

MIR

SECTOR I, BYUMBA

22 SEPT 1994 - 22 MAR 1995

OPERATION ORDERS AND INSTRUCTIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

EL/WG JUNE 2009

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

UNARCHIVES

SERIES S-1062

BOX 154

FILE 3

ACC. 1998/0283

TO : G3 OPS, FHQ
MILOBS GP HQ, KIGALI(OPS)

FROM : SECTOR CDR, SECTOR 3, GITARAMA

SUBJECT: INTERIM REPORT - INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUIREMENT

DATE: 22 MAR 95


1. PLEASE REFER TO YOUR MEMO - INFO COLLECTION 002, ACCORDING TO WHICH INFORMATION IS REQUIRED FOR FC BY 27 MAR 95.


2. SINCE THE SUBJECT OF REFUGEE OUTFLOW FROM RWANDA INTO BURUNDI HAS BEEN RAISED, I CONSIDER IT PERTINENT TO TO POINT OUT SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THIS AS AN INTERIM REPORT.

3. THE MOVEMENT OF REFUGEES FROM RWANDA INTO BURUNDI IS OF TWO TYPES. FIRSTLY THE MOVEMENT OF RWANDESE NATIONALS INTO CAMPS IN BURUNDI, ACROSS THE BORDER. THIS MOVEMENT IS NOT REGISTERED BY UNHCR WITHIN RWANDA AND IS ILLEGAL MOVEMENT ACROSS THE BORDER AS A RESULT OF THE SECURITY SITUATION AT ANY GIVEN TIME. THE REFUGEES ARE REGISTERED WHEN THEY ENTER CAMPS IN BURUNDI. THERE ARE 5 SUCH CAMPS LOCATED AT KAYANZA, NGOZI, KIRUNDO, MUYINGA AND CIBITOKI. THE SECOND IS MOVEMENT OF REFUGEES OF BURUNDI ORIGIN WHO HAD SOUGHT REFUGE IN RWANDA OVER A PERIOD OF TIME SINCE AS EARLY AS 1972. THESE REFUGEES ARE BEING REGISTERED BY THE UNHCR AND ARE BEING TRANSPORTED BACK TO BURUNDI. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT A TOTAL OF 3000 SUCH REFUGEES ARE STILL UNREGISTERED BUT LIVING IN RWANDA AS FREE LIVERS.

4. AS PER INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM UNHCR, A TOTAL OF 8865 REFUGEES OF RWANDESE ORIGIN HAVE ENTERED THE 5 CAMPS ACROSS THE BORDER IN THE 11 WEEKS OF 1995 THUSFAR. THIS MOVEMENT IS CONSIDERED TO BE UNDETECTED AND TAKES PLACE ACROSS THE STRETCH OF BORDER AND MOSTLY AT NIGHT AND IS THUS DIFFICULT FOR UNAMIR FORMED TROOPS AND MILOBS TO DETECT. PERHAPS IT IS THESE FIGURES OF MOVEMENT WHICH HAVE BEEN REFERRED TO BY THE UN AGENCIES AND NGOS IN THEIR REPORTS. THIS APPEARS TO BE AUTHENTICATED BY THE FACT THAT IN MARCH 95 ALONE 3797 SUCH REFUGEES HAVE BEEN REGISTERED IN THE CAMPS IN BURUNDI.


5. MILOBS GP HQ ONLY. A COPY OF FHQ MEMO IS ATTACHED FOR REFERENCE SINCE IT DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED TO YOU. IT MAY BE USEFUL TO SEND A COPY OF THE SAME TO ALL MILOBS SECTOR HQ SINCE THIS TYPE OF INFORMATION IS FAIRLY EASILY AVAILABLE WITH THEM.


SA HASNAIN
COLONEL
SECTOR CDR


25/3



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J McCOMBER
MAJ
SOO

Distribution List:
ALL MILOBS SECTORS

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5009/80
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FROM : G 3 PLANS

5000.46 (Plans)

TO : DISTRIBUTION LIST

DATED : 28 Dec 94

CONTINGENCY PLANS

1. Find the updated SOP on contingency plans laying down various measures to be adopted by the military staff members under different states of security.
2. Due to some essential additions, this copy supersedes the one sent vide letter 5000.46 dated 26 Dec 94. however Annexure 1 and 2 should be retained.

P K Malik
P K Malik
Maj
G 3 Plans 3
For G 3 Plans

Distribution List

- MA to FC
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FROM : G 3 PLANS

5000.46 (Plans)

TO : DISTRIBUTION LIST

DATED : Dec 94

CONTINGENCY PLANS : SOP FOR

UNAMIR MILITARY STAFF

General

1. Reference security instructions on Plans NIKE, HECTOR and JASON.
2. In the event of deteriorating situation in Sector 6 the security measures will be activated in Kigali. This SOP lays down the measures to be adopted under various conditions to ensure safety of the military staff working at the HQ UNAMIR and HQ Mil Obs.
3. The various existing plans denote the following;
 - a. Op NIKE. It lays down the measures to counter the increased threat in the sectors. It enables increased presence in the sectors.
 - (i) NIKE GREEN. It indicates a low level threat and normal activities will continue.
 - (ii) NIKE YELLOW ALFA, BRAVO and CHARLIE. It caters for a medium level threat and normal ops will continue till the situation permits without endangering safety of personnel.
 - (iii) NIKE RED. This status denotes a high level threat. It lays down strict restrictions on op activities and movements.
 - b. Op HECTOR. This plan encompasses the reinforcement measures for the threatened sectors.
 - c. Op JASON. This plan entails the threatened sectors falling back to Kigali or being evac to neighbouring countries in JASON GREEN and YELLOW ALFA stages. it also lays down instructions for the preliminary evac during JASON YELLOW BRAVO STAGE and the final evac of the Core

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Group and the left over security force in JASON RED stage.

Threat

4. The current situation in Rwanda seems to be stabilised however it is likely that the former RGF which is believed to be in the process of regrouping may in future embark insurgency ops. The threat in Sector 6 is likely to develop after the situation in the other sectors is deteriorated. The developing threat is likely to afford reaction time to activate the alert measures in Sector 6 and thus Kigali.

5. The threat to UNAMIR in Kigali is likely to be ;

- a. Insurgency threat aimed at BBGNU and the RPA.
- b. Attacks on UNAMIR personnel/ property.

6. The above mentioned threat is likely to develop as under;

- a. Infiltration in Sector 6 to assess the capability of RPA.
- b. Ambushing of UNAMIR vehs and property.
- c. Theft of vehs and personal and official property.
- d. Extortion.
- e. Sabotage of UN property.

Op Plan NIKE

7. NIKE GREEN (Low Level Threat).

- a. The presence of troops will be increased in Sector 6 by the Sector Cdr accordingly.
- b. Normal ops will continue.
- c. Mil obs and the will be kept updated of the situation by the ops branch and the Sector 6 Cdr.
- d. Prepare to meet the next level of threat.

8. NIKE YELLOW (Medium Level Threat).

a. YELLOW ALFA.

- (i) Sector 6 troops consolidate on the platoon, coy

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and the battalion positions progressively as per the existing plan.

- (ii) Security of KPs to be enhanced.
- (iii) Curfew imposed for all UN personnel from 10 pm to 6 am.
- (iv) All movements to be in groups of at least two persons.
- (v) Comm on motorola when moving out.
- (vi) Ops branch will ensure 24 hour comm with HQ Sector 6. It should be duplicated with tele.
- (vii) In case of emergency the duty officer in the ops branch should be approached on radio who will immediately get in touch with the HQ Sector 6 to rush in the RRF to the desired spot.
- (viii) Cdr Sector 6 to enhance the security at Hotel Meridien and Belgian Village to one section each and one platoon at the Amahoro Complex.

b. Yellow BRAVO and CHARLIE.

- (i) Plan HECTOR is likely to be ordered at this stage to beef up the troops strength in Sector 6. It is likely that one/two coys will reinforce Sector 6 to counter the increased threat. Cdr Sector 6 will be the overall cdr.
- (ii) No distinct gap between BRAVO and CHARLIE.
- (iii) All movements restricted to that required to perform official duties only.
- (iv) All members of staff may fall back to the following Safe Areas;
 - A. Amahoro Hotel.
 - B. Amahoro Stadium for the over flow.
- (v) Security at Amahoro Complex enhanced to one platoon.
- (vi) Logistics branch to ensure the desired water and electricity supply in the Amahoro Complex.

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9. NIKE RED.

- a. Staff members fall back to Safe Areas, if not done already.
- b. Sector 6 Cdr to deploy one platoon RRF at the Amahoro Complex in addition to the one in defence of the Complex.
- c. Movements kept to the minimum even during the day time.
- d. All to use ballistic protective equipment.
- e. This stage may also entail evac of civil non essential persons leaving behind only a core group.
- f. All branches will prepare a list of non essential staff members to be evac in the next stage.

Op JASON

10. This plan entails evac from Rwanda. It may only be partially activated depending on the situation. The aim will be to remain in a position to redeploy when the situation improves. The plan will be activated when the situation in the sectors deteriorates to the extent that the security of even the military personnel is endangered. It may result in evac of the threatened sectors only.

11. JASON GREEN. This part deals with the preparation for the evac. UN Agencies and the NGO personnel may be evac in this stage. All branches will prepare the non essential staff members for evac. The affected sectors will prepare for the procedure of falling back to Kigali or evacuation to a neighbouring country as ordered by the FORCE HQ.

12. JASON YELLOW. This part defines the evac process.

a. Yellow ALFA.

(i) Threatened sectors withdraw to Kigali after destroying their non essential stores. All important and vital stores will be brought back to Kigali. Some contingents may be evac to the neighbouring country. Contingents will be intimated about the disposal of the above mentioned stores in that case.

(ii) All non essential military personnel including the staff will manifest with the Mov Con.

(iii) All non essential stores of only the

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contingents/ troops in Sector 6 will be destroyed after taking confirmation from this HQ.

b. Yellow BRAVO. It involves preliminary evac. It will be undertaken when the final evac is most likely.

(i) All military non essential personnel and the left over civilians (core group) evac.

(ii) All troops not required for the defence of Kigali evac by land and/or air.

(iii) Units will be preferably evac by land route and others not forming part of formed contingents by air. The equipment of high value will be given priority in evac.

(iv) Those moving out by air will have a luggage weight limit of 15 kgs.

(v) All vehs and equipment not required by the minimum presence will be evac by land and/or air.

c. Yellow CHARLIE. It is the main evac stage.

(i) A Core Group will be formed which will continue functioning as the minimum presence, till the last evac. It will comprise of the following;

- A. Appropriate representative of HQ UNAMIR.
- B. Force Cdr/DFC/COS.
- C. Core Ops personnel.
- D. Engrs.
- E. Air op staff.
- F. Representative of the Logistics branch.

(ii) Important and essential stores evac.

(iii) Non essential stores of units which withdrew from Kigali destroyed under the arrangements of Engrs.

13. JASON RED. It involves the final evac of the Core Group from Rwanda. The security force will be evac by the land route and the Core Group by air. Remaining stores will be destroyed by the Engrs.

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Miscellaneous Aspects

14. Destination After the Evac. To be intimated in due course of time.

15. Earmarking of Accn in the Safe Areas. It will be coordinated by the G 3 Plans and all the branches will be intimated accordingly.

16. Family Members. The SRSG has instructed vide circular on security plans, dated 16 Dec that the responsibility for the security and evac of family members is that of the concerned officers. They should be evac before UNAMIR evac process starts.

17. Non Local Domestic Help. Same as above.

18. Forms to be Filled. The following forms need to be filled at the earliest and forwarded to CMPO and the Plans branch. Copies are attached as Annexure 1 and 2.

a. General Info. Copy attached as Annexure 1. Two copies per officer to be forwarded to CMPO by 30 Dec 94.

b. Inventory for Personal Effects. One copy to be forwarded to CMPO by 30 Dec 94.

19. Evac of Office Equipment. CMPO will coordinate the evac of essential office stores. Forward a list of office equipment in your branches to the CMPO by 09 Jan 95 to enable him to screen the same into essential category.

Check List

20. Forms as mentioned in paragraph 18 to be forwarded to CMPO by 30 Dec 94.

21. List of office equipment as mentioned in paragraph 19 to be forwarded to CMPO by 09 Jan 95.

22. All branches to prepare the list of non essential staff members and forward to the Plans branch by 09 Jan 95 as mentioned in paragraph 9 above.

23. Plans branch will compile the list of Core Group by 09 Jan 95.

24. All staff members should be in possession of ballistic equipment.

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Military Parallel States of Security to That Defined by the SRSG for the UNAMIR

25. The SRSG vide his letter dated 16 Dec 94 has defined five security conditions for the UN personnel. This branch has already intimated the security states pertaining to the military persons vide instructions on plans Op NIKE, HECTOR and JASON. Following are the parallel states applicable to the military personnel;

<u>Phases</u>	<u>Defined by the SRSG</u>	<u>Applicable to mil persons</u>
a. Phase-1	Precautionary (Movements restricted to essential activities)	Op NIKE GREEN, YELLOW and may be Op HECTOR.
b. Phase-2	Restricted movements (All movements to be restricted)	NIKE RED
c. Phase-3	Relocation (Persons, to the extent property relocated to conc centres in anticipation of evac)	NIKE RED
d. Phase-4	Programme suspension (Regular ops can not continue, all non essential persons evac)	JASON GREEN, YELLOW ALFA and BRAVO
e. Phase-5	Evac (All ops halted and all persons evac)	JASON YELLOW CHARLIE and JASON RED.

26. It is for info and neccessary action please.

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Maj
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Distribution List:

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G 3 Liaison	13
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Info

INDBATT	20
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(16)

28 Dec 94

6464.0/OPS

See Distribution

SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS - OP RETOUR

References:

- A. UNAMIR 3000.15 OPS dated 23 Dec 94.
- B. UNAMIR 3000.15 OPS dated 21 Dec 94.
- C. Z 723 Sheet 40 BUTARE, Ed 1, 1:50,000.
- D. Z 723 Sheet 31 GIKONGORO Ed 1, 1:50,000.
- E. Z 723 Sheet 17 KIGALI Ed 1, 1: 50,000.
- F. Z 723 Sheet 23 GITARAMA Ed 1, 1: 50,000.
- G. Z 723 Sheet 26 KIBUNGO Ed 1, 1 : 50,000.

1. GENERAL

a. Since the outbreak of the conflict in RWANDA, it is estimated that one million refugees are still in GOMA and BUKAVU in ZAIRE. Besides, about 1.9 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) are occupying various camps within the country. Most of these camps are located in the southern part of the country.

b. The return of these refugees especially the IDPs to their various homes/communes has been the top priority for UNAMIR.

1 of 8

The experience drawn from OP HOMEWARD revealed that the successful return of IDPs/refugees is dependent or predicated on the security situation prevalent in their homes/communes. Accordingly, all efforts are on deck to ensure that adequate security is provided at the homes/communes to encourage the DPS to return. Essentially, OP RETOUR is an expanded form of OP HOMEWARD.

2. MISSION. The MILOB GP HQ is to conduct security operations in conjunction with armed contingents to facilitate the return of IDPs to their various homes/communes.

3. EXECUTION

a. Gen Outline. The operation will be conducted in 3 phases.

(1) Phase I

(a) The preparation of home communes.

(b) Information campaign in target camps.

(c) The establishment of conditions within the camps which are conducive to voluntary vacation.

(2) Phase II

(a) Processing of IDPs through registration, screening and searching procedures in marshalling areas.

(b) The safe movement of IDPs to ORCs/home communes.

(3) Phase III. Establishment of IDPs in their home communes.

b. Gp and Tasks(1) MILOB SECTOR 1

(a) Detach to under comd effective 28 Dec 94 to Sector 4A - One MILOB team.

(b) Phase I. Continue with the present tasks.

(c) Phases II and III. Be prepared to support Sectors 2, 6 and 3 on orders.

(2) MILOB SECTOR 2. No change.

(a) Phase I. Continue to prepare the home communes for the return of DPs through liaison with the Civil Authorities, RPA, NGOs and UN Agencies in your AOR.

(b) Phase II

i. Monitor the security situation of the Open Relief Centres (ORCs) and the home communes.

ii. provide MILOB escort to the various ORCs and home communes within you AOR. (Annex A to Ref A).

(c) Phase III. Continue to monitor the security situation within the home communes on routine or continuous basis.

(3) MILOB SECTOR 3. Sector HQ to act as the coord HQ of the operations for MILOB GP HQ.

(a) Phase I

i. Continue to prepare targeted home communes for the return of DPs through liaison with the civil authorities, RPA, NGOs within your AOR.

ii. Monitor the security situation of the home communes.

(b) Phase II.

i. Provide MILOB escort for the movement IDPs to ORCs home communes and those on transit through your AOR.

ii. Continue to monitor the security of the ORCs, marshalling areas within your AOR.

(See Annex A to Ref A)

iii. Monitor the security of OWS locs.

iv. Provide continuous liaison with civil authorities, RPA, UN Agencies and NGOs.

(c) Phase III. Continue to monitor the security and conditions of IDPs in their home communes.

(4) MILOB SECTOR 4A

(a) Under Comd effective - One team from 29 Dec 94 until further notice. Sector 1 and 4C.

(b) Phase I

i. Continue to monitor the security situation of targeted camps within your AOR (Annex A to Ref A).

ii. Monitor and provide security in conjunction with armed contingents in the home communes and ORCs.

(c) Phase II.

i. Monitor and provide security in conjunction with armed tps within the marshalling areas and ORCs.

ii. Provide MILOB escort for convoys leading to ORCs, home communes and those in transit to Sector 3.

iii. Provide continuous liaison with the Govt authorities, UN Agencies, NGOs and RPA.

(d) Phase III. Continue to provide routine monitoring of remaining Camps.

(5) MILOB SECT 4B

(a) No Change.

(b) Phases I, II & III

i. Continue to perform present tasks.

ii. Be prepared to support MILOB Sectors 4A and 3 on order.

(6) MILOB SECT 4C

(a) Det to under comd - One MILOB Team.
MILOB Sect 4A wef 290900B

(b) Phases I, II & III

i. Continue to perform present tasks.

- ii. Be prepared to support MILOB Sectors 4A and 3 on order.

(7) MILOB SECT 5

(a) No change.

(b) Phases I, II & III

- i. Continue to perform present tasks.
- ii. Be prepared to support Sectors 6, 2 and 3 on order.

(8) MILOB SECT 6

(a) No Change.

- (b) i. Phase I. Continue to perform present tasks.
- ii. Phase II. Additional to Phase I tasks.

aa. Monitor the security situation within your AOR.

bb. Provide liaison with Civil Authorities, RPA, UN Agencies and NGOs within your AOR.

cc. Provide MILOB Escorts for DPs in conjunction with armed troops transiting to South KIGALI (NGENDA, GASHORA and KASENZE).

dd. Co-ord with Comd MILOB Sect 2 for the appropriate hand-over/take-over points.

c. Co-ordinating Instrs

(1) Timings

- (a) D Day. 29 Dec 94.

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- (b) D Day to D + 14 (29 Dec 94 to 12 Jan 95). Move from CAYNIKA Camp to (Sect 4A N).
- (c) D + 4 to D + 19 (02 Jan 95 to 17 Jan 95). Move from RUKONDO Camp (Sect 4A N).
- (d) Mov Timings for other Camps. See Para 3C Reference A.
- (e) Daily Timings. Daily timings will be communicated to all participants through Tac HQ - BUTARE.
- (f) Schedule. See Annex B Ref A.
- (g) ORCs. The first 12 ORCs to be established for target camps at CYANIKA are as follows:

i. SOUTH KIGALI - NGENDA, GASHORA, KASENZE.

ii. BUTARE - RUNYINYA, GESHAMVU, KIGEMBE, NAKIZU.

iii. GITARAMA - NTONGWE, MASANGO, MURAMA, NGOMA.

iv. KIBUNGO - SAKE.

(h) Additional to the daily SITREP, MILOBS Sectors 2, 6, 3 and 4A to forward weekly review/summary of OP RETOUR to MILOB GP HQ.

(i) Special incidents should be reported imm to MILOB GP HQ.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT

a. Vehs. Sectors to utilize organic vehs. In addition to Sector vehs Sect 4A will receive two vehs and Sect 3 one veh (on loan) for the operation.

b. Feeding. Under private arrangement. MILOBs are to be self-sufficient.

c. Dress. No change.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNALS

a. Locs

- (1) MILOB GP HQ. No change.
- (2) MILOB Sect 3 HQ. Co-located with TAC HQ - BUTARE.
- (3) TAC HQ. BUTARE.
- (4) F HQ. No change.

b. Comms. No change.



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Col
DCMO

Distribution:		Copy No	Incl Ref A
MILOB SECT	1	1	
	2	2	
	3	3	
	4A	4	
	4B	5	
	4C	6	
	5	7	
	6	8	
SMPO		9	
SLOGO		10	
F HQ		11	(Less Ref A)
DFC/CMO		12	(Less Ref A)
Spare		13 - 14	

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FORCE HQ
Kigali

3000.15 (OPS)

23 Dec 94

See Distribution

SUBJECT: SECURITY INSTRUCTION-OP RETOUR.

References:

- A. Z723 Sheet 40 BUTARE, Ed 1 1:50,000
- B. Z723 Sheet 31 GIKO GORO, Ed 1, 1:50,000
- C. Z723 Sheet 17 KIGALI, Ed 1, 1:50,000
- D. Z723 Sheet 23 GITARAMA Ed 1, 1:50,000
- E. Z723 Sheet 26 KIBUNGO Ed 1, 1:50000
- F. 3000.15/1/OPS dated 21 Dec 94.

1 GENERAL

a. The recent conflict in RWANDA has resulted in the displacement of approximately 3 million people from their homes. It is estimated that there are 1.1 million refugees in the areas of GOMA and BUKAVU in ZAIRE. The refugee camps in these areas are controlled by military/militia elements of the former Rwandan government which sees the continuing existence of these camps as a way of maintaining their political power base. There are an additional 1.9 million displaced persons within RWANDA. Most of these DPs are concentrated in camps in the South West of the country in Sector 4. DP camps have been used as operating bases for former government militia elements to carry out attacks within RWANDA.

b. The return of the refugees to their homes will help to break the hold that the former government has over the people in GOMA and BUKAVU, improve the security situation in the border areas and assist in the normalisation of RWANDA.

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SECRET

c. The DPs need to be returned to their homes in order to reduce the power of the militia in the camps and to reduce the number of attacks that are carried out in the vicinity of the camps.

d. In order that both the refugees and DPs can return home there needs to be assurances that their home communes are safe to return to, the people need to be separated from the military and militia elements of the former regime to prevent intimidation.

e. Op RETOUR therefore is planned for the return of IDPs and refugees to their Home Communes. The initial effort of Op RETOUR will be concentrated on IDPs in the Prefecture of GIKONGORO to their Home Communes principally in the Prefectures of GITARAMA, BUTARE and South KIGALI.

2. MSN. UNAMIR to assist in provision of acceptable security environment in conjunction with resources of the RPA.

3. EXECUTION.

a. General Outline. UNAMIR will ensure provision of security in three phases supported by RPA/Officials of Government and NGOs.

(1) Phase I.

- a) The preparation of Home Communes.
- (b) Information Campaign in target camps.
- (c) The establishment of conditions in the camps which are conducive to voluntary vacation.

(2) Phase II.

- (a) Processing of IDPs through registration, screening and searching procedures in marshalling areas.
- (b) The safe movement of IDPs to ORCs/Home Communes.

(3) Phase III. Establishment of IDPs in their Home Communes.

b. Gp and Tasks.

(1) Tac HQ.

(a) Phase I.

i. Gp - No change.

ii. Tasks.

aa. Assist UNREO, UN Agencies and NGOs in coordination of Op RETOUR.

ab. Advice contributing organisations of the level of help that could be expected from formed tps.

ac. Liaise with Prefects and Bourgmestres to ensure adequate security coverage is being provided.

ad. Liaise with the RPA and work out modalities.

ae. Inform HQ UNAMIR of the progress of Open Relief Centres(ORCs).

(b) Phase II.

i. Gp - No change.

ii. Tasks.

aa. Continue the tasks of Phase 1.

ab. Assist all contributing organisations to achieve their tasks.

ac. In concert with UNREO, brief Prefects and Bourgmestres on recurring problems and seek Govt approved solutions.

ad. Increased liasion with the RPA for creation of required security environment.

(c) Phase III. No Change.

(2) ZAMBATT.

(a) Phase I.

i. Gp - No Change

ii Tasks.

aa. Prevent intimidation and harassment of IDPs in camps by extremists within Sector.

ab. Enhance confidence amongst the camp population.

ac. Encourage voluntary relocation to Home Communes.

(b) Phase II.

i. Gp - 1 x Coy.

ii. Tasks. On order:

aa. Provide security of Coy. str at target camps in AOR during the period when they are to be vacated. This may include pre-registration. (see Annex A).

ab. Provide security at Marshalling area in target camps in AOR, in consultation with RPA and UNREO.

ac. Provide security to Overnight Way Stations(OWS) located within AOR (to be specified later).

ad. Provide escort of a half section str for each convoy from the IDP camps to the destination communes/Open Relief Centres(ORCs) < see Annex A>.

ae. Provide an RRF of pl str when any convoy is transiting through AOR.

af. Assist UNHCR and other UN Agencies in organisation of Marshalling areas within AOR.

ag. Liaise with the RPA.

(c) Phase III. Gp and Tasks - No Change.

(3) GHANBATT

(a) Phase I.

i. Gp - No Change.

ii Tasks.

aa. Prevent intimidation and harassment of IDPs in camps by extremists within Sector.

ab. Enhance confidence amongst the camp population.

ac. Encourage voluntary relocation to Home Communes.

ad. Provide security of a sect strength for Home Communes/ORCs located within AOR (see Annex A).

ae. Provide security at IDP camps loc at KIZI, MUGANO, KARAMBI, BUHORO, BUSANGE with a pl size force at each camp.

(b) Phase II.

i. Gp - 1x Coy.

ii. Tasks.

aa. Provide security of coy str at target camps (See Annex A).

ab. Provide security at Marshalling area in target camps within AOR.

ac. Provide security to OWS located within AOR (to be specified later).

ad. Provide escort of a half section str for each convoy from the IDP camps to the destination communes/ORCs (Annex A).

ae. Provide an RRF of pl str when any convoy is transiting through AOR.

af. Provide security of sect str for Home

Commune/ORCs located within AOR in Sector 2.

ag. Maintain a presence in target camp within AOR during the period when they are being vacated.

ah. Assist UNHCR and other UN Agencies in the organisation of marshalling areas within sector.

ai. Liaise with the RPA.

(c) Phase III. Reduce the conditions for violence in Home Communes within sector during the community reintegration process.

(4) SECTOR 3.

(a) Phase I.

i Gp - No Change

ii Tasks.

aa. Provide security in the Home Communes in AOR. (Annex A)

ab. Provide security to OWS loc at BUTARE.

ac. Provide escort of min half sect str for each convoy from the IDP camps to the destination Communes/ORCs in RUNYINYA, GESHAMVU, KIGEMBI, NIARIZU, NTONGWE, MASANGO, MURAMA, and KIGOMA.

ad. Provide an RRF of a pl str when any DP convoy is transiting through AOR.

(b) Phase II. No change.

(c) Phase III. Provide security of sect str for Home Commune/ORCs located within AOR (Annex A).

(5) INDBATT.

(a) Phase I. Gp and Tasks - No change from present tasks.

(b) Phase II.

i. Gp - No change.

ii. Provide security to OWS in KIGALI.

iii. Provide an RRF of a pl str when any convoy is transiting through AOR.

iiii. Liaise with RPA for guarding KIGALI OWS.

(c) Phase III. Be prep to rft with pl size elm in sect 2 & 3 on order.

(6) FRAFBATT.

(a) Phase I. Gp and Tasks - No change from present tasks.

(b) Phase II.

i. Gp - No change.

ii. Tasks. Be prepared to reinforce Sectors 4, 3 and 2 on order.

(c) Phase III. Be prepared to reinforce Sectors 4, 3 and 2 on order.

(7) ETHIOBATT.

(a) Phase I. Gp and Tasks - No change from present tasks.

(b) Phase II.

i. Gp - No change.

ii. Tasks. Be prepared to reinforce Sectors 4A, 3, and 2 on order.

(c) Phase III. No Change (As per para (7b)).

(8) TUNBATT.

(a) Phase I. Gp and Tasks - No change from present tasks.

(b) Phases II and III.

i. Gp - No change.

ii. Tasks. Be prepared to reinforce Sectors 3, 4A, and 2 on order.

(9) NICOY.

(a) Phase I.

i. Gp - No Change

ii Tasks - No Change.

(b) Phases II and III.

i. Gp - No change.

ii. Tasks. Be prepared to reinforce Sectors 2, 3, and 4A on order.

(10) MILOB GP HQ.

(a) Phase I.

i. Gp - As deemed necessary.

ii. Tasks - Motivate DP population in target camps to return to Home Communes / ORCs.

(b) Phase II.

i. Gp - No Change

ii. Tasks.

aa. Monitor target camps during evacuation of DPs(Annex A and B)

ab. Escort IDP convoys from target camps to ORCs/ Home communes in conjunction with formed troops and RPA.

(c) Phase III.

i. Tasks.

aa. Assist in commune ntis

ab. Monitor security situation of home communes and resettled IDPs.

(11) Force Engr Coy.

(a) Phase I.

i. Gp - 1 Engr Coy

ii Tasks - Assist in the prep and repair of BUSORO bridge GR 9547.

(b) Phases II and III. No change.

(12) CIVPOL. - All phases.

(a) Gp - No change.

(b) Tasks Assist in commune security.

(13) G3 AIR OPS - Provide heli sp for ptl, recon, liaison and AME.

(14) CLO. All phases.

(a) Gp. No change.

(b) Tasks

i. Coord liaison especially with the RPA and ensure all allotted tasks are carried out.

ii. Provide required no of interpreters to units and HQ on order.

(15) HAC. Brief and coord the activities of the NGOs.

(16) PAFFO All phases.

(a) Gp. No Change.

(b) Tasks.

aa. Prepare proactive PR campaign aimed at promoting sy climate in the communes highlighting RPA and UNAMIR presence and presence of NGOs.

ab. Prepare appropriate handouts to be distributed in the various target camps and Home Communes giving necessary details of the

op.

(17) RPA.

(a) Phase I.

i. Gp - As required.

ii. Tasks.

aa. Prevent intimidation and harassment of IDPs in target camps by extremists (Annex A).

ab. Enhance confidence amongst target camp population.

ac. Encourage voluntary relocation to Home Communes.

ad. Contribute to information campaign in target camp and Home Communes.

ae. Create confidence within camp and Home Commune populations.

af. Liaise with Bourgmestres, UN Agencies, NGOs and UNAMIR in Home Communes to work out the modalities of the op.

(b) Phase II.

i. Gp - As required.

ii. Tasks.

aa. Establish secure conditions in target camps prior to operation.

ab. Screen and search all IDPs prior to boarding of transport/foot columns.

ac. Escort convoys/foot columns in conjunction with UNAMIR tps from target camps to Home Communes (through OWS, where required).

ad. Ensure that IDPs are not required to submit to further searching and screening once under escort.

(c) Phase III.

- i. Provide secure environment in Home Communes.
- ii. Liaise with Bourgmestres, UN Agencies, NGOs and UNAMIR in Home Communes.
- iii. Provide route security for coys from target camps to ORCs/Home Communes.

c. COORD INSTRS.

(1) Timings.

- (a) D-Day - 29 Dec 94.
- (b) D-Day to D+14 (29 Dec to 12 Jan 95) - Move from CYANIKA camp (Sector 4AN).
- (c) D+4 to D+19 (02 Jan 95 to 17 Jan 95) - Move from RUKONDO camp (Sector 4AN).
- (d) D+14 to D+24 (12 Jan 95 to 23 Jan 95) - Move from KIZI, KINAZI, MUSANO, KANYINA, NYASISUYA, KARAMBI, BUHORO, GISUNZA and NYAMIRA camps.
- (e) D+19 to D+34 (17 Jan 95 to 01 Feb 95) - Move from KIBEHO camp (Sector 4AS).
- (f) D+29 to D+39 (27 Jan 95 to 06 Feb 95) - Move from NDAGO camp (Sector 4AS).
- (g) D+39 to D+43 (06 Feb to 10 Feb 95) - Move from MUNINI camp (Sector 4AS).
- (h) D+43 to D+47 (10 Feb 95 to 14 Feb 95) - Move from KARANA camp.
- (i) D+47 to D+49 (14 Feb 95 to 16 Feb 95) - Move from BUSANZE camp (Sector 3A).
- (j) D+49 to D + 53 (16 Feb 95 to 20 Feb 95) - Move from MUSABEYA camp.
- (k) D+29 to D+59 (27 Jan 95 to 26 Feb 95 and beyond) - Move of refugees.

(l) Refugees. It is hoped to begin the move of refugees from D+30. Details of this part of Op RETOUR will be promulgated later.

(m) Modifications. The schedule is subject to modifications. If camp populations are greater than predicted or if the rate of vacation is constrained by other factors, additional days may be required to vacate the camps.

(n) Daily Timings. Daily timings for the schedule will be promulgated locally through meetings at Tac HQ as is currently the case for Op HOMEWARD. Tac HQ is responsible for informing units in the AORs concerned of the necessary adjustments to their timings.

(2) Schedule. See Annex B.

(3) ORCs. ORCs are listed at Annex A. This list will be updated as information becomes available. The first twelve ORCs to be established for the target camp at CYANIKA and which will be fully operational by D-3 are in the Communes of:

(a) South KIVU - NGENDA, GASHORA, KANSENZE.

(b) BUTARE - RUNYINA, GESHMAVU, KIGEMBI, NAKIZU.

(c) GITRAMA - NTONGWE, MASANGO, MURAMA, NIGOMA.

(d) KIBUNGO - SAKE.

(4) MOVEMENT. Initial movement will be by vehicles. Earlier camps on the schedule have large populations beyond easy foot travelling distance and these will be transported by bus and trucks. At later stages of the move, as momentum increases and as camp populations have shorter distances to travel, much greater movement on foot will take place. Movement will be coordinated by WFP with IOM and UNAMIR transport support.

(5) Special Instrs.

(a) Camps security to commence by 28 Dec 94.

(b) OWS and ORCs will be secured by 28 Dec 94.

4. ADMIN AND LOGISTICS.

a. Tpt. UNAMIR will provide tpt assets to support Op RETOUR as follows:

(1). First Line Tpt. First Line tpt to be provided by

the following:

- (a). CANCON. 6 X TCVs.
- (b). ZAMBATT. 9 X TCVs.
- (c). GHANBATT. 5 X TCVs.
- (d). ETHIOBATT. 2 X TCVs.
- (e). TUNBATT. 4 X TCVs.
- (f). INDBATT. 5 X TCVs.
- (g). NICOY. 3 X TCVs.
- (h). AUSMED. 2 X TCVs.

(2). Reporting. First line tpt reporting are to be coordinated by Tac HQ.

(3). Agencies and NGOs. Agencies and NGOs will provide all available tpt to support Op RETOUR.

b. Feeding.

(1) Units. Units are to be self-contained for feeding.

(2). IDPs. The feeding of IDPs will be coordinated by UNREO at the Commune level. Food distribution to IDPs for a two week period will be effected in conjunction with WFP/CRS/ICRC targeted distribution.

c. Ammunition. As per SOPs.

d. ROE. State GREEN. See Annex E for other legal issues.


e. Dress. Normal.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Tac HQ. Tac HQ will be the coordinating UNAMIR HQ for Op RETOUR.

b. Convoy Escort. Escorting units are to provide radio communications with each convoy. FSO is to establish and issue procedure for escort communications through other AORs.

6. Ack.


HK ANYIDOHO
Brig Gen
Acting Force Commander

Annexes:

- A. List of Target camps/ ORCs and Home Communes.
- B. Schedule of Op RETOUR.
- C. Principles for settling IDPs.
- D. Open Relief Centres - Method of operation.
- E. Legal issues for Op RETOUR

Distribution:

External:

Action:

Copy No.

ETHIOBATT	1
FRAFBATT	2
ZAMBATT	3
GHANBATT	4
TUNBATT	5
INDBATT	6
NICOY	7
SECTOR 2	8
SECTOR 3	9
Force Provost Marshall	10
COO Tac HQ	11
G4	12
Force Engr	13
G3 Plans	14
CANSIGS	15
AUSMED	16
CIVPOL	17
CHAO	18
HRFO	19
FSO	20
CLO	21
G3 AIR	22
PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFR	23
IOC	24
RPA LO	25

Internal:

Information:

FC	26
DFC	27
COS	28
DCOS (OPS)	29
DCOS (SP)	30
FMO	31
G2	32
CAO	33
CSS	34
C Log O	35
G1	36

OP RETOUR - ORC DESTINATIONS

CAMP	PREFECTURE	ORC/COMMUNE
CYANIKA	South Kigali	Open from D-3 (26 Dec) <u>Ngenda</u> <u>Gashora</u> Kanzenze
	Butare	Runyinya Geshamvu Kigembi Niakazu
	Gitarama	Ntongwe Masango Murama Kigoma
	Kibungo	Sake
RUKHONDO	All of the above + Butare	Open from D + 2 (31 Dec) All of the above + Muyira Ntyazo Nyabisundu
	Gikongoro	Musango Rukhondo (to be activated only when camp has closed)

This list will be updated as time progresses. Planning for subsequent camps on the Schedule, and their ORCs, is currently being carried out.

OP RETOUR - PHASE 2 SCHEDULE

CAMP/DAYS FROM D	0	+5	+10	+15	+20	+25	+30	+35	+40	+45	+50	+55
CYANIKA (27,000)												
RUHKONDO (50,000)												
KIZI (2,500)												
KINAZI (2,500)												
MUGANO (3,000)												
KANYINYA ((4,000)												
NYASISUYA (1,000)												
KARAMBI (2,000)												
SUHOHO (3,000)												
GISUNZA (3,500)												
NYAMIRA (1,500) (Note 1)												
KIBEHO (75,000) (Note 2)												
NDAGO (55,000)												
MUNINI (12,000)									43			
KARANA (21,000)									43	47		
BUSANZE (9,000)										47-9		
MUSABEYA (14,000)										49	53	

Notes:

All these smaller camps scheduled on a concurrent basis.

From-D+20 movement figures assumed to double from 3,000 per day to 6,000 per day.

PRINCIPLES FOR SETTLING
THE
INTERNALLY DISPLACED

Stability, security and development are objectives of tantamount importance to the people of Rwanda, their Government and the international community. Fundamental to these objectives is the return of hundreds of thousands of Rwandese who are displaced within their own nation. Towards this specific goal, the Government with the support of the international community will intensify its efforts to settle the displaced in an expeditious and humane manner. In pursuing this immediate goal, the Government and the international community are determined to ensure that the principles set out below will underpin all their efforts:

Immediate Objectives

1. The immediate objective of the Government and international community is to have the internally displaced people of Rwanda return home with dignity and in conditions of safety and security.
2. In ensuring that these immediate objectives are upheld, it is agreed that there be:
 - i. Total Political Endorsement. All plans established to support the IDP operation will have the full support and active cooperation of the Government of Rwanda;
 - ii. No Enforced Camp Closure. Camps will not be forcibly closed. That said, an environment in which the people are motivated to leave voluntarily will be created;
 - iii. Initial Operations to Create Confidence. It is essential to build confidence amongst the displaced population and momentum in the operation. Therefore from the very outset full attention must be given to ensuring success along these lines;
 - iv. Secure Environment. Conditions in the Home Communes will be established to create a secure environment and provide essential social services which attract people home from the camps;
 - v. Confidence Building. Confidence building measures, primarily concerning security and information dimensions, will be essential;

vi. Impartial Information. Information promulgated as part of confidence building measures must be impartial;

vii. Return in Safety. All effort must be made to ensure that people return in safety. While ensuring this principle, the Government maintains the right to bring to justice, consistent with the due process of law, those accused of perpetrating genocide;

viii. Cooperation. The success of the operation will require the full cooperation of all contributing organisations, within the scope of their mandates;

vi. Flexibility. All plans developed to support the settlement of IDPs must be flexible and lend themselves to modification. Mechanisms must be in place to ensure that any adjustments take place in a way that fulfills the aforementioned principles both at the policy and implementation levels.

OPEN RELIEF CENTRES

1. The concept of Open Relief Centres (ORC) has been established to address the fundamental concerns of Internally Displaced Persons and the recipient communities, ensuring the re-integration of IDPs while maintaining the security and dignity of both groups. The ORC is a temporary place where displaced persons on the move and other returnees as well as locals in vulnerable conditions can freely enter or leave and obtain essential relief assistance in a relatively safe environment.
2. Open Relief Centres will be set up in accordance and in phase with local conditions and requirements in Rwanda. The ORC, are transit points, in the home communes, for IDP's returning to their homes. They are to facilitate immediate re-integration, through the provision of basic food items, seeds and construction materials, and by increasing confidence in law and order in the home communes. At the same time Quick Impact Project will promote rehabilitation of the country, at the communal level.
3. Material assistance provided through the ORC's in the home communes is aimed at re-integration, and will be phased out; dependency must be avoided.
4. The actors in setting up Open Relief Centres will be UNHCR (set-up and protection), WFP (food), UNICEF (water and sanitation), WHO (health), UNAMIR (security), UNHCR (protection), NGOs and local authorities. Each ORC will be managed by a designated NGO or UN Agency. Information gathering and dissemination will come under the responsibility of UNREO. Overall coordination will take place in the context of the Integrated Humanitarian Operations Centre framework, in close cooperation with the Ministry of Rehabilitation.

ORC components

a. Food distribution

Food needs are best covered by food (for work) programmes, distributions of food or rations at the commune level. Sustained direct distribution at the ORC-site should be avoided so as to not have concentration of foodstuffs at one location nor provide an incentive for people to stay at the ORCs. One-off distribution to IDPs for a two week period will be effected in conjunction with WFP/CRS/ICRC targeted distributions. (half rations/250grms/person/day)

Once IDPs leave the ORCs for their homes, they should be absorbed to the ongoing food, seeds and tools, distributions in the communes.

b. Temporary shelter

Ideally, ORCs would be considered a temporary solution limited in time (3-10 days), while the local authorities find an acceptable temporary, or preferably durable solution for those whose homes are either occupied or need repairs. It will be forbidden to build huts at the ORC's. Construction materials will be made judiciously available in the vicinity of the ORC to targeted populations in order for people to instantly work on rebuilding their houses. For planning purposes, plastic sheeting for one out of four families will be made available in each ORC.

c. Health

Ideally people in transit at the ORCs needing medical assistance should be referred to the health system in place at the commune level. Where such structures are inadequate NGOs or the appropriate UN Agency will be given the responsibility of supplying such services.

d. Water and sanitation

Access to a water source or water availability will be one of the criteria to determine the ORC location. These should be simple latrines; For planning purposes 1 pit latrines per 50 IDPs.

e. Transport

It is considered advisable to have transport facilities available at the ORCs, for people who cannot reach their secteur on foot (distance too big, disabled persons etc.).

f. Protection

Protection is one of the key issues of the ORCs. The protection role will be taken care of by UNHCR and UNHR in close collaboration with local authorities. It is considered important to register the IDPs on arrival to the centre, so as to monitor further events. UNHCR/UNHR or ICRC in principle will ensure presence in each of the ORCs.

Local residents as well as IDP's having returned to their homes, can contact the local authorities and the ORC in case of security problems in their home areas, including tensions over house occupation etc. In such cases admission and emergency shelter may be granted on a case by case basis. Solutions will then be found by, and in cooperation with the local authorities, including the gendarmerie or army as required.

The local authorities have at all times access to the ORC's in order to promote confidence etc.

The ORC's should not be a sanctuary for persons having committed crimes. Local law enforcement agents, including army personnel if duty authorized, can enter the ORC to arrest persons, if it can be demonstrated that substantiated suspicions against such persons exists. Arrests can in principle only be made in the presence of UN or ICRC official unless there is an emergency situation (risk of escape, genuine threat to the security of others, etc). The law enforcement agents will sign, at the ORC, for any arrest made, and family members, the ICRC and the UNHCR will have access to the person concerned.

LEGAL ISSUES FOR OP RETOUR

References:

- A. Resolution 925 dated 8 Jun 94
- B. Operational Directive No 2: Rules of Engagement dated 6 Oct 94
- C. FC Directive on Legal Jurisdiction Applicable to UNAMIR and Rwandan Authorities dated 3 Nov 94

Introduction

1. UNAMIR troops will be required to provide security to displaced persons and NGOs taking part in OP Retour. It is therefore essential that soldiers be briefed by their commanders as to what their legal rights and obligations are during the OP.

Rules of Engagement

2. Reference A states that the mandate of UNAMIR is to contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda and to provide security and support to humanitarian relief operations. This mandate and its legal ramifications are reflected in Reference B. All UNAMIR troops are to follow the ROE as stated in Reference B.

3. To achieve the above mandate and to comply with the Rules of Engagement (ROE), soldiers should be aware that their orders allow them to protect themselves, other UNAMIR troops, displaced persons and other civilians at risk (including humanitarian aid workers and UN personnel) from a hostile intent and/or hostile act.

4. To afford this protection a soldier is entitled to use minimum force to stop a serious offence from being committed against any of the aforementioned categories of people. A serious offence is defined as murder, rape or serious bodily harm.

5. If extremist individual(s) are intimidating or harassing IDPs from leaving the camps, UNAMIR troops are to use minimum force to separate the extremist(s) from the general population of IDPs. The use of force is to be consistent with the constraints stated in Reference B.

Handling Detainees

6. Rwandan nationals should only be detained if they commit a hostile act, display a hostile intent or carry out any of the acts referred to in Reference B, paragraph 8. The detainee(s) and any relevant evidence is to be handed at the earliest opportunity to the Fce MP.

7. The Fce MP are to hand over any detainee at the earliest opportunity to the local Office of the Prosecutor in accordance with Reference C.

8. UNAMIR soldiers are reminded that all detainees are to be treated humanely, ensuring that they are provided with food, drinking water and that they are afforded safeguards in terms of health; hygiene and protection against the rigours of climate and dangers of armed conflict.

UN CONFIDENTIAL
MILOB GP HQ

12

TO : FORCE HQ (OPS)
ALL MILOB SECTORS

DATE: 21 DEC 94

FROM : DCMO
MILOB GP HQ

REF: 6465/OPS/MILOBS

INFO : FC
DFC/CMO

SUBJECT: AFTER ACTION REPORT - OP HOPE

1. Please find herewith attached an After Action Report on 'OP HOPE' containing 11 pages.
2. This letter may please be down graded to UNCLAS after detaching the contents.
3. Best Regards.



MOEEN U AHMED
Col
DCMO

UN CONFIDENTIAL

UN CONFIDENTIAL
MILOB GP HQ

OP HOPE
AFTER ACTION REPORT

GENERAL

1. Over the recent past, there have been continuous reports of spurts of criminal activities by some threat forces in KIBEHO and NDAGO refugee camps located in Sector 4A. By virtue of these unlawful acts, these threat elements had begun tarnishing the good and noble work of UNAMIR, NGOs and Humanitarian agencies working hand in glove for peace and stability in RWANDA. Therefore, in response to this internal threat, UNAMIR in coordination with RPA , took up the onus to carry out 'OP HOPE' from 14 to 16 Dec 94. It was the maiden operation of such magnitude undertaken by UNAMIR and its outcome truly reinforced an age old ethos of UN, ie "Unity in Diversity".

AIM

2. The aim of 'OP HOPE' was to clear KIBEHO and NDAGO camps of criminal elements and in that MILOB GP was to remain in a supporting role to the formed troops.

PARTICIPATION

3. A total of 79 MILOBs participated alongside 1473 troops and staff. Also, two RPA battalions took active part in this operation. Acting Force Commander/CMO had established his Tac HQ at KIBEHO and commanded/conducted the operation. His participation on the ground gave impetus to the operation. The details of MILOB participation are as follows:

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- a. HQ MILOB GP. 5 Officers including DCMO.
- b. Sector 1. Total three MILOB teams out of which one team was placed under command Nigerian Company and two teams placed under Sector 3 as reserves located at BUTARE.
- c. Sector 2. Total three MILOB teams; one team under command company ex ZAMBATT and two teams placed under command Sector 3 as reserves located in BUTARE.
- d. Sector 3. Total three MILOB teams besides the Sector Comd and four MILOBs to establish and man the alternate MILOB Tactical HQ at BUTARE. These three MILOB teams were located at KIBEHO and placed under command the MILOB Tactical HQ.
- e. Sector 4A. Total three MILOB teams, all placed under command GHANBATT.
- f. Sector 4B. One MILOB team placed under command company ex FRAFBATT.
- g. Sector 4C. Total three MILOB teams, all under command ETHIOBATT.
- h. Sector 5. Total three MILOB teams all under command TUNBATT.
- j. Sector 6. Total three MILOB teams all placed on one hour's notice at KIGALI.

TASKS OF MILOBS

- 4. The MILOB GP HQ was tasked to establish a MILOB Tactical HQ at KIBEHO, to be co-located with the Force HQ. Also an

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alternate MILOB tactical HQ was to be established and manned at BUTARE. The tasks that were assigned to the MILOBs operating under command contingents included the following:

- a. Perform MILOB tasks assigned by respective contingent commanders.
- b. To monitor all activities and security situation within own area of operation.
- c. To inform MILOB Tac HQ of the situation on the assigned objectives to their force elements.
- d. Continuous reporting on the progress of operations.
- e. Report any violation of human rights.
- f. Provide liaison between UNAMIR troops and NGOs and civil authorities within own area of operations.
- g Submission of SITREP on 12-hour basis.
- h. Maintain post operation presence in KIBEHO and NDAGO camps and report situation.

CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

5. Mov to Assy Area. The assy area selected was BUTARE. The troops and the MILOBS participating in this operation assembled at BUTARE on 12 Dec 94. The logistics infrastructure catering for rations, water and POL was created at the Assy Area. Marrying up of MILOBs with their respective contingents took place. Selective recce of the objective area was carried out by certain key appointments holders. Confirmatory orders were issued at various

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levels. This phase of the operation passed off smoothly as planned.

6. Mov from Assembly Area to Camp Site. The move from the Assy area to the camp sites (objectives) was carried out over two routes, ie, BUTARE-GIKONGORO-KIBEHO (RED ROUTE) and BUTARE-KIBEHO (GREEN ROUTE), commencing 140015 hrs. The troops arrived at the release point at 140315 hrs. This phase of the operation was carried out smoothly and as per the time plan despite it involving movement of large convoy of vehicles over hilly terrain and during night on approximately 45 kms of unmetalled road.

7. Area To be Searched. The KIBEHO and NDAGO camps put together constituted an area of approximately five square kilometers. The whole area was divided into 11 distinct objectives. The distribution of the objectives for the purpose of the search was done as follows:

- a. TUNBATT - 1 & 3.
- b. GHANBATT - 2 & 8.
- c. ETHIOBATT - 4 & 6.
- d. FRAFBATT - 5 & 9.
- e. ZAMBATT - 7 & 10.
- f. INDIBATT - 11.

8. Search Operations. The troops commenced simultaneous search of these assigned objectives at 140530 hrs. RPA identification and liaison teams were integrated with the contingent down to platoon level. Force and MILOB Tactical HQ were co-located at KIBEHO and so were Advanced dressing Station under AUSMED and

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Detainee Processing Centre under CIVPOL and MP. Initially the search operation progressed slowly but later on it picked up the right momentum. The MILOB teams with each search party gave a continuous progress of operation over radio. The three MILOB teams earmarked as reserves at KIBEHO were tasked to carry out patrolling on the entire area and monitor the activities in the Detainee Processing Centre. The Force Tactical HQ was constantly kept informed of the MILOBs' reports. The complete operation was carried out with true professional zeal and military finesse which helped prevent any untoward incident. Finally, at 141700 hrs, the search ended on completion of the task. The whole operation resulted in the arrest of 43 potential criminals and confiscation of following weapons:

- a. Machetes - 810.
- b. Spears - 58.
- c. Axes - 190.
- d. Bayonets - 4.
- e. 7.62 rounds - 21.
- f. Magazines - 1.
- g. Swords - 5
- h. Knives - 214.
- j. Harpoons - 16.
- k. Sickles - 10.

9. De-Induction. The de-induction of troops from the camp

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sites commenced at 150800 hrs. Five MILOB teams were left behind for maintaining post operation presence and to monitor the situation.

LESSONS LEARNT

10. A deep peep down memory lane of military history would reveal that many battles have been lost by strong armies just because their commanders ignored the valuable lessons they learnt from their previous battles. During OP HOPE, many important military lessons have been re-validated. The aim here has been to avoid any surgical approach to the retrospection but reviewing to embed certain important military issues involved in this operation which ensured success.

a. Planning and Preparatory Stage.

(1) Need for Detailed Planning. In an operation of this magnitude and that too conducted by a unified force of heterogenous characteristics, there is an over-riding need for planning into greater details. The objective area was quite vast, and therefore divided into 11 parts which automatically called for detailed planning, which was done meticulously.

(2) Intelligence Acquisition. P r o c e s s e d information about the objective much prior to the launching of the operation, is the key to success. Therefore, there is a need to evolve some kind of intelligence acquisition plan long before the launching of intended operation which would ensure coordination of intelligence effort.

(3) Secrecy. An operation of this nature needs absolute secrecy. The secrecy of this op was

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neutralised to a great extent. UNAMIR comprises not only force components but also various other agencies. Also, UN operations have always attracted the media. Therefore, utmost care should be exercised while conceiving such operations or else the outcome may prove disproportionate to the effort involved. Also, plans should be unfolded on need-to-know basis only. All personnel must handle operation-related documents with due vigilance.

(4) Liaison and Coordination. OP HOPE enticed the participation of force elements, MILOBs, staff at various levels, a few UN agencies and the RPA. A constant liaison and coordination was to be the order of the day. Commanders at various levels have to apply their minds to various contingencies and problem areas and thereafter endeavour to sort out arising nitty-gritties. Liaison and coordination was planned from the very beginning of the operation and was executed throughout the conduct of the operation.

(5) Intergration of Logistic Representatives. As the logistics infrastructure would always take time to create, re-establish or move, it is of prime importance to involve the logistics representatives right from the initial stages of the planning. This would enable them to plan and pre-position the logistic requirements at correct point of time and place. The only drawback worth mentioning in the operation is logistics. it could have been better if logisticians had given due importance after they had received the warning order.

(6) Detailed Briefing. Need for a detailed briefing requires no emphasis. The most effective way of

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amalgamating force elements of different nationalities with varying shades of training and weaponry into a single mould, enabling them to operate shoulder to shoulder would be by means of a detailed and thorough briefing by commanders at all levels.

(7) Need for Simple Plan. Plan should be as simple as possible. It is easy to execute a simple plan which also readily lends itself to any modification when need arises. Such need is further felt especially when troops with varied training backgrounds are involved together.

b. Move and Occupation of Assy Area.

(1) Guidance at Assy Areas. Proper arrangements for guidance while the troops arrive in the assy area would avoid confusion, save movement and result in rapid deployment.

(2) Recce of Objective Area. A controlled recce of the objective area while troops are in occupation of the assy area is a must. This will have to be done discreetly.

(3) Need for Minimising Movement. During OP HOPE, there was a large volume of unnecessary movement in BUTARE. This is totally uncalled for and may result in premature disclosure of our interest. Therefore, all ranks need to be educated about this. Establishing certain numbers of Traffic Check Posts and manned by MP personnel would help curtail all unnecessary movements.

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c. Conduct Stage.

(1) Flexibility of Plan. Though the plan should be made flexible, any last minute changes should be avoided since it will only result in confusion and fatigue.

(2) Correct Radio Procedure and Discipline. There were many outstations on Force as well as MILOB radio net. Everyone was operating concurrently and required to pass on information simultaneously too. Therefore, the knowledge of correct radio procedure and discipline is vital for smooth conduct.

(3) Human Rights Implications. OP HOPE was a delicate operation since it could attract a lot of human rights implications. It called for utmost care and attention while conducting a search, handling detainees or interrogating them. Any harsh treatment or deviation from the laid-down rules of the game could have tarnished the image of UNAMIR since the media would have blown the issue out of proportion.

RECOMMENDATIONS

11. Loc of HQ. During 'OP HOPE', the force and MILOB Tactical HQ were located inside the objective area right on the commencement of the operation. It could have invited trouble had there been any retaliation or reaction from the threat forces while the troops commenced the search. It is therefore suggested that the HQ should only be brought inside the objective area once the initial phase is over and a secured area within the objective has been created.

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12. Aerial Recce of the Area of Intended Operations. Prior aerial recce of the area of intended operations would surely pay rich dividends. Though it was planned, it could not be undertaken due to bad weather. Some of the contingent commanders missed ground recce which should have been carried out prior to the operation.

13. Maintenance of Secrecy of Intended Operations. Utmost discretion has to be exercised at all levels such that while planning, preparing and executing the operation-related activities, no lapse of security is allowed to occur. Classified information must be unfolded strictly on a need to know basis. Moreover, omnipresence of enthusiastic media personnel adds a new dimension to the security threat. One has to be very careful while dealing with these media men and avoid temptation of publicity. Best thing would be to leave such interaction to the UN authorised personnel only. It was discouraging to hear the news of OP HOPE on BBC and Rwandan local radio prior to the commencement of the operation.

14. Need for Joint Planning. So as to evolve a credible tactical plan, it is suggested that the logistic representative be incorporated into the planning process right from the conception stage. This arrangement will produce matching tactical and logistic plans. Moreover, it will provide more reaction time to the logistics branch to make arrangements to cater for logistical needs at various stages of the operation.

CONCLUSION

15. OP HOPE has been a success because it was meticulously conceived and planned and boldly executed. The operation was orchestrated in a truly professional manner and hence prevented any violence. All the troops and MILOBs performed their tasks with pride, enthusiasm and sense of respect for the human race.

UN SECRET

Copy No. 1... of 18..

MILOB GP HQ
KIMIHURURA
KIGALI

104

10 Dec 94

PO 12/94

References:

Z 723 Sheet 40 BUTARE Ed 1, 1 : 50,000.
Z 723 Sheet 31 GIKONGORO Ed 1, 1 : 50,000.
ING 0 (MILOBS) dated 7 Dec 94.

SITUATION

a. Threat Forces. Additional to Ref C, criminals elements continue to unleash acts of terror, harassment and banditry in the camps. The following have also been recorded:

(1) Criminal elements are known to spread false propaganda with the aim of preventing lawful citizens from returning to their normal life.

(2) Threats Forces have access to small arms, hand grenades, machetes etc.

(3) Recent recorded incidents inside the camps include:

(a) Three hand grenades recovered during a search in KIBEHO on 20 Nov 94.

(b) Two bandits killed at NDAGO on 28 Nov 94 and another bandit killed on ni 28/29 Nov.

(c) Grenades explosion apparently thrown within the camp including several killings (over 50).

1 of 10

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b. Friendly Forces

(1) The FHQ intends to rid both the KIBEHO and NDAGO Camps of criminal elements in order to encourage the return of peaceful Rwandese people to their homes.

(2) The ops will involve approximately 8 UNAMIR Coys excluding support elements.

(3) The CIVPOL, NGOs, B & R and two RPA Battalions will be co-operating with UNAMIR Forces.

(4) Interpreters in support of UNAMIR Forces.

c. Atts and Dets. No change.

MISSION. MILOB GP is to conduct operations in support of armed Contingents to clear criminal elements from KIBEHO and NDAGO ops.

EXECUTION

a. Gen Outline. UNAMIR will conduct Cordon and Search Ops in co-ordination with the RPA. Two RPA Bns will form the outer cordon. Seven Coys (UNAMIR) will form the inner cordon. They will perform the search with the RPA Ident and Liaison Teams. A Coy will be inserted at NDAGO as a blocking force. A preliminary Ops consisting armed tps and MILOBs already in progress to increase UN presence.

b. MILOB SECT 1

(1) Det to Ops Comd CO NICOY wef 11 Dec 94
- One MILOB Team.

(2) Det to ops comd MILOB sect 3 wef 11 Dec 94
- 2 MILOB Teams.

(3) Tasks

(a) Continue to perform MILOB tasks assigned by Comd NICOY.

- (b) Monitor all security and ops situations along GREEN ROUTE.
- (c) Monitor and report to Tac HQ the security situation of Detainee Cage.
- (d) Report on continuous basis, progress of operations within your AOR.
- (e) Report violation of human rights to MILOB Tac HQ.
- (f) In conjunction with formed troops document arrested criminals.
- (g) Fwd SITREP 12 hourly commencing 1200 D Day.
- (h) Carry out investigation as directed by Comd or MILOB Tac HQ.
- (i) Provide liaison between UNAMIR troops, with NGOs and civil authorities within your AOR.
- j. Monitor humanitarian requirement within boundaries.

c. MILOB SECT 2

(1) Grouping

- (a) Det to Ops Comd CO ZAMBATT
wef 11 Dec 94 - One MILOB Team.
- (b) Det to Comd MILOB Sect 3
wef 11 Dec 94 - Two MILOB Teams.

(2) Tasks

- (a) Perform MILOB tasks assigned by Comd ZAMBATT.
- (b) Monitor all activities and security situation within your AOR.
- (c) Inform MILOB Tac HQ the situation on objectives 7 and 10.
- (d) Report on continuous basis the progress of ops within your AOR.
- (e) Fwd SITREP 12 hourly commencing 1200 D Day.

- (f) Report any violation of Human Rights.
- (g) Provide liaison between UNAMIR troops with NGOs and civil authorities within your AOR.

d. MILOB Sect 3

(1) Grouping

- (a) Under Ops Comd
wef 111600B Dec 94 - two MILOB Teams, Sect 1 MILOBs.
- (b) Under Ops comd.
wef 111600B Dec 94 - two MILOB Teams, Sect 2 MILOBs.
- (c) Det to under comd MILOB Tac HQ
wef 121600B Dec 94 - three MILOB Teams.

(2) Tasks

- (a) Continue monitoring the security situation in the Camps.
- (b) Establish MILOB Tac HQ at KIBEHO.
- (c) Prepare the alternate MILOB Tac HQ at BUTARE.
- (d) Monitor and report on 24hr basis the situation in the camps.
- (e) Submit SITREP on 12 hourly basis to MILOB Tac HQ, KIBEHO commencing 1200hrs D Day.
- (f) Report any human rights violations.
- (g) Prepare to maintain post ops presence with 3 x Teams till further order.
- (h) Provide liaison between UNAMIR and NGOs, civil authorities within your AOR.

e. MILOB Sect 4A - (GHANBATT)

- (1) Grouping. No change.

(2) Tasks

- (a) Continue to perform MILOB tasks assigned by formed contingent.
- (b) Monitor the activities and security situation

within your AOR and report on continuous basis.

(c) Info MILOB Tac HQ - KIBEHO on the progress of ops.

(d) Report any violation of human rights.

(e) Provide liaison between formed contingent with NGOs and civil authorities.

(f) Prepare to maintain post ops presence in the camps with 3 MILOB Teams.

(g) Fwd SITREP 12 hourly commencing 1200 D Day.

f. MILOB Sect 4A (ZAMBATT)

(1) Grouping. One MILOB Team from MILOB Sect 2.

(2) Tasks

(a) Continue to perform MILOB tasks assigned by CO ZAMBATT.

(b) Monitor activities and security situation on 24hr basis.

(c) Report violations of human rights.

(d) Provide liaison between UNAMIR forces with NGOs and civil authorities.

(e) Fwd 12 hourly SITREP commencing 1200 hrs D Day to MILOB Tac HQ KIBEHO.

(f) Report on continuous basis the situation on objective 7 and 10.

g. MILOB Sect 4B

(1) Det to Comd FRAFBATT wef 11 dec 94 - One MILOB Team.

(2) Tasks

(a) Continue to support FRAFBATT.

(b) Monitor the activities and security situation within your AOR.

- (c) Report any human rights violation.
- (d) Provide liaison between FRAFBATT with NGOs and the civil authorities within your AOR.
- (e) Fwd 12 hourly SITREP commencing 1200hrs D Day to MILOB Tac HQ.
- (f) Report the security situation of objective 5 and 9 on continuous basis.

h. MILOB Sect 4C

(1) Det to Comd ETHIOBATT
wef 11 Dec 94 - Three MILOB Teams.

(2) Tasks

- (a) Continue to support ETHIOBATT.
- (b) Monitor and report the security situation on 24 hour basis.
- (c) Report on the situation or progress of ops on obj 4 and 6.
- (d) Report any human rights violations within your AOR.
- (e) Provide liaison between UNAMIR with NGOs and civil authorities.
- (f) Fwd 12 hourly SITREP commencing 1200 hrs D day.

i. MILOB Sect 5

(1) Det to Comd TUNBATT wef 11 dec 94
- Three MILOB Teams.

(2) Tasks

- (a) Continue to support TUNBATT.
- (b) Monitor the activities and security situation on 24hr basis.
- (c) Provide liaison between UNAMIR with NGOs and civil authorities within your AOR.
- (d) Report any situation on obj 1, 3 and 11 to MILOB Tac HQ.

(e) Fwd a 12 hourly SITREP on the ops commencing 1200hrs D Day.

(f) Fwd report on any human rights violation to MILOB Tac HQ.

j. MILOB Sect 6

(1) Grouping

(a) Keep three MILOB Teams on 1 hr NTM to Ops Area.

(b) Keep close liaison with MILOB HQ on op OVERTURE.

(2) Tasks

(a) Continue with your present tasks.

(b) Be prepared to support any of the MILOB Sectors on order of DCMO/MILOB Tac HQ.

k. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Timings

(a) D - 2. (12 Dec 94) - Move to Assy Area

(b) D - 1 / D Day. Move to blocking/cordon positions /secure Force Release Point.

(c) D Day

(i) H - 3 - (0130hrs) Outer cordon and blocking force in posn at NDAGO.

(ii) H - 2 - Secure Force Release Point.

(iii) H - 1 - Occupy Force Release Point.

(iv) H hr - 0430hrs Tps commence search.

(v) H + 1 - Holding/Screening facility estb.

(d) D + 2 Ops completed.

(e) D + 3 Commence redeployment.

- (2) MILOBS continue to increase presence forthwith.
- (3) Search to be conducted only during daylight hours.
- (4) Curfew will be imposed at night (1800 - 0500hrs).
- (5) Assy Area - BUTARE.
- (6) Limit of search will be edge of NDAGO Camp.
- (7) Routes
 - (a) RED ROUTE - ROAD BUTARE - GIKONGORO - KIBEHO.
 - (b) GREEN ROUTE - BUTARE - KIBEHO.
- (8) Dispositions - Annex A.
- (9) Force Release Point
 - (a) Red Route. Track Junction GR 839195.
 - (b) Green Route. Road Junction GR 868077.
- (10) Air Plan. Annex C.
- (11) Detainee Handling Procedure. Annex D.
- (12) Liaison Plan. Annex E.
- (13) Comms. Coordinated later. Teams to continue with the present C/S. (Annex F)
- (14) Public Info Plan. Annex G.

ADMIN AND LOGISTICS

- a. MILOBS are to be self sufficient in food and water throughout the period of operations.
- b. C Rat will be available but issued at US\$8.00 per meal.
- c. Dress. Helmets and Flak Jackets will be worn.
- d. Med. Cas Clearing Post will be loc in AICF Building on OBJ 2.

COMMAND AND SIGNALS

- a. Loc of HQs
 - (1) FORCE TAC HQ. KIBEHO (Double Storey Building on OBJ 2) Tac HQ opens 140200B Dec 94.
 - (2) MILOB TAC HQ. Same loc as above.

b. Comms.

- (i) Min conversation during OP
- (ii) Ch-12 (Sect 4) will be used for the OP
- (iii) Detail callsigns at ANX F

c. Press Info. Comm with the Press only on permission of Force HQ.

d. OPS SEC. Sec of Ops be enforced.

Authentication:

S ILIYA

Lt Col

S O O

MOEEN U AHMED

Col

DCMO

Annexes:

- A. Sketch of Ops Plans, Bdrys, and Report Lines KIBEHO (issued later)
- B. Sketch showing objectives bdrys and Report Lines in NDAGO DP Camp. (Issued later)
- C. Air Plan.
- D. Detainee handling Procedures.
- E. Liaison Plan. — NOT AVAIL
- F. Comms Plan.
- G. Public Information Plan. — NOT AVAIL
- H. Sketch of Area of Ops and Induction Routes. — NOT AVAIL

Distribution:

Copy No

Incl Annex A to H

MILOB Sect

1

1

2

2

3

3

Q
UN SECRET

APDX 1
TO MIA
DISEN

COMMUNICATIONS INSTRUCTION

NICKNAMES

1. The following nicknames will be used for the duration of OP OVERTURE:

Meaning

Assy Area
Release Point Red Route
Release Point Green Route
Tac HQ (Op Overture) Loc
Casualty Collection Point
Screening and Holding area

Nickname

Paper Tiger
Jungle Juice
Cow Leg
Open Door
Soft Bed
Big Brother

Report Lines

Report Line No 1
Report Line No 2
Report Line No 3
Report Line No 4
Report Line No 5
Report Line No 6
Report Line No 7
Report Line No 8
Report Line No 9
Report Line No 10
Report Line No 11

Mango Grove
Apple Pie
High Ball
Happy Home
Iron Lady
Last Stand
Low Loader
Little Girl
Table Lamp
Good Hope
Shoe Polish

(NICKNAMES CONTIN)

Objectives

Obj 1	Hungry Bear
Obj 2	Rocking Horse
Obj 3	Active Edge
Obj 4	Snow Ball
Obj 5	Arctic Breeze
Obj 6	Flying Arrow
Obj 7	Long Shot
Obj 8	Flat Cap
Obj 9	Rummy Punch
Obj 10	Red Sox
Obj 11	Short Stop

CODEWORDS

2. The following seven Codewords will be used for the duration of OP OVERTURE:

<u>Codeword</u>	<u>Meaning</u>	<u>To be issued by:</u>
Hunter	Advance (H Hour)	Tac HQ (OP Overture)
Scatter	Commence Search	Tac HQ (OP Overture)
Basket	Move to second Obj	Tac HQ (OP Overture)
Flower	All Obj searched	Tac HQ (OP Overture)/Units
Helmet	Cordon in position	RPA
Baboon	Mov to Assy Area	Tac HQ (OP Overture)
Bingo	End of OP Overture	Tac HQ (OP Overture)


COMM INSTRUCTIONS

MILOB RADIO NET DIAGRAM

ANNEX F


TO DPO 12

DATED 10 Dec




SKETCH SHOWING OBJTS, BDYS AND REPORT LINES
AT KIBEHO CAMP

TRIM A
To Op Om
2 Dated
10 Dec 94



SKETCH SHOWING OBSS, BDRYS AND
REPOR LINES AT NDAHO CAMP

ANNEX B TO
OPO 12
DD 10 DEC 94



SECT-1 Copy No 9 of 16

UN SECRET

09

To : See distribution

From : MILOB GP HQ

Date : 07 Dec 94

Sub : WARNING ORDER

1. SITUATION. There have been increase in acts of banditry, intimidation and criminal activities especially in certain DP camps. The most affected camps are those of KIBEHO (5007) stretching to NDAHO (5201). Both the DP camps are located in sector 4A. It is imperative that firm action is taken to restore security in accordance with UNAMIR mandate. UNAMIR forces will undertake operations in cooperation with 2 RPA battalions to get rid of criminal elements from the mentioned camps/area.

2. MISSION. The MILOB GP will conduct operations in conjunction with formed troops to clear criminal elements from KIBEHO and NDAGO DP camps.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operation. UNAMIR will conduct a cordon and search op in cooperation with the RPA. Two RPA bns will form the outer cordon. Seven UNAMIR companies will form the inner cordon and conduct the search with RPA identification and liaison teams. A linear oriented search will be conducted concurrently by all UNAMIR companies commencing at Kibeho. A single UNAMIR coy will be inserted at Ndago as a blocking force. A prelim op to increase the UN presence in the camps will be conducted during the planning period.

b. MILOB Sect 1

(1) Detach one MILOB team to ops command of CO NICOY effective 10 Dec 94.

(2) Detach 2 MILOB teams under ops command of MILOB Tac HQ with effect from 11 Dec 94. Teams to report to sec 3 by 111600 Dec 94.

1

UN SECRET

Sectr Cdr _____
Ops ○ _____
Log ○ _____
Duty ○ _____

UN SECRET

- (3) Conduct MILOB operations in conjunction with formed troops.

c. MILOB Sect 2

- (1) Detach three MILOB teams to ops command of CO ZAMBATT effective 10 Dec 94.
- (2) Prepare to conduct operations in support of formed contingent.

d. MILOB Sect 3

- (1) Receive two teams from sec 1 by 111600 Dec 94.
- (2) Deploy two MILOB teams by 09 Dec 94 to the camps. Be prepared to deploy three additional teams by 12 Dec 94.
- (3) Monitor and report on 24 hours basis the situation at the camps.
- (4) Sect comd (Lt Col Hasnain) will be the assistant MILOB commander; to be co-located with MILOB Tac HQ.

e. MILOB Sect 4A

- (1) Detach three MILOB teams to ops command of CO GHANBATT effective 10 Dec 94.
- (2) Prepare to conduct operations in support of formed contingent.

f. MILOB Sect 4B

- (1) Detach one MILOB team to ops command of CO FRAFBATT effective 10 Dec 94
- (2) Conduct MILOB operations in support of formed contingent.

g. MILOB Sect 4C

- (1) Provide three MILOB teams under ops command of CO

UN SECRET

ETHIOBATT effective 10 Dec 94.

(2) Conduct MILOB operations in support of formed contingent.

h. MILOB Sector 5.

(1) Provide three MILOB teams under ops command of CO TUNBATT effective 10 Dec 94.

(2) Conduct MILOB operations in support of formed contingent.

i. MILOB Sect 6.

(1) Provide one MILOB team to MILOB Tac HQ.

(2) Keep two MILOB teams on 1 hr NTM to move to operational area.

(2) Be prepared to support any of the MILOB sectors, on orders from DCMO/TAC HQ.

j. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Timings

(a) D - 2 (12 Dec 94) Move to assembly area commence.

(b) D - 1 (13 Dec 94) Move to assembly area complete.

(c) D Day 14 Dec 94

(d) H - Hour First Light D Day

(e) H + 2 Operation complete (16 Dec 94).

(f) D + 3 Commence redeployment

(2) FCs ops orders at 090930 Dec 94 at UNAMIR HQ. All

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MILOB Sector Comds to attend. DCMOs coord conference on 091400 Dec 94. All Sect Comds to attend.

(3) Assembly area -- BUTARE

2090 // 4. SERVICE SUPPORT. MILOBs to be self sufficient on Water/Food throughout the operations (48 Hrs). Sleeping bags, Flak Jackets and Helmets be worn during cordon and search operation.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNALS

(a) <u>Loc of MILOB Tac HQ</u>	KIBEHO (5007) -- Time later
(b) <u>MILOB HQ (Rear)</u>	Present Loc
(c) <u>Force Tac HQ</u>	KIBEHO
(d) <u>Alternate</u>	BUTARE
(e) <u>Communication</u>	Instructions to follow.

Distr :

Action :

All MILOB Sectors

SLOGO


S PLAN/TRG O

SMPO

Info :

FHQ

DFC/COS/CMO



MOHEN U AHMED
COL
For CMO

10/11

SECT-1

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

MILOB GP HQ

TO : ALL SECTORS

Date : 7 Nov 94

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

Ref : Plans 50/94

SUBJECT : WEEKLY SRSG RETURN ON ACTIVITIES IN SECTORS

1. MILOBs in all Sectors are now required to work on statistics and produce the exact picture of their daily activities.
2. This document serve as a guideline for the return to be submitted weekly on Tuesdays for further transmission to the SRSG's office. Sector Comds are required to make this return a priority.
3. The return shall be outlined as follows:
 - a. Issues Related to Returnees and Original Inhabitants. Under this paragraph the report shall cover:
 - (1) The percentage of the original inhabitants who have come back into your sector.
 - (2) The number of the new comers who have settled in your sector.
 - (3) Whether there are any indications that property is being invaded. You are to produce statistics.
 - (4) Whether agricultural activities have resumed and outline the harvest and the new planting by percentage.
 - (5) The percentage of children attending school and their attendance and non attendance bracket. Outline the number of schools in your sector. Indicate whether Government or private and level of education offered.

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(6) The means of transport the public, refugees, merchants and others are using.

(7) Which other crossing points other than Government controlled entry/exit points are being used. Distinguish who uses such crossing points, rate of crossing and strength. Consider also the time the crossing points are being used, that is whether day or night.

b. Government Activities. Government activities have direct impact on reassuring the people and assist on confidence building among them. This paragraph shall cover:

(1) The treatment of returnees by the RWANDA PATRIOTIC ARMY (RPA).

(2) Those who influence people in the sector whether they are individuals or groups whether it is the radio or word of mouth/direct conduct being used.

(3) What is the flow of rumours from camps in ZAIRE like? What is and who is the source for such rumours?

(4) Whether you are meeting the local authorities, teachers priests, doctors. NGOs and commune leaders. How many times per week.

(5) The type of resources the local authorities have to assist on their daily functions. Highlight on vehicles, office equipment, employees and finance. Verify whether employees are being paid.

(6) Outline whether the situation is deteriorating or improving. Consider criminal or sabotage incidents, human rights violations, hospital occupancy, in addition report on market activity by assessing the flow of new commodities, availability of the local authorities and informal activities within the sector ie: the frequenting of restaurants, bars and shops.

(7) The public services provided by the Government. This can be first aid , nutrition, vaccination, road construction, water and sanitation etc. You are to include the number of health centres and highlight those that are functioning or not functioning.

(8) Whether there are prisons and how many they are. Establish also whether

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there are clandestine prisons and their locations. If there is not any form of prisons outline where detainees are being held.

(9) The cooperation that exists between MILOBs and customs authorities. Also cooperation with other authorities you interact with.

c. Non Governmental Organizations(NGOs) and UN Agencies.

- (1) Whether NGOs are assisting the Government or working counter purpose.
- (2) Whether their activities are intrusive or cooperative.
- (3) The level of cooperation between MILOBs and NGOs.

4. After compiling all this information you are required to state your source of information. As a guide, make maximum use of the authorities, NGOs, the public and please state whether you can verify your information.

5. This report is very important, we are all to strive hard to ensure it is compiled weekly and submitted to this HQ every **Tuesday** starting from the 06 Dec 94.

6. All are to action without fail.

M Masanganise

M MASANGANISE

Lt Col

for CMO

Info:

FHQ (OPS)

FHQ (Plans)

CMO

DCMO

SOO

SMPO

SLOGO

COVERING UN CONFIDENTIAL

DCMO - 8/18/94
Action
sm po 19/11
08

To: Distribution List

From: Force Commander

Date: November 1994

Subject: Contingency Plans

1. Enclosed are the HQ UNAMIR contingency plans for:
 - a. Security Alert - Op Plan NIKE;
 - b. Reinforcement - Op Plan HECTOR; and
 - c. Withdrawal and Evacuation - Op Plan JASON.
2. Addressees are to develop outline operation/support plans for submission to G3 Plans, HQ UNAMIR, by 5 Dec 94 as follows:
 - a. Military, CIVPOL and MILOBS:
 - (1) Sector 1 - CO NICOY;
 - (2) Sector 2 - CO GHANBATT;
 - (3) Sector 3 - OCs MALAWI and MALICOY to submit plans through Sector Comd;
 - (4) Sector 4A - CO ZAMBATT;
 - (5) Sector 4B - CO FRAFBATT;
 - (6) Sector 4C - CO ETHIOBATT;
 - (7) Sector 5 - CO TUNBATT;
 - (8) Sector 6 - COs INDBATT, CANCON and AUSMED.
 - b. Staff:
 - (1) Personnel/Logistics Support - DCOS SP
 - c. Civilian:
 - (1) UNAMIR civilian staff;)
 - (2) FSA personnel;) - Special Task Officer to CAO (Mr Lombardo) to coordinate
 - (3) Brown and Root personnel.)
 - d. UN Agencies - HAC to coordinate with respective Security Officers

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- e. NGOs - Sector Commanders (HAC to assist).
- 3. POC for enquiries is G3 Plans, HQ UNAMIR.

Distribution List

	Copy No 1
CO NICOY	2
CO GHANBATT	3
Comd Sector 3	4
OC MALAWICOY	5
OC MALICOY	6
CO ZAMBATT	7
CO FRAFBATT	8
CO ETHIOBATT	9
CO TUNBATT	10
CO INDBATT	11
CO AUSMED	12
CO CANCON	13
UNAMIR Civilian Security Officer	14
Special Task Officer to CAO	15
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5000.46 (Plans)

PART IUNAMIR SECURITY ALERT CONTINGENCY PLANOP PLAN NIKEGENERAL

1. This instruction covers the Security Alert Measures (SAMs) to be adopted by all UNAMIR and associated units in the UNAMIR AO. It is codenamed Op Plan NIKE. Those Instructions which must be read in conjunction with Op Plan NIKE are:

a. UNAMIR Reinforcement Contingency Plan - Op Plan HECTOR. Part II. It is likely that Op Plan NIKE SAMs could be activated concurrently with Op Plan HECTOR.

b. UNAMIR Withdrawal and Evacuation Contingency Plan - Op Plan JASON. Part III. Op Plan NIKE SAMs will be invoked if Op Plan JASON is activated.

2. Op Plan NIKE provides for the increase of UNAMIR security in the event of a deteriorating situation in Rwanda. It is designed to be flexible and responsive in a changing security environment, and to be applied locally or nationally, as the threat dictates.

3. It should be noted that the UNAMIR Rules of Engagement (ROE) levels of readiness/alert states may be applied independently or in conjunction with Op Plan NIKE.

THREAT

4. It is assessed that RGF has a developing capability to establish an insurgency threat against the BBGNU. The scale of this potential will increase with time. Current assessment is that the threat is likely to be manifest as follows:

a. Initially in Sector 4/5.

b. Concurrently in more than one border area.

c. In Kigali.

d. In the interior but not until the re-establishment of the population base in rural areas.

5. The threat to UNAMIR is likely to be:

a. A collateral threat caused by attacks on the BBGNU and RPA. Soft targets would be particularly vulnerable under these conditions.

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- b. Direct attack on UNAMIR in order to achieve political ends.

PROTECTION

6. In either case, the protection of UNAMIR personnel must be paramount. Under the current mandate UNAMIR also has a duty to protect the following:

- a. UNREO, UNHCR, UNCIVPOL and other UN agency personnel.
- b. NGO Personnel.
- c. Displaced Persons, Refugees and civilians in sites or populations under the protection of UNAMIR forces.
- d. Any other person under UN protection.

7. UNAMIR resources are limited. It is accepted that the provision of security and humanitarian assistance, under the UNAMIR mission, may have to be limited by an increased threat. In these circumstances, the extension of protection to all those listed above may be problematic. Op Plan NIKE gives guidance on the level of security to be achieved by UNAMIR under these conditions.

SECURITY ALERT MEASURES

8. Command. The responsibility for adherence to Security Alert Measures (SAMs) devolves to Sector Commanders, under the orders of HQ UNAMIR.

9. SAMs. UNAMIR SAMs under Op Plan NIKE will be as shown below. A detailed description of the action to be taken under each SAM is to be found in the Annexes shown:

- a. GREEN. Low level threat. Normal Activities. - See Annex A.
- b. YELLOW. Medium level threat. Increased security activities. - See Annex B. Deployment options are further subdivided as follows:
 - (1). ALFA. Withdrawal to platoon positions.
 - (2). BRAVO. Withdrawal to company localities.
 - (3). CHARLIE. Withdrawal to battalion defended areas.
- c. RED. High Level threat. Maximum security activity. Civil evacuation if required. UNAMIR evacuation plans in readiness for immediate execution. See Annex C.

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10. Activation. The activation of Op Plan NIKE will be sent by HQ UNAMIR, using the fastest means possible, followed by a confirmatory hard copy, at the earliest opportunity. An activation message will include the following information:

- a. The codeword - Op Plan NIKE.
- b. The unit/Sector to which the SAM applies.
- c. The SAM to be adopted.
- d. The time by which the SAM is to be activated.
- e. The ROE readiness/alert status
- f. Brief description of the reason for Op Plan NIKE activation.
- g. Confirmation details.

11. Example. An example Op Plan NIKE activation message (sent by radio) is given below:

4C THIS IS ZERO.

- A. OP PLAN NIKE.**
- B. ETHIOBATT SECTOR 4C.**
- C. YELLOW ALFA.**
- D. BY 241200B OCT 94.**
- E. ROE YELLOW**
- F. SIGHTINGS OF ARMED INSURGENTS IN GISAKURA AREA.**
- G. CONFIRMATION TO FOLLOW BY FAX.**

12. Reaction. On receipt of the Op Plan NIKE SAM message, the receiving unit is to:

- a. Follow the action outlined in the relevant Annex to this Instruction.
- b. Liaise with neighbouring Sectors to inform them of the location of sub-units.
- c. Prepare to carry out the action at the next SAM level.

13. Delegation. The authority to raise a SAM level is delegated to Sector Commanders, if they consider that this is warranted by the threat. They do not have the authority to lower a SAM level. In the event that a Sector Commander judges that a SAM level is to be raised, he must:

- a. Inform HQ UNAMIR by the fastest possible means, giving reasons for the increase in level.
- b. Liaise with neighbouring Sector Commanders.

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- c. Provide regular advice to HQ UNAMIR on his perception of the threat.

14. Reporting. Under NIKE YELLOW and RED, units and sub-units are to make reports as follows:

- a. Any unusual activity related to the threat to be reported immediately.
- b. Specific reference to Op Plan NIKE activity is to be made as part of the SITREPs at 0600 and 1800 hrs.
- c. A weekly summary of Op Plan NIKE activities.

15. Status of MILOBs. MILOBs have special status under the UN Convention, wherein they are defined as "experts". Because they are unarmed, early consideration for their security should be given by Sector Commanders. MILOBs are to be controlled as described in Annexes A-C.

16. Status of UNCIVPOL. UNCIVPOL authority can offer some advantages over military authority, in certain circumstances. Sector Commanders are to consider requesting UNCIVPOL support to enhance their security arrangements, particularly for the following:

- a. Crowd control.
- b. Personal search.
- c. Law and order enforcement.
- d. Guarding of Key Points.
- e. Liaison with Gendarmerie.

FURTHER ACTION

17. Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). Sector commanders are to develop formal RRF contingency plans, which match Op Plan NIKE escalation as follows:

- a. NIKE GREEN. One section per company at 30 mins NTM.
- b. NIKE YELLOW. One section per company at 10 mins NTM.
- c. NIKE RED. One platoon per company at 10 mins NTM.

18. Sector Plans. Sector Plans for Op Plan NIKE are to be developed immediately. Sector Commanders are to submit Op Plan NIKE sub-plans to HQ UNAMIR by 5 Dec 94.

19. Protected Personnel. Sector Commanders are to submit initial estimates of the numbers and deployment of Protected Personnel to HQ UNAMIR by 5 Dec 94.

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20. Warning and Reporting Procedures. G3 Ops is to develop Op Plan NIKE Warning and Reporting Procedures by 5 Dec 94.
21. Test Exercise. G3 Ops is to plan to exercise Op Plan NIKE measures as a CPX, as soon as Sector plans have been cleared by DCOS Ops.
22. Administration and Logistics. DCOS Sp is to provide detailed comment on the feasibility of the administrative and logistic constraints on Op Plan NIKE by 5 Dec 94.
23. Review. G3 Plans is to conduct a monthly review of Op Plan NIKE, revise the plan as required and coordinate the revision of supporting plans.

PART I ANNEXES

- A. Op Plan NIKE GREEN - Normal Activities.
- B. Op Plan NIKE YELLOW - Medium Level Threat.
- C. Op Plan NIKE RED - High Level Threat.

ANNEX A TO
PART I TO
5000.46 (PLANS)
DATED NOV 94

OP PLAN NIKE GREEN - NORMAL ACTIVITIES

1. Tasks. Carry out normal tasks as described in current HQ UNAMIR Op Order.
2. Reconnaissance. Carry out reconnaissance of the following:
 - a. All locations identified for use under NIKE YELLOW and RED.
 - b. Routes to all locations including alternatives.
3. Protected Personnel. Establish the identity, numbers and locations of Protected Personnel within AOR, and brief them on the procedure to be followed under NIKE YELLOW and RED. This must be done discreetly in a manner which avoids alarmism.
4. MILOBs. Ensure that all MILOB personnel within the Sector are briefed on Op Plan NIKE contingencies.
5. UNCIVPOL. Consider how UNCIVPOL deployment could be utilised to enhance military security arrangements.

ANNEX B TO
PART I TO
5000.46 (PLANS)
DATED NOV 94

OP PLAN NIKE YELLOW - MEDIUM LEVEL THREAT

1. Passage of SAMs. All units and sub-units within AOR are to be informed of the change of Op Plan NIKE SAM, by the fastest possible means.
2. Normal Operations. Units and sub-units are to continue to carry out tasks as described in current HQ UNAMIR Op Order, where possible.
3. Reconnaissance. Carry out further reconnaissance of the following:
 - a. All locations identified for use under NIKE RED.
 - b. Routes to all locations including alternatives.
4. Protected Personnel.
 - (1). Establish identity, numbers and locations of UN and NGO personnel within AOR.
 - (2). Maintain a register of these details.
 - (3). Inform those personnel of the reason for an increase in the threat and of the need to remain vigilant.
 - (4). Develop plans to marshall those personnel into UNAMIR Safe Areas.
 - (5). Inform those personnel of the action to be taken to withdraw them to UN Safe Areas.
5. Withdrawal to Safe Areas. Under Op Plan NIKE, withdrawal to Safe Areas will be ordered as required. Safe Areas are designed to provide increased protection of Protected Personnel, not to defend an area from direct attack, although they must be capable of doing so. The occupation of Safe Areas will be ordered as follows:
 - a. NIKE YELLOW ALFA. Section outposts to withdraw to platoon positions. Patrolling to be carried out at minimum of section level.
 - b. NIKE YELLOW BRAVO. Platoons to withdraw to company localities. Patrolling to be carried out at minimum of platoon level.

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- c. NIKE YELLOW CHARLIE. Companies to withdraw to battalion defended areas. Patrolling to be carried out at minimum of platoon level. National contingents operating independently at company level, will remain in place. Sectors will not be vacated.
6. Withdrawal of Protected Personnel to Safe Areas. During execution of NIKE YELLOW or RED, Protected Personnel may be withdrawn to Safe Areas, **on a voluntary basis**. UNAMIR personnel are not in a position to enforce withdrawal. Advice which can be given as a professional recommendation only. Withdrawal of these personnel should occur under the following conditions:
- a. At the request of the personnel concerned.
 - b. On the advice of the Sector Commander.
 - c. On orders from HQ UNAMIR.
7. Reception. Platoon, company and battalion locations must have provision for the inclusion of Protected Personnel within the relevant AOR. Arrangements should be made for the reception, accommodation, feeding and transportation of those personnel.
8. Fixed Installations. Sector Commanders are to increase the security of fixed installations, which include communications repeater sites, under NIKE YELLOW. In practice, it may be practical to co-locate platoon, company and battalion positions with fixed installation. In other cases, this may not be possible and the following minimum security is to be provided:
- a. NIKE YELLOW ALFA. Minimum of one section to augment security at fixed installations.
 - b. NIKE YELLOW BRAVO AND CHARLIE. Minimum of one platoon to augment security at fixed installations.
9. MILOB Withdrawal. MILOBs are to adhere to Op Plan NIKE SAMs. Arrangements for the reception and administration of MILOB personnel are to be coordinated by Sector Commanders. MILOBs may be given military tasks in the AOR under NIKE YELLOW, provided that the following criteria are fulfilled:
- a. They are not sent to the site of a known or suspected threat.
 - b. They travel as a minimum party of six in two vehicles.
 - c. They have guaranteed communications.
10. Movement. Convoy movement is permitted under the following conditions:
- a. Minimum convoy is four vehicles.

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- b. Minimum protection is one section per convoy or packet.
 - c. Movement off MSRs is minimized.
 - d. All convoys or packets have guaranteed communications.
 - e. Movement at night is minimized.
11. Administration. The following administrative actions are to be carried out:
- a. Combat Supplies. Seven days combat supplies are to be maintained at first line.
 - b. Stockpiling. A further seven days combat supplies are to stockpiled at unit level.
 - c. Destruction Plans. In accordance with Op Plans HECTOR and JASON.
 - d. Leave. Leave is restricted to compassionate cases only.
 - e. Alcohol. No alcohol is to be consumed when units are placed on NIKE YELLOW or RED.

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ANNEX C TO
PART I TO
5000.46 (PLANS)
DATED NOV 94

OP PLAN NIKE RED - HIGH LEVEL THREAT

1. Passage of SAMs. All units and sub-units within AOR are to be informed of the change of Op Plan NIKE SAM, by the fastest possible means.
2. Operations. Where possible, units are to continue to carry out tasks as described in current HQ UNAMIR Op Order.
3. Reconnaissance. Carry out further reconnaissance of the following:
 - a. All locations identified for use under Op Plans HECTOR AND JASON.
 - b. Routes to all locations including alternatives.
4. Protected Personnel.
 - a. Establish identity, numbers and locations of UN and NGO personnel within AOR, if this has not been done under NIKE YELLOW.
 - b. Maintain a register of these details.
 - c. Inform those personnel of the reason for an increase in the threat and of the need to remain vigilant.
 - d. Advise those personnel of the need to move into Safe Areas immediately.
 - e. If ordered by HQ UNAMIR, plan to escort those personnel to Kigali or a neighbouring country.
5. Withdrawal to Safe Areas. If withdrawal to battalion defended Safe Areas has not been ordered under NIKE YELLOW CHARLIE, an increase in SAM to RED automatically orders this withdrawal. National contingents operating independently at company level, will remain in place. Sectors will not be vacated.
6. Withdrawal of Protected Personnel to Safe Areas. During NIKE RED, Protected Personnel may be withdrawn to Safe Areas, **on a voluntary basis**. Sector Commanders are to give those personnel strong advice to withdraw to Safe Areas immediately.
7. Reception. Safe Areas must have provision for the inclusion of the UN and NGO personnel within the relevant AOR. Arrangements should be made for the reception, accommodation, feeding and transportation of those personnel.

8. Further Withdrawal. UN and NGO personnel may be further withdrawn, on a voluntary basis, as ordered by HQ UNAMIR. They may be escorted to Kigali or a neighbouring country.
9. Fixed Installations. Under NIKE RED, the minimum force required to augment security at fixed installations is one platoon. Sector Commanders are to recommend whether or not fixed installations should continue to operate in this security environment.
10. MILOB Withdrawal. MILOBs are to adhere to Op Plan NIKE SAMs. Arrangements for the reception and administration of MILOB personnel in Safe Areas are to be coordinated by Sector Commanders. MILOBs may not be given military tasks in the AOR under NIKE RED, without the specific authority of the Force Commander.
11. Movement. Convoy movement is permitted under the following conditions:
 - a. Minimum convoy is eight vehicles.
 - b. Minimum protection is two sections per convoy or packet.
 - c. No movement off MSRs.
 - d. All convoys or packets have guaranteed communications.
 - e. No movement at night.
12. Administration. The following administrative actions are to be carried out:
 - a. Combat Supplies. Seven days combat supplies are to be maintained at first line.
 - b. Stockpiling. A further seven days combat supplies are to be stockpiled at unit level.
 - c. Destruction Plans. In accordance with Op Plan HECTOR and JASON.
 - d. Leave. No leave is to be granted.
 - e. Dress. All personnel are to wear ballistic protective equipment and headgear where issued.
 - f. Alcohol. No alcohol is to be consumed when units are placed on NIKE RED.

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5000. 46 (Plans)

PART II

UNAMIR REINFORCEMENT CONTINGENCY PLAN

OP PLAN HECTOR

GENERAL

1. This instruction covers the Reinforcement Measures (RMs) to be adopted by all UNAMIR and associated units in the UNAMIR AO. It is codenamed Op Plan HECTOR. Those Instructions which must be read in conjunction with Op Plan HECTOR are:

- a. UNAMIR Security Alert Contingency Plan - Op Plan NIKE. Part I. It is likely that Op Plan NIKE SAMs will be linked to Op Plan HECTOR RMs.
- b. UNAMIR Withdrawal and Evacuation Contingency Plan - Op Plan JASON. Part III.

2. Op Plan HECTOR provides for the reinforcement of UNAMIR units and locations in the event of a deteriorating security situation in Rwanda. It is designed to be flexible and responsive in a changing security environment, and to be applied locally or nationally, as the threat dictates.

3. It should be noted that the ROE levels of readiness/alert states may be applied independently or in conjunction with Op Plan HECTOR.

4. Scenario. It is not possible to anticipate specific scenarios. Op Plan HECTOR seeks to generate additional formed bodies of troops to enhance the security cover provided in certain Sectors. It is expected that such reinforcement would be in a scenario in which an additional presence would improve the security situation, or provide better protection for UNAMIR personnel or those who UNAMIR has a duty to protect. In other scenarios, reinforcement would not be the appropriate response.

REINFORCEMENT MEASURES

5. Command Responsibility. The responsibility for implementation of RMs devolves to Sector Commanders, under the orders of Main HQ. The two key players are:

- a. Reinforcing Sector Commander (RSC). The Sector Commander from whose Sector formed bodies of troops will be deployed to reinforce another Sector.
- b. Gaining Sector Commander (GSC). The Sector Commander receiving reinforcing formed bodies of troops.

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6. Command Relationship. The delegation of command to the GSC will be coordinated by HQ UNAMIR. In principle, the GSC will assume TACON of reinforcing troops, subject to national command restrictions.

7. Requirement for Reinforcement. HQ UNAMIR will determine whether a Sector is to be reinforced on the basis of the following:

- a. At the request of the GSC.
- b. On evidence of a deteriorating security situation in the Sector(s) concerned.
- c. To preempt a threat which is expected to materialize.
- d. In response to a changing political situation.

8. Level of Reinforcement. Under Op Plan HECTOR, reinforcement up to multiple company level, by **formed platoons and companies**, can be ordered as required. Reinforcement by a complete battalion is unlikely, but can be ordered by HQ UNAMIR if required. Reinforcement of Kigali at battalion level is to be coordinated under the Force Evacuation Plan, Op Plan JASON.

9. RMs. UNAMIR RMs under Op Plan HECTOR will be as shown below. A detailed description of the action to be taken under each RM is to be found in the Annexes shown:

- a. **GREEN**. Low level threat. Normal Activities. - See Annex A.
- b. **YELLOW**. Medium level threat. - See Annex B. Deployment options are further sub-divided as follows:
 - (1). **ALFA**. Reconnaissance. Main Body at 24 hrs NTM.
 - (2). **BRAVO**. Deployment of Advance Party. Main Body at 12 hrs NTM.
 - (3). **CHARLIE**. Main Body at 6 hrs NTM.
- c. **RED**. High Level threat. Deployment of Main Body. See Annex C.

10. Activation. The activation of a RM will be sent by HQ UNAMIR, using the fastest means possible, followed by a confirmatory hard copy, at the earliest opportunity. An activation message will include the following information:

- a. The codeword - Op Plan HECTOR
- b. The Reinforcing Sector(s).
- c. The Gaining Sector(s).
- d. The level of reinforcement.

- e. The RM to be adopted.
 - f. RV location for YELLOW ALFA.
 - g. The time at which the NTM is to be achieved.
 - h. The ROE readiness/alert status.
 - i. Brief description of the reason for Op Plan HECTOR activation.
 - j. Confirmation details.
11. Example. An example Op Plan HECTOR activation message (sent by radio) is given below:
- 1,2 AND 5 THIS IS ZERO.
 - A. OP PLAN HECTOR.
 - B. SECTORS 1 AND 2 TO REINFORCE SECTOR 5.
 - C. SECTOR 1 TWO PLATOONS.
 - D. SECTOR 2 ONE COMPANY.
 - E. YELLOW ALFA.
 - F. RV SECTOR 5 HQ AT 240800B OCT 94.
 - G. RM TO BE ACHIEVED BY 241200B OCT 94.
 - H. ROE GREEN
 - I. AUGMENT SECURITY IN RUHRENGERI AND NDIZA AREAS.
 - J. CONFIRMATION TO FOLLOW BY FAX.
12. Reaction. On receipt of an Op Plan HECTOR message, addressees are to:
- a. Carry out the action described in the relevant Annex.
 - b. Liaise with neighbouring sectors to inform them of the location of sub-units when RMs are in place.
 - c. Prepare to carry out the action at the next RM level.
13. Safe Area Contingency Positions. Sector Commanders are to carry out reconnaissance of contingency positions for deployment of reinforcing units. In principle, it is to be expected that reinforcing units would be withdrawn under NIKE RED. If the tactical situation prevents this, they will need to remain in the Gaining Sector. As a precaution, contingency reconnaissance should be carried out as follows:
- a. Within each company Safe Area, under Op Plan NIKE, one platoon position.
 - b. Within each battalion Safe Area, under Op Plan NIKE, one company position.

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14. Summary of NTM Timings. Op Plan HECTOR.

RM	RECCE PARTY	ADVANCE PARTY	MAIN BODY
GREEN	6 hrs	12 hrs	48 hrs
YELLOW ALFA	Move	6 hrs	24 hrs
YELLOW BRAVO	-	Move	12 hrs
YELLOW CHARLIE	-	-	6 hrs
RED	-	-	Move

15. Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). Sector Commanders are to maintain RRF readiness as described under Op Plan NIKE.

FURTHER ACTION

16. Sector Plans. Sector Plans for Op Plan HECTOR are to be developed immediately. Sector Commanders are to submit Op Plan HECTOR plans to HQ UNAMIR by 5 Dec 94.

17. Test Exercise. G3 Ops is to plan to exercise Op Plan HECTOR measures as a CPX, as soon as Sector plans have been cleared by DCOS Ops.

18. Communications. FSO is to highlight communications issues concerned with Op Plan HECTOR by 5 Dec 94. Consideration should be given to:

- CNR compatibility.
- Frequency harmonisation.
- CEOI planning.

19. Logistic Planning. DCOS Sp is to provide detailed comment on the feasibility of the administrative and logistic constraints on Op Plan HECTOR by 5 Dec 94.

20. Review. G3 Plans is to conduct a monthly review of Op Plan HECTOR, revise the plan as required and coordinate the revision of supporting plans.

Part II Annexes:

- Op Plan HECTOR GREEN - Normal Activities
- Op Plan HECTOR YELLOW - Medium Level Threat
- Op Plan HECTOR RED - High Level Threat

ANNEX A TO
TO PART II TO
5000.46 (PLANS)
DATED OCT 94

OP PLAN HECTOR GREEN - NORMAL ACTIVITIES

1. Tasks. Carry out normal tasks as described in current HQ UNAMIR Op Order.
2. Reconnaissance. Identify:
 - a. Possible locations for use under HECTOR YELLOW and RED, at platoon and company level.
 - b. Routes to all locations including alternatives.
3. Administration of Reinforcing Troops. Make contingency plans to administer one three platoon company consisting of the following:
 - a. 120 personnel.
 - (1). Recce Party - 5.
 - (2). Advance Party - 10.
 - (3). Main Body - 105.
 - b. 10 vehicles.
4. Preparation of Own Troops. Prepare to deploy formed bodies of troops to another Sector. Battalion Sectors should initially plan on preparing one company; Company Sectors should initially plan on preparing one platoon, as follows:
 - a. Notice to Move (NTM).
 - (1). Recce Party at 6 hrs NTM.
 - (2). Advance Party at 12 hrs NTM.
 - (3). Main Body at 48 hrs NTM.
 - b. Equipment. Fully equipped and scaled for 7 days operations.
 - c. Combat Supplies. Self contained for 3 days.

OP PLAN HECTOR YELLOW - MEDIUM LEVEL THREAT

1. Tasks. Carry out normal tasks as described in current HQ UNAMIR Op Order, where possible.
2. Reconnaissance. If reinforcement is being planned, carry out detailed reconnaissance of locations earmarked for reinforcement under HECTOR RED, including routes.
3. Preparation for Reinforcement. If ordered to prepare to reinforce another Sector, reduce NTM to:
 - a. HECTOR YELLOW ALFA.
 - (1). Recce Party - Move immediately.
 - (2). Advance Party - 6 hrs.
 - (3). Main Body - 24 hrs.
 - b. HECTOR YELLOW BRAVO.
 - (1). Advance Party - Move immediately.
 - (2). Main Body - 12 hrs.
 - c. HECTOR YELLOW CHARLIE. Main Body at 6 hrs NTM.
4. Reception Arrangements. If reinforcement of the Sector is planned:
 - a. Issue verbal orders on arrival of the Recce Party.
 - b. Appoint an LO to coordinate reception arrangements.
 - c. Provide guides, movement control and signing as required.
 - d. Coordinate C2 including communications electronic instructions.
 - e. Prepare accommodation, if available, taking into account the tactical situation.
 - f. Coordinate administrative support.

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ANNEX C TO
5000.46 (PLANS)
PART II TO
DATED OCT 94

OP PLAN HECTOR RED - HIGH LEVEL THREAT

1. Tasks. Carry out tasks as described in current HQ UNAMIR Op Order, where possible.
2. Deployment on Reinforcement. If ordered to reinforce another Sector, deploy the Main Body immediately.
3. Reception Arrangements. If receiving reinforcements:
 - a. Issue confirmatory orders.
 - b. Coordinate C2 arrangements.
 - c. Arrange administrative support as required.

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5000. 46 (Plans)

PART III

UNAMIR WITHDRAWAL AND EVACUATION CONTINGENCY PLAN

OP PLAN JASON

GENERAL

1. This instruction covers the UNAMIR Withdrawal and Evacuation Contingency Plan (WECP) to be adopted by all UNAMIR and associated units in the UNAMIR AO. It is codenamed Op Plan JASON. Those Instructions which must be read in conjunction with Op Plan JASON are:

- a. UNAMIR Security Alert Contingency Plan - Op Plan NIKE. Part I. Raising of Op Plan NIKE SAMs will inevitably precede implementation of Op Plan JASON.
- b. UNAMIR Reinforcement Contingency Plan - Op Plan HECTOR. Part II.

2. Op Plan JASON provides for the withdrawal and evacuation of UNAMIR and associated personnel in the event of a seriously deteriorating security situation in Rwanda. It is designed to be flexible and responsive in a changing security environment, and to be applied on a national basis.

PROTECTION

3. Under the current mandate, UNAMIR has a duty to protect the following:

- a. UNREO, UNHCR, UNCT POL and other UN agency personnel.
- b. NGO Personnel.
- c. Displaced Persons, Refugees and civilians in sites or populations under the protection of UNAMIR forces.
- d. Any other person under UN protection.

4. UNAMIR resources are limited. It is accepted that the provision of security and humanitarian assistance, under the UNAMIR mission, may have to be limited by an increased threat. In these circumstances, the extension of protection to all those listed above may be problematic. Op Plan JASON gives guidance on the level of security to be achieved by UNAMIR under these conditions.

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PRINCIPLES OF EVACUATION

5. An Evacuation will be the Last Resort. Before it is ordered, UNAMIR will seek to continue the mission, whilst retaining security by:
- Increasing Security Alert Measures (SAMs). Op Plan NIKE.
 - Reinforcing threatened Sector(s). Op Plan HECTOR.
 - Withdrawing to Kigali, from where evacuated Sectors can be re-occupied, if there is a decrease in the threat.
 - Evacuating Kigali at the end of the withdrawal process.
6. UNAMIR will Present Strong and Coherent Resolve. An evacuation will only be ordered where there is no alternative. Even when non-essential personnel have been withdrawn or evacuated, a high security core of troops will provide a presence until evacuated.
7. Protected Civilians will be Evacuated First. They will be offered early withdrawal to Safe Areas, escorted to Kigali and advised to leave when the security situation makes their presence no longer tenable.
8. Equipment will not be Abandoned. Where possible, only equipment of low value will be left in Rwanda.
9. Kigali International Airport will be the Primary Means of Evacuation.
10. Final Evacuation Phase will be Conducted by Road.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

11. A possible sequence of events for the implementation of Op Plan JASON is given below:

SER	EVENT	RESPONSE
1	Insurgent threat increases in Sector(s).	Security Alert Measures increased under Op Plan NIKE.
2	Greater presence required to ensure security in Sector(s).	Op Plan HECTOR invoked to threatened Sector(s).
3	Situation worsens in threatened Sector(s).	Protected Personnel withdrawn to Kigali.
4	Increase in threat in other Sectors.	Non-essential personnel withdrawn to Kigali. Op Plan HECTOR invoked if troops available.

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5	Threat increases in all Sectors.	Op Plan HECTOR concentrated on Kigali Sector.
6	Kigali comes under direct threat.	Op Plan JASON activated. Protected Personnel advised to leave.
7	Insurgency in Kigali worsens.	Non-essential personnel evacuated.
8	Situation deteriorates.	Destruction plans prepared Some operational personnel evacuated.
9	Government loses control.	Bulk of operational personnel evacuated by air/road. Destruction plans invoked.
10	Order to evacuate given.	Remainder of available personnel leave by air. Security Force leaves by road.

12. Alternative Scenarios. A number of other scenarios could invoke Op Plan JASON. In the main, however, a progressive deterioration, leading to a total collapse of security would be required before the full plan would be implemented.

13. Degree of Evacuation. Op Plan JASON may be only partially executed. A stabilisation of the security situation would limit the degree of evacuation. Similarly, the process of evacuation could be reversed if the situation were to improve.

STAGES OF EVACUATION

14. JASON GREEN. During JASON GREEN, normal operations will continue. Preparation for further stages will be carried out. Major changes to the security environment will include:

- a. Op Plan NIKE SAMs may be raised.
- b. Op Plan HECTOR RMs may be activated to increase presence in threatened Sector(s).
- c. For full details, see Annex A.

15. JASON YELLOW. Under JASON YELLOW, the WECP will be stage, as described in Annex B, as follows:

- a. JASON YELLOW ALFA. Orders for withdrawal to Kigali.
- b. JASON YELLOW BRAVO. Protected and Non-Essential personnel evacuated.

- c. JASON YELLOW CHARLIE. Bulk of personnel evacuated by air/road.

16. JASON RED. Kigali/Rwanda evacuated by air. Security Force leaves by road. See Annex C.

RESPONSIBILITIES

17. Overall Responsibility for WECP. Chief Security and Area Security Coordinator for Rwanda is responsible for the coordination of the UNAMIR WECP.

18. Military Aspects of WECP. G3 Plans is responsible for the planning of military aspects of Op Plan JASON within HQ UNAMIR. Within UNAMIR, military responsibility for the WECP devolves to:

- a. Sector Commanders to coordinate withdrawal of their Sectors to Kigali.
- b. Sector Commander Sector 6 (Kigali) for the reception of units withdrawn to Kigali prior to evacuation.
- c. G3 Ops for the coordination of deployment of units.
- c. DFC/COS for the coordination of evacuation of Kigali, devolved as follows:
 - (1). Security and Protection - DCOS Ops.
 - (2). Transport, Movement, Sustainment and Destruction - DCOS Sp.
- d. Contingent/unit/sub-unit Commanders for the coordination of contingent plans to conform with UNAMIR plans and national requirements.

9. Protected Personnel. Those organisations representing personnel protected by UNAMIR are responsible for briefing their personnel on the HQ UNAMIR WECP and for ensuring that their own instructions conform to the overall plan. These include:

- a. UN agencies.
- b. UN Aid agencies.
- c. NGOs.
- d. Contractors.

20. Destruction Plans. UNAMIR equipment will not be permitted to fall into the hands of an aggressor, unless there is no way to prevent this. **Sector Commanders and HQ Staff branches are to prepare lists of equipment which meet the criteria below.** In principle, all usable UNAMIR stores and equipment will be evacuated. The following categories of stores and equipment are to be used:

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- a. Essential. Those stores and equipment without which the Force cannot evacuate in good order. This category includes all weapons, vehicles, fighting equipment scales and combat supplies for 7 days. It may also include critical information which will enable the Force to resume operations in Rwanda with minimum loss of efficiency.
- b. Important. Those stores and equipment which are high value, and whose loss would involve difficulty in fulfilling the mission, or considerable expense to the UN. These include alternative communications equipment, computers, medical stores, support equipment scales and remaining combat supplies.
- c. Non-Essential. Those stores and equipment which are difficult to evacuate and whose loss does not incur considerable expense to the UN. These include defence stores, office and accommodation stores, and land line already in place.

FURTHER ACTION

21. Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). G3 Ops is to develop a RRF plan for Op Plan HECTOR, taking into account RRF procedures adopted under Op Plan NIKE and the RRF to be provided by Comd Sector 6 during JASON YELLOW. See Annex B para 5.
22. Reception Plan. Commander Sector 6 is to develop a reception plan, in line with deployment under JASON YELLOW, as detailed by G3 Plans.
23. Protected Personnel. Parent Organisations of Protected Personnel are to develop their own evacuation plans, using Op Plan JASON as the template. These should be submitted ASP. UNREF is to ensure that the Parent Organisations of Protected Personnel are briefed on the security requirements of UNAMIR and that they submit, by 5 Dec 94:
 - a. List of all personnel in country.
 - b. List of vehicles, with stores and passenger capacity.
 - c. Location of assets.
 - d. Priority for evacuation.
 - e. Any call on evacuation resources which might be of use to UNAMIR.
24. Military Evacuation. Sector Commanders, Contingent Commanders and HQ UNAMIR staff branches are to submit outline lists of personnel and equipment to be evacuated by 5 Dec 94, to include:
 - a. Non-Essential Personnel.
 - b. Essential and Important Stores by tonnage and category.
 - c. Integral lift capability for personnel and stores.

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25. Communications. FSO is to develop an outline Force Communications Plan to support Op Plan JASON by 5 Dec 94.
26. Logistic Planning. DCOS Sp is to provide detailed comment on the feasibility of the administrative and logistic constraints on Op Plan JASON when initial civilian and military evacuation lists have been submitted.
27. Review. G3 plans is to conduct a monthly review of Op Plan JASON, revise the plan as required and coordinate the revision of supporting plans.

OP PLAN JASON GREENGENERAL

1. When JASON GREEN is in force, normal operations may continue, where the threat permits. This state is the opportunity for all preparatory action to be carried out, in the event that a higher Op Plan JASON state is ordered. Time utilised efficiently in planning Op Plan JASON activation during this period will pay dividends.

2. Op Plan NIKE. Op Plan NIKE may operate independently of Op Plan JASON. It provides for the raising of Security Alert Measures (SAMs), on a Sector or national basis as required. It is unlikely that Op Plan JASON would be activated unless the security situation had already warranted a SAM increase to NIKE YELLOW CHARLIE or NIKE RED. The withdrawal of Protected Personnel to Safe Areas can be expected before Op Plan JASON states are increased. Their evacuation from threatened Sector(s) under Op Plan JASON would follow naturally from this situation.

3. Op Plan HECTOR. Op Plan HECTOR may also operate independently of Op Plan JASON. As the UN intends to present a robust resolve in the face of an increased threat, it is likely that Op Plan HECTOR escalation to HECTOR YELLOW CHARLIE or HECTOR RED would be invoked before Op Plan JASON activation. The reinforcement of Kigali is a process which follows naturally from the reinforcement of other threatened Sector(s).

OUTLYING SECTOR RESPONSIBILITIES

4. Preparation. Sector Commanders of outlying Sectors (ie not Kigali, Sector 6), have specific command responsibilities under Op Plan JASON. These include:

- a. Preparation of Sector units and sub-units for Op Plan JASON activation.
- b. Briefing of all personnel.
- c. Contingency planning.
- d. Subsidiary Plans:
 - (1). Communications Plan.
 - (2). Logistic Plan.
 - (3). Movement Plan.
 - (4). Destruction Plan.

5. Military Information. Sector Commanders are responsible for the provision of up to date military information, where the tactical situation allows the deployment of troops, specifically in the following key areas:

- a. Insurgent activity.
- b. Developing threat.
- c. Route information, between locations and to/from Kigali.

6. Protected Personnel. UN, NGO and other Protected Personnel are to be considered when planning Op Plan JASON contingencies. Sector Commanders **are to plan to**:

a. Ensure that OP Plan NIKE SAMs are promulgated to all Protected Personnel and that they are:

- (1). Listed and registered.
- (2). Briefed on the developing threat situation.
- (3). Encouraged to withdraw to Safe Areas, as the threat evolves.
- (4). Administered within Safe Areas if necessary.

b. Provide up to date information to Main HQ on Protected Personnel, if deployed to Safe Areas, to include:

- (1). Names & Parent Organisation.
- (2). Locations.
- (3). Medical Condition.
- (4). Available transport.
- (5). Stores and Equipment.
- (6). Capability for self-sufficiency.
- (7). Intentions.

c. Brief Protected Personnel on the means by which their parent organisation is planning to evacuate them. If Motorola communications are intact, this may not be required.

d. Escort Protected Personnel to Kigali for further evacuation to another country, if ordered to do so.

KIGALI SECTOR RESPONSIBILITIES

7. Sector Command. Sector Commander Sector 6 Kigali, has specific responsibilities for the development of OP Plan JASON plans. He is responsible for coordinating the reception as ordered by HQ UNAMIR, within Sector 6 of the following:

- a. Those units, sub-units and contingents currently deployed in Sector 6.
- b. Those units and sub-units redeployed to reinforce Sector 6 under Op Plan HECTOR.
- c. Those units and sub-units redeployed to Sector 6 under Op Plan JASON.
- d. Protected Personnel occupying Safe Areas under Op Plan NIKE.
- e. Protected Personnel still occupying work locations in Kigali City.

8. Kigali International Airport (KIA). KIA is central to the UNAMIR WECP. The retention of security in the area of KIA is critical to the continued maintenance of the Force and of the evacuation of UNAMIR personnel, equipment and stores. G3 Plans is to plan to deploy elements of the Force under Op Plan JASON, to guard KIA as follows:

- a. Airport buildings including Control Tower.
- b. Marshalling apron work areas.
- c. Perimeter.
- d. Flight paths which could be threatened by low-level air defence systems.

9. Key Points (KPs). The protection of KPs will be essential to the implementation of Op Plan JASON. A full list of KPs, to be guarded by elements of the Force is to be evolved by G3 Plans, in discussion with other UN and NGO representatives. The number of KPs will be the minimum consistent with the threat and the maintenance of the Force. It is likely to include:

- a. Amahoro Hotel.
- b. Amahoro Stadium Complex including 500 Man Camp.
- c. Third Line Supply Compound.
- d. Wksps.
- e. Kigali City Hospital (AUSMED).
- e. UNDP Building.

10. Contingency Planning. G3 Plans is to plan the deployment of all Force units within Sector 6 under JASON YELLOW ALFA. These plans are to include:

- a. Deployment areas for all units and sub-units, reced to platoon level.
- b. Requirement for defence stores.
- c. Development of RRF plans.
- d. Accommodation requirements.
- e. Administrative arrangements including the delivery of water.

11. Communications. FSO is to develop a communications plan for the use of Sector 6 units deployed under JASON YELLOW and RED.

LOGISTIC PLANNING

12. General. Preliminary logistic planning by DCOS Sp for the activation of Op Plan JASON YELLOW and RED should commence immediately. Information is required to predict the sustainment requirements for the Force deployed into Sector 6. Consideration should be given to providing raw data from which operational options can be developed. Some issues are:

- a. The number of personnel to be evacuated during JASON YELLOW and RED.
- b. The means by which evacuation can be achieved.
- c. The impact on Op Plan JASON caused by a closure of K'A.
- d. Practical guidance for comparison of Force sustainment/structure requirements, when the Force is deployed to Kigali.
- e. Minimum stocks required based on 14 days without resupply.
- f. Accommodation options.

ANNEX B TO
PART III TO
5000.46 (PLANS)
DATED OCT 94

OP PLAN JASON YELLOW

GENERAL

1. JASON YELLOW is the trigger for the UNAMIR WECP to commence. It stages the withdrawal and evacuation process between JASON GREEN, the planning phase, and JASON RED, the final evacuation of Kigali and Rwanda.
2. JASON YELLOW is staged as follows:
 - a. JASON YELLOW ALFA. Outlying Sectors withdrawn to Kigali.
 - b. JASON YELLOW BRAVO. Evacuation of Protected and non-essential personnel.
 - c. JASON YELLOW CHARLIE. Evacuation of bulk of UNAMIR personnel.

JASON YELLOW ALFA - WITHDRAWAL PHASE

3. Outlying Sector Command Responsibilities. On the receipt of a JASON YELLOW ALFA message, outlying Sector Commanders are to:
 - a. Marshall units and sub-units in Safe Areas.
 - b. Marshall Protected Personnel into Safe Areas.
 - c. Prepare orders for a road move to Kigali, utilising routes recd under JASON GREEN.
 - d. Be prepared to receive detailed reception coordinating instructions from HQ UNAMIR, including timings.
 - e. Prepare Non-Essential stores for destruction.
 - f. Carry out route clearance and security.
 - g. Before departure, destroy Non-Essential stores.
 - i. Move to Kigali.
4. Sector 6 Commander Responsibilities. On receipt of JASON YELLOW ALFA message, Sector 6 Commander is to prepare reception arrangements for units withdrawing to Kigali as follows:

- a. Escort convoys from release points within Sector 6 to deployment areas.
 - b. Provide guides down to platoon level.
 - c. Provide security to units which are occupying their deployment areas, until local defence has been established.
 - d. Allocate two platoons to act as RRF at 5 mins NTM during occupation of deployment areas.
 - e. Escort Protected Personnel to parent organisations, if the security situation permits.
5. Deployment Coordination. G3 Ops/G3 Plans will coordinate the deployment of units within Sector 6. This will involve:
- a. Identification of deployment areas.
 - b. Coordination between units.
 - c. Arrival procedures.
 - d. Issue of defence stores.
 - e. Key Point isolation and guarding procedures.
 - f. Development of Map/Locator list for Sector 6.
 - g. Control of movement.
 - h. Security procedures and ROE.
 - i. RRF allocation.
 - j. Administrative arrangements.
6. Arrival Procedures. On arrival in Sector 6, units and sub-units will deploy to designated areas. Immediate actions on arrival are:
- a. Establish perimeter defence of designated area(s).
 - b. Coordinate return of Protected Personnel to parent organisation with Commander Sector 6, if the security situation permits.
 - c. Allocate RRF for local defence and take over responsibilities from Commander Sector 6.

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- d. List non-essential personnel and manifest for evacuation under JASON YELLOW BRAVO.
- e. Identify Important stores for evacuation.
- f. Identify Non-Essential stores for destruction.

JASON YELLOW BRAVO - PRELIMINARY EVACUATION

7. General. JASON YELLOW BRAVO will be ordered if the situation deteriorates to the point that:

- a. The presence of a full complement of UNAMIR personnel in Kigali places an unmanageable burden on the logistic structure necessary to sustain it.
- b. A large number of personnel cannot be properly employed due to security restrictions on their tasks.
- c. Protected Personnel could be placed in direct danger.
- d. Further evacuation seems likely.

8. Personnel. Personnel to be evacuated under JASON YELLOW BRAVO are:

- a. The bulk of Protected Personnel, less those required as a minimum presence on the ground by their parent organisations.
- b. UNAMIR civilian personnel whose work in the security environment is no longer deemed essential.
- c. UNAMIR military personnel whose role cannot be carried out in the current security environment.
- d. Formed UNAMIR units no longer required to enhance the security of Kigali.

9. Equipment. It is not intended to evacuate equipment under JASON YELLOW BRAVO except for:

- a. High value equipment which would be particularly difficult to evacuate in an increased threat scenario.
- b. Essential equipment of any formed unit which is ordered to evacuate at this stage.

10. Personal Baggage. Personnel evacuated during Op Plan JASON will be restricted to minimum personal baggage. Commanders should issue instructions for personnel to carry:

- a. Personal Weapon.

b. Equipment up to 30 kg in weight.

c. Personal documents including passport.

11. Means of Evacuation. At this stage the primary means of evacuation will be by air. Evacuation by road will be carried out by any formed unit which is ordered to evacuate at this time.

12. Destruction. Destruction will not be authorised for Non-Essential stores left by any formed unit which withdraws at this time.

JASON YELLOW CHARLIE - MAIN EVACUATION

13. General. JASON YELLOW CHARLIE will be ordered if the security situation deteriorates to the extent that:

a. The Force can no longer be easily sustained.

b. The presence of a large body of troops means that the lives of UN personnel are placed at serious risk.

c. The threat can more easily be met by a more compact force structure.

d. The Force mission requires a presence at minimal deployment.

e. Final evacuation under JASON RED is a likely possibility.

14. Personnel. Under JASON YELLOW CHARLIE, force strength will be reduced to the minimum consistent with the maintenance of a UN presence. The following will be evacuated:

a. All remaining Protected Personnel.

b. Those UNAMIR civilian personnel whose presence is not required for the maintenance of a Force presence.

c. Those UNAMIR military personnel not required to provide a Force presence. This will involve a large number of administrative and support personnel, as well as those formed units not detailed off as Security Force.

15. Equipment. The following equipment will be evacuated:

a. Important stores.

b. Essential stores of formed units ordered to withdraw at this stage.

c. The bulk of the vehicle fleet less those vehicles required in order to maintain a Force presence and Security Force.

16. Means of Evacuation. The means of evacuation employed will depend on available airlift, priority equipment requirements and land route security. In principle, evacuation will be achieved by:

- a. Air. Protected Personnel, UNAMIR civilian personnel and administrative and support personnel.
- b. Land. Formed units and sub-units, driving fleet vehicles in convoy, less those to be evacuated by air.

17. Security Force. The composition of the Security Force required to protect the UNAMIR presence will be determined by the threat. Its primary task will be to provide security for remaining UN installations and KIA, up to the point at which the air evacuation under JASON RED is completed. It is likely to consist of:

- a. HQ UNAMIR core operations personnel.
- b. A battalion (-) of wheeled/tracked APC-mounted infantry.
- c. Integral engineer support.
- d. Remaining Air Operations Staff.
- e. Second Line transport resources.

18. Destruction. When JASON YELLOW CHARLIE is ordered, the following equipment will be destroyed:

- a. All Non-Essential equipment, including that left by units evacuated under JASON YELLOW BRAVO.
- b. Important equipment which cannot be evacuated within remaining air/vehicle lift availability. The bulk of important equipment should have been evacuated under JASON YELLOW BRAVO.

OP PLAN JASON RED

GENERAL

1. JASON RED is the executive order to evacuate Rwanda. It involves:
 - a. The safe evacuation of the UN presence in Rwanda.
 - b. The evacuation of the Security Force.
2. JASON RED will be ordered by the FC when the following criteria have been fulfilled:
 - a. The UN presence in Rwanda no longer serves a military or political purpose.
 - b. The safety of those remaining UN personnel is in serious doubt.
 - c. The security situation in Rwanda is likely to deteriorate to a greater extent.

METHOD

3. Execution. JASON RED will be conducted as a 2 phase operation as follows:
 - a. Phase 1. Evacuation of remaining UN presence via KIA.
 - b. Phase 2. Evacuation by road of the Security Force.
4. Phase 1. Phase 1 will consist of the following elements:
 - a. Reduction of KP responsibility by Security Force to a minimum.
 - b. Centralisation of UN personnel in one location.
 - c. Provision of transitional security at KIA for final evacuation flights.
 - d. Route recce for land evacuation route.
 - e. Escort of remaining UN personnel to KIA by Security Force.
 - f. Evacuation of UN presence less Security Force.

5. Phase 2. Phase 2 will consist of the following.
 - a. Centralisation of Security Force.
 - b. Despatch of recce elements including engineer support.
 - c. Clearing of route if required.
 - d. Route security.
 - e. Road move to neighbouring country.
6. Command. The Force will be commanded by the FC until his departure. HQ UNAMIR core operations staff will continue to exercise command after his departure.
7. Liaison. Liaison for the execution of JASON RED will be effected with the local authorities. UNAMIR remains responsible for the safe evacuation of UN and Protected Personnel.
8. Communications. Security Force CNR will provide the main means of communication during JASON RED. FSO is to plan to provide out-of-country communications for use by Security Force during Phase 2.
9. Logistics. The Security Force is to be self-contained for 7 days.
10. Destruction Policy. Remaining Important and Non-Essential stores and equipment not destroyed or evacuated under JASON YELLOW will be destroyed by the Security Force before evacuation.

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Section 1
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ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

MILOB GP HQ

TO : ALL SECTORS

Date : 10 Nov 94

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

Ref : PLANS 41/94

SUBJECT : MONITORING LIVING CONDITIONS OF RETURNEES

1. Attached is a report on the above subject for your information which could also be useful to you when executing MILOB functions.
2. The FC appreciates this effort and recommended that all sectors to embark on such a programme. The report therefore serves as a guideline.
3. Please accept for action.

Mmasanganise

MJ MASANGANISE

Lt Col

for CMO

Info :

DCMO

SLOGO

SMPO

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INTERIM REPORT ON MILOB MONITORING EXERCISE OF CONDITION OF
RETURNEES - MUYIRA COMMUNE

Introduction

1. In fulfillment of part of MILOB tasks, to assist displaced persons in returning to and settling down in their homes, the team in Butare embarked on an exercise to monitor conditions of returnees in their homes. The exercise started on 12 October 1994 in cooperation with the UNHCR who however withdrew after the first day. The exercise started with the Muyira Commune in Butare Prefecture and is intended to cover all the communes. The MILOB Team is also using the exercise to confirm ^{whether} ~~whether~~ returnees are actually going back to the DPC, and if so, at what rate.

2. The monitoring exercise in Muyira Commune lasted four days during which the MILOBs interviewed the locals. The interview took the form of asking the people how the security situation in their homes was, what their most serious problems were ie. health, food, clothing, housing, farming etc. At the end of the first phase of the exercise, many things were brought to the fore.

Aim

3. The aim of this report is to give a brief account of the MILOB monitoring exercise of returnees in Muyira Commune and make recommendations.

Conduct of Exercise

4. The exercise started 12 October 1994 with MILOB using the list of returnees as registered by UNHCR in the DPC during Op Homeward. The team visited the homes of returnees, checking their living conditions and also cross-checking the returnees families against the lists. At the end of the first day out of 17 families registered for Muyira Secteur, 14 families were located. Three families that could not be located were said to be generally around. The exercise thereafter continued in Mukoma, Nyamiyaga and Munyinya Secteurs. Due to the large area to be covered and limitation in time, the exercise had to be reviewed after the first day. Random sampling is now done, rather than check family by family. The last Secteur, Munyinya was checked 20 October 1994, after which the exercise will continue in other communes.

5. Many problems were reported by the locals, the most acute which is common in all the Secteurs, being that of lack of hoes. As many as 4000 families require hoes to enable them to cultivate the land. Those that have hoes now are people who did not leave their

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homes and those who returned early enough to loot from other homes. The fear now is that if these hoes are not distributed in time people would be forced to eat the seeds given them. During the exercise, it was also discovered that the local staff of the NGOs responsible for distribution of cooking oil sold them to the locals rather than give them freely. A few people confessed to buying the cartons at 2000 FRW per carton of six gallons. A computation carried out by the MILOB Team and the Bourgemestre, showed that about 109 cartons of cooking oil, out of the stock brought for distribution could not be accounted for. Other problems identified include lack of medicines, food and building materials since many homes were destroyed.

6. It was also observed during the course of the exercise that contrary to general reports and impressions held, not very many people have returned to the DPCs or the refugee camps. Most of those who returned to the DPC are the early returnees, ie those who returned to their homes in late July and early August. In Munyina Secteur, the people reported that many of the early returnees were harassed by the Tutsis while some were killed. These prompted some to run back to the DPC and refugee camps thereby spreading the story of reprisals. This has generally stopped as many neighbours now live in peace.

Findings

7. The following findings were made:

- a. Local NGOs staff sell cooking oil instead of distributing it free;
- b. The people are hardly cultivating the land due to lack of hoes;
- c. About 4000 hoes will be required for the commune;
- d. Many people have no shelter and are therefore living in overcrowded homes where they are sheltered by friends and relatives;
- e. MSF and ICRC, during their food distribution refused to give to the new returnees who were not registered during the registration exercise conducted in September;
- f. Medical centres located at Nyamiyaga (SQ8440) and Busoro (SQ) are not adequate;

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- g. Some families still have relatives in the DPCs and refugees camps and would therefore want them brought back. Many families have been displaced and do not therefore know the whereabouts of their kin;
- h. Contrary to general belief, not very many returnees have fled back to the DPCs. Those that have fled are people who were caught up in the reprisals of July and August by the Tutsis. This has generally stopped; and
- i. The condition of most earth roads are bad. Many will be rendered impassable in the near future. Many wooden bridges also require repairs.

Conclusion


8. The monitoring exercise has enabled the team to identify many problems of the locals which were hitherto unknown. Cooking oil meant to be given out to the locals free is now being sold by the local staff of the NGOs. Many locals can not cultivate the land due to lack of hoes, thereby negating the objective of bringing people home to cultivate the land. Rural roads and bridges if not repaired will soon cut off many rural areas from the urban centres, thereby encouraging rural - urban migration.

Recommendation

- 9. It is recommended that:
 - a. Monitoring exercise be encouraged in other areas with large numbers of returnees;
 - b. The allegation of sale of cooking oil be investigated by the NGOs concerned and those found responsible dismissed;
 - c. The present system of distribution of relief materials be reviewed. That is, hoes and seeds be issued out together so that people with seeds but without hoes are not tempted to eat the seeds;
 - d. Appropriate NGOs and UN agencies be encouraged to assist locals with building materials to enable them to rebuild their destroyed homes; and

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- e. Government be advised to encourage locals to repair their roads/bridges in view of lack of resources by the Government, otherwise, many rural areas will be cut-off from urban centres.



E. Esslen
Major
Senior Team Leader
Butare,

21 October 1994

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ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



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MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

SEC-1

OPS

07

MILOB GP HQ

To : All Sectors

Date : 27 Oct 94

From : MILOB GP HQ

Ref : 6464.0/Ops

Sub : MONITORING OF POPULATION MOVEMENT ACROSS THE
RWANDA, BURUNDI, TANZANIA AND ZAIRE BORDERS

Ref :

- A. FHQ Ops Orders No. 20 dated 06 Oct 94
- B. MILOB GP HQ OPO 9 dated 16 Oct 94
- C. FRAGO No. 1 (Copy attached)

1. Attached with is a copy of reference C. The emphasis is on the provision of accurate data/figures on the movement of persons across Rwanda and its neighbouring countries. Such information is to be provided daily. Thereafter, a weekly appraisal of the in and out flow of people at the entry points is to be made to this HQ.

2. You are to implement the FRAGO in conjunction with Refs A and B. In particular, you are to note and abide by the timings.

S ILIYA

Lt Col

For CMO

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Ops Branch
HQ UNAMIR

19 Oct 94

06A

5000.15(G3 Plans)

FRAGMENTARY ORDER NO 01 TO OPERATION ORDER NO 20

Reference:

A. HQ UNAMIR 5000.1 dated 6 Oct 94.

SITUATION

1. General. As given in Reference A.
2. Specific. The population movement figures across Rwanda's borders are notoriously inaccurate and inconclusive. The number of routes, the patchy coverage of crossing points and the variety of reporting sources contribute to an overall statistical base which is, at best, imprecise, and more likely, erroneous. UN and UNAMIR planning is constrained by the poor quality of this information. This Fragmentary Order directs commanders to adopt more precise and independent methods, as a basis for statistical comparison.

MISSION

1. To monitor population movement across the Rwandan borders with Burundi, Tanzania and Zaire.

EXECUTION

4. General Outline. Sector Commanders of Sectors 1,2,3,4 and 5 are to establish border monitoring posts at all identifiable crossing points with Burundi, Tanzania and Zaire.

Tasks. Sector Commanders are to:

- a. Identify all crossing points within their Sectors which fulfil any one of the following criteria:


- (1). Are capable of wheeled traffic.
- (2). Are well used by people moving on foot.
- (3). If situated on water, are suitable landing sites for boats carrying over 20 people.

- b. Man these crossing points from 0600 to 1900 hrs daily, utilising MILOBs or infantry as appropriate.

- c. Keep an accurate record of people crossing in both directions, to include the following:
 - (1). No of adults.
 - (2). No of children.
 - (3). Vehicles by type.
 - d. Report these figures to HQ UNAMIR, as part of the Daily SITREP.
 - e. Maintain local statistical records of population movement.
6. Statistical Analysis. On receipt of the Daily SITREP figures from each Sector, SO2 G2 MilInfo is to incorporate them into the UNAMIR Daily SITREP and report them at the daily FC's Briefing as follows:
- a. Total inflow from each country.
 - b. Total outflow from each country.
 - c. Net gain/loss.
 - d. Comparison with previous day's figures.
 - e. On a weekly basis, comparison with previous week's figures.
 - f. Any items of special interest.
7. Database. SO2 G2 MilInfo is to maintain a database of all figures collated from Sector sources, and provide access to those UNAMIR personnel who require to use it for planning purposes.
8. MILOBs. Sector Commanders may utilise MILOBs or infantry under command, as required, to fulfil the mission.
9. Coordinating Instructions.
- a. Timings. Sector Commanders are to meet the following timings:
 - (1). Identification of crossing points - by 21 Oct 94.
 - (2). First date of monitoring - 23 Oct 94.
 - (3). First report to HQ UNAMIR - by 2359 hrs 23 Oct 94.

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10. Command and Signal. Normal methods of reporting are to be carried out by Sector Commanders. Should an inflow/outflow of special significance occur, Sector Commanders are to report the matter to HQ UNAMIR immediately.



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05

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

(4)

MILOB GP HQ

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MILOB GP HQ

KIGALI

PLANS OPO/02/94

23 Sep 94

See Distribution

OPERATIONS ORDER NO 02 - OP HOMEWARD

SITUATION

1. GENERAL. UNAMIR remains committed to assisting in the relocations of refugees and displaced persons throughout the AOR.
2. SPECIFIC. Occupants of some camps in Sector 4A have demonstrated a clear desire to return to their homes in the BUTARE and GITARAMA Prefectures. UNAMIR currently has considerable transport assets available to support such an Op.

MISSION

3. To provide MILOB Sp for Op HOMEWARD.

EXECUTION

4. Gen Outline. MILOB Sectors 3, 4A and 4B to liaise with TAC HQ (BUTARE), HAC, RPA Comds, BRITCON and ZAMBATT for the efficient conduct of the Op HOMEWARD.
5. Task
 - a. MILOB Comds Sector 3, 4A and 4B

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SEC COM:

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- (1) Liaise with RPF Comds/ COs as arranged by HAC.
- (2) Provide escorts to all convoys.
- (3) Clear and supervise check point procedures.
- (4) Est comms links with convoy to MOVCON at TAC HQ.
- (5) Liaise with local Prefect to establish reception arrangements for refugees/ displaced persons.


6. Coordinating Instructions

a. Coordinating Meeting. Action addressees to nominate suitable representatives to attend a coordinating meeting chaired by HAC at TAC HQ on Tue 20 Sep 94 at 1000hrs.

b. Timings. Op HOMEWARD to commence before the wet season begins. Detail timings will be worked out at Sector HQ level

COMMAND AND CONTROL

7. OP HOMEWARD will be commanded by COO at Tac HQ.
8. MILOB HQ will control UNMO escort requirements.


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A/CMO

Distribution:

External:

Information:

TAC HQ

Internal:

Action:

MILOB Sector 3

MILOB Sector 4A

MILOB Sector 4B

Information:

MILOB Sector 1

MILOB Sector 2

MILOB Sector 4C

MILOB Sector 5

SECTION 1

04

SEC-1

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

MILOB GP HQ

MILOB GP HQ

UNAMIR, KIGALI

6464.0/OPS

22 Sep 94

See Distribution

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF MILOBS AT KIBUNGOGENERAL

1. The security situation, particularly in the South-Eastern region of sector 2 has become worrisome. Unconfirmed reports have revealed that certain atrocities in the form of clandestine killing and terror are being perpetrated either in form of reprisals by the RPA or by pockets of INTERHAMWE still operating within the region.
2. The reports, suggest that the ebbing level of security in the area has provoked the movement of people through the use of footpaths, tracks and a few people using the main road into neighboring Tanzania. On the contrary a few refugees/displaced persons trickle into Rwanda from either Burundi or Tanzania.
3. The intention of the FHQ is to increase its presence in the area in order to facilitate the continuous monitoring of the situation and therefore increased security for the refugees and those already returning and living in their homes.

MISSION

4. The MILOBS are to continue to provide humanitarian assistance in conjunction with friendly agencies in support of the Rwandese Government.

EXECUTION

5. Tasks:

a. MILOB sec 2-Kigali

- (1) Deploy 4 x MILOB teams at Kibungo by 241800 hrs Sep 94.
- (2) Teams to conduct the following tasks:
 - (a) Provide humanitarian assistance in conjunction with NGOs and friendly agencies/forces.
 - (b) Monitor and report the security situation on 24 hours basis.
 - (c) Report immediately any violation of humanitarian rights to MILOB HQ.
 - (d) Coordinate the evacuation of refugees / displaced persons.
 - (e) Report daily movement or flow of persons into and out of Rwanda at the border posts of Rwanda / Tanzania near Rusumu and Rwanda/Burundi, south of Bugasera.
 - (f) Monitor continuously the activities of custom / immigration and RPA officials at the entry point.
 - (g) Provide liaison with the civil authorities and the RPA within boundaries.
 - (h) Investigate any breach of security or serious incidents within sector.
 - (i) Conduct or perform any task you judge can enhance the performance of your mission.
 - (j) Provide unarmed escort on orders of MILOB HQ.
 - (k) Perform any other task assigned to you by MILOB HQ or FHQ.

ADMIN REQUIREMENT

6. As you are aware, the administrative requirement to enhance your deployment are still being coordinated with the FHQ. However, you are to deploy the teams with 04 vehicles including what you can mobilize for the meantime. Further instructions on communications will be issued later. The teams meanwhile will continue to use their present callsigns.

7. The DCMO will visit the teams in place on 26 Sep 94 at a time to be communicated to you.

Signature
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Col
CMO

Distribution:

External:

Action:

MILOB SEC 2

Info:

✓ MILOB SEC 1

" " 2

" " 3

" " 4A, B & C

" " 5

FHQ

Internal:

CMO
DCMO
Plans/Trg Br
Pers/Admin Br
Logistics Br

SEC COM:

DEP. SEC. COM: *h 28/9*

OPS O: *UW*