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To : See distribution

From : MILOB GP HQ

Date : 07 Dec 94

Sub : WARNING ORDER

1. SITUATION. There have been increase in acts of banditry, intimidation and criminal activities especially in certain DP camps. The most affected camps are those of KIBEHO (5007) stretching to NDAHO (5201). Both the DP camps are located in sector 4A. It is imperative that firm action is taken to restore security in accordance with UNAMIR mandate. UNAMIR forces will undertake operations in cooperation with 2 RPA battalions to get rid of criminal elements from the mentioned camps/area.

2. MISSION. The MILOB GP will conduct operations in conjunction with formed troops to clear criminal elements from KIBEHO and NDAGO DP camps.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operation. UNAMIR will conduct a cordon and search op in cooperation with the RPA. Two RPA bns will form the outer cordon. Seven UNAMIR companies will form the inner cordon and conduct the search with RPA identification and liaison teams. A linear oriented search will be conducted concurrently by all UNAMIR companies commencing at Kibeho. A single UNAMIR coy will be inserted at Ndago as a blocking force. A prelim op to increase the UN presence in the camps will be conducted during the planning period.

b. MILOB Sect 1

(1) Detach one MILOB team to ops command of CO NICOY effective 10 Dec 94.

(2) Detach 2 MILOB teams under ops command of MILOB Tac HQ with effect from 11 Dec 94. Teams to report to sec 3 by 111600 Dec 94.

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- (3) Conduct MILOB operations in conjunction with formed troops.

c. MILOB Sect 2

- (1) Detach three MILOB teams to ops command of CO ZAMBATT effective 10 Dec 94.
- (2) Prepare to conduct operations in support of formed contingent.

d. MILOB Sect 3

- (1) Receive two teams from sec 1 by 111600 Dec 94.
- (2) Deploy two MILOB teams by 09 Dec 94 to the camps. Be prepared to deploy three additional teams by 12 Dec 94.
- (3) Monitor and report on 24 hours basis the situation at the camps.
- (4) Sect comd (Lt Col Hasnain) will be the assistant MILOB commander; to be co-located with MILOB Tac HQ.

e. MILOB Sect 4A

- (1) Detach three MILOB teams to ops command of CO GHANBATT effective 10 Dec 94.
- (2) Prepare to conduct operations in support of formed contingent.

f. MILOB Sect 4B

- (1) Detach one MILOB team to ops command of CO FRAFBATT effective 10 Dec 94
- (2) Conduct MILOB operations in support of formed contingent.

g. MILOB Sect 4C

- (1) Provide three MILOB teams under ops command of CO

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ETHIOBATT effective 10 Dec 94.

(2) Conduct MILOB operations in support of formed contingent.

h. MILOB Sector 5.

(1) Provide three MILOB teams under ops command of CO TUNBATT effective 10 Dec 94.

(2) Conduct MILOB operations in support of formed contingent.

i. MILOB Sect 6.

(1) Provide one MILOB team to MILOB Tac HQ.

(2) Keep two MILOB teams on 1 hr NTM to move to operational area.

(2) Be prepared to support any of the MILOB sectors, on orders from DCMO/TAC HQ.

j. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Timings

(a) D - 2 (12 Dec 94) Move to assembly area commence.

(b) D - 1 (13 Dec 94) Move to assembly area complete.

(c) D Day 14 Dec 94

(d) H - Hour First Light D Day

(e) H + 2 Operation complete (16 Dec 94).

(f) D + 3 Commence redeployment

(2) FCs ops orders at 090930 Dec 94 at UNAMIR HQ. All

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MILOB Sector Comds to attend. DCMOs coord conference on 091400 Dec 94. All Sect Comds to attend.

(3) Assembly area -- BUTARE

4. SERVICE SUPPORT. MILOBs to be self sufficient on Water/Food throughout the operations (48 Hrs). Sleeping bags, Flak Jackets and Helmets be worn during cordon and search operation.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNALS

(a) <u>Loc of MILOB Tac HQ</u>	KIBEHO (5007) -- Time later
(b) <u>MILOB HQ (Rear)</u>	Present Loc
(c) <u>Force Tac HQ</u>	KIBEHO
(d) <u>Alternate</u>	BUTARE
(e) <u>Communication</u>	Instructions to follow.



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Action :

All MILOB Sectors

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SECT-5

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Read with 1
INV. 015

Case #: GY 001 / 10 / 94

To: William Clarence
via Information Unit
cc. to MilObs sec. 5

From: Oskar Lehner, Souria Saad Zoy (HRFO Team Sector 4b and 5)

Subject: First Investigation Report about the Massacre in RUTAGARA / RWERERE
Commune / Sector 5, 31 Oct. 94

Date: 07/11/1994

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1) Summary:

On 31 October 94, between 02 30 and 03 00 hours three families (4 men, 6 women, 26 children) in three different houses were killed in RUTAGARA / RWERERE Commune by unidentified persons using guns and hand grenades. All houses were placed within 300 meters to the border. **So far the investigations could find no evidence whether RPA or forces coming from the Zairian side of the Border (Interahamwe, former RGF) have committed the crime.**

The villagers in Rutagara have not seen the malefactors and it seems that the population in this area itself is not sure which side the perpetrators came from.

The international press mentioned two "eye-witnesses" or "survivors" of the massacre, CELESTIN MUSEKURA and MUNGARUKIKO JEAN, both sons of one of the victims (see AFP-report in annex # 1, further UNHCR-report annex # 2). They are neither eye-witnesses nor survivors. They spent the night in an other house, some 500 meters away from where the massacre took place. They visited the house where their family was killed about 2 1/2 hour after they heard the shooting. In the house they meet RPA sodiers which explained that they are starting an investigation about the crime.

As the only result of the investigations **it can be proved that both sides, RPA and forces linked to the former government had the possibility to kill the people.** The three houses lay between the defense position and the Zairian border (see map annex # 3 and 4). During night this area is difficult to control. Many small paths, which have been used by the local population for a long time lead through this strip from Rwanda to Zaire. One path is passing house C on a distance of 5

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meters. Both sides from a military point of view had access to the three houses without running the risk to be detected by the other side or by the local population.

2) Investigations carried out:

On 31 Oct 94 MilObs informed HRFO about a massacre that took place during the night of 30/31 October 1994. Unidentified person had killed 36 people in three different houses along the Zairian border. MilObs visited the three sites on 31 Oct 94 together with local RPA officers (see attached MilObs report - Annex # 5). On 1, 2 and 3 Nov 94 a team of HRFO (Oskar Lehner and Souria Saad Zoy) accompanied by MilObs (Maj. Erich Weissenboeck) (further called the investigation team) went to the sites for further investigations.

Arriving at the spot on 1 Nov 94 the investigation team met Lt. Col. Charles Kayonga, the RPA battalion commander of Gisenyi. Most of the time the investigation team was accompanied by Col. Kayonga. For about 30 min. Col. William Bagire, the brigade commander of northern region joined the investigation team. Never the less members of the investigation team were able to speak to people without the presence of RPA soldiers. On this day the interviews with the witnesses a) to j) (see below point 5) were made.

On 2 Nov 94 the investigation team interviewed further witnesses, all villagers of Rutagara: temoignages k) till n).

On 3 Nov 94 the investigation team inspected the strip between the houses A, B, C and the Zairian border. Further the team interviewed some of the RPA soldiers that were on duty during the night of the massacre: statements o) till q).

On 06 Nov 94 the HRFO team talked to the two "eye-witnesses" some 3 km north of Goma: statement r).

To talk to the population we used a local Mr. Jean Ruhimba as interpreter in Rwanda and Mr. Jean Marie Boulere from UNHCR Goma in Zaire.

3) Observations:

The victims were killed in three different houses (see map - annex # 4). All three houses had the following similarities: they were situated very close to the Zairian border (about 100 to 300 meters) and were built at a very isolated location. The vegetation between the houses and in the strip towards the border is a very rough area. If one does not use a torch, one can cross this area only by using the footpaths. There are several footpaths leading from Zaire to Rwanda, which are frequently used by the locals.

To be able to find the houses at night the perpetrators must have had knowledge of the territory. Many people in this area (including the wiped out families) spent at least some weeks in the refugee camps in Zaire and came back to Rwanda in July, August or September. All victims are returnees.

Witnesses stated that the night of 30/31 Oct was very dark. The authors of this report, who live some 20 km south of the massacre place, can confirm this allegation.

The frontier is not marked and can not be located by a river or an other landmark. The borderline is not a straight line as shown in all maps but makes a lot curves. There is a constant flow of people that cross the border in this area in both directions.

According to the statements of the witnesses the massacre started on 31 Oct 94 between 02 30 and 03 00 hours.

a) The most northern house (**house A**) is placed at RUTAGARA 189204 (sector KINYANZOVU, Commune RWERERE). 19 bodies were found in one out of a group of four huts. The victims were made up of 2 men, 4 women and 13 children. The head of the family was a community leader by name ALPHONSE CYANGANZARA. When the investigation team arrived the bodies were still in the house, neighbors were preparing a grave behind the house.

The investigation team found several cartridge cases used for an AK 47 laying on the floor. When some neighbors started removing the bodies towards the grave, a hand grenade was found under one of the bodies. It obviously was a dud, as the safety splint was pulled out and the shackle was gone. The grenade was handed over to RPA. The victims showed the typical wounds of grenade explosions. The bodies were buried at about 13 00 hours.

b) **House B** (RUTAGARA 186201, sector BYAHI, commune RUBAVU) is placed between house A and C. 10 bodies were found in that house; 1 man, 1 women, 8 children. The head of the family was a man called KINYOGOTE. When the investigation team arrived the bodies were already buried. Cartridge cases used in Ak 47 guns were found on the floor. House B is the only house where there is another family living nearby (see below the statement of Mr. Seziraro).

c) **House C** (RUTAGARA 18319) is the most southern one. 7 dead bodies were found in the house: 1 man, 1 woman, 5 children. The head of the family was a man called NTAKAZARUMARA. MilObs think that just fire arms were used. Around the house the investigation team found cartridge cases of a R 4 gun. The bodies were already buried behind the hut.

4) Pieces of Evidence:

The investigation team collected several of the cartridge cases in and around the houses. Further pictures were taken and the scenery was filmed with a video camera.

At the place where one of the RPA patrol claims to have had a short gun battle (place D), one cartridge case was found.

Because of the consistence of the soil there were no usable foot marks

5) Statements of people at the spot:

a) Lt. Col. Charles Kayonga, RPA battalion commander Gisenyi made the following statement:

“The perpetrators were members of Interahamwe who crossed at night from Zaire to Rwanda. They killed the three families and fled back to Zaire. The RPA soldiers who were some hundreds meters away of the three houses heard the shooting but could not stop the enemy before he reached the border.

Since mid-September the RPA is aware of a certain propaganda coming from the Goma-refugee camps to persuade people to leave the area and to go to Zaire. Leave lets are spread and people come from Zaire across the border to talk to the locals. Further there exist letters from people living in the Goma area, that warn people from Interahamwe attacks in the near future. Culmination point of this campaign was between 25 Sept and 1 Oct.”

Remark: Mr. UMIHORYE JEREMIE, Conseiller in sector BYAHI, presented a letter of a friend in Goma. In this letter Mr. Umihorye is warned of massacres committed by Interahamwe, that would be camouflaged as RPA actions. A copy of this letter is attached as Annex # 6 and 7).

“During the last weeks there occurred several incidents:

- * Some two weeks ago the militia tried to attack Rwandan territory near CYANIKA (REWERERE commune). RPA was warned by the population and could fight the enemy. One member of the militia was killed.
- * A second incident happened near Murambi where the militia clashed with the RPA.
- * Late August a man called MILITERI YARBUGA (conseiller in BYAHI comm., Cellule BUHAZA) was killed by the militia.

The militia wants to intimate the supporters of RPA, scare people from coming back and forcing people to leave for Zaire.”

Remark: On 03 Nov 1994 the investigation team got a letter with further information about incidents and attempted infiltrations (see annex # 8).

b) Rwigano Balthazar (Secteur BYAHI, cellule RUTAGARA) made the following statement:

“The massacre was committed by RPA. I have not seen them doing it, but I believe it because of two reasons: The border is heavily guarded - the militia would not be able to infiltrate. Further I have that suspect because they did not inform us in the morning about what had happened during the night.”

c) Témoignages de villageois vivant a Rutagara :

Les villageois ont fait les déclarations suivantes :

Ils ont entendu des personnes crier au secours à 2H00 du matin le 31 octobre 1994. Des coups de fusil ont ensuite retenti de deux endroits différents : d'un côté, ils ont duré de 2H00 à 4H00 du matin et dans la direction opposée, de 3H00 à 4H00. A 6H00, un homme et sa jeune fille ont annoncé que des personnes avaient été tuées dans la nuit. Ce sont eux qui ont découvert les corps en allant aux champs. En entendant les coups de fusil, certains villageois ont pensé qu'il s'agissait d'entraînements militaires. D'autres ont pensé que l'Interahamwe se battait contre l'armée rwandaise. Ils étaient loin d'imaginer que des villageois étaient en train de se faire tuer. L'armée est venue sur les lieux à 8H30, prévenue par le père et sa fille.

d) Devant la maison C, une vive discussion s'est produite entre les villageois et le commandant du bataillon à Gisenyi, le lieutenant colonel Charles Kayonga.

“La population disait ne pas croire que les membres de l'Interahamwe étaient les auteurs de ces crimes dans la mesure où ceux-ci n'étaient jamais venus les déranger de quelque manière que ce soit. Ils ont exprimé leur crainte d'être attaqués à leur tour et ont accusé l'armée de ne pas assurer leur sécurité. Ils ont dit n'avoir aucun pouvoir pour se protéger eux-même car on leur a donné comme consigne de ne pas sortir la nuit. Certains ont exprimé leur souhait d'aller au Zaïre. Le lieutenant colonel a répondu que ces crimes ont été perpétrés par des personnes qui doivent être considérées comme des ennemis. Il a insisté sur le fait que les coupables connaissaient bien l'endroit où avaient eu lieu les crimes et que les personnes tuées étaient ciblées dès le départ. Il a promis à la population de prendre des mesures pour que leur sécurité soit assurée. Pour cela, il a dit que des jeunes gens des différents villages allaient être recrutés. Il a proposé que les villageois soient transférés près de la ville pour que leur sécurité soit mieux assurée.”

e) Le conseiller du secteur de BYAHI, M. Uwihoreye Jeromie, a alors dit que des mesures allaient être prises pour que des logements soient trouvés pour les personnes qui quitteraient ces villages. Il a ensuite affirmé qu'un journaliste de Goma avait entendu qu'une réunion de l'Interahamwe s'était déroulée dernièrement. Durant celle-ci, l'Interahamwe avait dit qu'elle traverserait la frontière pour terroriser la population avec des couteaux et des fusils. Il a aussi montré une lettre (annex # 6 and 7), disant que celle-ci provenait d'une personne habitant à Mogoma. Il a lu la lettre qui disait que l'Interahamwe préparait des attaques au Rwanda.

Remarque : Le journaliste de Goma et la personne habitant à Mogoma pourraient être une même et seule personne, l'interprète n'étant pas sûr de ce qu'il a entendu.

f) Témoignage de M. Israel Ntahorugiye (chef de secteur de Kivuyauzouv ?) relatif au massacre dans la maison A :

Il est le chef de secteur depuis le 19 juillet 1994. Durant la guerre, il est resté au Rwanda. Il est hutu. Il nous a fait les déclarations suivantes :

“Je ne sais pas qui a pu commettre ces crimes. Cela peut être aussi bien l'Interahamwe qu'un ennemi de Alphonse Chyanganzara (A.C.). Ce dernier, lors d'un voyage au Zaïre en juillet 1994, a été battu à coups de bâton par un membre de l'Interahamwe qui a pour nom Rutirwera (R.). Après la plainte de A. C., j'ai fait appel à R. qui a refusé de venir ici. En avril, mai et juin 1994, A.C. et sa famille sont restés au Rwanda. Le 15 juillet, ils ont fui au Zaïre et sont retournés au Rwanda le

18 juillet. Lors des massacres d'avril et juin, A.C. a volé des vaches à des paysans. Ce sont peut-être ces mêmes paysans qui ont tué A.C. et sa famille. A.C. avait aussi des problèmes avec un membre de sa famille.

J'ai nommé A.C. chef de cellule le 18 août, l'armée ayant aussi donné son accord. La nuit du massacre, l'armée est venue dans les environs et a poursuivi les ennemis jusqu'à la frontière, de 3H00 du matin jusqu'à l'aube. Un des ennemis a été touché par balle. Le fils aîné de la famille ainsi que son petit frère ont fui au Zaïre quand ils ont découvert les corps."

"J'entretiens de bonnes relations avec l'armée. Lorsque j'ai des problèmes, je leur fait appel. Le secteur est bien protégé mais depuis cet incident, l'armée et l'administration ont décidé de déplacer la population vers les villes. Depuis juillet, il n'y a eu aucun incident dans cette zone. A présent, la population a peur de l'Interahamwe. L'Interahamwe veut faire croire que c'est l'Armée populaire rwandaise qui est coupable de ces crimes."

g) Témoignage de M. Safari, qui habite juste derrière la maison B :

"J'ai entendu des appels au secours à 2H30 du matin. Quand j'ai voulu sortir de ma maison pour voir ce qu'il se passait, l'armée m'a dit qu'il y avait confrontation avec l'ennemi. Puis j'ai entendu des coups de fusil. Entre les cris et les coups de fusil, il y a eu un intervalle de temps de 5 à 10 minutes. A partir de 3H00, il n'y avait plus de bruit.

J'habite un endroit qui se trouve à environ 150 mètres d'ici, l'armée travaille et dort dans ce même endroit."

h) Témoignage de M. Faustin Sebuhoro relatif au massacre dans la maison B :

Il a découvert les corps. Il habite à 10 km du lieu du massacre. Il nous a fait les déclarations suivantes:

"Le 31 octobre, à 6H25 du matin, je suis venu avec mon beau-fils à la maison de M... Nous avons découvert que les portes des différentes maisons étaient ouvertes. Dans la maison principale, les 10 personnes de la famille étaient regroupées et étendues par terre. Chaque personne portait la trace d'une balle d'arme, une personne avait le crâne ouvert.

J'ai ensuite averti l'armée vers 6H40. Un seul militaire est venu avec moi sur les lieux. Il a agi comme si il découvrait les corps pour la première fois mais je crois qu'il était au courant de ce qui c'était passé, car après lui avoir montré l'endroit, il n'est pas allé chercher d'autres militaires. Il semblait avoir peur. Puis, le militaire a demandé à une personne d'informer le responsable de la cellule."

i) Témoignage du petit-fils de la famille tuée (maison B), M. Jean Dama Seni Senzira:

Il habite à 200 mètres du lieu des crimes et à 10 mètres d'un endroit habité par des militaires. Il nous a dit:

“Je n’ai entendu ni cris, ni coups de fusil cette nuit-là.”

j) Témoignages de villageois rencontrés devant la maison B :

1. “Les militaires ont, sans aucun doute, entendu les personnes crier car ils circulaient durant la nuit. Lorsque des bruits de coups de fusil se sont faits entendre, l’armée est passée chez moi et m’a demandé de ne pas sortir à l’extérieur. Elle m’a affirmé qu’elle se battait contre l’ennemi et qu’elle assurait la sécurité des villageois. Les coups de fusil continuaient toujours.”

2. Certains affirment avoir entendu des coups de fusil de 2H30 à 3H30 du matin

3. “Un militaire est venu frapper à ma porte alors que des bruits de fusil se faisaient entendre. J’ai hésité à lui ouvrir car j’avais peur. Il a refrappé à ma porte et m’a alors demandé des cigarettes. Il m’a dit qu’il ne fallait pas que je m’inquiète car l’armée faisait une simple vérification d’armes.”

4. “Cette nuit- là, l’armée semblait agitée”.

(Remarque : le villageois a alors changé ses propos)

“En fait, je n’ai remarqué que deux militaires agités. Cette nuit-là, à 20H30, j’étais en train de boire une bière avec un militaire lorsque un deuxième militaire est venu et m’a demandé ce que je faisais là. Il a ensuite demandé à l’autre militaire de le suivre pour des raisons de sécurité. Leurs comportements n’étaient pas habituels.”

k) Témoignages de M. Mangaiko, M. Hareraimana, Mme Regina, Mme Maria qui habitent près de la maison C et qui sont cultivateurs :

“La situation était calme jusqu’à dimanche. Mais depuis ce soir-là, nous avons peur de dormir chez nous car nous avons vu que l’armée ne peut pas nous protéger. Dans la nuit du dimanche au lundi, nous avons entendu des appels au secours. Nous avons alors cru que c’était l’Interahamwe qui était passée de l’autre côté de la frontière. D’autres personnes du village doutent de la culpabilité de l’Interahamwe car l’armée rwandaise est présente et assure la sécurité de telle sorte que l’Interahamwe ne puisse pas passer du côté rwandais. A la rigueur, l’Interahamwe pourrait passer de ce côté à l’insu de l’armée, mais elle aurait des problèmes pour repasser du côté zaïrois. Les gens réfugiés au Zaïre veulent peut-être tuer les gens d’ici pour que ceux-ci aient peur de rester au Rwanda. A présent, la population est mécontente car l’armée dit qu’elle la protège mais il y a quand même eu des massacres. Comment l’ennemi a-t-il pu venir ici sans que l’armée ne s’en rende compte ?

Lors de la nuit des massacres, 5 minutes après les appels au secours, nous avons entendu les militaires silloner dans le quartier.”

Remarque: Certains disent que l’armée poursuivait l’ennemi, d’autres disent le contraire, arguant que si cela avait été le cas, les militaires auraient dû attraper l’un des coupables, ce qui n’a pas été le cas.

“Lorsque les militaires sillonnaient le quartier, nous avons entendu le bruit d’une moto Suzuki.

De 2H45 à 4H30, les coups de fusil étaient intensifs, il n'y a pas eu d'interruption. De l'autre côté, des coups de fusil se sont également faits entendre, mais nous ne pouvons pas dire l'heure à laquelle ils se sont produits.
Cette nuit-là était très obscure.”

“Nous avons de bonnes relations avec les quatre premiers bataillons. A présent, nous avons peur car le cinquième bataillon n'a pu empêcher les tueries.

Lorsque les quatre premiers bataillons étaient ici, nous allions souvent à la frontière pour passer du côté zaïrois. Nous achetions alors de la nourriture au Zaïre. Avec le cinquième bataillon qui est là depuis deux semaines (Remarque : le cinquième bataillon semble pourtant être dans le secteur depuis un mois), nous ne pouvons plus traverser la frontière car les militaires disent que nous pouvons trouver de la nourriture à Gisenyi.

Lorsque nous allions au Zaïre, nous achetions de la nourriture à Goma. Nous avons des contacts avec les zaïrois mais pas avec les réfugiés. Ces derniers nous auraient tuer s'ils avaient su que nous venions du Rwanda car ils nous auraient soupçonné de faire partie du Front patriotique rwandais. Après la guerre, des réfugiés sont rentrés au pays et y sont restés”.

I) Témoignages de M. Moussigiende, M. Rwarahoze, M. Ntibandera, M. Sebiyi, M. Hakuziyaremye, M. Bizimungu qui sont cultivateurs, et de M. Ntaranyenabo, maçon :

“Le soir, dès 19H00, nous sommes dans nos maisons, car depuis le mois d'août, les militaires nous ont donné l'ordre de ne pas sortir après 19H00. Ils nous ont dit que si l'ennemi frappait a nos portes, il faudrait qu'on les prévienne.”

“Dans la nuit du dimanche au lundi, nous avons entendu des appels au secours à 2H00 du matin et 5 minutes après, des coups de fusil. Ceux-ci ont duré jusqu'à 3H30, sans interruption. Ils provenaient de l'endroit où ont eu lieu les massacres (Remarque : il s'agit de la maison C). Puis d'autres tirs se sont fait entendre, provenant de deux endroits différents (Remarque : il s'agit des maisons A et B). Entre les premiers tirs et les suivants, il y a eu un intervalle de silence de 15-30 minutes. A 3H30, le silence était revenu.

Nous avons entendu les militaires circuler dans la rue jusqu'au matin. Ils circulaient en voiture. A 4H30, nous avons entendu le bruit d'une moto mais nous ne savons pas qui en est le propriétaire car dans ce quartier, nous n'avons jamais vu quelqu'un conduire une moto.

Chaque nuit, l'armée patrouille jusqu'à la frontière. La nuit des massacres, après les appels au secours, les militaires étaient plus nombreux à patrouiller et étaient peut-être plus agités.”

“Le lundi 31 octobre, une personne est allée chercher des cigarettes à 18H30. Il a rencontré une patrouille militaire de quatre personnes qui lui ont demandé de rentrer chez lui.

Nous ne sommes pas contents car l'armée nous demande de rester chez nous à partir de 19H00 et de crier si l'ennemi nous attaque, or les gens qui ont été tués avaient appelé au secours et l'armée n'a pas pu les sauver.

L'armée est positionnée à 300 mètres du lieu où ont eu lieu les crimes. Durant la nuit, les militaires sont à la frontière pour empêcher les gens de passer du Rwanda au Zaïre. Il n'existe aucun endroit où les gens peuvent passer de l'autre côté de la frontière sans être vu, car sur tout le sentier, les militaires sont présents.

Malgré ce qui s'est passé, nous nous sentons plus en sécurité au Rwanda qu'au Zaïre. Avec les quatre premiers bataillons, nous nous sentions plus protégés. Avec le cinquième bataillon, nous n'avons plus le droit d'aller acheter de la nourriture au Zaïre. Certaines personnes ont essayé de passer la frontière qui se trouve à 1,5 km d'ici, mais elles n'y sont pas parvenues car les militaires sont partout. Avec les quatre premiers bataillons, beaucoup de personnes originaires d'autres cellules passaient par ici pour aller acheter à manger au Zaïre."

m) Témoignage de M. Gregoir Rwarahoze qui a découvert les corps dans la maison C :

"Le 31 octobre au matin, j'ai vu des militaires passer mais je ne leur est pas parlé. Je suis allé avec ma fille près de la maison C pour chercher des bananes. Les portes de la maison C étaient ouvertes. Ma fille est rentrée dans une des maisons et a trouvé les corps des victimes. Il était 7H30. J'ai vu deux militaires et les ai informé. Ils avaient peur et étaient effrayés. Ils m'ont dit qu'ils étaient au courant de ce qui s'était passé et qu'ils avaient prévenu l'armée. Je leur ai alors reproché de ne pas avoir averti la population. Ils m'ont dit que la famille avait été tuée par l'Interahamwe."

n) Témoignage de M. Seziraro, cultivateur. Il habite près de la maison B :

"Dans la nuit du 30 octobre, j'ai entendu des coups de fusil, mais je ne connais pas l'heure à laquelle ils se sont produits. Les gens du village m'ont dit que les tirs avaient duré de 3H00 à 4H00 du matin. J'ai entendu les tirs des trois endroits différents au même moment. Je ne pouvais pas sortir et je n'ai donc rien vu. Je n'ai pas entendu de cris. A 5H30, je suis sorti de ma maison pour aller aux toilettes et j'ai rencontré un militaire sur la route. Le lendemain, des villageois m'ont dit que des personnes étaient mortes durant la nuit.

Les soldats sont juste en face de ma maison. Ils sont là le jour et la nuit, depuis environ un mois. A tout moment, ils circulent, c'est pourquoi je ne comprends pas comment des gens ont pu être tués et pourquoi l'armée n'a pas arrêté l'ennemi. Il existe des patrouilles militaires entre la maison B et la frontière. Je ne comprends pas pourquoi l'armée n'a pu toucher l'ennemi dans aucun des trois endroits.

o) Sec. Lt. JOHN EDINDENGEYINKA (RPA), in charge of the command in the Rutangara sector during the night 30/31 Oct 1994:

The interview was made on 03 Nov, 10 30 hours.

"I was in command of the RPA-soldiers in the Rutagara area in the night of the incident. All in all we were 18 soldiers. 4 soldiers were sent on a patrol to the north using the road which is leading up to the north. The leader of this patrol was Cpl. JOHN UZAYESNGA. When the shooting started the north patrol was north-east of house A at point E (see map). An other patrol of 4 soldiers under the command of Cpl. JEROME HAKIZIMANA was controlling the road leading to the south. They were marching on the road. At the time of the first shots the patrol was south of house C at point F (see map). I myself was with three other soldiers in the center at point H. The rest of my soldiers was based further to the east on the road leading towards BYAHI. Because of the difficult area and the tense vegetation there was no patrol in the strip between the two roads and the frontier. At night it is not possible to patrol directly along the border. In this sector the frontier is

not a straight line but makes a lot of curves, it is very complicated to find it. The frontier is not marked by a river. Therefore at night it is difficult to the exact position of the border. Violations of the frontier would frequently happen.

At about 02 30 or 03 00 hours we heard people screaming from the direction of house A, B, and C. The shouting started in all three houses at the same time. After a short moment, we heard some shots.

The north patrol was at point E when the shooting started. They run in the direction from where the noise had come using the road. When reaching point D they had contact with the enemy. During this clash both sides fired several rounds. I do not know the amount of ammunition that was used by my soldiers. Nobody of my men was wounded.”

Remark: After this interview the investigation team searched the place where the gun battle was said to have happened. No cartridge cases could be found. In the afternoon Cpl. UZAYESENKA, the leader of the north patrol showed the team the exact location where the fight took place. One cartridge case was found. Corrosion and position of the cartridge case (partly swept into the earth) showed that it lay there for at least some days.

“The south patrol was marching on the road south of house C when the shooting started. Hearing the shooting they run into the direction from where they heard the noise. Near the house C, they run into the enemy. Both sides where shooting several rounds during the gun battle (see map point G). Nobody was injured. The patrol stayed there for the following hours.

I gathered my remaining soldiers at the crossing (see map point J). At about 03 00 hours we got re-enforcement from behind. The new arriving soldiers were walking on foot. As we considered being attacked by a whole company, we stayed in our defense positions until day break. At about 06 00 hours Lt. Col. KAREMERA arrived on a motor bike.

When it became light, my men searched the houses and found the dead bodies. We have informed the villagers about what we had found.”

p) Cpl. JOHN UZAYRSENGA, RPA, section leader north patrol:

Remark: As Cpl. UZAYRSENGA was on patrol we could not speak with him before same day, 17 00 hours. He showed the place of the gun battle, this time one cartridge case was found - see remark under o).

“Together with me were the following soldiers: KARISA FELIX, NARZIS MUGENZE, MOREKEZE LUI.

We heard the first shots from the house C, then nearly at the same time from house A and B. At that time we were about 1 km north east of house A. We went back on the road and at point D between the house A and B we met the infiltrates. When hearing us the enemy opened the fire. We shot back. Each of my soldiers shot about 5 rounds. We stayed at that place for the next hours because it seemed to be to dangerous to follow the enemy. At day break we went south to the crossing (point J).”

q) Cpl. JEROME HAKIZIMANA, RPA, section leader of the south patrol:

Remark: As Cpl. HAKIZIMANA was on patrol we could not speak with him before same day, 17 00 hours.

“Together with me on patrol were the following SOLDIERS: MONYESHORE INOCENT, MUGAMBIRA IBRAIM, KARGASI INOCENT.

When we heard the shooting we were about 1,5 km south of house C marching on the road. We turned round and run towards the place where the shooting happened. Near house C the infiltrators shot at us (point G). They were so close that their cartridge cases flow over us. We jumped to the ground and shot back. During the gun fight nobody of my section was hurt. We fired about ten rounds each, the enemy shot only a few times. We stayed at our place until dawn.”

r) MUSEKURA CELESTIN and MUNYARUKIKO JEAN, sons of a victim and presented by the international press (see annex # 1) as eye-witnesses and survivors of the massacre.

“ We are coming from Rwanda. There we lived in Rutagara Cellule, Kinyanzovu Sector, Rwerere Commune. Since we fled to Zaire we have no fix place to stay, actual we are living along the road that leads from Goma to the north, at UVIRA DE MONIGI. Our father is Alphonse CYANGANZARA” (house A).

In the night of the 31 Oct 94 at 03 00 hours, we heard gun shots and the explosions of grenades. We were staying in two houses near the Zairian boarder, some 500 meters away from house A. Me, MUSEKURA CELESTIN, I am polygam and I spent the night with my second wife MUSABIMANA NANI. My brother slept in a house nearby. After the shooting we stayed in the house until about 05 30 hours. We have no watch.

At about 05 30 hours, my brother and I went to the house of our parents to look what had happened during the night. There we found the dead bodies. They were killed with bullets, hand grenades and machetes. One body was beheaded, one foot of my father was cut of. We stayed about two hours in or beside the house of my parents.

During the whole time when we stayed there, there were soldiers in RPF uniforms in or around the house. They told us they would start investigations about who has killed our family. After two hours, at about 09 00 hours, we fled to Zaire. We fled because we thought the RPF would kill us also. All the other villagers who lived in Rutagara have fled too. Now there is nobody living in this village. Some now live in villages on the Zairian side of the border, others in Kibumba refugee camp. Other people who fled are: MUSANGANYA, BAKANYERETSE, NDAMAKIRIROU, MAJAMBERE, SAFARI, ZAKARIA, VENZA, MUMVAI. They now live in RUTAGARA DE Monigi / Zaire.”

Question: Why do you think that the RPA has killed your family?

“The FPR has killed my family. I have seen the FPR at 05 30 hours in the house of my family. They told us that they said that they just came to start with investigations. At 03 00 hours the FPR had gone from one house to the other to calm down the people. The FPR had killed all the people

that lived near their houses. The FPR lived in houses among the other people. If it was Interahamwe, why should they kill civilians and let alive the FPR soldiers.

I do not know why the FPR has killed my family. I do not know the motive. My father was the responsible for the returnees in that cellule. He was assigned at this post by the FPR. My father has left Zaire in July and came back to Rutagara / Rwanda in the beginning of October.”

Question: Why are you so sure that your family was not killed by Interahamwe?

“Because the FPR is defending the frontier. How can Interahamwe kill my family when FPR is patrolling along the boarder. No it can not be Interahamwe because FPR has many soldiers there. They have a large number of soldiers in that area, more than 100.”

Question: Have you already been interviewed by journalists?

“Yes we have already talked to some journalists. We have told them we have no places to stay and nothing to eat. They promised to provide us with food and with a tent. They never showed up, we are still waiting for them.”

Question: Why did not the RPA kill you during the two hours you have spent with them in the house of your parents?

“They did not know that we belong to the family. The FPR soldiers lived in a house next to the house of my father, some 5 meters away. They did not know us because they where new - they were here since 5 or 10 days. They were often rotated. I know the names of some of them: PJUMA, MUNANA, KAZUNGU, BAZURU. In the night, a part of the FPR soldiers went on patrol and some others stayed in the house.”

6) Findings and Considerations:

- **So far there exists no evidence or proof whether RPA or forces linked with the old government have committed the crime.**
- No usable traces or evidences were found that could provide us with information which side had committed the crime. The types of guns and hand grenades used by the perpetrators are used by both forces.
- The villagers, who live in the Rutangara area, themselves seem not to know who the perpetrators were. Therefore they are in the difficult position not to know whether it would be safer for them to stay or to go.
- As the houses A, B, and C lay between the boarder and the defense line of the RPA both sides had the same possibility to march towards the houses.
- The statements of the villagers are not very precise and sometimes contradictory. One has to consider that it was completely dark, people were scared and did not go out of their huts. They woke up when the action was already going on. They have not seen anything that could led to

the malefactors. As a result of the ongoing discussion among the villagers about the incident there is a certain unification in their statements. E. g. everybody mentioned that shooting started at 02 30 hours. Actually only few people in the village possess a watch..

- The main argument of those villagers who suspect RPA to have committed the crime are:
 - a) RPA is controlling this area with their troops, therefore Interahamwe can not infiltrate that area..
 - b) The villagers claim that RPA has not informed them the other day what had happened during the night and therefore has something to hide.
- In fact RPA had only few soldiers patrolling in the Rutagara area. The allegation of the villagers, that RPA is patrolling the strip between the border and the houses A, B, and C during night time must definitely be wrong. When it is dark the dense vegetation makes every movement along the border (north-south-direction) impossible. On the other side it is possible to pass this strip on footpaths when coming from Zaire (east-west-direction).
- MilObs (Lt. Col. Austdal and Mj. Weissenboeck) confirmed that the RPA forces that were on duty in the night of the massacre were not strong enough to prevent infiltration from the Zairian side.
- Considering the position of the RPA troops the risk for Interahamwe, to be detected before starting the atrocity, was fairly small. Never the less to do the raid a detailed knowledge about the territory is a must.
- In this context some information from UNHCR Goma should be mentioned. A field officer informed, that on 01 Nov 94, the day after the massacre, several people were beaten to death in Kibumba refugee camp. According to the field officers report these people were killed by other refugees in revenge for having taken part at the raid that caused the death of the three families in Rutagara (see report annex # 9).
- RPF also had the possibility to commit the massacre. However, they would have run a higher risk to be seen by some of the villagers. Further there would be the danger that the soldiers who live door on door with the population would start talking in the days after the massacre.
- Acts of banditry or plain robbery can be excluded. The raids were well prepared and coordinated. At all three spots the killing started nearly at the same time. The massacre has to be seen as a kind of message in the war of propaganda between the two sides. The killers were not interested in the three families per se. The families functioned just as the medium to transport the message.
- Asking for motives for the massacre there is of course the possibility that one of the two sides committed the atrocity pretending it was the other side. As all three families were returnees one possible motive for Interahamwe might be to scare people in the refugee camps not to go back to Rwanda.
- The number of returnees entering Sector 5 in fact has decreased during the last days. However it is difficult to prove that the information about the massacre are the reason for it.

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Ghanbatt Headquarters
GIKONGORO

Rwanda


GH2/065/A

19 Dec 94

HQ MILOBS Sector 5
GISENYI

REQUEST FOR GHANBATT BAND

1. We write to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 5 December, 1994.
2. We have accepted to play for you on the 7 or 8 January as requested .
3. A representative of the band will visit your headquarters on Wednesday 4 January 1995 to confirm date, time and remuneration involved.
4. We wish you a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year.


W AGYAPONG
Lt
for Commanding Officer

Ops — 
Pers/Leg —

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MILOB GP HQ

TO : FORCE HQ (OPS)
ALL MILOB SECTORS

DATE: 21 DEC 94


FROM : DCMO
MILOB GP HQ

REF: 6465/OPS/MILOBS

INFO : FC
DFC/CMO

SUBJECT: AFTER ACTION REPORT - OP HOPE

1. Please find herewith attached an After Action Report on 'OP HOPE' containing 11 pages.
2. This letter may please be down graded to UNCLAS after detaching the contents.
3. Best Regards.



MOEEN U AHMED
Col
DCMO

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MILOB GP HQ

OP HOPE
AFTER ACTION REPORT

GENERAL

1. Over the recent past, there have been continuous reports of spurts of criminal activities by some threat forces in KIBEHO and NDAGO refugee camps located in Sector 4A. By virtue of these unlawful acts, these threat elements had begun tarnishing the good and noble work of UNAMIR, NGOs and Humanitarian agencies working hand in glove for peace and stability in RWANDA. Therefore, in response to this internal threat, UNAMIR in coordination with RPA , took up the onus to carry out 'OP HOPE' from 14 to 16 Dec 94. It was the maiden operation of such magnitude undertaken by UNAMIR and its outcome truly reinforced an age old ethos of UN, ie "Unity in Diversity".

AIM

2. The aim of 'OP HOPE' was to clear KIBEHO and NDAGO camps of criminal elements and in that MILOB GP was to remain in a supporting role to the formed troops.

PARTICIPATION

3. A total of 79 MILOBs participated alongside 1473 troops and staff. Also, two RPA battalions took active part in this operation. Acting Force Commander/CMO had established his Tac HQ at KIBEHO and commanded/conducted the operation. His participation on the ground gave impetus to the operation. The details of MILOB participation are as follows:

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- a. HQ MILOB GP. 5 Officers including DCMO.
- b. Sector 1. Total three MILOB teams out of which one team was placed under command Nigerian Company and two teams placed under Sector 3 as reserves located at BUTARE.
- c. Sector 2. Total three MILOB teams; one team under command company ex ZAMBATT and two teams placed under command Sector 3 as reserves located in BUTARE.
- d. Sector 3. Total three MILOB teams besides the Sector Comd and four MILOBs to establish and man the alternate MILOB Tactical HQ at BUTARE. These three MILOB teams were located at KIBEHO and placed under command the MILOB Tactical HQ.
- e. Sector 4A. Total three MILOB teams, all placed under command GHANBATT.
- f. Sector 4B. One MILOB team placed under command company ex FRAFBATT.
- g. Sector 4C. Total three MILOB teams, all under command ETHIOBATT.
- h. Sector 5. Total three MILOB teams all under command TUNBATT.
- j. Sector 6. Total three MILOB teams all placed on one hour's notice at KIGALI.

TASKS OF MILOBS

- 4. The MILOB GP HQ was tasked to establish a MILOB Tactical HQ at KIBEHO, to be co-located with the Force HQ. Also an

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alternate MILOB tactical HQ was to be established and manned at BUTARE. The tasks that were assigned to the MILOBs operating under command contingents included the following:

- a. Perform MILOB tasks assigned by respective contingent commanders.
- b. To monitor all activities and security situation within own area of operation.
- c. To inform MILOB Tac HQ of the situation on the assigned objectives to their force elements.
- d. Continuous reporting on the progress of operations.
- e. Report any violation of human rights.
- f. Provide liaison between UNAMIR troops and NGOs and civil authorities within own area of operations.
- g. Submission of SITREP on 12-hour basis.
- h. Maintain post operation presence in KIBEHO and NDAGO camps and report situation.

CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

5. Mov to Assy Area. The assy area selected was BUTARE. The troops and the MILOBs participating in this operation assembled at BUTARE on 12 Dec 94. The logistics infrastructure catering for rations, water and POL was created at the Assy Area. Marrying up of MILOBs with their respective contingents took place. Selective recce of the objective area was carried out by certain key appointments holders. Confirmatory orders were issued at various

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levels. This phase of the operation passed off smoothly as planned.

6. Move from Assembly Area to Camp Site. The move from the Assy area to the camp sites (objectives) was carried out over two routes, ie, BUTARE-GIKONGORO-KIBEHO (RED ROUTE) and BUTARE-KIBEHO (GREEN ROUTE), commencing 140015 hrs. The troops arrived at the release point at 140315 hrs. This phase of the operation was carried out smoothly and as per the time plan despite it involving movement of large convoy of vehicles over hilly terrain and during night on approximately 45 kms of unmetalled road.

7. Area To be Searched. The KIBEHO and NDAGO camps put together constituted an area of approximately five square kilometers. The whole area was divided into 11 distinct objectives. The distribution of the objectives for the purpose of the search was done as follows:

- a. TUNBATT - 1 & 3.
- b. GHANBATT - 2 & 8.
- c. ETHIOBATT - 4 & 6.
- d. FRAFBATT - 5 & 9.
- e. ZAMBATT - 7 & 10.
- f. INDIBATT - 11.

8. Search Operations. The troops commenced simultaneous search of these assigned objectives at 140530 hrs. RPA identification and liaison teams were integrated with the contingent down to platoon level. Force and MILOB Tactical HQ were co-located at KIBEHO and so were Advanced dressing Station under AUSMED and

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Detainee Processing Centre under CIVPOL and MP. Initially the search operation progressed slowly but later on it picked up the right momentum. The MILOB teams with each search party gave a continuous progress of operation over radio. The three MILOB teams earmarked as reserves at KIBEHO were tasked to carry out patrolling on the entire area and monitor the activities in the Detainee Processing Centre. The Force Tactical HQ was constantly kept informed of the MILOBs' reports. The complete operation was carried out with true professional zeal and military finesse which helped prevent any untoward incident. Finally, at 141700 hrs, the search ended on completion of the task. The whole operation resulted in the arrest of 43 potential criminals and confiscation of following weapons:

- a. Machetes - 810.
- b. Spears - 58.
- c. Axes - 190.
- d. Bayonets - 4.
- e. 7.62 rounds - 21.
- f. Magazines - 1.
- g. Swords - 5
- h. Knives - 214.
- j. Harpoons - 16.
- k. Sickles - 10.

9. De-Induction. The de-induction of troops from the camp

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sites commenced at 150800 hrs. Five MILOB teams were left behind for maintaining post operation presence and to monitor the situation.

LESSONS LEARNT

10. A deep peep down memory lane of military history would reveal that many battles have been lost by strong armies just because their commanders ignored the valuable lessons they learnt from their previous battles. During OP HOPE, many important military lessons have been re-validated. The aim here has been to avoid any surgical approach to the retrospection but reviewing to embed certain important military issues involved in this operation which ensured success.

a. Planning and Preparatory Stage.

(1) Need for Detailed Planning. In an operation of this magnitude and that too conducted by a unified force of heterogenous characteristics, there is an over-riding need for planning into greater details. The objective area was quite vast, and therefore divided into 11 parts which automatically called for detailed planning, which was done meticulously.

(2) Intelligence Acquisition. P r o c e s s e d information about the objective much prior to the launching of the operation, is the key to success. Therefore, there is a need to evolve some kind of intelligence acquisition plan long before the launching of intended operation which would ensure coordination of intelligence effort.

(3) Secrecy. An operation of this nature needs absolute secrecy. The secrecy of this op was

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neutralised to a great extent. UNAMIR comprises not only force components but also various other agencies. Also, UN operations have always attracted the media. Therefore, utmost care should be exercised while conceiving such operations or else the outcome may prove disproportionate to the effort involved. Also, plans should be unfolded on need-to-know basis only. All personnel must handle operation-related documents with due vigilance.

(4) Liaison and Coordination. OP HOPE enticed the participation of force elements, MILOBs, staff at various levels, a few UN agencies and the RPA. A constant liaison and coordination was to be the order of the day. Commanders at various levels have to apply their minds to various contingencies and problem areas and thereafter endeavour to sort out arising nitty-gritties. Liaison and coordination was planned from the very beginning of the operation and was executed throughout the conduct of the operation.

(5) Intergration of Logistic Representatives. As the logistics infrastructure would always take time to create, re-establish or move, it is of prime importance to involve the logistics representatives right from the initial stages of the planning. This would enable them to plan and pre-position the logistic requirements at correct point of time and place. The only drawback worth mentioning in the operation is logistics. it could have been better if logisticians had given due importance after they had received the warning order.

(6) Detailed Briefing. Need for a detailed briefing requires no emphasis. The most effective way of

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amalgamating force elements of different nationalities with varying shades of training and weaponry into a single mould, enabling them to operate shoulder to shoulder would be by means of a detailed and thorough briefing by commanders at all levels.

(7) Need for Simple Plan. Plan should be as simple as possible. It is easy to execute a simple plan which also readily lends itself to any modification when need arises. Such need is further felt especially when troops with varied training backgrounds are involved together.

b. Move and Occupation of Assy Area.

(1) Guidance at Assy Areas. Proper arrangements for guidance while the troops arrive in the assy area would avoid confusion, save movement and result in rapid deployment.

(2) Recce of Objective Area. A controlled recce of the objective area while troops are in occupation of the assy area is a must. This will have to be done discreetly.

(3) Need for Minimising Movement. During OP HOPE, there was a large volume of unnecessary movement in BUTARE. This is totally uncalled for and may result in premature disclosure of our interest. Therefore, all ranks need to be educated about this. Establishing certain numbers of Traffic Check Posts and manned by MP personnel would help curtail all unnecessary movements.

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c. Conduct Stage.

(1) Flexibility of Plan. Though the plan should be made flexible, any last minute changes should be avoided since it will only result in confusion and fatigue.

(2) Correct Radio Procedure and Discipline. There were many outstations on Force as well as MILOB radio net. Everyone was operating concurrently and required to pass on information simultaneously too. Therefore, the knowledge of correct radio procedure and discipline is vital for smooth conduct.

(3) Human Rights Implications. OP HOPE was a delicate operation since it could attract a lot of human rights implications. It called for utmost care and attention while conducting a search, handling detainees or interrogating them. Any harsh treatment or deviation from the laid-down rules of the game could have tarnished the image of UNAMIR since the media would have blown the issue out of proportion.

RECOMMENDATIONS

11. Loc of HQ. During 'OP HOPE', the force and MILOB Tactical HQ were located inside the objective area right on the commencement of the operation. It could have invited trouble had there been any retaliation or reaction from the threat forces while the troops commenced the search. It is therefore suggested that the HQ should only be brought inside the objective area once the initial phase is over and a secured area within the objective has been created.

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12. Aerial Recce of the Area of Intended Operations. Prior aerial recce of the area of intended operations would surely pay rich dividends. Though it was planned, it could not be undertaken due to bad weather. Some of the contingent commanders missed ground recce which should have been carried out prior to the operation.

13. Maintenance of Secrecy of Intended Operations. Utmost discretion has to be exercised at all levels such that while planning, preparing and executing the operation-related activities, no lapse of security is allowed to occur. Classified information must be unfolded strictly on a need to know basis. Moreover, omnipresence of enthusiastic media personnel adds a new dimension to the security threat. One has to be very careful while dealing with these media men and avoid temptation of publicity. Best thing would be to leave such interaction to the UN authorised personnel only. It was discouraging to hear the news of OP HOPE on BBC and Rwandan local radio prior to the commencement of the operation.

14. Need for Joint Planning. So as to evolve a credible tactical plan, it is suggested that the logistic representative be incorporated into the planning process right from the conception stage. This arrangement will produce matching tactical and logistic plans. Moreover, it will provide more reaction time to the logistics branch to make arrangements to cater for logistical needs at various stages of the operation.

CONCLUSION

15. OP HOPE has been a success because it was meticulously conceived and planned and boldly executed. The operation was orchestrated in a truly professional manner and hence prevented any violence. All the troops and MILOBs performed their tasks with pride, enthusiasm and sense of respect for the human race.

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UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

U N A M I R

TO : ALL SECTORS
HAC
SOO

FILE NO: MILOB/REPAT/6443.21

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

DATE : 27 DECEMBER 94


SUBJ : REPATRIATION - JAN 95

1. FORTY-ONE MILOBS WILL BE REPATRIATED DURING MONTH JAN 95. LIST IN POST. HOWEVER FOLLOWING NIGERIAN MILOBS DUE FOR REPATRIATION ON 9 JAN 95 SHOULD REPORT AT MILOB HQ FOR INTERVIEW ON 03 JAN AT 1000 HRS AND DEPART FOR NAIROBI ON 05 JAN 95.

- A. LT COL EKWEALOR (MO - 624).
- B. MAJ MANDE (MO- 552).
- C. CAPT NANI (MO - 553).
- D. LT CDR ALADE (MO - 640).
- E. LT CDR AKPAN (MO - 545).
- F. SQN LDR GAJERE (MO - 627).
- G. LT COL MUBI (MO - 601).
- H. MAJ BROSSA (MO - 613).
- I. LT COL ESSIEN (MO - 662).
- J. LT CDR USMAN (MO - 655).
- K. CAPT ODIOR (MO - 559).
- L. SQN LDR ADELAKUM (MO - 631).
- M. MAJ LOGAWOMA (MO - 551).
- N. SQN LDR SABIR (MO - 654).

2. SECTOR COMMANDERS TO SUBMIT THEIR CONFIDENTIAL REPORTS TO MILOB GP HQ BY 31 DEC 94.

3. SHORT NOTICE REGRETTED.


K OPONG KYEKYEKU
LT COL
FOR CMO

S 2528

MILOB GP HQ
KIMIHURURA
KIGALI

10 Dec 94

OPO 12/94

References:

- A. Z 723 Sheet 40 BUTARE Ed 1, 1 : 50,000.
- B. Z 723 Sheet 31 GIKONGORO Ed 1, 1 : 50,000.
- C. WNG 0 (MILOBS) dated 7 Dec 94.

1. SITUATION

a. Threat Forces. Additional to Ref C, criminals elements continue to unleash acts of terror, harassment and banditry in the camps. The following have also been recorded:

(1) Criminal elements are known to spread false propaganda with the aim of preventing lawful citizens from returning to their normal life.

(2) Threats Forces have access to small arms, hand grenades, machetes etc.

(3) Recent recorded incidents inside the camps include:

(a) Three hand grenades recovered during a search in KIBEHO on 20 Nov 94.

(b) Two bandits killed at NDAGO on 28 Nov 94 and another bandit killed on ni 28/29 Nov.

(c) Grenades explosion apparently thrown within the camp including several killings (over 50).

1 of 10

b. Friendly Forces

(1) The FHQ intends to rid both the KIBEHO and NDAGO Camps of criminal elements in order to encourage the return of peaceful Rwandese people to their homes.

(2) The ops will involve approximately 8 UNAMIR Coys excluding support elements.

(3) The CIVPOL, NGOs, B & R and two RPA Battalions will be co-operating with UNAMIR Forces.

(4) Interpreters in support of UNAMIR Forces.

c. Atts and Dets. No change.

✓ 2. MISSION. MILOB GP is to conduct operations in support of formed Contingents to clear criminal elements from KIBEHO and NDAGO Camps.

3. EXECUTION

✓ a. Gen Outline. UNAMIR will conduct Cordon and Search Ops in co-ordination with the RPA. Two RPA Bns will from the outer cordon. Seven Coys (UNAMIR) will form the inner cordon. They will perform the search with the RPA Ident and Liaison Teams. A Coy will be inserted at NDAGO as a blocking force. A preliminary Ops consisting armed tps and MILOBs already in progress to increase UN presence.

b. MILOB SECT 1

(1) Det to Ops Comd CO NICOY wef 11 Dec 94
- One MILOB Team.

(2) Det to ops comd MILOB sect 3 wef 11 Dec 94
- 2 MILOB Teams.

(3) Tasks

(a) Continue to perform MILOB tasks assigned by Comd NICOY.

- (b) Monitor all security and ops situations along GREEN ROUTE.
- (c) Monitor and report to Tac HQ the security situation of Detainee Cage.
- (d) Report on continuous basis, progress of operations within your AOR.
- (e) Report violation of human rights to MILOB Tac HQ.
- (f) In conjunction with formed troops document arrested criminals.
- (g) Fwd SITREP 12 hourly commencing 1200 D Day.
- (h) Carry out investigation as directed by Comd or MILOB Tac HQ.
- (i) Provide liaison between UNAMIR troops, with NGOs and civil authorities within your AOR.
- j. Monitor humanitarian requirement within boundaries.

c. MILOB SECT 2

(1) Grouping

- (a) Det to Ops Comd CO ZAMBATT
wef 11 Dec 94 - One MILOB Team.
- (b) Det to Comd MILOB Sect 3
wef 11 Dec 94 - Two MILOB Teams.

(2) Tasks

- (a) Perform MILOB tasks assigned by Comd ZAMBATT.
- (b) Monitor all activities and security situation within your AOR.
- (c) Inform MILOB Tac HQ the situation on objectives 7 and 10.
- (d) Report on continuous basis the progress of ops within your AOR.
- (e) Fwd SITREP 12 hourly commencing 1200 D Day.

- (f) Report any violation of Human Rights.
- (g) Provide liaison between UNAMIR troops with NGOs and civil authorities within your AOR.

d. MILOB Sect 3

(1) Grouping

- (a) Under Ops Comd
wef 111600B Dec 94 - two MILOB Teams, Sect 1 MILOBs.
- (b) Under Ops comd.
wef 111600B Dec 94 - two MILOB Teams, Sect 2 MILOBs.
- (c) Det to under comd MILOB Tac HQ
wef 121600B Dec 94 - three MILOB Teams.

(2) Tasks

- (a) Continue monitoring the security situation in the Camps.
- (b) Establish MILOB Tac HQ at KIBEHO.
- (c) Prepare the alternate MILOB Tac HQ at BUTARE.
- (d) Monitor and report on 24hr basis the situation in the camps.
- (e) Submit SITREP on 12 hourly basis to MILOB Tac HQ, KIBEHO commencing 1200hrs D Day.
- (f) Report any human rights violations.
- (g) Prepare to maintain post ops presence with 3 x Teams till further order.
- (h) Provide liaison between UNAMIR and NGOs, civil authorities within your AOR.

e. MILOB Sect 4A - (GHANBATT)

- (1) Grouping. No change.

(2) Tasks

- (a) Continue to perform MILOB tasks assigned by formed contingent.
- (b) Monitor the activities and security situation

within your AOR and report on continuous basis.

- (c) Info MILOB Tac HQ - KIBEHO on the progress of ops.
- (d) Report any violation of human rights.
- (e) Provide liaison between formed contingent with NGOs and civil authorities.
- (f) Prepare to maintain post ops presence in the camps with 3 MILOB Teams.
- (g) Fwd SITREP 12 hourly commencing 1200 D Day.

f. MILOB Sect 4A (ZAMBATT)

- (1) Grouping. One MILOB Team from MILOB Sect 2.
- (2) Tasks
 - (a) Continue to perform MILOB tasks assigned by CO ZAMBATT.
 - (b) Monitor activities and security situation on 24hr basis.
 - (c) Report violations of human rights.
 - (d) Provide liaison between UNAMIR forces with NGOs and civil authorities.
 - (e) Fwd 12 hourly SITREP commencing 1200 hrs D Day to MILOB Tac HQ KIBEHO.
 - (f) Report on continuous basis the situation on objective 7 and 10.

g. MILOB Sect 4B

- (1) Det to Comd FRAFBATT wef 11 dec 94 - One MILOB Team.
- (2) Tasks
 - (a) Continue to support FRAFBATT.
 - (b) Monitor the activities and security situation within your AOR.

- (c) Report any human rights violation.
- (d) Provide liaison between FRAFBATT with NGOs and the civil authorities within your AOR.
- (e) Fwd 12 hourly SITREP commencing 1200hrs D Day to MILOB Tac HQ.
- (f) Report the security situation of objective 5 and 9 on continuous basis.

h. MILOB Sect 4C

- (1) Det to Comd ETHIOBATT

wef 11 Dec 94 - Three MILOB Teams.

(2) Tasks

- (a) Continue to support ETHIOBATT.
- (b) Monitor and report the security situation on 24 hour basis.
- (c) Report on the situation or progress of ops on obj 4 and 6.
- (d) Report any human rights violations within your AOR.
- (e) Provide liaison between UNAMIR with NGOs and civil authorities.
- (f) Fwd 12 hourly SITREP commencing 1200 hrs D day.

i. MILOB Sect 5

- (1) Det to Comd TUNBATT wef 11 dec 94
- Three MILOB Teams.

(2) Tasks

- (a) Continue to support TUNBATT.
- (b) Monitor the activities and security situation on 24hr basis.
- (c) Provide liaison between UNAMIR with NGOs and civil authorities/within your AOR.
- (d) Report any situation on obj 1, 3 and 11 to MILOB Tac HQ.

- (e) Fwd a 12 hourly SITREP on the ops commencing 1200hrs D Day.
- (f) Fwd report on any human rights violation to MILOB Tac HQ.

j. MILOB Sect 6

(1) Grouping

- (a) Keep three MILOB Teams on 1 hr NTM to Ops Area.
- (b) Keep close liaison with MILOB HQ on op OVERTURE.

(2) Tasks

- (a) Continue with your present tasks.
- (b) Be prepared to support any of the MILOB Sectors on order of DCMO/MILOB Tac HQ.

k. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Timings

- (a) D - 2. (12 Dec 94) - Move to Assy Area
- (b) D - 1 / D Day. Move to blocking/cordon positions /secure Force Release Point.
- (c) D Day
 - (i) H - 3 - (0130hrs) Outer cordon and blocking force in posn at NDAGO.
 - (ii) H - 2 - Secure Force Release Point.
 - (iii) H - 1 - Occupy Force Release Point.
 - (iv) H hr - 0430hrs Tps commence search.
 - (v) H + 1 - Holding/Screening facility estb.
- (d) D + 2 Ops completed.
- (e) D + 3 Commence redeployment.

- (2) MILOBs continue to increase presence forthwith.
- (3) Search to be conducted only during daylight hours.
- (4) Curfew will be imposed at night (1800 - 0500hrs).
- (5) Assy Area - BUTARE.
- (6) Limit of search will be edge of NDAGO Camp.
- (7) Routes
 - (a) RED ROUTE - ROAD BUTARE - GIKONGORO - KIBEHO.
 - (b) GREEN ROUTE - BUTARE - KIBEHO.
- (8) Dispositions - Annex A.
- (9) Force Release Point
 - (a) Red Route. Track Junction GR 839195.
 - (b) Green Route. Road Junction GR 868077.
- (10) Air Plan. Annex C.
- (11) Detainee Handling Procedure. Annex D.
- (12) Liaison Plan. Annex E.
- (13) Comms. Coordinated later. Teams to continue with the present C/S. (Annex F)
- (14) Public Info Plan. Annex G.

4. ADMIN AND LOGISTICS

- a. MILOBs are to be self sufficient in food and water throughout the period of operations.
- b. C Rat will be available but issued at US\$8.00 per meal.
- c. Dress. Helmets and Flak Jackets will be worn.
- d. Med. Cas Clearing Post will be loc in AICF Building on OBJ 2.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNALS

- a. Loc of HQs
 - (1) FORCE TAC HQ. KIBEHO (Double Storey Building on OBJ 2) Tac HQ opens 140200B Dec 94.
 - (2) MILOB TAC HQ. Same loc as above.

- b. Comms.
 - (i) Min conversation diring OP
 - (ii) Ch-12 (Sect 4) will be used for the OP
 - (iii) Detail callsigns at ANX F
- c. Press Info. Comm with the Press only on permission of Force HQ.
- d. OPS SEC. Sec of Ops be enforced.

Authentication:
S ILIYA
Lt Col
S O O

MOEEN U AHMED
Col
DCMO

Annexes:

- A. Sketch of Ops Plans, Bdrys, and Report Lines KIBEHO (issued later)
- B. Sketch showing objectives bdrys and Report Lines in NDAGO DP Camp. (Issued later)
- C. Air Plan.
- D. Detainee handling Procedures.
- E. Liaison Plan. — NOT AVAIL
- F. Comms Plan.
- G. Public Information Plan. — NOT AVAIL
- H. Sketch of Area of Ops and Induction Routes. — NOT AVAIL

Distribution:

Copy No Incl Annex A to H


MILOB Sect	1	1
	2	2
	3	3

		4A	4&5
		4B	6
		4C	7
		5	8
		6	9
MILOB	Plans	Br	10
	Log	Br	11
	Pers	Br	12
A/FC/COS/CMO			13
CIVPOL			14
FHQ			15
Spare			16 - 18

10


SKETCH SHOWING OBJTS, BDYS AND REPORT LINES
AT KIBEHO CAMP

Annex A
To Op Ord
12 Dated
10 Dec 94



SKETCH SHOWING OBS, BDRYS AND
REPORT LINES AT NDAHO CAMP

ANNEX B TO
DPO 12
DD 10 DEC 94



UNITED NATIONS - CONFIDENTIAL

Annex C to
Op Order / 2
Dated 10 Dec 94

1. SITUATION. As WNGO dated 05 Dec 94.
2. MISSION. To provide helicopter support for Casevac and Command and Control for Operation OVERTURE.

3. EXECUTION.

A. General Outline. UNAMIR will conduct a cordon and search operation with the RPA to clear KIBEHO and NDAGO camps of criminal elements. Two Bell 212 helicopters will provide Casevac and C2 support for the operation.

B. Group.

1. Canadian Helicopters.

A. Gp.

(i) 2 Bell 212 helicopters.

(ii) Guarding provided by RPA and TAC HQ for the Forward Air Refuel Point (FARP) at BUTARE AIRSTRIP for day/night operation.

(iii) Crews to man 2 helicopters for day operations mounted from the FOB, one of which will include an on board medical team.

(iv) A standby crew on 30 mins readiness based at KIGALI, from dusk to dawn.

C. Tasks.

(1) Helicopter support is to establish a Forward Operating Base (FOB) at Grid - 49351050 corresponding to 2 deg 37.1'S and 29 deg 32.7'E. This position will be co-located with a medical coordination team.

UNITED NATIONS - CONFIDENTIAL

PROCEDURES FOR THE ARREST AND SEARCHING OF PERSONS AND THEIR
PROPERTY BY TROOPS EMPLOYED ON OP OVERTURE

GENERAL

1. The way in which detainees are handled by the troops of UNAMIR will be of critical importance to the success of Op OVERTURE in the eyes of NGOs and of the world's media. It is essential, therefore, that:

- a. Detainees are handled with the utmost dignity and propriety.
- b. Detainees' processing is reliably documented.
- c. The troops employed in the task of handling detainees understand that they will be dealing with persons who are suspected of having participated in a range of serious offences but who have not been convicted. The possibility that detainees will not eventually be convicted requires that they are handled with as much sensitivity and respect as possible.
- d. Detainees are to be treated sufficiently firmly that no attempt is made to escape or to embarrass the UN.
- e. Troops understand that any detainees are under the protection of the UN and that they must be closely guarded against any attempt at revenge or reprisal.

2. CIVPOL is to be used to monitor the process of arrest and transfer to the MP Detainee Processing Centre (DPC) whilst MPs are to be involved in the process of handling detainees thereafter. ICRC, UNHRC and other agencies may be present at any stage in the process and will be requested to be present at the handover of individuals to the Public Prosecutor.

PROCEDURE FOR THE ARREST OF DETAINEES

3. The procedure for the handling of Rwandese and other nationals detained by UNAMIR troops during Op OVERTURE is to be as follows:

- a. Having been identified, detainees are to be apprehended as swiftly as possible using the absolute minimum of physical force. Troops are to be reminded of UNAMIR Rules of Engagement (which allow for the use of deadly force for self defence including the protection of detainees but ~~do not~~ extend to the use of deadly force to apprehend a person who is trying to evade capture).
- b. Detainees are to be searched to:

(1) Confirm that they are not armed. Any firearms that are collected are to be unloaded and magazines discharged.

(2) Collect, document and safeguard any evidence - including weapons - that may be relevant to a prosecution case.

(3) Collect and document any valuables held by detainees so that UNAMIR is protected against any suggestion that it has been party to theft or looting.

These possessions are to be placed in a plastic bag which is to be taken with the detainee to the MP Detainee Processing Centre (DPC).

SEARCHES OF DWELLINGS AND VEHICLES

4. If a detainee can be associated with a vehicle or dwelling, it, too, is to be searched - an action that will be best conducted in the presence of the detainee if at all possible. The procedure to be adopted is as follows:

a. The condition of the vehicle or dwelling to be searched is to be recorded and a list made of the persons present on the Record of Search (ROS), an example of which is at Appendix 1.

b. Conduct the search, if possible in the presence of the detainee or a relative or other associate, causing a minimum of damage. The location of the search is to be recorded as accurately as possible, using a sketch plan if necessary, either on, or attached to, the ROS.

c. In the event that any material evidence is discovered, it should be photographed in situ. It should then be transferred to a plastic bag for carriage to the DPC.

d. At the conclusion of the search, a description of any damage that was done in its execution should be entered on the ROS and those present at the conclusion of the search should be listed.

e. Any evidence, including the ROS and all photographs that may have been taken, should be transferred to the DPC and passed to the MP officer supervising the custody of the detainee.

BODILY SEARCHES

5. Photography by the Media. Under no circumstances are the media to be allowed to photograph or film detainees in the process of being searched.

6. The Searching of Females. If it is possible, detainees are to be physically searched only by a person of the same sex. If, because a person of the same sex is not available, detainees may be

searched by a member of the opposite sex only in the presence of another person and, preferably, one of a more senior rank than the person doing the searching. Extreme care is to be taken to minimize the risk of an allegation of improper behaviour in this process and to document any complaint or suggestion - by any person - that improper behaviour has occurred.

TRANSFER TO THE MP DETAINEE PROCESSING CENTRE

7. Use of "Plasticuffs". Detainees' hands are to be bound behind their backs with "plasticuffs" (either before or after the search procedure, as thought necessary by the senior person present). Care is to be taken that the plasticuffs are not too tight and that the circulation of blood to the hands is not restricted. Subsequently, frequent checks are to be made that the hands of bound detainees are healthy and that the plasticuffs have not been over-tightened, perhaps by one of the detainees in an attempt to embarrass or hinder the UN.

8. Escorting Detainees to the DPC. If necessary, detainees are to be collected in groups (but not allowed to assemble so closely that they can touch or talk with each other) for transport to the DPC where they are to be handed to an MP officer. It is important to ensure that continuity is achieved in the handling of detainees to minimize the chances of an accusation of brutality being made against a UN soldier, his unit or UNAMIR; for this reason, and to ensure that the process is properly documented, detainees must be escorted to the DPC by the soldiers who detained them.

9. Evidence. Any bags containing any items taken from the detainee and any photographs pertaining to the detainee are to be handed to the MP officer. He is to label the items with the details of circumstances under which they were found and the name and UNAMIR ID number of the soldier giving it to him. Any ROS that has been completed is to be passed to the MP officer for retention with the DPR.

THE MP DETAINEE PROCESSING CENTRE

10. Perimeter and Segmentation. The DPC is to be surrounded and segmented as necessary with concertina wire with the joint aims of inhibiting:

- a. Any attempt by detainees to escape or to riot.
- b. Unauthorized entry.

The perimeter is to be patrolled to defend against, and deter, any attempt at attack.

11. Accommodation. Detainees are to be provided with covered and secure accommodation (9' x 9' and larger tents are permissible) with adequate heating, lighting, ventilation and seating for their comfort.

12. The Conditions of Detainees. The following rules are to apply:

a. Detainees are to be segregated as much as possible and not permitted to touch or talk.

b. Males and females are to be kept separate except that small children may accompany - and be comforted by - their parents should it be necessary.

c. Plasticuffs may be removed if, in the opinion of the MP officer, the individual is not likely to cause danger to others or to attempt to escape. In the event that the MP officer decides not to release a detainee from plasticuffs or to reapply them for a protracted period, the fact and cause is to be written clearly and in full on the DPR. The conditions of the detainees hands are to be monitored, as described above.

d. Food and drink is to be available for detainees at all times.

13. Photographs. At the DPC, a photograph is to be taken of the detainee standing with the soldier who made the arrest and with the officer into whose safe custody the detainee is being passed. The photograph is to show clearly the condition of the detainee at the time of the handover and to identify the persons responsible for him or her. The UN ID numbers, ranks, names and unit of the UN personnel are to be written legibly on the reverse of the photograph together with the place, date and time of the taking of the photograph. In addition, if it is known, the name of the detainee should be written on the reverse of the photograph.

14. Medical Officer. A medical officer is to be present at the processing of all detainees. He/she is to be available to deal with any request for medical attention from a detainee.

15. Searching of Detainees. The detainee is to be searched by an MP and any items recovered in addition to those recovered earlier are to be secured in the same way as before.

16. Detainee Processing Records. A Detainee Processing Record (DPR), of which an example is at Appendix 2, is to be compiled for each detainee. It is to:

a. Record the personal details of the individual, so far as they are known, including name, place date and time of arrest, approximate height and weight, sex, differentiating features and details of any languages known to be spoken.

b. Record the personal details of the soldier who made the arrest and of the witnesses of any searches, should this be applicable.

c. Record the personal details of the MP officer into whose care the detainee passed at the DPC and the date and time of this event, together with any observations made about the condition of the detainee at this stage.

d. Record the details of any bags containing property

removed from the detainee or a vehicle or dwelling with which he was associated in some way.

e. Have stapled to it, photographs taken:

(1) At the time of handover to the MP officer on the detainee's arrival at the DPC.

(2) Show further entries, as necessary, relating to:

(a) Any handover of responsibility of MP officers perhaps resulting from a shift change occurring while the detainee is in the DPC.

(b) The date and time of departure from the DPC.

(c) The condition of the detainee at each handover of responsibility.

(d) The date and time of the detainee's handing over to the Public Prosecutor together with the latter's signature to confirm the transfer of responsibility for the safekeeping of the detainee.

17. Transport to the Public Prosecutor's Office. Detainees are to be collected into groups for transport by a shuttle of minibuses to the Public Prosecutor's Office in Gikongoro with an escort of one MP for each 4 or 5 detainees -who are to have plasticuffs reapplied for the move - and not more than 1 detainee for each 2 seats in the minibus.

18. Departure Documentation. On departing the DPC, a photograph is to be taken of the detainee together with the MP officer from whose care he or she is passing and the MP who has been detailed to escort the detainee to the Public Prosecutor. Once again, the details of these individuals are to be recorded on the rear of the photograph and it is then to be stapled to the DPR.

APPENDICES (to which additional pages may be fixed if necessary):

1. Example of a Record of Search (ROS).
2. Example of a Detainee Processing Record (DPR).

RECORD OF SEARCH (ROS) (FIX ADDITIONAL PAGES IF NECESSARY)

Date and time of start of search:	Immediate supervisor of the search:	Subject of the search (give a description):
	UNAMIR ID No:	Car/truck/house/hut/other:
Location (address or grid reference if known, or draw a sketch map/plan on the reverse of this page or on another page fixed to it):	Condition of property before the search (list features showing obvious damage):	Names and UNAMIR ID numbers of others conducting the search:
Non-UNAMIR persons present during the search:	Reason for the search including name of suspect if known:	Description of any damage done in the execution of the search:
Other comments:	Outcome of search (list any evidence found and removed):	Date and time at the end of the search:
Certified that the information on this page (and any others fixed to it) is true to the best of my knowledge and that all items collected have been dispatched to the MP DPC.	Total number of pages including this one: Signature of search commander:	Date and time of signature:

DETAINEE PROCESSING RECORD (DPR)

Date and time of arrival of the detainee at the MP DPC:	MP officer on duty:	UNAMIR soldier escorting the detainee on his arrival:
	UNAMIR ID No:	UNAMIR ID No:
Name and address of detainee (if known)	Brief description of the detainee (add another page if necessary):	Medical officer on duty and details of any observations/treatment):
Languages known to be understood by the detainee:	Approx Height (in metres)	Signature: UNAMIR ID No:
	Approx Weight (kg):	
	Male or female?	
	Date of birth or approximate age:	
Other characteristics:		
Subsequent checks of detainee (date & time, with initials of MP officer) incl any handover of responsibility between MP officers:	Requests made by the detainee (with date and time):	Details of UNAMIR MP escort to the Public Prosecutor's office:
		UNAMIR ID No:
Date and time at departure of detainee from the MP DPC:	ICRC and other agency representatives present at handover to the Public Prosecutor:	Public Prosecutor's signature for receipt of the detainee:
		Date & Time:
Certified that the detainee to which this form relates was handed to the Public Prosecutor together with all evidence that could be attributed to his case.		Signature of MP officer: Date & time:


COMM INSTRUCTIONS

MIL-OB RADIO NET DIAGRAM

ANNEX F

TO OPO 12


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(Contd.)

RADIO NET DIAGRAM

1. NET DIAGRAM AS FOLLOWS:



2. FREQUENCIES

A. HF - F1, F2, F3 TBA

B. VHF - F1, F2, F3 TBA

3. ALL COMMS LINKS SHOWN WILL BE MANNED BY THE FORCE SIG SQN USING INTEGRAL COMMS EQPT

4. ALL OTHER COMMS LINKS ARE A BN/COY RESPONSIBILITY

COMMUNICATIONS INSTRUCTION

APPX 1 TO ANNEX F
TO MILVIA OPD 12
ATTACHED 10 DEC 94

NICKNAMES

1. The following nicknames will be used for the duration of OP OVERTURE:

<u>Meaning</u>	<u>Nickname</u>
Assy Area	Paper Tiger
Release Point Red Route	Jungle Juice
Release Point Green Route	Cow Leg
Tac HQ (Op Overture) Loc	Open Door
Casualty Collection Point	Soft Bed
Screening and Holding area	Big Brother

Report Lines

Report Line No 1	Mango Grove
Report Line No 2	Apple Pie
Report Line No 3	High Ball
Report Line No 4	Happy Home
Report Line No 5	Iron Lady
Report Line No 6	Last Stand
Report Line No 7	Low Loader
Report Line No 8	Little Girl
Report Line No 9	Table Lamp
Report Line No 10	Good Hope
Report Line No 11	Shoe Polish

(NICKNAMES CONTIN)

Objectives

Obj 1	Hungry Bear
Obj 2	Rocking Horse
Obj 3	Active Edge
Obj 4	Snow Ball
Obj 5	Arctic Breeze
Obj 6	Flying Arrow
Obj 7	Long Shot
Obj 8	Flat Cap
Obj 9	Rummy Punch
Obj 10	Red Sox
Obj 11	Short Stop

CODEWORDS

2. The following seven Codewords will be used for the duration of OP OVERTURE:

<u>Codeword</u>	<u>Meaning</u>	<u>To be issued by:</u>
Hunter	Advance (H Hour)	Tac HQ (OP Overture)
Scatter	Commence Search	Tac HQ (OP Overture)
Basket	Move to second Obj	Tac HQ (OP Overture)
Flower	All Obj searched	Tac HQ (OP Overture)/Units
Helmet	Cordon in position	RPA
Baboon	Mov to Assy Area	Tac HQ (OP Overture)
Bingo	End of OP Overture	Tac HQ (OP Overture)

SECT 5

TO : ALL SECTORS/BRANCHES

File Ref.: MILOBS/6608.0/LOG

FROM: MILOBS GP HQ

INFO: DFC/COS/CMO

DATE: 30 NOV 94

SUBJECT: SERVICING AND MAINTENANCE OF VEHICLES

Reference:

A. Administrative Instruction 011/94 dated 4 Nov 94

1. It has come to the notice of this HQ that despite the instructions contained in the above ref., quite a number of vehicles being operated by MILOBS are sent to the workshop for attention after they are long overdue for servicing. In some cases vehicles are driven for more than 3,000 km over the required mileage for servicing before they are turned-in at the workshop. This is against normal vehicle maintenance regulations and the practice whereby some vehicle operators send their vehicles to the workshop only when the vehicles are long overdue for servicing is becoming a bit of a nuisance to the CTO's outfit and this must be stopped.

2. Apart from causing possible damages to certain parts which need to be serviced or replaced at the specific servicing mileage, vehicle operators are also at a risk of their lives if they continue to operate the vehicles for thousands of kilometers over the required servicing mileage since accidents may occur through malfunctioning or mechanical failure due to lack of servicing and maintenance.


3. It is not for fun or paper decoration that the servicing mileages are **boldly** written on the Maintenance Record Cards in the trip ticket holders.

UN RESTRICTED

It is to ensure that vehicles are serviced at the appropriate time/mileage to put them in good mechanical conditions always for continuous operations.

4. It is therefore incumbent on all vehicle operators to ensure that their vehicles are sent to the workshop at the specified mileage for the necessary servicing to be carried out on the vehicle.

5. This is for the information and compliance of all vehicle operators.



P.K. NYAAKU

Lt Col

for CMO