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CONFIDENTIAL

UNB. /16-03UN/61

7th August, 1961

My dear U See Tin,

Since James, I presume, is still in Geneva, I am taking the liberty of writing to you regarding our office and the forthcoming General Assembly. As you are no doubt aware, we need a Third Secretary very urgently. The fact that the General Assembly is only a few weeks away keeps every one of us extremely busy, and I have to attend Asian-African group meetings almost every day. I understand that the Foreign Office is considering several eligible candidates including Ko Shwe Zin and Jimmy Saw Lwin. Of course I do not know any of them, and I would be perfectly happy to have any one of them provided the one selected is reasonably strong in English and has a proper sense of public relations. Among other assignments I propose to give him some research work and gathering of information which of course involves a certain type of contact with the public including the press. I would be most grateful if you could arrange to send him here at least a month ahead of the commencement of the General Assembly.

As regards the composition of the delegation, I need hardly mention that U On Sein will be ideal, as usual, for the Special Political Committee. Daw Mya Sein is still at Sweet Briar College, Virginia, and I do not know what her plans are. If her services are still available, I would like to see her represent Burma in the Third Committee as she did last year. This will of course save our Government transportation expenses for one, but if she is successful in getting a job here, her participation in our delegation work is out of the question. I will make further enquiries and let you know.

As you know, the Second Committee is getting more and more important and we need one who can contribute most effectively. U Nyun Wei did very well when he was here. If his services are not available, I should think that U Aye Hlaing of the University would be excellent.

U Tin Maung should continue to look after the Fourth Committee work. There is one big item before the Fifth Committee - Reorganization of the U.N. Secretariat, and in my view this is The Item of the 16th session. It is likely to generate a lengthy and heated debate. If we cannot get a suitable person with the necessary background of U.N. operations, it seems I shall have to take up this item myself besides the Political Committee. Perhaps in this Committee an officer of the Foreign Office could be very helpful.

U See Tin  
Executive Secretary  
Foreign Office  
Rangoon

/2.



The work in the Sixth Committee, as usual, does not seem heavy. However, as the experience of the previous sessions indicate, a judge can be of very great help not only in matters relating to this Committee but also in matters connected with the work of the whole delegation. If the services of a judge cannot be made available, consideration should be given to diplomats or politicians with considerable legal background. Perhaps U Sain Bwa might be worthy of consideration. Apart from other qualifications his participation in the projected Neutral Summit Conference in Belgrade will be an asset to the delegation.

With fondest regards,

Very sincerely,

(Sgd)

.....  
(U Thant)  
Permanent Representative  
of Burma  
to the United Nations.

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT ON ASIAN-AFRICAN GROUP MEETINGS

ALGERIA:

The Asian-African group met at 2.30 p.m. on the 31st July 1961, and not on the 1st August as stipulated in my report dated the 21st July. The failure of the Security Council to take appropriate action regarding the situation in Tunisia necessitated the convening of the meeting one day earlier. The draft of the Explanatory Memorandum submitted by the Standing Committee on Algeria was approved, but in the light of the suspension of the Franco-Algerian negotiations on the 28th July 1961, the following sentence was added to paragraph 9 of the draft:

"But on July 28 the resumed negotiations were suspended at the request of the Algerian Delegation due to the French Government's refusal to recognize the basic principles of territorial integrity and the unity of the Algerian people."

Twenty-four signatures were collected on the spot, and the next meeting of the group was scheduled for Thursday, the 10th August 1961, when more members are expected to receive instructions from their governments regarding cosponsorship of the request for inscription of this item. The last date for the request for inscription is the 20th August, 1961.

SITUATION IN TUNISIA:

At the same meeting (31st July), the question of the situation in Tunisia was considered at the request of the Delegation of Liberia. In view of the failure of the Security Council to take any action regarding it, the group considered the advisability of convening either a Special Session of the General Assembly under Rule 8 (a) of the Rules of Procedure or an Emergency Special Session under Rule 8 (b). General opinion favoured the latter course. Under the Rules, a special session would require at least ten days' delay for notification. An emergency special session under Rule 8 (b) must meet within 24 hours after it is requested. The second course, however, is contingent on the General Assembly Resolution 377 A of the Fifth session which is popularly known as the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution which the Soviet Bloc never recognized. Under that resolution, an Emergency special session shall be convened within 24 hours after the Permanent Members of the Security Council "lacked unanimity" on a certain issue, and if the seven members of the Security Council request for such an action, or the majority of members of the United Nations request for such a session.

The majority of members of the group felt that in the Security Council unanimity was lacking among the Permanent members, and that it was procedurally correct to request the convening of an Emergency Special Session. Some members felt that in the past Rule 8 (b) has been applied only when a majority vote in the Security Council was overridden by a veto. In the Tunisian question no adverse votes have been cast on any resolution. France, a permanent member, has not voted on any of the resolutions. However, the general consensus was in favour of ~~resolutions~~ to Rule 8 (b) on the interpretation of the General Assembly Resolution 377 A (V) that whenever the five permanent members of the Security Council are not in accord, an Emergency special session can be requested by the majority of members of the United Nations. It was thus decided and 21 signatures were collected on the spot.

When the group met again on August 3, the delegation of Tunisia reported that so far 46 signatures have been collected. Burma endorsed the request for an Emergency special session, vide our cable No. UNB 607 of July 31, 1961.

The break-down of the 46 signatures received up till August 3 is as follows:

Asian-Africans	-	35 (out of 46)
Eastern Europeans	-	9
Yugoslavia	-	1
Cuba	-	1

Among the Asian-Africans, the following did not sign with the explanation that they have not received instructions from their governments:

Japan, Chad, Senegal, Niger, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Camerouns, Congo (Brazzaville), Gabon, Central African Republic and Madagascar.

It will be noticed that Japan is the only country out of 20 Asian countries which did not sign. Others belong to what is generally known here as the African French Community. It is interesting to note that Upper Volta of that community cosponsored the request for an Emergency special session. Congo (Leopoldville) also joined others in cosponsoring the request. Her representative announced that his country's new government under Prime Minister Adoula has decided to join hands with the majority of Asian-Africans.

At the same meeting (August 3), the representative of Tunisia reported that he had contacted several delegates outside the group with a view to getting more cosponsors. He said that several delegates doubted the legality of invoking Rule 8 (b). After a lengthy discussion, it was decided that the group should meet again on August 4.

At that meeting (August 4), the representative of Tunisia reported that no other delegations outside the Asian-African group had so far received instructions from their governments regarding cosponsorship of the request for an Emergency Special Session. After a prolonged discussion it was decided to resort to Rule 8 (a) and request the convening of a Special Session. The delegation of Nigeria then proposed that the request for a meeting of the Special session with 46 signatures should be sent to the Secretary-General on that very day and then the Secretary-General should be asked to poll the views of the remaining members of the United Nations. I proposed that we should first obtain fifty signatures before we make the request, and that consideration should be deferred till Monday, August 7. My proposal was supported by delegates from the Sudan, Ethiopia, Tunisia and Iraq, and the group approved the draft of a letter to be addressed to the Secretary-General. The same is reproduced below:

"Excellency,

1. On the instructions of our respective Governments, we do hereby request the convening of a Special Session of the General Assembly under Rule 8 (a) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, to consider the grave situation in Tunisia obtaining since 19th July 1961, in view of the failure of the Security Council to take appropriate action.



2. In view of the gravity of the situation, we request that this Special Session be held immediately (or as soon as possible) after the concurrence of a majority of member states. We trust that this is in keeping with the wishes of the vast majority of member states.

(sqa)

( U Thant )  
Permanent Representative  
of Burma  
to the United Nations.

Permanent Secretary,  
Foreign Office,  
Rangoon, Burma.

7th August, 1961.

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT ON ELECTIONS TO BE HELD DURING THE 16TH SESSION OF THE  
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Presidency: Dr. Ali Sastroamidjojo of Indonesia and H.E. Mr. Mongi Slim of Tunisia are the two candidates for the Presidency of the United Nations General Assembly at its 16th session and both have approached our delegation for support. Under the accepted convention, it is the turn of an Asian-African to preside over this session.

Dr. Sastroamidjojo wrote several personal letters to me from Djakarta requesting me to canvass for him in the Asian-African group, and the Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations (H.E. Mr. S. Wirjopranoto) has been in constant contact with me for the same purpose. It is obvious that the Indonesian Government has confidently counted on Burma as Dr. Ali's supporter. I understand that he is coming to New York in the third week of August, to canvass personally.

Mr. Mongi Slim, who is slated to be his country's Foreign Minister in the event of his election as President of the General Assembly, is also working very hard to gain the support of the Asian-Africans. In June when President Boland of the General Assembly privately sounded me out if I would accept the Chairmanship of the projected Congo Conciliation Commission, Mr. Slim got wind of it and asked me to visit Tunisia as a guest of his Government in the event I decided to visit the Congo.

At this moment Mr. Slim's chances are far brighter than Dr. Ali's. Although the Eastern European countries have committed to support Dr. Ali's candidature, Mr. Slim is assured of support by, among others, the Arab League and the African French community. All the Western Europeans and almost all Latin-Americans, with the exception of Cuba, will no doubt vote for Mr. Slim. I understand that Cambodia and Ceylon have promised their support of Dr. Ali. India has not come out for either candidate.

The most telling point in favour of Mr. Slim is the fact that since the inception of the United Nations, no African has presided over any session of its General Assembly while five Asians have enjoyed this honour. Besides, Mr. Slim is an exceptionally refined diplomat with great personal charm.

Dr. Ali's strongest card is his immense stature as the Chairman of the historic Bandung Conference and a former Prime Minister. However, he is regarded by the West as too "leftist" which, of course, is not true.

In concert with some colleagues, I am trying my best to avoid the prospect of an open contest. There is a possibility that Dr. Ali may withdraw at the last minute if it is discovered that the odds are against him. This possibility is enhanced by the fact that Asian-Africans now constitute half the membership of the United Nations and we are now in a strong position to demand the end of the gentlemen's agreement by which the Asian-African group is accorded the same status as two other smaller groups: European and Latin-American. It is widely felt in our group that for the purpose of

Presidential elections, Asians and Africans should be regarded as two separate entities, each entitled to a Presidential chair on its own numerical strength. It will mean in effect that if an African is elected President for the 16th session, an Asian should strive for that exalted post in the 17th session. Such a proposal will of course run into strong opposition by the Europeans and Latin-Americans, but the Asian-African group is strong enough to block the election of any other candidate, provided it is united. Apart from other considerations, logic is on our side.

I would recommend that the Government should defer its consideration until the situation is clearer.

#### Vice-President:

Thirteen Vice-Presidents, including the five Permanent Members of the Security Council, have to be elected. So far only two candidates have come out from the Asian-African group which is entitled to four seats (including the Presidency). The two candidates are Ghana and Niger, and since an Asian-African is going to be elected President, there is still one more vacancy to be filled in. Niger's candidature is endorsed by the African French community popularly known as the Brazzaville group. Other announced candidates outside the group are Costa Rica and Haiti from Latin America, and Greece and the Netherlands from Europe. It will be recalled that last year Greece withdrew her candidature in favour of Canada.

#### Chairmanship of Committees:

The following are the announced candidates for chairmanship of committees:

First Committee: H.E. Mr. Jiri Nosek of Czechoslovakia  
H.E. Dr. Mario Amadeo of Argentina

Special Political Committee: Nil

Second Committee: H.E. Mr. Said Hasan of Pakistan

Third Committee: H.E. Mr. Salvador Lopez of the Philippines

Fourth Committee: Mrs. Angie Brooks of Liberia

Fifth Committee: Mr. Hermod Lannung of Denmark

Sixth Committee: Nil

According to established convention, the offices of the Chairmen of Committees are distributed as follows:

Asian-African group	2
European group	2
Latin-American group	2
Eastern European group	1

It will be observed that there are three candidates from the Asian-African group for two posts and one shall have to withdraw. Mr. Lopez of the Philippines has been assured of the group support at one of its meetings last year when Mr. Lopez agreed to withdraw his candidature to give way to two other candidates. (He withdrew his candidature on two previous occasions too). The problem before the Asian-African group is whom to support out of the two remaining candidates.



Mr. Said Hasan, however, is now under orders of transfer to Pakistan, and he told me that his candidature will most probably be withdrawn. In that event, Mrs. Brooks will be the only other candidate from our group and no problem will be posed. Mrs. Brooks, however, is a controversial figure, and according to those who know her, she is very unstable.

The show-down, however, will be in the First Committee. It will be recalled that Mr. Jiri Nosek was an unsuccessful candidate for the Presidency of the 15th session of the General Assembly and our delegation, upon instructions from the Government, supported his candidature. I feel rather strongly that after sixteen years of the existence of the United Nations, it is time that an Eastern European should hold the important post of either the Presidency of the General Assembly or the Chairmanship of the Political Committee. My observations on the qualification of Mr. Nosek were set forth in my confidential report to the Foreign Office vide this office letter No. UNB.432/15-03UN/60 dated the 14th July, 1960.

The chief argument levelled against Mr. Nosek's candidature is that Mr. Kurka, Permanent Representative of Czechoslovakia to the United Nations, was elected as Vice-Chairman of the Political Committee at the 15th session of the General Assembly, and that he did chair the Committee at the resumed session when the Chairman (Sir Claude Corea) could not preside due to illness. I do not consider this argument to be valid. Dr. Mario Amadeo is assured of support by the Latin American group and the European group and he is likely to be elected since the Asian-African group is divided over the contest. I would recommend that we support the candidature of Mr. Jiri Nosek, although it would mean backing the losing horse.

#### Security Council:

In accordance with an informal agreement reached at the 15th session of the General Assembly, Liberia will resign at the end of this year, and Ireland is slated to serve the remainder of the two-year term. Three vacancies will be caused due to the expiry of the terms of Ceylon, Ecuador and Turkey at the end of this calendar year. So far Ghana is the only candidate for the seat to be vacated by Ceylon, and Cuba is the only candidate for the seat to be vacated by Ecuador. I understand that Venezuela and Guatemala are at present vying for the Latin-American group support for this seat. For obvious reasons Cuba will not receive Latin-American support. It will be recalled that Cuba failed to get that support last year in her bid against Chile. A further report will be submitted as soon as the official Latin-American candidate is announced.

The real problem is related to the seat to be vacated by Turkey. According to Eastern Europeans and many Asians, this particular seat formerly split between the Philippines and Yugoslavia and then between Poland and Turkey, is legitimately an Eastern European seat. Among other reasons, it is felt that the requirements of the principle of equitable geographical representation as provided in article 23 of the Charter should be satisfied. Yugoslavia, Poland and Turkey are regarded as Eastern Europe in a purely geographical sense. Another argument against the Philippines is that she was a member of the Security Council only four years ago while Romania has never been one. Another deadlock is in store if one of the two does not withdraw.

#### Economic and Social Council:

The terms of the following six members will expire at the end of this year: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, New Zealand, Spain,

U.S.A. and Venezuela. Of course the United States will be re-elected, and the problem before the Assembly will be to elect five new members. So far, eleven candidates have come out for the five seats. They are Israel, Thailand, Colombia, Yugoslavia, Haiti, Italy, Bulgaria (for re-election), India, Iraq, Tunisia and Australia.

At the 15th session of the General Assembly, a deadlock ensued in the contest between India and Belgium, and after repeated consultations between the representatives of the European group and the Asian-African group, Italy was offered as a compromise candidate by the European group and India agreed to withdraw her candidature on the understanding that the European group would be prepared to support a candidate from amongst the members of the Asian-African group at the 16th session of the Assembly. A perusal of the history of the ECOSOC will show that the seat now occupied by Spain is not legitimately a European seat. It drifted gradually from Asia to the West. It was occupied successively by Iran, Turkey, Greece and now Spain. In these circumstances it is only fair that Spain's seat should come back to Asia, and with the seat to be vacated by Afghanistan, the Asian-African group is entitled to two seats. I would recommend that we support the candidatures of India and Iraq. Since Tunisia has put up a candidate for the Presidency of the General Assembly, I do not think she should aspire for two important positions at the same session. Australia is the logical successor to New Zealand and in view of the fact that the Australian mission here has been working very closely with our mission, I would recommend that we support her candidature. Colombia and Haiti are the two candidates for the seat to be vacated by Venezuela and so far the Latin American group has not come out officially in support of the one or the other. Burma, as in all previous occasions, should support the official group candidate. This leaves us with the only problem regarding ECOSOC elections - the candidatures of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria for the Eastern European seat. Yugoslavia appears to be gaining more support than Bulgaria mainly because of the fact that re-elections to the principal organs of the United Nations are not very much favoured here. I would recommend that we support the candidature of Yugoslavia.

#### Trusteeship Council:

No elections are envisaged for the Trusteeship Council this year.

#### International Law Commission:

Under the statute of the International Law Commission, the General Assembly has to elect 21 members of that Commission every five years. The next election is due at the forthcoming session of the Assembly. In the last election, six were elected from the Asian-African group and it appears that the same number will be elected this time. The Asian-African group has so far not considered the desirability of increasing this allocation.

Up till now 24 candidates have come out officially, and they are listed in Annex I. It will be observed that Ecuador has submitted two names contravening Article (2) of the Statute. However, the Permanent Mission of Ecuador has requested that the candidature of Dr. A.M. Paredes be supported if Burma decides to vote for Ecuador. In any case, the Latin-American group, the European group and the Eastern European group normally decide on their own candidates and no problem is likely to be posed. The main problem before us will be the election of six members from among the Asian-African candidates.

It will be observed that Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, India, U.A.R., Iran, Japan, Turkey, Nigeria, Israel, the Philippines,



Thailand and Ceylon have nominated candidates. Since Nigeria is the only candidate from Africa, it is sure to be elected. Thus our choice is restricted to five from Asia. We have committed our support of the candidate from Afghanistan vide our office letter No. UNB 410/24UN/61 dated the 23rd May, 1961. This support does not preclude us from supporting other candidates as it is implied in Foreign Office letter No. BUN 232/Hta, dated the 28th July, 1961. I would recommend that candidates from Nigeria, India and Afghanistan be included in our list of six to be supported.

International Court of Justice:

There will be no more elections until the 18th session of the General Assembly in 1963.

Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories:

I have asked the Deputy Permanent Representative to report on the elections to this Committee and his report is appended as Annex II.

Committee on Contributions:

Four vacancies will be caused by the expiry of the terms of office held by U.S.A., U.K., Poland and Iran. So far we have received only one communication from the Mission of Iran announcing the offer of its candidate Mr. F.N. Kia for re-election.

Committee on South West Africa:

No candidates.

Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions:

No candidates.

Board of Auditors:

No candidates.

Investment Committee:


No candidates.

U.N. Administrative Tribunal:

No candidates.

U.N. Staff Pension Committee:

No candidates.

  
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(U Thant)  
Permanent Representative  
of Burma to  
the United Nations.

Permanent Secretary  
Foreign Office  
Rangoon

4th August, 1961



ANNEX I

## ELECTION TO:

INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION

All 21 members of the Commission are elected at one and the same time for a term of 5 years.

CANDIDATE	COUNTRY	DATE LETTER	REMARKS
1. Prof. Roberto Ago	Italy	Jan. 10th '61	Re-election
2. Mr. Muhammad Munir	Pakistan	Feb. 3rd '61	
3. Dr. Abdul Hakim Tabibi	Afghanistan	Feb. 10th '61	Burma's nomination
4. Prof. Mustafa K. Yasseen	Iraq	Feb. 27th '61	Endorsed unanimously by Arab States
5. Prof. Milan Bartos	Yugoslavia	Feb. 28th '61	Re-election
6. Dr. Radhabinod Pal	India	March 17th '61	Re-election
7. Dr. Abdullah El-Erian	U.A.R.	Apr. 6th '61	
8. Dr. Ahmad Matine Dastary	Iran	Apr. 17th '61	Re-election
9. Mr. Erik Castren	Finland	Apr. 27th '61	For seat occupied by Sweden
10. Mr. Senjin Tsuruoka	Japan	Apr. 28th '61	
11. Prof. Manfred Lachs	Poland	May 5th '61	
12. Dr. Mihet Erim	Turkey	May 15th '61	Re-election
13. Dr. T.O. Elias	Nigeria	May 17th '61	
14. H.E. Mr. S. Rosenne	Israel	May 18th '61	
15. H.E. Mr. M.J. Gamboa	Philippines	May 26th '61	
16. Prof. Rudolf Bystricky	Czech.	May 29th '61	
17. Mr. Kunthi Suphamongkhon	Thailand	June 2nd '61	
18. Prof. C. Eustathiades	Greece	June 6th '61	
19. Prof. Alfred Verdross	Austria	June 12th '61	Re-election
20. Mr. R.S.S. Gunewardene	Ceylon	June 19th '61	
21. Mr. Marcel Cadieux	Canada	June 20th '61	
22. Prof. Andre Gros	France	July 25th '61	
23. Dr. A. Marfa Mora	Ecuador	July 25th '61	It is requested that should Burma decide to support only one of the two, Dr. Paredes be supported
24. Dr. A.M. Paredes			

The Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories:

Provisional agenda of the sixteenth regular session of the General Assembly includes two items in respect of the question of the renewal of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories. These items are 45 and 46.

Item 45 is entitled: Question of the renewal of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories (resolution 1332 (XIII) of 12 December 1958). Item 46 is entitled: Election, if required, to fill vacancies in the membership of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories. In operative paragraph of resolution 1332 (XIII), the General Assembly decides that it will reconsider, at the sixteenth session, the question of continuing the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, together with the question of the composition and the terms of reference of this or any such future committee.

By the same General Assembly resolution, the life of the Committee was extended for another three years from January 1959 till December 1961.

The composition of the Committee in 1960 was as follows:

(a) Administering Members:

Australia	New Zealand
Belgium	United Kingdom
France	United States
Netherlands	

(b) Non-Administering Members:

(1) Elected to serve until 31 December 1960:

Brazil

(11) Elected to serve until 31 December 1961:

Dominican Republic	India
Ghana	Iraq

(111) Elected to serve until 31 December 1962:

Argentina	Ceylon
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At the fifteenth session of the General Assembly, Mexico and Liberia were elected members of the Committee. Belgium ceased to be a member and her place was taken by Liberia to restore parity. The Committee sat in New York, prior to the resumed fifteenth session. The Fourth Committee will discuss in detail, the question whether the Committee on Information should or should not be continued and if it decides to continue the Committee it will also consider the question of the composition and terms of reference of this Committee or any such future Committee.

If the Committee in its present form and with the same unsatisfactory terms of reference is given another span of life (3 years), vacancies in respect of four Non-Administering members viz. Dominican Republic, Ghana, India, Iraq will have to be filled during the sixteenth session of the General Assembly. Elections will be conducted in the Fourth Committee, and the result confirmed by the plenary.

Burma had served on the Committee for one term.

In view of the fact, Burma together with Paraguay and the United Arab Republic will cease to be members of the Trusteeship Council at the end of 1961, the Burmese delegation might consider whether Burma should offer her candidacy for election to the Committee on Information for one of the four vacancies.

India lies in the same geographical region as Burma. But so far, it is not known if India wishes to offer herself for re-election. If she does so, Burma should not contest the election, although the chances are that Burma will have more votes than India.

As the General Assembly by resolution 1332 (XIII) will reconsider the question of continuing the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, together with the questions of the composition and terms of reference of the same Committee or any such future Committee, the chances of new African members, and for that matter, new Asian members, getting elected to the Committee are very good. My own feeling is that the majority of members will press for the establishment of a Special Committee composed of administering members and non-administering members drawn from Latin-America, Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe. The principle of parity will be insisted upon by the administering members.

Whether the General Assembly decides to continue the Committee on Information with the same composition of 14 members: (Argentina, Australia, Ceylon, Dominican Republic, France, Ghana, India, Iraq, Liberia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, United Kingdom and United States) or to enlarge the membership of the Committee and widen its terms of reference, we should recommend to the Union Government of Burma that Burma should seek election to the Committee on Information at the sixteenth session.

The representatives attending the session of the General Assembly's Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, which concluded on May 26, 1961 were:

Argentina	Dr. Carlos Ortiz de Rozas
Australia	J.D.L. Hood
Ceylon	H.O. Wijegoonawardena
Dominican Rep.	Dr. Carlos Sanchez y Sanchez
France	Michel de Camaret
Ghana	Alex Quaison-Sackey
India	N. Rasgotra
Iraq	Miss Faiha Ibrahim Kamal
Liberia	Miss Angie Brooks
Mexico	Jorge Casteneda
Netherlands	L.J. Goedhart
New Zealand	P.K. Edmunds
United Kingdom	G.K. Caston
United States	Jonathan B. Bingham
Chairman	C.W.A. Schurmann

If Burma decides to contest the election and if elected, it is important to bear in mind that the country's representative must be a person specially qualified in the functional fields within the Committee's purview in accordance with operative paragraph 3 of Assembly resolution 1332 (XIII) of 12 December 1961.

4th August, 1961

.....  
(Tin Maung)  
Deputy Permanent Representative



## REPORT ON ASIAN-AFRICAN GROUP MEETINGS

### Algeria:

The Asian-African group met on Monday, the 10th July, 1961 and considered the question of Algeria. There was a general consensus of opinion that since the suspension of the Franco-Algerian peace talks at Evian-les-Bains on the 13th June, 1961 partition of Algeria has been the main theme of utterances by French leaders. It was also noted that in his speaking tour of Eastern France, General de Gaulle has placed increasing emphasis on partition. The President laid down three possibilities for the choice of the Algerian people: total integration with France, association with France, or secession (meaning independence). However, he quickly added a proviso to the third choice - Partition. There is obviously a link between the French suspension of the Evian negotiations on the implementation of self-determination and their increased insistence on partition.

The general feeling in the Asian-African group was definitely against partition, and the chairman for the month was instructed by the group to express this feeling to the press immediately after the meeting.

Then the question of inscribing the Algerian item in the agenda of the 16th session of the General Assembly was discussed and the group unanimously agreed to leave the matter to the Standing Committee on Algeria of which I am the Chairman.

The Standing Committee met on Tuesday, the 18th July, 1961 and it was decided to recommend to the whole group that the Algerian item should be inscribed as a supplementary item for the next session of the General Assembly. As in the previous years the Standing Committee also drafted an explanatory memorandum to accompany the request for inscription. On Thursday, the 20th July, 1961 the draft explanatory memorandum was sent to all members of the Asian-African group. The next meeting of the Asian-African group to consider this item is scheduled for Tuesday, the 1st August, 1961.

I would recommend that Burma should cosponsor the request for inscription of the Algerian item and that the draft explanatory memorandum be approved. Three copies of the draft are enclosed herewith.

### Apartheid:

At the second meeting of the Asian-African group, held on the 18th July, 1961, the delegation of India requested the members of the group to cosponsor its proposed request for inscription of the item "The Question of Race Conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa". Burma, as in the previous years, agreed to cosponsor the request. Three copies of the draft of an explanatory memorandum to be attached to the letter requesting inclusion of the item in the provisional agenda of the 16th session of the General Assembly are enclosed herewith.

### Angola:

At the same meeting, the delegation of India requested the members of the group to cosponsor its request for inscription of the item "The situation in Angola" in the provisional agenda of the 16th session.


Doubts were expressed by several delegations regarding the need to request the inscription of this item as it is already in the provisional agenda in connection with the report of the Angola Commission formed by the last Assembly. The representative of India argued that although the question of Angola will feature as an item as a matter of course, the gesture by the Asian-African group in requesting the inscription will focus attention on the gravity of the Angola situation and put greater moral pressure on Portugal to revise its policy.

I attempted to comprise the two viewpoints by suggesting that the Asian-African group should address a letter to the Secretary-General outlining the gravity of the situation in Angola, with a request to distribute the same as an official document to all members of the United Nations Organisation, and secondly, to request the convening of an Emergency session of the General Assembly or the Security Council, if deemed necessary. My proposal was accepted by the group, and a sub-committee of four comprising me, Mr. C.S. Jha (India), Mr. Adnan Pachachi (Iraq) and Mr. Collet Michel (Guinea) was formed to draft the letter meant to be addressed to the Secretary-General. The sub-committee met on Wednesday, the 19th July, 1961 and drafted a letter which will be discussed by the whole group on Friday, the 21st July. If approved by the group, our delegation proposes to append our endorsement to it, in anticipation of the Government's approval.

Congo:

At the second meeting of the Asian-African group held on the 18th July, 1961 the representative of Guinea drew the attention of the group to Mr. Gizenga's letter to the Secretary-General, dated the 9th July, 1961, requesting provision of security measures to all members of the Congolese Parliament both during and after the session of Parliament. The Guinean delegate pointed out that the Secretary-General's reply to Mr. Gizenga, dated the 13th July, 1961 assured United Nations' protection to members of Parliament only on their arrival in Leopoldville and during the Parliament session. He stressed the fact that it is absolutely necessary that the members of the Congolese Parliament should be given protection even after the session of Parliament. No opposition was voiced to this proposal and the chairman undertook to see the Secretary-General to convey to him the view of the group.

The meeting of the Asian-African group (held on the 18th July, 1961) was opened by a statement of the Hon'ble Julius K. Nyerere, Prime Minister of Tanganyika, whose country will become independent on December 9, 1961.

  
.....  
(U Thant)

Permanent Secretary  
Foreign Office  
Rangoon

21st July, 1961



CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT OF THE DELEGATION OF BURMA TO THE (RESUMED)  
FIFTEENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

The composition of the Delegation and its distribution among the various committees is shown below:

Representatives:

U Thant (Chairman)	First Committee
U On Sein (Vice-Chairman)	Special Political Committee
U Pyo Nyein	-
U Tin Maung	Fourth Committee

Advisers:

U Aung Thant	Fifth Committee
U Kyawt Maung	-

U Pyo Nyein, as in the Fifteenth Regular Session, helped the Chairman in the latter's work in the Plenary and First Committee meetings.

When the Assembly met on 7th March, 1961, there was a general feeling that "cold war" items could be dropped. Several neutralist delegates privately pressed both the United States and Soviet delegates to forgo debate on four controversial questions:

1. Soviet charges of aggression against the United States arising out of the U-2 and RB-47 flights.
2. Cuban charge of aggression against the United States.
3. Soviet Union's intervention in Hungary in 1956.
4. "Respect for Human Rights" in Tibet.

Several private meetings took place between Mr. Andrei A. Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Minister, and Mr. Adlai E. Stevenson, United States Chief Delegate, but no agreement was reached between them on the postponement of discussion of any item. I also saw both of them privately several times, and Mr. Gromyko hinted that the Soviet delegation would drop its charge of aggression against the United States, and he expressed the hope that the United States and "those concerned" would similarly drop cold-war items. I got the impression that the Soviet delegation, at the start of the session, was keen to eliminate controversial items from the agenda to create a congenial atmosphere for a Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting. However, the Soviet delegation did not consider Disarmament as a cold-war item and it felt very strongly that this item should be debated in the resumed session. The United States delegation, on the other hand, preferred to put off the debate on this item as the entire disarmament issue was under review in Washington. On the first day of the session (March 7), the Soviet delegation circulated a statement that it regarded the arms question as "the paramount issue" at this session and said that there should be prompt decisions taken on how to negotiate a treaty covering general and complete disarmament.

On the first day of the session President Nkrumah of Ghana delivered a speech. In it he modified his previous demand for a U.N. Congo force composed exclusively of African troops. He suggested instead that contingents from uncommitted countries of Asia and elsewhere could be used. It was generally believed that his shift was made in an effort to win United States support for his Congo programme.



### Economic and Social Council Elections

On the second day, while private negotiations were going on regarding the dropping of several controversial items from the agenda, the Assembly took up the question of Economic and Social Council elections. It will be recalled that during the Fifteenth Regular session, thirteen ballots were taken without success. Belgium and India, as candidates for the vacancy, divided most of the secret votes, but neither was able to achieve the necessary two-thirds majority. After seven ballots had been taken on that day India received 46 and Belgium 45. On December 9, 1960, India had 45 and Belgium 44. After protracted negotiations between the representatives of the Asian-African Group and the European group, the latter announced that Italy would be offered as the European candidate in place of Belgium. On April 18 before the commencement of the afternoon session, agreement was reached and India decided to withdraw her candidature. The Assembly President, Mr. Frederick H. Boland, announced at the start of the session that an agreement had been reached outside the chamber. He said, "The Western-European group is prepared to agree that if Belgium and India agree not to press their candidacies at this session of the Assembly and another European candidate is elected now, then the Western-European group will be prepared to support two candidates from among the members of the Asian-African group at next autumn's election".

Voting then took place and Italy was elected by 81 votes against India's 4. As a result of the voting, the Asian-African group will have an additional seat next year on the Council - legitimate seat when Afghanistan's term expires and additional seat when Spain's term expires at the same time.

### Disarmament

As stated earlier Mr. Stevenson, chief United States delegate, tried to get the Russians to accept the idea of deferring the disarmament issue as the new Administration in Washington did not expect to complete its disarmament policy review before summer. However, the Soviet delegation had been insistent on a full debate. Along with a few other neutralist delegates I attempted to reconcile the two opposing viewpoints. Several newspapers here of March 10 gave prominence to Burma's endeavours to break the deadlock.

Since then Mr. Stevenson and Mr. Gromyko had been meeting privately, and on March 22 it was understood that the United States and the Soviet Union had decided to resume Disarmament negotiations in Geneva, probably in August, but they had not yet agreed on the composition of the new negotiating body. It will be recalled that the work of a ten-nation disarmament committee, equally divided between East and West, was disrupted on June 27, 1960, when the Eastern European members accused the United States of bad faith and walked out. Since then the Soviet Union had proposed that five neutral nations (India, Indonesia, United Arab Republic, Ghana and Mexico) be added to the ten-nation committee. The United States did not come out with any counter-proposal, but Mr. Stevenson hinted to me in our private conversations that his delegation would hold out for no more than two neutrals (India and Mexico), possibly as observers, and not as full members.

The Soviet Union also insisted on a renewed declaration of principles by the General Assembly, endorsing Premier Khrushchev's call for "complete and general disarmament". The United States preferred to keep new declarations out of all disarmament documents. This difference reflects a more basic one: the Soviet desire to conclude a general disarmament treaty and the United States wish to negotiate disarmament by stages.

Agreement was, however, reached on March 30 when the United States and the Soviet Union presented a joint proposal to the

Political Committee that a debate on Disarmament be postponed until the next session of the Assembly in September. The proposal was approved unanimously by the Committee. The two-power draft resolution proposed that the Assembly decide "to take up for consideration the problem of disarmament and all pending proposals relating to it at its Sixteenth session". It was later adopted by the Assembly.

In brief statements to the Political Committee, Mr. Stevenson and Mr. Gromyko explained that they were proposing a postponement because the United States, which under the new administration is reviewing its entire disarmament policy, was not yet ready to start negotiations. Although Mr. Gromyko avoided provocative language, his overtones placed the responsibility for delay entirely on the United States. Mr. Stevenson said that the United States would be ready by the end of July "for what we hope will be fruitful negotiations". Exchanges of views, he added, will take place during June or July.

#### Africa: a United Nations Programme.

This item which was inscribed in the agenda of the Fifteenth Regular session by the United States was taken up by the Political Committee on March 23. When the discussion began Mr. Stevenson was the first to speak. He called on the African States to take the initiative in drawing up a comprehensive new programme for development of their continent, and he pledged that the United States would give "whole-hearted aid. The programme should be multilateral to keep it free of political strings, he said, and should be a programme "by, of and for Africa".

The only response from an African was a speech by Mr. Jaja Wachuku, head of Nigerian Delegation, criticizing the programme in very strong and stinging terms. Comparing it to Washington's recently announced aid programme for Latin America, he objected that the declaration on Africa lacked a "statement in dollars".

After a lengthy interruption by discussion of other more pressing items, the question of Africa came up again on April 11 when 24 African States submitted a comprehensive programme for the long-term social and economic development of Africa under the auspices of the United Nations. All the African states except the Union of South Africa and Guinea joined in introducing the proposal.

The African programme, as outlined in the draft resolution, calls for:

- (a) Expansion of existing United Nations technical assistance programmes for Africa. The supplying of government officials from outside countries and the establishment of training institutes for technical personnel were singled out for special attention.
- (b) The establishment of an economic development bank for Africa, as already recommended by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa.
- (c) The establishment of an economic development institute for Africa, with the assistance of the Special Fund, to train personnel in economic planning and programming.

This item, along with several others, was deferred for discussion to the sixteenth session of the General Assembly.

#### The Korean Question.

The Political Committee took up the Korean Question on April 12 and decided two days later to seat South Korea without waiting



for North Korea, by a vote of 44 to 15, with 18 abstentions. As in the previous years Burma abstained. Thus once again the representatives of South Korea were able to participate in the discussions without the right to vote. Burma, along with other neutralist members endeavoured to invite both North and South Korea to the debate. This move prompted the United States to introduce a new element in the discussions. It sought to bar North Korea's seating until that regime had unequivocally accepted the "competence and authority" of the United Nations to deal with the reunification matter. The Indian delegate then proposed to defer the entire Korean question until the Sixteenth session of the General Assembly. Mr. C.S. Jha contended that the new United States proposal required much consideration by member governments. To take up the Korean question now, he added, would be to introduce a "cold war" item that might call for long debate and was likely to cause acrimonious disputes. Burma supported India's move, but the Indian proposal to defer discussion was defeated by 49 votes to 30, with 17 abstentions.

The decision of the Political Committee was conveyed by the Secretariat to the Government of North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea), and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of North Korea replied to the President of the General Assembly and the Vice-Chairman of the First Committee on April 17. This reply was circulated as a United Nations document (A/C.1/838). The reply, in effect, says that the resolution adopted was unjust since the condition attached was unprecedented in the history of the United Nations. It further says that the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has always respected and supported the United Nations Charter. It ends with the note that "the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will not recognize any unjust resolution adopted in the United Nations without the participation and approval of its representatives".

Along with several other items, the Korean Question was shelved to the Sixteenth session of the General Assembly.

#### The situation in Angola.

The situation in the Portuguese colony of Angola first came up for discussion in the Security Council. On March 14, Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic presented a draft resolution to the Council ordering an inquiry into conditions in that Portuguese territory, and the resolution also called on Portugal to make reforms to safeguard the rights and freedoms of the inhabitants of Angola. Its key paragraph would set up a sub-committee to appraise the Council statements and to "conduct such inquiries as it may deem necessary", and report back to the United Nations.

When the draft resolution was put to the vote on March 15, it was rejected by a vote of 5 to 0 with 6 abstentions. Since seven approving votes were required for adoption, the resolution was not carried. The most significant feature of the Security Council debate and the vote was the fact that the United States joined the Asian-Africans and the Soviet Union. The policy statement by Mr. Stevenson marked a departure by the new United States administration from the Eisenhower administration's policies on colonialism.

Although the draft resolution was not adopted Asian-African delegates were jubilant over the new United States' stand on colonialism. The Asian-African group met three times to review the situation and decided to inscribe it as an item on the agenda of the session. On March 23 the General Assembly decided, by 79 votes against 2, to place the Angola question on the agenda. The two negative votes were cast by Spain and South Africa. Portugal walked out of the Assembly before the vote.



When the General Assembly considered the question on April 20 it had before it a draft resolution (A/L.345) sponsored by 35 Asian African countries including Burma. The draft resolution urges Portugal to heed her obligations under the United Nations Charter to uphold human liberties. It also calls for the appointment of a sub-committee, to conduct an enquiry into the Angola situation. By a vote of 73 to 2, with 9 abstentions, the Assembly adopted the resolution. The two nations opposing were South Africa and Spain. Portugal was absent for the vote.

#### The situation in the Republic of the Congo.

When the resumed session started on March 7 there was a general feeling here that the Assembly should promptly adopt a resolution to supplement the Security Council resolution of February 21 which authorised the United Nations to use force in the Congo as a last resort to prevent civil war. Such a resolution would, it was believed, emphasize the necessity for the immediate withdrawal of Belgian advisers from the Congo. However, the Assembly postponed a resumption of the Congo debate from day to day because no delegate was ready to speak and partly because most delegates wanted to study a report to be submitted by the Conciliation Commission after its study of the situation in the Congo. The report was submitted on March 21. On that day Mr. Andrei Gromyko of the Soviet Union demanded that the United Nations Congo operations be liquidated within thirty days.

The Asian-African group met twice to consider the drafting of a resolution, but opinion was so divided that further attempts for group action were abandoned. Our delegation, however, in concert with several like-minded delegations, presented a draft resolution (A/L.339) under which the General Assembly would impose a time-limit of 21 days for the withdrawal of Belgian officers and mercenaries from the Congo. The draft resolution would call for "appropriate measures" if Belgium should fail to heed the call for withdrawal.

Some delegates who took part in private discussions refused to cosponsor it since it was argued that the time-limit of 21 days was unrealistic. The cosponsors maintain that several previous resolutions on the Congo called for the immediate withdrawal of Belgians and that it was time to specify a definite time-limit. The dissenters also felt that the draft resolution should endorse some of the principal provisions of the report by the Conciliation Commission. This would call for the release of political prisoners by both sides, convocation of the Congolese parliament under the United Nations auspices, formation of a government of National union and the establishment of a new United Nations Commission for the Congo. The "Casablanca group" was opposed to the establishment of a new Commission of Conciliation.

Burma also cosponsored the second draft resolution (A/L.340) setting forth the above principles. Other states which followed our position in sponsoring both resolutions were Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya and Sudan. India was not opposed to the appointment of a new Conciliation Commission but her delegate suggested that it should be designated by the President of the General Assembly "at an appropriate time". Indonesia and Ceylon were not in favour of a new Conciliation Commission. Our delegation holds the view that in the still unsettled situation obtaining in the Congo a United Nations Commission is necessary. The proposed Commission would of course supersede the Conciliation Commission established by the Secretary-General's Advisory Committee for the Congo. It would consist of seven members to be appointed by the President of the Assembly. It was the intention of the sponsors of the draft resolution that the Commission should comprise three members from Africa, two from Asia, one from Latin America and one from a neutral European country. Eastern European

delegations objected to the new draft resolution as, among others, reference was made to the Secretary-General in the third operative paragraph.

On April 7 still another draft resolution (A/L.341) was presented by the Soviet Union. It did not demand the evacuation of the United Nations force from the Congo and the replacement of Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld as Secretary-General. So mild was the draft compared with previous statements the Russians have made in the Assembly and Security Council that it was generally felt here that there was a significant shift in the Russian policy on the Congo. The second preambular paragraph would have the Assembly assert "the paramount importance" of the "territorial integrity and political independence" of the Congo. This apparently meant the Soviet rejection of any proposal to convert the Republic into a confederation of more or less autonomous states. The third preambular paragraph declared that attempts were under way to "dismember" the country and that no actions leading to a violation of its unity should be permitted by the United Nations.

Several African delegations introduced amendments to the three resolutions before the Assembly. The most important of these amendments is the one presented by Congo (Leopoldville) (A/L.346) seeking to replace the words "within a period not exceeding 21 days, failing which necessary action should be taken in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations" in draft resolution A/L.339, by the words "as soon as they are replaced by personnel recruited with the assistance of the United Nations, with due regard for Congolese sovereignty".

On April 14, Mr. Stevenson announced the position of the United States on the draft resolutions and amendments. He had two objections to our first draft (A/L.339), the first relating to a clause characterizing Belgium as "the central factor" in the situation in the Congo, and the second declaring that all Belgian military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers must be withdrawn within 21 days, "failing which necessary action should be taken in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations". While the presence of Belgians in the Congo has been a factor, Mr. Stevenson said, the United States could not agree that it was "the central cause" of the Republic's troubles. The imposition of a 21 day dead-line with a strong hint of sanctions to follow in case of failure would only make the solution of the Congo problem more difficult, he added. He indicated, however, that the United States would support our second draft (A/L.340).

Meanwhile India introduced a new draft resolution (A/L.347) calling for a commission of investigation into the slaying of former Premier Patrice Lumumba. India proposed that the commission be composed of four jurists including Justice U Aung Khine of Burma. The proposal was just a formalization of Secretary-General's action on the advice of the Advisory Committee on the Congo. Mr. Mario Cardoso of the Congo indicated that such a commission, if it were accepted, could operate "only according to the Congolese Penal Code" as administered by the Congolese National Government.

Voting took place on April 15. Two significant phrases "within a period not exceeding 21 days" and "failing which necessary action should be taken in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations" were eliminated as they did not command two-thirds votes. The resolution as a whole as amended was adopted by 61 votes to 5 with 33 abstentions.

The draft resolution (A/L.340) was adopted by 60 votes to 16 with 23 abstentions. The Indian draft calling for an investigation commission was also adopted by 45 votes to 3 with 49 abstentions.

#### Complaint by Cuba.

When the Revolutionary Government of Cuba lodged a complaint with the United Nations in September, 1960, regarding "the various plans



of aggression and acts of intervention being executed by the Government of the United States of America against the Republic of Cuba, constituting a manifest violation of its territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, and a clear threat to international peace and security", no one here seriously believed that the charge could be substantiated. Newspapers off and on carried news despatches from Florida in the United States and Guatemala regarding the training of anti-Castro Cubans, but any prospect of an invasion was discounted.

In March when the Fifteenth session of the Assembly was resumed, the whole picture was clearer. An army of 5,000 to 6,000 men constituting "the external fighting arm of the anti-Castro Revolutionary Council" was formed during that month. Its purpose was said to be the liberation of Cuba from what it described as the Communist rule of the Castro regime. Within Cuba, the Revolutionary Council counted on an evergrowing underground network engaged in organizing guerillas, carrying out sabotage and gathering intelligence. Most of the instruction given to the anti-Castro forces was reported to have been centred in the Guatemalan camps where infantry and artillery units were trained by United States experts. Special instruction was also made available in small camps in Florida. Commando leader training, according to newspaper reports, was given by a Filipino expert at a jungle warfare school in Panama.

On April 15 Dr. Roa, Cuba's Foreign Minister, charged in the Political Committee that the United States was responsible for the dawn bombing of three Cuban airfields on that day. The United States denied the accusation and said the pilots had defected from the Cuban Air Force. On the next day Premier Fidel Castro of Cuba challenged President Kennedy to present before the United Nations the fliers who bombed Cuban air bases. He called on the United States President to prove that the fliers had defected from the Cuban Air Force while they carried out the raids. The Premier charged that the United States not only was directly responsible for the attacks in which three bases were hit, but was trying to deceive the world by declaring that the fliers were defectors. The Cuban leader made his remarks at a funeral oration in Havana for members of the air force and militia killed in the attack.

On that day the atmosphere in the Political Committee was tense and it was significant that the United States delegate did not reply to the charge.

On April 17 Romania presented a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.274) expressing deep concern at the armed attack on Cuba and demands the immediate cessation of the military operations against that country. The resolution also makes an urgent appeal to the States, "whose territories and means are being used for the attack on the Republic of Cuba, to stop without delay every assistance to those who are carrying out this armed attack." The mood of the unaligned delegates was such that, irrespective of the political and military alignment of the sponsor, the resolution was considered worthy of support.

On the next day (April 18) Mexico presented the second draft resolution (A/C.1/L.275). In its first operative paragraph it makes an urgent appeal to all States to ensure that their territories and resources are not used to promote a civil war in Cuba. The resolution further urges these States to put an immediate end to any activity that might result in further bloodshed. Meanwhile, landings have taken place in Cuba and severe fighting was going on.

Several Latin American delegations were working on their own draft with the participation of the United States delegation. The Seven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.276) was presented later on that day (April 18). It exhorts the members of the Organization of American States to lend their assistance "with a view to achieving a settlement



by peaceful means in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations Charter and of the Charter of the Organization of American States". On that day Premier Castro announced for the first time that his forces were winning victories in Cuba. Several U.S. planes were also reported to have been shot down.

On April 19 the Soviet Union tabled the fourth draft resolution (A/C.1/L.277) proposing that the General Assembly "condemn the aggressive actions of the United States and other countries on whose territories counter-revolutionary bands are being formed, trained and armed, and from whose territories invasion of the territory of the Cuban Republic is being carried out". It also calls on all member states to render the necessary assistance to the Cuban Government, if requested, "to repel the aggression". Just before Mr. Zorin of the Soviet Union introduced his resolution, Mr. Stevenson of the United States told the Political Committee that no offensive had been launched against Cuba from United States territory. The delegate of Guatemala also repeated his Government's denial that anti-Castro forces currently engaged in Cuba had come from Guatemala. Mr. Zorin dismissed these denials and asked sarcastically whether the landing forces had come from outer space. He remarked that only one person in the world, Major Gagarin, had ever come from outer space. In the course of his speech Mr. Zorin read to the Committee the text of Premier Khrushchev's message in which he warned President Kennedy that "we shall render the Cuban people and their Government all necessary assistance in beating back the armed attack on Cuba."

On that day (April 19) I made my intervention, and copies of my speech have been pouched.

Before the voting on the draft resolutions took place in the Political Committee on April 21, Sudan and Nigeria tabled separate amendments to the Seven-Power draft resolution. They were contained in documents A/C.1/L.278 and A/C.1/L.279 respectively. The Sudanese amendment which primarily sought to delete the words "which belongs to the Organization of American States" was rejected by 43 votes to 31, with 23 abstentions. Burma, along with other like-minded delegations, voted for the amendment. It was considered that the reference of the Cuban question to this regional organization would not yield any positive results since the majority of members of the Organization of American States are anti-Castro and pro-United States. Besides, as the Mexican delegate had pointed out, previous meetings of the Organization in Costa-Rica did not produce any result.

The Nigerian delegate withdrew his amendment, and the Seven-Power draft resolution was voted paragraph by paragraph. Burma voted against the first operative paragraph and when it was adopted, we voted against the resolution as a whole. However, the draft resolution was adopted by 61 votes to 27, with 10 abstentions.

Then the Mexican draft resolution (A/C.1/L.275) was put to the vote. Burma voted for it and it was adopted by 42 votes to 31, with 25 abstentions. It was of course obvious that it had no chance of adoption by the Assembly.

After the voting the Soviet Union and Romania withdrew their respective draft resolutions.

After the voting, I explained the vote of our delegation, and texts of my explanation have already been pouched. My reference to "the public utterances by some world leaders yesterday" was meant to refer to the speeches made by President Kennedy and other United States leaders on April 20. President Kennedy had said, "We reserve the right to take unilateral action".

On that night (April 24) the matter was taken up at the Plenary session. The Seven-Power draft resolution was put to the vote first. Burma voted against the first operative paragraph, as explained above, and the paragraph was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required two-thirds majority, (56 in favour, 32 against, and 8 abstentions). When the resolution as a whole, without the first operative paragraph, was put to the vote, Burma abstained. Draft resolution as amended was adopted by 59 votes to 13, with 24 abstentions.

The Mexican draft was then put to the vote. Burma, as in the Political Committee, voted for it. The result of the vote was 41 in favour, 35 against, and 20 abstentions. The draft resolution, thus, was not adopted.

The events in Cuba and the involvement of the United States, whatever its extent, have caused a good deal of distress even among friends and well-wishes of the United States. I have no doubt that this episode has badly tarnished the bright image of President Kennedy. Although the Central Intelligence Agency under Mr. Allan Dulles was the brain behind the attack on Cuba, President Kennedy assumed full responsibility for the whole affair. Although one may agree with the President's thesis that the United States cannot tolerate a pro-Communist state in Cuba, only 90 miles away from her, "it is bad precedent which, if followed elsewhere, will create international complications wherever it is followed", as Prime Minister Nehru of India said on April 20. As I have reported by cable, the general opinion among neutral delegations here holds the Kennedy administration to be morally and legally guilty of a bare-faced attempt to overthrow a neighbouring government by force.

#### Other matters.

On April 5 the Soviet Union dropped its demand that the United Nations should debate its complaint concerning United States plane flights over Soviet territory. In doing so, the Soviet Union suggested that the United States might agree to drop two other items - Hungary and Tibet - in the interest of improving Soviet-United States relations. The United States spokesman declared that the United States would insist on discussing Hungary and Tibet. However, for lack of time, the discussion of these two items was postponed till the Sixteenth session.

On the same day (April 5) Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld told the General Assembly that he would resign if it requested him to do so. Replying to Soviet demands that he get out because of his Congo policy, Mr. Hammarskjöld asserted that the Assembly could proceed on the basis that it had before it his "standing offer of resignation". It will be relevant to mention that on the voting on the draft resolution on the Congo (A/C.1/L.340) cosponsored by Burma, the operative paragraph authorizing the Secretary-General to take necessary and effective measures to prevent the introduction of arms, etc. into the Congo was opposed by only eleven states - nine Eastern European countries, Cuba and Guinea. This vote, in my view, is one of the most revealing gestures of the United Nations Assembly expressing its confidence in the Secretary-General. Perhaps it is one of the most important results of the resumed session.

Before the commencement of the resumed session only the nine Eastern European states had announced their decision not to contribute their share towards the cost of United Nations operations in the Congo. On April 11, President de Gaulle of France came out with a similar announcement. He said that France "did not wish to practise either by her men or her money in any present or possible enterprise of this organization - or of this disorganization." France thus proclaimed a virtual strike against the United Nations.



On April 15 at the commencement of the Plenary session, President Boland announced that he had congratulated the Soviet Union on its historic scientific achievement of orbiting a man in outer space. I made an observation that the United Nations Organization should fittingly commemorate the event. Copies of my speech have been pouched to the Foreign Office. Seventeen delegates joined in commending the Soviet Union and Major Gagarin for the historic achievement. Several delegates publicly endorsed my proposal. President Frederick Boland assured me that he would give serious thought to my proposal. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld also joined in praise for the flight into space by Soviet Major Gagarin.

On April 19 the General Assembly voted to recommend that the Security Council consider the admission both of Mauritania and of Outer Mongolia to the United Nations. The vote was 48 to 13 with 33 abstentions. Burma voted for the proposal. Both the Soviet Union and the United States abstained.

(Sgd)  
Thant

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(U Thant)  
Permanent Representative of Burma to  
the United Nations.

The Permanent Secretary  
Foreign Office  
Rangoon

2nd May, 1961



FINAL REPORT OF THE DELEGATION OF  
BURMA TO THE FIFTEENTH REGULAR  
SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS  
GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

The composition of the Delegation and its distribution among the various Committees is shown below:

Representatives:

U Thant (Chairman)	First Committee
Dr. U Bo Gyi (Alternate Chairman)	Sixth Committee
U On Sein	Special Political Committee
U Hla Maung	Second Committee
U Pyo Nyein	

Alternate Representatives:

U Chan Tha	
Sao Hso Hom	
Daw Mya Sein	Third Committee
U Tin Maung	Fourth Committee
U Maung Maung Gale	Fifth Committee

Advisers:

U Aung Thant  
U Kyawt Maung

U Pyo Nyein generally helped the Chairman in the latter's work in the Plenary and First Committee meetings. U Chan Tha, as Chairman of the Burma Investment Board, utilised most of his stay in New York by discussions and consultations with prospective American investors, and made three trips for this purpose outside New York - Washington, Canada and Puerto Rico. Sao Hso Hom rendered assistance to the delegates in their work in several committees, and U Aung Thant worked throughout the session as secretary of the delegation. Among his functions is the writing of daily minutes of Delegation meetings.

Cable reports were submitted to the Foreign Office from time to time on important issues raised both in Committees and Plenary sessions, and fortnightly reports on the work of individual Committees, except the First Committee, have been submitted. In the circumstances, I propose to deal mainly with the work of the First Committee and Plenary items in this Final Report. Failure to submit fortnightly reports on the First Committee items, due to very heavy pressure of work, is regretted.

The session started on September 20, 1960, glittering with international celebrities. No one is still quite sure why so many heads of state and heads of government were on hand. There was no visible diplomatic reason for their presence, no critical negotiations were in prospect and no major crisis required immediate top-level action, since the Congo had been dealt with, at least for the moment.

The Assembly's first and only significant acts on September 20 were to elect Ambassador P.H. Boland of the Republic of Ireland president of the Assembly, and to seat 14 new countries, 13 of them from Africa. The Congo of President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba was among those admitted, but no decision was taken as to which delegation - that of the President or that of the Prime Minister - should be seated to represent it. The issue was referred to the Credentials Committee. Admission of a 15th state, the Federation of Mali, was deferred. Delegates were in doubt whether to seat Mali as a unit or to admit its two parts, Senegal and Mali, separately. Later in the session two parts were seated separately. Nigeria was admitted on October 7.

#### General Debate

On the second day of the session President Eisenhower called upon the United Nations to build a new world of peace and security, with top priority for the newly emerging states of Africa. He laid before the Assembly a five-point programme for Africa, a challenge to begin anew on disarmament, and a call for permanent United Nations peace-making machinery. President Eisenhower summarized his five-point programme for Africa as follows:

1. Non-interference in the African countries' international affairs.
2. Help in assuring their security without wasteful and dangerous competition in armaments.
3. Emergency aid to the Congo.
4. International assistance in shaping long-term African development programmes.
5. United Nations aid for education.

In the course of his speech President Eisenhower urged that nations earmark some elements of their armed forces for use by the U.N. in case of future crisis demanding a U.N. peace force like that in the Congo. He said the United States was prepared to earmark naval and air transportation.

On the next day Soviet Premier Khrushchev, in a two hour speech, made a spirited appeal for peaceful and competitive co-existence. He also demanded the immediate end of colonialism everywhere by proclamation of the U.N. Assembly. He renewed his offer of general and complete disarmament, again spelling it out in terms of three stages. The plan was in very large part a repetition of proposals offered in Geneva in March and in June, 1960.

Other features of his speech were:

1. A threat to return to the Congo to reestablish Patrice Lumumba in power.
2. A demand that the office of the U.N. Secretary-General be abolished and replaced by a three-man directory, with one member each from the Soviet bloc, the Western bloc and the neutralists.
3. A proposal that U.N. headquarters be removed from New York to Switzerland, Austria, or the Soviet Union.



4. Expression of a hope that a new summit conference would be held "in a few months". He intimated that signature of a German peace treaty would be delayed for that period.

Just before Premier Khrushchev, President Nkrumah of Ghana spoke. Among others he said he wanted the U.N. command in the Congo "changed forthwith" and replaced with one which would support Patrice Lumumba as Premier. He also asked for the withdrawal of all non-African contingents in the U.N. peace force there. Secretary of State Mr. Christian Herter, questioned at a luncheon of the Foreign Press Association, said he thought President Nkrumah "marked himself as very definitely leaning towards the Soviet bloc". Even among Westerners, however, there was concern and dismay that he (Herter) should have voiced such views publicly. It was felt that his statement might tend to antagonize not only Ghana but other Asians and Africans sympathetic to Ghana.

On Monday, September 26, U.N. Secretary-General Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld made a statement in reply to Premier Khrushchev. He said he would follow through with his present Congo policy until or unless the U.N. General Assembly tells him to alter it. He insisted that he had faithfully and impartially carried out the instructions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, adding that if the Assembly wanted him to do any differently, it should give him new instructions.

On September 27 President General Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic urged the General Assembly to recommend "without delay" a meeting on disarmament between President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev. In his first and only speech to the Assembly, President Nasser suggested "that the two great leaders should, under the standard of the United Nations, meet either by themselves, or together with whom you select" to set "guiding rules for a new attempt towards disarmament". His proposal was received coolly by the Western powers, although East European delegates privately welcomed it. According to Western spokesmen, President Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Macmillan would like to see the disarmament question taken up in the existing ten-power disarmament group and hope that the group will meet as soon as possible. The Soviet Union, which walked out of the ten-power group in Geneva last June, proposed on September 27 that it be enlarged to include five Asian-African and Latin-American countries: India, Indonesia, Ghana, United Arab Republic and Mexico.

Another highlight of this session's general debate was Prime Minister Macmillan's speech on September 29. His address was generally regarded here as an appeal to the Soviet Union to join the Western powers in an attempt to restore the atmosphere prevailing last spring before the break-up of the summit conference. Addressing his remarks directly to the Soviet Union, Mr. Macmillan emphasized that fear of a Soviet attack was responsible for the North Atlantic Alliance and "other great deterrent forces of the West". He conceded, however, that Russian fears of the West were "human and perhaps understandable" and said that the key to a reduction of the present tension was disarmament. Accordingly, Mr. Macmillan proposed, as only a "modest step", the assignment of experts to make non-political studies of the technical problems involved in achieving such limited progress towards disarmament as the prevention of surprise attack and a freeze on the present level of armaments. The British Prime Minister warmly defended both the Western powers and Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld against Soviet charges of "colonialism". Mr. Macmillan's references to the Summit meeting and

and to the failure of post-World War II attempts to achieve disarmament produced two outbursts by Premier Khrushchev. The Soviet leader shouted back at Mr. Macmillan from his seat in the Assembly Hall and pounded on his desk with his fists.

On the next day (September 30) five leaders of neutralist countries formally appealed to the General Assembly to go on record in favour of renewed contacts between President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev. The appeal, signed by Prime Minister Nehru of India, Presidents Nkrumah of Ghana, Sukarno of Indonesia, Nasser of the United Arab Republic and Tito of Yugoslavia, came in the form of a draft resolution circulated to all delegations. In a letter to President F.H. Boland, the five said they were submitting their resolution "in view of the present tension in international relations". It will be recalled that President Nasser of the United Arab Republic had publicly appealed for such a meeting in his address to the General Assembly. Reaction to this proposal by the United States was not favourable, although Soviet delegation sources indicated that Premier Khrushchev would accept an invitation to meet President Eisenhower.

The proposal put the United States in an extraordinarily delicate and embarrassing dilemma. American diplomats believed that there would be enormous risks in this course, including the risk that Premier Khrushchev would exploit the meeting throughout the world as a triumph for his tactics. There was also the possibility, in the view of the Americans, that the confrontation, far from easing East-West tensions, might produce a clash which would intensify them. My private conversations with Prime Minister Nehru indicated that he felt very strongly about the five-power proposal and would not take lightly a move to sidetrack it. He even invited me to cosponsor it, but since it was tabled under the signatures of heads of government, I politely declined the offer. Prime Minister Nehru also told me that he had confidence in personal diplomacy. The possibility that an Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting would produce ill-results, rather than good, did not seem to worry him. In his own words, "these hypothetical fears" do not deserve serious consideration.

On October 2 President Eisenhower rejected the proposal. He indicated that his conditions for meeting with the Soviet Premier had not changed. His reaction was conveyed in a letter addressed to the five sponsors of the draft resolution. The President's letter was reportedly drawn up after he had held a conference at the White House with Prime Minister Macmillan of Britain and Prime Minister Menzies of Australia.

On October 3 Australia proposed an amendment to the neutralist resolution. This called for summit talks similar to the one in Paris, which the Soviet Union's reaction to the U-2 incident prevented from starting. The Australian amendment would have the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France begin their talks "at the earliest practicable date."

On October 4 Prime Minister Nehru asked me to convene, in my capacity as Chairman of the Asian-African group, a meeting of the group where he and other heads of governments who had sponsored the draft resolution would address the meeting. The meeting was called the same afternoon and all the sponsors except President Tito were present (President Tito left New York for Yugoslavia earlier in the day). Prime Minister Nehru informed the meeting that the Australian amendment would be opposed by the sponsors. He asserted that the Australian amendment was not an amendment and that it dealt with a different matter altogether. He also indicated that if the Australian delegation agreed to table their paper as a separate resolution it might be worthy of consideration.



After a prolonged debate, the Assembly came to the vote in the early hours of October 6. The Australian amendment was rejected by 45 votes to 5 with 43 abstentions. When the original resolution was voted on, Argentina, apparently with the backing of the United States, requested a separate vote on whether to retain the references to President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev. This was approved by the close vote of 37 to 36. When the references to the two leaders were eliminated, Prime Minister Nehru said that the draft resolution, thus truncated, became absurd, and withdrew it on behalf of the sponsors. A long procedural wrangle marked the proceedings. Voting on the sole question of whether to retain the references to President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev, the sponsors mustered 41 votes in favour to 37 against, with 17 abstentions. Prime Minister Nehru challenged the ruling by President Boland that a two-thirds majority was necessary. However, Mr. Boland's ruling was upheld by a vote of 43 to 37 with 15 abstentions. Thus, the Assembly adjourned in the small hours of October 6 without adopting any resolution.

Many Western delegates privately expressed the belief that the United States has won a costly victory. Since the start of the session it was the first major clash between the United States and the uncommitted nations of Asia and Africa who are expected to dominate the session. Soviet-bloc members were openly jubilant that the United States had managed to get into the position of opposing a meeting while Moscow supporters could sit silently without incurring neutralist criticism. The United States, Britain, France and other Western supporters voted for the deletion of references to President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev, while the Soviet bloc abstained.

Other highlights of the General Debate in the Plenary meeting were speeches by the heads of government. President Sukarno of Indonesia, on September 30, asked the transfer of U.N. Headquarters from New York to less controversial territory. He asserted that "an Asian or an African country, in its faith and belief, would gladly offer hospitality to the United Nations." On the same day, President Nkrumah of Ghana proposed a reorganization of the United Nations Secretariat by the appointment of three deputy Secretaries-General "acceptable to the Western and Eastern blocs and to the neutralist countries." The deputies should be invested with "clearly defined authority", he said and should not serve "merely as assistants" to the Secretary-General. The plan proposed by him involves a less drastic change than that offered the previous week by Premier Khrushchev and apparently fewer legal obstacles would stand in the way of its adoption.

On October 1 Premier Khrushchev told the General Assembly that only the admission of the Peoples' Republic of China to the United Nations could avert the danger of a "terrible" atomic war. Without including the Chinese mainland, he said, world disarmament would be impossible and "there cannot be any normal work by the United Nations".

On October 3 King Hussain of Jordan said that President Nasser of the United Arab Republic had lost strength in most of the Arab world in the last two years by "too many mistakes, too much violence, too much subversion, and by too many promises not kept." He told the General Assembly that attacks on him and his Government by the United Arab Republic were backed by international communism and could lead to a world war.

On the same day the Secretary-General, in the course of his second intervention, virtually rejected the Soviet demand that he resign. Earlier in the day Premier Khrushchev had asserted, "To avoid misinterpretation I want to reaffirm that we do not trust Mr. Hammarskjold and cannot trust him". Mr. Hammarskjold reminded the

Assembly that the Soviet proposal to replace him by a triumvirate representing three major groups of United Nations members "would make it impossible to maintain an effective executive." "By resigning he declared, "I would, therefore, at the present difficult and dangerous juncture throw the organization to the winds. I have no right to do so because I have a responsibility to all those state members for which the organization is of decisive importance, a responsibility which overrides all other considerations."

After the applause that greeted this statement, there was a prolonged ovation in the General Assembly.

Prime Minister Menzies of Australia who spoke on October 5 accused Premier Khrushchev of trying to intensify the cold war by fomenting tension, encouraging bitterness and "seeking to paralyze or confuse the minds of free people". He assailed as an "act of complete hypocrisy" the Soviet Premier's attempt to depict colonialism as a Western evil. Mr. Menzies countered with a charge that the Soviet Union itself was "the greatest colonial power now existing".

On behalf of our delegation, I participated in the General Debate on October 10, and copies of the statement have already been submitted to the Foreign Office.

#### Question of Chinese Representation

On October 8 the General (Steering) Committee forwarded to the Assembly a proposed United States resolution providing that no action be taken to change the representation of China at the 15th session. The Assembly vote to adopt the Committee recommendation was 42 to 34 with 22 abstentions. Burma, as in previous sessions, voted against the United States' proposal. The figures represented a slight shrinking from the vote the United States had obtained in the 14th session. Then the ballot was 44 to 29 with 9 abstentions.

Contrary to some opinion previously expressed, the balloting was not affected much by the admission of Cyprus and sixteen new African states. None of the seventeen new members voted for the United States resolution. Cyprus and twelve new African nations abstained, and Nigeria, Senegal and Mali voted against it. Before the matter came to a final vote, the Assembly had turned down by a narrower margin amendments proposed by Guinea and Nepal that would have reversed the committee's recommendation and asked that the organization place the issue on the agenda of the session. On these amendments the proponents of the discussion of the Chinese question also mustered 34 votes.

The margin of Assembly voting on the issue was the narrowest in ten years.

#### Items regarding Hungary and Tibet

The question of inscribing two long-standing questions - Hungary and Tibet - on the agenda of the current session came up for consideration on October 10. The decisions on both questions were recorded by roll-call votes. On the question of Hungary, the voting was 54 in favour, 12 against and 31 abstentions. As in previous sessions Burma voted for the inscription. In view of the changed relationship between Burma and Hungary and in view of the fact that the new regime in Hungary has stabilized itself, I would recommend that our attitude towards the question of inscription of this item should be reviewed.



On the matter of the alleged Chinese interference in Tibet, the vote was 49 in favour of agenda inclusion, 13 against and 35 abstentions. Burma, as in the previous session, abstained.

This year's resolution regarding the inscription of the Hungarian item was introduced by the United States after the United Nations representative on Hungary, Sir Leslie Munro of New Zealand, reported that he was still unable to get facilities or cooperation for conducting an investigation. No Soviet representative spoke on the Hungarian question. Hungary's representative, Mr. Janos Peter, Deputy Foreign Minister, said this was a "routine item" and that "even the United States does not pay too much attention" to it.

In the discussion of the Tibetan question, Mr. Valerian A. Zorin of the Soviet Union charged that the debate was intended to divert attention from the fact that "democratic" reforms had replaced the power of "a small band of serf-holders" and "the cruel medieval structure of feudalism."

Both these items will come up for discussion in the resumed session of the General Assembly in March, 1961.

#### Allocation of Items

When the General (Steering) Committee forwarded its recommendations regarding the allocation of items to the General Assembly on October 11, the question of Disarmament was proposed for the Political Committee. The Soviet delegation immediately tabled a draft resolution proposing that this item be taken up in the Assembly itself instead of referring it to the Political Committee. The vote was 54 against, 13 in favour and 31 abstentions. Burma abstained in the vote. In addition to the nine members of the Soviet bloc, Afghanistan, Cuba, Mali and Guinea voted in favour of the Soviet proposal. Most of the abstentions were by Asian and African countries. In the course of his intervention in the debate Premier Khrushchev insisted that the Assembly discussions on Disarmament should take place at the heads-of-government level. He suggested a special session of the Assembly next spring in Geneva, Leningrad or Moscow. The United States delegate Ambassador Wadsworth did not make any reference to the proposed summit meeting, but he confined his remarks to his preference for the Political Committee as the suitable forum for discussion.

When the allocation of the item on Colonialism was taken up on October 12, the Assembly witnessed wild scenes of disorder. The session became the most disorderly meeting in the history of the United Nations. Premier Khrushchev became enraged when a Philippine delegate (Mr. Lorenzo Sumulong) spoke of the domination of Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Premier called Mr. Sumulong a "jerk" and a "lackey" of Western imperialism. Mr. M. Mezincescu, the Rumanian Deputy Foreign Minister (and Chairman of the Third Committee) in the course of his reply to Mr. Francis O. Wilcox, United States Assistant Secretary of State, criticized Mr. Boland, President of the General Assembly, for not having silenced the United States delegate who had also referred to Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. Mr. Mezincescu, after criticizing Mr. Boland's conduct of the debate, banged the speaker's stand with his fist and started a sentence to the effect that the Irish people, no less than other peoples, were entitled to freedom when Mr. Boland banged his gavel. The President was so irritated that he broke the gavel and adjourned the meeting. The disorders prevented a vote on that day on Premier Khrushchev's demand that the Assembly itself, rather than its Political Committee, take up a Soviet "Declaration" calling for immediate independence for the remaining colonies and dependent territories of the world.

When the session was resumed on the next morning, the Assembly accepted Premier Khrushchev's proposal that it take up the Soviet declaration on Colonialism in plenary session. This decision was taken without a vote after the United States and Britain, seeing that they faced defeat by Asian, African and Soviet-bloc members, gave up their attempt to have the "Declaration" referred to the Political Committee. The Assembly approved the Soviet proposal by acclamation. It was the first and most impressive victory for the Soviet Union in the 15th session of the General Assembly.

In the afternoon session when the allocation of another Soviet item regarding the plane incidents was voted upon, the Soviet proposal to have it discussed at the Plenary was rejected by a vote of 54 against, 10 in favour and 33 abstentions. Most of the abstentions were by Asian and African countries (including Burma) and European neutrals. Cuba was the only member that joined the nine nations of the Soviet bloc in voting for the Soviet proposal. The Assembly then agreed, without objection, to refer the Soviet accusation to the Political Committee. This item is likely to be taken up at the resumed session of the General Assembly in March 1961, but there are rumours in the U.N. lobbies that Premier Khrushchev might withdraw this item from the agenda to demonstrate to the world that he is keen to create a favourable political climate to facilitate negotiations with the new administration in Washington.

#### New Peace Move

On the last day of the General Debate, October 17, Mr. V.K. Krishna Menon, head of India's delegation, presented a fifteen-power draft resolution (A/L.320) (Co-sponsored by Burma) calling for greater efforts to end world tensions. With the full knowledge of our delegation, I was associated with a few other delegations in drafting this resolution. The resolution, broad and general in its terms, represents a new neutralist effort to find a way out of the stalemate in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union since the shooting down of the United States U-2 plane by the Soviet and the failure of the Paris summit conference. This move reflected the same concern that produced an unsuccessful five-power resolution early in this Assembly session.

On the night of October 17 the General Assembly unanimously approved the resolution with 91 votes in favour and none against. Originally the number of cosponsors, including Burma, was fifteen but it swelled to twenty-eight before the vote took place.

#### Political Committee meets

On October 18 Political Committee met for the first time and decided to give priority in debate to proposals on Disarmament and nuclear weapons. Four items were thus grouped together: general and complete disarmament, the Report of the Disarmament Commission, an Irish proposal for action to prevent the further dissemination of nuclear weapons, and a proposal for a ban on tests of atomic weapons.

The item regarding a United Nations programme for the independence and development of Africa was placed second. The question of Algeria was placed third. Fourth on the list for committee debate was the question of Mauritania. Other items which are now relegated to the resumed session are in order of priority: Korea, Soviet complaint against the "menace to world peace created by aggressive actions of the United States against the U.S.S.R.", and the control of outer space.



The Committee also decided that all four disarmament items could be discussed as a whole by the delegates, but that draft resolutions might be submitted on any one of the four items.

### Disarmament

The Political Committee took up the question of Disarmament on October 19. Mr. V.A. Zorin of the Soviet Union was the first speaker and in the course of his intervention he said that the Soviet Union would boycott the United Nations discussion of disarmament if the Political Committee "should waste time" on the consideration of "futile proposals", such as those put forward by the Western states. Replying, Mr. James J. Wadsworth of the United States said, "We will not walk out of this Committee in any circumstances and we will not be intimidated by a Soviet threat to do so." The main Western criticism of the Soviet disarmament proposal was that it was "absolutely inadequate" on the question of inspection and control of disarmament. They added that it would be a long time before the United States and its allies agreed to evacuate its military bases in countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as the Soviet Union demanded be done in the first stage of its disarmament programme. Mr. Zorin attacked Western plans for renewed arms talks as involving "endless procrastination and disruption." He said he did not present his country's disarmament proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. The Soviet Union, he asserted, would listen carefully to any suggestions for improvement.

On October 21, Dr. G. Martino, head of the Italian delegation, criticised the Soviet proposals as lacking in control measures that would inspire international confidence. He said that the Soviet plan would also demand the dismantling of the NATO bases in Western Europe, while the Soviet Union and its allies maintained strong conventional armed forces in the East, just beyond the borders.

Mr. David Ormsby-Gore, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Britain, told the Political Committee on October 24 that acceptance of Soviet disarmament plans would be "totally crippling" to the Western nations in their attempt to defend the smaller countries of Europe against potential communist aggression. He was referring to a Soviet proposal that, in the first stage of disarmament all military bases on foreign soil be dismantled. On that day Poland introduced a draft resolution (A/C.1/L252/Rev.1) proposing that the General Assembly call a special session to discuss the problem unless some "relevant agreement" was reached by negotiators in Geneva before next April 1. The Polish draft would have the Assembly ask the smaller states not to accept nuclear weapons, to refuse to establish bases on their soil and to dismantle launching pads already in course of construction. It also would have the nuclear powers decline to assist other states, either in the production of atomic weapons or in the establishment of means for their delivery. The Polish proposals were generally in line with the stand taken by most un-committed nations.

One highlight of the Disarmament debate was the persistent charge of the Soviet Union and its allies that the United States military authorities were mapping strategic targets in the Soviet Union as a prelude to attack. It was alleged that the Pentagon has named a Special Committee to study vulnerable points within the Soviet Union and that the United States military chiefs were preparing "to unleash the German tiger" for new raids in Europe.

In a very significant intervention made on October 27 Mr. James J. Wadsworth of the United States said that total world

disarmament could be achieved within five or six years with good faith and "a real sense of urgency" on both sides. Mr. Wadsworth said that the United States was ready to begin negotiations immediately on at least three preliminary measures suggested by Premier Khrushchev. These are (1) an agreement to cease nuclear testing, now suspended under a moratorium, (2) the acceptance of obligations not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and (3) the possible establishment of zones from which atomic weapons and rockets would be barred. He pressed for a quick resumption of the disarmament negotiations that were broken off in Geneva last July.

As the debate progressed, it was clear that none of the proposals, made by East or West, was likely to be adopted. Most delegates voiced the opinion that it would be undesirable for the committee to come to a vote on the rival resolutions or for the General Assembly to try to force upon the major powers resolutions to which they did not agree. Instead, it was suggested, the committee should attempt to indicate the common ground on which the two major groupings had agreed and to outline corresponding principles on which new conversations could centre.

On October 28 Mr. Howard C. Green discussed with me at great length the nature of the draft resolution he had in mind. The resolution would in effect propose the establishment of a committee composed exclusively of small and medium-sized nations to help solve the disarmament deadlock. The proposed committee would be restricted to non-nuclear powers. It was his idea that the committee would consist of ten or twelve small and medium powers from the various geographical areas, and would be created by the United Nations Disarmament Commission. The Canadian Foreign Minister's request for cosponsorship was discussed at our Delegation meetings and minutes of these meetings have already been submitted to the Foreign Office. When it was known that some other NATO powers had decided to cosponsor the proposed draft resolution, the Delegation decided that we should not cosponsor it but support it if it came to a vote. I discussed the matter with several like-minded delegations and it came to light that Malaya, Ceylon, Sudan and Ghana were also similarly approached by Canada. They were also reportedly following the same stand as Burma.

On behalf of our delegation I participated in the general debate on Disarmament on November 2, and copies of the speech have also been submitted to the Foreign Office.

The Foreign Minister of Ireland, Mr. Frank Aiken, repeatedly discussed with me the implications of his country's draft resolution (A/C.1/L.253/Rev.1) concerning the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, and our delegation, at its meeting on November 2, decided to support it. On the same day I conveyed our decision to Mr. Aiken. On the same day I conveyed our decision not to cosponsor the Canadian draft resolution but to support it, to the Canadian Foreign Minister, as decided at our delegation's 26th meeting.

\* / a At the invitation of Mr. Krishna Menon of India I participated in informal discussions with the delegations of India, United Arab Republic, Morocco, Yugoslavia, Sweden and Venezuela on the advisability or otherwise of drafting/separate resolution on Disarmament. The results of these discussions were duly reported to the Delegation meetings.

At our Delegation meeting of November 14, it was decided to cosponsor a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.258) concerning the



item on suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests, as in the previous sessions. India was the initiator of this draft. The Delegation also decided to support the draft resolution submitted by India, Austria and Sweden (A/C.1/L.256) on the same subject, and I made a statement in the Political Committee on November 15 on these resolutions. Copies of my speech have been submitted to the Foreign Office.

Canada formally presented the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.255) on November 10, and Norway and Sweden were the only two other cosponsors. It would have the Assembly direct the Disarmament Commission "immediately" to establish a small working group as outlined above. Its functions would be to examine the resolutions on disarmament introduced by the West and the East and to outline general principles on disarmament on which the major powers might agree. Since there was a consensus of opinion that no vote be taken on any resolution until the major powers had found an opportunity to agree on a resumption of arms talks, the Political Committee suspended its Disarmament discussion pending such a possible agreement. It then decided to take up the next question "Mauritania".

When the Disarmament debate was resumed on November 14, after the Mauritania debate, the Canadian Foreign Minister spoke again on his draft resolution and warned the committee that unless the nuclear arms race was ended at once it would be too late to control it at all. In my second intervention on Disarmament on the next day (November 15) I generally endorsed the sentiments expressed by Mr. Green.

On the same day (November 15) Mr. Krishna Menon introduced our joint draft resolution on Disarmament (A/C.1/L.259) containing directives for achieving general and complete disarmament. The resolution was immediately welcomed by Mr. V.A. Zorin of the Soviet Union who said that it contained "the minimum of directives for negotiations on the elaboration of general and complete disarmament." Mr. James J. Wadsworth of the United States, however, declared that while the United States favoured some provisions of the proposal, others made it unacceptable "in its present form". In the course of his statement Mr. Zorin said that the Soviet Union was ready "for constructive negotiations on general and complete disarmament with the new government of the United States and likewise with other interested states". This brought from Mr. Wadsworth a protest against the Soviet delegation's "unjustified interference in the internal political affairs of the United States."

On November 17 Poland proposed the establishment of a new committee to warn the peoples of the world of the consequences that would follow a nuclear war. Mr. Josef Winiewicz, Deputy Foreign Minister of Poland, told the Political Committee that the new group might include twelve or fifteen members, named with due regard to the United Nations membership and to their geographic distribution. Before he made that statement he saw me privately and requested me to cosponsor a draft resolution on the lines he outlined. I placed the matter before our Delegation meeting on November 18. I understood later that he made similar approaches to the delegates from the United Arab Republic and Ghana. Although the provisions of the proposed draft were in conformity with our Government's stand on the subject, cosponsorship would be tantamount to openly aligning ourselves with an Eastern European nation on an important aspect of Disarmament, and therefore the Delegation, at its meeting on November 21, decided not to cosponsor it although we might be able to support it if it was pressed to a vote during the session. However, the indications at that time were that this draft resolution, along with several others, might be relegated to the resumed session of the General Assembly.

On November 17, the day when Poland made the new proposal, the Ethiopian delegate urged unanimous adoption of another draft resolution presented by his delegation and nine other Asian-African states calling on the United Nations to outlaw the use of nuclear arms.

The debate on Disarmament was suspended on that date to enable the Big Powers directly concerned to enter into private informal discussions. Meanwhile other items were taken up both in the Political Committee and the Plenary meetings. American Presidential election of November 8, the victory of the Democratic Party candidate and President-elect Mr. Kennedy's known views on certain aspects of United States foreign policy were among the factors which hindered the then United States delegation from taking any definitive stand on specific disarmament proposals. Meanwhile, on December 3, the Soviet Union called again for a United Nations summit meeting on disarmament next spring. The move was seen as an attempt to pave the way for talks between Premier Khrushchev and President-elect John F. Kennedy. The suggestion that heads of government gather at a special United Nations General Assembly session was contained in a communique issued by the Soviet and Cambodian governments following a visit to Moscow of Cambodia's Chief of State Prince Norodom Sihanouk. The United States delegates privately dismissed the idea as a propaganda maneuver and they expressed doubts that the Kennedy administration would give it serious consideration. President Kennedy, it should be recalled, had made clear his belief that highly technical questions like disarmament could not be dealt with, in the first instance, by heads of government. I hold the view that any further move by Moscow for a United Nations summit to consider the question of disarmament will be rejected by the United States.

On December 8 Canada presented its revised draft resolution proposing that the United Nations reactivate its Disarmament Commission, giving that body two special sub-committees, one to act as a "watchdog" over future arms talks by the major powers and the other to furnish any expert background required on the complex arms question. The resolution would also ask the Disarmament Commission to "meet more frequently" on the crucial issue and to report to the General Assembly and the Security Council by June 1. The Canadian Foreign Minister told me on that day that the new proposal had the backing of both the United States and Britain. The new Canadian draft was sponsored by Norway, Sweden, Chile, Malaya and Pakistan. It will be recalled that an earlier Canadian proposal for the appointment of a "watchdog" committee of neutrals was co-sponsored only by Norway and Sweden.

When the debate on Disarmament was resumed on December 19, the Political Committee was confronted with thirteen draft resolutions. Out of these the Committee decided only to vote on the following three:

- (1) Draft resolution A/C.1/L.253/Rev.1 and Add.1-3.

The draft resolution as a whole was adopted by a roll-call vote of 58 to none, with 20 abstentions. Burma voted for the resolution.

- (2) Draft resolution A/C.1/L.256

The draft resolution as a whole was adopted by a vote of 72 to none, with 5 abstentions. Burma voted for the resolution.



(3) Draft resolution A/C.1/L.258/Rev.1

The draft resolution as a whole was adopted by a roll-call vote of 67 to none, with 11 abstentions. Burma voted for the resolution.

All discussion of general and complete disarmament was postponed until the Assembly reconvenes on March 7. The great majority of countries preferred to let disarmament rest for the moment. The reason was based principally on the fear that an attempt to reach agreement on this sensitive question would end in a stalemate with no immediate prospect for further moves. A major factor was the feeling that it was useless to try to get any effective action on a vital issue involving the United States when the Eisenhower administration was on the point of handing over power to its Democratic successor. Therefore, the Committee agreed to put off ten of the thirteen draft resolutions as "controversial" and requiring further time for consideration.

The situation in the Republic of the Congo

Two reports on the situation in the Republic of the Congo have been submitted to the Foreign office - the first, dated July 28, 1960, dealing with the Security Council consideration of the question, and the second, dated September 22, 1960, dealing with the consideration of the question by the Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly which commenced on September 17 and terminated on the night of September 19, 1960. In these circumstances, this report will be confined only to the discussion of the question at the 15th regular session of the General Assembly.

The United Nations has been seized of the Congo problem since almost the moment the nation was granted independence by Belgium on June 30, 1960. On the night of September 19 (actually in the small hours of Tuesday, September 20) the Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly passed by a vote of 70 to 0 a resolution introduced by 16 Asian-African nations on the Congo. The resolution upheld the Secretary-General, Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld, by asking him "to continue to take vigorous action" in pacifying the Congo. Despite the Secretary-General's efforts, the situation continued to be confused. The Secretary-General has proclaimed United Nations neutrality in the Congo's political disputes which were then centred around two men who claimed supreme power - Prime Minister Lumumba and President Kasabubu - but none of them was actually governing the country. Russia has attacked Mr. Hammarskjöld's policy as part of a Western plot to oust Mr. Lumumba and return the Congo to the status of a colony. President Nkrumah of Ghana and President Nasser of the United Arab Republic supported this stand in their speeches in the General Debate, by implication. President Nkrumah said that the United Nations should not be "neutral between legal authorities and law breakers". President Nasser charged that "imperialism is trying to take the United Nations as a mask to conceal its designs" and called on the U.N. to restore Mr. Lumumba.

In the first few weeks of the General Assembly the Congo crisis appeared further than ever from solution. There was no effective Congolese government. Mr. Lumumba, whom President Kasabubu deposed as Premier, still lived in the Premier's house and claimed the job, and the Army Chief of Staff Col. Joseph Mobutu announced the "neutralization" of both Mr. Kasabubu and Mr. Lumumba. Each of the three appeared to have enough armed forces behind him to prevent the others from setting up a government but not enough to govern effectively himself. Against this background, on October 10, President Sekou Toure of Guinea moved in the General Assembly to seat provisionally a representative of Mr. Lumumba. On the same day the

delegation of Guinea tabled a draft resolution to that effect. The resolution was based on a rule providing for the provisional seating of a disputed delegation "until the Credentials Committee has reported and the General Assembly has given its decision." In my speech in the General Debate on that day (October 10) I endorsed the United Nations activities in the Congo in line with our earlier stand in the Emergency Special Session.

Meanwhile Mr. Hammarskjeld was in constant consultation with the Advisory Committee composed of all states which contributed troops to the Congo. Most of them are Asian-Africans who have been privately urging Mr. Hammarskjeld to press for reconvening of the Congolese parliament with its overwhelming pro-Lumumba majority, and which has been immobilized by Belgian money and Mobutu's troops. This was the view of Mr. Rajeshwar Dayal whom I saw in New York during the Congo debate. The Western powers, and the United States in particular, did not favour any proposal to reactivate the Parliament since it would result in the reinstitution of Mr. Lumumba as Prime Minister, and if he returns to power, there is little doubt that he will invite the Soviet bloc representatives back into the country. It will be recalled that the Eastern European diplomats were ordered out of the Congo by Col. Mobutu.

On October 25, the Advisory Committee, in line with the resolution passed at the Emergency Special Session, designated all its fifteen Asian-African members as a Conciliation Committee to the Congo to try to help all factions reach "a speedy solution of all their internal conflicts." On the same day Mr. Hammarskjeld gave his first public estimate of the cost of the 20,000-man Congo force. He informed the Assembly that the expenses would total \$66,625,000 from July 1960, when the first units arrived in the Congo, until December 31, 1960. The Soviet delegate said that the cost of the United Nations force should be borne by the Belgians, whom he said were responsible for the crisis in the Congo. He asserted that the Soviet Union would not contribute to the funds needed for this force. The Secretary-General also reminded the Assembly that it would be necessary to pay expenses for the United Nations force in 1961 and, in addition, to provide the \$100,000,000 for the relief of the financial crisis faced by the Congolese government.

The situation continued to deteriorate and on October 27 Mr. Hammarskjeld demanded in a note to the Belgian Government that it withdraw all its "military, paramilitary and civilian" personnel from the Congo and route all aid to the Congo through the United Nations. The Secretary-General blamed the presence of "a considerable number" of Belgians for the continued tension. He proposed to "isolate the Belgian factor and eliminate it." In a letter to Mr. Moise Tshombe, President of secessionist Katanga province, the Secretary-General warned him to revise his policy because, he said, Katanga might find itself cut off from all except United Nations aid. The Belgian Government immediately rejected the Secretary-General's request to cease giving technical aid to Katanga province and channel future Congo aid through the United Nations. The Belgian view, it is reported, is that the Republic of the Congo has the right as a sovereign nation to obtain the services of technicians from countries of its choice.

On October 29 the eighteen nation Advisory Committee decided to send to the Congo the fifteen member Asian-African Conciliation Committee in an attempt to end the differences between warring Congolese factions. This decision was arrived at after Mr. Rajeshwar Dayal of India, Secretary-General's special representative, had issued a report bitterly attacking the return of the Belgians and their influence over the Mobutu regime. The report charged that the Belgians were going back as part of what appeared to



be a Belgian Government effort to reassert control over the Congo. He blamed the Belgians for the secessionist movements in Katanga and other areas, and he said that they "have been actively arming separatist Congolese forces." The Dayal report also attacked Colonel Mobutu as a "usurper" of power and criticized the members of his regime, and described Col. Mobutu's military force as "the principal fomentor of lawlessness." The solution, Mr. Dayal implied, was to convene the Congolese parliament, which was suspended by Col. Mobutu.

While most Asian-Africans endorsed Mr. Dayal's report warmly, the United States was particularly concerned over his attacks on Belgium, a NATO ally. On November 4 the State Department issued a statement asserting its "confidence in the good faith of Belgium in its desire to be of assistance in the Congo." The Dayal report also provoked President Kasabubu's bitter anger who said he would fly to the United Nations to take issue with Mr. Dayal.

When the Conciliation Committee decided to leave for the Congo on November 2, Mr. Dayal was reported to have advised against the idea at that time, presumably fearing that the United Nations officials might encounter a hostile reception there organized by Kasabubu and Mobutu.

On November 7 Mr. Lumumba, in Leopoldville, broke a long silence to endorse Mr. Dayal's report. He said that the findings in the report were completely in accord with "truth and reality as we have experienced them during the last few weeks." He further said that "the Government that I represent" and the Congo Parliament fully supported the Dayal report. On the same day President Kasabubu arrived in New York to defend Col. Mobutu's regime and the Belgian Government.

The debate on the situation in the Congo was scheduled to take place on that day to discuss the draft resolution tabled by eight Asian-African nations. Originally the draft resolution was sponsored by Ghana, Guinea and Morocco but it was later joined by five others - Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Mali and the United Arab Republic. The sponsors earlier approached me to join them but I declined to do so since the proposal to seat "immediately the representatives of the Central Government of the Congo" was considered unrealistic although in principle it was a very sensible one. To determine the Central Government is the big question mark. Mr. Lumumba alone cannot be regarded as "Central Government" as Mr. Kasabubu or Col. Mobutu alone cannot be so regarded. The duly elected Congolese Parliament which even the Belgians had at one time described as "freely elected" chose Mr. Kasabubu as President and Mr. Lumumba as Prime Minister. The recognition of only one of them as "Central Government" is neither constitutional nor realistic, and in the view of our delegation the most important and desirable thing to be done is just to reactivate Parliament with guarantees for the safety of its members. With these considerations we refused to cosponsor the draft resolution.

The General Assembly postponed debate on the Congo crisis on November 7 for twenty-four hours to await a statement by President Kasabubu who was scheduled to arrive in New York on that day. However, it was made clear on that day by the United States, Britain, France and other Western delegations that they would insist on the next day that Mr. Kasabubu be seated as chairman of the delegation from the Congo. Their contention is that since Mr. Kasabubu's legal status as chief of state has not been challenged, he is entitled to be seated as a delegate.

President Kasabubu made the long-awaited statement on November 8, and on November 9 Ghana made a surprise move to postpone the debate on the Congo indefinitely. Ghana's initiative was prompted in part by the presence here of President Kasabubu and the likelihood that the Assembly's Credentials Committee would agree to his request for the seating of a Congolese delegation of his supporters. The most telling point of the Ghanaian delegate's argument was that the debate should be postponed pending the efforts of the fifteen-member Asian-African Conciliation Commission to reconcile the clashing political factions in the Congo and restore some governmental stability. The move for postponement was adopted by the Assembly by 48 to 30 votes, with 18 abstentions. As explained above Burma voted for postponement. The United States tried to avoid the adjournment by asking for a suspension of the session, but did not succeed.

However, on the next day (November 10) the Credentials Committee met and recommended the seating of a Congolese delegation headed by President Kasabubu. The vote was 6 in favour and 1 against. Only the Soviet Union voted against the resolution. The United Arab Republic and Morocco, after supporting Soviet demands that action be postponed, did not participate in the vote. The Report of the Credentials Committee came up for discussion at the General Assembly on November 18. Ghana again took the lead to postpone the consideration of the Credentials Committee report until the Conciliation Committee could report. This time, however, the Ghanaian proposal was rejected by a vote of 51 to 36, with 11 abstentions. In conformity with our previous stand, our delegation voted for postponement. It is significant that countries like Finland, Ireland, Mexico and Sweden voted for postponement.

Other highlights of the debate on the Congo are as follows:

- (a) Differences of opinion developed between the United States and the United Nations on approach and emphasis. The United Nations officials looked to a conciliation between President Kasabubu and Mr. Lumumba. The State Department was convinced that such conciliation was impossible and undesirable. United States and United Nations officials agreed that President Kasabubu and the Congolese Parliament are the two constitutional anchors around which a solution must be worked out. But United Nations officials were working towards a start with Parliament while the United States experts thought that the first step must be made with the President. Despite these differences, United States officials were convinced that only the United Nations can prevent the Congo from becoming an East-West battleground.
- (b) Belgian Foreign Minister Mr. Pierre Wigny said on November 14 that the United Nations operation in the Congo was a failure, and he served notice that Belgium would leave the United Nations if in future its functionaries did not exercise what he called "the rule of restrictions imposed on them by the protocol of public officials". He was apparently referring to Mr. Rajeshwa Dayal, Secretary-General's Special representative in the Congo.
- (c) The United Nations is confronted with an acute financial crisis as a result of the commitments it has undertaken in the Congo. According to conservative estimates, the United Nations programme in the Congo will cost between \$150,000,000 and \$200,000,000 between September 1960 and the end of 1961.



After a long and bitter debate the General Assembly, on November 22, decided to seat a delegation headed by President Kasabubu as the representative of the Congo. The recommendation of the Credentials Committee was accepted by a vote of 53 to 24, with 19 abstentions. The vote was a victory for the United States and other Western powers. The Soviet bloc, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia and other supporters of Mr. Lumumba were in the minority. Burma, in conformity with its previous stand, abstained in the vote. Among other abstainers were Cambodia, Canada, Finland, Ireland, Pakistan and Sweden. This decision to seat the delegation headed by President Kasabubu is, in my opinion, one of the major actions taken at this Assembly. The decision caused intense dismay among those Asian-African delegates who wished to postpone discussion of the Congolese situation till the Conciliation Committee could proceed to the Congo and submit its report.

On December 7, Yugoslavia announced that she was withdrawing her diplomatic mission from Leopoldville and recalling a twenty-one-man contingent from the U.N. Congo force. The Yugoslav move came as reports were received here of the withdrawal of contingents from Ceylon and the United Arab Republic. There were additional reports that Ghana and Indonesia were considering similar moves. Burma, for totally different reasons, has asked for the withdrawal of her military officers, and my personal observations have been conveyed to the Foreign Office, vide UNB907 of December 28, 1960. At the time of writing this report (January 24, 1961) no other contingent, except that from Yugoslavia, has been withdrawn from the Congo.

After the adoption of the Credentials Committee Report, the debate on the situation in the Congo continued. Two new developments took place:

- (a) Yugoslavia and six Asian-African States presented a draft resolution calling on the Assembly for new measures to curb the armed forces of Col. Mobutu. The resolution was cosponsored by Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Morocco and United Arab Republic.
- (b) Mr. Hammarskjold served notice that he would not lend himself to acts by the United Nations forces in the Congo that he considered beyond the bounds of the Charter.
- (c) President Nkrumah of Ghana, on December 17, asked the Secretary-General to replace immediately the military leadership of the United Nations force in the Congo.
- (d) The United States and Britain presented a draft resolution on December 18 asking the United Nations to make new efforts to restore peace in the Congo by helping to bring the factions together. They urged that member nations refrain from sending arms into the troubled country. This resolution was viewed by several Asian-African delegates as another attempt to use the United Nations to mask "imperialist" support of Belgium in keeping a hold on the Congo. The resolution asked the Secretary-General "to do everything possible to assist the Chief of State, President Kasabubu."

In the early hours of December 21 when the General Assembly adjourned, the debate on the Congo ended in a deadlock. Two resolutions were voted upon - one sponsored by India, Yugoslavia and six other Asian-African states (A/L.331), and the other by the United States and Britain (A/L.332). The Asian-African draft resolution was rejected by 42 votes to 28, with 27 abstentions.

The two-power resolution had 43 supporters and 22 opposed, with 32 abstentions, falling short of the required two-thirds by just one vote. Burma abstained on both resolutions.

Although the Assembly did not agree on a political solution, there was more success on the financial front. Just after midnight the Assembly approved by a vote of 46 to 17, with 24 abstentions, a compromise draft resolution on the problem of financing the \$60,000,000 cost of 1960 military operations in the Congo. In line with our delegation's stand in the Fifth Committee, Burma voted for the resolution. The plan makes the expenses a separate account outside the organization's regular budget, but puts a legal obligation on all members to pay.

### The Question of Algeria

Before the start of the 15th session of the General Assembly, Ambassador Frederick Boland of Ireland (who later became President of the Assembly) told me that he thought a resolution calling for a U.N. supervised referendum would win the necessary two-thirds majority. Such was the feeling of many delegates who in the past generally did not associate themselves openly with the Algerian nationalist cause. Many of those who, in the 14th session, voted against the Asian-African resolution, with the expectation that President de Gaulle would initiate political negotiations with the Algerians, were solely disappointed with the absence of any concrete action in the past nine months. Meanwhile the French army of 500,000 has been pinned down in Algeria at an estimated cost of more than a billion dollars a year. In the stalemate, the pressures on General de Gaulle have been increasing at home and abroad. At home, the famous Manifesto of 121 intellectuals led by Jean-Paul Sartre urged the French soldiers to desert.

One significant development of the Algerian question was that since the preliminary talks between France and the Algerian nationalists broke down in June 1960, the Algerians have been negotiating for aid from the Soviet bloc. Late in October 1960, Mr. Ferhat Abbas, Premier of the Algerian Provisional Government told newspaper correspondents that Russia and China had tendered aid without political conditions, and that it would be accepted because the Algerians had concluded "after six years of struggle that the United States will do nothing to help us." About the same time Tunisia and Morocco suggested that they might federate with the Algerian rebel regime, thus "internationalizing" the war. The Algerian nationalist leaders have frequently indicated that they seek neither a war to the finish, nor big power intervention, but a negotiated peace with France. The election of Senator Kennedy as President of the United States on November 8 foreshadowed pressure from America on France since he has expressed sympathy for Algerian self-government.

Against this background the Asian-African Standing Committee on Algeria, of which I still continue to serve as Chairman, met once in September, four times in October and six times in November to consider the line of action. The whole Asian-African group met several times, and at its meeting of November 10 the group decided that the question of Algeria be discussed at the Political Committee on December 5, and I was asked to move the proposal formally in the Committee. At the Political Committee meeting of November 11 I made the proposal as instructed by the group and it was adopted unanimously without a single voice of dissent raised. Even the United States delegate Mr. James Wadsworth described my move as "logical and sensible."



The debate on Algeria started on December 5 with the keynote speech by Mr. Mongi Slim of Tunisia. France, as in the previous sessions, boycotted the debate. Mr. Slim's speech was mild in tone, but tough in its attack on the plans for Algeria recently announced by President de Gaulle. Principally, he objected to the fact that the de Gaulle plan implied the possible partition of Algeria to protect the interests of the European minority. The Tunisian delegate called on the United Nations to guarantee a free and honest referendum for Algeria to decide its political future. He insisted that the presence of the United Nations would guarantee the validity of the referendum and also exert a calming influence on the country.

On the next day (December 6) eighty-two prominent Americans from all walks of life urged the United States Government to support a proposal for a United Nations sponsored plebiscite in Algeria to implement the principle of self-determination. They signed a "Statement on Algeria" prepared by the American Committee on Africa.

On December 7 the newly-independent French-speaking African delegates were reported to be working on a draft resolution calling for a referendum in Algeria with the plebiscite supervised by them. The proposal was immediately rejected by Algerian representatives here. There was a widespread belief here that France was behind this move.

The Standing Committee on Algeria, at its meeting on 5th December, entrusted me with the task of drafting a resolution on the lines indicated by the majority of Asian-African delegates at the group meetings of November 30 and December 1. The draft submitted by me was examined by the Committee at two meetings and presented to the whole group meeting on December 7 when it was approved. At this meeting it was decided that the approval of respective governments would be sought for cosponsorship. Approval of our Government was sought on that day by cable. As the majority of members of the group wished to table it on Friday, December 9, Burma cosponsored it on that day anticipating Government's approval, after the matter was discussed at our Delegation meeting. The Asian-African group also decided, at its meeting of December 9 that I, in my capacity as Chairman of the Standing Committee on Algeria, should present the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.265) to the Political Committee. I complied with the decision by presenting it on December 12. Copies of my speech have already been submitted to the Foreign Office.

On December 11 and 12 riots flared up in several Algerian towns. The fighting arose from opposition by the European settlers to President de Gaulle's policies and Moslem enthusiasm for them as a possible way to peace and independence. On the second day riots took the form of communal battles between the French and Arabs, the latter hoisting F.L.N. flags in their demonstrations. It was the first reported instance of the whole Arab community in Algeria openly backing Algerian rebel cause for independence. On the same day (December 12) Mr. Ferhat Abbas, the Algerian leader, sent a message to the Secretary-General calling for urgent United Nations intervention in riot-torn Algeria. The message noted the graveness of events in Algeria and urged the United Nations to take "urgent measures". It was against this background that I presented the draft resolution.

On December 14 Britain upheld the French policy in Algeria and cautioned the United Nations against interference. Mr. David Ormsby-Gore's speech was in fact the first defence of France's position in the Algerian debate. So far the debate has been

dominated by Asian and African demands that the United Nations organize a referendum to decide Algeria's future. In another development the whole Asian-African group met on December 13 and decided that the Chairman for the month and I should see the Secretary General and convey him a letter from the group expressing concern over French army attacks on the Algerian civilian population and asking his help in urging France to desist from such acts in future. Mr. Ferdinand Oyono of Cameroun, Chairman of the group for December and I saw the Secretary-General on December 14 and handed over the letter a copy of which is attached herewith as Annex I. A copy of the Secretary-General's reply to me is also appended herewith as Annex II.

The Asian-African draft resolution was put to the vote in the Political Committee on December 15 and it was adopted by 47 votes to 20 with 28 abstentions. However, the key paragraph that the plebiscite in Algeria be "organized, supervised and controlled by the United Nations, was adopted by the narrower margin of 38 to 33. This could mean its defeat in the Assembly, where a two-thirds vote of members present and voting is required. This was anticipated but the sponsors of the draft resolution wanted to ascertain the size of support for such a bold move before the draft was revised for presentation at the Plenary.

The Plenary meeting of the General Assembly took up the matter on December 19 and the revised draft was adopted by 63 votes to 8, with 27 abstentions. However, the Assembly deleted a key provision that would have had the United Nations conduct a referendum to decide Algeria's future. It was defeated when the voting produced a 40-to-40 tie with 16 abstentions.

The new resolution, for the first time, puts the Assembly on record as recognizing in principle that the United Nations has a role to play in Algeria. Before the final vote, eleven French-speaking African states, led by Senegal, politically sympathetic to France, sought unsuccessfully to remove the controversial referendum idea. They wanted to replace it with a proposal for renewed French-Algerian negotiations for a cease-fire in the Algerian war and later for a referendum. This was rejected in two separate votes.

The Assembly also rejected an attempt by Cyprus to soften but retain the referendum plan by making it a recommendation of the Assembly instead of a decision as proposed in the Political Committee. In fact the Cypriot amendment was tabled at the suggestion of the original sponsors at a private meeting, but this change was turned down by a vote of 57 to 27, with 17 abstentions. It thus failed by 2 votes to get the two-thirds majority needed for the final Assembly approval. Just before the voting took place in the Assembly I made a brief intervention copies of which have already been submitted to the Foreign Office.

After the Assembly ballot almost all the sponsors privately expressed satisfaction. We were particularly pleased that the resolution recognized the right of the Algerians to independence and accepted the United Nations' responsibility in achieving this goal. The Assembly acceptance of Algeria's "unity and territorial integrity" is also significant in that it is opposed to any attempt to partition Algeria to protect the interests of Europeans there.

In French delegation circles satisfaction was expressed over the fact that France's major allies - Britain and the United States - had given her unqualified support and that the African members of the French Community had taken a friendly initiative to support the French cause.



Some Asian-African states, especially the Arab States, were considering, after the adjournment of the session, raising the Algerian question anew when the General Assembly reconvenes in March unless progress is made towards a settlement. At the time of writing this report the settlement does not appear to be in sight.

Declaration on the granting of independence to Colonies

The item entitled "Declaration on the granting of independence to Colonial countries and peoples" was introduced into the General Assembly by Premier Khrushchev in the course of his statement in the General Debate. The result was a Soviet resolution (A/4502) calling for the independence "forthwith" of all colonial and trust territories and all leased areas in foreign countries. The proposal, if adopted, would abolish most Western bases abroad as well as United States control over such areas as the Panama Canal zone and the naval base in Cuba.

Before the item came up for discussion, several western delegates privately expressed their desire that initiative on this question should be taken by Asian-African countries and not by Soviet Russia. They saw in the Soviet resolution a move to make the issue a weapon in the cold war. On October 21 President Boland privately suggested to me that the Asian-African group should seriously consider the question of tabling a separate resolution of its own. At its two meetings over which I presided, the Asian-African group decided to take up the question independent of the Soviet move. A small ad-hoc drafting committee was formed with the Indonesian representative (Ambassador Palar) as chairman, and on November 1 the drafting committee finalized the text of a draft resolution (A/L.323). Earlier, the Assembly, in compliance with the wishes of the Soviet Union and the Asian-African countries, had decided to take up the question in the plenary session without prior consideration in committee.

At every Asian-African group meeting opinion was sharply divided on whether to call for immediate independence or to fix a date for the final liquidation of Colonialism. Dates considered were 1961, 1962 and 1963. There was, however, consensus of opinion that the proposed resolution should reflect the anti-colonial resolutions adopted at the Asian-African conference in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955 and African conferences at Accra, Ghana, in 1958 and at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in the summer of 1960. There was further consensus of opinion that reference to leasehold areas or military bases should be eliminated, since several Asian-African countries including Japan, the Philippines, Jordan and Libya permit the Western powers to maintain bases on their territory. This situation is one reason why the Asian-African group has decided to introduce its own resolution instead of throwing its weight behind the Soviet declaration. Another reason is the belief that since the Asian and African countries are the nations really concerned about colonialism, an Assembly resolution calling for its termination should be introduced by the Asian-African members.

The strength of the anti-colonial delegates has already been demonstrated by the fact that the United States and Britain had to withdraw their opposition to the special procedure demanded by the Soviet Union. As a result, the decision to have the Assembly itself take up the question without preliminary committee consideration was taken by acclamation, and the Soviet Union won one of its most impressive victories in the 15th session. The United States and other Western countries had intended originally to answer the Soviet declaration with the assertion that the Soviet satellite countries

in Eastern Europe were also "colonies" and should also be liberated. However, most Asian-African countries are strongly opposed to including this subject in the debate.

On December 14, before the two draft resolutions were put to the vote, Soviet Union introduced an amendment to the Asian-African draft setting the dateline for independence at "not later than 1961". Mr. Alex Quaison-Sackey of Ghana appealed unsuccessfully to the Soviet Union to withdraw its amendment. The Soviet amendment was then defeated by 47 votes to 29, with 22 abstentions. Those voting with the Soviet bloc were most of the Arab countries, some African nations, Cuba, Yugoslavia and Mexico. Two other Soviet defeats followed. The Assembly voted down, by 35 to 32, with 30 abstentions, a section of the Soviet draft declaration demanding complete independence "forthwith". The Assembly then defeated the remainder of the Soviet declaration, which had formed the burden of Premier Khrushchev's attack on Colonialism in his speech before the Assembly on September 23. The vote was 43 to 25, with 29 abstentions.

The Assembly then passed the Asian-African resolution (co-sponsored by Burma) by 89 votes to 0. The United States, Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal, Australia, Spain, Dominican Republic and the Union of South Africa abstained. The vote came to a dramatic end as a Negro member of the United States delegation demonstrated her opposition to the United States' abstention from the vote. Mrs. Zelma Watson George stood and joined the Asian-African delegates in applauding the adoption of the Asian-African resolution. Reliable sources said that President Eisenhower refused to change the decision to abstain on colonialism resolution despite the fact that the entire United States delegation had been in favour of voting for it. The United States is believed to have been under pressure from Britain, France and Belgium to abstain. The general feeling among many delegates at the U.N. was that the United States had suffered a propaganda setback in the struggle for the allegiance of the Asian-African group by abstaining on a resolution that had almost unanimous U.N. endorsement, including that of the Soviet Union.

Many American observers here, including several journalists, were greatly dismayed at the fact that the United States had antagonized the Asian-African countries by not voting for their resolution. Many Americans, who have thought of their country in terms of the Statute of Liberty and the Declaration of Independence, were upset to find the United States bracketed together with the most controversial countries like Belgium, Dominican Republic, Portugal, Spain and the Union of South Africa. North Atlantic solidarity apparently was a primary motive. However, Mr. James T. Wadsworth, chief United States delegate, carried off his voting assignment with as much grace as he could muster, but the specific reasons he adduced for objecting to the resolution seemed to most delegates to be hair-splitting. In the opinion of most Asian-African delegates, the resolution was one of the landmarks in the progress of the United Nations, and in retrospect I consider it as the greatest achievement of the 15th session of the General Assembly.

#### Complaint by Cuba

The item inscribed on October 19 by Cuba was entitled "Complaint by the Revolutionary Government of Cuba regarding the various plans of aggression and acts of intervention being executed by the Government of the United States of America against the Republic of Cuba, constituting a manifest violation of its territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, and a clear threat to international peace and security."



The Assembly's Steering Committee recommended that the item be allocated to the Political Committee. On November 1 when the question of allocation was considered at the Plenary session, Cuba tabled an amendment to the effect that the item be discussed at the Plenary, and not at the Political Committee. Before the voting took place I made a brief explanation of our vote, and copies of the same have been submitted to the Foreign Office. However, the Cuban amendment was rejected by a vote of 45 to 29, with 18 abstentions. The vote for the allocation of the item to the Political Committee was 53 to 11, with 27 abstentions. Cuba and the Soviet bloc were supported only by Indonesia.

Before the vote, Mr. James J. Wadsworth of the United States rejected the Cuban charges as "monstrous distortions and downright falsehoods." Although rejecting the accusations, he declared that the United States welcomed a full debate on the complaint to "bring out the truth". However, he maintained that the traditional place to hear the matter was the Political Committee. Dr. Raul Roa, Foreign Minister of Cuba, contended that the item would be "buried" because of the Political Committee's already crowded agenda. The Soviet-bloc states in particular harped on the charge that this was a United States stalling maneuver to gain time for the Pentagon to complete its military plans for an invasion from bases in Florida and also from Guatemala.

Although the debate nominally was on the procedural issue of the handling of the complaint and not on the substance of the charges, it touched off a full-scale discussion of the charges. At that time Dr. Roa protested that a four engined plane from the United States had supplied military equipment to anti-Government rebels and accused the United States of planning an invasion "in a few days". Dr. Roa also charged that Guatemala was also a training ground for an invasion against Cuba.

Although the item was allocated to the Political Committee, the Cuban delegation did not show any keen desire to take it up there. On November 11, Dr. Roa discussed with me the text of a draft resolution he proposed to table in the Committee and asked me if Burma would be willing to cosponsor it. It in effect sought to condemn the United States, and for obvious reasons I declined the invitation. The fact was duly reported to our Delegation meeting. I understand that India, Indonesia, Ceylon, Iraq, United Arab Republic, Ghana and Guinea were similarly approached.

Cuba took up the question again early this month in the Security Council, but the present indications are that Cuba may not press for a debate at the resumed session, anticipating improved Cuban-United States relations under the Democratic Presidential regime.

#### The Problem of Mauritania

At the Asian-African group meeting on November 7, the Moroccan delegate appealed to the group to support its proposed move to request France to postpone granting of independence to Mauritania on November 28, and meanwhile to have bilateral talks between Morocco and France with a view to integration of Mauritania with Morocco. Most Asian-African delegates felt that Morocco has a very weak case since it will be hardly advisable for us to oppose admission of Mauritania to the United Nations after its independence on November 28. In this connection a reference is invited to our cable UNB716 of November 7 and Foreign Office cable BUN282 of November 11.

The Moroccan case further received a jolt when on November 23 the Tunisia<sup>w</sup> Government announced that it would support the entry of Mauritania into the United Nations as an independent state. This announcement was considered by Morocco as an "act of treason" against the unity of the Maghreb, the North African countries. At the Asian-African group meeting at the United Nations on the same day the delegations were sharply split. Representatives of the newly independent African states that have become members of the French community - dubbed by some Asian Africans as "Latin Africans" - openly came out against the Moroccan position, while the Arab delegates and a few others like Indonesia, Guinea and Mali endorsed the Moroccan stand.

The general debate on the item was concluded on November 25. On the next day Morocco lost an uphill fight for endorsement by the United Nations of its claim to Mauritania. A resolution on the subject was withdrawn by the sponsors - Indonesia, Jordan and Libya - after it became apparent that the Political Committee would not support the Moroccan contention. An amendment to the resolution (A/C.1/L.263) expressing the hope that France, Morocco and Mauritania would reach a peaceful solution of the problem, was defeated by a vote of 31 in favour and 39 against, with 25 abstentions. It was then that the sponsors gave up the battle, "in view of the sharp division which has potentialities of bitterness and further disturbances in relations among the African States."

Ambassador Armand Berard of France, before the vote, noted that the Mauritania approved independence in a referendum in 1958. He said that anything that would cast doubt on that referendum would "cast aspersions" on the other former French territories which have achieved their independence in the same manner. Mr. Berard indicated that Mauritania would be free to take a vote on the Union with Morocco if it so desired. Speaking at a press conference after the voting, Mr. Boucetta of Morocco said that such a vote would be difficult because some Mauritanian "political parties have been dissolved, and their leaders are in jail."

The United States was silent during the debate and voted against the amendment. Presumably, it did not support the Moroccan claim.

When the question of Mauritania's admission to the United Nations came up for discussion at the Security Council on December 3, the Soviet Union demanded that the Council also accept Outer Mongolia. The Soviet move, which was bitterly opposed by the major Western powers, was made by Mr. Valerian Zorin, chief Soviet delegate and President of the Security Council for December. The move was at once interpreted as an attempt to trade Mauritania's admission to the United Nations for that of Outer Mongolia. It will be recalled that Outer Mongolia has been turned down twice since 1955.

It was widely rumoured in the U.N. lobbies that Morocco, which considers Mauritania a part of her territory and hence is opposing Mauritania's admission as a separate state, had asked the Soviet Union to veto the Mauritanian bid. The Outer Mongolia move was generally regarded here to have resulted as a more moderate choice. The Security Council debate went on till the small hours of December 4 and it concluded with the Soviet Union's dramatic veto of the United Nations membership of Mauritania. The veto was not unexpected, but the motive was not clear. Mr. Zorin was reported to have offered privately to vote for Mauritania if Outer Mongolia was also admitted.