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26 MAR - 28 APR 1983

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ACC.	<u>94/152</u>

23 March 1983
JH/ddj

ITINERARY FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

<u>Date</u>	<u>Itinerary</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Hours from GMT</u>	<u>Airline and flight no.</u>	<u>Equip.</u>	<u>Stops</u>
Sat 26 March	Lv. New York (JFK)	1000	-5	BA 178	747	0
	Arr. London (LHR)	2140	+1			
	(Excelsior Airport Hotel)					
Sun 27 March	Lv. London (LHR)	1125	+1	SU 244	IL	0
	Arr. Moscow	1705	+3			
Tues 29 March	Lv. Moscow	1850	+3	SU 576	IL	0
	Arr. Paris (CDG)	2135	+2			
	(Hotel Plaza Athenee)					
Fri 1 April	Lv. Paris (ORY)	1035	+2	AF 501	AB	0
	Arr. Lisbon	1155	+1			
Wed 6 April	Lv. Lisbon	0905	+1	PT 452	727	0
	Arr. London (LHR)	1135	+1			
	Lv. London (LHR)	1445	+1	EI 165		
	Arr. Dublin	1555	+1			
Fri 8 April	Lv. Dublin	1420	+1	Special Aircraft		
	Arr. Glasgow	1530	+1			
	Lv. Glasgow	1600	+1	FI 233	727	0
	Arr. Reykjavik	1710	0			
Mon 11 April	Lv. Reykjavik	0730	0	FI 232	727	0
	Arr. Copenhagen	1350	+2			
Wed 13 April	Lv. Copenhagen	1640	+2	AY 814	DC-9	0
	Arr. Helsinki	1945	+2			
Sat 16 April	Lv. Helsinki		+2	Surface by boat		
	Arr. Stockholm		+2			
Tues 19 April	Lv. Stockholm	1550	+2	SK 705	DC-9	0
	Arr. Oslo	1645	+2			
Thur 21 April	Lv. Oslo	1640	+2	SK 569	DC-9	0
	Arr. Paris (CDG)	1850	+2			
	(Hotel Plaza Athenee)					
Tues 26 April	Lv. Paris (CDG)	0725 1400	+2	LH 111	727	0
	Arr. Frankfurt NY	0835	+2			
	Lv. Frankfurt	1005	+2	LH 536	707	1
	Arr. Addis Ababa	1910				(Khartoum)
Wed 27 April	Lv. Addis Ababa	1600	0	KQ 473	DC-9	0
	Arr. Nairobi	1745	0			
Thur 28 April	Lv. Nairobi	0830	0	BA 54	747	0
	Arr. London (LHR)	0705	+1			
	Lv. London (LHR)	1000	+1	TW 709	L1011	0
	Arr. New York (JFK)	1235	+1			
	OR					
Wed 27 April	Lv. Addis Ababa	1300	0	ET 706	727	0
	Arr. Rome	1820	+2			
	Overnight Panco del Medici					
Thu 28 April	Lv. Rome	1050	+2	PA 111	747	0
	Arr. New York (JFK)	1400	+1			

programme

<u>Place</u>	<u>Hotel</u>	<u>Telephone</u>
London	Excelsior Airport Hotel	7596611
Paris	Plaza Athenee	3598523
Lisbon	Queluz Palace	637141
Dublin	Berkeley Court Hotel	785626
Reykjavik	Hotel Saga	29900
Copenhagen	Hotel Scandinavia	(1)112324
Helsinki	Hotel Kalastajatorppa	488011
Stockholm	Haga Palace	(8)850593
Oslo	Grand Hotel	334870
Moscow	Government Dacha	



MISSÃO PERMANENTE DE PORTUGAL
JUNTO DAS NAÇÕES UNIDAS
NEW YORK

Harvard → CG by the
Amb. on Feb. 25 March
6.15 pm

PROGRAMA DA VISITA A PORTUGAL

DE

S.E. O SECRETÁRIO GERAL DAS NAÇÕES UNIDAS

LISBOA

1 A 6 DE ABRIL DE 1983



MISSÃO PERMANENTE DE PORTUGAL
JUNTO DAS NAÇÕES UNIDAS
NEW YORK

1º DIA

Sexta-feira, 1 de Abril

11,55 - Chegada ao Aeroporto da Portela

12,30 - Partida para Queluz

12,45 - Instalação no Palácio de Queluz



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2º e 3º DIAS

Sábado, 2 de Abril

Domingo, 3 de Abril

VISITA PRIVADA



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4º DIA

Segunda-feira, 4 de Abril

11,30 - Encontro com S.E. o Ministro dos Negócios
Estrangeiros, no Ministério dos Negócios
Estrangeiros

13,15 - Almoço livre

16,00 - Encontro com S.E. o Primeiro Ministro, em
São Bento

19,00 - Audiência de Sua Excelência o Presidente
da República

20,30 - Jantar intimo oferecido por Sua Excelência
o Presidente da República, no Palácio de
Belém



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5º DIA

Terça-feira, 5 de Abril

11,00 - Visita ao Centro de Informação das Nações Unidas

13,00 - Almoço oferecido por S.E. o Primeiro Ministro,
no Palácio da Vila, em Sintra

16,00 - Apresentação de cumprimentos a S.E. o
Presidente da Assembleia da República

20,30 - Jantar oferecido por S.E. o Ministro dos
Negócios Estrangeiros no Palácio das
Necessidades (black-tie)



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6º DIA

Quarta-feira, 6 de Abril

8,15 - Conferência de Imprensa na Sala Vip do Aeroporto

9,05 - Partida

Wednesday, 30 March

- ACC Meets in Paris (UNESCO)

9.30 ACC - (Special Day on Development)
(until 13.30)

13.30 Luncheon by Mr. M'Bow for ACC participants
(until 15.30)

15.30 Leave for Elysée Palace

16.00 Reception by President Mitterrand for the
members of ACC

17.00 ACC Private Meeting (3 issues:

- 1) Political briefing by Secretary-General;
- 2) ILO Pension Question - proposal to
ILO Governing Council on supplementary
pension scheme;
- 3) Appointments -
 - a) Chairmanship of Task Force on
Science and Technology
 - b) Coordination on New and Renewable
Sources of Energy
 - c) Chairmanship of IOB

[[?]
18.30 Ambassador of Pakistan to France]

Thursday, 31 March

- 9.30 Complete the private meeting, if necessary
- regular business of ACC:
Item - Interagency cooperation and
co-ordination
- 13.00 Buffet lunch by Mr. M'Bow
- 14.00 Items Emergencies, as requested by FAO
Staff participation in ACC
Review of operational activities for
development (Mr. West)
- 20.15 Dinner by Foreign Minister Cheysson
for some ACC members

Friday, 1 April - GOOD FRIDAY

10.35 Leave Paris (Orly) (AF-501)

11.55 Arrive Lisbon

Saturday, 2 April - private stay in Lisbon

) EASTER Sunday, 3 April - private stay in Lisbon

Monday, 4 April - in Lisbon

7.00pm Private meeting with the President of PORTUGAL

followed by:

Dinner (with ladies) by the President

Tuesday, 5 April - in Lisbon

13.00

Luncheon by the Prime Minister of Portugal

8.30pm

Dinner by the Foreign Minister of PORTUGAL in honour of the SG and Mrs. Pérez de Cuéllar followed by dancing.

Wednesday, 6 April

10.55 Leave Lisbon (RG-762)

1.30 Arrive London

2.45 Leave London (EI 165)

3.55 Arrive Dublin

Greeted by Minister for Foreign Affairs

16.30 Check in at Berkeley Court Hotel

17.15 Reception given in honour of Secretary-General by
the Royal Irish Academy and Irish United Nations
Association at Iveagh House (Department of Foreign
Affairs)

18.30 Depart Iveagh House for Shelbourne Hotel

18.45 Private Dinner in the Shelbourne

20.00 Attend play "Translations" by Brian Friel at Abbey
Theatre

Thursday, 7 April

IRELAND

10.00	Meeting with the President of the Republic
11.00	Talks at Iveagh House with Minister for Foreign Affairs
13.00	Working luncheon hosted by Minister for Foreign Affairs (Stag)
15.00	Press conference in Iveagh House
15.40	Visit to Trinity College, Dublin
16.40	Return to Berkeley Court Hotel
20.00	Government dinner at Iveagh House (Black Tie) Hosted by Taniste (Deputy Prime Minister) Mr. Richard Spring

Friday, 8 April

9.30	Depart hotel for scenic drive in Co. Wicklow
10.45	Coffee at the Roundwood Inn
12.00	Visit to Russborough House
12.30	Private luncheon at Downshire House Hotel, Blessington
13.50	Depart hotel for Baldonnell Military Airport
14.20	Depart Baldonnell for Glasgow by Irish Air Corps executive jet
15.30	Arrive Prestwick Airport, Glasgow

ICELAND

17.10	Arrival at Keflavik Airport (FI-233 from Glasgow)
18.10	Arrival Hotel Saga
19.50	Depart from Hotel Saga
20.00	Dinner given by Prime Minister Gunnar Thoroddsen at Hotel Borg
23.00	Depart Hotel Borg
23.10	Arrive Hotel Saga

Saturday, 9 April - ICELAND

9.25	Departure from Hotel Saga
9.30	Discussions with the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the Government Guest House
11.00	Departure from the Government Guest House
11.05	Arrival at the Árni Magnússon Manuscript Institute
11.30	Departure from the Árni Magnússon Manuscript Institute for Hotel Saga
12.05	Departure from Hotel Saga
12.30	Luncheon given by the President of Iceland at Bessastadir
14.45	Departure from Bessastadir
15.00	Arrival at the National Energy Authority Headquarters Opening ceremony of the United Nations University Geothermal Training Programme 1983
15.35	Departure for Hotel Saga
16.20	Departure from Hotel Saga
16.30	Lecture given by the Secretary-General in the University of Iceland and, Auditorium (sponsorship: the University of Iceland and the United Nations Association)
17.10	Departure from the University of Iceland
17.30	Press conference and TV interview at the Hotel Saga (Mimisbar)
19.50	Departure from Hotel Saga
20.00	Dinner given by the Mayor of Reykjavik at Kjarvalsstadir
23.00	Departure from Kjarvalsstadir

Sunday, April 10

9.00	Departure from Hotel Saga
9.10	Visit to the Althing where the Secretary-General will be received by the Speaker of the United Althing
9.45	Departure for Reykjavik Airport
10.00	Departure from Reykjavik Airport with a coast guard plane
10.45	Arrival at the Vestman Islands - Sight-seeing tour
12.30	Luncheon given by the Vestmanneyjar Town Council
14.30	Departure from the Vestman Islands. Short landing at Hornafjörður with a sight-seeing tour
17.00	Arrival at Reykjavik Airport
17.15	Arrival at Hotel Saga
18.50	Departure from Hotel Saga
19.00	Informal Dinner given by the Foreign Minister of Iceland and Mrs. Johannesson at the Government Guest House
22.00	Departure from the Government Guest House for Hotel Saga

Monday, 11 April

- 6.45 Depart Hotel Saga
- 7.30 Leave Reykjavik (FI232) from Keflavik Airport

DENMARK

- 13.50 Arrive Copenhagen Airport, Kastrup
(Flight No. FI 232)
- 14.10 Arrive Hotel Scandinavia
- 14.50 Depart from Hotel Scandinavia
- 15.00 Talks with Mr. Poul Schlüter, Prime Minister,
and Mr. Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Christiansborg Palace
- 17.00 Depart for Hotel Scandinavia
- 19.50 Depart for Christiansborg Palace
- 20.00 Government dinner at Christiansborg Palace
(Black tie)
Hosts: Mr. Poul Schlüter, Prime Minister,
and Mrs. Lisbeth Schlüter

Tuesday, 12 April - DENMARK

9.30	Depart from Hotel Scandinavia
9.45	Visit to the United Nations Information Office 37, H. C. Andersens Boulevard
10.30	Departure
10.45	Press Conference at Eigtveda Pakhus, 25, Strandgade followed by a radio and TV interview
12.15	Depart for Hotel Scandinavia
12.45	Depart for Frederiksberg City Hall
13.00	Luncheon at Frederiksberg City Hall Host: Mr. John Winther, Mayor
15.00	Departure
15.15	Visit to the UNICEF Packing and Assembly Centre 129, Arhusgade, Free Port
16.15	Departure
16.25	Visit to the Danish Parliament (Folketinget) at Christiansborg Palace
17.10	Departure
17.15	The Secretary-General will address a meeting arranged by the Danish United Nations Association at Fellessalen at Christiansborg Palace
18.30	Depart for Hotel Scandinavia
19.30	Depart for Marienborg
20.00	Informal dinner at Marienborg, Kgs. Lyngby Hosts: Mr. Poul Schlüter, Prime Minister and Mrs. Lisbeth Schlüter

Wednesday, 13 April

9.30	Depart from Hotel Scandinavia	
10.15	Visit to the Museum of Modern Art, Louisiana, Humlebak	
11.15	Depart for Elsinore	
11.30	Visit to Kronborg Castle, Elsinore	
12.30	Depart for Fredensborg Palace	
13.00	Luncheon offered by Her Majesty Queen Margrethe II at Fredensborg Palace	NO TOASTS
15.00	Departure	
16.40	Depart from Copenhagen Airport, Kastrup (Flight AY 814)	

4.40 Leave Copenhagen (AY-814)

19.45	Arrive Helsinki Accommodation at Hotel Kalastajatorppa	
20.30	Private supper at Kalastajatorppa	

Thursday, 14 April - FINLAND

9.30	Meeting with the Prime Minister
11.45	Visit to the Ministry of Defense (peace-keeping)
12.30	Luncheon given by the Mayor of Helsinki
14.30	Visit to the Parliament
15.30	Return to Kalastajatorppa
18.30	Short lecture by Secretary-General at the "Paasikivi" Society (Foreign Policy Association) in the chamber music hall of the Finlandia House; before or after the lecture a tour of the Finlandia House, if desired
20.00	Prime Minister's dinner (Smolna/Dark suit)

Friday, 15 April - FINLAND

9.30	Meeting with the Foreign Minister
10.45	Sight-seeing in Helsinki
12.00	Audience with the President of the Republic
13.00	Luncheon given by the President of the Republic (with ladies)
14.45	Return to Kalastajatorppa
16.30	Press conference (Kalastajatorppa)
17.30	Foreign Minister's reception for representatives of the civic associations (Smolna)
19.00	Opera - (Marriage of Figaro)

Saturday, 16 April

10.00	Departure for Turku
11.30	Visit to Turku Cathedral, accompanied by Archbishop John Vikstöm
12.15	Return to the hotel
13.00	Luncheon at "Hamburger Börs"
14.30	Tour arranged by the city of Turku of historically interesting places
19.30	Dinner given by the city of Turku at Turku Castle
21.30	Departure for Stockholm with M.S. "Svea Corona"

Sunday, 17 April - SWEDEN

7.00	Arrival by boat from Turku - met by FM
7.15	Arrival and accommodation at Haga Palace
8.45	Departure Haga Palace
9.00	Departure Bromma Airport
9.50	Arrival Kalmar Airport
10.30	Visit to Orrefors Glassworks accompanied by Foreign Minister
12.30	Luncheon with the provincial governor (Kalmar) Mr. Erik Krönmark
14.45	Departure from Kalmar
15.30	Arrival Bromma
15.45	Arrival Haga Palace
20.00	Government dinner

Monday, 18 April - SWEDEN

10.00 Meeting with the Prime Minister, Mr. Olof Palme

12.30 Luncheon with H. M. the King - NO TOASTS

14.00 Meeting with the Foreign Minister,
Mr. Lennart Roström

16.00 Joint press conference with Prime Minister

17.30 Reception for civic associations in Stockholm

Evening: Free for quiet dinner in Haga palace

Tuesday, 19 April

8.00	Leave Haga Palace for Uppsala, accompanied by Defence Minister
8.45	Wreath-laying ceremony at Dag Hammarskjöld grave
9.00	Short visit to Hammarskjöld Foundation
9.30	Departure from Uppsala for Strängnäs
10.30	Arrive at Strängnäs to visit course for UN officers
11.30	Return to Stockholm
12.45	Meeting with the Speaker, Mr. Ingemund Bengtsson
13.00	Statement at a meeting of the Parliament
13.30	Luncheon given by the Speaker
15.00	Departure from the Parliament building
15.50	Departure Arlanda Airport (SK 705) (accompanied by Prime Minister)
16.45	Arrive Oslo
16.50	Short meeting with the Norwegian press
17.00	Departure Fornebu
17.15	Arrival Grand Hotel (alternatively Parkveien 45)
19.55	Departure for Akershus Castle
20.00	Government dinner at Akershus Castle Hosts: Mr. Daare Willock, Prime Minister and Mrs. Willoch

Wednesday, 20 April - NORWAY

8.55	Departure Grand Hotel for the Storting (the Parliament)
9.00	Visit to the President of the Storting Mr. Odvar Nordli
9.10	Meeting with the Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Committee
9.50	Departure
9.55	Arrival at the Government Building
10.00	Talks with Mr. Kaare Willock, Prime Minister, Mr. Sverre Strøm, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Mr. Anders C. Sjøaastad; Minister of Defence
12.00	Press conference at the Prime Minister's Office
12.30	Arrival Grand Hotel
13.00	Departure for the Royal Palace
13.15	Audience given by His Majesty King Olav V
13.30	Luncheon at the Royal Palace
15.30	Festive meeting arranged by the Norwegian United Nations Association in the Festive Hall, University of Oslo
20.00	Dinner at the Heftye House (Host: Mr. Albert Nordengen, Mayor of Oslo)

Thursday, 21 April

10.15	Departure Grand Hotel
10.30	Arrival Munch Museum
11.35	Departure for Grorud Graveyard
11.50	Arrival at Grorud Graveyard
11.55	The Secretary-General lays a wreath on the grave of Mr. Trygve Lie, former Secretary General of the United Nations
12.05	Departure for Gardermoen Military Base
12.30	Luncheon
13.40	Orientation about Norwegian peace keeping activities, South Gardermoen
15.35	Departure for Gardermoen Airport
16.40	Departure by SK 569 for Paris
18.50	Arrive Paris (CDG)

Friday, 22 April - PARIS

Saturday, 23 April - PARIS

Sunday, 24 April - PARIS

Monday, 25 April - Conference on Namibia in PARIS

Tuesday, 26 April

~~0725~~

Depart Paris

~~0835~~, 1400

Arrive ~~Frankfurt~~ N.Y

1005

~~Depart Frankfurt~~

1910

~~Arrive Addis Ababa~~

AFGHANISTAN

(Points for general discussion)

1. The recent visit of the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General to the area has achieved the following results:

a) Both sides have accepted the Secretary-General's suggestion for a draft comprehensive settlement as a further basis for negotiations;

b) Agreement has been reached on the time relationship between the four elements of the comprehensive settlement (withdrawal of troops, return of refugees, non-interference in internal affairs, and international guarantees), which is to say, on the timing of the implementation.

c) Agreement has also been reached on the need to proceed with the consultations of the refugees as soon as possible.

d) It was understood that the forthcoming Geneva rounds of indirect talks would focus on further elaboration of the draft comprehensive settlement and on the mechanics of the consultations with the Afghan refugees. (The complexity of this procedure should not be under-estimated, as the Afghan refugees are not organized in one single structure. They are also disbursed in different countries. The timing of these consultations will also be discussed in Geneva.)

2. The support provided by the interlocutors has been encouraging so far, and this is the reason why the Secretary-General's Personal Representative suggested the negotiations be conducted in Geneva.

3. The Secretary-General intends to continue his efforts for a search for a political solution of the problem based on the principles of the United Nations Charter. He could not accept a solution under his aegis which would do away with those principles.

4. The Secretary-General has no reason to believe that the support provided to him by the parties would fade away in the future; the credibility of his own Office requires that concrete results should be achieved within a reasonable time span.

5. The structure of the government in Afghanistan is not the subject of the negotiations under the United Nations' auspices, as this might be interpreted as interference in internal affairs. It might happen, however, that when the four elements of the settlement are implemented, the internal situation in Afghanistan might present some changes with respect to the present situation. However, this should be the consequence of the expression of the free will of the Afghan people.

NOTE FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Prospects of the Cyprus negotiating process

1. The search, under the auspices of the Secretary-General, for a settlement of the Cyprus problem is entering a critical phase. One year and a half after the submission of the "evaluation" paper, the parties have been brought face to face with the few fundamental issues on which the shape of any settlement will depend. Both sides have stated publicly that if no progress is achieved by September 1983, a new negotiating format will have to be considered. In reality, what may have to be considered is whether, as a practical matter, the parties are ready for a negotiated solution at this time.

2. Three approaches have been used in the intercommunal talks: ① a comprehensive settlement (package deal, though implementation could come in stages), ② a stepped approach (one step to be agreed in advance leaving the substance of subsequent steps to be negotiated later), ③ and a mini-package (initial practical measures, including Varosha resettlement, to improve the situation and facilitate later negotiation of the basic issues).

3. With regard to ① a comprehensive settlement, the talks have proceeded in the framework of the "evaluation" paper. The outstanding issues concern the system of government (presidential or council), safeguards (Turkish Cypriot representation and veto powers), territorial aspect (including Morphou) and related problems such as demilitarization, international guarantees and the "three freedoms" (of movement, residence and property). One illustration: the Turkish Cypriots demand veto rights that would enable them to block both the executive and the legislature, leading

.../2

back to de facto partition, except that the Greek Cypriots would have lost control of the internationally recognized Government of Cyprus. The Greek Cypriots demand a strong presidency and majority rule, leaving the Turkish Cypriots unprotected. In confidential conversations, Mavrommatis has indicated acceptance of veto rights similar in extent to those of 1960, provided there were an impartial conciliation/arbitration procedure to prevent impasse.

4. Concerning the ²stepped approach, Gobbi has urged a two-step scheme. The first step would involve establishment of a weak central government, in charge only of foreign affairs, with Kyprianou as President and Denktash as Vice President; resettlement of Varosha under UN auspices, enlargement of the buffer zone and partial troop withdrawals. Additional functions would be added gradually. The (second) step would be negotiated later. This approach circumvents many of the divisive issues, and Gobbi feels it may offer the best available option. The parties have yet to react to this suggestion, under which the Central Government could easily be blocked, and the Greek Cypriots would lose control of that Government.

5. Concerning ³a mini-package, Gobbi considers that this option could be revived if the others fail.

6. Even if the obstacles on the way to a comprehensive or other type of settlement can theoretically be overcome, it is not clear that the parties have the political will to do so, or the strength required for flexibility.

President Kyprianou meets with Prime Minister Papandreou on 7 April; after that meeting Gobbi hopes to produce an assessment of the prospects. He sees no hope of progress if the Greek Prime Minister insists on troop withdrawals as a precondition for negotiations.

7. As in the past, neither Kyprianou nor Denktash appears enthusiastic about a settlement, though for different reasons. Papandreou feels that a negotiated settlement at this time

is bound to favour the Turkish side. The Turks support continued talks, but have shown no desire so far to make concessions.

8. It is important to get the parties, during the next few months, to show flexibility, and, with the help of the Secretary-General and the SRSG, make an effort to bridge their differences. Specific formulas could be devised under any of the three available options, provided there is the will to compromise. In his forthcoming conversations, the Secretary-General may wish to make the following points:

- (a) Warn all concerned that a failure of the talks would not lead to indefinite maintenance of the status quo; rather it would lead to instability, including possible Turkish Cypriot moves toward UDI and final partition;
- (b) Urge all friendly Governments to bring their influence, and even pressure, to bear on both parties (as well as on Greece and Turkey) to show flexibility.
- (c) Indicate his intention to undertake, after the Cyprus debate in the General Assembly, a personal effort with the assistance of Gobbi to explore with both parties the negotiating margins in respect of the several fundamental issues, with a view to assessing the chances of achieving a breakthrough.

DISARMAMENT

- Have reached a critical juncture in efforts at disarmament;
- Talks in Geneva between US and USSR on intermediate and strategic weapons of utmost importance;
- Both President Reagan and General-Secretary Andropov expected commitment to serious negotiations. You urge them to seize the current momentum.

Time specially ripe for disarmament with international public opinion calling for a halt to the arms race;

- Note that General Assembly launched a World Disarmament Campaign to promote public support for disarmament objectively in every region.

UN committed to disarmament. Major efforts in First Committee and in Geneva Committee on Disarmament (CD), which you addressed recently;

- In the CD, particularly hope for progress on nuclear-test ban and production of chemical weapons.
- (for USSR). Note great importance attached to disarmament by Soviet Union and various proposals advanced. You share Soviet emphasis on paramount necessity of stopping nuclear arms race;

Appreciate support given by Soviet Union to UN work on disarmament in First Committee and Committee on Disarmament. Recall generous contribution to World Disarmament Campaign.

- (for Nordic countries). Note traditional strong support for disarmament, and emphasis given to link between disarmament and development. Welcome close co-operation Nordic countries in this field.
- (For Sweden). Mention Mr. Palme's personal support for disarmament and study on "Common Security". You have asked the UN Disarmament Commission to consider the report.

QUESTION OF THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS ISLANDS

1. The political declaration adopted at the conclusion of the Non-Aligned Summit meeting held in New Delhi contains virtually identical language to that contained in the Managua Declaration as regards the Falklands/Malvinas and thus represents a considerable strengthening of the draft prepared in New York.
2. The Heads of State or Government reiterated their firm support for the Republic of Argentina's right to have its sovereignty over the Malvinas restituted through negotiations with the participation and good offices of the Secretary-General taking into account the interests of the population of the Islands. The Conference recognized that the sovereignty dispute extended also to South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands as integral parts of the Latin American region and expressed its satisfaction with the solidarity and firm support of the Latin American and non-aligned countries to the Republic of Argentina in its efforts to prevent the consolidation of the colonial situation existing in those islands. The Conference also considered that "the massive military and naval presence" and the activities of the United Kingdom in the Malvinas Islands region were a cause for grave concern to the countries in the region and adversely affected stability in the area.
3. Despite these developments it seems doubtful that negotiations can be resumed until after the British and Argentine elections.

Iran/Iraq

The United Nations has been engaged in mediation efforts since November 1980. Mr. Palme and Mr. Cordovez have made five visits to the area, the last in February 1982.

The UN effort has concentrated on securing an overall settlement in three stages:

- (a) acceptance of principles to govern relations between the two countries;
- (b) cease-fire and phased withdrawals to pre-war lines;
- (c) negotiations on substantive issues under UN auspices and conciliation on the Shatt-al-Arab issue.

Unfortunately, these efforts have not yet borne fruit.

During 1982, Iran launched three major drives and succeeded, at heavy cost, in recovering virtually all its occupied territory. Iraq now eagerly seeks peace. Iran still believes it can force a military settlement to achieve its demands, principally the condemnation of the aggressor and the payment by Iraq of reparations.


The mediation efforts since 1980 of the Non-aligned Movement and the Islamic Conference as well as those of Cuba, India and Algeria have also failed so far.

The seventh Non-aligned Summit at New Delhi was unable to agree on a statement on Iran/Iraq in its Final Declaration, leaving it to its President, Prime Minister Gandhi, to issue an appeal. Mrs. Gandhi has also indicated her intention, in her role as President of the Non-aligned Movement, to undertake a new mediation effort. She has informed the Secretary-General that she would keep him informed of those efforts.

* * *

In your contacts in Moscow, you would wish to reaffirm that the United Nations is ready to reactivate its efforts whenever time is ripe. Mr. Palme, despite his heavy responsibilities, is also ready; his next mission could be undertaken, of course, only with the assurance of a significant outcome. Both parties have indicated their continued confidence in the Secretary-General and his efforts. However, the New Delhi Summit again indicated that Iran was not ready at this point to respond to those efforts. You yourself are ready to travel to the area and have so informed the parties.

You might also wish to refer to the assurances you received from the United States that it was maintaining a neutral stance and keeping its hands off regarding the Iran/Iraq situation. (The United States, as you recall, was particularly concerned that Iraq might mount a major attack on the Iranian oil facilities at Kharg Island.) You might wish to add that you had expressed your gratification to the United States and that you hoped that the USSR would also remain aloof, since an expansion of the war would be extremely tragic.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "D. G. ...", written in a cursive style.

KAMPUCHEA

1. The New Delhi Summit of Non-Aligned countries decided that the seat of Kampuchea would remain empty until the next Summit in 1985. The Declaration adopted in New Delhi stresses the urgent need to de-escalate the tensions in and around Kampuchea, through a comprehensive political solution providing for the withdrawal of all foreign forces. It also re-affirms the right of the people of Kampuchea to determine their own destiny and urges all States in the region to undertake a dialogue for the resolution of their differences.

2. Informal consultations held in New Delhi have led to the idea of a dialogue between the five ASEAN countries, Viet Nam and Laos, without the participation of the Heng Samrin régime. This idea has been strongly criticized by China and Democratic Kampuchea, who feel it might lead to a regional conference. In a joint statement issued on 23 March 1983, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers "take note of the idea" of a dialogue but point out that its purpose would be "to bring Viet Nam to the International Conference on Kampuchea". These terms of reference are likely to be unacceptable to Viet Nam.

3. The Chinese "five-point proposal" for a settlement in Kampuchea was made public on 1 March 1983. In this proposal, China indicated, for the first time, that talks on the normalization of relations with Hanoi could, under certain conditions, be resumed before the total withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea.

4. In a statement issued by the Indochinese Summit of 22-23 February, Viet Nam announced a "partial withdrawal" for 1983 and further withdrawals "each year" depending on the improvement of the security situation in Kampuchea. Total withdrawal remains linked to the end of the Chinese and Khmer Rouge "threats".

5. The second round of Sino/Soviet normalization talks ended on 21 March 1983. The Chinese side has indicated that no progress was achieved on Kampuchea, as the Soviet Union reiterated the view that its dialogue with China should not involve "third parties".

6. During talks with the Secretary-General in New Delhi, ASEAN and Viet Nam welcomed the idea of a new mission by Mr. Ahmed to Southeast Asia. Since then, Viet Nam has extended a formal invitation to Mr. Ahmed. The dates of the proposed mission are being discussed with the countries concerned. (June?)

25 March 1983

MIDDLE EAST

- Since Lebanon invasion, several proposals for a solution of Middle East problem (Egypt/France, President Reagan, Fez Summit and President Breshnev);
- United States mediating efforts meeting difficulties;
- United Nations not been able to play significant role Middle east recent years. Security Council should contribute as best framework - views of Soviet Union?.
- UNIFIL's situation precarious. Mandate expires 19 July;
- UNIFIL may be required to protect Palestinian Refugees. Security Council decision needed;
- UNIFIL severe budget deficit. Troop-contributing countries (e.g. Fiji, Ghana, Senegal) not fully reimbursed;
- Soviet Union refuse to pay assessed contributions;
- Recall Soviet Union contributed to UNTSO, UNEF II until 1975 and UNDOF:
- Soviet policy appears flexible. UNIFIL is playing very useful role preventing Israeli occupation and protecting Palestinians. Appeal to Soviet Union to contribute.

NAMIBIA1. Consultations by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has held consultations aimed at facilitating the implementation of Security Council resolution 435. Since returning from his visit to the Front Line States, he has held consultations on this matter with the Contact Group, South Africa, the Front Line States, Nigeria and SWAPO.

2. "Linkage" or "Parallelism"

This question has been introduced as an extraneous issue. UN position is well-known. However, implementation of Security Council resolution 435 without some movement on Cuban troop withdrawal is highly unlikely. The South Africans are saying "if Cuban question can be solved, we are in business". It is not possible to test South Africa's final attitude and Western governments ability to influence South Africa without some movement on this issue.

3. Front-Line Summit in Harare, Zimbabwe, 20 February 1983

Heads of the Front Line States met in Harare last month. The Angolans indicated that they were engaged in discussing the Cuban and South African troop withdrawals with South Africa and the United States. Decision was made to request a Security Council meeting in May to consider the question of Namibia.

4. Direct bilateral talksa. Meeting between Angola and South Africa in Cape Verde on 23 February 1983

This meeting did not produce concrete results. South Africa lowered the level of their delegation, using SWAPO's infiltration into Namibia (800 soldiers) as an excuse and holding Angolans responsible for this. Angolans have pointed out that the southern-most part of Angola is occupied by South Africa. How then could Angolan troops support SWAPO? President dos Santos has indicated, however, that Angola did not intend to break the contact with South Africa.

b. Meeting between Angola and the United States in Paris on 14-15 March 1983

Talks are said to be at a very critical point and difficult decisions have to be made. These talks are expected to continue in the near future.

c. Talks between the United States and South Africa in Washington during the week of 14 March 1983

Discussion between South African and United States' delegations took place last week for several days. The talks were said to have concentrated on regional and internal questions. The South African delegation consisted of both military and Foreign Service officials.

The Western Five feel that direct talks should be allowed to continue and take their time.

5. Security Council

The Council is expected to meet in May or June. There seems to be a move within the Front Line States to have a Council meeting in June under Zimbabwe's chairmanship.

The OAU summit will take place on 6 - 11 June 1983 in Addis Ababa and consultations will decide whether the Security Council will meet before or after the summit.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS
POLITICAL AFFAIRS DIVISION

16 March 1983

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)

The Soviet Union is a founding member of the United Nations and a permanent member of the Security Council. It is represented in major bodies of the UN.

The Soviet Union maintains that the UN Charter is a universally recognized code of rules that must govern relations between States. It stands for an increase in the role of the Organization in international life as an important forum for uniting the efforts of States to consolidate peace and international security and help solve urgent world problems. The new General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Y.V. Andropov confirmed the continuity of the Soviet foreign policy.

Foreign Policy and Position on Questions before the UN

The USSR defines the main goals of its foreign policy as a struggle for peace, elimination of the threat of a nuclear war, general and complete disarmament, peaceful co-existence of states with different social systems. The Soviet foreign-policy guidelines and tasks are determined by the congresses of the CPSU. The ways of achieving these goals in the current international situation were outlined in the Peace Programme for the 1980s adopted at the 26th Congress of the CPSU, held in 1981, and by subsequent Soviet initiatives put forward recently. An appeal from the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU related to the Soviet foreign policy to the Parliaments, Governments, Political Parties and peoples of the world was issued on 22 December 1982 (see Annex 1).

Soviet foreign policy regards disarmament as the material guarantee of peace and security. At the Second Special Session on Disarmament the Soviet Union assumed unilaterally an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and called upon other nuclear weapon states to follow its example. It has also

suggested to elaborate a phased programme of nuclear disarmament. It believes that to avert nuclear catastrophe is the main task of mankind today.

At the 37th session of the UN General Assembly the Soviet Union put forward in this connection two proposals: "Immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapons tests" and "Multiplying efforts to remove the threat of nuclear war and to ensure a safe development of nuclear energy".

The Soviet Union proposed the elaboration, adoption and phased implementation of a programme of nuclear disarmament up to and including the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. This includes the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for the manufacture of various types of nuclear weapons and negotiations on the prohibition of neutron weapons.

In principle, it takes a positive attitude to the idea of a freeze on nuclear weapons and stockpiles as a first step towards reducing these stockpiles which should be followed up by real and tangible nuclear disarmament.

The Soviet Union advances the prompt conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security guarantees of the non-nuclear countries, the importance of the attainment of an international agreement not to deploy nuclear weapons in countries where there are no such weapons at the present time, to refrain from further deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of other states.

The Soviet Union has been advocating the exclusion of chemical weapons from the arsenals of States and proposed basic provisions of a Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons and on their Elimination, stating also that it believes in the need to free Europe meanwhile from weapons of mass destruction such as chemical weapons.

In the opinion of the USSR the arms race must not be permitted to spread into the outer space and the UN can and must play its part in this respect.

In general, the USSR has repeatedly stated that it is in favour of moving ahead in all areas where opportunities exist for limiting and radically reducing armaments that there is no type of weapons which the Soviet Union would not be prepared to limit or ban on the basis of reciprocity.

Within the context of strengthening international security, in addition to measures related to disarmament, the USSR together with other Warsaw Treaty Member States proposed at their meeting in Prague in January to conclude a treaty with NATO States on mutual non-use of military force and the preservation of peace relations.

Currently Soviet activities in the disarmament field are centred on negotiations with the United States on strategic arms limitation and reduction and on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe as well as on Vienna talks on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. It holds that there exists an approximate parity between the USSR and the USA, between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO. Maintaining the military balance at decreasing levels of nuclear and conventional arms would meet the security interests of the members of these two groups and international security, as a whole.

The Soviet Union considers the summit meeting of the leaders of the USSR and the USA to be useful for both countries as well as for the whole world. It holds that such meeting should be thoroughly prepared and no preconditions be put forward.

The Soviet Union considers that genuine peace in the Middle East requires putting an end to Israel's occupation of all the Arab territories seized in 1967; that inalienable rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including creation of their own state, should be implemented; return to the Arabs the eastern part of Jerusalem; providing for all the states in

the region the right to a secure and independent existence; termination of the state of war and establishment of peace between the Arab states and Israel and that the security and sovereignty of all states in the region must be internationally guaranteed by the permanent members of the Security Council or by the Security Council as a whole. The best way to a durable peace in the Middle East is to convene an appropriate international conference with the participation of all parties concerned. The USSR regards positively the views on a Middle East settlement expressed at the Arab summit in Fez.

The Soviet Union is in favour of putting an end to the war between Iran and Iraq, which it considers to be senseless, through negotiations.

The USSR advocates a peaceful political settlement of the situation prevailing around Afghanistan on the basis of complete, unconditional cessation of armed or other intervention in Afghanistan's affairs and dependable international guarantees secured for the non-resumption of intervention. Such a political settlement, according to the USSR, would create the conditions necessary for a stage-by-stage withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

The USSR views positively the start of talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan mediated by a personal representative of the UN Secretary-General.

The USSR has expressed its confidence that the Namibian people will attain freedom and independence in accordance with the principles of the Charter and the UN resolutions.

The USSR opposes the consideration of the question on the situation in Kampuchea by the General Assembly claiming that it is carried on against the will of the Kampuchean people and Government without participation of their legal representatives. At the same time, the USSR stressed its support for the efforts undertaken by the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Viet Nam and the People's Republic of Kampuchea aimed at turning South East Asia into a zone of peace.

The USSR stands for the idea of turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace and for the plan to convene an international conference on this question.

The Soviet Union has expressed its serious concern with the persisting tension in Central America and the Caribbean stressing at the same time the necessity of peaceful settlement of conflicts in the region. It opposes foreign interference in the internal affairs of El Salvador and other countries of the area and has declared its complete support for all peoples fighting for their freedom and for national and social progress. It favours the creation in the region of a zone of peace.

On a number of occasions the Soviet Union stated its position that a just settlement should be found through negotiations within the UN framework and on the basis of UN decisions for the Falkland/Malvinas Islands problem.

In accordance with Soviet views, the root-cause of serious obstacles in restructuring international economic relations on a democratic and equal basis resides in the policies of certain Western Powers aimed at keeping the developing countries in an unequal position.

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* *
*

The USSR, which is one of the major contributors to the UN budget, (contribution of the USSR for the financial years 1983, 1984 and 1985 is 10.54 percent) is very critical of its steady growth.

As of 31 December 1982 there were 181 Soviet nationals employed in the UN Secretariat posts subject to geographical distribution (desirable range 176-238, mid-point 207.30).

Political Structure of the USSR

The Soviet Union^{*} is a federal State comprising 15 Union Republics of equal status, voluntarily linked and having the right to secede. Some Union Republics contain Autonomous Republics, Regions and areas.

The highest organ of State power is the bicameral legislature, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, comprising the Soviet of the Union, and the Soviet of Nationalities. Both Chambers have equal rights and powers and their terms run concurrently. Members are directly elected by universal adult suffrage and serve 5-year terms. At a joint session the members elect the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet to be the legislature's permanent organ. The Presidium consists of the Chairman (the post is vacant after the death of L.I. Brezhnev), the First Deputy Chairman (Mr. V. V. Kuznetsov), (as ex officio Deputy Chairmen) the 15 Chairmen of the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics and 21 members. The Presidium functions as a collective Head of State. The Supreme Soviet also appoints the Council of Ministers, headed by a Chairman, to form the executive and administrative branch of government, responsible to the Supreme Soviet. The Chairmen of the Council of Ministers of the Union Republics are ex officio members of the USSR Council of Ministers.

The only political party, the CPSU, is described in the constitution as "the leading and guiding force of Soviet society". The CPSU determines the general perspectives of the development of society and the course of the home and foreign policy of the USSR. The CPSU's highest authority is the Party Congress which is convened every five years. The Congress elects the Central Committee which in turn elects a Political Bureau and the Secretariat.

A list of Party, State and Government officials is attached (Annex II).

^{*}/ Population - 271.2 million people of more than 150 nationalities.

APPEAL TO THE PARLIAMENTS, GOVERNMENTS, POLITICAL PARTIES,
AND PEOPLES OF THE WORLD

We, the representatives of all the peoples of the USSR, assembled at Moscow for the solemn observance of the sixtieth anniversary of the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on behalf of the 270 million Soviet people, send this message of peace to the parliaments, Governments, political parties, and peoples of the world.

What the finest minds of mankind have dreamed of for ages - the ending of national hostility and discord and the attainment of genuine equality and friendship between different nations - has become a reality in our country thanks to the Leninist policy pursued by the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, the implementation of the Socialist principles of national and social freedom, and the abolition of all forms of oppression and exploitation.

The USSR's foreign policy is likewise determined by the new relations between people and between nations in our Socialist State. Our ideal, our unchanging aim and our constant concern are that there should be universal peace, friendship, and co-operation among peoples. The Great October Socialist Revolution marked the beginning of a new era in history. Having shaken off social and national oppression, working people created the Land of the Soviets, a State that has affirmed fraternal friendship and relations of equality among peoples, ensuring true freedom, progress, and prosperity to all nations..

Durable, dependable, and stable peace is the first and most compelling need of all people, all nations and all mankind.

The need for peace takes on special significance today, when States possess weapons capable of destroying human civilization and all life on earth and when the threat of war, which had been made appreciably more remote in the 1970s, has again begun to intensify and international tension is growing visibly more severe.

All the efforts of States, the activities of Governments, organized political forces and all citizens of every country should now be addressed to preventing a nuclear catastrophe. Nothing is or can be more important than this.

We, the authorized representatives of the Soviet people, solemnly declare that, in keeping with the Leninist policy of peace and international co-operation, the Soviet Union will do all in its power to avert war.

We reaffirm that, in accordance with the commitment it has undertaken, the Soviet Union will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, and we call once again upon the other nuclear Powers to undertake a similar commitment.

/...

We declare that the Soviet Union is prepared, on a basis of reciprocity with the United States of America, to freeze its arsenal of nuclear weapons.

We urge the speedy and productive completion of the Soviet-United States talks on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms and on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe, and we urge the early conclusion of an agreement on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe.

We propose reaching agreement without delay on a complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, so that no more new kinds and types of nuclear weapons may be developed.

We urge the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons.

We call for the early resumption of suspended negotiations on all other matters relating to the limitation and reduction of armaments.

We call upon the legislative bodies and Governments of all States of the world to contribute actively to the settlement of conflict situations and to the extinguishing of hotbeds of tension exclusively by political means.

We favour strengthening the United Nations and enhancing its role in consolidating international peace and security.

In furtherance of these aims, the Soviet Union is prepared to co-operate with all States of the world irrespective of their political and social systems.

All the States of the world today bear a great and historic responsibility for the present and the future.

Soviet citizens are convinced that if States and peoples join forces, they will be able to eliminate the threat of war, preserve and consolidate peace on earth and ensure the human right to life. It is for such a joining of forces that we call upon the parliaments, Governments, political parties and peoples of the world.

SUPREME SOVIET OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE
SOVIET UNION

I. MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE
(In order of the Russian alphabet)

Andropov, Yuri Vladimirovich - General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
 Aliyev, Geydar Ali ogly
 Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeyevich
 Grishin, Victor Vasil'yevich
 Gromyko, Andrey Andreyevich
 Kunaev, Dinmohammed Akhmedovich
 Pel'she, Arvid Yanovich
 Romanov, Grigory Vasil'yevich
 Shcherbitskiy, Vladimir Vasil'yevich
 Tikhonov, Nikolay Aleksandrovich
 Ustinov, Dmitriy Fedorovich
 Chernenko, Konstantin Ustinovich

II. PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET

Chmn., Presidium, USSR Supreme Soviet
1st Dep. Chmn., Presidium, USSR Supreme Soviet Kuznetsov, Vasil'y Vasil'yevich
Dep. Chmn., Presidium, USSR Supreme Soviet Barkauskas, Antanas Stasevich
Dep. Chmn., Presidium, USSR Supreme Soviet Gilashvili, Pavel Georgiyevich
Dep. Chmn., Presidium, USSR Supreme Soviet Kalin, Ivan Petrovich
Dep. Chmn., Presidium, USSR Supreme Soviet Khalilov, Kurban Ali Ogly
Dep. Chmn., Presidium, USSR Supreme Soviet Kholov, Makhmadula Kholovich
Dep. Chmn., Presidium, USSR Supreme Soviet Yazkuliyeu, Bally Yazkuliyeuich
Dep. Chmn., Presidium, USSR Supreme Soviet Koshoyev, Temirbek Khudaybergenovich
Dep. Chmn., Presidium, USSR Supreme Soviet Usmankhodzhayev, Inamdzhaz Buzrukovi
Dep. Chmn., Presidium, USSR Supreme Soviet Imashev, Sattar Nurmashevich
Dep. Chmn., Presidium, USSR Supreme Soviet Polyakov, Ivan Yevteyevich
Dep. Chmn., Presidium, USSR Supreme Soviet Sarkisov, Babken Yesayevich
Dep. Chmn., Presidium, USSR Supreme Soviet Strautmanis, Petr Yakubovich
Dep. Chmn., Presidium, USSR Supreme Soviet Kebin, Ivan Gustavovich
Dep. Chmn., Presidium, USSR Supreme Soviet Vatchenko, Aleksey Fedoseyevich
Dep. Chmn., Presidium, USSR Supreme Soviet Yasnov, Mikhail Alekseyevich

III. COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Chmn., USSR Council of Ministers Tikhonov, Nikolay Aleksandrovich
1st Dep. Chmn., Council of Ministers Aliyev, Geydar Ali ogly
1st Dep. Chmn., Council of Ministers Arkhinov, Ivan Vasil'yevich
Dep. Chmn., Council of Ministers Kostandov, Leonid Arkad'yevich
Dep. Chmn., Council of Ministers Baybakov, Nikolay Konstantinovich
Dep. Chmn., Council of Ministers Dymshits, Veniamin Emmanuilovich
Dep. Chmn., Council of Ministers Talyzin, Nikolay Vladimirovich
Dep. Chmn., Council of Ministers Marchuk, Guriy Ivanovich
Dep. Chmn., Council of Ministers Martynov, Nikolay Vasil'yevich
Dep. Chmn., Council of Ministers Novikov, Ignat'y Trofimovich
Dep. Chmn., Council of Ministers Antonov, Aleksey Konstantinovich
Dep. Chmn., Council of Ministers Nuriyev, Ziya Nuriyevich
Dep. Chmn., Council of Ministers Smirnov, Leonid Vasil'yevich
Dep. Chmn., Council of Ministers Bodyul, Ivan Ivanovich

Min of Culture	Demichev, Petr Nilovich
Min. of Defense	Ustinov, Dmitriy Fedorovich, Mar. of Soviet Union
Min of Foreign Affairs	Gromyko, Andrey Andreyevich
Min. of Foreign Trade	Patolichev, Nikolay Semenovich
Chmn., State Com. for Foreign Economic Relations	Skachkov, Semen Andreyevich
Chmn., State Com. for Science and Technology	Marchuk, Guriy Ivanovich

PERSONAL

EAST TIMOR

A number of Australians have visited East Timor in recent months. These include the Australian Ambassador to Indonesia and, separately, other members of his staff, the former Prime Minister of Australia Mr Whitlam (who testified before the Fourth Committee as a petitioner last November) and Editors of three major Australian newspapers (the Foreign Editor of the Sydney Morning Herald and the Editors of the West Australian and the Financial Review). From reports these responsible persons have made separately, I would draw the following conclusions about the present situation in East Timor.

On the military side, Fretelin strength is probably now no more than 400 with about 100 weapons. They are in isolated groups in the hills and do not appear to have the capacity for coordinated action. Incidents are sporadic and usually relate to obtaining food rather than to making political gestures, except on two occasions this year when Fretelin groups burnt villages which had not wished to provide them with food. The Indonesians are anxious to facilitate the surrender of the remaining Fretelin supporters, a number of whom wish to surrender, but one problem lies in the protection of surrenderees, who are afraid of vendettas against them from other Timorese. Indonesian military presence in the province has been progressively reduced. The majority of the two battalions now in East Timor are East Timorese. The recently appointed Governor Carrescalau is a Timorese Roman Catholic.

There are a number of political detainees on Auturo Island but these have been progressively reduced and the Provincial Secretary has been instructed to see that all detainees are moved from Auturo to the mainland within a year.

All of the Australian observers have maintained that there is no famine in East Timor, a view which has been confirmed by the UNICEF and ICR Representatives and by the Papal Nuncio in Jakarta. Concern remains however about the present harvest, as much of the corn planted has been effected by the late arrival of the usual rains and up to half the current harvest could be lost. A Presidential gift of 1000 tons of corn arrived in January and a further 1000 tons from the Special Committee on East Timor is scheduled to be delivered about now. While there could be a food shortage, measures to alleviate this seem to be in hand and there is no famine. The Central Government has made efforts to rehabilitate the coffee industry and the coffee price set by the Government is at present above that paid to coffee growers in other parts of Indonesia.

The Australian Embassy has described relations with the Church in Timor as not especially good but improving. Two general problems are that the Vatican has not yet recognised East Timor as part of Indonesia and that the Indonesian Catholic Church considers there should be a more normal ratio of Indonesian to foreign Catholic Priests. Incidentally, the Governor told Australian officials recently that the Catholic Sisters, who had provided the American journalist, Mr Rod Nordland of the Philadelphia Enquirer with much of his critical information, had been exaggerating in an attempt to raise more money from abroad for their Mission.

There is no indication that the Indonesian authorities are suppressing the Catholic faith. When I was in Indonesia I was impressed by the high degree of religious tolerance in the country. Several Roman Catholics occupy prominent positions in the Indonesian Government. Also the Province of Flores is predominantly Catholic and the Central Government has never sought to restrict the practice of religion in this province.

I consider that it is fair to say Portugal abandoned the colony in 1975 when a civil war erupted between the embryonic political parties, UDT, which was the largest at that time and Fretelin which managed to secure the bulk of the arms the Portuguese had moved from Mozambique to East Timor. It is also often forgotten that there were more than 40,000 East Timorese refugees in West Timor at the time the political parties, other than Fretelin, sought Indonesian intervention in 1975.

Most Australians familiar with the situation consider the integration of East Timor is irreversible and that the former Portuguese colony is now as much as part of Indonesia, as Goa is of India. The Indonesians consider that an act of self-determination was conducted in 1976 (however dubious this act may be regarded by others) and that the East Timorese people participated in the Indonesian general election in 1982. Indonesia is also directing more financial resources to East Timor than it is to West Timor and some of the other relatively poorer provinces in Eastern Indonesia.

East Timor has become something of a focus for opposition to Indonesia, both on the part of Communists and Communist sympathisers who still resent the suppression of the Indonesian Communist Party after the attempted coup in 1965 and on the part of the Portuguese, who are embarrassed by the failure of their decolonisation policy in East Timor and seek to transfer the blame to the Indonesians for the problems for which they are largely themselves responsible.

As I said during our recent private discussion the Indonesians are a proud, patient, sensitive and self-absorbed people. They believe they will succeed, in the end, in having the Angolan/Mozambique/Portuguese resolution defeated in the United Nations, probably this year (less than one third of the United Nations membership voted for the resolution at UNGA 37), but if not this year then next year, or the year after that.

For these reasons I believe they will be unwilling to agree to a visit to East Timor by a representative of the Secretary-General under resolution 37/30 which they would interpret as a sign of weakness when events were moving in their favour. I would not rule out, however, their agreement to some arrangement whereby a respected personal representative of yours made a visit to South East Asia, including Indonesia and, within Indonesia, including East Timor, and made a report to you personally which would help you discourage other countries, outside of the South East Asian region, to maintain the issue in the United Nations.

It is my personal opinion that keeping the East Timor issue before the United Nations in terms of resolutions like 37/30 does not serve any useful purpose. Those who sincerely wish to assist the people of East Timor can do so most effectively, not by criticising Indonesia's take-over of the territory more than seven years ago, but by giving assistance for use in East Timor through the Indonesian Government and through international agencies operating there such as UNICEF and the ICR.

Expresso Lisbonne du 19/3/83

TIMOR EST A PERDU AU SOMMET DE NEW DELHI

Le problème de l'autodétermination de Timor Est a laissé pratiquement insensible le Sommet des non-alignés qui s'est terminé la semaine dernière à New Delhi, et ceci, en dépit des efforts du Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires étrangères du Portugal, M. Paulo Marques, représentant le Portugal pays invité, ainsi que les efforts des pays africains d'expression portugaise.

En vérité, on n'a pas obtenu la moindre mention du problème dans le communiqué final. Certains épisodes semblent même indiquer un certain boycott des pays organisateurs et surtout du pays hôte qui ont tout fait pour bloquer l'évocation même du problème. Ainsi, par exemple, quand M. Samora Machel condamnait dans son discours l'occupation indonésienne de Timor et faisait remarquer que ce pays avait, lui aussi, le droit à l'autodétermination, les micros étaient comme par hasard tombés en panne. Un autre exemple: dans le discours du Président de l'Angola, José Eduardo Dos Santos, le paragraphe sur Timor Est a disparu.

Paul Marques a déclaré que le désintérêt pour ce problème ne pouvait être plus complet. "C'est un mauvais présage, a-t-il fait remarquer, pour le vote sur cette question aux Nations Unies où les non-alignés représentent les deux-tiers des Etats membres.

Entre temps, on admet que ce sujet sera traité pendant la prochaine visite du Secrétaire général des Nations Unies, M. Pérez de Cuéllar, à Lisbonne où il aura des conversations avec le Premier Ministre, Pinto Balsemao et le Président de la République.

Le Secrétaire général arrivera à Lisbonne le 1er avril où il sera en visite privée jusqu'au 3 avril (comme cela est bien connu, le Secrétaire général a une fille mariée qui vit au Portugal). La visite du Secrétaire général se transformera en visite officielle les 4 et 5 avril. Toutefois, pendant son séjour au Portugal, M. Pérez de Cuéllar sera l'hôte du Palais de Queluz.

On rappelle, à ce propos, que le Secrétaire général a reçu un mandat personnel pour trouver une solution au problème de Timor Est et du côté portugais l'affaire relève de la compétence conjointe du Président de la République et du Gouvernement portugais.

Dans l'entourage du gouvernement on commence à se rendre compte que l'insistance sur l'indépendance de Timor Est conduit l'Indonésie à mépriser de plus en plus les aspects humanitaires de cette question refusant catégoriquement tout type d'accord culturel qui permettrait de préserver le patrimoine culturel portugais ainsi que les aspects les plus caractéristiques de ce peuple. Malgré tout, on continue à observer le rapatriement de certains habitants de Timor par l'intermédiaire du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge.

* * * * *

24F298/3

P2/3

Le Secrétaire général sera en visite privée à Lisbonne du 1er au 6 avril.

Malgré le caractère privé de son séjour, il sera reçu, le 4 avril, par le Président de la République avec qui il dînera. Le 5, il déjeunera avec le Premier Ministre, M. Pinto Balsemao et dînera avec le Ministre des Affaires étrangères, M. Futscher Pereira.

De source diplomatique on affirme que ces rencontres avec des dirigeants portugais donneront lieu à des discussions sur la situation en Afrique australe et Timor est.

27F298/3

P3/3

4. Requests the Special Committee to continue to discharge the functions entrusted to it under General Assembly resolution 1970 (XVIII), in accordance with established procedures, and to report thereon to the Assembly at its thirty-eighth session.

RECORDED VOTE ON RESOLUTION 37/29:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussia, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, USSR, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against: None.

Abstaining: France, United Kingdom, United States.

Absent: Comoros, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent.

37/30. Question of East Timor

Date: 23 November 1982
Vote: 50-46-50 (recorded)

Meeting: 77
Report: A/37/623

The General Assembly,

Recognizing the inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination and independence in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, and other relevant United Nations resolutions,

Having examined the chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to East Timor, 33/ and other relevant documents,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on the question of East Timor, 34/

Taking note of resolution 1982/20 adopted by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities on 8 September 1982, 35/

Having heard the statement of the representative of Portugal, 36/ as the administering Power,

Having heard the statement of the representative of Indonesia, 37/

33/ A/37/23 (Part V), chap. X; to be issued subsequently as part of Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/37/23/Rev.1).

34/ A/37/538.

35/ See E/CN.4/1983/4-E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/43.

36/ See A/C.4/37/SR.14.

37/ See A/C.4/37/SR.23.

Having heard the statements of the representative of the Frente Revolucionária de Timor Leste Independente 38/ and of various petitioners, as well as of the representatives of non-governmental organizations, 39/

Bearing in mind that Portugal, the administering Power, has stated its full and solemn commitment to uphold the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and independence,

Bearing in mind also its resolutions 3485 (XXX) of 12 December 1975, 31/53 of 1 December 1976, 32/34 of 28 November 1977, 33/39 of 13 December 1978, 34/40 of 21 November 1979, 35/27 of 11 November 1980 and 36/50 of 24 November 1981,

Concerned at the humanitarian situation prevailing in the Territory and believing that all efforts should be made by the international community to improve the living conditions of the people of East Timor and to guarantee to those people the effective enjoyment of their fundamental human rights,

1. Requests the Secretary-General to initiate consultations with all parties directly concerned, with a view to exploring avenues for achieving a comprehensive settlement of the problem and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session;
2. Requests the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to keep the situation in the Territory under active consideration and to render all assistance to the Secretary-General with a view to facilitating the implementation of the present resolution;
3. Calls upon all specialized agencies and other organizations of the United Nations system, in particular the World Food Programme, the United Nations Children's Fund and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, immediately to assist, within their respective fields of competence, the people of East Timor, in close consultation with Portugal, as the administering Power;
4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-eighth session the item entitled "Question of East Timor".

RECORDED VOTE ON RESOLUTION 37/30:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Brazil, Burundi, Byelorussia, Cape Verde, China, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Iceland, Ireland, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Portugal, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Ukraine, USSR, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Canada, Chad, Chile, Democratic Kampuchea, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Gambia, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indongesia, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Liberia, Malaysia, Maldives, Morocco, New Zealand, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Qatar, Saint Lucia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sudan, Suriname, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United States, Uruguay, Yemen.

Abstaining: Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Burma, Central African Republic, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Finland, France, Gabon, Federal Republic of Germany, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Mauritania, Nepal, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, Romania, Samoa, Senegal, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, United Kingdom, United Republic of Cameroon, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire.

Absent: Bulgaria, Comoros*, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, German Democratic Republic, Iran, Libya, Malta, Mongolia, Saint Vincent*.

* Later advised the Secretariat it had intended to vote against.

38/ See A/C.4/37/SR.15-17.

39/ See A/C.4/37/SR.15-18.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS
POLITICAL AFFAIRS DIVISION

CC: NI: vs
16 March 1983

Republic of Portugal

Republic of Portugal

Relationship to the UN. Portugal joined the United Nations on 14 December 1955 and is a member of all inter-governmental agencies except the International Development Association (IDA). At the thirty-seventh General Assembly session the Prime Minister of Portugal Francisco Pinto Balsemao pointed out that the history of the United Nations stood as an example to give mankind its full dimension, free from the yoke of political domination and deadly wars. Portugal affirms that the Organization can handle confrontations by means of dialogue and that it provides the necessary impartiality as a forum for negotiations. In the opinion of the Portuguese Government, reforms must be introduced in certain structures and habits of the Organization without changing the provisions of the UN Charter. Portugal maintains that the UN offers the appropriate institutional means to solve international problems.

Currently, Portugal is represented in the Economic and Social Council, UNCTAD's Trade and Development Board, Committee on Shipping, Committee on Information. As of 31 December 1982 there were 14 Portuguese nationals employed in the UN Secretariat in posts subject to geographical distribution (desirable range 6-17). The overall number of Portuguese nationals presently employed in the UN system is 45. Portugal is simultaneously a recipient and a donor of UN assistance. It will receive from UNDP over the period 1982-1986 4 million dollars worth of technical assistance. Portugal's contributions to the UN bodies are provided in the Annex. The Permanent Representative of Portugal to the UN is Ambassador Rui E. Barbosa de MEDINA.

Portugal's Foreign Policy on UN-related issues. At the thirty-seventh General Assembly session the Prime Minister of Portugal stressed that dialogue and confidence among States were essential to international relations. Portugal maintains that lack of confidence was evident during the Second Special Session devoted to Disarmament. It views disarmament as a balanced and controlled reduction of nuclear and conventional weapons. It also considers that tensions in international relations must neither be an excuse nor a justification for absence of concrete results in disarmament negotiations. Portugal thinks that the

present Geneva talks are an encouraging step. It follows with great interest the MFR Vienna negotiations and believes that the latest proposals advanced by the Western countries provide a good basis for progress. Portugal holds that implementation of the Helsinki Final Act would be a decisive element towards international détente and co-operation. In its view, "détente must be global and indivisible, based on criteria of reciprocity and must govern relations among countries with different social and political systems".

The Portuguese Government maintains that the independence of Namibia in accordance with Security Council resolution 435 is essential for the stabilization process in the region. It condemned South Africa's attacks against Angola and Mozambique and the economic pressures to which these two countries and Zimbabwe have been continually subjected. The Government of Portugal declared that it put its trust in the efforts of the Secretary-General, the Contact Group and the Front-line countries for the successful resolution of the Namibian question. The Portuguese President called recently for US diplomatic recognition of Angola as a way of easing tensions and aiding eventual Cuban withdrawal. Portugal considers the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as something to be decided exclusively by the Angolan Government.

Portugal stressed that recognition of Palestinian self-determination and respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of all nations in the area are essential elements for attaining a lasting and just peace in the Middle East. In this respect, the Portuguese Government praised both the Reagan plan and the Fez proposals as "significant steps" towards that end. Reportedly, the Portuguese Government has recently decided to consider the financial and military implications of a Lebanese request to send troops to Lebanon to join the international peace-keeping forces.

Portugal voted in favour of resolutions adopted by the 37th GA session on Afghanistan, Kampuchea and Iran-Iraq issues and underlined the need to intensify diplomatic efforts aimed at resolving these problems. It abstained in the vote on the

resolution on the Falkland/Malvinas Islands.

In regard to East Timor, the Portuguese Prime Minister pointed out at the last session that his country made no claim to this territory, but saw as a high priority the need for the international community to ensure the exercise of the rights to self-determination of East Timor's population. The Portuguese Government expressed deep concern over the "difficult living conditions" of Timorese people and the "violations of its cultural identity and its rights". It seeks a global solution to the East Timor issue within the UN framework.

In 1976, Portugal recognized China's sovereignty over Macao in return for Beijing's agreement that Portugal should continue to run it as it has since the 1887 treaty with China.

Portugal believes that the deterioration of the world economic situation requires greater solidarity among nations. It also underlined the importance and usefulness of a realistic productive and action-oriented North-South dialogue. Portugal considers itself to be at "an intermediate stage of economic and technological development" which enables it to understand not only the needs of developing countries but also the difficulties of the more advanced economies. The Lisbon government is committed to Portugal's entry into the EEC in 1984, although it is aware that European competition will initially have an adverse effect on the Portuguese economy. Portugal expressed its concern over energy problems and protectionist trade measures. It hopes that the forthcoming GATT Conference would take more decisive measures aimed at fostering international trade among all countries and groups of countries.

Portugal is not satisfied with all the provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention, namely, those regarding the composition of the international authority. However, the Portuguese Government signed the Convention because, in its opinion, it avoids chaos in international maritime relations.

Portugal holds the view that human rights are inseparable from the rights of people and of nations to self-determination and independence and are closely related to world peace, security and prosperity. It stressed that States must respect the rights

of other nations and those of their own citizens. Portugal puts particular emphasis in condemning the system of apartheid as being unacceptable on an ethical and human rights plane and as a barrier to human progress.

Current political situation in Portugal. An unusual political situation presently prevails in Portugal. The President of the Republic, General Antonio Ramalho Eanes, decided at the beginning of February this year to dissolve the Parliament and called for general elections for 25 April. This action was described by the Portuguese President as "the most fitting way to resolve the government crisis" that started on 19 December 1982. As known, the Prime Minister, Francisco Pinto Balsemao, submitted his resignation after his coalition (Democratic Alliance) lost significant percentage points in mid-term local elections. Consequently, he also stepped down as leader of the Social Democratic Party after losing a key vote in his party congress. Despite his resignation, the Balsemao government was asked to remain in office until a new cabinet was set up following the April elections. Before adopting these decisions the Portuguese President waited for the government to present to the Parliament an austerity budget and a package of economic measures which were readily ratified. These measures contemplated an increase in the price of foodstuffs and virtually all essential goods, enforced taxes and authorized requests for important loans abroad. The current Balsemao government remained in office to implement the urgent economic measures approved by Parliament. The anticipated legislative elections on 25 April will be the fourth since the democratic regime was installed in 1974. The Democratic Alliance led by Mr. Balsemao and made up by the Social Democratic Party, Social Democratic Center and People's Monarchist Party won the last legislative elections held on 5 October 1980. The election campaign will take place from 5 to 25 April. Reportedly, the Portuguese Socialist leader, Mario Suarez, reached an understanding with the Social Democrats (Portugal's largest political party) to form a coalition after the elections. During a recent trip to Washington, Mario Suarez said to American officials that he felt assured that the US and Portugal would remain allies if the Socialist Party came to power in the April elections.

List of principal government officials

President: General Antonio dos Santos Ramalho EANES

Prime Minister:	Francisco Pinto BALSEMAO
Minister of National Defense and Minister of Industry:	Richardo Baiao HORTA
Minister of Foreign Affairs:	Vasco FUTSCHER PEREIRA
Minister of Justice:	Meheres PIEMENTEL
Minister of Agriculture, Trade and Fisheries:	Basilio HORTA
Minister of State for Finance and Planning:	Joao SALGUEIRO

PORTUGAL

STATUS OF ASSESSED AND VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS
AS OF 28 FEBRUARY 1983

Name of Fund	1982		1983	
	Assessment or Pledge	Payment	Assessment or Pledge	Payment
A. Assessed Contributions - Rate of Assessment	0.19%		0.18%	
Working Capital Fund for the Biennium 1982/1983 (Additional Advances in 1982)	114 000	114 000		
Regular Budget	1 148 524	1 148 524	1 059 027	-
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)	11 991	11 991	6 170 <u>a/</u>	5 960
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	68 140	45 216	37 625 <u>b/</u>	-
B. Voluntary Contributions				
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)	3 000	-		
United Nations Industrial Development Fund (UNIDO)	15 000	15 000	15 000	-
Voluntary Fund for the Decade for Women			3 500	3 500
United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF)		15,000	15,000	
United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA)		15,000	20,000	
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)		102,500		
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)		15,000	15,000	

a/ For six-month period ending 31 May 1983.b/ For six-month period ending 18 July 1983.

CONFIDENTIAL

BACKGROUND PAPERS FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. Current disarmament issues in Europe
2. The Soviet Union's position on disarmament
3. Icelandic position on disarmament
4. Danish position on disarmament
5. Finnish position on disarmament
6. Swedish position on disarmament
7. Norwegian position on disarmament
8. Palme Commission
9. Chemical and Bacteriological (biological) Weapons

24 March 1983

CURRENT DISARMAMENT ISSUES IN EUROPE

1. There are two parallel bilateral negotiations going on in Geneva between the Soviet Union and the United States. The negotiations on reduction of strategic arms (Western acronym: START) began in June 1982, at which time the United States presented a proposal originally outlined by President Reagan in May 1982 and characterized by him as a phased reduction plan. In the first phase, the number of ballistic missile warheads would be reduced by one-third and no more than half of them would be land-based. In the second phase, equal ceilings would be sought on other elements, including limits on ballistic missile throw-weight. The Soviet Union immediately called the plan unbalanced. In December 1982, General Secretary Andropov made public the counter-proposal of the Soviet Union, which aimed at, inter alia, ¹ a reduction of Soviet strategic arms by 25 per cent and ² a reduction of corresponding American arms so that the two States would have the same number of strategic delivery vehicles. This proposal refers to all types of strategic weapons without exception (reductions across the board). According to available information, the United States is currently studying the Soviet proposal.

2. The other bilateral negotiations on Intermediate Nuclear Forces (Western acronym: INF) began in November 1981, also in Geneva. While the Soviet Union maintained at the time that there was a rough balance of intermediate nuclear forces between the two Powers, the United States contended that the balance was heavily in Soviet favour (perhaps about 6 to 1). In December 1979, NATO decided to deploy (572) United States Pershing and cruise missiles in five Western European countries, starting in December 1983, if no agreement on mutual reductions is reached by then (the so-called "two-track"

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decision. In November 1981, President Reagan presented his so-called "zero-option" proposal, according to which the United States would cancel the deployment of the missiles, if the Soviet Union dismantled its SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles. The Soviet Union declared this proposal unacceptable, inter alia, because it disregarded the British and French nuclear forces. Whereas the United States has so far probably adhered to the "zero-option" in the negotiations, the Soviet Union has made a number of counter-proposals. In December 1982, General Secretary Andropov suggested, inter alia, that the Soviet Union would retain in Europe 162 intermediate-range missiles, which corresponds to the combined size of the British and French forces, if NATO abandoned its deployment plans. As the deadline set by NATO approaches, the deployment question has become an issue in the internal politics of the Western European countries concerned, resulting in appeals to the United States to show more flexibility in the negotiations. President Reagan in his statement to the nation on 23 March announced that on 30 March he will once again address the issue of intermediate-range missiles and make a new proposal which will presumably be a modification of his original "zero-zero" proposal. (According to press reports the new United States proposal will suggest the deployment of 100 missiles with 300 warheads for each side). France has declared that it would not agree to its nuclear forces being counted in the Soviet-American negotiations, and the British reaction has been similar.

3 Three proposals on nuclear-weapon-free zones in Europe are at present under discussion. On the basis of the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, headed by Olof Palme, now Prime Minister of Sweden, Sweden took the initiative in sounding out attitudes

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regarding a corridor in Central Europe free of battlefield nuclear weapons, the breadth of which could be 300 kilometers (assumed to mean 150 km on each side). Some socialist States, including the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic have supported the Swedish idea, advancing slightly modified versions of the proposal (suggesting that the zone be wider): Official reactions in the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States, among others, have been negative. The NATO side maintains, inter alia, that a zone of this kind would involve a departure from NATO's collective security system which is based, among other things, on the concept of deterrence through nuclear weapons. A Finnish proposal, made originally in 1963, on a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone has not resulted in a consensus among the Nordic countries, although there has been a certain amount of narrowing down of the differences. Recently, Sweden has been in favour of the idea, but it entertains certain additional considerations, notably about the Baltic Sea. Norway and Denmark, while stating that they support the idea in principle, are critical in practice, holding that the Nordic zone is possible only within the context of parallel arrangements concerning Central Europe. The Soviet Union supports the proposal and announced in June 1982 that it was ready to consider certain measures applicable to its territory in the region adjacent to the proposed Nordic zone. In March 1983, a representative of the Soviet armed forces referred to the possibility of including the Baltic Sea in the zone. The idea of a nuclear-weapon-free zone Balkans in the Balkans has been proposed by Romania and Bulgaria. Yugoslavia has expressed its interest in principle in the proposal, provided the zone would also include parts of the Mediterranean.

Other questions

A The Vienna talks on mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments

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and associated measures (in Central Europe) (known as MBFR) between seven NATO and four Warsaw Treaty States (plus a number of other States members of the two alliances participating with special status), began in October 1973. For a long time there has been no progress in these negotiations except for an understanding envisaging the reduction of the armed forces of both sides to equal collective ceilings of 900,000 men. Within the framework of this understanding, the Soviet Union, in February 1983, tabled new proposals on behalf of the participating Socialist States with a view to breaking the deadlock on other questions. According to the Soviet proposals, each side would determine on its own the volume of the reduction of its armed forces from the present level, necessary to achieve the equal collective ceilings, which the NATO States have not accepted. Agreement should also be reached on mutually acceptable adequate measures for verification of the levels of the armed forces which remain after reductions.

⑤ The second follow-up conference to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in Madrid started in November 1980, but so far the participants have not been able to agree on a concluding document. The participants not present at the Vienna talks, i.e., France and the neutral and non-aligned European States, have supported the idea of a European Conference on disarmament and confidence-building measures (CBMs) and there has been some support within both NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization for the convening of such a conference. Among five proposals on this idea, the French one is regarded as reflecting the Western position and the Polish proposal that of the socialist States. The group of neutral and

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non-aligned participants have sought to promote a compromise through a proposal of their own. Uncertainty concerning the outcome of the ongoing bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union (see above) and the tense international situation in general have made the outcome of the Madrid Conference uncertain.

6 It should be recalled that in the framework of the 1975 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, important measures for confidence-building measures were envisaged which included: (a) prior notification of major military manoeuvres (defined as exceeding 25,000 troops; the signatories agreed to notify such manoeuvres 21 days or more in advance and to provide other relevant information on them); (b) prior notification of other military manoeuvres; (c) exchange of observers; (d) prior notification of major military movements; and (e) certain other measures.

7. A proposal of the Warsaw Treaty Organization on a treaty with NATO was made at the Warsaw Treaty summit meeting in Prague in January 1983 (see my memorandum of 11 January 1983). The essence of the proposal is the idea of a treaty on mutual non-use of force between the two alliances, but it also contains an appeal to provide more stimulus to the ongoing negotiations on a number of specific disarmament questions in the Committee on Disarmament.

THE REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON DISARMAMENT
AND SECURITY ISSUES

(Palme Commission)

1. The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues was launched in Vienna (Austria) on 13 September 1980. Fashioned after the Brandt Commission (the Independent Commission on International Development Issues, under the chairmanship of former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt), the Commission concerned itself with the alarming problems of security and disarmament, and after three years of meetings, published its report entitled "Common Security" which was presented by Mr. Olof Palme to the Ad Hoc Committee of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament on 26 June 1982.

2. At the 37th session, the General Assembly, by resolution 37/100 B adopted on 13 December 1982, having noted the report the Independent Commission had submitted to the second special session, requested, inter alia, that the Secretary-General transmit the report to the Disarmament Commission for its consideration at its substantive session in 1983.

3. In the report, the Independent Commission suggests short-term and medium-term measures to facilitate the process of disarmament and to establish a system of common international security. Among the most immediate short-term measures are: a Soviet-American agreement and rough parity in intermediate-range nuclear forces; a Soviet-American agreement on banning the forward deployment of new short-range nuclear-weapons systems that might threaten some European targets; the establishment of a chemical-weapon-free zone in Europe; the convening of a conference on confidence-building measures in Europe; negotiations on a ban on the deployment of anti-satellite weapons; resumption

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of US/USSR negotiations on a treaty banning chemical weapons; talks between suppliers and recipient States to restrict and reduce the transfer of conventional weapons; guidelines for regulating the conventional arms transfers; and the question of reporting military expenditures in accordance with the standardized reporting system.

4. Among the medium-term measures proposed are, inter alia, a US/USSR agreement on additional reductions in strategic offensive forces and an agreement on equal ceilings on NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces at the reduced level in Central Europe; the establishment of a battlefield nuclear-weapon-free zone starting with Central Europe and expanding ultimately to the northern and southern flanks of the two alliances; negotiations for disarmament throughout Europe; a total ban on the deployment of anti-satellite weapons; universal adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty; universal compliance with the General Assembly resolution on reporting military expenditures to the United Nations in accordance with a standardized reporting system; substantial reduction in military spending in developed and developing countries, releasing resources for national needs, development assistance and large-scale conversion of military, scientific and technological efforts to civilian purposes.

5. The ultimate goal must be general and complete disarmament and there is an immediate need to initiate a downward turn in the arms spiral. The report suggests that the short-term measures could and should be implemented in the next two years and the medium-term measures within the next five.

Members of the Commission

6. In addition to its Chairman, Mr. Olof Palme of Sweden, the Commission consists of statesmen, officials, intellectuals and national leaders. They include, in particular, Messrs. Giorgi Arbatov (Member of the Academy, USSR);

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Egon Bahr (Member of the Federal German Parliament); Jozef Cyrankiewicz (Former Prime Minister of Poland); Jean-Marie Daillet (Member of the French Parliament); Alfonso Garcia-Robles (Ambassador of Mexico to the Committee on Disarmament); Haruki Mori (Former Ambassador of Japan to the United Kingdom); C.B. Muthamma (Ambassador of India to the Netherlands); Olusegun Obasanjo (Former Head of State of Nigeria); David Owen (Former Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom); Salim Salim (Foreign Minister of Tanzania); and Cyrus Vance (Former Secretary of State of the United States).

7. As its name indicates, the Commission is independent and its members serve in their private capacity.

24 March 1983

CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) WEAPONS

1. Biological and chemical weapons have generally been associated in the public mind with the extensive use of poison gas in World War I. The overwhelming public concern expressed in this connexion led to the adoption of the Geneva Protocol of 1925^{1/} which prohibits the use in war of chemical and bacteriological warfare agents. With the ratification of the Protocol by the United States in 1975, all militarily significant States are now Parties to the Protocol, including members of NATO, the Warsaw Treaty and China. Many States Parties to the Protocol have, however, attached reservations to the effect that they may resort to chemical warfare if other Parties were to do so first.

2. In recent years, negotiations have continued towards a convention which would ban the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons as well as call for their destruction. Among issues that long impeded progress on the question was whether chemical and biological weapons should be considered jointly or separately. In 1971, agreement on separating the two issues was reached in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) which led to the adoption of the Convention on Biological Weapons.^{2/} The Convention was opened for signature on 10 April 1972 and entered into force on 26 March 1975. The depositaries of the Convention are the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States. As of December 1982, 94 countries have become Parties to the Convention.

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^{1/} Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

^{2/} Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

3. Since 1971, the question of chemical weapons has been discussed as a separate issue. Various General Assembly resolutions have requested the CCD and subsequently the Committee on Disarmament (CD) to continue negotiations, as a matter of high priority, with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and for their destruction. The CD has been dealing with the question of chemical weapons as item 4 of its agenda since April 1979, and since 1980, the item has been considered mainly by an ad hoc working group of the Committee.

4. The Committee on Disarmament has before it a number of comprehensive proposals on a chemical weapons convention, including the proposals of the Soviet Union ^{3/} and the United States^{4/}; as well as the reports of the contact groups set up by the Working Group in 1982 ^{5/} and the views of the 1982 Chairman of the Working Group ^{6/}.

5. As far as the scope of the prohibition is concerned, there appears to be general support for a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons except those for non-hostile military purposes. Until recently, one of the main problems regarding the scope was the question of whether or not to include a reference to "the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons". A number of States - mainly socialist - were opposed to this on the grounds that the matter of the use

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^{3/} "Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction" (CD/294).

^{4/} "Detailed views on the contents of a chemical weapons ban" (CD/343).

^{5/} CD/334.

^{6/} "Possible compromise wordings of the elements of a future convention" (CD/333).

has been settled by the Geneva Protocol and that, consequently, the new convention should only deal with the remaining issues - development, production, stockpiling and destruction. However, in a statement before the Committee on 22 February 1983, the representative of the Soviet Union announced the agreement of his Government to include in the future convention a provision relating to the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons. Although some differences still persist, this decision by the Soviet Union is considered as a step which would help to expedite a final agreement on the question of the scope of a future convention.^{7/}

6. Another major problem regarding the scope of the prohibition concerns the question of binary weapons. Generally speaking, these weapons consist of components which acquire the characteristics of a chemical warfare agent only when they are combined together which, in principle, could be done prior to their use. Over the period of years, the United States has maintained that strictly speaking binary weapons may fall outside the scope of a convention on chemical weapons. This view was not shared by the socialist and non-aligned countries. The socialist group has, in fact, proposed that the location of production facilities involved in the production of binary weapons be declared during the first year after the convention enters into force and that during the first two years, this type of facility should be completely eliminated. The United States,

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^{7/} A general agreement seems to be evolving that the main article on the scope of the convention should spell out a set of prohibitions and a set of obligations. It would encompass the prohibitions regarding development, production, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons, as well as the obligations to destroy existing stockpiles and dismantle production facilities. Some exceptions are advocated under non-hostile or "Permitted Purposes" such as industrial, agricultural, medical, research and law enforcement purposes or purposes directly connected with protection against chemical weapons.

for its part, maintains that the effect of such a proposal would be to require early declaration and destruction of some facilities while others would remain unaffected for a much longer period. The United States has, therefore, proposed that the convention should require a declaration from each party concerning the location, nature and capacity of any chemical weapons production or filling facility. This would include dual purpose facilities used for the production of all key precursor chemicals potentially useful for all types of chemical weapons including binary ones.

7. Differences of opinion also continue on the question of verification of a ban on chemical weapons. The statement made in the CD on 22 February by the Soviet Union announcing its acceptance of the principle of on-site inspections on the "basis of an agreed quota", constituted a step to the solution of this problem. The United States, however, continues to insist that appropriate forms of systematic international on-site inspection should be envisaged for the following: declared chemical weapons stockpiles and the process of their elimination; declared chemical weapons production facilities and the process of their elimination; declared facilities for permitted production of chemicals which pose a particular risk. The Soviet Union, for its part, rejects this approach on the grounds that it would be tantamount to subjecting the entire chemical industry of States to inspection.

8. As regards the work of the Committee on Disarmament (Working Group on Chemical Weapons), the United States considers that the Group should focus on the difficult issues which are the key to real progress towards a convention such as those concerning verification. It maintains that, unless the verification issues are resolved, it would be a fruitless exercise to deal first with "easier" issues or to draft treaty texts on matters already

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agreed on in principle, and that before the drafting of actual treaty texts can be productive, an acceptable verification and compliance framework must first be negotiated. This approach is not shared by other groups, which feel that the Working Group could usefully engage in negotiations on "easier" issues in parallel with resolving the question of verification.

9. It is expected that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons will be able to resume its work shortly under the chairmanship of Ambassador McPhail of Canada. Earlier resumption of the work was not possible this year due to serious differences in approach between the regional groups on matters referred to above.

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

TO: The Secretary-General

DATE: 25 March 1983

THROUGH:
S/C DE:FROM: Jan Martenson
DE: Under-Secretary-General
Department for Disarmament Affairs

REFERENCE: _____

SUBJECT: President Reagan's speech on arms policy
OBJET: _____

1. President Reagan's speech on United States arms policy on 23 March should be essentially seen within the context of discussions in the Congress of his proposed military budget. Therefore, the basic purpose of the speech was, reportedly, not merely to lay out United States future arms policy, but also to appeal to the American public to support his defence budget.
2. Nevertheless, the speech contains some indications of direct relevance to the future direction of United States arms policy. The President's emphasis on defensive weapons systems and the reference to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty are a case in point.
3. The emphasis on developing defensive weapons systems, if translated into practical steps, would have important implications for United States arms strategic policy and also for its strategic relationship with the Soviet Union. By emphasizing strategic defensive weapons, the concept of deterrence might be placed in a different perspective: with an anti-ballistic technology, the possibility of acquiring a first-strike capability might become feasible.
4. On the other hand, it can be assumed that the President was merely referring to the possible future course of United States arms policy which, to some extent, may have already been influenced by virtue of technologies developed in the last ten years.
5. The technology in question (particle beams and laser beams) is believed to have been under development for some time, both in the Soviet Union and the United States, but the indications are that it may not be operational for years. The fact that the President chose to refer to such weapons systems at this stage, many years before they are operational, might be attributed to his desire to indicate his willingness to explore various possibilities which would ultimately render strategic nuclear weapons inoperative and thus result in their elimination. It appears, however, that early Soviet reactions on this approach by President Reagan, consider the development of anti-missile technology as opening up a new stage in the arms race which would imply also a violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty between the USA and the USSR.
6. Of direct relevance to particle beam and laser beam technology is the issue of the militarization of outer space. Information available indicates

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that such weapons systems might eventually be deployed on satellites in outer space. Such a development could have wide-ranging implications for the future disarmament negotiations.

7. Another important point in the speech is the indication of a new approach towards the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces at Geneva as a result of discussions with the European allies of the United States. This might be taken as indicating that the United States administration is considering a possible "interim solution" or "graduated approach" which, while aiming at a total removal of all Soviet and United States intermediate-range nuclear missiles from Europe (the "zero-zero" option), would provide in the first instance for a reduction in the Soviet intermediate-range missile force as well as in the number of Pershing II and cruise missiles which the United States would deploy. President Reagan is expected to make a proposal of this kind in a speech he will give next week.