

[4 CONFIDENTIAL]

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES 5-1062

BOX 169

FILE

ACC. 1998/0283

From : UNAMIR RADIO ROOM KIGALI RWA PHONE No. : 873 151 3352

May. 22 1994 8:09PM P21

FLIN 765

P1/8

UNAMIR

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

CRN 185

194 MAY 22 19 52

MOST IMMEDIATE

MIR 1018 194 MAY 22 21 14

E/IN 764

07/7

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA
1994 MAY 22 21 38 UNAMIR

(MISSION DES NATIONS UNIES POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA)
(MINUAR)

KIGALI RWANDA

OUTGOING FAX NO. KmF891
Misc 696

PAGE 1 OF 7

TO: AZRAR\UNOMUR\KABALE FOR RIZA AND BARIL	FROM: BARZAITRE\UNAMIR\KIGALI
PREFIX/NO: MIR/	DATE: 22 MAY 94
ATTN:	PHONE: 3-3092
FAX NO: 256-2-228987 256-486-23816	FAX NO: 873-151-3352
INFO: FAX NO:	DRAFTED BY: MAJ BUSSIÈRE FILE REF:
Internal Dist.	
SUBJECT: RE-ASSESSMENT OF PHASE 1 - DEPLOYMENT OF TASKS	
REFERENCE:	

1. FIND ATTACHED A RE-ASSESSMENT PAPER ON THE MENTIONED SUBJECT. THIS HAS BEEN FAXED TO ANNAN.
2. NOTE THAT OUR CODE CABLE TRANSMISSION FACILITY IS DOWN FOR THE MOMENT.
3. REGARDS.

UN RESTRICTED

SUBJECT: RE-ASSESSMENT OF PHASE-1 DEPLOYMENT AND TASKS

GENERAL

1. Fighting in Kigali City area has intensified significantly. RPF troops are closing in and launching offensive operations in Kigali city. They seem all out to capture Kigali International Airport (KIA) and Camp Kanombe barracks. UNAMIR has been protecting KIA physically since the outbreak of hostilities. Of late the terminal site has become dangerous for UN troops as both factions are engaged in heavy fighting in and around the area.

2. The proposal of turning the Kigali International Airport into a UN Neutral Territory has not been agreed upon. The RPF had initially agreed on the proposal but now they wish the RGF to withdraw their forces from KIA and from Camp Kanombe and have them relocate at a safe distance from these sites. The Government/RGF have had serious reservations as to UNAMIR's ability to defend the airfield against RPF attack since the beginning and then be able to keep the airfield neutral even under pressure. FC received this morning the RGF proposal for the establishment of the airport as a neutral territory but they have included some restrictions/conditions that are yet to be resolved between us, RPF and of course the RGF. It is not at all expected that the RGF will accept moving from Kanombe area. This stumbling block was finally discussed in detail with the RPF today. They stated, through the LC, that the airport and Camp Kanombe are part of the package. This could be the show stopper of this exercise. FC has written formal comments/concerns to Maj Gen Kagame and has asked him for a prompt reply. If FC does not see any solution by tomorrow, then he will initiate the withdrawal from the airport, to the Amahoro complex.

3. Presently the northern part of the KIA is under heavy artillery/mortar and small arms fire due to the RPF firing at RGF forces around and within the inner perimeter of the airfield, particularly around the main terminal buildings. Scheduled flights on 19, 20 and 21 May 94 were cancelled. KIA has turned into an important military target as the RPF continue their pressure on the RGF resulting in RGF soldiers filtering into the airfield complex. The damage to the infrastructure is increasing significantly as the tarmac and the landing strip are receiving more and more hits from mortar/artillery fire. The tower is now inoperative as RGF put a MG post there and it was neutralised. Based on the latest situation, a re-assessment of the deployment plan and tasks of Phase-1 UNAMIR II was conducted.

UN RESTRICTED

OPTIONS FOR CONTROL OF KIA

4. The various options of control/availability of the KIA are as under:

a. KIA becomes neutral territory in four days. This is acceptable as we do not expect Phase I of UNAMIR II build up to commence before then and we have enough resources to take care of ourselves till then. State of the airfield by then will be a concern if fighting continues. Such an eventuality requires at least staffing of an alternate airhead option.

b. RGF refuses to make KIA neutral territory but agrees to secure it with UNAMIR II. This would be workable as it has in the past for UNAMIR but RPF will never accept this. The KIA will most certainly become a military target. Such eventuality requires an alternate airhead to be identified now.

c. The KIA becomes a neutral territory with RGF and RPF doing monitoring of UNAMIR II for transparency. This is acceptable to us and we know it is to RPF as they had proposed it at one time. RGF have been approached on it and no response received as yet. If we get the answers today/tomorrow that will be fine, but staffing of an alternate site is needed to cater for the unexpected.

d. RPF gain control of the airfield. This is a possibility. How long it will take them to do that? Will it include Camp Kanombe? Will the airfield be damaged in the fighting or deliberately by the withdrawing RGF? These concerns require us to look at and prepare an alternate airhead now.

e. The possibility on a stalemate at and around the airfield is possible and in such a case an alternate airhead is essential now.

f. The stalemate happens but a truce/cease fire is signed. This requires an alternate airhead be reconnoitred for possible use if there are serious violations.

AIRFIELD NEEDS FOR UNAMIR II OPERATIONS

5. Requirement of airfield for UNAMIR II can be divided into two; Present and Future.

a. Present Requirement.

(1) Essential Support. To maintain forces during Phase 1 essential supplies like food, water and fuel

UN RESTRICTED

will be needed. Presently UNAMIR II has a stock of 14 days of food, water and fuel. We can sustain at least 10 days without essential supplies. If KIA is closed for 10 days, it will not be a problem to continue our tasks.

(2) Medical Evacuation. For medical evacuation, UNAMIR II needs to keep the airport under its security control.

(3) Essential Stores. UNAMIR II with its present strength can sustain with its essential stores for the time being. No essential stores are required until the re-enforcements arrive.

(4) For In/Out Passengers. It is not critical to bring in or take out UNAMIR II personnel from Kigali at this time. However, if flights arrive, passengers can avail the facility for increasing the staff available and for welfare opportunities.

(5) Humanitarian Material. Indeed Rwanda needs a lot of help in terms of food, water and medicine. These needs can be brought in by air for at least Kigali. But this bridge still has not been maximized. The effort to utilize the C-130 already flying from Nairobi to Kigali, plus the two (2) German aircrafts about to come in can do more but there does not seem to be enough stocks available at Nairobi.

From the above assessment, it is derived that even if the KIA is not held by the Force, UNAMIR II could sustain and continue its operations for another 10 days or so. However the greatest concern we have is the evacuation of casualties. The alternate plan to use the helicopters from UNOMUR is still possible but as yet has not been used nor exercised. It would be most advisable that a secondary airfield, capable of handling C-130 type aircraft be reced for possible use as soon as possible.

b. Future Needs.

(1) GHANBAT Re-enforcement. To bring the strength of GHANBATT to 800 personnel and mechanizing it, an airhead is an absolute necessity. The airfield will be required for bringing troops, weapon systems, main combat vehicles (APCs) and ammunition.

(2) Advance Parties. Advance and reconnaissance parties of Engineers, Signals, Pd Medical Hospital and Log Coy will also be arriving during Phase 1 in order to prepare for Phase II.

UN RESTRICTED

(3) Build-up of Supplies. Food, water, fuel, medical stores, defence stores and spares will be needed to support the augmented force.

A secure airhead is a fundamental need for the deployment of troops and equipments in Phase 1. Phase 1 deployment is supposed to commence between D+7 to D+14 (24-31 May 94) and probably finish between D+21 to D+28 (7-14 June 94). With the little time available, the state of the KIA infrastructure, the stagnation in the cease fire implementation, all these elements mitigate against the KIA being our main airhead. An alternate principal airfield is required in the shortest of time possible in order not to stop/slow down the deployment of Phase I assets.

TASKS IN KIGALI WITHIN MANDATE-PHASE I

6. UNAMIR II is presently and will continue to perform following tasks in Kigali Sector:

- a. Protection/support people in danger.
- b. Transfer of people in danger.
- c. Escort Duties.
- d. Patrolling in city area.
- e. Units in the supply of food to refugees and distressed people.
- f. Protection of UN installations.
- g. Liaison with both the parties for possible cease fire.
- h. Monitoring of truce/cease fire.
- i. Evacuation of casualties by air.
- j. Providing escorts, liaison and monitoring by UNMOs.
- k. Protection of KIA.

One infantry battalion (-) is needed full time to provide the protection and security of the KIA. If we don't need to protect the KIA as a neutral territory, then the above mentioned tasks (less sub-para k of course) could under very difficult conditions be carried out without the re-enforcement of GHANBATT during Phase-1. Again such an eventuality could be considered only if the proper equipment, materiel, personnel rotation/welfare and

UN RESTRICTED

increased medical and logistic support are made available now.

7. GHANBATT. In Phase I, it was planned to bring Ghanbatt up to its full strength. Present strength is 321 and 479 personnel are supposed to join the battalion starting D+7 to D+14. The use of an alternate airport in a neighboring country - (BUJUMBURA or GOMA) and local smaller airports within Rwanda (CYANGUGU/GISENYI/RUHENGERI) are essentials for the reasons stated above. Under these circumstances we see the need to divide the battalion and deploy one maybe two coys for securing the new airport (outside Rwanda), Logistics base (in Rwanda) near these airports (Butare or Gisenyi) and for convoy protection duties along the Mission's life line and the support/security of local humanitarian activities. Thus any addition to the present level of forces deployed, or redeployed in Kigali, without the task of the KIA, the following additional tasks may have to be undertaken:

- a. Secure the alternative airhead (BUGUMBARA or GOMA).
- b. Secure the new logistics base behind to the airhead (BUTARE or GISENYI).
- c. Provide convoy escorts from alternate airhead to Kigali.
- d. Secure a local smaller airfield in Rwanda in order to establish the humanitarian air bridge that has been closed for the last three (3) days (CYANGUGU, RUHENGERI, GISENYI, BUTARE).

8. Alternate Airhead. The KIA looks less and less as our principal entry point for UNAMIR II. It is therefore pertinent to consider the implementation of an alternative airhead now in order to permit Phase I to commence. Our first recommendation is BUJUMBURA airfield (BURUNDI) and the second one being GOMA (ZAIRE). Both airfields could also be used simultaneously if the volume of airlift required it. If we use BUJUMBURA, we need to establish a secure log base at Butare, for Goma it would be in Gisenyi. These main alternate airfields should be able to accommodate our build-up needs before the Phase I deployment is commenced. The secondary airfields could be functional within days of closing or leaving the KIA. That can accommodate C-130 and Trausall (C-160) type aircraft.

CONCLUSION/RECOMMENDATION

9. It is then recommended that all the forces and material planned for deployment in Phase I should continued to move to Rwanda according to the current milestone. However, the use of

UN RESTRICTED

alternate airhead with its closeby logistics base and the use of the secondary airfields should be implemented soonest if the results of the negotiations between RPF, RGF and UNAMIR II do not conclude over the next day or so. The troops to task allocation proposed in this paper, without the KIA task will permit early deployment in the RGF areas and as such accelerate the securing of conditions for humanitarian relief in this particularly difficult area.

R.A. DALLAIRE
Major General
Force Commander

*FLIN 724*CNR-232 CNU-08 P1/6

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: 94 MAY 13 13 11 13 BOOH-BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
INFO: A/CMO, UNOMUR, KABALE
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 11 May 1994
NUMBER: 1549

J.J. Rize

13 MAY 11 P 2

F/in 763

P 1/16

UNAMIR

194 MAY 21 21 23

194 MAY 22 19 23

IMMEDIATE

UNAMIR FORCE HQ
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

KMF 890
MISC 695

21 MAY 1994

TO: COL ASRAR ACMO KABALE, UNOMUR	FROM: MAJ GEN R A DALLIRE FORCE COMMANDER UNAMIR, KIGALI RWANDA <i>[Signature]</i> For PC
FAX: (256) 486 23816	FAX: 001 (212) 963 3090
SUBJECT:	
NUMBER OF PAGES, INCLUDING THIS COVER: SIXTEEN	

REFERENCES:

- A. DEFENCE MINISTRY OF RWANDA LETTER NO. 0731/G3.3.3 DATED 20 MAY 1994.
 - B. UNAMIR FORCE HQ FAX MESSAGE NO NIL DATED 20 MAY 1994.
 - C. UNAMIR FORCE HQ LETTER NO. 3000.15 (OPS) DATED 21 MAY 1994.
1. ENCLOSED HERewith PLEASE FIND THE LETTERS AND FAX MESSAGES UNDER REFERENCES A, B AND C.
 2. YOU ARE REQUESTED TO HANDOVER THESE LETTERS AND FAX MESSAGES TO MAJ GEN BARIL AS SOON AS HE ARRIVES AT YOUR LOCATION.
 3. REGARDS.

IMMEDIATE

TO: ANMAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
INFO: BARIL

FROM: MAJ GEN DALLAIRE
FORCE COMMANDER
UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA

FAX: 001 (212) 963 9053

FAX: 001 (212) 963 3090

SUBJECT: ALTERNATIVE AIRHEAD FOR UNAMIR II

NUMBER OF PAGES, INCLUDING THIS COVER: THREE

REFERENCE:

A. RPF PRESS RELEASE DATED 17 MAY 94.

1. THE PROPOSAL OF TURNING THE KIGALI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (KIA) INTO NEUTRAL ZONE HAS NOT BEEN CONCLUDED AS YET. THE RPF HAD INITIALLY AGREED ON THE PROPOSAL BUT NOW (REF A) THEY WISH THE RGF TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES FROM KIA AND FROM CAMP KANOMBE MILITARY BARRACKS (THE MAJOR RGF CAMP IN KIGALI) AND HAVE THEM RELOCATE AT A SAFE DISTANCE FROM THESE SITES. RGF HAVE HAD SERIOUS RESERVATIONS AS TO UNAMIR'S ABILITY TO DEFEND THE AIRFIELD AGAINST RPF ATTACK SINCE THE BEGINNING. FC DOES NOT EXPECT RGF TO ACCEPT MOVING FROM CAMP KANOMBE AS IT IS THE HINGE ON THE EAST SIDE OF THE CITY AS THEY ARE BEING MORE AND MORE HEMMED IN BY THE RPF. RGF HAVE NO OBJECTION OF UNAMIR'S PRESENCE IN THE AIRPORT AND IN FACT WOULD PREFER A JOINT SECURITY PLAN WITH US. FC EXPECTING FINAL ANSWER FROM RGF/GOVERNMENT THIS MORNING. AN OPTION OF UNAMIR DEFENDING AND RGF AND RPF MONITORING WITH US THE NEUTRAL TERRITORY WAS ALSO DISCUSSED WITH RGF BUT NO ANSWER AS YET.

2. THE VARIOUS OPTIONS OF CONTROL/AVAILABILITY OF KIGALI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (KIA) HAVE BEEN REVIEWED.

A. KIA BECOMES NEUTRAL TERRITORY IN FOUR DAYS. THIS IS ACCEPTABLE AS WE DO NOT EXPECT PHASE I OF UNAMIR II BUILD UP TO COMMENCE BEFORE THEN AND WE HAVE ENOUGH RESOURCES TO TAKE CARE OF OURSELVES TILL THEN. STATE OF THE AIRFIELD BY THEN WILL BE A CONCERN IF FIGHTING CONTINUES. SUCH AN EVENTUALITY REQUIRES AT LEAST STAFFING OF AN ALTERNATE AIRHEAD OPTION.

B. RGF REFUSES TO MAKE KIA NEUTRAL TERRITORY BUT AGREES TO SECURE IT WITH UNAMIR II. THIS WOULD BE WORKABLE AS IT HAS IN THE PAST FOR UNAMIR BUT FC IS CONVINCED RPF WILL

P 3/16

NEVER ACCEPT THIS. THE KIA WILL MOST CERTAINLY BECOME A MILITARY TARGET. SUCH EVENTUALITY REQUIRES AN ALTERNATE AIRHEAD TO BE IDENTIFIED NOW.

C. THE KIA BECOMES A NEUTRAL TERRITORY WITH RGF AND RPF DOING MONITORING OF UNAMIR II FOR TRANSPARENCY. THIS IS ACCEPTABLE TO US AND WE KNOW IT IS TO RPF AS THEY HAD PROPOSED IT AT ONE TIME. RGF HAVE BEEN APPROACHED ON IT AND NO RESPONSE RECEIVED AS YET. IF WE GET THE ANSWERS TODAY/TOMORROW THAT WILL BE FINE, BUT STAFFING OF AN ALTERNATE SITE IS NEEDED TO CATER FOR THE UNEXPECTED.

D. RPF GAIN CONTROL OF THE AIRFIELD. THIS IS A REASONABLE POSSIBILITY. HOW LONG IT WILL TAKE THEM TO DO THAT ? WILL IT INCLUDE CAMP KANOMBE ? WILL THE AIRFIELD BE DAMAGED IN THE FIGHTING OR DELIBERATELY BY THE WITHDRAWING RGF ? THESE CONCERNS REQUIRE US TO LOOK AT AND PREPARE AN ALTERNATE AIRHEAD NOW.

E. THE POSSIBILITY ON A STALEMATE AT AND AROUND THE AIRFIELD IS REASONABLE AND IN SUCH A CASE AN ALTERNATE AIRHEAD IS ESSENTIAL NOW.

F. THE STALEMATE HAPPENS BUT A TRUCE/CEASE FIRE IS SIGNED. THIS REQUIRES AN ALTERNATE AIRHEAD BE RECONNOITRED FOR POSSIBLE USE IF THERE ARE SERIOUS VIOLATIONS.

3. PRESENTLY KIA IS UNDER HEAVY ARTILLERY/MORTAR AND SMALL ARMS FIRE DUE TO RPF FIRING AT RGF FORCES NEAR AND ON PARTS OF AIRFIELD (AIR DEFENCE GUNS). BOTH SCHEDULED FLIGHTS YESTERDAY WERE CANCELLED AS ONE THIS MORNING. RPF CONTINUE THEIR PRESSURE ON RGF AND RGF SOLDIERS ARE FILTERING BACK ONTO THE AIRFIELD COMPLEX. THE TERMINAL SITE HAS BECOME DANGEROUS FOR UN TROOPS.

4. IN THE LIGHT OF ABOVE, FC WILL BE DECIDING TODAY AS TO WHETHER WE MAINTAIN A PRESENCE OR NOT ON THE AIRFIELD. IF WE WITHDRAW, THE 206 PERSONNEL WOULD THEN BE MOVED TO THE AMAHORO COMPLEX. THINNING OUT WILL BE ATTEMPTED BEFORE HAND.

5. THE KIA LOOKS LESS AND LESS AS OUR PRINCIPAL ENTRY POINT FOR UNAMIR II. WE WOULD THEREFORE REQUEST YOU TO CARRY OUT IMMEDIATE STAFF CHECKS AS TO THE POSSIBILITIES OF USING AIRPORTS OF THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES AS PRINCIPAL POINT OF ENTRY. SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE AIRHEADS ARE GIVEN BELOW IN PRIORITY:

A. BUJUMBURA - BURUNDI. IF POLITICAL SITUATION WILL PERMIT. IT MAY POSSIBLY HELP THE SITUATION THERE. THE LOGISTICS BASE WOULD BE SET UP IN BUTARE. THE GHANABATT INCREASE WOULD BE DEPLOYED FOR BASE PROTECTION, CONVOY PROTECTION AND LOCAL HUMANITARIAN TASKS. THE FORCES PRESENTLY IN KIGALI COULD MEET THE PROTECTION AND HUMANITARIAN TASKS IF WE DID NOT HAVE THE KIA TO PROTECT.

- B. GOMA - ZAIRE. THE LOGISTICS BASE WOULD BE IN GISENY. SIMILAR SCENARIO AS BUTARE FOR ALL CONCERNED.
 - C. ENTEEBE - UGANDA
 - D. DAR-ES-SALAM - TANZANIA
5. REGARDS.



MINISTÈRE DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE
ARMÉE RWANDAISE
ÉTAT-MAJOR

G3

*Q
amman
send copy of
this to Kigali
Kigali / Kigali
li*

KIGALI, le 20 MAI 1994

N° 0713 /G3.3.3

Monsieur le Commandant de la MINUAR

O B J E T : Statut de l'Aéroport
International de KIGALI.

REFERENCE : Votre lettre du 21 Avr 1994.

Monsieur le Commandant,

Je vous transmets en annexe mes observations quant aux conditions nécessaires pour assurer la neutralité et la sécurité de l'Aéroport telles que reprises dans votre lettre en référence.

- a. En effet, comme il a été constaté à plusieurs reprises, le FPR utilise la MINUAR pour la protection de ses positions de combat en prétextant la présence des membres de la MINUAR sur ses positions pour empêcher les FAR de riposter aux tirs ennemis en provenance des positions FPR(CND, MERIDIEN, STADE AMAHORO, QG MINUAR etc...).

Il serait alors inacceptable que cette situation se reproduise à l'Aéroport international de KIGALI. C'est pourquoi je vous propose les conditions reprises en annexe de la présente qui sont de nature à assurer une neutralité positive de l'Aéroport.

- b. Je prends bonne note également de l'engagement du FPR par écrit à respecter le nouveau statut de l'Aéroport de KIGALI. Cet engagement par écrit devra ressortir expressément la bonne foi du FPR, pour ne pas tenter de s'emparer de l'Aéroport.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Commandant de la MINUAR, l'expression de ma très haute considération.

Copie pour information :

- Son Excellence Monsieur le Premier Ministre
- Monsieur le Ministre des Transports et de Communication
- Monsieur le Ministre de la Défense
- Chef EM Gd N

Aug
BIZIMUNGU Augustin
Général-Major
Chef EM AR

ANNEXE A MA LETTRE N° 0713 /G3.3.3 DU 20 MAI 1994

Les conditions nécessaires pour assurer la neutralité et la sécurité de l'Aéroport.

- a. Les FAR et la Gendarmerie doivent se retirer de l'Aéroport et de ses environs immédiats sauf les militaires de l'aviation et la Gendarmerie aéroportuaire.
- b. L'établissement d'une zone de sécurité, autour de l'aéroport d'au moins 300 mètres pour les tirs d'armes lourdes et les installations de ces armes lourdes au moins à 1000 mètres (1 kilomètre).
- c. Tous les tirs des FAR et FPR doivent être évités par les mortiers et autres systèmes d'armes dans la zone neutre dite de sécurité dont les limites sont définies ci-dessus.
- d. La défense éloignée de l'Aéroport est assurée par les FAR.
- e. Les FAR et le FPR ne doivent pas utiliser la force pour pénétrer dans la zone de sécurité.
- f. L'Aéroport est ouvert pour des raisons strictement humanitaires jusqu'à la conclusion d'un accord de cessez le feu. Après cet Accord les conditions qui prévalaient avant la reprise des hostilités (avant le 07 Avr 94) seront d'application.
- g. Le personnel civil qui travaille à l'Aéroport doit avoir des facilités pour venir travailler. Ces facilités doivent être garanties par la MINUAR.
- h. La MINUAR s'engage à assurer la Neutralité de l'Aéroport par tous les moyens en vue de NE PAS laisser l'Aéroport tomber sous le contrôle du FPR.

ACCORD DE FACILITATION D'AIDE HUMANITAIRE

1. Les deux parties reconnaissent que la situation humanitaire à KIGALI se détériore rapidement suite aux nombreux accrochages. Il y a un manque de nourriture, d'eau potable et de médicaments. La situation est plus spécialement critique dans les Camps de réfugiés et dans les hôpitaux. Il y a toujours plusieurs corps qui jonchent les rues, créant un danger d'épidémie. L'hostilité des troupes combattantes et militaires ne permet pas l'apport d'aide humanitaire au peuple qui souffre.
2. Afin de prévenir une détérioration plus accrue de la situation humanitaire à KIGALI, les deux parties sont prêtes à établir une entente pour la livraison d'aide humanitaire internationale sous la surveillance de la MINUAR.
3. Les parties contrôlant les secteurs devant chaque Camp de réfugiés, et hôpital, vont établir un poste de garde qui sera responsable pour la sécurité du Camp/Hôpital. Des endroits de distribution d'aide humanitaire seront établis par chaque partie dans leur secteur respectif.
4. Les deux parties en cause vont s'informer par l'entremise de la MINUAR de l'existence et de la création de nouveaux Camps/Hôpitaux ainsi que des points de distribution afin d'éviter l'échange accidentel de coups de feu dans ces secteurs.
5. Les deux parties s'entendent pour donner le libre accès et les escortes pour les convois d'aide humanitaire aux observateurs militaires de la MINUAR voyageant vers ou retournant des Camp/Hôpitaux. La zone neutre ne sera traversée qu'avec des escortes de la MINUAR.
6. Chacun des Camps/Hôpitaux, points de distribution et convois d'aide humanitaire doit être clairement identifié par un drapeau blanc avec une croix rouge.
7. Les deux parties s'engagent à respecter une zone de sécurité de 1000 mètres (1 Km) autour de chaque Camp ou hôpital où les combats ne peuvent avoir lieu.
8. Dans le cadre de la salubrité et hygiène publique, les 2 parties conviennent de faciliter l'accès aux techniciens d'ELECTROGAZ devant assurer l'entretien de ses installations (zone de captage d'eau-station de pompage et de distribution d'eau-Usine d'épuration-postes de transformation).
9. Chacune des parties devra fournir à la MINUAR un officier de liaison pour l'aide humanitaire. Cet Officier devra avoir ses propres moyens de communication.

TRANSLATION OF RGF DOCUMENTS DATED 20 MAY 1994 CONCERNING NEUTRALITY OF KIA

You are receiving as an annex my observations about the necessary conditions to ensure the security and the neutrality of the airport as discussed at the references.

a. As identified many times the RPF use UNAMIR to protect their combat positions on the pretext that members of UNAMIR are in location thereby making it difficult for the RGF to return to fire on the RPF positions located at CND, Meridien, Amahoro Stadium, and UNAMIR HQ etc.

It is unacceptable for this situation to occur again at KIA. This is why I am proposing the conditions outlined in the annex which will assure neutrality at the airport.

b. I would expect written confirmation from the RPF, confirming that they will respect the new Kigali Airport status. This confirmation should express the real desire of the RPF to not use the airport as an military objective.

Annex A To His Letter No. 0713/G3.3.3 DU 20 May 1994

The necessary conditions to assure the neutrality and the security of KIA:

a. The RGF and the Gendarmerie should leave the airport and its immediate area except for the military aviation personnel and the Gendarmerie airport personnel.

b. The establishment of a security zone around the airport for a minimum of 300 hundred meters for heavy direct fire weapons and a minimum of 1000 meters for all indirect fire weapons.

c. All fire from RGF and RPF mortars or other systems should be prohibited within the zone of neutrality as described above.

d. The defence of the airport outside the neutral zone will be assured by the RGF.

e. The RGF and the RPF may not use force in order to penetrate the neutral zone.

f. The airport will only be open for humanitarian reasons until a cease fire accord is reached. After this accord is reached the conditions that prevailed prior to 07 April, 1994 will be in effect.

g. The civilian personnel who work at the airport must be allowed to come to work. This ability will be provided by UNAMIR.

h. UNAMIR will ensure the neutrality of the airport, ensuring that it does not fall into the the control of the RPF.

AGREEMENT TO FACILITATE HUMANITARIAN AIDE

1. Both parties agree that the humanitarian situation in Kigali is deteriorating rapidly as a result of many disagreements. There is a lack of food, water, and medication. The situation in the refugee camps and hospitals are critical. There are still dead bodies in the street, thereby creating a danger of epidemics. The fighting of the two sides do not permit the delivery of humanitarian aide to the people who are suffering.

2. In order to prevent the situation from getting worse in Kigali, both parties should be ready to establish an agreement allowing the delivery international humanitarian aide under the protection of UNAMIR.

3. The parties controlling the sectors in which there are refugee camps or hospitals must establish a security force responsible for the security of that camp/hospital. The distribution areas will be identified for the distribution of aide by each party for each sector.

4. Both parties must be informed through UNAMIR about the existence or the establishment of new hospital/camps in order to avoid the accidental exchange of fire in those sectors.

5. Both parties must give free access and provide escorts to UNAMIR observers and humanitarian convoys going to and from the camps or hospitals. The neutral zone may only be crossed with escorts from UNAMIR.

6. Each camp, hospital, humanitarian convoy, distribution point must be clearly identified by a white flag with a red cross.

7. Both parties agree to respect the one thousand meter exclusion zone around each camp/hospital where no fighting will take place.

8. In the interest of health and public hygiene, both sides should allow access by the technicians to ELECROGAZ in order to maintain those installations. (water purification, pumping and distribution stations).

9. Both parties must give a liaison officer to UNAMIR for humanitarian aide. This officer should have his own means of communications.

Translation by:
Austdal / Nelson
21/5/94
Austdal
i.g.
C. Plans.

UN RESTRICTED

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NY
FROM: MAJ GEN DALLAIRE, UNAMIR
DATE: 21 MAY 1994

NUMBER:

NUMBER OF PAGES: SEVEN ONLY

SUBJECT: RE-ASSESSMENT OF PHASE-1 DEPLOYMENT AND TASKS

1. PLEASE FIND ATTACHED A RE-ASSESSMENT PAPER ON THE MENTIONED SUBJECT.
2. REGARDS.

1
UN RESTRICTED

UN RESTRICTED

SUBJECT: RE-ASSESSMENT OF PHASE-1 DEPLOYMENT AND TASKS

GENERAL

1. Fighting in Kigali City area has intensified significantly. RPF troops are closing in and launching offensive operations in Kigali city. They seem all out to capture Kigali International Airport (KIA) and Camp Kanombe barracks. UNAMIR has been protecting KIA physically since the outbreak of hostilities. Of late the terminal site has become dangerous for UN troops as both factions are engaged in heavy fighting in and around the area.

2. The proposal of turning the Kigali International Airport into a UN Neutral Territory has not been agreed upon. The RPF had initially agreed on the proposal but now they wish the RGF to withdraw their forces from KIA and from Camp Kanombe and have them relocate at a safe distance from these sites. The Government/RGF have had serious reservations as to UNAMIR's ability to defend the airfield against RPF attack since the beginning and then be able to keep the airfield neutral even under pressure. FC received this morning the RGF proposal for the establishment of the airport as a neutral territory but they have included some restrictions/conditions that are yet to be resolved between us, RPF and of course the RGF. It is not at all expected that the RGF will accept moving from Kanombe area. This stumbling block was finally discussed in detail with the RPF today. They stated, through the LO, that the airport and Camp Kanombe are part of the package. This could be the show stopper of this exercise. FC has written formal comments/concerns to Maj Gen Kagame and has asked him for a prompt reply. If FC does not see any solution by tomorrow, then he will initiate the withdrawal from the airport, to the Amahoro complex.

3. Presently the northern part of the KIA is under heavy artillery/mortar and small arms fire due to the RPF firing at RGF forces around and within the inner perimeter of the airfield, particularly around the main terminal buildings. Scheduled flights on 19, 20 and 21 May 94 were cancelled. KIA has turned into an important military target as the RPF continue their pressure on the RGF resulting in RGF soldiers filtering into the airfield complex. The damage to the infrastructure is increasing significantly as the tarmac and the landing strip are receiving more and more hits from mortar/artillery fire. The tower is now inoperative as RGF put a MG post there and it was neutralised. Based on the latest situation, a re-assessment of the deployment plan and tasks of Phase-1 UNAMIR II was conducted.

UN RESTRICTED

OPTIONS FOR CONTROL OF KIA

4. The various options of control/availability of the KIA are as under:

- a. KIA becomes neutral territory in four days. This is acceptable as we do not expect Phase I of UNAMIR II build up to commence before then and we have enough resources to take care of ourselves till then. State of the airfield by then will be a concern if fighting continues. Such an eventuality requires at least staffing of an alternate airhead option.
- b. RGF refuses to make KIA neutral territory but agrees to secure it with UNAMIR II. This would be workable as it has in the past for UNAMIR but RPF will never accept this. The KIA will most certainly become a military target. Such eventuality requires an alternate airhead to be identified now.
- c. The KIA becomes a neutral territory with RGF and RPF doing monitoring of UNAMIR II for transparency. This is acceptable to us and we know it is to RPF as they had proposed it at one time. RGF have been approached on it and no response received as yet. If we get the answers today/tomorrow that will be fine, but staffing of an alternate site is needed to cater for the unexpected.
- d. RPF gain control of the airfield. This is a possibility. How long it will take them to do that ? Will it include Camp Kanombe ? Will the airfield be damaged in the fighting or deliberately by the withdrawing RGF ? These concerns require us to look at and prepare an alternate airhead now.
- e. The possibility on a stalemate at and around the airfield is possible and in such a case an alternate airhead is essential now.
- f. The stalemate happens but a truce/cease fire is signed. This requires an alternate airhead be reconnoitred for possible use if there are serious violations.

AIRFIELD NEEDS FOR UNAMIR II OPERATIONS

5. Requirement of airfield for UNAMIR II can be divided into two: Present and Future.

- a. Present Requirement.
- (1) Essential Support. To maintain forces during Phase 1 essential supplies like food, water and fuel

UN RESTRICTED

will be needed. Presently UNAMIR II has a stock of 14 days of food, water and fuel. We can sustain at least 10 days without essential supplies. If KIA is closed for 10 days, it will not be a problem to continue our tasks.

(2) Medical Evacuation. For medical evacuation, UNAMIR II needs to keep the airport under its security control.

(3) Essential Stores. UNAMIR II with its present strength can sustain with its essential stores for the time being. No essential stores are required until the re-enforcements arrive.

(4) For In/Out Passengers. It is not critical to bring in or take out UNAMIR II personnel from Kigali at this time. However, if flights arrive, passengers can avail the facility for increasing the staff available and for welfare opportunities.

(5) Humanitarian Material. Indeed Rwanda needs a lot of help in terms of food, water and medicine. These needs can be brought in by air for at least Kigali. But this bridge still has not been maximized. The effort to utilize the C-130 already flying from Nairobi to Kigali, plus the two (2) German aircrafts about to come in can do more but there does not seem to be enough stocks available at Nairobi.

From the above assessment, it is derived that even if the KIA is not held by the Force, UNAMIR II could sustain and continue its operations for another 10 days or so. However the greatest concern we have is the evacuation of casualties. The alternate plan to use the helicopters from UNOMUR is still possible but as yet has not been used nor exercised. It would be most advisable that a secondary airfield, capable of handling C-130 type aircraft be reced for possible use as soon as possible.

b. Future Needs.

(1) GHANBAT Re-enforcement. To bring the strength of GHANBATT to 800 personnel and mechanizing it, an airhead is an absolute necessity. The airfield will be required for bringing troops, weapon systems, main combat vehicles (APCs) and ammunition.

(2) Advance Parties. Advance and reconnaissance parties of Engineers, Signals, Fd Medical Hospital and Log Coy will also be arriving during Phase I in order to prepare for Phase II.

UN RESTRICTED

(3) Build-up of Supplies. Food, water, fuel, medical stores, defence stores and spares will be needed to support the augmented force.

A secure airhead is a fundamental need for the deployment of troops and equipments in Phase 1. Phase 1 deployment is supposed to commence between D+7 to D+14 (24-31 May 94) and probably finish between D+21 to D+28 (7-14 June 94). With the little time available, the state of the KIA infrastructure, the stagnation in the cease fire implementation, all these elements mitigate against the KIA being our main airhead. An alternate principal airfield is required in the shortest of time possible in order not to stop/slow down the deployment of Phase I assets.

TASKS IN KIGALI WITHIN MANDATE-PHASE I

6. UNAMIR II is presently and will continue to perform following tasks in Kigali Sector:

- a. Protection/support people in danger.
- b. Transfer of people in danger.
- c. Escort Duties.
- d. Patrolling in city area.
- e. Units in the supply of food to refugees and distressed people.
- f. Protection of UN installations.
- g. Liaison with both the parties for possible cease fire.
- h. Monitoring of truce/cease fire.
- i. Evacuation of casualties by air.
- j. Providing escorts, liaison and monitoring by UNMOs.
- k. Protection of KIA.

One infantry battalion (-) is needed full time to provide the protection and security of the KIA. If we don't need to protect the KIA as a neutral territory, then the above mentioned tasks (less sub-para k of course) could under very difficult conditions be carried out without the re-enforcement of GHANBATT during Phase-1. Again such an eventuality could be considered only if the proper equipment, materiel, personnel rotation/welfare and

UN RESTRICTED

increased medical and logistic support are made available now.

7. GHANBATT. In Phase I, it was planned to bring Ghanbatt up to its full strength. Present strength is 321 and 479 personnel are supposed to join the battalion starting D+7 to D+14. The use of an alternate airport in a neighboring country - (BUJUMBURA or GOMA) and local smaller airports within Rwanda (CYANGUGU/GISENYI/RUHENGGERI) are essentials for the reasons stated above. Under these circumstances we see the need to divide the battalion and deploy one maybe two coys for securing the new airport (outside Rwanda), Logistics base (in Rwanda) near these airports (Butare or Gisenyi) and for convoy protection duties along the Mission's life line and the support/security of local humanitarian activities. Thus any addition to the present level of forces deployed, or redeployed in Kigali, without the task of the KIA, the following additional tasks may have to be undertaken:

- a. Secure the alternative airhead (BUGUMBARA or GOMA).
- b. Secure the new logistics base behind to the airhead (BUTARE or GESENYI).
- c. Provide convoy escorts from alternate airhead to Kigali.
- d. Secure a local smaller airfield in Rwanda in order to establish the humanitarian air bridge that has been closed for the last three (3) days (CYANGUGU, RUHENGGERI, GISENYI, BUTARE).

8. Alternate Airhead. The KIA looks less and less as our principal entry point for UNAMIR II. It is therefore pertinent to consider the implementation of an alternative airhead now in order to permit Phase I to commence. Our first recommendation is BUJUMBURA airfield (BURUNDI) and the second one being GOMA (ZAIRE). Both airfields could also be used simultaneously if the volume of airlift required it. If we use BUJUMBURA, we need to establish a secure log base at Butare, for Goma it would be in Gisenyi. These main alternate airfields should be able to accommodate our build-up needs before the Phase I deployment is commenced. The secondary airfields could be functional within days of closing or leaving the KIA. That can accommodate C-130 and Trausall (C-160) type aircraft.

CONCLUSION/RECOMMENDATION

9. It is then recommended that all the forces and material planned for deployment in Phase I should continued to move to Rwanda according to the current milestone. However, the use of

UN RESTRICTED

alternate airhead with its closeby logistics base and the use of the secondary airfields should be implemented soonest if the results of the negotiations between RPF, RGF and UNAMIR II do not conclude over the next day or so. The troops to task allocation proposed in this paper, without the KIA task will permit early deployment in the RGF areas and as such accelerate the securing of conditions for humanitarian relief in this particularly difficult area.



R.A. DALLAIRE
Major General
Force Commander