- Central Bank-- Currency
- Schools- Child Care
- Administrative Cadres
- Repair of Govt. Buildings
- Municipal Services
- De-mining
- Roads/Bridges & Transport

The SRSG observed that while some of the above - like the Airport, Radio Rwanda, Telecommunications and Hospitals are (begining to be ) operational, key utilities like Power & Electricity, Money & Banking and Radio UNAMIR, which have a catalytic role on the operations of other vital areas (like Water and relief/rehabilitation services necessary for the creation of an enduring political and social environment in Rwanda have been largely ignored. Thus, lamented The SRSG, all the effort of the entire International Community, including UNICEF and UNAMIR,

would be lost should these vital services remain unattended.

Emphasizing the need to jointly consider the Prevention Syndrome and the Cure Syndrome in addressing the Rwandese situation, The SRSG implored Executive Director Grant to use his good offices to assist in providing finance for the restoration of power\electricity and the establishment of Radio UNAMIR. Ambassador Khan suggested that the UN Agencies could each be encouraged to contribute a fraction towards meeting the cost of these essential services against the arrival of the World Bank team next week, September 14, 1994. The Rwandese problem, The SRSG concluded, is further compounded by The World Bank "which is asking a lifeless body i.e. Rwanda to give responses that it just cannot give."

#### THE FORCE COMMANDER

Giving the Troop(s) strength size, Gen. Tossignant emphasized the need for UNAMIR to show a true military presence all over Rwanda and stressed that the distribution of UNAMIR Forces to the various sectors of the country has largely accomplished the military objective of addressing on the ground, the perceived threat posed by the Rwandese phenomenon. The General further informed Director Grant that the RPA is gradually being made to assume its traditional role as The National Army with the responsibility of securing the four corners of all the sectors of Rwanda. The FC supported in full ~~The SRSG~~ and observed that there is no impending threat to the security of the country in the foreseeable future.

*the views  
expressed  
by the  
SRSG  
in his  
substantive  
briefing*

#### UNICEF EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

*at per Grant recalled that*  
In a tradition cold war situation, there are three ways to handle an emergency like this where the country has been thoroughly incapacitated\decimated:

- 1) A Cash Advance
- 2) Bringing in missing commodities
- 3) Payment of Public Servants\Officials in kind as obtained in Cambodia where there was a major rice shortage.

In addressing the Rwandese phenomenon, Mr. Grant advised a holistic approach, innovative enough at a time like this when there is (a) general international sympathy for the government and people of Rwanda.

*economic*

*He*  
~~Executive Director Grant unequivocally endorsed The SRSG,~~ *shared the SRSG's concerns about the extent to which the country faces*  
~~H.E. Khan's request when he promised to provide through UNICEF,~~  
substantial financial resources (both from the World Bank allocation\grant and within UNICEF) to facilitate the implementation of the \$2 million Electricity Project and the \$600000 UNAMIR Radio Project within the earliest possible time.

The SRSG thanked the UNICEF Executive Director warmly for his cooperation and promised assistance before the meeting ended at 1:30 p.m.

Abu Bakarr Sidique Dao, OIC, Humanitarian Affairs/ O S R S G

LIST OF MEMBERS PRESENT

NAMES	INSTITUTION
H.E. Shaharyar M. Khan	SRSG UNAMIR
Mr. James Grant	UNICEF ED
Maj Gen J. G. Tuosignant	FC UNAMIR
Dr. A. H. Kabia	ED UNAMIR
Mr. N. Fisher	UNICEF REP
Mr. A. Roberfroid	UNICEF REP
Mr. D. Toole	UNICEF
Mr. A. Golo	UNAMIR
Mr. P. Mehu	UNAMIR
Mr. B. P. Dessande	UNAMIR
Abu bakarr Sidique Dao	UNAMIR

DRAFT

As a follow-up to Security Council Resolution 872 of 5 October 1993, UNAMIR has now established an office for the co-ordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Rwanda with the appointment of a Humanitarian Assistance Officer (HAO) to "oversee and co-ordinate the humanitarian assistance efforts of UN Agencies, bi-lateral donors, non-governmental and other concerned institutions."

As the Humanitarian situation remains worrisome and central in the overall ops of UNAMIR, The Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) has understandably given a high priority humanitarian questions in Rwanda.

INTERIM ARRANGEMENT:

Obviously, there is an overwhelming need for UNAMIR to provide an intensified and co-ordinated activity at the policy level to address the serious humanitarian concerns in Rwanda with the main aim of helping those in need; thereby improving the political and security situation in the country.

The UN Dept. of Humanitarian Affairs, supported by UNDP, has set up the UN Rwanda Emergency Relief Office in Nairobi, with sub-offices in Kigali and Kabale. According to UNREO, a broad understanding was reached on the allocation of responsibilities among UN Agencies for the Rwanda Emergency at a recent meeting (involving UNCHR Ms. Sadako Ogata, WFP Executive Director Ms. Catherine Bertini, UNICEF Deputy Executive Director Karin Sham Poo, UNDP Assistant Administrator Ms. E. Johnson-Sirleaf and the DHA Director and Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Mr. Peter Hansen) wherein UNREO/DHA was charged with the following responsibilities:

1. Co-ordination of humanitarian relief assistance in Rwanda
2. Elaboration of strategies and contingency plans
3. Field monitoring, situation and needs assessment
4. Interaction with local authorities
5. Liaising with military contingent Commanders & UNAMIR FC
6. Security procedures and communications.

As an emergency relief measure, the above scope of authority and area of responsibility of UNREO should be appreciated and acknowledged; of course, pending the establishment of the UNAMIR Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Assistance. With the establishment of The HAO now, the office of The SRSG would expect to see an enhanced co-operation between UNAMIR and UNDP -- which is traditionally charged with the responsibility of co-ordinating humanitarian relief activities in Rwanda --with a view to ensuring a more effective and rational utilization of the resources of the various humanitarian agencies operating in the country.

#### THE FORCE COMMANDER

Giving the Troop(s) strength size, Gen. Tossignant emphasized the need for UNAMIR to show a true military presence all over Rwanda and stressed that the distribution of UNAMIR Forces to the various sectors of the country has largely accomplished the military objective of addressing on the ground, the perceived threat posed by the Rwandese phenomenon. The General further informed Director Grant that the RPA is gradually being made to assume its traditional role as The National Army with the responsibility of securing the four corners of all the sectors of Rwanda. The FC supported in full the views expressed by The SRSG in his political briefing and observed that there is no impending threat to the security of the country in the foreseeable future.

#### UNICEF EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Mr. Grant recalled that in a traditional cold war situation, there are three ways to handle an emergency in a country that has been thoroughly incapacitated\ decimated like Rwanda:

- 1) A Cash Advance
- 2) Bringing in missing commodities
- 3) Payment of Public Servants\Officials in kind as obtained in Cambodia where there was a major rice shortage.

In addressing the Rwandese phenomenon, Mr. Grant advised a holistic approach; innovative enough at a time like this when there is (a) general international sympathy for the government and people of Rwanda.

He unequivocally shared the SRSG's concern about the critical economic situation in the country and promised to provide through UNICEF, substantial financial resources (both from the World Bank allocation\grant and within UNICEF) to facilitate the implementation of the \$2 million Electricity Project and the \$600000 UNAMIR Radio Project within the earliest possible time.

The SRSG thanked the UNICEF Executive Director warmly for his kind sentiments and cooperation and before the meeting ended at 1:30 p.m.

Abu Bakarr Sidique Dao,  
OIC, Humanitarian Affairs/ O S R S G

LIST OF PERSONALITIES PRESENT

NAMES	INSTITUTION
H.E. Shaharyar M. Khan	SRSG UNAMIR
Mr. James Grant	UNICEF ED
Maj Gen J. G. Tuosignant	FC UNAMIR
Dr. A. H. Kabia	ED UNAMIR
Mr. N. Fisher	UNICEF REP
Mr. A. Roberfroid	UNICEF REP
Mr. D. Toole	UNICEF
Mr. A. Golo	UNAMIR
Mr. P. Mehu	UNAMIR
Mr. B. P. Dessande	UNAMIR
Abu Bakarr Sidique Dao	UNAMIR



DRAFT

As a follow-up to Security Council Resolution 872 of 5 October 1993, UNAMIR has now established an office for the co-ordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Rwanda with the appointment of a Humanitarian Assistance Officer (HAO) to "oversee and co-ordinate the humanitarian assistance efforts of UN Agencies, bi-lateral donors, non-governmental and other concerned institutions."

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LOGICAL STEPS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF  
THE OFFICE FOR THE CO-ORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE  
WITHIN UNAMIR

1. Appointment and deployment of the HAO at UNAMIR HQ.
2. Setting up of office of HAO with a Secretary and two (2) additional General Service Staff (1 International and 1 local).
3. SRSG\ED to officially inform the FC\DFC, for the attention of MILOB GP HQ, about the changes and new structure so that:  
MILOB HQ and Sector Commanders will henceforth liaise, co-operate and communicate with UNAMIR HAO in all matters relating to Humanitarian Assistance work in Rwanda. This includes:
  - a) The provision of security to NGO convoys whose activities/ movements are properly and effectively co-ordinated by the HAO;
  - b) The provision of security for stores and staff of such NGOs country-wide.
  - c) The submission of daily or weekly SITREPs by SectorComm to the HAO at UNAMIR HQ for collation and submission to the SRSG.
  - d) Daily meetings between the Military HAO and UNAMIR HAO at UNAMIR HQ at a time to be mutually agreed upon.
4. As a follow-up to the ED's memo of 25 August 1994 which was addressed to all UNAMIR Heads of Sections/Units and copied the HAC/UNDP Res Rep, the ED to convene a meeting with the UNDP/HAC and his Deputy (Charles Petrie) to formally introduce the HAO to the former so that both parties will work within the new framework and coordinate their activities in the light of the new dispensation.

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UNAMIR had been trying to find a political equilibrium in Rwanda until April 6 when hell broke loose; and anarchy, mayhem, massacres, genocide and war gripped the country.

The SRSG however expressed regret that all the efforts of the international community- bilateral and multilateral aid agencies, UN Agencies and NGOs alike- would come to naught if critical elements and the real issues involved in resuscitating Rwanda are not addressed. These had already been compiled into a Rwanda Emergency Relief Programme (RENP) tabulated as follows:

SHORT TERM	MEDIUM TERM
1. Airport	Police Force & Prison System
2. Power & Electricity	Central Bank-- Currency
3. Water	Schools- Child Care
4. Radio	Administrative Cadres
5. Telecommunications	Repair of Govt. Buildings
6. Harvest	Municipal Services
7. Hospitals	De-mining
8. Security	Roads\Bridges & Transport

The SRSG observed that while some of the above - like the Airport, Radio Rwanda, Telecommunications and Hospitals are (begining to be ) operational, key utilities like Power & Electricity, Money & Banking and Radio UNAMIR, which have a catalytic role on the operations of other vital areas (like Water and relief\rehabilitation services necessary for the creation of an enduring political and social environment in Rwanda have been largely ignored. Thus, lamented The SRSG, all the effort of the entire International Community, including UNICEF and UNAMIR, would be lost should these vital services remain unattended.

Emphasizing the need to jointly consider the Prevention Syndrome and the Cure Syndrome in addressing the Rwandese situation, The SRSG implored Executive Director Grant to use his good offices to assist in providing finance for the restoration of power\electricity and the establishment of Radio UNAMIR. Ambassador Khan suggested thast the UN Agencies could each be encouraged to contribute a fraction towards meeting the cost of these essential services against the arrival of the World Bank team next week, September 14, 1994. The Rwandese problem, The SRSG concluded, is further compounded by The World Bank "which is asking a lifeless body i.e. Rwanda to give responses that it just cannot give."

NOTE FOR THE FILE

MINUTES OF THE MILOBS COMMAND AND STAFF CONFERENCE AT  
SECTOR 3 HEADQUARTERS - GITARAMA ON FRIDAY, 02 SEPTEMBER 1994

Welcoming all the Sector Commanders present at the first post-war command and control weekly meeting, the Chief MILOBS Officer, Colonel Ticoka, reminded everybody present that MILOBS were the military's "ears and eyes"; emphasizing that their operations were essential for strategic planning; which is a sine qua non for the achievement of the (UNAMIR) mission objective. These sentiments were endorsed by the Deputy Force Commander who briefly attended the meeting on his way to Gikongoro (BRITCON); exhorting participants to appreciate the importance of such weekly meetings as a forum for free and fair exchange of ideas. Sector Commanders were then requested to make their respective presentations starting with Sector 4C.

**SECTOR 4C**

Sector 4c, according to the Sector Commander, was generally calm after the French left the former Humanitarian Protection Zone (HPZ) on August 22 this year. However, the situation is slowly inviting cause for concern as the number of people, particularly suspected hardliners and extremists in the zone, keeps increasing. Consequently, banditry is escalating. This is exacerbated by the ominous spectacle of gun-toting gendermerie, forest rangers and civilians roaming all over the place with apparently little regard for the peace-keeping operations of UNAMIR troops. Moreover, NGOs are being threatened with violence whenever they insist on taking refugees or displaced people away. The Zairean border guards are reportedly demanding some 500 Rwandese Francs from each refugee who wants to return to Rwanda, thus making repatriation more unattractive for them. The role of the Ethiopian Battalion would need to be re-examined as they are perceived to look like Tutsis, albeit wrongly. Secondly, as most of them could neither speak French nor English, their performance on the ground is likely to be impaired. Perhaps it may not be out of place to deploy a second battalion (like the Tunisians) in Sector 4C which is clearly considered the most volatile in the region. Bugarama town in the south, for example, is considered a haven for extremists. Moreover, the fact that the Motorola Handsets that are being used cannot transmit beyond 20 km does not help the situation either.

**SECTOR 4A**

According to the Sector Commander, there are 11 refugee camps in the north and 17 in the south. The situation here is less volatile and, infact, there is an appreciable degree of co-operation between the security forces and the NGOs who meet on Saturdays and Wednesdays to coordinate the latter's activities. The activities of the RPA are also closely monitored in the Sector and its environs while the British Field Ambulance is reported to be of tremendous assistance, particularly in the south.

In this Sector alone, there are over six (6) orphanages. There is ample need therefore to coordinate the flow of humanitarian assistance among the sectors. Farming inputs and building materials are equally in short supply. It is generally agreed that MILOBS, being the most credible, should be sending regular SITREPs to enable the Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Assistance work more effectively within the office of the SRSG for the realisation of the humanitarian assistance objective.

#### SECTOR 1

Located in the north-east of Rwanda, this Sector is reportedly calm. The RPA and the Prefet are working closing with the UNAMIR personnel who are always in touch with the NGOs and the HAC. The only discernible problem here is with mines in the south-west of Byumba.

#### SECTOR 2

This is the Kigali area, the heart of Rwanda. Life is gradually returning to normalcy. UNAMIR headquarters is located here and the RPA is most visible on all fours. Work on basic utilities- i.e. light, water and telephones- is progressing, as the airport becomes fully operational. This is all part of the Rwanda Emergency Normalization Plan enunciated by the SRSG which I explained in detail to the Commanders present.

In the area of humanitarian assistance, it is observed that the government should take responsibility of receiving those returnee who come to Kigali and not leave them to the various UNAMIR vehicles/trucks that bring them in. The government could approach one of the many NGOs operating in the sector for assistance in this regard.

The proposal to establish an independent UNAMIR Radio Station to welcome news indeed while attempts to give Radio Rwanda country-wide coverage with transmission to reach every nook and corner of this country should be encouraged.

To facilitate the flow of vehicular traffic both by NGOs and the public at large in the north of the Sector, however, the Bugassera bridge should be repaired and made motorable again.

The meeting was adjourned at 5:45 p.m. with an indication by the CMO that the next meeting is scheduled to take place in Cyangugu next Friday, September 9, 1994.

Abu Bakarr Sidique Dao  
OIC  
Humanitarian Affairs\ OSRSG  
2nd September 1994

With regards to law and order though, GHANBATT has arrested quite a few criminals that should face the long arm of the law. However, in the absence of the appropriate structures, these suspects are being held and fed by GHANBATT, much to their discomfiture. It has been suggested that as a deterrent, these criminal suspects should be held in Butare Prison and the Red Cross is ready to look after them in there.

As a means to facilitate repatriation, the SectorComm conducts frequent confidence-building tours by taking some camp leaders to see for themselves that life is normalizing. This would give refugees the urge to return home. It is suggested, however, that human rights observers and perhaps NGOs should follow-up on these repatriation exercises.

The RPA has reportedly given orders for people to surrender their guns; failing which, they would be forced to jump in.

It is suggested that food should be supplied to security personnel, including MILOBS, in the Sector since food is not easily available there.

#### SECTOR 5

This Sector is reportedly relatively peaceful as there are no incidents. The NGOs are quite active in Ruhengeri particularly; and infact, The Red Cross is running a water plant in Gissenyi while the Canadians maintain an operating theatre in the Sector. Electricity is coming on in spurts and the brewery is to open as soon as the light situation improves. There is no restriction in UNAMIR troop movements whilst the fields are being tilled.

However, accross Gissenyi, there are 600 French troops who appear to be sympathetic to the RGF. They are concerned that Rwanda is losing its French identity. Zairean guards, too, are harassing and intimidating refugees who want to come back; and this is not particularly helpful.

Even though the MERIDIAN is now running at half mast, the consensus is that, at least, the supply of drinking water should not be cut off by the authorities.

#### SECTOR 3

Generally calm, but the military situation is tense as the RPA is constantly on high alert, allegedly haunting ex-RGF and Interhamwe.

There are reports of RGF returnees though. But the question is, how does the RPA treat them? Perhaps the office of the SRSG may want to enquire from the government authorities.

There are also reports that the Gitarama Prison and the Butare Prison have been sealed off by the RPA. The suspicion is that Interhamwe suspects or accused are being systematically executed in there. This too should be investigated.

Otherwise, life in Gitarama, Ruhango and Butare is getting normal with Butare slowly becoming a commercial centre for trade with Burundi. Agriculture is taking root while the markets have been opened.

Humanitarian assistance is reportedly wanting in this Sector as aid is not coordinated. Food, water, medication and non-food items are in very short supply. The situation appears serious as the humanitarian effort is reportedly concentrated in Sector 4.



With regards to law and order though, GHANBATT has arrested quite a few criminals that should face the long arm of the law. However, in the absence of the appropriate structures, these suspects are being held and fed by GHANBATT, much to their discomfiture. It has been suggested that as a deterrent, these criminal suspects should be held in Butare Prison and the Red Cross is ready to look after them in there. As a means to facilitate repatriation, the SectorComm conducts frequent confidence-building tours by taking some camp leaders to see for themselves that life is normalizing. This would give refugees the urge to return home. It is suggested, however, that human rights observers and perhaps NGOs should follow-up on these repatriation exercises. The RPA has reportedly given orders for people to surrender their guns; failing which, they would be forced to jump in. It is suggested that food should be supplied to security personnel, including MILOBS, in the Sector since food is not easily available there.

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#### SECTOR 3

Generally calm, but the military situation is tense as the RPA is reportedly on high alert, allegedly haunting ex-RGF and RPF returnees though. But the question is, what to do with them? Perhaps the office of the SRSG may want to enquire from the government authorities. There are also reports that the Gitarama Prison and the Butare Prison have been sealed off by the RPA. The suspicion is that these two should be investigated. Agriculture is becoming a commercial centre for trade with the RPF. The situation appears serious as the humanitarian effort is reportedly concentrated in Sector 4.

PROPOSED ARRANGEMENT:

As the overall Humanitarian Assistance Co-ordinating body in Rwanda, UNAMIR should create a centralized, integrated Policy Unit to plan and co-ordinate UNAMIR's role and activities in the overall humanitarian assistance effort in the country. To be effective, UNAMIR's HAO should, in particular, liaise closely with the following two(2) institutions which have contributed immensely in humanitarian work in the country; albeit in an ad hoc\temporary basis thus far under UNREO :

- (i) The UNAMIR Military contingent which has been providing escorts for delivery convoys and security protection for distribution centres and storage depots and
- (ii) The UNDP\UNREO and various relief agencies including ICRC, UNHCR, UNICEF, FAO/WFP, WHO, etc.

MODUS OPERANDI:

To ensure a smooth co-ordination arrangement under the auspices of UNAMIR, a meeting should be held with UNDP, UNAMIR's Military and key relief agencies under the chairmanship of The SRSG or the Executive Director to emphasize the need for co-operation with The HAO. Since the HAO is expected to be submitting Humanitarian Reports to the SRSG through the Executive Director on a regular basis, the obvious need for relief agencies to submit their work plan(s) and status report(s) without delay cannot be over-emphasized. UNDP\UNREO should also be encouraged to co-operate within the context and import of this endeavour. In a bid to establish an effective co-ordination arrangement at the policy level with immediate effect, UNAMIR should, as a guide, give priority to institutions and relief agencies that co-operate and collaborate with UNAMIR's overall co-ordinating arrangement.

Submitted please.


Abu Bakarr Sidique Dao  
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OFFICER

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LOGICAL STEPS FOR THE EFFECTIVE  
CO-ORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE  
WITHIN UNAMIR

1. Appointment and deployment of the HAO at UNAMIR HQ.
2. Setting up of office of HAO with a Secretary and two (2) additional General Service Staff (1 International and 1 local).
3. SRSG\ED to officially inform the FC\DFC, for the attention of MILOB GP HQ, about the changes and new structure so that:  
MILOB HQ and Sector Commanders will henceforth liaise, co-operate and communicate with UNAMIR HAO in all matters relating to Humanitarian Assistance work in Rwanda. This includes:
  - a) The provision of security to NGO convoys whose activities/movements are properly and effectively co-ordinated by the HAO;
  - b) The provision of security for stores and staff of such NGOs country-wide.
  - c) The submission of daily or weekly SITREPs by SectorComm to the HAO at UNAMIR HQ for collation and submission to the SRSG.
  - d) Daily meetings between the Military HAO and UNAMIR HAO at UNAMIR HQ at a time to be mutually agreed upon.
4. As a follow-up to the ED's memo of 25 August 1994 which was addressed to all UNAMIR Heads of Sections/Units and copied the HAC/UNDP Res Rep, the ED to convene a meeting with the UNDP/HAC and his Deputy (Charles Petrie) to formally introduce the HAO to the former so that both parties will work within the new framework and coordinate their activities in the light of the new dispensation. Both the HAO and the Deputy HAC should work out modalities for the immediate attention of all NGOs and other relief agencies operating in Rwanda for their cooperation and adherence to policy emanating from the SRSG through the HAO. The Deputy HAC and the HAO should jointly visit, by air if possible, all Sectors in order to determine the scope, extent and concentration of humanitarian assistance country-wide to enable the latter produce a comprehensive status report with the cooperation of the former for the attention of The SRSG.

  
Abu Bakarr Sidique Dao  
Humanitarian Assistance Officer

29<sup>th</sup> Aug., 1994

SRSG'S OFFICE


UNAMIR / MINUAR  
KIGALI

PROGRAM OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE  
OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL

TUESDAY, 21 DECEMBER 1993

1000	Audience with Mr. Landoald Ndasingwa, Minister of work and member of the Liberal Party (LP). He will be accompanied with Mr. Charles Kayiranga, President of the LP and Mr. André Kameya, Secretary-general of the LP. At UNAMIR HQ.	Audience avec M. Landoald Ndasingwa, Ministre du travail et Membre du Parti Libéral. Il sera accompagné de M. Charles Kayiranga, Président du Parti Libéral et M. André Kameya, Secrétaire général du Parti Libéral. Au siège de la MINUAR.
1100	Audience with the Chargé d'Affaires of the Switzerland Embassy, Mrs. Marie-Grance Renfer. At UNAMIR HQ.	Audience avec Mme. Marie-Grance Renfer, Chargé d'Affaires de l'Ambassade de la Suisse. Au siège de la MINUAR.
1600	Meeting with the Presidents of the Political Parties non involved in the government. At UNAMIR HQ.: Conference Room 4061.	Rencontre avec les Présidents des partis politiques non participants au gouvernement. Au siège de la MINUAR: Salle de conférence 4061.

From The Desk Of ABU BAKARR SIDIQUE DAO



The PREFECTURES of The Rep. of Rwanda are as follows:

1. Kigali -----Central
2. Kibungu -----South-East
3. Kagera -----North-East
4. Byumba -----North
5. Ruhungere-----North-West
- \*\* Gitarama-----West
6. Gisenyi-----North-Central
7. Kibuye-----West-West
8. Cyangugu-----South-South-West
9. Gikongoro-----South-West
10. Butare-----South

NOTE FOR THE FILE

MEETING OF THE SRSG WITH THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF UNICEF  
ON FRIDAY, 9th SEPTEMBER, 1994 at 11:30 a.m.

Expressing a hearty welcome to The Executive Director of UNICEF Mr. James Grant, The SRSG, Mr Shaharyar M. Khan said that Mr. Grant's visit is an encouragement to UNAMIR and acknowledged the cooperation of all UN agencies- including UNICEF- and the NGOs.

UNAMIR had been trying to find a political equilibrium in Rwanda until April 6 when hell broke loose; and anarchy, mayhem, massacres, genocide and war gripped the country.

The SRSG however expressed regret that all the efforts of the international community- bilateral and multilateral aid agencies, UN Agencies and NGOs alike- would come to naught if critical elements and the real issues involved in resuscitating Rwanda are not addressed. These had already been compiled into a Rwanda Emergency Relief Programme (RENP) tabulated as follows:

**SHORT TERM**

1. Airport
2. Power & Electricity
3. Water
4. Radio
5. Telecommunications
6. Harvest
7. Hospitals
8. Security

**MEDIUM TERM**

- Police Force & Prison System
- Central Bank-- Currency
- Schools- Child Care
- Administrative Cadres
- Repair of Govt. Buildings
- Municipal Services
- De-mining
- Roads\Bridges & Transport

The SRSG observed that while some of the above - like the Airport, Radio Rwanda, Telecommunications and Hospitals are (begining to be ) operational, key utilities like Power & Electricity, Money & Banking and Radio UNAMIR, which have a catalytic role on the operations of other vital areas (like Water and relief\rehabilitation services necessary for the creation of an enduring political and social environment in Rwanda have been largely ignored. Thus, lamented The SRSG, all the effort of the entire International Community, including UNICEF and UNAMIR, would be lost should these vital services remain unattended.

Emphasizing the need to jointly consider the Prevention Syndrome and the Cure Syndrome in addressing the Rwandese situation, The SRSG implored Executive Director Grant to use his good offices to assist in providing finance for the restoration of power\electricity and the establishment of Radio UNAMIR. Ambassador Khan suggested thast the UN Agencies could each be encouraged to contribute a fraction towards meeting the cost of these essential services against the arrival of the World Bank team next week, September 14, 1994. The Rwandese problem, The SRSG concluded, is further compounded by The World Bank "which is asking a lifeless body i.e. Rwanda to give responses that it just cannot give."

#### THE FORCE COMMANDER

Giving the Troop(s) strength size, Gen. Tossignant emphasized the need for UNAMIR to show a true military presence all over Rwanda and stressed that the distribution of UNAMIR Forces to the various sectors of the country has largely accomplished the military objective of addressing on the ground, the perceived threat posed by the Rwandese phenomenon. The General further informed Director Grant that the RPA is gradually being made to assume its traditional role as The National Army with the responsibility of securing the four corners of all the sectors of Rwanda. The FC supported in full the views expressed by The SRSG in his political briefing and observed that there is no impending threat to the security of the country in the foreseeable future.

#### UNICEF EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Mr. Grant recalled that in a traditional cold war situation, there are three ways to handle an emergency in a country that has been thoroughly incapacitated\ decimated like Rwanda:

- 1) A Cash Advance
- 2) Bringing in missing commodities
- 3) Payment of Public Servants\Officials in kind as obtained in Cambodia where there was a major rice shortage.

In addressing the Rwandese phenomenon, Mr. Grant advised a holistic approach; innovative enough at a time like this when there is (a) general international sympathy for the government and people of Rwanda.

He unequivocally shared the SRSG's concern about the critical economic situation in the country and promised to provide through UNICEF, substantial financial resources (both from the World Bank allocation\grant and within UNICEF) to facilitate the implementation of the \$2 million Electricity Project and the \$600000 UNAMIR Radio Project within the earliest possible time.

The SRSG thanked the UNICEF Executive Director warmly for his kind sentiments and cooperation and before the meeting ended at 1:30 p.m.

Abu Bakarr Sidique Dao,  
OIC, Humanitarian Affairs/ O S R S G

LIST OF PERSONALITIES PRESENT

NAME	INSTITUTION
H.E. Shaharyar M. Khan	SRSG UNAMIR
Mr. James Grant	UNICEF ED
Maj Gen J. G. Tuosignant	FC UNAMIR
Dr. A. H. Kabia	ED UNAMIR
Mr. N. Fisher	UNICEF REP
Mr. A. Roberfroid	UNICEF REP
Mr. D. Toole	UNICEF
Mr. A. Golo	UNAMIR
Mr. P. Mehu	UNAMIR
Mr. B. P. Dessande	UNAMIR
Abu Bakarr Sidique Dao	UNAMIR

Je ne veux pas d'exemples  
quel qu'on.

Je ne veux pas d'exemples quel qu'on

o

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Mr. CLARENCE  
UNDP Building  
Office of the High Commissioner for  
HR  
Chief, Human Rights Operation  
in Rwanda

Ch 8 - HR 123

\*UGANDAN REFUGEES<sup>29</sup> - north west of Rwanda

NGO Vendors: 3pm Meeting at UNHCR  
UNDP launching its Development Program  
starting this week

Thursday, 10 o'clock <sup>UNDP</sup> Meeting

Rehabilitation Program

Needs Assessment Mission  
to attend. NGOs to be interested in  
Development Programme.

UNDP/HABITAT Mission in Rwanda

UNIFEM } Post Traumatic Disorder / Women  
? Income-Generating

Visa ⇒ \$20/- to enter.

Then = 6 months - RF 4,000/-

Mins in Kigali - avoid bridges etc.

Sector 4  $\Rightarrow$  Ethio bal - being Hgt site  
Additional Vehicles? Vehicle Registration  
a much.  
< 485,000 Displaced? Sector 4

Sector 1 - Kagesa Park -  $\frac{1}{2}$  returns.  
- General situation is satisfactory.

Sector 3? Isolated Interhamwe activities?  
NGO activities found wanting still

Orphanage to be more...

Sector 5: Quiet.

Staff in Hospital? Quitting because of  
pay? But SRSC's office should  
assist - Money to assist Govt.  
in running the country (say \$20m) allocated  
to UN agencies. SRSC's disappointed

1. Je vous réserve pour mon vol  
de demain matin.

2. Je souhaite de vous voir  
prochainement

I hope to see you soon.

3. C'est un grand plaisir de  
travailler avec vous.

Note: Independent NAOs move of their own volition - Don't even bother for security. Risky stuff.

UNHCR / ICR not cooperating!!

"We'll do it ourselves!" Ordinarily, they will not accept security cover.

• MANIFEST?

Conway's staff said. But if 10 people e.g. the Military should take with go names of details.

\* Conway coming at night with papers.  
• Concern will not take care in KICAH at night.

HAC (Maj McNeil) trying to arrange with another "aid Agency" to say yes!!

No light :

Std Operational <sup>13</sup> procedures for UNICEF.  
note: UNICEF should be made responsible  
for the sins of their parents.

UNRWA, Sudan, etc.

\* UNICEF's dealing with the <sup>of RLF's</sup> children  
is no' recognition of the old Guard.  
• Negotiations!!

\* Plc

• In UNAMIR HQ's, nobody has come  
out to be the spokesman of RLF.

• Bukavu Stop

Rer Troops being trained - Chief  
of BRSC

5

Budgetary aid? Pay salaries?

\* Only France perhaps. They now  
maintain a chargé d'affaires.

Belgium??

• Salaries?

What salary scale(s) to use.  
NGO's - ready to pay workers in their  
sector(s).

UNICEF promised \$30 a month.

- Govt. is coming up with a proposal.  
(Plan of Rehabilitation & Finance)

Education

Can WFP pay <sup>teachers</sup> in kind? No, people need  
cash!!

HR \$ 4. m

\$ 1 m on health  
\* best is for repatriation

Development agencies do not like  
to invest in infrastructure. They  
think that is for bi-lateral donors.  
What is negotiable take 2 hospitals

FAD

\$ 4

There is not a great deal of  
flexibility. There have been discussions  
between the agencies and the O.N.W.  
Bank on these details.

The problem now is how to  
convince the donor agencies and the  
executing agencies to rethink



To look at The feasibility of setting  
up a Computerized Humanitarian  
Assistance Co-ordinating effort;

Develop own data-base

- Various agencies -

- Tie it into geographical systems.

- 1. Staff in UNREO might be part of UNAMIR
- 2. No need to interfere with Country programmes of various agencies.

• Beyond 9th Dec. 1994?

BBGNU says 5 years; after which, election.

UNAMIR come in by The Arusha Agreement which is shorter than BBGNU's time frame.

3 Hright Experts will arrive today  
- to leave 13 Sept 94.

Press to beef up!! Here

Fc

1. Policy of the Govt of re-integration  
of previous R & F into RPA.

2. What is the status of the Jun-

• toting personnel in Sector 4.  
Rwandan F.C.: this people are to be  
disarmed.

What happens with the guns?

3. Interviews / Reporting - little nuances.  
UNAMIR shd not be seen to form an  
opinion; to be partisan.

Strategy: Go to the stay!

Study: Perhaps 75% of people now  
in Kigali are either from Burundi,  
Zaire, Uganda, Tutsis.

①

\$4m  
UNICEF - Health  
Refers. 150 Health  
Centers.

Comprehension fund  
Salaries

\$3

Nutrition

\$3m

Water  
Sanitation

To fix the 11 water  
networks in the  
areas: Pump/chem.

Provide seeds

Supplementary food/WFP

Food for schools + Hospitals

Details in 2 weeks

WFP \$1.5m

3 Health Projects - no details -  
which they submitted to the  
Bank

②  
UNAMIR is not considered as a  
development agency.

But as Chief-co-ordinator,

He can call them to UNAMIR  
and tell them to account for every  
thing that they do against  
the background of reality.

\* UN agencies are not allowed  
to give grant/loans for salaries.

↳ The World Bank gives loans for  
development.

The IMF for Bal of Payments.

Unfortunately it is a frustration of  
mandates & procedures.

UNDP is going to finance 20-27 UNVs  
for the airport. IEAD is executing.

- Man the control tower, customs?  
Funding for 6 months only.

The World Bank in the 70's in-  
vested in Infrastructure.

UNDP, ~~73~~, invests in infrastruc-  
ture traditionally, the fund is only  
for the LDC's i.e. poverty allevia-  
tion, etc

- UNDP is willing to do TA assistance.  
Cannot invest in equipment.

There are 84 NGOs in Rwanda today  
doing all this. Very impressive!

Normally, this the govt. that determines  
its priorities. But here, it is different.

UNDP

Will help the govt. to raise funds—  
experts in fiscal policy to be recruited.

13<sup>th</sup> Sept

Duron - Area officer for Rwanda  
 Resident  
 Rep of World Bank - Mr. Gamba  
 Coing. Ch. of Rept. (Argentinian)

For the purpose of fund mobiliza-  
 tion there are Round Table Consultative

By Dec 31, UNDP plans World Bank

to org. a Round Table in Geneva.  
 Donors are all there. Govt. present-  
 papers on want it want.

If people don't see concrete things  
 happening now, they might lose patience.