

UNAMIR

CORRESPONDENCE - GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA -  
OUTGOING

29 MAR - 31 OCT 1994

PLEASE RETAIN  
ORIGINAL ORDER

[2 CONFIDENTIAL]  
RTH/WG APR 2001

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BOX 7  
FILE 4  
ACC. 1998/0282



6. Place on file H 2/11  
MA

UNAMIR HQ  
KIGALI

October 1994

His Excellency  
Maj Gen Paul Kagame  
The Vice President and Minister of Defence  
KIGALI  
Rwanda

Dear General,

**COMPLAINT AGAINST THE SEIZURE OF UN VEHICLE NO. 1045**  
**BY MEMBERS OF THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC ARMY**

Barely two weeks ago, I was constrained to bring to your attention the seizure of UNAMIR vehicle at gun point by your soldiers. It is regrettable to inform you that on 29 Oct 94, at about 1915hrs, Lt Col Purtscher's (Uruguay) vehicle (UNAMIR 1045) was seized at gun point while about entering his residence at KIMIHURURA near the Military Observer Group Headquarters. The vehicle was snatched by RPA soldiers who were in two vehicles, one of which was painted in camouflage. In his vehicle was a handbag containing \$2,800 USD and valuable documents among which were two official national passports.

We have in the past identified with the high level of discipline in your military. Suffice it to say that such acts could easily erase this position. I still do not wish to conclude that a pattern of hostility and even blackmail is being directed against the good image of UNAMIR. Such acts if not checked, would discourage the sincere efforts we are making towards the return of normalcy to your country. I wish to reiterate that the security of UNAMIR remains the responsibility of your Government.

1

NTF

*I am sure that General  
Kagame knows about this incident by now.  
I'm not about to write to him everytime there is  
such an incident. I will meet with him personally.*

*[Signature]*  
20 Oct 94

I have the firm belief that the perpetrators will be identified and appropriate action taken against them as usual. I will be grateful if you look into the matter personally and recover the vehicle as quickly as possible. I wish to thank you once more for the prompt action you took to recover the seized vehicle reported to you on the 16 Oct 94.

We assure you our continued cooperation with your government.

Oct 94

G C TOUSIGNANT  
Maj GEN  
Force Commander

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR HQ

Kigali

25 October, 1994

3000.26(Ops)

Dear General,

Subject: RPA ASSAULT OF UNAMIR PERSONNEL

1. During the past week two disturbing incidents between RPA and UNAMIR soldiers have been reported with the RPA soldiers involved, pointing their weapons at BRITCON and CANCON personnel in two separate incidents at RUHENGARI and KIGALI.
2. In one of the incidents it was reported that an RPA Captain, went as far as physically assaulting a Canadian soldier. Such incidents, apart from marring the good relationship between UNAMIR troops and the RPA, also affect public opinion of the RPA in contributing countries whose personnel encounter such unfortunate incident with the RPA.
3. The possibility that one such incident escalates to excessive or even deadly force in the near future must be avoided. Mutual respect must be fostered between our militaries.
4. It is imperative that the small minority within the RPA responsible for these acts be made aware of the wider implications of their actions regarding relations between RPA and UNAMIR and countries contributing troops to UNAMIR. It is requested that courtesy and restraint be exercised.
5. Counting on your usual cooperation.

G.C. Tousignant  
Major-General  
Force Commander

Major-General Paul KAGAME  
Vice-President and Minister of Defence  
Broad-Based Government of  
National Unity of Rwanda  
KIGALI



Kigali, 21 October 1994

Dear Minister,

Subject: UN VEHICLE

I write to inform you that the UN vehicle that disappeared on Saturday 15 October has been recovered.

Thank you for your personal attention in this matter, and its prompt resolution.

Accept, Dear Minister, the assurances of my highest consideration.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'G. C. Tousignant'.

G. C. Tousignant  
Force Commander

Maj Gen Paul Kagame  
Minister of Defence  
Kigali

cc: SRSG

1. Thank you for your letter of --  
in which you ask for <sup>logistical</sup> assistance  
to support the reestablishment of your  
schools.

2. I do not have the means to assist  
you within the military element of  
UNAMIR but I have passed your  
request to my Humanitarian Affairs  
Officer, Colonel Yaache, who will contact  
you direct and will attempt to obtain  
assistance for you from other UN agencies  
or Non Government Organizations working  
in Rwanda.

3. I hope very much that your schools can be  
reopened quickly and that your children's  
education can continue. (copy Yaache)

E.

Please do a letter  
for FC's signature, in  
reply to the Education  
Minister's request.  
260 A m

12

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Kigali le 12 octobre 1994

Monsieur le Ministre,

Je vous remercie pour votre lettre du 11 octobre dernier dans laquelle vous me demandez une assistance logistique pour la réouverture de vos écoles.

Je ne possède pas actuellement les moyens d'intervenir directement dans l'aide que vous souhaitez, mais j'ai fait suivre votre lettre au Colonel Yaache qui dirige la Division de l'Aide Humanitaire au sein de la MINUAR qui vous contactera rapidement et essaiera d'obtenir le soutien nécessaire auprès des autres agences des Nations Unies ou des Organisations non Gouvernementales installées au Rwanda.

J'espère que vous obtiendrez toute satisfaction et que vos écoles pourront être bientôt ré-ouvertes afin que vos enfants puissent continuer leurs études.

Je vous prie de recevoir, Monsieur le Ministre, l'expression de mes sentiments les plus distingués.

G. C. Tousignant  
Commandant de la Force

Mr. Pierre Célestin Rwigema  
Ministre de l'Enseignement  
Primaire et Secondaire  
Kigali

cc: Col Yaache  
Aut 13/10/94  
G.S.



Kigali, le 11 OCT. 1994

N° 08.00/27

✓ Monsieur le Commandant de  
la MINUAR  
KIGALI.

Objet : Demande de soutien  
pour la Formation des  
Finalistes du Secondaire.  
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Monsieur le Commandant,

Suite aux entretiens que j'ai eu  
avec le Lieutenant Colonel CHABIK Ahmed, j'ai l'honneur de  
vous demander un soutien logistique de trois ordres, à  
savoir :

- 1° La réparation d'un mur troué et de la toiture (tôles  
trouées par des balles) d'un dortoir du Lycée Notre  
Dame de Cîteaux à Kigali ;
- 2° Le transport du bois nécessaire pour la préparation de  
la nourriture des élèves ;
- 3° Le mazout pour les moteurs de pompage d'eau et les groupes  
électrogènes des établissements scolaires.

En effet, Monsieur le Commandant,  
il ne restait qu'un trimestre à étudier pour les 5500 élèves  
aient leurs diplômes de fin d'études secondaires et le  
Ministère de l'Enseignement Primaire et Secondaire a décidé  
de les regrouper dans les établissements ci-après pour une  
formation accélérée de 60 jours à partir du 17 octobre 1994.

1. Lycée Notre Dame de Cîteaux à Kigali.

Besoins : - Réparation d'un mur troué par un obus ;  
- Réparation de la toiture trouée par des balles ;  
- Transport du bois de chauffage de  $\pm$  20 km ;  
- Rétablir le courant électrique dans un dortoir ;

2. Lycée de Kigali.

Besoins : - Transport du bois de chauffage de  $\pm$  20 km.

3. Ecole des Sciences Infirmières de Rwamagana.

- Transport du bois de chauffage de  $\pm$  15 km ;  
- Mazout pour le groupe électrogène : 300 litres.

.../...

4. Groupe Scolaire du Christ-Roi de Nyanza.

- Transport du bois de chauffage de + 20 km ;
- Mazout pour le moteur de pompage d'eau : 480 litres ;
- Mazout pour le groupe électrogène : 300 litres.

5. Groupe Scolaire de Save (Garçons et Filles).

- Transport du bois de chauffage de + 15 km ;
- Mazout pour le moteur de pompage d'eau : 480 litres.
- Mazout pour les deux groupes électrogène : 600 litres.

6. Petit Séminaire de Butare.

Besoins :

- Transport du bois de chauffage de + 10 km ;
- Mazout pour le groupe électrogène : 300 litres.


7. Petit Séminaire de Ndera - Kigali.

Besoins :

- Transport du bois de chauffage de + 10 km ;
- Mazout pour le groupe électrogène : 300 litres.

J'aimerais que, comme vous l'avez toujours fait, vous nous aidiez à satisfaire ces besoins, afin que ces élèves ne perdent pas leur année après six ans d'études réussies.

Je compte sur votre habituelle compréhension et vous prie de croire, Monsieur le Commandant, à ma haute considération.



RWIGEMA Pierre Célestin,  
Ministre de l'Enseignement  
Primaire et Secondaire.

Dr NGENDAHIMANA Gérard  
DIRECTEUR DE CABINET



Kigali

26 September 1994

3000.15.Ops

SUBJECT: PROTEST BY THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT REGARDING THE ATTITUDE OF THE HELICOPTER PILOT.

1. On 11 September 1994, one United Nations helicopter was detailed to carry the Rwandan Minister for Interior to MUGENERO, RWAMATAMU, KARENGERA and NYAMASHEKE. As per your request the helicopter was tasked to depart from Kigali at 1000 hours and was scheduled to return to Kigali by 1600 hours.

2. At the last destination, you were unable to arrive at the helicopter until 1650 hours due to your busy schedule of that day. At that time the pilot approached you while you were addressing a gathering at 1700 hours to inform you that the helicopter had to take off no later than 1710 hours in order to return to Kigali prior to darkness. The aircraft waited another ten minutes prior to taking off at which time the pilot could not distinguish you from the remainder of the crowd.

3. As our helicopters were fully committed to numerous tasks the following day, UNAMIR could unfortunately not schedule an aircraft for you until later that day. The attempt to pick up your party in the morning was turned down by you due to insufficient passenger lift. Accordingly, I personally authorized the use of the emergency standby search and rescue helicopter to pick you and your party from Nyamasheke that morning.

4. In view of the above, I believe that the pilot did as much as possible to extend his latest possible departure time from Nyamasheke without violating safety regulations. Moreover, I postulate that the accusation of racial prejudice by the pilot is not fully justified. However, the pilots have been briefed to avoid such confusion and misunderstanding in the future. At the same time, this office regrets the whole incident.

5. Assuring you of our highest consideration at all times.

G.C. TOUSSENT  
Major General  
Force Commander

His Excellency The Minister of Interior  
Kigali



KIGALI 26 September 1994

Dear Minister,

Subject: UNAMIR MEDICAL ASSISTANCE TO BYUMBA CLINIC

The Medical Branch of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) is responsible for co-ordinating medical support, through UNAMIR medical units, to assist the humanitarian effort wherever spare capacity may exist. It is requested that assistance may be provided to the clinic at BYUMBA by a UNAMIR medical unit.

The UNAMIR Nigerian Rifle Company (NICOY) is currently garrisoned at BYUMBA camp. This Company includes a Company Aid Post (CAP) commanded by a Medical Officer, Captain Okeke. Captain Okeke has made introductory inquiries through the local RPA Medical Officer, Captain Mack, to determine what assistance could be provided to the BYUMBA clinic. It would be possible for NICOY to help the local people by assisting with minor treatment and dispensing at this clinic subject to your approval. Humanitarian pharmaceuticals would be made available to NICOY for this purpose. The CAP's ability to provide this assistance extends to the limit of its spare capacity to do so.

It is therefore requested that approval be granted for NICOY to provide assistance to the clinic at BYUMBA.

Accept, dear Minister, the assurances of my highest consideration.

G.C. Tousignant  
Major General  
Force Commander

His Excellency Colonel Doctor Joseph KAREMERA  
Minister of Health  
Rwandese Government  
KIGALI

COPY

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Copy  
FMO

- Done  
26/09/84



Kigali  
24 September 1994  
3000.26 (Ops)

Dear Sir,

SUBJECT: PERFORMANCE OF ENGINEERING TASKS IN RWANDA

In fulfilment of their tasks, UNAMIR engineering units require external support. Specific tasks to be carried out in Rwanda can be accomplished only in close co-operation with the Ministry of Public Works and Energy. Civil contractors specializing in power distribution, water production, or road and bridge improvement and maintenance will also play an important role in the conduct of these tasks. Access to material resources and heavy road-building equipment on a contractual basis is also of great importance to UNAMIR.

The highest priority should be given to the prevention of further deterioration of dirt roads and airstrips and to the restoration of the permanent supply of running water. These areas of concern are primarily due to the lack of sufficient Rwandese specialists in the areas of speciality.

Therefore, I am of the opinion that a joint working meeting with the Ministry of Public Works and Energy with UNAMIR engineers should be convened shortly to address the following points:


- a. Information regarding Rwandese road and bridge infrastructure rehabilitation plan, in order to establish which areas require the highest priority;
- b. Access to and use of components of a MLC 80 Bailey or similar equipment bridge controlled by the Ministry of Public Works and Energy;
- c. Repair and maintenance proposals for the Gitarama - Kibuye road and the Cyangugu air strip through the use of private contractors;
- d. A possible rental contract for UNAMIR's use of 2 motorized graders, 2 wheeled excavators (JOHN DEERE 850LC or similar), 2 wheeled loaders (CAT 950 or similar), and 4 x 10 ton tipper trucks; and
- e. Proposal for the recruitment of 45 workers for the

start-up, operation and maintenance of the Butare water pump station at Kadahoka, to include:

- (1) 10 operators (water distribution);
- (2) 5 electricians;
- (3) 5 mechanics;
- (4) 5 plumbers; and
- (5) 5 chemical engineers.

Furthermore, the provision of the required plumbing stores and motors should be explored.

I look forward to your usual kind co-operation and trust you will assist in arranging the meeting with the Force Engineer Officer at your earliest convenience.



GC TOUSIGNANT  
Major General  
Force Commander

Mr. Charles Ntakirutinka  
Minister of Public Works and Energy  
Broad-Based Government of  
National Unity of Rwanda  
KIGALI



23 September 1994

Reference: Your 114/04.09.01/7 dated 20 Sep 94  
LOGISTICS ASSISTANCE TO CYANGUGU

Thank you for your letter at the Reference, in which you requested assistance in supplying equipment, rations and fuel to the immigration officials and prefect's office in Cyangugu. In the absence of Dr Khan, who is temporarily out of the country, your letter has been passed to me.

I am most pleased that within Sector 4 the transition to civilian control has developed in the progressive and relatively trouble free manner that we have witnessed, and that your government now has access and authority throughout the whole sector. With this in mind I find your request difficult to approve. Before your forces had access to the border area, I was happy to supply your immigration officers some basic rations, when obviously they could not be resupplied by you. Although I acted outside my mandate in doing this, it was done to facilitate the rapid establishment of your government's authority at the border.

Now the situation has changed. The RPA is present throughout the area, and has established a number of barracks, which, I expect, are being routinely resupplied with logistics. I feel you must turn to them for support. Indeed, on the subject of tentage and field stores, I am woefully short and cannot meet my own needs.

On the subject of force levels within UNAMIR, I maintain a constant review of the strength of my forces deployed within the prefectures, to ensure stability and security throughout Rwanda.

I am extremely sorry to have to turn down your request for logistical support, but I am sure that you will understand my position. I must operate within my mandate.

I assure you of my willingness to assist you in any way that is possible. We share a common goal in the restoration of peace and national reconciliation throughout your country.

G.C. Tousignant  
Force Commander

Minister for Internal Affairs  
Mr. Seth Sendashonga  
B.P. 446  
Kigali

cc: SRSG/DFC/DCos Sp



REPUBLIC OF RWANDA  
MINISTRY FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS  
AND COMMUNAL DEVELOPMENT  
B.P. 446  
KIGALI

Kigali, 20th September 1994

No 1114 104-69-01/7

✓ His Excellency the Special Representative  
of the Secretary General of the United  
Nations  
Kigali

Subject: Cooperation between RPA and UNAMIR in Cyangugu

Your Excellency,

It is with great pleasure that the interim Préfet for Cyangugu has reported to me a state of good cooperation between him, the RPA (Rwandese Patriotic Front) and UNAMIR forces in Cyangugu, for which I would like to express my appreciation and that of the entire Government of Rwanda.

As we emerge from these delicate phases marked by the withdrawal of the French forces, the take-over of the area by UNAMIR and the subsequent deployment of the RPA, it is only fair that we rejoice in our common success and strive to achieve even greater successes in trying to convince the refugees to come back home. In this regard I am aware of your recent mission in Zaïre and would like to hope that some of the steps discussed with the Zaïrean authorities at the highest level could be implemented as soon as possible so as to isolate the few criminal elements in the Rwandese refugee camps from the genuine refugees.

The préfet has discussed and agreed with the Ethiopian Battalion Commander that while we strive to control our borders for any security threat, everything will be done not to hinder the return of the refugees. I am also happy to know that the UNCHR has renewed its pledge to ensure that all those who manage to cross the borders by their own means (before the organized manner discussed with Zaïre is hopefully put in place) are quickly transported to their areas of origin.

No doubt, Your Excellency, you are aware of our acute problems both financially and logistically. That is the reason why we would like to renew our request for support to the civil administration in Cyangugu by way of provision of:

(1) Two (2) tents, chairs and tables to the immigration officers posted

at Rusizi II. This border post has no infrastructure following the complete destruction and looting which the whole of Cyangugu suffered in the presence of the French and other soldiers of the "Opération Turquoise". This has often forced the immigration officers to leave the border post unattended to whenever it was raining or when sunshine was too strong.


(2) Logistical support to the Préfet by availing to him petrol for his visits to the Communes and other areas of interest such as factories, schools, tourism infrastructures, etc...

(3) Continued provision of food rations to the Immigration officers and other members of the civil administration posted in Cyangugu at Préfecture Headquarters and border posts for the next one month until we can organize their supplies.

We hope that the spirit of cooperation prevailing in Cyangugu will be extended to other areas such as Kibuye and Gikongoro and that as the situation continues to stabilize in these areas, UNAMIR forces can be deconcentrated from these to other parts of the country. In keeping with the spirit of openness with which we have conducted our relationship, kindly feel free to alert us for discussion on any problem that may arise.

Yours sincerely

Seth SENGASHONGA  
Ministère de l'Intérieur



CC:

- His Excellency the President of the Republic of Rwanda, Kigali
- His Excellency the Prime Minister, Kigali
- His Excellency the Minister for Defense, Kigali
- His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Kigali



21 September 1994

Reference: Your 08.00/16 dated 14 Sep 94.

VACATION OF SCHOOL BUILDINGS BY UNAMIR


Thank you for your letter at the Reference, in which you request the return of your school buildings. I am most pleased to read that you intend to restart the schools system at an early date, and have instructed my staff to assist you in this.

Some of your school buildings, however, form the barracks for many of my troops, who are deployed throughout the country to assist in the security of Rwanda. There is currently no alternative accommodation for them. At present I have no tents, and the lack of civil infrastructure has denied my staff the opportunity to arrange the use of other buildings. Before those schools can be handed back my staff must identify alternative accommodation, negotiate access, move out of the school buildings and make those basic refurbishments which are possible. So for the moment my troops must remain in some of your schools and I estimate that this will impose a two week delay to your programme at the Reference.

I also understand that, in some towns, agencies other than UNAMIR have occupied school buildings. I have no control over this, and I can only suggest that you deal directly with those agencies. There may also be a need in other schools for a check to be made for any mines or explosives, left as a result of the war.

Please be reassured that I see the re-establishment of schools among the highest of priorities in the normalisation of Rwanda, and I have impressed this on my staff. When their assessment has been done I will contact you with the estimated timetable of handover.

Please do not hesitate to contact me if you require any more information.



MGEN G. C. Tousignant

Minister of Education  
Mr. PC Rwigema  
BP 622  
Kigali

cc: SRSG/CAO/DFC  
DCos Ops/DCos

Kigali, le 14/09/1994

N° 08.00/16

Monsieur le Ministre de  
la Défense - KIGALI,

/Monsieur le Commandant en Chef  
de la MINUAR-KIGALI.

Monsieur le Préfet de Préfecture  
(TOUS).

Objet :

Réouverture des Ecoles  
Primaires et Secondaires.

Monsieur le Ministre,  
Monsieur le Commandant en Chef,  
Monsieur le Préfet,

J'ai l'honneur de porter à votre  
connaissance que le Ministère de l'Enseignement Primaire et  
Secondaire compte organiser la réouverture des écoles primaires  
et secondaires avant la fin de cette année 1994.

La formation des finalistes du  
secondaire commencera en octobre 1994 tandis que les non finalis-  
tes reprendront les cours en novembre 1994 ; quant au primaire,  
la réouverture des écoles se déroulera selon le calendrier  
après :

19 septembre 1994 : Préfecture de Ruhengeri.  
20 septembre 1994 : Préfectures de Byumba et Kigali.  
21 septembre 1994 : Préfecture de Kibungu.  
22 septembre 1994 : Préfectures de Gitarama et Butare.  
23 septembre 1994 : Préfecture de Gisenyi.  
27 septembre 1994 : Préfectures de Cyangugu, Gikongoro et  
Kibuye.

Cependant, suite à la reprise des  
hostilités, certains des Etablissements et Centres Scolaires sont  
l'objet de lieux d'activités diverses comme la prise en charge  
d'orphelins, l'hébergement de déplacés de guerre ou l'abri des  
militaires etc...

Voudriez-vous, Monsieur le Ministre, Monsieur le Commandant  
Monsieur le Préfet, prendre vos dispositions pour que ces écoles  
soient libérées et remises dans les conditions d'accueil des  
élèves selon le calendrier ci-haut mentionné.

J'espère que vous réserverez à la  
présente toute votre attention et vous prie de croire Monsieur  
le Ministre, Monsieur le Commandant, Monsieur le Préfet, à ma  
très haute considération.

RWIGEMA Pierre Célestin,  
Ministre de l'Enseignement  
Primaire et Secondaire

Copie pour information à :

- Son Excellence Monsieur le  
Président de la République  
Rwandaise - KIGALI.
- Son Excellence Monsieur le  
Premier Ministre - KIGALI.
- Monsieur le Ministre de  
l'Intérieur et du Développement  
Communal - KIGALI.



UNCLASSIFIED

5000.39 (G3 PLANS)

01 02 201200Z SEP 94 RR RR UUUU

PLANS 012

UNAMIR HQ

DISTR LIST C

TACHQ BUTARE

G3 ENGR

INFO MA TO FC

DFC/COS

HAC

OIC ADMINISTRATION

BEMS

UNCLAS PLANS 012

SUBJ: OCCUPATION OF SCHOOL BUILDINGS BY UNAMIR

1. ADDRESSEES ARE TO SUBMIT DETAILS OF SCHOOLS WITHIN RESPECTIVE  
SECTORS WHICH ARE OCCUPIED BY UNAMIR FORCES AS FOLLOWS:

A. NAME OF SCHOOL

B. PREFECTURE IN WHICH SCHOOL IS LOCATED

C. NUMBER OF TROOPS IN OCCUPATION

D. TYPE OF UNIT IN OCCUPATION EG. PLATOON, COY HQ, MILOB TM ETC

E. GENERAL CONDITION OF BUILDING(S)

2. ADDRESSEES WHICH CURRENTLY OCCUPY SCHOOL BUILDING(S) ARE TO

UNCLASSIFIED

02

UUUU

PLANS 012

IMMEDIATELY IDENTIFY ALTERNATE ACCOMMODATION AND SUBMIT DETAILS TO  
ENABLE NEGOTIATIONS FOR PERMISSIVE OCCUPANCY OR LEASE

3. RESPONSE TO PARA 1 REQUIRED TO G3 PLANS BY 23 SEP 94

G3 PLANS

LCOL A. BRIMELOW, G3 PLANS

LCOL A. BRIMELOW, G3 PLANS, 11148

UNCLASSIFIED

INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

5000.39(PLANS)

TO: MA TO FC

INFO: MR GOLO, OIC ADMIN  
DCOS OPS  
FORCE ENGINEER

DATE: 20 SEPTEMBER 1994

SUBJECT: VACATION OF SCHOOLS BY UNAMIR.

REFERENCE: MINISTER of Education 08.00/16 dated 14 Sep 94.

1. The reference requests that schools building in specified prefectures be vacated by UNAMIR over the period 19 - 27 September. Refurbishment of UNAMIR occupied schools is also requested. Clearly UNAMIR will be unable to vacate the schools in accordance with the proposed schedule.

2. The enclosed message has been dispatched in order to gain visibility of the requirement. Some delay should be anticipated while action to effect the following requirements takes place:

- a. Identification of alternate accommodation.
- b. Negotiations to secure the use of alternative.
- c. Assessment of refurbishment.
- d. Refurbishment.

3. Your initial draft response, along with UNAMIR'S resolve to cooperate, might suggest a two week delay to the Minister's proposed vacation program.

4. You will also note that the Reference does not address those schools which may be occupied by other UN agencies or NGO.



A. BRIMELOW  
Lt Col  
G3 Plans

Enclosure:

1. Reference.
2. Message reference.



Kigali, le 13 septembre 1994

Monsieur,

Objet: Voyage de la délégation présidentielle devant se rendre à La Haye pour la Conférence Internationale sur le Rwanda

J'ai bien reçu votre lettre du 12 septembre 1994.

Pour permettre à la délégation présidentielle d'atteindre Nairobi le 15/09/94 avant 1000 heures, la seule possibilité est de prendre le vol UN de la veille. C'est la raison pour laquelle nous vous avons proposé le 14/09/94. Nous avons donc fait une réservation pour 11 personnes, pour le 14/09/94. La délégation devra se présenter à l'Aéroport International de Kigali à 0845 hrs pour le départ du vol de 0945 hrs.

En ce qui concerne le retour, le transfert des troupes que nous devons effectuer le 18/09/94 nous obligent à vous proposer le vol UN du 19/09/94 qui quitte Nairobi à 0730. La délégation devra se présenter à l'Aéroport International Jomo Kenyatta de Nairobi à 0530 hrs.

En espérant que vous comprendrez les raisons qui nous empêchent de reporter le déplacement de nos troupes, je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur, l'expression de ma considération distinguée.

Col F. Haddow  
Assistant Militaire du  
Commandant de la Force

*See background  
in file "Flights  
Schedules" J.*

Monsieur Emmanuel GASANA  
Chef de Cabinet  
Présidence de la République  
Kigali





Kigali, le 11 septembre 1994

Monsieur,

Je me réfère à la lettre en date du 9 septembre 1994 que Monsieur Jos Lemmers, Directeur exécutif du Centre Nord-Sur vous a adressée concernant la participation de Son Excellence le Président de la République Rwandaise et d'autres personnalités gouvernementales à la Conférence internationale sur "Le Rwanda dans son contexte régional: droits de la personne, réconciliation et réhabilitation" (La Haye, 16-17 septembre 1994).

Afin de permettre à la délégation du Gouvernement Rwandais qui participera à cette Conférence de prendre leur correspondance dans les vols réservés par Monsieur Lemmers, et ainsi qu'il nous l'a demandé, nous avons réservé des places pour sept personnes dans le vol UN Kigali-Nairobi du 14 septembre et dans le vol UN Nairobi-Kigali du 19 septembre 1994. Les horaires de ces vols vous seront communiqués en temps opportun.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur, l'assurance de ma considération distinguée.

Colonel F. Haddow  
Assitant Militaire du  
Commandant de la Force

Monsieur Emmanuel GASANA  
Directeur de Cabinet de la  
Présidence de la République Rwandaise  
Kigali

cpi. Monsieur Jos Lemmers,  
Centre Nord-Sud

KIGALI 8 September 1994

Dear Minister,

Subject: USE OF BUTARE AIRSTRIP FOR AIR EVACUATIONS


The Medical Branch of United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) is responsible for co-ordinating medical support for military troops and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO's) operating throughout Rwanda. On numerous occasions, this support is in the form of medical and casualty evacuations by air and road.

The Australian Medical Support Force has recently been informed, by the RPA in Butare, that we no longer have permission to use the Butare airstrip, located at grid reference 715142. This raises great concern about the welfare of military troops and NGO's in this area.

During the day, a helicopter can land at any suitable landing point near Butare. However, by night, the Butare airstrip, due to its approved navigational equipment and lighting systems, is the only available facility at which a helicopter is allowed to land. Without approval to use Butare airstrip, the only means of evacuation from this area after dark is by road - which may prove fatal for a serious casualty.

In order to provide the best medical support possible to its troops, UNAMIR requests approval to use the Butare airstrip for aeromedical evacuation.

Accept, Dear Minister, the assurances of my highest consideration.



G.C. Tousignant  
Major General  
Force Commander

His Excellency Major General Paul KAGAME  
Minister of Defence  
Rwandese Government  
Kigali

G.  
Pse lib  
A24/9 MA



1) FC  
2) GL Arp

info.  
6/9/94

UNITED NATIONS  
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES  
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

162.

*Sept*  
Kigali, 5 August 1994

Thank you for your letter of 30 August 1994 in which you requested UNAMIR's cooperation in assisting members of the Rwandese communal police and in establishing progressively a local security presence in Sector 4 of UNAMIR's operations.

Notwithstanding the fact that following Opération Turquoise's withdrawal from the South-West Zone, UNAMIR ensured that security was maintained in that area, we believe and agree with you that a presence of the new Rwandese gendarmerie will be preferable in the long term.

In this regard, we encourage you to send a team of Rwandese Police Administrators to Kibuye, Gikongoro and Gyangugu to assess the situation and evaluate the potential of the communal police which has been operating in those prefectures. UNAMIR, through its civilian Police monitors, will be ready to provide advice and training support once you have identified the individuals who would carry out these security tasks.

Please be assured, Excellency, as always, of our cooperation and respect.

Yours sincerely,

Shaharyar M. Khan  
Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General

His Excellency General Paul Kagame  
Vice-President and Minister of Defense  
Republic of Rwanda  
Kigali



A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'G. C. Tousignant', written over a horizontal line.

FROM: MAJGEN G.C TOUSIGNANT OMM, CD  
TO: MAJ F. KAMANZI, RPA LIAISON OFFICER  
FOR INFORMATION: DCOSOPS  
DRAFTED BY: MAJ H. NICHOLSON, SO SUP  
DATE: 4 SEP 94  
SUBJECT: BARGE RESUPPLY OPERATIONS - LAKE KIVU

1. UNAMIR II has negotiated with a civilian barge contractor operating out of Goma to provide a barge service on Lake Kivu, in order to resupply our Franko-African battalion at Kibuye. It is our intention to land the barge in Gisenyi to load rations, water and general stores for transportation to, and off loading at Kibuye. It should be noted that no Zairian nationals will land in Rwanda. Only UNAMIR logistic personnel will disembark from the barge at Gisenyi and Kibuye. It is intended to operate this service on either one of the following week days, Monday, Tuesday or Wednesdays.

2. UNAMIR requests permission to conduct this barge service, noting the landings on Rwandan soil as indicated and for the safe and unhindered conduct of such resupply operations. The operation of this barge service, as described, is of particular importance for the continued support of UNAMIR personnel in Kibuye.

3. Your continued cooperation and dedicated assistance in these matters is appreciated.



UNITED NATIONS  
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES  
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

NOTE VERBALE

①


SRSG/NV/14/94

La Mission des Nations Unies pour l'Assistance au Rwanda (MINUAR) présente ses compliments au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération Internationale de la République Rwandaise et a l'honneur de porter à sa connaissance l'intention du Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies pour le Rwanda S.E. Monsieur Shaharyar M. Khan, de visiter les services ou établissements publics suivants :

- a) l'Usine de pompage et de distribution d'eau potable de la ville,
- b) Radio Rwanda,
- c) le Central téléphonique.

Elle saurait gré au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération Internationale de bien vouloir en informer les divers Départements Ministériels concernés et par la même occasion porter à leur connaissance que le Cabinet du Représentant Spécial se propose de prendre contact avec eux pour discuter des points évoqués plus haut.

La Mission des Nations Unies pour l'Assistance au Rwanda saisit cette occasion pour renouveler au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération Internationale de la République Rwandaise les assurances de sa très haute considération.



le 2 septembre 1994

Ministère des Affaires Etrangères  
et de la Coopération Internationale  
de la République Rwandaise  
KIGALI

② Noted  
WJP  
2 Sep 94



Kigali, 30 August 1994

Dear General,

Subject: ASSISTANCE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A  
NATIONAL GENDARMERIE IN RWANDA

Reference: Our letter of 15 August 1994

In the letter in reference, we proposed a meeting between officer of the Civilian Police (CIVPOL, UNAMIR) and representatives of several Ministries, as well as a joint mission CIVPOL/Rwandese authorities from the different administrative "communes".

Given the importance of coordinating our efforts towards the prompt establishment of a National Gendarmerie in Rwanda, I would very much appreciate receiving your comments on the date and venue of the proposed meeting and joint mission.

Accept, dear General, the assurances of my highest consideration.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "G. Tonsignant".

Guy C. Tonsignant  
Major-General  
Force Commander

His Excellency Major-General Paul KAGAME  
Vice-President and Minister of Finance  
Republic of Rwanda  
Kigali

CPI: Minister of Justice  
Minister of Internal Affairs and  
Communal Development



Kigali, le 27 août 1994

Objet: **CONVOIS POUR LE RETOUR DES  
FONCTIONNAIRES ET DEPLACES DE GUERRE**

Référence: Votre lettre du 15 août 1994

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai l'honneur de vous aviser que tous les efforts sont faits par la MINUAR, dans la mesure de ses moyens, afin de permettre aux déplacés de guerre qui le souhaitent de pouvoir rentrer chez eux le plus rapidement possible. D'ailleurs, nous avons déjà de nombreux convois journaliers effectuant cette tâche de retour.

Pour ce qui est des fonctionnaires qui font l'objet de votre lettre, je vous demanderais de bien vouloir m'indiquer le nombre des personnes à déplacer, leurs noms, les lieux où ils se trouvent et les dates où ils voudraient rentrer, afin de nous permettre d'organiser l'opération en toute sécurité.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Ministre, les assurances de ma haute considération.

G.C. Tousignant  
Major-Général  
Commandant de la Force

Son Excellence  
Monsieur Jean Marie Vianney NDAGIJIMANA  
Ministre des Affaires Etrangères et  
de la Coopération  
République du Rwanda  
Kigali



Kigali, 26 August 1994

Sir,

Subject: CONDOLENCES IN RESPECT TO THE LATE CAPTAIN  
GEBERE SEREKE WAHID

On behalf of the Secretary-General and of all the members of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), I should like to express our most sincere condolences to the Government and people of Ethiopia, and particularly to its Armed Forces, on the untimely death of Captain Gebere Sereke Wahid in a road traffic accident in Kigali, Rwanda, on 20 August 1994.

Captain Wahid's death is indeed a great loss to the entire UNAMIR Force, at a crucial moment when it is steadily building up. We share your pain for this loss and join you in mourning this gallant officer who has sacrificed his life in the pursuit of peace in Rwanda.

I should like to request you to also convey our sincere condolences to the bereaved family.

May the soul of Captain Wahid rest in Perfect Peace.

Accept, Sir, the assurance of my highest consideration.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'G.C. Tousignant', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

G.C. Tousignant  
Major-General  
Force Commander

The Minister of National Defence  
Addis-Ababa  
Ethiopia



• Sot G3 Plans

1. Education Ministry wants us to vacate  
their schools in time for lessons to restart  
according to the list below.
2. They also ask that the schools be restored  
as much as possible, to a condition that  
will allow lessons to be taught.
3. Pse confirm that we can comply with this  
timetable, to allow me to draft a reply for Feina H 19/9



Kigali, 25 August 1994

Dear Mr President,


Subject: CIVIL SECURITY IN SECTOR 4

I have been informed through the Force Commander UNAMIR that approximately 209 armed ex-Gendarmes are present and operating in Sector 4C, currently manned by the Ethiopian Battalion. These Gendarmes were given a civil security role by the FCF in the former Humanitarian Protection Zone. Their continued presence could cause potential insecurity unless their present and future status is clarified.

We request your consideration of the clarification of their exact status. Once you have formulated a policy position regarding your intentions, I would like to discuss the final approach that we should collectively pursue in order to resolve this issue. Subsequently, I would suggest that a meeting be convened with the Ministries of the Interior and Communal Development, Justice, and Defence, and the UNAMIR Civilian Police Commissioner to work out the details of the implementation plan. Such details could include the screening process, a conversion training plan and a method of integration with the other Gendarmes.

I kindly request your urgent attention to this matter and anticipate our upcoming deliberations.

Accept, Dear Mr President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

  
Shaharyar M. Khan  
Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General of the  
United Nations

His Excellency Mr Pasteur BIZIMUNGU  
President of the Republic of Rwanda  
Kigali



Kigali, 25 August 1994

Dear Mr President:

I was very pleased to attend the Ruhengeri political rally on 24 August 1994. It afforded me a wonderful opportunity to get a first-hand view of your country and its people. The different sites visited allowed me to better understand the magnitude of the effort needed to rebuild your country in order to permit every citizen to return to a normal life. You can rest assured, Mr President, that you have my personal and UNAMIR's unlimited commitment in this process.

Your staff graciously provided me with an interpreter. This gesture was very much appreciated.

Finally, I wish to present my apologies for departing early, but some urgent matters at UNAMIR required my presence. Once again thank you for the invitation.

Accept, Dear Mr President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

G.C. Tousignant  
Major-General  
Force Commander

His Excellency ~~Mr. Pasteur~~ BIZIMUNGU  
President of the Republic of Rwanda  
Kigali

① ③

*Sezana*

*Copy made for  
Maj Kamuzo*

*1. I/ I am not here  
would you make  
sure that Major  
Kamuzi has  
a chance to see  
this report.*

UNAMIR  
FORCE HQ  
Kigali  
25 June 1994  
3000.26(Ops)

*2. Thanks.*

*26.8.94*

Commandant  
Major - General  
G.C. Tousignat  
Major - General  
Commandant

FC

SUBJECT: RPA INCIDENTS UNAMIR AND NGO

1. There are increasing indications that a small minority of undisciplined RPA soldiers are deliberately trying to mar the cordial relationship currently prevailing between the RPA and UNAMIR.

2. For the past week a series of disturbing incidents have been reported as follows:

a. LOG BASE (KIGALI). On 22 Aug around 2000 hrs a group of six drunken RPA armed soldiers wanted to enter the Log Base Compound with force to look for a windshield for their vehicle. After a lengthy negotiation tension was diffused.

b. STADIUM. The RPA LO officer wanted to enter the stadium without prior notice or clear identification that he was the Liaison Officer. There was some misunderstanding but the issue was resolved.

c. MABANZA (SECTOR 4B). On 25 Aug 94 six armed RPA soldiers led by Capt SHAMANA in a Nissan vehicle without prior notice, attempted to drive into Sector 4B at MABANZA. The driver was disarmed and allowed to proceed to MABANZA with three civilians who were in the vehicle. The remaining five armed soldiers were denied entry with their weapons.


d. CENTRAL HOSPITAL KIGALI.

(1) At 1500 hrs on 24 Aug 94 an RPA soldier pointed RPG-7 at a UN APC near the Central Hospital. The APC stopped and the RPA soldier climbed onto the UN vehicle while an RPA Captain standing by pointed his pistol at UN personnel.

(2) At 1625 near the same venue an RPA lieutenant approached a group of UN soldiers who were supervising unloading of medical stores and waved his weapon in the direction of the UN personnel in a threatening manner.

He later turned and laughed and walked away joining his companions who were waiting in a vehicle.

3. Submitted for your attention, Sir.

  
ARP  
Colonel  
DCOS OPS



Kigali  
23 August, 1994

3000.26(Ops)

Dear General,

SUBJECT: DEMINING OPERATION IN RWANDA

The aftermath of the last war has left numerous unexploded munitions and mines throughout Rwanda which require detection and disposal. The enormity of the task cannot be over emphasized.

I am pleased to inform you that UNAMIR would like to assist your government to rid your country of these unexploded ordnance devices by helping you to establish a Demining School. The school, once fully operational, would produce 180 Rwandese annually qualified to undertake mine clearing and bomb disposal tasks throughout your country.

To speed up the establishment of the Demining School, I would appreciate very much if you could provide a building preferably in Kigali, for the purpose. The building should have two classrooms and be big enough to accommodate 25 students.

My EOD staff at UNAMIR Headquarters is available to provide details on the subject when required through your liaison officer appointed for all engineer matters.

I am looking forward to your usual co-operation.

GC TOUSSIGNANT  
Major General  
Force Commander

Major General Paul KAGAME  
Vice President and Minister of Defence  
Broad-Based Government of  
National Unity of Rwanda  
KIGALI



UNAMIR HQ  
KIGALI

22 August 1994

5000.39(PLANS)

Subject: REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY USE OF CENTRE CHRISTO

1. Authority is please requested for the use of a part of CENTRE CHRISTO as a temporary transit accommodation for UNAMIR troops.
2. The accommodation was previously requested for the Ghanaian battalion and was approved. However, the place was not used owing to the redeployment of the battalion in the GIKONGORO area.
3. It is expected that the accommodation would be required for a maximum of 6 months and it is hoped approval would be granted to allow the Zambian Battalion arriving on 24 August to use the place.
4. I count on your usual cooperation. Thank you.

G. TOUSIGNANT  
Major-General  
Force Commander

His Excellency,  
Major-General Paul Kagame  
Vice President and Minister of Defence  
Office of the Vice President  
KIGALI

UNITED NATIONS  
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES  
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

*G. Tousignant*

FROM: MAJ GEN G. TOUSIGNANT, FORCE COMMANDER UNAMIR

TO: MAJ F. KAMENZI, RPA LIAISON OFFICER TO UNAMIR

FOR INFORMATION: CLOGO

DATE: 20 AUG 94

SUBJECT: RESUPPLY TO KIBUYE

1. As of the 22 Aug 94 UNAMIR intends to resupply the Franko African Battalion (FRAFBAT) located at Kibuye, by road from Kigali-Ruhengeri-Gisenyi to Goma. Then by barge from Goma to Kibuye. Resupply by other means will only hinder the maintenance of FRAFBAT at Kibuye. The barge operator is Office De Routes.

2. It is understood that the operation involves crossing into Zaire to load stores and vehicles onto the barge. This boarder crossing is required as the barge operator can not load in Gisenyi. It is therefore requested that permission be granted for the continued safe and unhindered passage of this routine resupply mission to Kibuye as indicated above.

3. Your dedicated continued assistance and cooperation in these matters is appreciated.





Kigali, 20 août 1994

Monsieur le Président,

Je vous remercie de l'invitation que vous avez bien voulu me faire parvenir pour participer au rassemblement populaire à BYUMBA ce samedi, 20 août 1994.

C'est avec plaisir que j'aurais participé à cet événement. Malheureusement, d'autres engagements auxquels je ne peux me soustraire rendent impossible ma présence. Je vous prie donc de bien vouloir accepter mes excuses les plus sincères.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Président, les assurances de ma plus haute considération.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'G. Tousignant'.

Guy C. Tousignant  
Major-Général  
Commandant de la Force

Son Excellence Monsieur Pasteur BIZIMUNGU  
Président de la République du Rwanda  
Kigali


②  
Suzanna  
Please send  
my regrets  
in my excuse  
plus  
Sincerely.  
20. Aug 94

Republic of Rwanda  
Presidency of the Republic

19/08/1994

His Excellency the President of the Republic of Rwanda requests the  
pleasure of the company of .....the..... Force..... Commanders.....  
.....of..... UNAMIR..... at a meet the people rally in BYUMBA  
Prefecture at BYUMBA Stadium on Saturday the 20th of August 94.

Your presence will be highly appreciated.



Major Dr Sezibera Richard  
Office of the President of the Republic.

**ARRIVAL TIMES**

**09.30HRS : ARRIVAL OF THE POPULATION**

**09.35HRS : ARRIVAL OF DISTINGUISHED GUESTS AND  
V.I.P's**

**09.40HRS : ARRIVAL OF MINISTERS**

**09.45HRS : ARRIVAL OF THE PRIME MINISTER**

**09.50HRS : ARRIVAL OF THE VICE PRESIDENT / MINISTER  
OF DEFENCE**

**10.00HRS : ARRIVAL OF HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT**

## **PROGRAMME**

**10.00 - 10.45 HRS : MEETING WITH OPINION LEADERS**

**10.45 - 11.10 HRS : VISIT ORPHANAGES**

**11.10 - 11.25 HRS : ARRIVE AT THE VENUE**

**11.25 - 11.30 HRS : NATIONAL ANTHEM**

**11.30 - 11.40 HRS : WORD OF PREFECT**

**11.40 - 12.00 HRS : MIN. INTERNAL AFFAIRS**

**12.00 - 12.10 HRS : INTERLUDE OF SONGS**

**12.10 - 12.40 HRS : P/MINISTER**

**12.40 - 13.10 HRS : V/P MIN. DEFENCE**

**13.10 - 13.25 HRS : INTERLUDE OF SONGS**

**13.25 - 14.25 HRS : SPEECH BY H/E AND QUESTIONS BY THE  
POPULATION**

**14.25 - 15.25 HRS : LUNCH**

**15.25 - 16.00 HRS : DEPARTURE.**



KIGALI, 17 August 1994

Dear Minister,

Subject: USE OF BUTARE TECHNICAL TEACHERS COLLEGE BY UNAMIR  
AND CARE AUSTRALIA MEDICAL FACILITIES


As part of UNAMIR II, Australia is providing a significant medical contribution. This contribution is being provided by the military and by Non Government Organisations.

The major role of the Australian military is to provide medical support to UNAMIR troops deployed to South West Rwanda. To help them achieve this they wish to position approximately 85 personnel in Butare. Care Australia also wish to establish a medical facility in Butare to assist the local population. If they were to locate together, great benefits could be gained by both. The military facility could help Care Australia treat the local population and provide them with administrative support.

On Saturday the 13th of August, representatives from both of these units held discussions with Captain John Zigira, the Prefect of Butare. After the discussions a reconnaissance was conducted with Dr. Nacisse. During the reconnaissance permission was requested from Dr Nacisse to use the Butare Technical Teacher's College to establish a shared medical facility. Dr. Nacisse supported this request but was unable to give approval. Dr. Nacisse has written a letter of recommendation which is enclosed and has referred us to you for approval.

I anticipate the Australians will occupy the facility for six months with a further commitment of six months likely. Your approval of this request would be of great benefit to UNAMIR II and the local population of Butare.

Accept, Dear Minister, the assurances of my highest consideration.

  
Romeo A. Dallaire  
Major General  
Force Commander

His Excellency Mr. Pierre Claver RWIGEMA  
Minister of Primary Education  
Rwandese Government  
Kigali

République Rwandaise  
Préfecture de Butare.  
Région Sanitaire Butare.


Butare, 13.8.94

Attestation.

Je soussigné, D<sup>r</sup> GAKUBA  
Marius, Médecin Directeur de la  
Région Sanitaire de Butare et Coordina-  
teur des ONG œuvrant à Butare,  
atteste par la présente que le  
Centre de Formation Pédagogique  
de Butare a été visité <sup>par une</sup>  
une Équipe de NIMURU <sup>et Core Australia</sup> et que  
le lieu a été trouvé convenable  
pour abriter ~~person~~ d'Hôpital.  
Le Préfet est d'accord et va  
demander l'accord du ministre  
de l'Enseignement primaire  
et secondaire.

D<sup>r</sup> GAKUBA Marius

13.8.1994





Kigali, le 7 août 1994

Monsieur le Président,

Objet: MONUMENT DE LA MINUAR

J'ai l'honneur de soumettre à votre haute appréciation une requête qui, j'ose espérer, recueillera votre agrément.


Au cours de leur mission au Rwanda, quelques membres du Groupe d'observateurs militaires neutres (GOMN) de l'OUA et de la Mission des Nations Unies pour l'Assistance au Rwanda (MINUAR) ont donné leur vie pour la paix. Au total, 14 Casques Bleus ont péri au service de leur pays et du Rwanda.

Puis-je, Excellence, comme dernière requête en tant que Commandant de la Force de la MINUAR, vous prier de bien vouloir nous permettre d'ériger un simple monument qui pourrait être construit et financé par les membres de la MINUAR, en l'honneur de nos camarades disparus. Sur la stèle seraient gravés les noms des 14 officiers et soldats qui ont perdu la vie au Rwanda.

Le site où serait élevé ce monument doit avoir une signification compatible avec les désirs des Rwandais. Je me permets de suggérer, Monsieur le Président, que ce site pourrait constituer un lieu symbolique, soit pour la Mission en général (comme par exemple la Sous-Préfecture de Kinyihira où a eu lieu la première cérémonie de levée du drapeau au moment de la passation de pouvoir entre le GOMN et la MINUAR le 1er novembre 1993), soit pour un événement d'intérêt particulier pour la MINUAR (comme le pont près de Kigali Night où l'échange de premiers groupes de personnes déplacées a eu lieu entre les lignes de tirs a été arrêté), soit encore l'endroit où l'un de nos casques bleus a donné sa vie comme ultime sacrifice (soit le même pont, ou le Stade Amahoro). Le principe de base à respecter, me semble-t-il, doit être l'humilité.

Son Excellence Monsieur Pasteur BIZIMUMGU  
Président de la République du Rwanda  
Kigali

En espérant que vous réserverez une suite favorable à cette demande, je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Président, les assurances de ma plus haute considération.



Roméo A. Dallaire  
Major-Général  
Commandant de la Force





Kigali, 17 August 1994  
5000.5 (PLANS)

Dear Mr President,

Subject: APPROVAL FOR BELGIAN AIRCRAFT TO LAND AT  
KANOMBE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

Approval is requested for a Belgian aircraft to land at Kanombe International Airport with the advance party of the Malawi Contingent and essential equipment for the UNAMIR force.

A total of 5 flights are expected, commencing on or about 20 August 1994. The air crew will remain at the airport during the turn-around periods.


It would be greatly appreciated if approval were granted to enable timely deployment of these much needed reinforcements and equipment. Thank you most sincerely for your help.

Shaharyar M. Khan  
Special Representative of  
the Secretary-General

His Excellency  
Mr Pasteur BIZIMUNGU  
President of the Republic of Rwanda  
Office of the President  
Kigali

Le début des cours étant prévu pour le lundi 14 août 1994, je vous serais reconnaissant des dispositions que vous voudrez bien faire prendre en vue du regroupement des élèves au Centre de Formation pour le vendredi 12 août 1994.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Mon Général, les assurances de ma haute considération.



Roméo A. Dallaire  
Major-Général  
Commandant de la Force

Pièces jointes:

- Constitution d'une unité de Gendarmerie (2)
- Programme de formation (1)
- Emploi de temps (1)



Kigali, le // août 1994  
3000.8 (CLO)

Mon Général,

Objet: CREATION ET FORMATION D'UNE UNITE DE GENDARMERIE A KIGALI

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire parvenir ci-joint les documents relatifs à la formation de cent (100) élèves gendarmes en vue de la création d'une unité de Gendarmerie, au terme des contacts pris avec les représentants du Ministère de la Défense.

Il est proposé ce qui suit:

- le Centre d'Instruction sera situé dans les locaux de l'ancienne Garde Présidentielle;
- le Chef du Centre sera un officier Rwandais;
- le Directeur des Etudes sera un officier de la MINUAR, en la personne du Chef d'Escadron Lanséni Diakité; il sera assisté d'un officier Rwandais;
- les cours suivants seront dispensés par des instructeurs locaux:

- . Droit Pénal Général,
- . Droit Pénal Spécial,
- . Procédure Pénal,
- . Connaissance générales et matières militaires;

- les officiers de la MINUAR dispenseront des cours comme suit:

- |                                  |  |
|----------------------------------|--|
| . Circulation routière           | Anatole Sangaré, Commissaire Divisionnaire             |
| . Maintien de l'ordre            | Lanséni Diakité, Chef d'Escadron                       |
| . Connaissance de la Gendarmerie | " " " "  |
| . Service en Brigade             | " " " "  |
| . Renseignements généraux        | Nimétigna Traoré, Moussa Sanogo, Commissaire Principal |
| . Police administrative          | N'Golo Ouattara, Commissaire Principal                 |
| . Police scientifique            | " " " "  |
| . Tir de Police                  | Moussa Sanogo, Commissaire Principal                   |

Major-Général Paul KAGAME  
Vice-Président et Ministre de la Défense  
République Rwandaise  
Kigali

See annexes  
in Section  
"Gendarmerie"  
of this same  
file



Kigali, /0 August 1994

Dear General,


Subject: USE OF MILITARY ACADEMY FOR AUSTRALIAN MEDICAL  
SUPPORT FORCE SOLDIERS

As part of UNAMIR II, Australia is providing a 300 man Medical Support Force. The majority of this force will be establishing a hospital facility within the Central Hospital Kigali complex.

Within the CHK complex, there is insufficient space to accommodate the Australian soldiers and their administrative support equipment. I write to request authority to use the Military Academy for this purpose. Many of the buildings within the Military Academy have been damaged during the war. The Australian soldiers intend to carry out significant repairs to the buildings during the period they occupy the complex.

I anticipate the Australian force will occupy the Academy for twelve months. Your approval of this request would be of great benefit to UNAMIR II and the Government of Rwanda.

Accept, Dear General, the assurances of my highest consideration.

  
Roméo A. Dallaire  
Major-General  
Force Commander

Major-General Paul KAGAME  
Vice-President and Minister of Defence  
Kigali



UNAMIR - MINUAR

Kigali  
/ 10 August 1994

3000.26 (Ops)

SUBJECT: TRANSFER OF FRENCH VEHICLES TO HPZ

1. The French Government is handing over 50 military vehicles to the African Battalion they are leaving in the HPZ which is coming under control of UNAMIR with effect from 15 Aug 94.
2. These vehicles will be shipped to GOMA on 13 Aug 94 from where they will be moved by road to KIBUYE through GISENYI on 14/15 Aug 94.
3. The vehicles will be driven by personnel from the Senegalese/Tchadian battalion but will be escorted by UNAMIR MILOBs.
4. It is requested that clearance be given for the road movement of this convoy on the stated dates.
5. I count on your cooperation on this subject.

  
R.A. DALLAIRE  
Major General  
Force Commander

His Excellency The Vice President  
and Minister of Defence of Rwanda  
Office of the Vice President  
KIGALI



Kigali  
/z August 1994

3000.26(Ops)

SUBJECT: MEETING BETWEEN RPA AND COLONEL MUSONERA ON INTEGRATION  
OF EX RGF SOLDIERS INTO THE RPA

1. Colonel Musonera, one of the signatories of the KIGEME accord has expressed the desire to meet with the RPA to discuss the subject of integrating some ex RGF troops into the RPA.

2. In this regard, it is requested that you indicate the possibility of such a meeting at a place of your convenience, preferably on the HPZ border, as well as the time and date.

3. This information when received will be passed on the Col Musonera for action.

  
R.A. DALLAIRE  
Major General  
Force Commander

His Excellency The Vice President  
and Minister of Defence of Rwanda  
Office of the Vice President  
KIGALI

GOMA LE 9 AOUT 1994


FM : CHEF DL  
TO : DL KIGALI

CMB GENERAL

1 - Le Colonel MUSONERA, un des signataires de l'accord de KIGALI, souhaite une entrevue avec une autorité militaire du FPR. Celui-ci souhaite obtenir des garanties pour réintégration des FAR volontaires dans la nouvelle armée rwandaise.

2 - Equipement de radio diffusion.  
Compte tenu de la charge actuelle des éléments TURQUOISE, cette mission doit être confiée aux MILOBS par MINUAR.

LE COLONEL G CANOVAS  
CHEF DES DL/PCIAI



SIGNATURE






Kigali, le 8 août 1994  
1000 (FC)

Monsieur le Président,

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire parvenir ci-joint une copie en Anglais du projet de procédures pour la mise en place du cessez-le-feu à être suivies dans la Zone de Protection Sûre (zone démilitarisée) que nous avons l'intention de publier. La version française de ce document vous sera transmise sous peu.

Je vous serais reconnaissant de bien vouloir me faire parvenir tous commentaires de votre gouvernement afin de nous permettre d'élaborer la version finale de ce document dans les plus brefs délais. Vos commentaires sont indispensables étant donné les relations étroites entre nos Forces respectives pour le succès du cessez-le-feu.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Président, les assurances de ma plus haute considération.

  
Roméo A. Dallaire  
Major-Général  
Commandant de la Force

Son Excellence Monsieur Pasteur BIZIMUNGU  
Président de la République de Rwanda  
Kigali

Reply rec'd  
from Gen KAGAME  
on 24/9/94

DRAFT 2

SECTOR 4 - HUMANITARIAN PROTECTED ZONE

CEASEFIRE AND DEMILITARIZED ZONE

IMPLEMENTATION AND PROCEDURES

Refs: A. Army Field Manual - Wider Peacekeeping (Fourth Draft)  
B. UNAMIR Ceasefire SOPs (Second Draft)  
C. Kinyira Agreement 30 May 1993

General

1. A ceasefire has been established along the line illustrated at Annex A. The area west of this line is known as Sector Four and as the Humanitarian Protected Zone (HPZ). The HPZ is currently controlled by the French Coalition Forces which includes a presence by UNAMIR Military Observers. During the upcoming weeks UNAMIR will relieve the Coalition forces in place and over time control all activities within the HPZ.

2. To aid the ceasefire process within the HPZ it is paramount to ensure the security and effective monitoring of the ceasefire line. In addition procedures must be implemented to begin the process to stabilize and to facilitate the return to normalcy within the HPZ. The HPZ is to be treated as a demilitarized zone secured and monitored by UNAMIR, with the assistance of the local Rwandan authorities.

3. The aim of the ceasefire and the implementation of a demilitarized zone is to:

- a. to ensure that the ceasefire is honoured;
- b. to control and monitor all ex-RGF and Gendarmerie either in the zone or entering it.
- c. to disarm the civilian population including the self - defence groups;
- d. to allow humanitarian relief operations for the refugees and displaced persons;
- e. to create safe conditions for those people who are trying to protect themselves from random attacks, massacres and retribution;
- f. to prevent a massive migration of the population to Zaire and Burundi;
- h. to create the conditions which will encourage Rwandese citizens to return to their homes within the country;
- j. to encourage and aid in the re-establishment of prefecture, commune and cell administrations;
- k. to assist in the running of normal political activity and;

1. to create proper conditions for the return to law and order.

4. This document will be divided into two parts:

Part I. SOPs for monitoring the ceasefire line; and

Part II. Procedures for the Administration of the  
Demilitarized Zone.

Part I - STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR THE MONITORING OF THE  
CEASEFIRE

5. In geographical terms, a ceasefire may be delineated using the following elements:

- a. Ceasefire line. The ceasefire line marks the forward limit of the positions occupied by opposing factions. In this case the line marks the agreed forward positions of the RPA and either French Coalition Forces or UNAMIR Armed troops. This line also marks the boundary of the HPZ;

- b. Buffer zone. A two kilometre buffer zone inside the HPZ is in effect now and will be maintained.

6. Management of Ceasefire. The effective management of a

ceasefire will require numerous observers and liaison teams with independent, reliable and round-the-clock communications to sector as well as UNIMAR Force HQ and to all parties concerned. The management procedure will include:

- a. investigation of alleged breaches of the ceasefire;
- b. attribution of blame to transgressors; and
- c. retribution against offenders; ordinarily carried out by the parent factions of the guilty parties concerned.

7. Commanders should rehearse their management procedures and ensure that they remain in close contact with all parties involved. A prompt, firm and fair reaction to breaches of the ceasefire agreement is essential. Delayed and inappropriate reactions will prejudice the ceasefire's credibility and risk a rapid overall degeneration of the general security environment. It may be possible to mount joint patrols as such action will act with RPA/Gendarmerie as a confidence - building measure for the population.

#### Responsibility

8. Political Leaders and Commanders of both the RPA/BBG and the UNAMIR will bear political and military responsibility for compliance with the ceasefire agreement.

9. UNAMIR will be responsible for monitoring the ceasefire agreement through the use of deployed forces, UNMOs, CIVPOL and surveillance devices.

#### Role of Rwandese Patriotic Army for the Ceasefire

10. To keep UNAMIR informed of the ceasefire violations and progress in disarming the civilian population by prefectures, subprefectures and sectors in areas controlled by both forces and under their responsibility.

11. To report atrocities committed.

12. To refrain from taking unilateral actions.

13. To use negotiations as a primary means of solving problems with the opposite force.

14. To send a liaison officer to the UNAMIR FHQ and the sector headquarters.

15. To keep a close relation with the FHQ and the sector headquarters.

#### Definitions Related to the Ceasefire

16. Weapon. Any lethal object which can be used to cause

physical harm to an individual. This includes fire arms, machetes, bows and arrows, knives, swords, bayonets, spears, batons, clubs etc.

17. Observation Posts. Specially selected points throughout the country which allow for the best visibility of surrounding area in terrain held by one or both opposing forces and used primarily to monitor any military troop movements, reinforcing of positions or ceasefire violations. The distance between individual OPs should not be greater than 10 km. OPs are to be manned 24 hrs a day and 7 days a week. OPs should be equipped with binoculars, night-vision devices, maps, compass and radio and line communication with HQ.

a. Type of OPs. There may be the following type of OPs, depending on terrain conditions and intensity of operation:

- (1) Permanent;
- (2) Temporary; and
- (3) Unmanned.

18. Secured Area. An area such as a refugee camp, where access of the opposing forces would be controlled and regulated by UNAMIR forces. Within the secured area there must be sufficient security for UNAMIR military and civilian components.

19. UN Installations. All UNAMIR military and civilian camps and equipment, deployed on Rwandese territory, belonging to the mission and necessary to fulfil its mandate. The UN Installations will be guarded by UNAMIR assigned elements. Access to these areas is restricted and access is controlled by separate UNAMIR regulations.

20. Refugee/Displaced Persons Camp Guards. In order to provide protection to refugee camps against acts of lawlessness, particularly acts of ethnic cleansing, UNAMIR units will be responsible for the required security arrangements.

21. Check Points. A manned point used as a means of controlling movement and checking vehicle and pedestrians in order to enforce control measures, orders and regulations pertinent to the ceasefire agreement. These may be static or mobile;

a. Static Check Points. Troops/UNMOs are permanently located at fixed points. These will be normally be on important road junctions, at the entrances/exits to controlled area etc. A static check point is manned on a permanent basis. It must have both radio and line communication with their HQ.

b. Mobile Check Points. Static check points may not be



enough to cover an area of operation. In this case, mobile check points are necessary. It will have a minimum of a section strength (10 men) with two UN vehicles. It is established at varying times and at varying places based on an irregular schedule. It must have radio communication with a base/unit's HQ.

22. Road Block. A static or mobile check point which closes the road for vehicle movement. A road block must have signs reading "Road Block" in English, French and Kinyarwanda and be clearly visible from, a distance by an approaching vehicle.

23. Search. A search operation is necessary to eliminate infiltration, however it causes harassment and inconvenience to the population. This operation, therefore, must be quick, methodical, accurate, involve correct behaviour and be based on solid drills by the soldiers carrying out a search mission. Search operations would be conducted in coordination with local authorities. Following principle should be employed during search operation:

- a. due care must be taken to avoid damage to any vehicle or property being searched;
- b. coffins carrying funeral convoys should not be searched;

- c. all unauthorized arms, ammunition and explosives found are to be confiscated and receipt given to individuals. The confiscation form found as Annex N to Part III of UNAMIR SOPs is to be used;
- d. Vehicle Search. Each time a vehicle is searched, the search party must systematically search the trunk, engine compartment, the driver/passenger areas, the chassis etc. Suspicious vehicles must be thoroughly searched.
- e. Personal Search. If the situation warrants, the unit commander may authorize a personal search which is to be carried out in a dignified manner taking care not to cause any public embarrassment to the individual. Women will only be searched with ferromagnetic metals' detectors and will NOT be physically searched. If however they have to be searched, women must be used; and
- f. Area Search. Area searches are aimed at locating non-official weapons and ammunition stores etc. Such actions will only be done in conjunction with a cordon operation. During an area search, locals should be segregated. A house or a shop shall be searched in the presence of its owner.

24. Cordon. UNAMIR may have to carry out cordon operations to search for weapons, ammunition or explosives. Prior permission from UNAMIR FHQ is needed to carry out a cordon and search operation. Cordon must be done with sufficient troops and a reserve. Care must be taken to ensure that the area is not mined or booby-trapped, therefore engineer EOD should be attached for all cordon operations.

25. Patrolling. Patrolling will form an essential part of the cease-fire. This will be done by UNAMIR forces, UNMOs, and local authorities.

a. Types of patrols. There may be the following types of patrols depending on terrain conditions and the complexity of operation:

(1) Foot patrol;

(2) Vehicle/APC mounted patrol;

(3) Air patrol;

(4) River/lake patrol; and

(5) Border patrols.

b. Aim of Patrolling.

- (1) to show a UN presence;
- (2) to confirm/verify/supervise an incident, agreement or ceasefire violation;
- (3) to obtain information about terrain, topography etc;
- (4) to locate and confiscate arms, ammunition, explosives etc;
- (5) to provide protection for NGOs or the population, and in particular for displaced persons;
- (6) to prevent infiltration of unwanted elements into selected and controlled area/zone; and
- (7) to monitor the arms embargo along the borders.
- (8) to monitor the return of the refugees.

c. Strength. In no circumstances should a foot patrol be less than section strength (10 men), while a vehicle patrol or river/lake patrol should be no less than two vehicles or boats.

d. Security. Security of UN patrols depends on how much they know about an area of their operation. However following aspects need consideration:

- (1) Patrol routes should be free of mines. Only

routes known to be absolutely free from mines may be patrolled. DO NOT undertake patrolling in suspected mined areas; and

- (2) Ensure that UN signs/marks in the form of UN flag and UN head-gear are clearly visible during patrolling.

26. Escort. In UNAMIR elements two types of escort will be used:

- a. UNMO Escort. this will be unarmed escort composed of military observers. In case of any suspicion of danger the escort shall be augmented by an armed escort from a UNAMIR unit. Unarmed escorts shall be normally provided to VIPs, NGOs and another visiting persons, provided that there is no threat;
- b. Armed Escorts. Armed escorts will be composed of soldiers from a UNAMIR unit. They will be provided to humanitarian relief operations convoys, UN convoys or to VIPs as required; and
- c. Authority of Detailing Escorts. FHQ/Sector HQ's shall have the authority to detail escorts.

27. UN Convoys. UN Convoys will be conducted for UNAMIR

deployment and is necessary for fulfilment of its mandated tasks in an area of operation assigned.

28. Investigation Teams (IT). ITs are composed of UNMO and UN CIV POLs and will be employed to clarify all cases of cease fire violations and will submit relevant reports to Sector HQ's for onward transmission to FHQ.

29. Committees for Civic Matters. Committees comprising specially selected groups of staff personnel from UNAMIR components designated for humanitarian may be detailed to help to solve important civic matters in cooperation with the local civilian infrastructure.

30. Humanitarian Recce Teams. Personnel of UNAMIR units and UNMOs will be tasked for collecting all data regarding displaced persons concentrations as well as refugee camps and road infrastructure to be used for food transportation purposes.

#### Concept of Operation

31. UNAMIR military component and UNMOs must at all times ensure that preconditions set out in the foregoing paragraphs are implemented/adhered to.

32. To establish conditions necessary for monitoring of the ceasefire agreement, both the UNAMIR military component and UNMOs

should carry out the following operations:

- a. Establishment of Observation Posts. OPs should be established at vantage points that ensure the best possible visibility even in difficult weather conditions and at night, observation posts should allow for the maximum of information regarding movement of troops, weapons, etc, if any, and other observable proof of the ceasefire violation.
- b. Refugee Camp Guards. Protection of this kind should be set up in all displaced persons camps, where a threat to those persons exists;
- c. Establishment of Check Points. Both mobile and static check points should be established on all major road junctions, and entry and exit points into an area. Static check points must be established in the entry/exit point of troop position;
- d. Road Blocks. In conjunction with check points, road blocks will be set up especially during night;
- e. Search. Search operations should be carried out in all mobile and static check points. It should be done at irregular intervals;

- f. Patrolling. Schedule of patrolling, elaborated for both for patrols from UNAMIR units and UNMOs shall cover all major roads, tracks of sensitive areas of operational importance. UNMOs shall always be accompanied by armed escorts while patrolling at night;
- g. Cordon. this will be carried out on specific information related to discovery of non-official stores of weapons, ammunition or explosives. Cordon operation shall be avoided at night. Cordon operations would be undertaken in conjunction with local authorities;
- h. Investigation Teams. Special groups of UNMOs and UN CIV POLs designated for investigation, clarifying and reporting all cases of ceasefire violations;
- i. Committees for Civic Matters. UNAMIR will participate in committees for civic matters to help solve all important civil matters regarding humanitarian activity in towns; and
- j. Humanitarian Recce Teams. These groups will be tasked for the collection of all data regarding displaced persons camp, location and recommending options for humanitarian assistance delivery by road.

#### Rules of Engagement




- j. Humanitarian Recce Teams. These groups will be tasked for the collection of all data regarding displaced persons camp, location and recommending options for humanitarian assistance delivery by road.

#### Rules of Engagement

33. ROE as per Section 2, OP directive 9. UNAMIR Rules of Engagement.


DRAFT I of Part II

#### PART 2 - PROCEDURES FOR DEMILITARIZED ZONE (HPZ)

34. Following a ceasefire, demobilization operations will require the coordinated disengagement and withdrawal of belligerents. The aim of this stage will be to move combatants away from the sustaining environment of their base areas and assemble them in secured locations where they can safely disarm. This process is likely to require a large number of troops and commanders will need to consider redeployment and reinforcement as a preparatory measure. Because of a shortage of manpower, the operation may have to be sequenced, one small (but mutually balanced) area at a time. Once the contonement areas are activated, the RGF, Gendarmerie and militia's will need to be accounted for and controlled. They will also require
- 

sustainment, including medical care. It may be appropriate to locate contonement areas adjacent to civil infrastructure facilities so that these groups may be offered gainful employment in reconstructing and developing those facilities. Relocation and contonement may also be required for vulnerable elements of the population.

35. Disarming the RGF, Gendarmerie and militia's is likely to prove the most difficult and dangerous stage of demobilization. If done prematurely, the whole theatre of operations may be destabilized. As UNAMIR disarms the local population they will be obliged to guarantee the security of the local population. This task is likely to prove demanding and manpower intensive. Successful disarming will depend as well on their trust of UNAMIR - both in terms of their impartiality as well as their region wide credibility. The latter will depend on the public perception of the UNAMIR force's military capability and will to carry through the demobilization process, maintain the peace and punish transgressors. Besides collecting weapons from combatants and militias, disarming will include the collection of war supplies from stockpiles and caches. UNAMIR will also interdict supply routes from neighbouring states. The custody and accurate accounting of weapons and war supplies will play a vital part in verifying the completion of the process. Industrial resources that could have a military application (for example - diesel) may also need to be controlled.




36. The final stage is the dispersal and rehabilitation of the belligerents. This stage is principally the responsibility of the civil authority and therefore leads into the next category (Military Assistance). It is at this stage that military and civil responsibilities will overlap and careful judgement will be required to time the transition from one authority to the other. This stage may be carried out in conjunction with the reconstitution and reform of the civil authority's police and defence forces which could well include former RGF, Gendarmerie forces who might be re armed, regrouped and placed under new authority. The planning and supervision of such reform might become the responsibility of a specified element of UNAMIR.

#### MILITARY ASSISTANCE

37. Military assistance refers to all form of mandated assistance by UNAMIR, to the Civil authority. In the absence of any effective government, military assistance will take the form of direct help given to civil communities. The principle of impartiality will still govern military actions. Force may be used. The overall security situation must be relatively stable.

#### LAW AND ORDER


38. UNAMIR military assistance operations will contribute to the overall aim of maintaining law and order a responsibility that rests in the first place with the civil police. The maintenance of law and order constitutes the framework for all operational action and is essential for



successful establishment of civil authority. If law and order is failing the aim of military assistance will be to restore the situation to the point where the police can once again "effectively enforce the law". In Sector 4, the UNCIU<sup>U</sup>POL will play a key role until the Gendarmerie ~~can~~ be reconstituted and deployed.

#### PRINCIPLES

39. Popular Support. Military assistance operations will be impossible without a substantial degree of popular support. A principle purpose underlying every UNAMIR activity will therefore be the acquisition and fostering of popular support. Effective civil affairs programmes ("hearts and minds" campaigns) will be critical in this respect. The policy of the civil administration will be to establish controls and protective measures as necessary to gain public confidence and enhance society's support. Commanders should reinforce this aim at every opportunity and avoid using their troops in an unnecessarily provocative fashion where there is a risk of confrontation with the local population. Whenever possible the populace should be encouraged to play an ever increasing role in their own protection. In addition to civil affairs programmes, commanders should also consider the potential for planning lower level community projects jointly with the local authorities. Such projects should meet a genuine need, involve the overt participation of the UNAMIR contingent and be directed at all sections of the community.



#### MINIMUM FORCE


40. In a military assistance situation, the involvement and likely close proximity of the local population makes the principle of minimum force particularly important to observe. The commander should never use more force than is necessary and reasonable to achieve his immediate military aim. All members of UNAMIR must be aware of the constraints which the law imposes on the use of force. Failure to observe the law will lead to a risk of prosecution, and possibly to civil proceedings for damages. Breaches of the law will also serve to alienate the law abiding members of the local population, and respect for the rule of law framework on which the entire military assistance campaign will be taking place will be weakened if it appears that the law is being flouted by those whose task it is to uphold it.

#### LEGALITY

41. UNAMIR will be under obligation to strictly observe the relevant provisions of the national laws of Rwanda. Commanders will be held responsible for their actions and must therefore check the legality of planned operations with the FHQ, so that their soldiers are not exposed to the uncertainties of legal interpretation. This is properly a function of forward staff planning.

#### COORDINATION AND COOPERATION


42. The successful conduct of operations depends on the effective coordination of civil and military effort. This



coordination applies particularly to military and public information, security, planning, public safety, and operational direction. Such coordination is best achieved through centralized planning meeting in which UNAMIR and civil administration are drawn together in order to formulate policy and implement it in a coordinated fashion at all levels. At the higher level, this coordination will be attained through the medium of a series of formally constituted committees. At lower levels centralized direction and control will be achieved through liaison, regular meetings and the use of joint operations rooms at each level of command. Centralized coordination will result in effective cooperation between the civil authority and UNAMIR. Such cooperation will be essential to emphasize the mutual confidence between them and to ensure that the conduct of operations is coherent and contributes directly to the achievement of government aims. Effective cooperation should be demonstrated at the earliest opportunity by the joint operation of UNAMIR and local security forces. To facilitate centralized direction and control, the boundaries of police and UNAMIR forces should coincide.

#### CONCENTRATION OF FORCE

43. The principle of minimum necessary force does not imply 'minimum necessary troops'. A large element of UNAMIR speedily deployed at a critical location will demonstrate 'clout' and credibility and may enable a commander to use less force than he might otherwise have done or even, by encouraging a peaceful




resolution, to avoid using any force at all. Commanders must bear in mind, however, that a potentially peaceful situation can become hostile because of a provocative display of an over-large force.

#### MILITARY INFORMATION

44. At each level, commanders should seek to establish a single, integrated military information organization. Ideally, the information and security elements of the civil administration and local security forces should be incorporated. The commander should task his military information organization with specific requirements to provide the timely information he needs.

#### USE OF LOCAL SECURITY FORCES


45. Local security forces in a military assistance situation are likely to be in need of support and encouragement, and they should be afforded, whenever possible, the opportunity of playing a useful and constructive part in operations. The following local forces will have much to offer UNAMIR in terms of local knowledge and expertise, although they lack adequate resources at this time.

- a. RESERVE FORCES. Local reserve, part-time or paramilitary forces should be employed on duties where their local knowledge and links with the community can be used to the full without exposing them to unreasonable pressures which could compromise their security.
- 

b. HOME GUARDS AND WARDENS. Depending on the security situation it may be possible to establish locally recruited home guards or wardens to protect life and property in their own local areas. This would require them to be suitably armed and trained in order to perform static home guard duties, basic patrol tasks or act as wardens responsible of liaison with the people living in their sectors. They could prove extremely valuable in reporting information affecting local security to the authorities.

c. BORDER GUARDS, CUSTOMS AND IMMIGRATION. The expertise and resources of border guards, customs and immigration may be harnessed by UNAMIR in military assistance operations to provide surveillance and information as well as control the passage of both supplies and people. Whenever possible, local security forces should operate with or alongside UNAMIR. As areas are brought restored to order, local forces should assume control as part of the important transition process towards the civil authority regaining full responsibility.

46. PUBLIC INFORMATION . Through an effective public information programme commanders should seek to foster and maintain a good public image for their forces wherever they are deployed. This will be particularly important in the demilitarized zone. The local populace must be kept in touch with government intentions by means of public information activities. Through this means, it will be possible to





to explain the need for some of the restrictions being imposed and publicize other items of information that may prove helpful to both the public and military authorities. Hostile propaganda may be countered and the local population kept fully informed of government aims and policies. Every formation headquarters should have its own public information officer and staff with a press office open 24 hours a day. There should also be a press officer in each unit.

47. BRIEFING. Commanders must ensure that they and their soldiers have received comprehensive briefings covering the background to the conflict and all aspects of the civil authority's activities and intentions. All UNAMIR personnel must be aware of the political aims of the government and of the measures devised to implement them. This will enable commanders to plan operations which are in accord with the civil administration's intentions and it will ensure that all ranks understand the reasons behind what they are doing and will react to unexpected situations appropriately.

#### MILITARY OPERATIONS

48. CATEGORIES. UNAMIR tasks can be grouped in the following categories reflecting the purpose for which such tasks might be undertaken:

- a. SUPERVISION;
  - b. ADMINISTRATION;
- 

- c. PROTECTION;
- d. REACTION;
- e. CONTROL; and
- f. COORDINATION.

9. Each category of tasks is considered separately below.


#### SUPERVISION

50. There are a number of important supervisory tasks that UNAMIR might be required to carry out in a military assistance role:

- a. a transition of authority (possibly preceded by providing security for an election);
- b. reforming local security forces including the provision of training, logistic and administrative support;
- c. the relocation and rehabilitation of refugees and other elements of a displaced population;
- d. the location, clearance and disposal of unexploded ordnance including mines (many of which may be unmarked) and improvised explosive devices. This task may prove an important contribution to the civil affairs programme and could conclude such things as the training of local nationals in mine clearance.


Each of the above supervisory tasks will require specialist personnel and resources which will need to be tailored to the particular situation faced.

#### ADMINISTRATION



51. Civil Administration. When assistance to a civil authority is requested, it is likely that at least part of the government's administrative machinery will have broken down. The consequences of that administrative breakdown are likely eventually to affect the life of the entire community. When public services cease to function, rents and taxes fail to be collected, local authorities decline in effectiveness and subsequent disruptions can lead to rising unemployment and widespread dissatisfaction. In these circumstances UNAMIR may be invited to give additional assistance in the area of civil administration. This might range from liaison at one extreme to a military government at the other.


52. Public Utilities. The supply of power, water, public transport, communications and health and hygiene services are an essential part of the fabric of life in a modern state and their disruption is consequently critical. UNAMIR will have much to offer in contributing to the maintenance and repair/reconstruction of such essential services. Engineer resources will be particularly useful in lending practical assistance, offering advice or giving direction. Similarly, in remoter areas, special forces may be able to provide guidance and coordinate assistance to the civil administration. If committed to such a role, commanders should seek to retain as much of the civil labour force as possible, especially the skilled labour, although this may mean providing protection.



## PROTECTION


53. Introduction. Protective tasks include the safeguarding of individuals, communities and installation. Protective measures will tend to use up manpower. Commanders must be mindful of the need to balance protective requirements against the need for more active operational measures.

54. Individuals. Government officials, prominent citizens, members of UNAMIR or associated relief agencies and their families are at risk in the demilitarized zone. The scale and extent of precautionary measure (such as the employment of close protection) should be related to the threat, but contingency plans should be made for and increase in the threat. Commanders must make a thorough assessment of the problem and implement appropriate measures. Individuals may often be at their most vulnerable whilst travelling. Movement, by any means including road (in individual vehicles or by convoy) should be protected by a combination of:

- a. precautionary measures (including basic security safeguards);
  - b. tactical measures (for example escorts, OPs and check points); and
  - c. contingency measures (possibly including such things as airmobile reserve forces).
- 

55.        PROTECTED AREAS. The aim of establishing protected areas is to create the conditions in a defined area within which a community will be able to respect and observe the law, and which will be protected from outside interference and attack. A protected area will be a region where, ultimately, the civil administration works and where the civil community is able to go about its business and live freely without fear. Having established such areas, the controlling authorities will aim to expand them in size and link them up. The pursuit of civil affairs programmes and lower level community projects will therefore be critical to success in establishing protected areas. The development and participation of the civil administration is necessary if a protected area is going to have any chance of long-term success. Generally speaking, the establishment and maintenance of protected areas is fraught with difficulty since they will often cause friction, threaten the perceived impartiality of UNAMIR and demand large amounts of manpower.

56.        INSTALLATIONS. Responsibility for guarding all civil installations rest with the civil police. Military assistance may be required to supplement the police or take over from them if weapons or techniques are required which only the military can supply. Installations should be classified according to their status and commanders should view critically all requests to provide guards. Classification of installations and guard commitments should be regularly reviewed.




57.        REACTION. The ability of UNAMIR to react is essential to remaining balanced and regaining control over events. In all operations commanders should have reserves and contingency plans to assist the civil authority if required in dealing with outbreaks of violence including terrorism and riotous assemblies. The commander will normally be guided by these authorities, but he must make his own judgement as to what form of military assistance is appropriate, and he will remain accountable for his actions.

58.        CONTROL MEASURES. Commanders may be called upon to enforce collective control measures. Prohibitions and restrictions are always distasteful to the general public and the imposition of extra controls is likely to be particularly unpopular. Consequently such measures must be carefully planned. The need for them should be made clear, and they should be fairly and equitably applied. Control measures which affect the civil population must be conducted within the law and no restriction should be placed on the movement or general freedom of civilians unless there is legal power or authority to do so.

AIMS

59.        The aims of applying controls will include:

- a. Improving the ability of the local security forces to enforce the law, thus increasing public confidence in government;
  - b. **Detering violent or criminal activity;**
- 

- c. Restricting the potential for riotous assemblies;
- d. Limiting the illegal traffic of war supplies or contraband;
- e. Apprehending wanted persons; and
- f. Detecting patterns of activity and gaining information.

#### APPLICATION


60. Control measures should be planned and directed on a joint police/military basis with the fullest cooperation at every level. Ineffective control will undermine public confidence in the security forces and measures should be applied firmly but with understanding. Whenever possible, explanations should be given to the public for actions taken. Controls should not be exercised for any longer than necessary. They may include road blocks, checkpoints, curfews, searches and patrols.

#### COORDINATION.

61. UNAMIR will be required to assist the civil authority in coordination humanitarian relief efforts. This aspect is covered in more detail in the next section. Coordination tasks could include the investigation of war crimes and human rights abuses.

#### TIMING FORCE WITHDRAWAL.

62. At a local level, commanders should continually review opportunities for returning responsibility to the civil authority. In general, the criterion for deciding whether to




withdraw from a particular military assistance function will be whether or not that function can be protected and exercised by the civil authority without further assistance. Such decisions are sensitive and will require careful judgement. Too early a withdrawal may prove disastrous, but over prolonged military commitment, may prove nearly as harmful. Accordingly, the withdrawal of UNAMIR commitments within a military assistance operation should be flexible, taking account of the need to respond rapidly to political developments. There may even be a need to recommit military forces. In general, commanders should therefore consider withdrawal from particular military commitments in three possible ways:

- a. Rapidly (if the prospect of success seems assured);
- b. Gradually (in phases which can be slowed down or speeded up). Such phases may relate to functions or geographical regions; and
- c. Partially (by changing the role of UNAMIR from direct to indirect assistance).

#### HUMANITARIAN RELIEF

##### SCOPE

63. Humanitarian relief operations are the focus for attention within the UNAMIR mandate and may exert a profound influence on the overall course of events. In certain circumstances, they may also be used as a tool by the commander






to reward the compliance of belligerent factions.

#### LEGAL BASIS

64. In a situation of internal conflict there are certain provisions of international law that apply to the granting of humanitarian relief. For example, Article 3 of each of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 relating to the Protection of War Victims lays down certain minimum humanitarian standards which are to be adopted in cases of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of a party to the Conventions.

#### CONTEXT

65. Humanitarian relief operations will be carried out in conjunction with other UNAMIR tasks. In the Rwanda relief situation, there are a broad variety of international civil agencies that are involved; including the UN, and the government, non-government and private voluntary organizations. Some of these humanitarian relief operations will therefore occur under different guidance, authority and conditions of other operations going on in the same area. UNAMIR should be wary of lending direct support to non-accredited aid agencies which may be involved in illegal activities (such as the movement of weapons) and could thus, by association, prejudice the contingent's legitimacy.



TARGETS OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF.

DISPLACED PERSONS AND REFUGEES.


66. The migration of displaced persons (those forced to leave their homes) and refugees (those forced to leave their countries) are a common feature of Rwanda. The departure or removal of such people from their native support environments has put them direly in need of humanitarian relief. The numbers of those requiring help has been estimated at approximately 2 million.

RESIDENTS

67. Humanitarian relief may also be required for resident communities which are at risk from the activities of militias, the lack of food, water and medical supplies. Disease is also a factor.

PHASE OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS

68. UNAMIR will become involved in two particular phases of humanitarian relief operations:

- a. EMERGENCY PHASE. The aim of the emergency phase is to save lives; It will therefore entail the provision of vital services and the distribution in the basic requirements for survival, namely food, water, fuel, shelter and medical care. Emphasis will be on the assembly and rescue of victims and, if necessary, transportation.
- 

from a life-threatening environment. Emergency medical care will be crucial component of this phase.

- b. ADMINISTRATION PHASE. When the targets of humanitarian relief are no longer in immediate danger, the emphasis of the operation will shift to continuing the administration of those rescued and setting in hand arrangements for their subsequent rehabilitation and the reconstruction of public services.


#### PRINCIPLES OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS

##### LIAISON AND COORDINATION

69. Community leaders will always have much to offer in terms of influence, information and linguistic skills. Commanders should therefore always seek to liaise with and gain the support of community leaders to enlist their cooperation and improve the coordination of relief activity. To this end, local leaders should be involved as much as possible in the planning and supervision of activities. If feasible, they should be taken on reconnaissance trips and also included in such things as briefings, orders and advance parties.

##### SECURITY

70. Whenever possible, commanders should place priority on demobilizing and securing the area within which operations




operations are to be mounted. The benefit of humanitarian operation will be minimized if they are not conducted with an effective security framework. There will be little long-term utility, for example, in providing humanitarian relief to communities who are in imminent danger of extermination from militias. A secure environment also provides better protection for humanitarian convoys than isolated escorts.

#### TIMELINESS

71. Timeliness is a critical factor to the success of humanitarian relief operations. Information, intelligence, reconnaissance, mobility, speed of reaction and effective planning and staff work are all aspects of activity that will contribute to humanitarian operations being mounted in a timely fashion.

#### PRIORITIES

72. The planning and execution of humanitarian relief operations should always reflect a careful prioritization of the targets and their needs. This prioritization will be reflected in the composition, equipment and supplies of relief teams. The movement of relief personnel and supplies to the target area should also be prioritized to meet the most urgent needs first.



#### UNIFIED COMMAND

73. Whenever possible, commanders should encourage the establishment of unified commands in which all appropriate agencies are represented. The commands should be supported by widespread liaison and reliable communications.


#### MILITARY TASKS

74. Military tasks pertaining to humanitarian relief are likely to fall into the following categories:

- a. Protection of delivery and relief workers ( against conflicting parties to a conflict of criminal elements);
- b. Establishment, support and protection of regional safe havens and protected areas;
- c. Administrative tasks, including the coordination of relief agencies and distribution supplies. Special forces are particularly suited to this task;
- d. Engineer support, including road construction and maintenance, bridging and infrastructure engineering; and
- e. Sustainment, including transportation, supply, maintenance and medical support.

#### CONCLUSION:

75. The implementation of the ceasefire SOP'S and the procedures, programs identified as required in the demilitarize



zone will greatly increase the likelihood of UNAMIR success in helping to restore normalcy in Sector 4 and Rwanda in general. It cannot be over emphasized that Humanitarian effort must be closely coordinated, with close cooperation of the Government and local leaders. In addition the proactive involvement UNAMIR commanders, contingents and military observers will be the key to success.



UNAMIR - MINUAR

Kigali, 1 August 1994  
3000.15 (OPS)

Dear General,


Subject: PROTEST AGAINST RPA TROOPS FOR NOT ALLOWING  
UNAMIR PERSONNEL TO TALK TO THE LOCAL  
POPULATION

1. It has been observed with great concern that some members of RPA are not allowing UNAMIR personnel to talk to the local people of Rwanda in some areas. One such incident took place a few days ago when our military observers went to the Tanzanian border and wanted to talk to the local population but were not allowed to do so by members of the RPA.

2. I wish to strongly protest against this attitude by RPA troops as it shows a rather negative attitude towards our personnel. As you are aware, they are moving throughout the country in their humanitarian effort to gather information in an attempt to assess the requirements of the people. Incidents of this nature will not only prevent them from getting the actual picture of the situation, but will also deprive the needy from the essential humanitarian relief assistance being offered by the UN and other organizations.

3. I hope that you will personally look into this incident and take the necessary steps to ensure cooperation between RPA members and all UN personnel.

4. Please be assured of my full cooperation at all times.

  
Roméo A. Dallaire  
Major-General  
Force Commander

Major-General Paul KAGAME  
Vice-President and Minister of Defence  
Broad-Based Government of  
National Unity of Rwanda  
Kigali



(E)

Kigali, le 5 <sup>août</sup> juillet 1994

Monsieur le Président,

Objet: ADMINISTRATION DANS LA ZONE DE PROTECTION SURE

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire parvenir ci-joint copie d'une fiche que je viens de recevoir du Commandant de l'Opération Turquoise concernant la mise sur pied des organismes de gestion et d'administration régionaux dans la Zone de Protection Sûre.

La mise en place de ces structures, dont le but est de créer un environnement propice au retour rapide à une vie normale, contribueront sans doute à la transition qui sera assumée par la MINUAR après le départ des Forces de coalition de l'Opération Turquoise.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Président, les assurances de ma plus haute considération.

Roméo A. Dallaire  
Major-Général  
Commandant de la Force

Son Excellence Monsieur Pasteur BIZIMUNGU  
Président de la République du Rwanda  
Kigali

copies: Vice-Président et Ministre de la Défence  
Ministre de la Réhabilitation et de  
la Réintégration Sociale

Copies : SRSG  
HAC  
COD  
DFC  
CPLANS



**OPERATION TURQUOISE**  
sous-chef opérations

Goma, le 03 août 1994

**FICHE****Objet: Administration en ZHS**

- Les événements survenus au Rwanda depuis le 6 avril et l'exode massif des populations vers les régions de l'ouest, ont perturbé les structures et le fonctionnement des services administratifs et publics dans la majeure partie du pays.

En ZHS les commandants de groupements se sont d'emblée efforcés, en étroite collaboration avec les populations, de mettre sur pied des organismes de gestion et d'administration régionaux, dans le but essentiel de *créer un environnement propice au retour rapide à une vie normale*.

A cet effet trois objectifs ont été retenus:

- rétablir la sécurité des personnes et des biens;
- restaurer un minimum de services publics;
- favoriser la reprise des activités économiques (agriculture, commerce,...).

Les structures ainsi mises en place n'ont, bien évidemment, qu'un caractère intérimaire. Elles pourraient avoir vocation à assumer la transition avec la MINUAR, puis avec les autorités gouvernementales rwandaises.

**1°-Constitution des structures administratives provisoires**

Sous des appellations différentes, comités, cellules, conseils,... les structures mises en place dans les trois secteurs de groupements présentent les similitudes suivantes:

- elles ont été demandées par les populations;
- elles sont composées de personnels cooptés par les habitants;
- elles se veulent représentatives des différentes sensibilités.

**2°-Fonctionnement des structures:**

Il est vite apparu que la situation de crise au Rwanda avait provoqué la déliquescence des organismes de gestion des cités et des campagnes. La solution aux problèmes humanitaires ainsi générés, passait en grande partie par la restauration urgente d'un cadre administratif capable de prendre en compte les aspirations des populations et permettant à ces dernières, de trouver une structure d'accueil et de référence.

L'organisation et le fonctionnement des structures provisoires s'appuient sur le découpage administratif existant.

La préfecture est le siège du centre décisionnel. C'est à ce niveau que s'élaborent les concepts d'action dans les différents domaines prioritaires. Les commandants de groupements sont présents, ou représentés par des officiers chargés des affaires civiles, dans ces instances. Leur rôle est d'aider à la coordination des actions envisagées et de participer à la mise en œuvre des décisions.

Les relais se situent au niveau des sous-préfectures et des commandants de groupements.

zones et de comités de quartier. Les commandants de groupements assurent auprès des populations la mise en œuvre des décisions.

de proximité. Les commandants de groupements assurent auprès des populations la mise en œuvre des décisions.

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### 3°-Domaines d'action.

Pour favoriser le retour à une vie normale, en attendant que les structures officielles soient à nouveau en place, les comités locaux, avec l'aide de Turquoise, se sont intéressés aux domaines qui suivent:

**-Sécurité publique:** Face à l'insuffisance numérique des forces de gendarmerie et de police, les comités locaux ont sollicité les unités Turquoise pour participer à la sécurité des biens et des personnes. Les conduites à tenir en la matière, ont été consignées par écrit en s'inspirant des règles communément appliquées dans ce type de situation.

De plus les comités locaux ont procédé à la nomination de gendarmes, dont la compétence, l'intégrité et la notoriété étaient unanimement reconnues. Dans le même temps certains établissements pénitentiaires ont été réhabilités.

Il faudra probablement envisager de poursuivre cette action pendant un certain temps encore en zone démilitarisée. Toutefois il sera nécessaire de donner toute la légitimité indispensable à ces opérations, de faire procéder rapidement à la nomination des instances judiciaires régionales.

#### **-Santé publique:**

Les forces Turquoise ont assuré la liaison entre les agences et ONG présentes sur zone et les comités locaux afin de réactiver les centres de soin et les hôpitaux. Des kits médicaux ont été mis en place et les médecins militaires ont participé activement au fonctionnement des services médicaux recréés.

Il a été fait appel, au bénévolat des personnels locaux qualifiés.

Cette action de santé publique s'est aussi orientée vers les camps des personnes déplacées. Il convenait non seulement de les protéger, mais aussi de veiller, autant que faire se pouvait, à leur prodiguer des soins et leur procurer eau et nourriture. L'action de Turquoise et des comités locaux en l'espèce, fut d'appeler l'attention des agences spécialisées sur les cas les plus sérieux et de les aider.

#### **-Services publics:**

Le bon fonctionnement des services publics conditionne la vie des cités et le bien-être des populations. A contrario la détérioration ou l'abandon des installations et des réseaux de distribution constituent des facteurs de déstabilisation et d'exode.

C'est pourquoi, à la demande des comités, les forces Turquoise ont:

- assuré la garde des centrales électriques, des génératrices, des stations de pompage des eaux;
- participé aux travaux de remise en état des réseaux de distribution ;
- relancé les transports en commun publics en réquisitionnant les véhicules volés;
- assuré la sécurité des marchés locaux.

Toutes ces mesures d'ordre administratif commencent à porter leur fruit. Les villes retrouvent peu à peu une certaine sérénité. Mais l'équilibre est encore précaire et il paraît indispensable de maintenir voire d'accentuer les efforts dans les trois domaines qui précèdent. Ils conditionneront le succès de la MINUAR. Pour y parvenir il faudra à court terme fidéliser, en les rétribuant, les agents de l'administration. Et il conviendra aussi de veiller à ce que ces personnels soient avant tout, soucieux du bien public.

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA


MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Rwanda presents his compliments to His Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Rwanda and has the honour to request clearance for the deployment of military observers to UNAMIR from the following countries:

1. Australia
2. Ethiopia
3. Guinea
4. Guinea Bissau
5. Ireland
6. Jordan
7. Kenya
8. Sweden

The Special Representative wishes to take this opportunity to renew to His Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs assurances of his highest esteem and consideration. *RHC*



UNAMIR, Kigali, Rwanda  
3 August 1994

Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Kigali, RWANDA



UNAMIR - MINUAR

2 August 1994

TO: MAJOR GENERAL PAUL KAGAME  
DEFENCE MINISTER, RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT


FROM: MAJOR GENERAL ROMEO A. DALLAIRE  
COMMANDER UNAMIR

SUBJECT: HUMANITARIAN AID FOR REFUGEES  
DEPLOYMENT OF A CANADIAN FIELD AMBULANCE

1. Canada has committed one of its army's medical units, 2 Field Ambulance, to provide humanitarian aid for Rwandanese refugees. 2 Field Ambulance will arrive in RWANDA this week and will be able to quickly deploy its resources to provide medical support to refugees in transit. 2 Field Ambulance, in addition to its medical capability, has an engineer capability to purify up to 100,000 liters of water a day. CANADA has committed 2 Field Ambulance to this effort for up to 60 days.

2. The Commanding Officer of 2 Field Ambulance, in RWANDA on reconnaissance, has identified a location for the deployment of his unit that will allow the most effective support to the refugees. This site was selected after consultation with the Crisis Action Team GISENYI, the Rwandan Patriotic Army Liaison Officer to UNAMIR Sector Headquarters GISENYI, the U.N. Rwandan Emergency Organization, The U.N. High Commission for Refugees, UNAMIR, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and Mediciens Sans Frontiers.

3. Your approval is requested for 2 Field Ambulance to occupy the compound of "Laiterie Nkamira" and the adjacent building complex of 3 separate buildings for a period of up to 60 days. This site is located on the main road between GISENYI and RUHENGURI, approximately 1.5 km northwest of the MUDENDE / MUTURA turn-off. (Grid 314185 Map Series Z721 Sheet 7 GISENYI).

  
R.A. Dallaire  
Major General  
Force Commander



UNAMIR - MINUAR

2 August 1994

TO: MAJOR GENERAL PAUL KAGAME  
DEFENCE MINISTER, RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT


FROM: MAJOR GENERAL ROMEO A. DALLAIRE  
COMMANDER UNAMIR

SUBJECT: HUMANITARIAN AID FOR REFUGEES  
DEPLOYMENT OF A CANADIAN FIELD AMBULANCE

1. Canada has committed one of its army's medical units, 2 Field Ambulance, to provide humanitarian aid for Rwandanese refugees. 2 Field Ambulance will arrive in RWANDA this week and will be able to quickly deploy its resources to provide medical support to refugees in transit. 2 Field Ambulance, in addition to its medical capability, has an engineer capability to purify up to 100,000 liters of water a day. CANADA has committed 2 Field Ambulance to this effort for up to 60 days.

2. The Commanding Officer of 2 Field Ambulance, in RWANDA on reconnaissance, has identified a location for the deployment of his unit that will allow the most effective support to the refugees. This site was selected after consultation with the Crisis Action Team GISENYI, the Rwandan Patriotic Army Liaison Officer to UNAMIR Sector Headquarters GISENYI, the U.N. Rwandan Emergency Organization, The U.N. High Commission for Refugees, UNAMIR, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and Mediciens Sans Frontiers.

3. Your approval is requested for 2 Field Ambulance to occupy the compound of "Laiterie Nkamira" and the adjacent building complex of 3 separate buildings for a period of up to 60 days. This site is located on the main road between GISENYI and RUHENGARI, approximately 1.5 km northwest of the MUDENDE / MUTURA turn-off. (Grid 314185 Map Series Z721 Sheet 7 GISENYI).

  
R.A. Dallaire  
Major General  
Force Commander



UNAMIR  
FORCE HQ  
KIGALI  
3/ July 1994

1000.1(FC)


Dear General, *Lu*

SUBJECT: CONCERN ABOUT THE DENIAL OF MOVEMENT AND ACCESS

1. On your request I instructed my Force Signal Officer to verify the status of Rwanda's international satellite communication site located at Nyaanza. This technical reconnaissance had as its primary purpose to determine what advice or assistance could be provided to your government in restoring this system.
2. On 30 July 1994 the Force Signal Officer and his Chief Communications Operator attempted unsuccessfully to gain access to the facility. Access to this location was controlled by a number of soldiers. Eventually the officer in charge, a Major, came to the location. It was explained to him by my officer that the BBGNU of Rwanda had requested this assistance from UNAMIR in an attempt to restore international communications. The officer simply indicated that the satellite base station was now in the possession of the Army. The Major was not clear as to why access was denied.
3. I wish to strongly raise my concern to you about this situation for it only counters the initiatives which we are attempting at your request. Based on our previous discussions I had informed my staff and soldiers that freedom of movement within all sectors, except four, had been granted to UN personnel.
4. The message concerning movement and access as it applies to the UN does not seem to be reaching the ground soldiers. I assure you that all of these initiatives are in support of your priority to restore your country's infrastructure.

5. It would be very much appreciated if you could take this issue up personally and let us know of the outcome. I count on your cooperation on the issue and hope that your forces will continue to cooperate with us.

Yours sincerely,



R. A. DALLAIRE  
Major-General  
Force Commander

THE VICE PRESIDENT AND MINISTER OF DEFENCE  
THE BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL  
UNITY OF RWANDA  
KIGALI



UNAMIR - MINUAR

Kigali, *J. Gant* 1994  
5000.4 (LOG)

Dear General,

Subject: ACQUISITION OF INFRASTRUCTURE

1. The British Medical and Engineer teams are to be located in RUHENGARI. The Stadium has been identified as a suitable site for a treatment centre for Rwandese citizens returning from Zaire. This should not interfere with the civil administration.
2. It is requested that you authorize the use of the infrastructure for a minimum period of 3 months. The teams have started work on 3 August 1994.
3. I always appreciate your cooperation and expect an early response.

*Roméo A. Dallaire*  
Roméo A. Dallaire  
Major-General  
Force Commander

Major-General Paul KAGAME  
Vice-President and Minister of Defence  
The Broad-Based Government of  
National Unity of Rwanda  
Kigali





Kigali, le 3 août 1994  
1000. (FC)


Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre ci-joint une Note verbale concernant le but ainsi que les conditions de la présence des Forces armées canadiennes sur le sol rwandais.

Si les termes de cette Note sont acceptables au Gouvernement de la République du Rwanda, cette note constituera avec la réponse en ce sens de votre Ministère une Entente qui prendra effet à la date de la réception de la Note du Ministère.

Etant donné l'urgence de la situation, je vous serais reconnaissant de bien vouloir me faire parvenir la réponse de votre Gouvernement dans les plus brefs délais.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Ministre, les assurances de ma haute considération.

  
Romeo A. Dallaire  
Major-Général  
Commandant de la Force

Son Excellence Monsieur Jean Marie NDAGIJIMANA  
Ministre des Affaires Etrangères et de la  
Coopération  
Kigali



(2) NTF

Copy given to LO  
George 19-8-94

(3) NTF

Letter received from  
Minister. Forwarded  
22/8/94

Canadian Embassy



Ambassade du Canada

Note No WAGR-0808

L'Ambassade du Canada présente ses compliments au Ministère des Affaires étrangères de la République du Rwanda et a l'honneur de solliciter du Gouvernement de la République du Rwanda l'autorisation d'envoyer dans les meilleurs délais des membres des Forces armées canadiennes sur le sol rwandais; la présence des Forces armées canadiennes en République du Rwanda aura pour seul but de fournir sur place de l'aide humanitaire et toute autre assistance possible aux réfugiés rwandais, aux autres personnes déplacées et aux individus dans le besoin d'aide humanitaire. Les membres des Forces armées canadiennes auront, avec le consentement des autorités rwandaises, le droit de porter leurs armes personnelles et d'utiliser ces armes afin de défendre le personnel des Forces armées canadiennes et les personnes placées sous leur protection. Les membres des Forces armées canadiennes en mission au Rwanda bénéficieront des privilèges et immunités du personnel administratif et technique des missions diplomatiques en vertu de la Convention de Vienne sur les relations diplomatiques du 18 avril 1961. Les Forces armées canadiennes exerceront à ce titre leur juridiction exclusive en matière disciplinaire et criminelle sur les membres

- 2 -

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
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L'Ambassade du Canada a de plus l'honneur de solliciter, eu égard à l'extrême urgence de la situation, et des liens d'amitié unissant les peuples du Canada et de la République du Rwanda, une réponse dans les plus brefs délais afin de permettre aux Forces armées canadiennes de commencer leur mission humanitaire dès le 3 août 1994.

L'Ambassade du Canada saisit cette occasion pour renouveler au Ministère des Affaires étrangères de la République du Rwanda l'expression de sa très haute considération.

Nairobi, KENYA

le 2 août 1994



\*\* TOTAL PAGE 003 \*\*

1/8

P.O. Box 30481  
Nairobi, Kenya  
TELEX: 22198 DOMCAN KE  
TEL: (254-2) 21-4804


## FAX TRANSMITTAL HEADER

FAX NUMBER: (254-2) 21-6485

DATE: 19 August 1994 FROM: NROBI WAGR-0868  
TO: UNAMIR/Major St-Denis  
Kigali)  
FAX NO: (000-1-212) 963.3090  
SUBJECT: CAF in Rwanda  
SENDER: Canadian High Commission  
NAIROBI, Kenya  
NUMBER OF PAGES: 8 (including cover)  
REFERENCE: Phone conversation Wall/St-Denis, August 19

-----  
Further to our conversation at 10:00 hrs, attached is  
copy of Fax sent to Major Lancaster August 2. We sent a further  
request for a report on August 3. This matter is now considered  
very urgent - see copy of attached telegram EXTOTT/GAF 0726. We  
would be grateful for whatever help you can give.

Yours sincerely,



J.C. Wall  
Counsellor

\*\* TOTAL PAGE.001 \*\*

Box 30481  
Nairobi, Kenya  
TELEX: 22196 DOMCAN KE  
TEL: (254-2) 21-4804

*Cic*  
*2/8*

**FAX TRANSMITTAL HEADER****FAX NUMBER: (254-2) 21-6485**

DATE: 2 August 1994 FROM: NROBI WAGR-0810  
TO: UNAMIR/Major Lancaster


FAX NO: (000-1-212) 963-3090  
SUBJECT: CAF in Rwanda  
SENDER: Canadian High Commission  
NAIROBI, Kenya

NO. OF PAGES: 3 (including cover)

REFERENCE: Our Diplomatic note number WAGR-0808 to the Ministry  
of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Rwanda

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Please present on our behalf, as soon as possible, and  
advise us and DND/Hollie MacDougall (Fax: 613/995-3155) and  
EXTOTT/JLA/Alain Hausser (Fax: 613/944-0870) of response.

  
Chris Cooter  
Second Secretary

318

Canadian Embassy



Ambassade du Canada

Note No WAGR-0808

L'Ambassade du Canada présente ses compliments au Ministère des Affaires étrangères de la République du Rwanda et a l'honneur de solliciter du Gouvernement de la République du Rwanda l'autorisation d'envoyer dans les meilleurs délais des membres des Forces armées canadiennes sur le sol rwandais; la présence des Forces armées canadiennes en République du Rwanda aura pour seul but de fournir sur place de l'aide humanitaire et toute autre assistance possible aux réfugiés rwandais, aux autres personnes déplacées et aux individus dans le besoin d'aide humanitaire. Les membres des Forces armées canadiennes auront, avec le consentement des autorités rwandaises, le droit de porter leurs armes personnelles et d'utiliser ces armes afin de défendre le personnel des Forces armées canadiennes et les personnes placées sous leur protection. Les membres des Forces armées canadiennes en mission au Rwanda bénéficieront des privilèges et immunités du personnel administratif et technique des missions diplomatiques en vertu de la *Convention de Vienne sur les relations diplomatiques* du 18 avril 1961. Les Forces armées canadiennes exerceront à ce titre leur juridiction exclusive en matière disciplinaire et criminelle sur les membres du personnel

...2

4/8

- 2 -

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
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L'Ambassade du Canada a de plus l'honneur de solliciter, eu égard à l'extrême urgence de la situation, et des liens d'amitié unissant les peuples du Canada et de la République du Rwanda, une réponse dans les plus brefs délais afin de permettre aux Forces armées canadiennes de commencer leur mission humanitaire dès le 3 août 1994.

L'Ambassade du Canada saisit cette occasion pour renouveler au Ministère des Affaires étrangères de la République du Rwanda l'expression de sa très haute considération.

Nairobi, KENYA

le 2 août 1994



5/8

ACTION	
AUG 9 1994	
SECTION:	<i>Pa</i>
RETURN <input type="checkbox"/>	DESIGN <input type="checkbox"/>
FILE NO:	

UNCLASSIFIED

FM EXTOTT GAF0726 18AUG94

TO - CATS NROBI

INFO TT NDHQOTT/DIPOL/ DE CAF

DISTR -GAA -GGB -GGD -JLA

FROM DUBOIS CHANTAL -GAF

---STATUT DE NOS MILITAIRES AU RWANDA

LE 29JUILLET, JLA VOUS A FAIT PARVENIR PAR TELECOPIE TEXTE D'UNE NOTE A TRANSMETTRE AUX AUTORITES RWANDAISES VISANT A REGULARISER STATUT DES MILITAIRES CDNS DE L'UNITE MEDICALE, LES AUTORISANTS ENTRE AUTRES A PORTER DES ARMES PERSONNELLES. AU COURS DU WEEK-END, GAF/SAINT-HILAIRE A TELEPHONE A VOTRE AGENT DE SERVICE POUR LUI EXPLIQUER IMPORTANCE DE PROCEDER RAPIDEMENT A ECHANGE DE NOTES. LE LUNDI SUIVANT, VOUS NOUS INFORMIEZ QUE VOUS N'AVIEZ PAS RECU LA TELECOPIE DE JLA. COMME L'ECHANGE DE NOTE AVAIT EU LIEU AVEC LE ZAIRE AU COURS DU WEEK-END, NOUS VOUS L'AVIONS RETRANSMIS IMMEDIATEMENT POUR SERVIR DE MODELE. A L'EPOQUE, ON CROYAIT QUE L'UNITE MEDICALE SERAIT D'ABORD DEPLOYEE A GOMA MAIS ELLE L'A ETE DU COTE RWANDAIS.

2. NOUS VOUS DEMANDONS DE NOUS CONFIRMER PAR TEL DE RETOUR STATUT DE ARRANGEMENT QUE NOUS VOUS AVONS DEMANDE DE NEGOCIER AVEC AUTORITES RWANDAISES ET DE NOUS FAIRE PARVENIR COPIE. SI CE N'EST PAS DEJA FAIT, IL FAUDRAIT ACCORDER PREMIERE PRIORITE A CETTE TACHE. COMME SOLDATS DU FPR ONT COMMENCE A ARRETER TROUPES DE ...2



6/8

PAGE TWO GAF0726 UNCLASSIFIED

L'ONU POUR INFRACTIONS COMME EXCES DE VITESSE, MDN A BESOIN  
IMPERATIF DE RECEVOIR CONFIRMATION DE ARRANGEMENT, PARTICULIEREMENT  
POUR SES MILITAIRES QUI NE FONCTIONNENT PAS SOUS LE COUVERT DE LA  
MINUAR.

UUU/274 182103Z GAF0726

OTT027/RANAI/DE OTT GAF0726

7/8

ACTION	
DATE:	AUG 19 1994
SECTION:	<i>PS</i>
RETURN	<input type="checkbox"/> DESTROY <input type="checkbox"/>
FILE No:	

UNCLASSIFIED

FM EXTOTT GAF0725 18AUG94

TO - CATS NROBI DELIVER BY 190800

INFO TT NDHQOTT/DIPOL/ DE CAF

DISTR -GAA -GGB -GGD -JLA

FROM DUBOIS CHANTAL -GAF

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...2

8/8

PAGE TWO GAF0275 UNCLAS

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IMPERATIF DE RECEVOIR CONFIRMATION DE ARRANGEMENT, PARTICULIEREMENT  
POUR SES MILITAIRES QUI NE FONCTIONNENT PAS SOUS LE COUVERT DE LA  
MINUAR.

UUU/274 181901Z GAF0725

OTT002/YANAI190800/DE OTT GAF0725

1/8

P.O. Box 30481  
Nairobi, Kenya  
TELEX: 22196 DOMCAN KE  
TEL: (254-2) 21-4804


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FAX NUMBER: (254-2) 21-6485

DATE: 19 August 1994 FROM: NROBI WAGR-0868  
TO: UNAMIR/Major St-Denis  
Kigali)  
FAX NO: (000-1-212) 963.3090  
SUBJECT: CAF in Rwanda  
SENDER: Canadian High Commission  
NAIROBI, Kenya  
NUMBER OF PAGES: 8 (including cover)  
REFERENCE: Phone conversation Wall/St-Denis, August 19

Further to our conversation at 10:00 hrs, attached is copy of Fax sent to Major Lancaster August 2. We sent a further request for a report on August 3. This matter is now considered very urgent - see copy of attached telegram EXTOTT/GAF 0726. We would be grateful for whatever help you can give.

Yours sincerely,



J.C. Wall  
Counsellor

Circ  
2/8


Box 30481  
Nairobi, Kenya  
TELEX: 22196 DOMCAN KE  
TEL: (254-2) 21-4804

**FAX TRANSMITTAL HEADER****FAX NUMBER: (254-2) 21-6485**

**DATE:** 2 August 1994 **FROM:** NROBI WAGR-0810  
**TO:** UNAMIR/Major Lancaster  
**FAX NO:** (000-1-212) 963-3090  
**SUBJECT:** CAF in Rwanda  
**SENDER:** Canadian High Commission  
NAIROBI, Kenya  
**NO. OF PAGES:** 3 (including cover)  
**REFERENCE:** Our Diplomatic note number WAGR-0808 to the Ministry  
of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Rwanda

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Chris Cooter  
Second Secretary

318

Canadian Embassy



Ambassade du Canada

Note No WAGR-0808

L'Ambassade du Canada présente ses compliments au Ministère des Affaires étrangères de la République du Rwanda et a l'honneur de solliciter du Gouvernement de la République du Rwanda l'autorisation d'envoyer dans les meilleurs délais des membres des Forces armées canadiennes sur le sol rwandais; la présence des Forces armées canadiennes en République du Rwanda aura pour seul but de fournir sur place de l'aide humanitaire et toute autre assistance possible aux réfugiés rwandais, aux autres personnes déplacées et aux individus dans le besoin d'aide humanitaire. Les membres des Forces armées canadiennes auront, avec le consentement des autorités rwandaises, le droit de porter leurs armes personnelles et d'utiliser ces armes afin de défendre le personnel des Forces armées canadiennes et les personnes placées sous leur protection. Les membres des Forces armées canadiennes en mission au Rwanda bénéficieront des privilèges et immunités du personnel administratif et technique des missions diplomatiques en vertu de la Convention de Vienne sur les relations diplomatiques du 18 avril 1961. Les Forces armées canadiennes exerceront à ce titre leur juridiction exclusive en matière disciplinaire et criminelle sur les membres du personnel

...2



Kigali, le 3 août 1994  
1000. (FC)

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Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Ministre, les assurances de ma haute considération.

  
Romeo A. Dallaire  
Major-Général  
Commandant de la Force

Son Excellence Monsieur Jean Marie NDAGIJIMANA  
Ministre des Affaires Etrangères et de la  
Coopération  
Kigali

Canadian Embassy



Ambassade du Canada

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- 2 -

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
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L'Ambassade du Canada saisit cette occasion pour renouveler au Ministère des Affaires étrangères de la République du Rwanda l'expression de sa très haute considération.

Nairobi, KENYA

le 2 août 1994



\*\* TOTAL PAGE.003 \*\*




Kigali, 22 July 1994  
1000.2 (FC)

Subject: KIDNAPPING OF MR SYLVESTRE KAMALI

Dear General,

1. Please find enclosed a copy of a letter on above subject received at this headquarters for your urgent attention and appropriate directive. A copy of the curriculum vitae of Mr Kamali is also enclosed for your guidance in case the name does not sound familiar to you.
2. An initial investigation was carried out by our humanitarian cell but so far no encouraging response has been received. I would wish that you personally take up this matter in view of the dimension it has assumed.
3. I would like to point out that an incidence of this nature if not properly handled will bring an embarrassment to all of us especially at this moment when we are preaching and making every effort towards reconciliation. We are deeply concerned about rumours circulating on recent disappearance of people here and there. The incidence of Mr Kamali may go a long way to confirm these rumours since the witness has laid bare the facts.
4. I trust, General, that I may continue to count on the same co-operation that you have always shown and that we may move forward to bring about the peace, reconciliation, unity, freedom and justice that is so badly needed in Rwanda.

Yours Sincerely,

  
Romeo A. Dallaire  
Major General  
Force Commander

H.E. Major General Paul Kagame  
Vice President and Minister of Defence  
Kigali - Rwanda.

④  
PA  
*political file*

LETTER ADDRESSED TO THE SRSG  
FROM THE DIRECTEUR DE CABINET  
OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC

③  
FC  
*Well I guess we just have  
to continue with our efforts  
and hope that the needs of  
results will emerge soon.*  
03/14

Translated from the French  
Kyle Utley, 01041994

29 March 1994

Mr. Special Representative,

The President of the Republic has tasked me to inform you that he has received the letter you addressed to him on the 28th of March 1994 concerning the installation of the Transitional Institutions.

The Head of State would like, by the present, to reiterate to you, as well as the International Community represented in Kigali and the members of the Diplomatic Corps in the name of which you transmitted said letter, the profound gratitude of himself and the Rwandese people for all the efforts that you ceaselessly pursue in accompanying our country on its quest for peace and the determination to instill stable political institutions supporting national reconciliation and our country's reconstruction after this long period of war.

The President of the Republic wishes to remind you that his political attitude, since his inauguration at the head of the Rwandese state, has always been founded on peace, national unity and the development of the whole country.

On this subject, he is very glad about the conclusions drawn at the end of the meeting that you held on Monday, 28 March 1994 in which participated the Papal Nuncio, the Dean of the Diplomatic Corp, the Tanzanian Ambassador (representing the facilitator) and the Ambassadors of Germany, Belgium, Burundi, USA, France, Uganda and Zaire: observer nations to the Arusha peace negotiations.

Consequently, the President of the Republic has tasked me to bring to your attention that he shares entirely your opinion that the RPF and all the political parties accepted in Rwanda on the date of the signature of the Protocol Accord on the Power Sharing, and that are engaged in respecting the Peace Agreement, must be represented in the Transitional National Assembly effective upon its installation.

The Head of State shares, as well, your opinion that the Commission on Unity and Reconciliation must be established as soon as possible, and it is this commission's responsibility to permanently monitor the respect of each political force and the principles of the Code Political Ethics: a violation of which is punishable by a sanction of exclusion from the institutions.

The President of the Republic strongly hopes that each political party and the RPF will come around to your way of thinking and do everything to ensure that the installation of the Transitional Institutions will no longer suffer any hinderance such as have been used as ploys to bring about the exclusion of a political force of one kind or another from these institutions .

These are the observations the Head of State has charged me to convey on his behalf. I assure you of his full availability to collaborate on the installation of the Transitional Institutions as well as his preoccupation with returning Rwanda to the road to peace and progress for all it's inhabitants.

Please accept, Mr. Special Representative, the expression of my highest consideration.

(Enoch Ruhigira)



PRESIDENCE DE LA REPUBLIQUE  
CABINET DU PRESIDENT

*Code -*

Kigali, le 29 mars 1994...

N° 208/01.10

RECEIVED	
OFFICE OF SRSG	
Date	29-3-94 - 12h00
No.	848 By PF

Réf. No :

Annexe :

Objet :

*②*  
*DKC*  
*The SRSG has spoken to Dr Jacques-Roger BOOH-BOOH*  
*Enoch and this is the - Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire*  
*talk essentially means that Général de l'ONU*  
*the CSR should be in at KIGALI -*  
*the start once they sign the code of ethics. Please return. I agree to me that the President is still one being deliberately obscure. I wonder why?*

Monsieur le Représentant Spécial,

Le Président de la République me charge de vous informer qu'il a bien reçu la lettre que vous Lui avez adressée le 28 mars 1994, relativement à la mise en place des institutions de la transition.

Le Chef de l'Etat voudrait par la présente, vous redire ainsi qu'à la Communauté Internationale, représentée à Kigali, particulièrement par vous-même et les membres du Corps Diplomatique au nom desquels vous Lui avez transmis votre dite lettre, Sa profonde reconnaissance et celle du Peuple rwandais, pour tant d'efforts que vous ne cessez de vous imposer, pour accompagner notre pays, dans sa quête de la paix et dans sa volonté de mettre sur pied des institutions politiques stables, à même de favoriser la réconciliation nationale et la reconstruction de notre pays, après cette longue période de guerre.

Le Président de la République souhaite vous rappeler que son action politique, depuis qu'il se trouve à la tête de l'Etat rwandais, est et reste basée sur la paix, l'unité nationale et le développement de l'ensemble du Pays.

A ce titre, Il se félicite des conclusions dégagées à l'issue de la réunion que vous avez tenue ce lundi 28 mars 1994 et à laquelle ont participé le Nonce Apostolique, Doyen du Corps Diplomatique, l'Ambassadeur de la République Unie de Tanzanie, représentant du Facilitateur ainsi que les Ambassadeurs d'Allemagne, de Belgique, du Burundi, des Etats-Unis d'Amérique, de France, d'Ouganda et du Zaïre, pays observateurs aux négociations de paix d'Arusha.

En conséquence, le Président de la République m'a chargé de porter à votre connaissance qu'il partage entièrement votre avis que le FPR et tous les partis politiques, agréés au Rwanda à la date de signature du Protocole d'Accord sur le Partage du Pouvoir et qui se sont engagés à respecter l'Accord de Paix, doivent être représentés à l'Assemblée Nationale de Transition dès sa mise en place.

*2/3 CRW-101*


ok | Le Chef de l'Etat partage par ailleurs votre avis que c'est à la Commission sur l'Unité et la Réconciliation qui doit être mise en place le plus rapidement possible, qu'il revient de contrôler en tout temps, le respect par chaque force politique, des principes du Code d'Ethique Politique dont la violation est passible de la sanction d'exclusion des institutions.]

Le Président de la République espère fermement que chaque parti politique et le FPR se rallieront à votre avis et feront tout, pour que la mise en place des institutions de la transition ne souffre plus d'aucune entrave de la part de qui que ce soit userait de stratagèmes, pour aboutir à l'exclusion de ces institutions, d'une quelconque force politique.

Telles sont les observations que le Chef de l'Etat m'a chargé de porter de Sa part, à votre connaissance. Il vous assure de Sa pleine disponibilité pour collaborer à la mise en place des institutions de la transition, soucieux qu'il est de relancer le Rwanda sur la voie de la paix et du progrès pour tous ses habitants.

Veillez agréer, Monsieur le Représentant Spécial, l'expression de ma plus haute considération.

Le Directeur de Cabinet  
Enoch RUHIGIRA



3/3 CRN-108