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An interesting
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MEMORANDUM

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TO: FHQ/DFC/COS/DCMO/DCOS OPS/HAC

File

SUBJECT: RECONCILIATION/OP RETOUR

DATE: 9 MAR 95

1. Aim. The aim of this paper is to review the logic of Op Retour and to discuss some of the factors affecting the possibility of reconciliation. It is hoped that this will be viewed as a fresh line of thinking that may have some use in the development of future UN policy and plans.

2. Background. Prior to the outbreak of the war of Apr 94, the struggle between Hutu and Tutsi seemed to be going largely in the favour of the Hutu. They used their majority status to seize and maintain political power, effectively squeezing out the Tutsi minority. If one begins with the Tutsi success in the previous war and understands that this success both forced the majority to acknowledge the power of the minority and gave impetus to the growing fear of Tutsi domination, one can begin to understand the main elements of the problem now facing the present government. On the one hand, moderate elements believed that compromise was both necessary and possible. On the other hand, hardliner Hutus felt that compromise would lead to loss of power and a return to domination by the Tutsi minority. Hardline demagogues were able to play on the fears of the largely illiterate Hutu peasants to create a level of paranoia that spilled over into hysteria under the impetus of the dramatic death of the president, in Apr 94. The trouble was, the militias, who carried out the majority of the genocidal acts so far recorded, were armed and organized while the Tutsi minority within the country had no weapons and had put their faith in compromise, the UN and the RPF. Ultimately, the RPF provided the only meaningful defence; and only after a terrible price in blood.

3. Current Situation. Having lost nearly one million lives, there are very few Tutsi families in Rwanda who were not personally affected by the massacres. Over and over again one hears harrowing tales of narrow escape and eye witness accounts of horrible atrocities. Underlying every story is the fear that it might all happen again. Given the depth of fear and the emotional state of the survivors of what must, in all frankness, be termed a genocide, it would be expecting a degree of forgiveness more reasonably attributable to angels than humans. Moreover, the fear that the Hutus will one day finish what they started is a powerful motivating force among the survivors. The most pressing concern of the government then is to deal with this fear. Given the stark realities the Tutsis face: the fact that they are a minority, the

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fact that they have little financial help, that a large Hutu population within their borders and have an intact army under the same leadership that perpetrated genocide sitting just outside their borders, it is not that the present government sees democratic compromise in light. They were betrayed once by their belief in the Aru compromise. They are unlikely to trust their fate to a similar compromise in the near future. We should not underestimate the importance of the survival imperative to a people who believe that they prevented complete annihilation only through force of arms.

4. Recent Events. The large number of arrests and the emerging pattern of intimidation and terror in many communes may indicate an effort to consolidate power by eliminating opposition. The death of the Prefet of Butare can also be seen as a step in the process of establishing control. For that matter, the arrest and continued detention of the Sous-Prefet of Gitarama on apparently groundless charges also fit into the same pattern. It would appear that either the government is committed to a course of repressive measures or that they exercise little control over some elements who are determined to take a hard line. In either case, the prisons are overflowing, communal detention centres are full and Hutus are very nervous in most communes in this Sector. Meanwhile, the main focus of UNAMIR over the past few months has been to bring as many people back to their homes as possible.

Operation Retour

5. The operation to try peacefully to empty IDP camps as a precursor to enticing refugees home from neighbouring countries was launched with the conviction that there was no alternative. It was feared that the only way to avert forced closing of the camps and bloodshed was to take the initiative to encourage people to go home of their own volition. While it is understood that life in the camps is not exactly idyllic and that the presence of camps within the country's borders poses a security threat to the present government, one cannot reasonably expect to overcome the deep fears and hatred that exist on both sides by merely solving a few logistic problems. The single biggest problem to be dealt is the psychological effect of genocide. Bringing victims and perpetrators of this genocide back together while the memories of its horror are still so fresh is bound to cause problems. Given the scope of the trauma that has to be worked through, bringing the two sides face to face this soon after the event, while bodies are still being exhumed from mass graves for reburial, is hardly conducive to reconciliation.

6. Alongside the passion for vengeance that almost certainly exists among the survivors, more reasonable people will be concerned to make sure that they protect themselves from the possibility of a repetition. Given their numeric minority status

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and their recent history, the responsible members of the government would be irrational if they did not seek to establish some sort of minority control. At the moment, with the memories so strong and with options so limited, it would be understandable for the government to be inclined to take a fairly hard line and to use its most reliable element to maintain control - the RPA. If the government's aim is to establish control through repression and force of arms then bringing people home in easily manageable numbers, as we are currently doing with Op Retour, delivers them to repression. Op Retour, in so far as it brings victims and perpetrators together, would seem to invite the kind of reaction that has been noticed in Musambira, Mugina and Kigoma, of which we have been reporting regularly. These communes appear to have become a hotbed of repression over the past few weeks.

7. Bringing people back together without dealing with the fear that drove them apart is similar to an attempt to move a battered woman back into the same home as her abusive husband. They are unlikely to kiss and make up as long as one fears further abuse and the other fears retaliation. While both are safe while apart, neither is safe if forced to live under the same roof without having worked through their problems and having come to terms with them. Seen in this light, any attempt at precipitous reconciliation is unwise; and possibly dangerous. Op Retour seems to overlook an essential element of reconciliation - that it is unlikely to come about if either or both sides have reason to fear the other. If Op Retour is completely successful, it will recreate many of the conditions that led to one of the most horrible massacres in recent history. If partially successful, it is liable to expose many innocent families to repression for the foreseeable future. The operation may also discredit the agencies that participated in it.

8. Perhaps where Op Retour went wrong was in its failure to address the security problems likely to be faced by the returnees and the possibility of repression. Yet, given the dangers faced by the current government and the constraints they work under, repression would seem the most likely way of meeting their survival imperatives; at least in the short term. From a cynical point of view, it is just possible that the government expressed its willingness to go along with Op Retour because it perceived that it was the best way to get the people and the suspects home to be arrested without losing the support of the international community. It may also be possible that the threats against the camps were a deliberate ploy to get our cooperation in a well conceived cover plan. We thus need to analyse whether Op Retour was a result of inability to correctly perceive the real intentions of the present government.

The situation at the moment is far from clear.

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What does seem obvious however is that there are good reasons for the present government to use its military power to maintain itself. To allow democracy in the traditional sense of the word is to run the risk of losing power to a majority guilty of a genocide and to run the risk of the genocide starting again. It also seems evident that there are deep sentiments of fear and vengeance at work behind the scenes and that until these sentiments are resolved, there can be no reconciliation. Finally, it also seems that reconciliation in advance of the resolution of the issues that led to the war will fill whatever new prison space is created and lead to more repression and intimidation as the government tries to restrain its people, prevent chaos and retain power. For these reasons, it seems unwise to press on with reconciliation attempts that are not aligned with efforts to resolve the underlying issues that exist. The fear and the hatred must be dealt with if there is to be lasting peace. These issues will require both intelligent structural adjustments and time.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

10. It is believed that there are few easy choices open to UNAMIR at the present time. If we push on with repatriation, we run the risk of being accused of assisting the present government to establish a repressive regime. If we try to slow down the present initiative to close the IDP camps in Rwanda, we run the risk of having the RPA do it by force. But, if the logic in this paper is accepted, that is a step we ought to take. The present government has an interest in keeping international support and funding flowing in and may be reluctant to show their hand too plainly out of fear of alienating countries on whose help they presently rely. It may therefore be possible to prevail upon them to accept a longer period of IDP return by pointing out to them that unilateral military action in this case may have financial consequences that outweigh the security concerns caused by the presence of these camps. In the meantime, it is recommended that more time be devoted to resolving the issues that block reconciliation and that more aggressive action at the political level may be required.

11. The fear and the hatred that lie close to the surface on both sides of the political dynamic must be assuaged to some degree by the establishment of a justice system that is perceived by both sides to be fair. At the moment, such a system does not exist and the present practice of placing persons suspected of genocidal acts in "preventative detention" without trial, and without hope of trial in the near future, is widely perceived as repressive and arbitrary. Perhaps it would be worth exploring the possibility of making the establishment of at least a rudimentary judicial system a condition for further repatriation. It has been learned that such a system, with international judicial talent, is already in

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cards. The question is whether the government will seriously
towards the implementation of a system which will prevent
arbitrary arrests and preventative detention. It is for the
international community to, once again, ensure its implementation
in a carrot and stick policy.

An easy alternative to Op Retour is not easy to conceive of at
this time. With all its failings, Op Retour is still a workable
provided that it is stretched out over a longer period so as
allow the establishment of a judicial system and to permit
tensions to subside a little. In the prevailing circumstances, time
by itself, be a great healer and perhaps would also give us
breathing space which could be used to put greater diplomatic
pressure on the government to find a better way to face its
survival imperatives.

S.A. Hasnain
Col
Sect Cdr

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REFERENCE.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 15 December 1994
NUMBER: 4164
SUBJECT: Security in IDP Camps



1. Thank you for your MIR 2797 of 15 December on the above. The Office of the Secretary-General has requested a further update on the operation conducted by UNAMIR in the IDP camps. This Update will be used to brief the Security Council at informal consultations scheduled for tomorrow morning. We would therefore appreciate it if you could send us, by 9:00 a.m. our time tomorrow 16 December, any additional information you may have regarding the operation.

2. Vice-President Major-Kagame met this morning the Secretary-General and addressed the Security Council, after informally briefing the Council Members. I also met with him. The text of his statement to the Council and a Note on his meeting with me are attached for your information. Regards.

CNR 699 P 2/6

**STATEMENT OF HIS EXCELLENCY MAJOR-GENERAL
PAUL KAGAME, VICE-PRESIDENT AND MINISTER
OF DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA
TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL**

NEW YORK, DECEMBER 15 1994

CNR 699 P 3/6

MR. PRESIDENT, DISTINGUISHED MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

IT IS A GREAT HONOUR TO ADDRESS THIS COUNCIL, AND AN APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITY TO WARMLY THANK THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND ITS MEMBERS FOR THE SUPPORT THEY GAVE TO MY COUNTRY DURING THE DIFFICULT TIMES WE WENT THROUGH. IN THE NAME OF MY GOVERNMENT AND THE RWANDESE PEOPLE, PLEASE ACCEPT MY PRESENCE HERE AS A THOUGHTFUL SIGN OF GRATITUDE.

OUR THANKS ARE ALSO ADDRESSED TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, DR. BOUTROS-BOUTROS GHALI, WHO DID WHATEVER HE MANAGED TO DO IN SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN MY COUNTRY AND THE REGION. WITH YOUR HELP AND WISDOM, SOME INVALUABLE WORK WAS DONE ALTHOUGH MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE.

THE WORLD WILL NEVER FORGET THE TRAGEDY THAT STRUCK OUR COUNTRY AND THE HUMAN RACE SINCE THE HOLOCAUST. WE TOOK OUR COURAGE IN OUR HANDS AND FOUGHT TO STOP THE GENOCIDE THANKS TO ALL RWANDESE PEOPLE WHO STOOD UP ALMOST SINGLEHANDEDLY. THE FORMER DEFEATED GOVERNMENT FORCES PHYSICALLY DESTROYED EVERYTHING ON THEIR WAY, KILLING AND RAPING INNOCENT CIVILIANS WHILE ALSO LOOTING WHATEVER THEY COULD LIFT AND CARRY. SCARS OF DEEP WOUNDS INFLICTED TO THE CIVIL SOCIETY ARE STILL WELL MARKED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, A COUNTRY WE ARE DETERMINED TO REBUILD AND GIVE A NEW SENSE OF JUSTICE AND UNITY AS A MATTER OF URGENCY.

OUR COUNTRY HAS KNOWN DIFFICULT TIMES BEFORE, ALTHOUGH NOT AS FAR BACK AS INTERNATIONAL MEDIA PUT IT, AND THE RECENT GENOCIDE ENGINEERED BY EVIL FORCES CONSTITUTES A RESULT OF WHAT BLESSED IMPUNITY CAN OFFER, I. E. VIOLENCE AND MORE VIOLENCE, REFUGEES AND MORE REFUGEES IN THE REGION.

OUR NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES HAVE ON THEIR SOIL A BLEND OF NEW RWANDESE REFUGEES: A MIXTURE OF ARMED KILLERS WHO ARE STILL IN UNIFORMS AND INNOCENT PEOPLE BOTH OF WHOM ARE CONTINUALLY MISLED BY THE VERY LEADERS WHO ENGINEERED PREVIOUS AND MOST RECENT MASSACRES. ENJOYING SUCH KIND OF SUPPORT, STRENGTHENED BY THE INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE ALMOST BLINDLY DIRECTED TO THEM THROUGH INCONSISTENT POLICIES AND VIOLATED LAWS AND RULES THAT GOVERN SOME OF THE UN BODIES SUCH AS THE UNHCR WITH REGARD TO WHO IS REFUGEE AND WHO IS NOT, THE CRIMINALS HAVE ONCE AGAIN TAKEN THE LAW IN THEIR OWN HANDS AND STARTED TO INTIMIDATE AND KILL ORDINARY INNOCENT PEOPLE WHO ARE LONGING TO RETURN HOME.

THESE REFUGEES ARE CLEARLY HELD HOSTAGES AND IRONICALLY WITHOUT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY BEING ABLE TO STOP IT. WE CERTAINLY WANT THESE HOSTAGES TO BE FREE AND GO BACK TO THEIR HOMELAND. WE ARE EXPECTING THEM HOME AND THE SAME WAY WE ARE WAITING FOR ADEQUATE MEANS TO SECURE THEIR SAFE RETURN AND SETTLEMENT.

IT IS DEPLORABLE THAT THE DEGREE OF INTIMIDATION INFLICTED TO THOSE INNOCENT PEOPLE CAN BE LEFT TO CONTINUE UNCHALLENGED. THERE IS AN OVER-ESTIMATION OF STRENGTH OF THESE CRIMINAL GROUPS. THEY CAN

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DECISIVELY BE DISARMED AND RELOCATED TO PLACES WHERE THEY DO NOT POSE AN IMMEDIATE SECURITY PROBLEM TO RWANDA. WE APPEAL TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO ASSIST ZAIRE IN DEALING WITH THIS PROBLEM.

THE NUMBER OF UNAMIR FORCES WHICH WERE REDUCED FROM 2,800 TO 270 WHEN MASSACRES STARTED HAS NOW REACHED A HIGH FIGURE OF 5,600. THEIR PRESENT ROLE IS CERTAINLY APPRECIATED AND THAT IS THE REASON WHY MY GOVERNMENT WAS IN FAVOUR OF THE RENEWAL OF THE MANDATE.

INSIDE THE COUNTRY, THE RWANDESE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE PROVISION FOR THE FOLLOWING: THE TRANSITIONAL BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT AND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY HAVE BEEN SET UP IN THE SPIRIT OF ARUSHA ACCORDS SIGNED ON AUGUST 4, 1993. IN THE SAME SAFEGUARD OF THE ACCORDS, WE ARE GLAD TO HAVE WELCOMED BACK ABOUT 2,500 SOLDIERS FROM FORMER GOVERNMENT FORCES AMONG WHOM ARE 70 OFFICERS WHO ARE FOLLOWING REORIENTATION PROGRAMMES. THEIR PROGRAMME WILL SOON BE OVER AND THEIR REINTEGRATION EFFECTIVE IN A MATTER OF WEEKS.

OUR GOVERNMENT HAS DONE WHAT IT COULD DO TO MEET THE IMMEDIATE NEEDS OF ITS POPULATION BUT WE HAVE NO ADEQUATE MEANS TO DO IT AND TO PUT IN PRACTICE OUR PRINCIPLES OF GOOD GOVERNANCE BASED ON JUSTICE FOR ALL RWANDESE REGARDLESS OF WHAT WAS USED TO DIVIDE US. WE APPEAL TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO TAKE ITS RESPONSIBILITIES IN ASSISTING US TO HELP RWANDESE PEOPLE TO HELP THEMSELVES.

DELAYS PUT TO ASSIST OUR GOVERNMENT OR REFUSAL TO DO SO WILL END UP DIMINISHING CONFIDENCE AND UNDERMINING THE TRUST WE EXPECT FROM THE LARGE MAJORITY OF THE POPULATION. IT WILL ALSO INCREASE PRESSURE ON THE INTERNATIONAL DONOR COMMUNITY TO KEEP THE AID SYNDROME ALIVE. TIME IS ON OUR HANDS AND THE LONGER WE WAIT THE WORSE THE SITUATION BECOMES.

WE BELIEVE THAT RWANDESE PEOPLE SHOULD BE ASSISTED TO HELP THEMSELVES AND BE GIVEN A CHANCE TO PROVE THEY CAN DO IT IN THE BEST WAY TO ACHIEVE NATIONHOOD IN JUSTICE, TOLERANCE, RECONCILIATION AND UNITY.

PEACE AND STABILITY IN RWANDA AND IN THE REGION WILL DEPEND UPON WHAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY CAN DO AND HOW SWIFTLY IT CAN DO THAT. SENDING RIGHT AND STRONG SIGNALS TO CRIMINALS AND ADDRESSING IMPUNITY IN THE REGION IS FOR SURE THE BEST SOLUTION FOR ALL OF US. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS ALREADY UNDERSTOOD THAT STABILITY AND RULE OF LAW CAN ONLY STEM FROM TAKING PROPER MEASURES TO ADDRESS IMPUNITY AND SWIFTLY ENOUGH TO INSURE JUSTICE, UNITY, AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONHOOD IDEAS, FREE FROM DIVISIONS AND SECTARIANISM.

THANK YOU.

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**Meeting between Major-General Paul Kagame
and Mr. Kofi Annan**

This afternoon, 15 December 1994, the Rwandese Vice President Major-General Paul Kagame paid a visit to USG Kofi Annan to exchange views on the situation in and around Rwanda. Mr. de Souza representing DPA also attended the meeting. The Vice-President emphasized that the situation in Rwanda and that which prevails in the Rwandese camps in Tanzania and Zaire must be dealt with simultaneously. While assistance should be given to the refugees in the camps in the neighbouring countries, conditions conducive to the return of refugees must be created in Rwanda. This therefore called for a critical look at what should be done. The Government of Rwanda was unable to deal with the situation alone. The international community should therefore look at what its obligations were in Rwanda.

It was regrettable that the status of a refugee was being extended even to some criminal elements who were in the refugee camps. While these elements were still organizing and inciting people in the camps they were at the same time seeking to be granted immunity from prosecution for the crimes they had committed.

Mr. Annan pointed at the urgency of dealing with the situation in the refugee camps and the complex issue of isolating the militia and the former Government soldiers from the refugees in the camps. He sought the views of the Vice-President on how he thought this should be done. He also emphasized the need to encourage the people in the IDP camps to voluntarily leave the camps rather than for force to be used. General Baril explained to the Vice President the options which were under consideration at the United Nations and emphasized the need to involve the Zaireans in any of the options. Mr. Riza pointed out that it had been difficult to find troops for any of the options being discussed. He sought the views of the Vice President as to whether the problems in the camps in Tanzania, where Government tended to have the will to act, should be handled first before dealing with the problems in the camps in Zaire.

The Vice President noted that the problems in the camps in Zaire and Tanzania were not that different except that the Tanzanian Government had the capacity and the will to take action in the camps on its territory. He believed that Zaire should be made to understand that the problems in the camps on its territory and any attempt by the former soldiers to attack Rwanda from Zaire would in the long run not be in its interest. If therefore, Zaire would have the political will to act and the international community gives it support the problems in the camps could be dealt with without much violence. In any case some force would have to be applied since some of the criminal elements were living in those camps and could not easily be brought to justice. The Vice President was of the view that too much was being made of the threat of the militia in the camps to resist. He thought their threat did not match their numbers. He believed that a force of 3,000 to 3,500

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soldiers could accomplish the mission. He was also of the opinion that resources should be concentrated on the problems in the camps in Zaire, but that Tanzania should also be assisted.

The Vice President agreed with Mr. Annan that the IDP camps should be disbanded voluntarily. However, he noted that these camps had become sanctuaries of criminal elements who would leave the camps to commit crimes and return to the camps. This should not be tolerated. He expressed his Government's desire to cooperate and work with UNAMIR to find ways of dealing with such problems. Criminal elements should be forced out of the camps while the internally displaced people should be allowed to voluntarily decide to return to their communities. However, a dependency syndrome was being encouraged by the relief agencies who seem not to want the people to leave the camps while the internally displaced people find it comfortable to stay in the camps rather than returning to their communities.

The Vice-President said that he had now been informed that the World Bank will be releasing loans for Rwanda in January.



Leonard T. Kapungu
15 December 1994

cc: Mr. Annan
Mr. Riza
Mr. Annabi
Gen. Baril

1994-12-16

03:00

PAGE = 06

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: BARIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: ANYIDHO, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 8 December 1994

NUMBER:

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE PEACE KEEPING OPERATION FOR THE RWANDAN REFUGEE CAMPS

References:

- A. MIR 2300 dated 4 Nov 94.
- B. MIR 2322 dated 7 Nov 94.
- C. UNAMIR fax F/O 3051 dated 9 Nov 94.
- D. MIR 2408 dated 14 Nov 94.
- E. UNATIONS 3787 dated 18 Nov 94.
- F. UNATIONS 4025 dated 2 Dec 94.

1. Thank you for your offer for UNAMIR to contribute further to the staffing of the plan for a possible operation in the Zairian refugee camps. Much advice has been already been provided at References A to D, copies of which are enclosed for ease of reference.

2. Paragraphs 18-25 of Reference E gave command guidance and framed in broad terms a concept of operations. There is to be a 2 phase operation to isolate the Former Government Forces and their political and militia elements from the remainder of the refugees in order to ensure the security of international relief workers, and provide protection for the storage and delivery of humanitarian assistance. In Phase One, 2 mechanised battalions are to enter camp sites and establish secure areas, by disarming the Disruptive Elements (DEs) and isolating them in holding areas. Once security has been achieved, they are to hand over responsibility for security to a locally trained force, and continue to the next site. In Phase Two, area security is to be provided by motorised units, operating at Company Group level, which will assume responsibility for a number of camps that were cleared in Phase One. Safe passage is to be provided for refugees to the border where UNAMIR Rwanda forces will assume responsibility for security during transit to and after arrival at home communes.

3. Mission. From Reference E I have deduced the following mission:

"To create security conditions conducive to the voluntary repatriation of refugees, in order to encourage the return of Rwandan people from refugee camps in Zaire."

4. Limitations. * Limitations on the Mission are:

- a. The size of the assigned force is yet to be confirmed.
- b. The Mandate is yet to be formulated.
- c. ROE has not been established.
- d. I have been directed to initiate the operation in North Kivu.

5. Specified Tasks and Troops Required. Reference E specified the following tasks, from which a Troops to Task calculation has been drawn:

a. Provide Security for International Aid Workers. Currently there are over 70 NGO bodies in the Goma area, with a total expatriate strength of approximately 1000 souls. ~~If benign security conditions persist, area protection in the form of vehicle and foot patrols, will be required. It will be a single company task. Should the situation deteriorate and the requirements for the aid workers to operate continue, this task alone will occupy one battalion.~~

b. Provide Security for the Storage and Delivery of Humanitarian Supplies. There are over 30 storage sites and approximately 600 NGO personnel, delivering to 6 camps. In benign conditions this is a company task. ~~In a deteriorated situation, a static guardforce will be required in addition to escorts, raising the requirement for troops to a 4 company battalion and an additional company.~~

c. Establish Screening Procedures to keep Weapons Outside the HPZ. For this task not to produce a heavy manpower bill, the DEs must be removed during the Phase One. The task can then be achieved by local security forces.

d. Provide Safe Passage for Refugees to the Rwandan Border. In benign conditions this will be a platoon task. ~~In a deteriorated situation, protected vehicle escort convoys would be required. This would raise the manning cost to one mechanised company.~~

6. Implied Tasks. From those tasks the following implied tasks have been determined and information to assist:

a. Gain information on disruptive elements (DEs). This task should be given to the agency charged with the selection and training of the local security force. Additional technical assistance should be sought from member countries. See Reference A Paragraph 1.a.

b. Search for and confiscate weapons. Additional search training will be required for infantry troops. ~~Detection equipment will be needed for search teams.~~

c. Apprehend DEs. The mandate for the Force must clearly define what activities are illegal, to allow the separation of DEs. ~~The camp leaders can be expected to claim a legitimate right to exercise their authority over their people. If they remain within the law, their political influence may be extremely difficult to overcome.~~

d. Establish cage system. This will require a military guard force of up to one company, with some spare capacity.

e. Provide escort for DEs move away from HPZ. This will require up to one motorised company, with some spare capacity.

f. Provide EOD capability. This will require an EOD capability for each of the 2 mechanised battalions for detection and disposal of UXO.

g. Provide medical support. This task will require a first, second and third line medical capability. First line should be organic to the battalions, the remainder will be an additional Force Troops requirement. See Reference C.

h. Provide Protection for UNAMIR Troops and Males. ~~will self-protect. Material protection will require 250 - 500 troops. See Reference D.~~

i. Participate in Coordination of Humanitarian Activity. This will be a function of the Zairian operation FC's staff.

j. Coordinate Repatriation. This will be a function of the FC's staff, in conjunction with HQ UNAMIR and Rwandan agencies.

k. Provide Escorts to Border. See Paragraph 4.d. above. It will require a mechanised force of between a platoon and a company.

l. Provide Security for Safe Corridors in Rwanda including the Coordination of Welcome Centres and Transport. This will be a UNAMIR Rwanda task.

m. Coordinate C² with UNAMIR Rwanda. This will be a responsibility of UNAMIR FC's staff who will coordinate with the Zairian operation.

n. Coordinate Log Sp with UNAMIR Rwanda. This will be a responsibility of UNAMIR FC's staff who will coordinate with the Zairian operation.

o. Produce Public Information plan. This will be a function of the Zairian operation FC's staff, in consultation with SRSg.

p. Traffic Control. This will require an MP capability to coordinate vehicle and personnel traffic flow. See Reference C.

7. Factors.

a. Enemy/Ground.

(1) Numbers. The size of the problem relative to my strength forces me to phase my operation.

(2) Weapons. It is not considered likely that the RGF will mount a conventional military operation against UN forces, therefore I do not need conventional force ratios to achieve my mission. They are likely, however, to assist DEs in the provision of weapons, so I should be prepared to encounter RPG, MMG, grenades, small arms, mines and booby traps.

(3) Tactics. It is likely that the enemy will either escape quickly, or use small scale actions to disrupt my activity, and tie down my forces. To counter this I must channelise and block the enemy from the outset, and maximise an overt presence and an effective reactive capability.

(4) Civil Disturbance. The enemy is likely to incite local civil disturbance, to maintain control, therefore I require crowd control equipment and my troops must be trained appropriately. Sound understanding and strict adherence to the ROE will be essential.

(5) Ground. The ground is flat, but the volcanic rock is extremely damaging to wheeled vehicles when moving off-road. Within the camps the access roads are extremely narrow. The 6 camps are extremely large (Katale has 250,000 occupants) and are not separated by any definable geographic feature. I must divide them into tactical sectors and subsectors according to the size of the manoeuvre elements. I must also consider the best disposition and force requirement to establish the HPZ. I must plan a mix of wheeled and tracked vehicles, and establish

a traffic flow system within camps. This will be a task for an MP Unit. I must plan additional ES to deal with wheel and track maintenance. I must have engineer defence stores to establish effective boundaries within my AORs.

b. Operational Security. ~~Operational surprise will not be achievable due to its impracticality.~~ Since the operation has to be conducted sequentially tactical surprise will also be unlikely, as the enemy will easily deduce what my successive objectives are to be. I can, however, plan small deception operations, to assist me to maintain the initiative, and keep the enemy off balance. I can also achieve limited surprise by concealing the precise timings of my operations. Area security can be afforded by the motorised battalion operating in a screen or guard role. The training agency for the local security force should be given the task of assisting in my surveillance plan.

c. Time. I have been given between 24-30 months to conduct the operation which requires the pacification of 870,000 refugees in North Kivu, and 370,000 in the South. Given a 20% planning margin, my operation will require to neutralise camp areas to the total of 35,500 refugees per month to achieve the task in 30 months. I cannot achieve this with the force available to me. The situation may change as the operation develops, and camps increasingly "melt down", but if they do not I will need additional time.

d. Logistics. ~~To support the Zairian operation a logistic service battalion will be required, since there~~ will be a requirement for forward support. Since logistics will assume such importance, the selection of a fully capable unit will be vital. For stocks, sustainability and tasks see Reference C.

8. Constraints. Appropriate ROE is a vital precondition of deployment. See Reference D Paragraph 20.a.

9. Additional Concepts to be Developed. Prior to the plan being developed there are a number of additional concepts that require consideration. These have not been explored in this paper since they are, in the main, dependant on the size of the force, but are included for your consideration.

a. Task Organisation.

b. Concept of Manoeuvre.

- (1) How mission is to be achieved.
- (2) Effect to be imposed on DEs, and for how long.
- (3) Force posture.
- (4) Axis of effort.
- (5) Determination of Objectives and Phases.

c. C² Arrangements.

- (1) Tactical mission.
- (2) Command relation lines.
- (3) Provision of Real Link Communication

(4) Locations of CPs.

d. Rear Area Operations.

e. Employment of Tactical Reserves. Note that UNAMIR will supply the reserve at the operational level.

f. Employment of Helicopters. Note that UNAMIR has no spare capacity.

g. Logistic Concept. See Reference C.

h. Engineer Concept.

i. Withdrawal Concept/Contingency Plans.

j. Liaison/Coordination Concept.

k. DE/Detainee Handling Concept.

l. Public Information/Psyops Concept.

m. Military Information Collection Concept.

n. Operational Deployment Concept.

10. Early Selection of Commander. While fully understanding the difficulties that the Secretary General has experienced in securing offers of troops from member countries, I restate the importance of the early nomination of the Force Commander for the Zairian part of the operation, to allow his input to planning and the formulation of a mandate and ROE.

11. Best regards.