



S-0875-0002-10-00001

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*Title* **Items-in-Peace-keeping operations - United Nations Operations in the Congo - correspondence with Sture Linner, Secretary-General's Personal Representative in Brussels**

*Date Created* **29/03/1962**

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*Container* **S-0875-0002: Peace-Keeping Operations Files of the Secretary-General: U Thant: United Nations Operations in the Congo**

*Print Name of Person Submit Image*



*Signature of Person Submit*



4/13

To: The Secretary-General  
For information

R-

Thans.  
92  
13/4

From Le Monde of 11 April 1962 (translated from the French)

Mr. Thant Establishes Direct Contact with Brussels  
on Problems of the Congo

From our special correspondent Pierre de Vos

Brussels, 10 April. - Mr. Sture Linner, former chief of UN civilian operations in the Congo, arrived Tuesday morning in Brussels, where he will exercise for approximately two months the functions of Mr. Thant's special representative to the Belgian Government for Congolese questions. The Secretary-General in fact wishes to maintain contact between Belgium and the United Nations for several weeks.

Mr. Sture Linner's appointment, which has been agreed to by Brussels, should doubtless be connected with a rumour according to which the question is said to have been raised that a Belgian might be designated as the responsible United Nations civilian official in the Congo. Such a designation would have the twofold effect of marking an end of the hostility to which Belgium feels it has been subjected on the part of the UN, and of designating a man in charge who knows the country. The name of a Belgian industrialist residing in Leopoldville has been mentioned for this post. He is Mr. Depoorter, who has been in the Congo for more than 15 years, and was before independence a high official in charge of economic affairs. Since July 1960 he has been at the head of the Federation of Enterprises in the Congo (F.E.C.). On the other hand, Brussels newspapers have been commenting on this report with circumspection. They would wish to have an African rather than Mr. Depoorter appointed to this post so as to prevent the UN and certain Congolese leaders from taking the opportunity of turning Belgium into a scapegoat. The Congolese swamp is in fact in so grave a condition - according to La Cité - that the office of civilian chief (chief of civilian operations? Tr.) is one of the most ungrateful ones.

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## RAPPELLE

Maghrébine  
l'histoire

personnelles. Après celles de  
Siba, Balafrej ou Yazid, prépa-  
re à entendre d'étranges modu-  
parfois discordantes. — sur un  
e.

ont à négliger les cicatrices de  
histoire et à obtenir par un  
cord de libres volontés ce qui  
it jadis, pendant moins d'un  
siècle, réalisé par la force des  
armes. Ce sera au mieux une  
œuvre de longue haleine.

(1) Evolution politique de l'Afri-  
que du Nord musulmane, 1920-1961,  
Bernard Colla, éditeur, dans la col-  
lection « Sciences politiques ».

Citer ce livre à l'occasion d'une  
ventuelle unité maghrébine impose  
de dire qu'il mériterait de l'être à

M. Thant établit un contact direct  
avec Bruxelles sur les problèmes du Congo

De notre correspondant particulier PIERRE DE VOS

Bruxelles, 10 avril. — M. Sturé Lin-  
ner, ancien chef des opérations civi-  
les de l'O.N.U. au Congo, est arrivé  
mardi matin à Bruxelles, où il exer-  
cera pendant deux mois environ les  
fonctions de représentant spécial de  
M. Thant pour les questions congolai-  
ses auprès du gouvernement belge.  
En effet, le secrétaire général désire  
maintenir pendant quelques semaines  
un contact entre la Belgique et les  
Nations unies.

Il convient sans aucun doute de  
rapprocher la nomination de M. Sturé  
Linner, agréée par Bruxelles, d'une  
rumeur selon laquelle il serait ques-  
tion de désigner un Belge comme res-  
ponsable civil des Nations unies au  
Congo. Cette désignation aurait pour  
double effet de marquer la fin de  
l'hostilité, dont la Belgique estime  
avoir souffert de la part de l'O.N.U.,  
et de désigner un responsable con-

naissant le pays. Le nom d'un indus-  
triel belge installé à Léopoldville est  
avancé pour cette fonction. Il s'agit  
de M. Depoorter, qui est au Congo  
depuis plus de quinze ans, et a été  
haut fonctionnaire, chargé des affai-  
res économiques avant l'indépendan-  
ce. Depuis juillet 1960, il était à la  
tête de la Fédération des entreprises  
au Congo (F.E.C.).

Cependant, les journaux bruxellois  
commentent avec circonspection cette  
information, et souhaitent voir dési-  
gner un Africain à cette fonction plu-  
tôt que M. Depoorter, en vue d'éviter  
que l'O.N.U. et certains dirigeants  
congolais ne trouvent l'occasion de  
transformer la Belgique en bouc émis-  
saire. Le marasme congolais est en  
effet à ce point grave, écrit notam-  
ment la Cité, que la fonction de res-  
ponsable civil de l'O.N.U. est des  
plus ingrates.

From C.L. Sherry

From Le Monde of 11 April 1962 (translated from the French)

Mr. Thant Establishes Direct Contact with Brussels  
on Problems of the Congo

From our special correspondent Pierre de Vos

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Mr. Sture Linner's appointment, which has been agreed to by Brussels, should doubtless be connected with a rumour according to which the question is said to have been raised that a Belgian might be designated as the responsible United Nations civilian official in the Congo. Such a designation would have the twofold effect of marking an end of the hostility to which Belgium feels it has been subjected on the part of the UN, and of designating a man in charge who knows the country. The name of a Belgian industrialist residing in Leopoldville has been mentioned for this post. He is Mr. Depoorter, who has been in the Congo for more than 15 years, and was before independence a high official in charge of economic affairs. Since July 1960 he has been at the head of the Federation of Enterprises in the Congo (F.E.C.). On the other hand, Brussels newspapers have been commenting on this report with circumspection. They would wish to have an African rather than Mr. Depoorter appointed to this post so as to prevent the UN and certain Congolese leaders from taking the opportunity of turning Belgium into a scapegoat. The Congolese swamp is in fact in so grave a condition - according to La Cité - that the office of civilian chief (chief of civilian operations? Tr.) is one of the most ungrateful ones.

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29/3/62

For translation into French

M. Henri Spaak

Ministre des Affaires Etrangères

Bruxelles (Belgique)

(cc: Amb. Loridan)

I hope that you will agree with me that it would be useful to you and to me, in connection with the current problems in the Congo, to have in Brussels for the time being a special representative of the Secretary-General. I have thought that such an arrangement would be particularly <sup>helpful</sup> ~~useful~~ with regard to financial matters affecting your Government and also the Union minière. Moreover, such a representative in Brussels would be helpful in interpreting to you any new measures contemplated or actually applied by the UN in the Congo.

If you concur in the principle, it is my intention to designate Dr. Sture Linnér for this assignment which, at this stage I envisage as being for about two months, after which we could of course review the need. Dr. Linnér is well known to you and, as you know, because of his extensive experience in the Congo and before that ~~his experience~~ in business, he is particularly well qualified for this responsibility. He is prepared to assume this responsibility without delay and could come to Brussels as soon as favourable word from you has been received.

With personal regards,

U Thant  
Acting Secretary-General

English text of cable sent in French to M. Henri Spaak on 29 March 1962

M. Henri Spaak  
Ministre des Affaires Etrangères  
Bruxelles (Belgique)

I hope that you will agree with me that it would be useful to you and to me, in connexion with the current problems in the Congo, to have in Brussels for the time being a special representative of the Secretary-General. I have thought that such an arrangement would be particularly useful with regard to financial matters affecting your Government and also the Union Minière. Moreover, such a representative in Brussels would be helpful in interpreting to you any new measures contemplated or actually applied by the UN in the Congo.

If you concur in the principle, it is my intention to designate Dr. Sture Linner for this assignment which, at this stage I envisage as being for about two months, after which we could of course review the need. Dr. Linner is well known to you and, as you know, because of his extensive experience in the Congo and before that in business, he is particularly well qualified for this responsibility. He is prepared to assume this responsibility without delay and could come to Brussels as soon as favourable word from you has been received.

With personal regards,

U Thant  
Acting Secretary-General

YZ292 S (UN2) NY 48 6 0014Z =

ETAT PRIORITE

DR. STURE LINNAR

C/O WILHELM WACHTMEISTER

SWEDISH FOREIGN OFFICE

STOCKHOLM (SWEDEN) =

HAVE JUST RECEIVED APPROVAL FROM FOREIGN MINISTER.

WOULD LIKE TO INFORM HIM OF DATE OF YOUR ARRIVAL AT

YOUR NEW BASE. HOPE THIS COULD BE MONDAY, NINTH.

PLEASE ADVISE SOONEST =

U. THANT NEWYORK +

COL NIL +

UNITED NATIONS  
RECEIVED  
TELETYPE UNIT



UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

5 APRIL 1962 - CLEAR CABLE

U THANT

SECRETARY GENERAL

UNITED NATIONS

NEW YORK

I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE OF 30 MARCH AND I BELIEVE LIKE YOU THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR YOU TO HAVE A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN BRUSSELS WHICH MIGHT, IN MY OPINION, FACILITATE THE DISCUSSION OF CERTAIN PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE UNITED NATIONS. YOUR MESSAGE CONTAINS HOWEVER, AS REGARDS THE MISSION OF MR. LINNER, A REFERENCE TO FINANCIAL QUESTIONS REGARDING THE CONGO COMING WITHIN THE COMPETENCE OF THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE UNION MINIERE. I TRUST THAT THE UNITED NATIONS WILL NOT INTERVENE IN DISCUSSIONS TO BE HELD BETWEEN BELGIUM AND THE CONGO FOR THE PURPOSE OF SETTLING WHAT HAS BEEN CALLED SO FAR THE DIFFERENCES STILL OUTSTANDING BETWEEN BELGIUM AND THE CONGO. I AGREE WITH YOU THAT AN INITIAL MISSION OF TWO MONTHS MIGHT BE GIVEN TO YOUR SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND THAT WE COULD SEE AFTER THAT PERIOD WHETHER IT IS NECESSARY OR NOT TO CONTINUE THE EXPERIMENT. UNDER THESE CONDITIONS IT IS WITH PLEASURE THAT I SHALL SEE THE ARRIVAL OF MR. STURE LINNER TO BRUSSELS. HIGH CONSIDERATION.

SPAAK

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UNATION 2224537  
BELEXT BRU

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ACTION

TO

MONSIEUR U THANT, SECRETAIRE GENERAL DES NATIONS UNIES A NEW YORK =

J AI BIEN RECU VOTRE MESSAGE DU 30 MARS ET PENSE COMME VOUS QU IL  
SERAIT UTILE QUE VOUS AYEZ UN REPRESENTANT SPECIAL A BRUXELLES.  
JE CROIS QUE CELA POURRAIT FACILITER LA DISCUSSION DE CERTAINS PROBLE  
MES ENTRE LE GOUVERNEMENT BELGE ET LES NATIONS UNIES. TOUTEFOIS, VOTRE  
MESSAGE CONTIENT QUANT A LA MISSION DE MR. LINNEN UNE ALLUSION  
AUX QUESTIONS FINANCIERES RELATIVES AU CONGO, QUI INTERESSENT LE  
GOUVERNEMENT BELGE ET L UNION MINIERE. J IMAGINE QU IL NE S AGIT  
PAS POUR L ONU D INTERVENIR DANS LES DISCUSSIONS QUE LA BELGIQUE  
DOIT AVOIR AVEC LE CONGO AFIN DE REGLER CE QU IL A ETE CONVENU  
D APPELER JUSQU ICI LE CONTENTIEUX BELGO-CONGOLAIS. JE PENSE AUSSI  
COMME VOUS QU UNE MISSION INITIALE DE DEUX MOIS POURRAIT ETRE CONFIEE  
A VOTRE REPRESENTANT SPECIAL ET QUE NOUS POURRIONS VOIR APRES CETTE  
PERIODE S IL EST NECESSAIRE OU NON DE CONTINUER L EXPERIENCE.  
DANS CES CONDITIONS, C EST AVEC PLAISIR QUE JE VERRAI ARRIVER  
MONSIEUR STURE LINNEN A BRUXELLES. HAUTE CONSIDERATION. =

SPAAK +

UNATION 2224537  
BELEXT BRU

IS TART OK PLS ??

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BIEN RECU MCI +?

ANATION 2224537  
BEBEXT BRU

UNITED NATIONS  
1962 APR 5 PM 3:1  
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ETA TPRIORITE

SON EXCELLENCE

M. PAUL HENRI SPAAK

MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES

BRUXELLES (BELGIUM)

JE VOUS REMERCIE DE VOTRE MESSAGE DU 5 AVRIL PAR LEQUEL VOUS AVEZ  
ACCEPTE MA PROPOSITION TENDANT A L'ENVOI D'UN REPRESENTANT SPECIAL  
A BRUXELLES POUR DEUX MOIS A PROPOS DES PROBLEMS ACTUELS D'INTERET  
COMMUN RELATIFS AU CONGO.

P2/67/61

JE SUIS PERSUADE QUE CETTE MESURE SERVIRA NOS INTERETS A TOUS DEUX.  
SOYEZ CERTAIN QUE JE PARTAGE ENTIEREMENT VOTRE OPINION SUR LE  
POINT SOULEVE DANS VOTRE MESSAGE A PROPOS DES DISCUSSIONS  
BELGO-CONGOLAISES. M. LINER M'A INFORME QU'IL ARRIVERA A BRUXELLES  
LE 10 AVRIL A 13 HEURES PAR AVION SK 551. HAUTE CONSIDERATION

U THANT

SECRETAIRE GENERAL PAR INTERIM

CFM 5 10 13 551

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ACK PLS

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*Linner*

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TO	

*8/6 agree*

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MOM PSE  
CABINET STHM  
UNATION 2224537

CABINET STHLM

6/4/62

SECRETARY-GENERAL UNATIONS NEW YORK

FROM LINNER

IF ACCEPTABLE TO YOU WOULD LIKE HONOUR LONGSTANDING COMMIT-  
MENT TO SPEAK OVER DANISH RADIO AND AT COPENHAGEN UNIVERSITY  
EVENING 9TH STOP WOULD THEN ARRIVE AT PLACE FOR NEGOTIATIONS  
10TH BY SK 551 AT 13.00 STOP GRATEFUL CABLE REPLY SOONEST  
TOGETHER WITH INDICATION WHEN VISIT WILL BE MADE PUBLIC YOUR  
END STOP WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE IF UP TO DATE INFORMATION  
ON CONGO AVAILABLE AT HOTEL METROPOL BY THEN-

CABINET+

CABINET STHLM KL 11.55  
UNATION 2224537

OK?  
UNATION 2224537 RECD OK TU

UNATION 2224537

CABINET STHM THANKS+  
BYBY+

UNITED NATIONS  
RECEIVED  
APR 6 1962  
TELETYPE UNIT

INFO. COPY

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LTF

DR STURE LINNEN

CARE OF WACHTMEISTER

FOREIGN OFFICE

STOCKHOLM (SWEDEN) =

THANKS YOUR PROMPT REPLY. TRAVEL SCHEDULE YOU SUGGEST IS APPROVED  
AND WILL INFORM OTHER PARTY ACCORDINGLY. WILL ISSUE RELEASE ON  
ARRANGEMENT ON SATURDAY, SEVENTH. ARRANGEMENTS BEING MADE TO  
KEEP YOU INFORMED =

SECRETARY-GENERAL NEWYORK +

COL NIL +

UNITED NATIONS  
1949.11.10 09:12:42  
TELETYPE UNIT

FOR JSLM

NS

Burchell

CONFIRMATION COPY  
OF MESSAGE DISPATCHED

YZ393 S NY 55 7 1144Z =

ETAT PRIORITE

DR. STURE LINNAR

CARE OF WACHTMEISTER

FOREIGN OFFICE

STOCKHOLM (SWEDEN) =

MOST IMMEDIATE WE ARE WITHHOLDING ANNOUNCEMENT YOUR NEW ASSIGN-  
MENT UNTIL EIGHTH OR POSSIBLY NINTH FOR PURPOSES OF COORDINATION  
WITH LEO. WE WILL INFORM YOU LATER EXACT TIME RELEASE HERE.  
UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE THEREFORE DO NOT REPEAT NOT RELEASE  
YOUR END. =

SECRETARY-GENERAL NEWYORK

COL NIL +

UNITED NATIONS  
1962 APR -7 AM 6:51  
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DR STURE LINNER

CARE OF WACHTMEISTER

FOREIGN OFFICE

STOCKHOLM (SWEDEN) =

MOST IMMEDIATE. FOLLOWING COMMUNIQUE WILL BE RELEASED TO PRESS  
HERE 9 APRIL 1600 HOURS LOCAL;

QUOTE THE ACTING SECRETARY-GENERAL ANNOUNCES THAT DR. STURE C.  
LINNER IS TO UNDERTAKE A TEMPORARY ASSIGNMENT AS HIS SPECIAL  
REPRESENTATIVE IN BRUSSELS IN =

P2/54/50 =

CONNEXION WITH CONGO MATTERS. PARA BY A COMMUNICATION OF 29  
MARCH 1962 ADDRESSED TO MR. PAUL-HENRI SPAAK, MINISTER FOR FOR-  
EIGN AFFAIRS OF BELGIUM, THE ACTING SECRETARY-GENERAL PROPOSED  
THAT HE SHOULD SEND TO BRUSSELS A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE,  
WHO WOULD REMAIN THERE FOR ABOUT TWO MONTHS, TO =

P3/55/50 =

CONSULT WITH THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT ON CURRENT PROBLEMS OF  
COMMON INTEREST CONCERNING THE CONGO. IN HIS REPLY OF 5 APRIL  
1962, MR. SPAAK INFORMED THE ACTING SECRETARY-GENERAL OF HIS  
GOVERNMENT'S AGREEMENT TO THE PROPOSAL. PARA DR. LINNER,  
UNTIL 10 FEBRUARY 1962, WAS THE OFFICER-IN-CHARGE OF =

P4/32 =

THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN THE CONGO. HE IS NOW IN EUROPE  
AND PLANS TO ARRIVE IN BRUSSELS ON 10 APRIL 1962 TO ASSUME HIS  
NEW FUNCTIONS. UNQUOTE =

SECRETARY GENERAL NEWYORK +

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UNITED NATIONS

Press Services  
Office of Public Information  
United Nations, N.Y.

(For use of information media -- not an official record)

Press Release SG/1170  
9 April 1962

ACTING SECRETARY-GENERAL NAMES DR. STURE LINNER  
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR ASSIGNMENT IN BRUSSELS

Acting Secretary-General U Thant announced today that Dr. Sture C. Linner is to undertake a temporary assignment as his Special Representative in Brussels in connection with Congo matters.

In a communication of 29 March 1962 addressed to Paul-Henri Spaak, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, the Acting Secretary-General proposed that he should send to Brussels a special representative, who would remain there for about two months, to consult with the Belgian Government on current problems of common interest concerning the Congo. In his reply of 5 April 1962, Mr. Spaak informed the Acting Secretary-General of his government's agreement to the proposal.

Dr. Linner, until 10 February 1962, was the Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations Operation in the Congo. He is now in Europe and plans to arrive in Brussels on 10 April 1962 to assume his new functions.

\* \*\*\* \*



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ETATPRIORITE

GNUG

LEO -

2605 MOST IMMEDIATE. GARDINER FROM BUNCHE. FOLLOWING COMMUN-  
IQUE WILL BE RELEASED TO PRESS HERE 9 APRIL 1600 HOURS LOCAL:  
QUOTE THE ACTING SECRETARY-GENERAL ANNOUNCES THAT DR.  
STURE C. LINNER IS TO UNDERTAKE A TEMPORARY ASSIGNMENT  
AS HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN BRUSSELS IN CONNEXION WITH -  
P2/54/50 -

CONGO MATTERS. PARA BY A COMMUNICATION OF 29 MARCH 1962  
ADDRESSED TO MR. PAUL-HENRI SPAAK, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN  
AFFAIRS OF BELGIUM, THE ACTING SECRETARY-GENERAL PROPOSED  
THAT HE SHOULD SEND TO BRUSSELS A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE,  
WHO WOULD REMAIN THERE FOR ABOUT TWO MONTHS, TO CONSULT WITH -  
P3/58/50 -

THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT ON CURRENT PROBLEMS OF COMMON INTEREST  
CONCERNING THE CONGO. IN HIS REPLY OF 5 APRIL 1962, MR.

SPAAK INFORMED THE ACTING SECRETARY-GENERAL OF HIS GOVERNMENT'S  
AGREEMENT TO THE PROPOSAL. PARA DR. LINNER, UNTIL 10 FEBRUARY  
1962, WAS THE OFFICER-IN-CHARGE TO THE UNITED -

P4/27 -

NATIONS OPERATION IN THE CONGO. HE IS NOW IN EUROPE AND  
PLANS TO ARRIVE IN BRUSSELS ON 10 APRIL 1962 TO ASSUME  
HIS NEW FUNCTIONS. UNQUOTE +

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UNITED NATIONS  
REC APR -9 PM 12:15  
TELEGRAPH UNIT

DELEGATION DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO-LEOPOLDVILLE  
au Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies

N. 0319/2

DELEGATION DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO-LEOPOLDVILLE  
au Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies  
N. 0319/2

La Délégation de la République du Congo-Léopoldville auprès des Nations Unies présente ses compliments à Monsieur le Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies et le prie de bien vouloir faire publier comme document officiel du Conseil de Sécurité, le télégramme N. 36 du 9 avril 1962 de la part de Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la République du Congo-Léopoldville, et qui faisait l'objet de notre communication N. 0317/2.

La Délégation de la République du Congo-Léopoldville auprès des Nations Unies saisit cette occasion pour renouveler à Monsieur le Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies, les assurances de sa plus haute considération.

M New York, le 9 avril 1962.

A Monsieur le Secrétaire Général  
des Nations Unies à New York.

*Replied.*  
*AB*  
*9/4*  
UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (LEOPOLDVILLE)  
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

N.0317/2

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville) to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to transmit herewith the text of cable No. 36 of 9 April 1962 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Congo (Leopoldville):

"U Thant,

"Secretary-General of the United Nations, New York.

"Mr. Secretary-General:

"I have learned with surprise of the designation of Mr. Sture Linner as your Special Representative to Brussels to consult with the Belgian Government on Congolese problems.

"I wish to point out that the Government of the Congo, a sovereign country, will never admit such a procedure aiming at settling Congolese problems without being consulted.

"With a view to maintaining good relations between the Congolese Government and the United Nations authorities, I urge you to take into consideration the views of the Congolese Government on that matter.

"If such is not the case, the Congolese Government makes all reservations as to the agreements that may be reached between Belgium and the United Nations, and states already that it will not consider itself bound by any arrangement between the two partners.

"High consideration.

"His Excellency, Justin Bomboko - Minister for Foreign Affairs. "

NEW YORK - 9 April 1962

REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO  
DÉLÉGATION DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DU CONGO-LÉOPOLDVILLE  
auprès des Nations Unies

N. 0317/2

100-10-10-10-10  
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100-10-10-10-10

La Délégation de la République du Congo-Léopoldville  
auprès des Nations Unies présente ses compliments à Monsieur le Secrétaire  
Général des Nations Unies, et a l'honneur de lui transmettre ci-après, le  
texte du télégramme N. 36 du 9 avril 1962, de la part de Monsieur le Ministre  
des Affaires Etrangères de la République du Congo-Léopoldville.

" Monsieur U. Thant,  
" Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies à New York.

" Monsieur le Secrétaire Général,

" J'apprends avec surprise désignation M. Sture Linner comme votre représen-  
" tant spécial à Bruxelles pour traiter avec gouvernement belge notamment  
" problèmes congolais.  
" Je tiens à vous faire savoir que le gouvernement du Congo, pays souverain,  
" n'admettra jamais une telle procédure tendant à régler problèmes congolais  
" sans être consulté.  
" En vue maintien bonnes relations entre gouvernement congolais et autorités  
" des Nations Unies, vous prie instamment tenir compte point de vues du  
" gouvernement du Congo en ce domaine.  
" Au cas contraire gouvernement congolais émet toutes ses réserves quant aux  
" accords qui pourraient intervenir entre la Belgique et les Nations Unies et  
" déclare d'ores et déjà qu'il ne se considérera engagé par aucun arrangement  
" entre les deux partenaires.  
" Haute considération.  
" SE/ Justin Bomboko - Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. "

La Délégation de la République du Congo-Léopoldville  
auprès des Nations Unies saisit cette occasion pour renouveler à Monsieur  
Le Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies, les assurances de sa plus haute  
considération.

New York, le 9 avril 1962.

A Monsieur le  
Secrétaire Général de  
l'Organisation des Nations Unies  
à New York

4/19

To : The Secretary General  
For information

R-

Thanks.  
8/19/14

Brussels' Relations with Leopoldville:

Promising Ministerial Conversations

Brussels, 12 April. - The Leopoldville Foreign Minister Bomboko, who had come to Brussels to take part in the Common Market countries' conference with their African partners, used this opportunity for contacts with Foreign Minister Spaak. These formal contacts developed into a Belgian-Congolese ministerial conference, with several meetings. The Congo's Finance Minister Arthur Pinzi, the Belgian Finance Minister Dequae, and the Belgian Minister for Foreign Trade and Technical Assistance Brasseur, also took part in the conversations.

This was the first time since independence that the Congo's problems were dealt with at that level. A number of urgent wishes were presented to the Belgians, and were sympathetically received by the latter. Procedures for outstanding controversial questions were agreed upon, though a long time will be required to solve them. The June 1960 Belgian-Congolese friendship treaty, though unratified by either Parliament, is still, in some respects, not obsolete. The time may have come to include some of its provisions, especially relating to Belgian technical assistance, in a new Belgian-Congolese Agreement.

Both sides emphasized new prospects flowing from recent changes of mood and resumption of diplomatic relations. Bomboko praised Spaak's attitude. Dequae felt that it was at last possible to speak reasonably with the Leopoldville Government, which now understood Belgian concerns and realized that neo-colonialist designs were far from Belgian minds.

Bomboko also discussed with Cools, Belgium's Ambassador to Moscow, the question of setting up a Congolese Embassy in the Soviet capital. The USSR, now represented in Leopoldville by a chargé d'affaires, is said to intend to name an ambassador. Moscow seems to be using a new tactic. It is no accident that the chief of the Belgian section of the Soviet Foreign Ministry has been assigned to Leopoldville. He is an expert in Belgian affairs. It is assumed that such a person would evaluate Belgian-Congolese relations otherwise than the anti-colonialist agitators who did so much harm as advisers to Lumumba or Gizenga. These advisers' dilettantism has become better known through the memoirs of Serge Michel, Lumumba's former French propaganda chief, who had been placed at Lumumba's disposal by Ben Bella people. The memoirs support the view that certain North African elements sought to set up a base for themselves in the Congo with Soviet help.

Meanwhile there are sharp disputes in Belgium's small Communist Party concerning Congo policy. A member of the Party Central Committee, while criticizing Krushchev's position on Albania, called for repudiation of the

Communists in Belgium's Parliament who issued a statement calling for Elisabethville-Leopoldville negotiations, thus endorsing all of Spaak's policy.

The Congo already has diplomatic missions in Brussels, Paris, London and Rome, headed by chargés d'affaires. Bonn and Lagos will follow. There are also missions to the Common Market and to the UN, occupied by politicians who follow the Kasa-Vubu - Mobutu - Bomboko line. The chargé d'affaires in Rome, Mandi, once Foreign Minister of the Stanleyville regime, was once gaoled at the behest of Gizenga's Egyptian advisers, and was released through UN intervention.

From Brussels Bomboko sent a protest telegram to the UN Secretary-General objecting to Linner's being sent to Brussels. This cable embarrassed the Belgians, who realized that bilateral Belgian-Congolese talks are not enough to normalize the situation. The present tendency is to link the United Nations at some moment with the voluminous assistance programme being prepared by Belgium for the Congo, but no unilateral tutelage (by UN) will be accepted. Future UN assistance should be as efficient as Belgium's, and it should no longer be the case that half the expenditures would go for administrative and travel costs.

*Handwritten signature*

YZ383 S (UN2) NY 159/149 20 2137Z 1/54/50 =

ETATPRIORITE

STURE LINNER

HOTEL METROPOLE

BRUSSELS (BELGIUM) =

BR-10 FOLLOWING NOTE DATED 19 APRIL RECEIVED FROM BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE:

QUOTE LA MISSION PERMANENTE DE LA BELGIQUE PRESENTE SES COMPLIMENTS AU SECRETAIRE GENERAL PAR INTERIM ET, D'ORDRE DE SON GOUVERNEMENT, A L'HONNEUR DE L'INFORMER DE CE QUI SUIV: PARA DEPUIS =

2/54/50 =

PLUSIEURS MOIS, LE GOUVERNEMENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO A DEMANDE AU GOUVERNEMENT BELGE DE METTRE A SA DISPOSITION, DANS LE CADRE DU PROGRAMME D'ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE, QUINZE TECHNICIENS BELGES, NOMMELEMENT DESIGNES, EN VUE DE REORGANISER L'ARMEE NATIONALE CONGOLAISE. PARA A LA SUITE DE NEGOCIATIONS =

3/51/49 =

QUI SE SONT DERoulees A BRUXELLES ENTRE LES MINISTRES DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO D'UNE PART, ET DE LA BELGIQUE D'AUTRE PART, UN ACCORD EST INTERVENU AUX TERMES DUQUEL TREIZE EXPERTS BELGES SERAIENT ENVOYES AU CONGO POUR EFFECTUER CETTE MISSION. UNQUOTE =

DUNCHE +

UNITED NATIONS  
1952 17720 PM 11 53  
T. 1145. 1147



8/6

shall I give copy of  
this to Dr Bunche?

yes, pl.

B  
21/4

99

SG

Dr. Linner requests that we acknowledge receipt of these notes by cable.

I would suggest that we tell him to mark the envelopes 'Personal' in the future to ensure that the letters come directly to SecGen's attention.

gg

*Al send a  
Cable acknowledging  
receipt of this letter.*

*H  
2/14*

*→ Soul-CVN/99*

Rec'd. 21/4/62 a.m.  
SL

UNITED NATIONS

Brussels, 18 April 1962

Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

One week is of course too short a time to permit any more deep-probing analysis of Congolese affairs as reflected in the extremely complicated political and financial society of this country, but, at the risk of being obliged to adjust some points of view as time goes on and the network of contacts widens, I venture nevertheless a few comments in the following. I should be grateful if you would consider these comments not as a formal report but rather as kind of diary notes.

To begin with there is strong reason to believe that Tshombe continues to receive substantial financial backing from the Union Minière circles in Brussels. Thus I have it from what I consider a reliable source that they paid 43 million Belgian francs to Tshombe's personal account in a Swiss bank towards the end of January 1962. When I mentioned this allegation to a prominent Société Générale director whom I know well from his many visits to Leopoldville he confessed ignorance about such transactions but was not at all surprised. He confirmed what I think we all know, namely that the leading groups within the Société Générale and the Union Minière in Brussels are split up into different factions as regards their Congo policy. The Governor of the Société Générale, Mr. Nokin, is generally considered an intelligent and far-sighted man but he has no personal Congo experience and delegates Congo matters to the Vice-Governor, Mr. van der Straeten. The latter did for a long time support the independence of Katanga but has recently been converted to a more positive attitude towards Adula's Government, especially after a visit to Leopoldville some time ago. He is however nowadays weak and undecided and, because of his age, is on his way out. Under these circumstances a rather free play is given to the top managers of the Union Minière. There again the picture is not encouraging. Of the two Administrateurs-Délégués, Mr. Robillart is thought to be what from the UN point of view could be considered as broad-minded and realistic, but his influence as regards Katanga appears to be rather limited as compared with that of his colleague - Mr. Martoz - who has always been and still is in favour of an independent Katanga. An even more active and influential secessionist is the number three in the Union Minière, Mr. Waleffe, whom none of my spokesmen in or outside of the Société Générale circles hold in high esteem. This picture, incidentally, has to a certain degree a parallel in the Union Minière set-up in Elisabethville, inasmuch as the number one man there, van Weyenbergh, appears to be moving over towards a more comprehensive attitude whereas his second man, as late as in February, was stubbornly pro-Tshombe, anti-Leo and, of course, very much anti-UN. With the policy support the die-hards amongst the Société Générale and the Union Minière

Secretary-General U Thant  
United Nations Headquarters,  
New York, N.Y.

Copy given to  
Dr Bunchie

directors in Brussels get from influential circles in London, Paris and Salisbury, to mention only a few of the nerve centres in this context, it is indeed hard to see how to make them change their minds. The Belgian Government is next to powerless against them; on that issue neither Socialists nor Social Christians seem to have any illusions. About the only thing that appears to worry the secessionists is - not a possible invasion of the Katanga by the Congolese National Army, should the Adula-Tshombe talks break down - but rather what would happen (to the Belgians and to the mines) if their invasion were coupled with a move of the Balubas from North Katanga towards Elisabethville.

One thing appears to be evident : whereas the Belgian Catholics strongly support Tshombe in the belief that he represents a bulwark against Communism, the high finance circles labour under no such illusions. They have not forgotten Munongo's official statement last July that the Tshombe Cabinet was considering sending a mission to Moscow to obtain Soviet aid. Nor are they all ignorant of the fact that Tshombe for quite some time has been entertaining the idea of a rapprochement with the Lumumbists, directed against Adula and the more moderate members of his administration. A meeting in Paris last January between emissaries from the Syrian Government and Tshombe's representatives has also given rise to some worried speculation. But although realizing that Tshombe's ideological conceptions may be somewhat shallow, many of them rather seem inclined to step up their support of him so as to keep him tied to themselves, the more so as they are aware of Tshombe's endeavours to get more closely associated with French, German and Swiss capital as a counter-balance to and possible replacement of the Belgian interests.

As to the Belgians in the Katanga, they are, of course, divided between themselves in the traditional Belgian way, but, as many of their compatriots here are the first to say, they have at least one thing in common : their long-standing aversion against the people in Leopoldville, Congolese and Belgians alike, matched only by their equally traditional aversion against the Belgian Government, of whatever colour it happens to be.

Whilst recording these rather unpromising views and facts I might as well add something else in the same vein. According to a Belgian who has followed Katanga politics closely for many years and whose judgment I highly respect, it is most doubtful that even if Tshombe were to reach an agreement with Adula such an agreement would be respected by Munongo, Kibwe and Kimba. In his opinion, Munongo is the strongest man in that cabinet and a man who is still dominated by narrow tribal thinking - on the whole, far worse than Tshombe. Many people in the UN have come to a similar conclusion, but no one can claim such a long acquaintance with the men in question as a basis for his opinion.

Another factor which contributes to what seems to be a widespread pessimism amongst responsible Belgians here is the weakness of Adula's entourage. The man who is held to be, in many ways, the most influential in the Congo - and personally I do not feel this assessment to be too exaggerated - is Nendaka, the chief of the Sécurité, feared by everybody, Adula included, because of his ruthlessness, cleverness and unreliability. In quite another category you have Ndele, who was so promising, intellectually and morally, in the beginning and who, as Governor of the National Bank, could play an important rôle in propping up Adula's régime. He is now said to be declining in a rather pathetic way. That on his frequent visits to Brussels he is using every means to undercut our Mr. Frasca comes as no surprise - we knew that in Leopoldville already. But the way he is taking bribes here from right and left and spending his time and energy in a most undignified manner shocks those Belgians who had hoped he would develop

into a serious professional. Some of his former mentors are trying to get him to do a three-month course at the Swiss National Bank to sober up and get his feet back on the ground. And so the list could be continued : Pinzi, Bomboko, and one after the other they feather their nest in Brussels and Geneva, buying houses and apartments and engaging in all sorts of financial transactions with money that obviously belongs to their government and should be used constructively for the benefit of their country.

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After dictating the above, I have had a meeting with Mr. van der Straeten. He categorically denies any payments having been or being made by the Union Minière to Tshombe's personal account in Switzerland. But the vagueness with which he talks about Congolese affairs, both in Katanga and elsewhere does not indicate that he really has his finger on the pulse.

I should be grateful if you would care to send me a cable confirming safe receipt of these notes.

Sincerely yours,



S. Linner

21 Apr'62

CVNarasimhan

3800

SG

STURE LINNER  
HOTEL METROPOLE  
BRUSSELS (BELGIUM)

FROM SECGEN. ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT YOUR LETTERS 18 APRIL. SUGGEST THAT IN FUTURE  
SUCH LETTERS BE MARKED PERSONAL TO ENSURE THAT THEY COME DIRECTLY TO MY ATTENTION.

*CVNarasimhan*

UNITED NATIONS

Brussels, 21 April 1962

PERSONAL

Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

Coming back to my letter of 18 April I think you might be interested to know that the indications I conveyed therein were completely borne out yesterday in a conversation I had with the US Ambassador Mr. Douglas MacArthur II.

Thus, 43 million Belgian francs were indeed paid to Tshombe's personal account in Switzerland, end of January 1962. The Ambassador even knows the account number. At the time he took up the matter with Mr. Robillart who frankly admitted the transaction, but explained it as part of "regular" payments to the so-called National Bank of Katanga which, at that bank's request, had been in part switched over to Tshombe's personal account in Switzerland. This specific case, Robillart added, was by no means an exceptional one.

The Union Minière's \$ 3.5 billion investment in Katanga is apparently considered worth the risk of their becoming badly compromised once again in international opinion, were such maneuvers to be exposed. Robillart expects to retire next year and is not, or at least has not been, willing or strong enough to withstand pressure, especially that of Mr. Waeffle, who also MacArthur considers outright bad. Again according to MacArthur, Mr. van der Straeten has not had a new idea since the 1920's, does not know what is going on in Brussels or in Katanga and is not, on the whole, an impressively honest man.

I am arranging for a meeting next week with the Governor of the Société Générale, Mr. Nokin, who seems to be the only one who could or would remove or at least weaken the influence of the Union Minière secessionists here and in Katanga. By now I have lined up enough information and arguments to make out a pretty tough case and I shall have no compunction about speaking out squarely to him. Thus, we shall at least be on record as having warned him clearly and emphatically of the possible consequences their laissez-faire attitude might have, not only for the Union Minière in Katanga but also for the even more important Société Générale interests in the Congo as a whole.

U Thant  
Secretary-General,  
United Nations,  
New York, N.Y.

U Thant

1/5

Ralph



Let me add that the Government's attitude in this and any other matter I have discussed with them is clearly constructive and positive towards the UN. "The Government" in this context really means Mr. Spaul whose recent imbroglio with de Gaulle has, if anything, only strengthened his already very strong position here.

Since I will, in a few days, have the benefit of Mr. Amichree's presence here, I refrain from reporting at this stage on various other questions - especially concerning the Rwanda-Burundi and the civilian operations in the Congo - on which I am sure he will be able to give fresh information and views.

Yours sincerely,



S. Linnar



UNITED NATIONS

Brussels, 27 April 1963

PERSONAL

Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

With reference to my letter of 26 April I am afraid I have to trouble you with another piece of adverse publicity which has just been brought to my notice.

A Dr. T. Vlourinck has published a 99-page pamphlet (which I send to you under separate cover) called "Violations par l'ONU au Katanga", with a sub-title "46 hommes en colère - les 46 médecins d'Elisabethville dénoncent les violations par l'ONU au Katanga ; de sa propre charte, de la Déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme et des Conventions de Genève". The book is prefaced by Mr. Paul Struye, President of the Belgian Senate. Further editions will appear shortly in English - of which I will send you a copy - and in Spanish.

So far next to nothing has appeared in the press here about this publication but it would be surprising if it did not stir up emotions here once again. I should therefore be grateful if you would instruct someone at Headquarters to prepare some notes on it, preferably in French, so that

rely.

\* "UN violations in Katanga", with a sub-title "46 angry men - the 46 doctors of Elisabethville denounce violations by UN in Katanga: of its own Charter, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of the Geneva Conventions.

D. Thant  
Secretary-General,  
United Nations,  
New York, N.Y.

UNITED NATIONS

Brussels, 27 April 1962

PERSONAL

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So far next to nothing has appeared in the press here about this publication but it would be surprising if it did not stir up emotions here once again. I should therefore be grateful if you would instruct someone at Headquarters to prepare some notes on it, preferably in French, so that I could make use of them should the need arise.

Yours sincerely,

  
S. Linner

U. Thant  
Secretary-General,  
United Nations,  
New York, N.Y.

9/1/62

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

3 May 1962

Dear Sture,

The Secretary-General gave me your letter of 26 April just before he left. We have considered the question you raise about putting out some information concerning ONUC overhead costs, and particularly salaries. On the civilian side, there should not be too serious a problem about doing this and I am getting some figures put together. The trouble, however, is the military side where, as you know, there is an enormous discrepancy between the payments made by the UN to various governments for their contingents. Apart from the ONUC allowance, which is standard for all troops, the overseas allowances, which governments pay and which UN must reimburse, vary from \$10 a month in the case of the Indians to \$780 a month in the case of Brazilian military personnel. This is a matter of varying national laws and practices, of course, and is an exceedingly embarrassing situation, both publicly and in our relations with delegations. It is McCaw's view that it would be very unwise to put out information which, if it were honest, would inevitably lead to publicizing this very unfortunate situation. We therefore think it would be better not to make any statement about the payments to ONUC military personnel. Indeed, McCaw has done his best not to give this information even to delegations here.

The question arises whether the publication by us of representative civilian salaries may not stimulate pressing enquiries about military payments. Therefore, although I will send you some representative figures for civilian salaries, I am inclined to think they should only be used with the utmost discretion so that a large controversy can be avoided.

Sincerely yours,

Ralph J. Bunche  
Under-Secretary

Mr. Sture Linner  
Hotel Metropole  
Brussels, Belgium

UNITED NATIONS

Brussels, 26 April 1962

PERSONAL

Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

It was encouraging to read this morning in the leading article of "La Libre Belgique" - a notoriously anti-UN paper - that they consider my mission here "a good thing". This is a welcome change from some of the sour notes which were struck in this newspaper just before and at the time of my arrival.

What is less encouraging, however, is the recurring criticism in the Belgian press against what is alleged to be the extremely heavy overhead costs of the ONUC Administration in general. "La Libre Belgique" this morning thus talks of secretaries being paid 2800 Belgian francs weekly, plus 4000 francs "indemnity" per week, and about the ONUC soldier getting 29,000 francs per month. The article in "Le Soir" of 27 March 1962, full of wrong facts and allegations in a similar vein, has, I understand, been brought to your attention; it was forwarded to me by Mr. Arachree on 19 April and arrived here yesterday. It is perhaps a little late now to publish a reply to this specific article but since, as mentioned above, similar criticism is being expressed every now and then, I would suggest that somebody at Headquarters put the facts straight. If I were to receive a compilation of factual figures, put in the proper context, I could then bring them to public notice through various channels and in a discreet way which would not necessarily provoke sterile polemics. Complete silence from our side might on the other hand rather call forth further attacks.

Yours sincerely,

*S. Linner*  
S. Linner

U Thant  
Secretary-General,  
United Nations,  
New York, N.Y.

ZY470 9 LONDON

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21.15 BST

*Linner - Brussels*

OMNIPRESS -

NEW YORK -

UNLON 282 FOR CARRUTHERS. FYI LINNER HELD PRESS BACKGROUND BRIEFING AT LONDON CENTRE THIS AFTERNOON AND FOLLOWING IS ROUND UP OF EIGHTY MINUTE SESSION ATTENDED BY LONDON MAIN DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENTS. LINNER BEGAN WITH FIVE MINUTE STATEMENT GIVING HIS TERMS OF REFERENCE IN BRUSSELS AND EXPLAINING

P2-

HIS PRESENT MISSION. HE STATED THAT HIS TALKS WITH BELGIAN GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE INTERESTS OF THE CONGO WERE PROCEEDING QUOTE IN AYE CORDIAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE ATMOSPHERE UNQUOTE PARA IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS LINNER GAVE FOLLOWING OFF THE RECORD ANSWERS COLON ONE SEARCH IS NOW BEING MADE TO FIND AYE

P3-

FORMULA FOR PROBLEM OF PAYMENTS FROM UNION MINIERE TO CONGOLESE CONTRAL GOVERNMENT AND UNION MINIERE NOW AGREE THAT KATANGESE SECESSION AND INDEPENDENCE DEAD ISSUES SEMICOLON TWO WE HAVE ALWAYS ENCOURAGED BELGIANS ESPECIALLY IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR TO STAY ON IN CONGO WITHIN LIMITS OF SECCOUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ON MILITARY AND POLITICAL

P4 =

ADVISERS AND TO THE EXTENT THIS WAS AGREED TO BY CENTRAL GOVERNMENT  
ADVISERS BUT THERE ARE CERTAIN DIFFICULTIES. SEVERAL HUNDRED BELGIAN  
TEACHERS ARE BEING RECRUITED FOR EXAMPLE AND THIS PROCESS IS NOW IN  
THE WORK SEMICOLON THREE THE CATEGORIES OF EXPERTS MOST IN DEMANDH  
RE TEACHERS AND DOCTORS SEMICOLON FOUR AR

P5 =

THE RECRUITMENT OF JUDGES IS NOW TAKING PLACE SEMICOLON FIVE THERE  
ARE NO LIMITATIONS ON BELGIANS NOR ON ANY OTHER NATIONALITY AND  
ONLY FACTOR IS THAT CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT SHOULD AGREE SIX MY JOB IN  
BRUSSELS IS TO REPRESENT SECGEN IN DISCUSSIONS WITH BELGIAN  
GOVERNMENT, AND ALSO TO DISCUSS WITH

P6 =

PRIVATE CIRCLES IN CONGO. ATMOSPHERE AT PRESENT IS ONE OF MUTUAL  
UNDERSTANDING SEMICOLON SEVEN EYE AM NOT SCOUTING FOR TALENT IN  
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BUT CLEARLY THERE IS NEED AND WE WANT TO HELP  
CONGO AS FAR AS POSSIBLE SEMICOLON EIGHT WE HAVE TO MAINTAIN ACCESS  
FOR OUR TROOPS THROUGHOUT

P7 =

CONGO SEMICOLON NINE CLAIMS FOR WAR DAMAGE FROM UNION MINIERE AND  
BRITISH KATANGA RESIDENTS ARE NOT REPEAT NOT UNDER DISCUSSION  
SEMICOLON TEN RAILWAY BRIDGE BETWEEN KATANGA AND KASAI WILL BE  
REBUILT SHORTLY SEMICOLON FYI ATMOSPHERE OF PRESS BRIEFING WAS  
COYDIAL WITH HARDLY ANY POLITICAL QUESTIONS

LONOMNIPRESS +++

CORRECTIONS: P4, LINE 2, LAST WORD SHOULD READ 'BELGIAN'



Brussels, 23 May 1967

Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

During my stay in London from May 10 to 18, I first got in touch with Sir Roger Stevens and Mr. Millard at the Foreign Office, as suggested by the UK delegation in New York. Sir Roger subsequently arranged for me to meet Lord Home, Lord Dundee, Minister of State, Lord Clitheroe and, from the private sector, Captain Waterhouse, Sir Mark Turner who, besides being Managing Director of Kleinwort, Benson Ltd. is also a Director of the Tanganyika Concessions, and Mr. Padler, Managing Director of the United Africa Company and also playing a central role in the co-ordination of British technical assistance to developing countries.

I also met David Astor who, apart from being the top man on the Observer, also has quite some say in the Tanganyika Concession circles, Collin Legum of the Observer, Roy Lewis, chief diplomatic correspondent of the London Times, Gavscho, Renter's chief diplomatic correspondent, Ian Colvin of the Daily Telegraph - all those and others in individual meetings apart from the off-the-record background briefing which I gave to the press on my arrival.

Finally, I met Dennis Healey in the Labour shadow cabinet, whilst scheduled meetings with Gaitskell, Wilson and Grimmond as well as with Kenneth Younger of Chatham House had to be postponed for later on. As agreed with Ralph Bunche in Stockholm I shall return to London for a day on May 31st to give a lecture to a large group of Parliamentarians and to see those various personalities just mentioned. On June 14th I will give a lecture at Chatham House (this trip incidentally at their expense).

The talk with Lord Home lasted one hour. He went out of his way to be friendly and cordial and had quite a few pleasant things to say about you personally and about UN operations in the Congo in the past and at present. However, he made it perfectly clear that he and his government strongly objected to the possibility of UN moving troops into Kolwezi, Kipushi and Jadotville. Such a move, he said, could only be interpreted as a means of exerting military pressure on Tshombe to obtain financial concessions in favour of Adoula and this, he claimed, was both unfair and dangerous. I reminded him of course of the question of the mercenaries but he tried to brush this one off, first stating that there was no such problem at all in the places mentioned, and second that even if there were some mercenaries around that fact alone could in no way warrant our moving troops and thus provoking clashes with the mercenaries and/or the tribal population and the Katangese gendarmerie.

U Thant,  
Secretary-General,  
United Nations,  
NEW YORK, N.Y.

Whilst making it clear that I had no mandate to say that our troops would, in fact, go into those places mentioned above nor, if so, at what time these movements would take place, I did, on the other hand, strongly emphasize that we had for many months been bending over backwards to avoid any move of that kind, in spite of our quite clear instructions from the Security Council and the General Assembly to get rid of the mercenaries problem. I reminded him of the fact that on February 6th Tshombe personally had promised me that he would do everything he could, and urgently, to facilitate our entry into those places. I also mentioned that some of my Belgian friends in Brussels recently had given it to me as a fact that arms and mercenaries were still going to the north of Katanga.

I mentioned as a personal idea of mine that I thought it would be useful if both La Société générale/Union Minière and the Tanganyika Concessions each sent a top level representative down to Léopoldville to meet with Adoula and Tshombe, separately and all together. I believe that if representatives of the mining groups in Brussels and London came to know Adoula personally they could not help being impressed by his moderation and common sense and consequently much of their fear would be eliminated. In the same way it would be useful for both Adoula and Tshombe to hear it clearly stated, as each and every representative of the Tanganyika lobby in London and the mining group in Brussels had said to me, namely that they all now realized that the secession or independence of Katanga was a dead issue. Finally it would be, I feel, to everybody's advantage to have these financial questions in connection with the mining activities analysed by the very men who were directly responsible for the financial policy of Katanga.

An incidental advantage of having the Brussels and London representatives together down there would be that it would be very much more difficult for one or the other of the two groups to put the blame for this or that action or lack of action on their opposite numbers, as I personally heard it being done over and over again both in Brussels and in London. Furthermore, I am sure that even a high ranking local representative in Katanga as, for instance, Mr. Wevenbergh, is too much personally involved and afraid about his own safety to be able to speak with the necessary authority.

Lord Home, as before him Captain Waterhouse and the other members of the Katanga lobby that I met, reacted most favourably to this idea. I understood from Ralph when we met in Stockholm the other day that a certain attitude of Adoula's might make such an arrangement difficult, but I would nevertheless strongly recommend that it be given urgent and positive consideration.

A second suggestion I had previously made to Waterhouse and the others and which I now repeated to Lord Home was that pressure should be exerted on Tshombe from all sides to make him pay a certain sum to the central government as soon as possible as a token of a co-operative attitude. The way I see it is that Tshombe

.../...



will in any case, sooner or later, have to knuckle down and therefore it would be in his own interest, as well as in that of the central government, to have such a more or less symbolic payment made without delay and without necessarily tying his hands as to percentages and formulas to be applied for the future.

A third idea of less importance but perhaps nevertheless worth considering was to have the Union Minière make a goodwill gesture towards the central government by offering them a certain amount of money for the establishing of a mining school or a training course for mining officials and engineers. There again the idea is that since the Union Minière will have to deal more and more with the central government whether they like it or not, they might as well already now take the initiative to create more interlocuteurs valables than are now available.

Whereas these ideas were all favourably received I met more resistance in London than in Brussels on another point. In Brussels I had proposed that the Union Minière should seriously consider the possibility of putting part of their payments to the Katangese régime en escroc ("en consignation" is, I believe, the most adequate French term for it), pending the final outcome of the negotiations. This should be openly discussed with Tshombe and possibly, if not necessarily, be agreed to by him. The British, including Lord Home, were afraid that the mere mention of such a proposal might provoke Tshombe or perhaps rather some of his colleagues in the Katanga to hostile actions against both the Union Minière and the UN. I explained to Lord Home, as previously to Waterhouse and others that after all the Union Minière could not just sit and wait for everybody else to find a solution to all the problems they themselves had created, but that they had to take certain initiatives and certain risks. I mentioned that both Mr. Nokin and Mr. Robillard had agreed to discuss with our leading military and civilian officers the possibilities of our affording a reasonable degree of protection to both the Union Minière local personnel, European and Katangese, and the more vital parts of their installations, especially dams and plants. If this new spirit of understanding and collaboration could be made to percolate from the superior echelons in Brussels down through the rank and file of the mining officials in Katanga, and if consequently the local mining people could be made to understand that the UN troops had no aggressive intentions against their regular mining activities, then we and the Union Minière could show a common front, as it were, against any group of Katangese or foreigners that might want to stir up trouble. Lord Home rather doubted that the Tanganyika Concessions people would be willing to pursue such a line of thought, but I mentioned to him that Captain Waterhouse, for instance, had not been entirely averse to the idea and that as a matter of fact he had declared himself willing to go over to Brussels in the near future to discuss this and the other points mentioned above with his friends in the Union Minière.

Lord Home asked about the UN technical assistance programme which gave me an opportunity to stress the need for closer co-ordination between those nations

.../...

who played a substantial role in this respect. Incidentally, referring to your cable No.199, I of course do agree that if a high level co-ordinating committee were to be established it should certainly be on an informal basis. In fact I have never had anything else in mind and both Amachree and myself, I am sure, only wanted to establish regular consultations and some kind of unified pattern so as to avoid some of the present ad hoc arrangements which are so costly and inefficient.

I would like to end this summary by stressing the need felt in all circles for high level information and discussions on the Congo problems. During my short time there I made three BBC broadcasts which gave me a welcome opportunity to put emphasis on our civilian operations. Furthermore, it was possible to delay a one-hour television programme on Katangan events and problems long enough, I hope, for us to get much more of the UN version of the story into the picture.

Finally, I gave a lecture to the UN Association in London and it was almost touching to see with what eagerness and gratitude they absorbed whatever I could tell them. As to the more responsible parts of the press, a man like Andrew Boyd, for instance, of the Economist, told me that they could have done a much more efficient job in the interests of the UN were they given more opportunities to be in personal touch with leading UN officials. In this connection I would like to put on record that I heard from every side what a wonderful job Brian Urquhart had done whilst he was over in London.

This leads me over to the kind of thing I had an opportunity to discuss with you in Stockholm, namely the part that Geneva Office could and should play in the future as to influencing the public opinion in one European country after the other. I was glad also to have a chance to discuss this with Ralph in Stockholm and I know that men like Philip de Seynes, David Owen and Paul Hoffman think along the same lines.

I will come back with separate reports as soon as I have had an opportunity of sizing up the present situation in Brussels. Unfortunately we are having considerable trouble with our coding machine here but I trust these difficulties will soon be overcome.

With kindest personal regards,  
Yours sincerely,

*Sam Linn*

UNITED NATIONS

1962 MAY 24 PM 2:50

TELEGRAPH UNIT

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
UNATIONS NEWYORK =

FOR MISS GABY GERVAIS UNATIONS NEWYORK EIGHTH FLOOR

LL22 MY LETTER TO SECGEN TODAY WHICH UNFORTUNATELY NOT MARKED

PERSONAL STOP PLEASE HAVE IT DELIVERED DIRECTLY TO SECGEN +

*mail control  
advised  
by*



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ETAT PRIORITE

LINNER

HOTEL METROPOLE

BRUSSELS (BELGIUM) =

BR-34 FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM LEO 24TH: PARA QUOTE ONUC 3653  
OPI 602 FROM NO COMMUNIQUE CONJOINT. DELEGATIONS GOUVERNEMENT  
CENTRAL ET KATANGA SE SONT REUNIES CE MATIN DIX HEURES POUR  
SECONDE FOIS DANS CABINET PREMIER MINISTRE EN PRESENCE MESSIEURS  
GARDINER ET ROLZ BENNETT REPRESENTANTS =

P2 =

DES NATIONS UNIES. LES DEUX DELEGATIONS ONT DISCUTE ET SE SONT  
MIS D'ACCORD SUR LES QUESTIONS DE PROCEDURE. POUR ACCELERER  
LA MARCHÉ DE LEURS TRAVAUX LES DEUX DELEGATIONS ONT DECIDE  
DE TENIR DES SEANCES DE TRAVAIL DEUX FOIS PAR JOUR SOIT DE  
DIX HEURES A DOUZE HEURES ET =

P3 =

DE SEIZE HEURES A DIXHUIT HEURES. UN COMMUNIQUE CONJOINT SERA PUBLIE  
A L'ISSUE DE CHAQUE SEANCE. LES REPRESENTANTS DES NATIONS UNIES  
ONT ETE INVITES PAR LES DEUX DELEGATIONS A ASSISTER AUX SEANCES.  
LA PROCHAINE RENCONTRE EST PREVUE CE JOUR A SEIZE HEURES. PARA  
POUR LE GOUVERNEMENT =

P4/47 =

CENTRAL, C. KAMITATU. POUR LA DELEGATION KATANGAISE, KISHIDA.  
PARA. CINQUIEME TRAIN REFUGIES A QUITTE ELISABETHVILLE POUR  
KAMINA A TREIZE HEURES QUINZE ZULU AVEC MILLE CINQ CENTS  
PERSONNES A BORD, NEUF CENTS KULUA ET SIX CENTS BATETELE.  
ENDALL UNQUOTE =

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ETAT PRIORITE

LINNER

HOTEL METROPOLE

BRUSSELS (BELGIUM) =

BR36 FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM GARDINER 25TH: G-632 SEC6EN FROM GARDINER .

I. FOLLOWING IS JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AFTER THIS MORNINGS MEETING : QUOTE LES DELEGATIONS DU GOUVERNEMENT CENTRAL ET DU KATANGA SE SONT REUNIES CE MATIN A 10 HEURES POUR LA QUATRIEME FOIS DANS LE =

P2/92/90 =

CABINET DU PREMIER MINISTRE EN PRESENCE DE MESSIEURS GARDINER ET ROLZ-BENNET, REPRESENTAINS DES NATIONS UNIES. PARA. LES DEUX DELEGATIONS ONT DISCUTE ET SE SONT MISES D'ACCORD N SUR L'ORDRE DU JOUR QUELLES ONT ADOPTE DANS SON ENSEMBLE. PARA. LA PROCHAINE RENCONTRE EST PREVUE CE JOUR A =

P3 =

16 HEURES. UNQUOTE 11. THE QUOTE PROJET D'ORDRE DU JOUR UNQUOTE ADOPTED IS AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE 1. ADOPTION DES SUGGESTIONS DE L'ONUC COMME BASE DES ENTRETIENS 2. PROCEDURE POUR EFFECTUER LA CONSOLIDATION DE L'INTEGRITE TERRITORIALE DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO. A) MANDATS DE LA COMMISSION ET DES =

P4/41/39 =

SOUS-COMMISSIONS (LES EXPERTS - DE L'ONU DOIVENT ETRE CONSULTES) B) DESIGNATION DES MEMBRES DE LA COMMISSION ET DES SOUS-COMMISSIONS. 3. DECISIONS PARTICULIERS CONCERNANT LA CONSOLIDATION. 4. ACCEPTATION ET SIGNATURE DU COMMUNIQUE COMMUN UNQUOTE =

BUNCHE NEWYORK +

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UNITED NATIONS  
1962 MAY 25 PM 3 25  
TELEGRAPH UNIT

92/

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION - ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CABLE

TO        SecGen  
FROM     Brussels  
DATE      24 MAY 1962  
NUMBER   ZY271

The "Echo du Katanga", Brussels edition of 18 May, quotes Kini, Congolese Chargé d'Affaires in Brussels as having stated recently: "Despite all the good will of the United Nations and the importance of the assistance which, the diplomat~~s~~ stated, ~~which~~ the United Nations has given to the Republic of the Congo, this assistance has been, not ineffective, but not very effective - because the methods were very different... In the sphere of technical assistance the United Nations has done all it could (he said) to ~~come to the aid of~~ <sup>help</sup> the Congo on an <sup>(massive)</sup> immense scale but this assistance has also proved <sup>(somewhat)</sup> ~~distinctly~~ inadequate. Let us take, for example, Mr. Kini stated, the medical occupation of the bush. A WHO doctor arriving in the Congo tends to want to stay in a hospital <sup>at</sup> ~~in~~ the center. There are very few who will agree to go into the bush because they have no electricity there and no refrigerators. In general it is the former Belgian officials who are coming back and little by little are continuing to agree to take very <sup>(distant)</sup> ~~remote~~ posts, and this, despite what one might call the ~~the~~ insecurity. In the face of this problem it is not difficult to draw one conclusion; where there are two doctors, one from WHO and the other from Belgian technical assistance, it is not difficult to imagine which one we choose."

27271 BRUXELLES 250 24 1410Z

UNATIONS NEWYORK

V FOR SEGEN UNATIONS NEWYORK - LL 21

L ECHO DU KATANGA BRUSSELS EDITION OF MAY 18 QUOTES KINI  
CONGOLAIS CHARGE D AFFAIRES IN BRUSSELS AS HAVING STATED RECENTLY  
QUOTE MALGRE TOUTE LA BONNE VOLONTE ET L IMPORTANCE DE L AIDE  
QUE L ONU, A DIT LE DIPLOMATE, A APPORTEE A LA REPUBLIQUE DU  
CONGO, CETTE AIDE A ETE NON PAS INEFFICACE MAIS PAS TRES  
EFFICACE STOP PARCE QUE LES METHODES ETAIENT TRES DIFFERENTES...  
DANS LE DOMAINE DE L ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE L ONU A FAIT TOUT  
SON POSSIBLE (DIT-IL) POUR VENIR EN AIDE AU CONGO D UNE MANIERE  
MASSIV MAIS CETTE ASSIST

NCE S EST AVEREE EGALEMENT ASSEZ IN-  
SUFFISAT STOP PRENONS, PAR. EXEMPLE, PRECISE M CINI, L OCCU-  
PATION MEDICALE DE LA BROUSSE STOP UN MEDICIN DE L OMS ARRIVANT  
AU CONGO ATENDANCE A VOULOIR RESTER DANS UN HOPITAL DU CENTRE  
STOP TRES RARES SONT CEUX QUI ACCEPTERONT D ALLER DANS LA BROUSSE,  
CAR ILS NY ONT PAS L ELECTRICITE, NI UN FRIGO STOP GENERALEMENT,  
LES ANCIENS FONCTIONNAIRES BELGES QUI REVIENNENT E PETIT A  
PETIT CONTINUENT A ACCEPTER D OCCUPER DES POSTES. TRES RECULES  
ET CELA MALGRE CE QU ON PEUT APPELER L INSECURITE STOP DEVANT  
CE PROBLEME , IL N EST PAS DIFFICILE DE TIRER UNE CONCLUSION:  
EN PRESENCE DE DEUX MEDECINS, L UN DE L OMS ET L AUTRE DE  
L ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE BELGE, IL N EST PAS DIFFICILE  
D IMAGINER CE QUE NOUS CHOISISSONS UNQUOTE +

UNITED NATIONS

1952 JUN 24 1410Z

TELEGRAPH UNIT

1952 JUN 24 1410Z

TELEGRAPH UNIT

INCOMING CLEAR CABLE

TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL  
FROM:  
DATE: 24 May 1962  
NO: LL-24

L'Echo du Katanga, Brussels edition of 18 May quotes Kini, Congolese Chargé d'Affaires in Brussels as having stated recently:

"Despite all the good will and the extent of the aid which the United Nations has given to the Republic of the Congo", said the diplomat, "that aid has been, not inefficient, but not very efficient, because the methods were very different ... In the field of technical assistance, the United Nations has done everything it could", he said, "to come to the help of the Congo on a massive scale, but this assistance has also proved to be rather inadequate. Let us take, for example," Mr. Kini said "the medical servicing of the "bush". A doctor from WHO arriving in the Congo tends to want to stay in a central hospital. Very few of them are willing to go into the "bush", for they have no electricity there and no refrigerator. Generally, the former Belgian officials who are returning little by little still agree to occupy posts in very remote areas, and that despite what can be called the insecurity. In the face of this problem, it is not difficult to draw a conclusion, if two doctors are available, one from WHO and the other <sup>from</sup> Belgian Technical Assistance, it is not difficult to imagine which one we choose."



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YOUR BR 45 MY WIFE ARRIVING ATHENS JUNE THIRD STOP WILL TAKE  
NECESSARY DISPOSITIONS.

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3 Lancy

FILE 1

FILE 2

Lancy

62-11790  
hh

Unofficial translation

Cable

To: The Secretary-General of the United Nations  
From: *Linner ?*  
Date: 25 May 1962

FOLLOWING IS PART OF STATEMENT MADE BY GILLET, BOARD PRESIDENT IN UNION MINIERE, 24 MAY.

"I CANNOT AVOID MENTIONING FIRST OF ALL THE TRAGIC EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER AND DECEMBER. WE HAVE PAID TRIBUTE IN OUR REPORT TO THOSE MEMBERS OF OUR STAFF WHO FELL AT THEIR POSTS, AND I AM SURE THAT IN DOING SO WE WERE EXPRESSING THE UNANIMOUS FEELINGS OF OUR SHAREHOLDERS. THOSE EVENTS HAVE HAD SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS ON THE WORK OF OUR FACTORIES. THE MILITARY ATTACKS ON OUR INSTALLATIONS SERIOUSLY DAMAGED CERTAIN VITAL CENTRES OF OUR OPERATIONS. BEING ANXIOUS NOT TO DISTURB THE CALMER ATMOSPHERE WHICH NOW PREVAILS, IN OUR REPORT WE HAVE ONLY TOUCHED ON THE TRAGEDIES OF KATANGA, WHICH MANY WOULD LIKE TO FORGET. IF I RETURN TO THE SUBJECT, IT IS SOLELY IN ORDER TO PAY A TRIBUTE TO OUR STAFF, WITHOUT REGARD TO THEIR RACE OR OFFICIAL RANK. DESPITE THE DANGERS AND THE PHYSICAL AND MENTAL ORDEALS THEY FACED, OUR STAFF SHOWED A FIERCE LOYALTY TO THE COMMON TASK AND CONTINUED THEIR WORK WITH A COURAGE AND DEVOTION WHICH I FEEL IT MY DUTY TO RECALL IN THIS ASSEMBLY. NO OTHER PROOF OF THIS IS NEEDED THAN THE SPEED WITH WHICH PRODUCTION WAS RESUMED IN OUR FACTORIES AFTER THE ATTACKS AND THE LOOPING TO WHICH THEY WERE SUBJECTED. WE WISH TO EXPRESS OUR APPRECIATION AND OUR GRATITUDE TO OUR STAFF, AND I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT YOU WILL ASSOCIATE YOURSELVES WITH US IN THIS.

YOU WILL SEE FROM THE BALANCE SHEET THAT WE HAVE NOT APPRECIABLY ALTERED OUR RATE OF INVESTMENT, WHICH REMAINS AT THE LEVEL OF 1,250 MILLION. WE ARE FACED WITH A CHOICE BETWEEN TWO ALTERNATIVES. THE FIRST IS TO REDUCE INVESTMENT, WHICH WOULD LEAD TO A FALL IN PRODUCTION IN THE NEAR FUTURE, SINCE THE EQUIPMENT OF THE FACTORIES AGES QUICKLY AND THE OUTPUT

/...

OF THE MINES FALLS IF THOSE WHICH ARE EXHAUSTED ARE NOT REPLACED BY OTHERS, WHICH THEN HAVE TO BE FITTED OUT. THE SECOND IS TO CONTINUE THE PROGRAMME NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN THE LEVEL OF PRODUCTION. BOTH ALTERNATIVES INVOLVE RISKS, WHICH ARE INEVITABLE IN ANY ENTERPRISE IN THE CONGO TODAY. ALL THINGS CONSIDERED, WE HAVE DECIDED IN FAVOUR OF MAINTAINING PRODUCTION. I TOLD YOU LAST YEAR, AND I MUST REPEAT IT, THAT OUR POLICY CAN BE SUMMED UP IN THE WORD "MAINTAIN". IT IS ADMITTEDLY A DIFFICULT POLICY TO CARRY OUT, BUT IT IS, WE BELIEVE, IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF OUR SHAREHOLDERS.

OUR REPORT GIVES YOU THE REASONS FOR THE POOR RESULTS - THE FALL IN PRICES, THE RISE IN COSTS, THE STOPPAGES AND DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE HOSTILITIES IN KATANGA. BUT THERE IS A MORE IMPORTANT QUESTION: WILL THE GREATLY REDUCED DIVIDEND WHICH HAS BEEN DECLARED AT LEAST BE PAID, AND IF SO, WHEN? THAT QUESTION RAISES THE WHOLE PROBLEM OF THE CONDITIONS GOVERNING THE OPERATION AND THE TRANSACTIONS OF THE UNION MINIERE. THESE CONDITIONS HAVE BEEN SO MISUNDERSTOOD AND HAVE GIVEN RISE TO SUCH ATTACKS AGAINST US THAT I FEEL IT NECESSARY TO EXPLAIN THEM ONCE MORE. HAUT KATANGA, WHERE OUR MINING AND METALLURGICAL OPERATIONS ARE CARRIED ON AND FROM WHICH ALL OUR OUTPUT IS EXPORTED, IS ENTIRELY UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE KATANGESE GOVERNMENT. THE LEOPOLDVILLE GOVERNMENT HAS NEVER SO FAR EXERCISED ANY POWER IN THIS REGION. SINCE KATANGA DECLARED ITSELF INDEPENDENT IN JULY 1960, THE KATANGESE AUTHORITIES HAVE ADOPTED A SERIES OF LEGISLATIVE ORDINANCES AND ACTS UNDER WHICH COMPANIES CARRYING ON ACTIVITIES IN THE REGION ARE OBLIGED TO PAY THEIR TAXES, DUES, EXPORT DUTIES AND ROYALTIES TO THOSE AUTHORITIES, AS WELL AS THE DIVIDENDS DUE TO THE STATE. IN ADDITION, UNDER THE CURRENCY CONTROL REGULATIONS, ANY CURRENCY OBTAINED FROM THE EXPORT OF GOODS ORIGINATING IN KATANGA HAS TO BE TRANSFERRED TO THE BANQUE NATIONALE OF KATANGA.

THE LEGALITY OF THE KATANGESE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION IS THE SUBJECT OF A PASSIONATE DEBATE IN WHICH WE CANNOT AND DO NOT WISH TO INTERVENE.

/...

THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE KATANGESE REGIME IS JUSTIFIED BY SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES MUST NOT BE CONFUSED WITH THE FACT THAT THIS REGIME EXISTS DE FACTO AND THAT IT HAS, MOREOVER, DEMONSTRATED ON MANY OCCASIONS ITS ABILITY TO ENFORCE ITS DECISIONS. THE UNION MINIERE, THEREFORE, CANNOT BUT COMPLY WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE KATANGESE AUTHORITIES. ANY REFUSAL WOULD BE INTERPRETED AS A DELIBERATE ACT OF INSUBORDINATION, ENTAILING THE MOST SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES AND POSSIBLY THE CESSATION OF OUR OPERATIONS."

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Such a stoppage would stifle the economic life of Katanga and ~~the~~ deprive its people of their means of subsistence. We could expect disturbances to occur, similar to those which have taken place in other parts of the Congo, ~~the~~ imperilling the safety of our agents and their families.

In order to <sup>(help us in)</sup> ~~determine~~ our choice of the line of conduct we should adopt, we have consulted lawyers of international reputation <sup>who</sup> ~~who~~ have formally advised us that owing to the de facto existence of the Katangese Government, the payments which our company has made to the local authorities since independence are entirely valid.

We have also been reproached for stopping the export of our products <sup>by</sup> ~~through~~ the ~~Matadi~~ <sup>(route)</sup> Port of Francqui/Matadi. These exports were at first made impossible because of the insecurity ~~the~~ reigning in Kasai for ~~so~~ many months. Since November last there has in addition been a physical impossibility resulting from the destruction of the bridge over the River Lubilash during military operations.

The work on the reconstruction of the bridge was held up for a long time because of the insecurity of the frontier region where it is ~~situated~~ situated. The preparatory work on the construction of a temporary bridge has at last begun and the material has been supplied. If the work is not held up again it may be possible to restore the use of the bridge in three or four months.

<sup>(we have sufficient quantities)</sup> ~~material~~ <sup>supplies</sup> permit, to make token deliveries with the object of determining the possibilities for the use of the Port-~~de~~ Francqui/Matadi route in present conditions of operation.

The Union Minière deplores the continuance of the political impasse at present affecting the relations between the Central Government and that of Katanga. Whenever we have been able to do so we have expressed the hope that an agreement would be reached between the two, an agreement on which depends the future fate of a considerable number of African and European nationals. In the meanwhile, however, we are compelled to conform to the decisions of the authority, which in any case has the means of imposing them on us. It is these decisions which are causing uncertainty regarding the payment of <sup>(the)</sup> ~~dividend~~. We have made <sup>(representations)</sup> ~~approaches~~ to the Katangese authorities and we shall continue them with a firm determination to defend your interests to the best of our ability. These authorities have given us the assurance that they are not, in principle, opposed to <sup>(making)</sup> ~~the~~ transfers necessary for the

2/  
payment of <sup>the</sup> ~~dividend~~ and that it is only the lack of foreign currency which prevents them doing so at the present time.

In addition to this uncertainty regarding the payment of <sup>the</sup> ~~dividend~~ there is, of course, that of future fiscal arrangements. In <sup>sum</sup> ~~the~~, this distribution is proposed to you in the hope that it will be possible to pay it in the not too distant future. However, as circumstances of all kinds may frustrate our intentions, this distribution must necessarily be decided on subject to the broadest reservations in order to meet all ~~possibilities~~ <sup>eventualities</sup>. If significant changes were to occur in the facts on which we have based our proposal for a dividend, a general ~~assembly~~ meeting would be convened.

There is one last question which is undoubtedly of concern to you: that of the ~~possibilities~~ <sup>prospects</sup> for the ~~present~~ <sup>current year</sup> ~~financial period~~. The reply obviously depends on the political, monetary and financial situation of Katanga. I ~~would not dare to make~~ <sup>risk</sup> forecasts in such problematical spheres. On the other hand, from the industrial point of view, I can assure you that the situation remains good, the normal rate of production is ~~being~~ maintained and the courage of our staff has not ~~weakened~~ <sup>flagged</sup>. It has rightly been said that in the Congolese disaster one thing has survived, private enterprise. The Union Minière is evidence of that. With its powerful means of production restored, its staff courageous and competent, ~~social activities~~ <sup>and work</sup> being extended to ~~the~~ <sup>an</sup> entire population, it could be a factor in the recovery of the Congo. It is ready to play that role. But we must not deceive ourselves: there are many other factors which will affect that recovery. UNQUOTE

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UNATIONS NEWYORK STOP LL 25

SECRETARY GENERAL FOLLOWING IS PART OF STATEMENT MADE BY GILLET

BOARD PRESIDENT IN UNION MINIERE , 24TH MAY STOP

" JE NE PUIS MANQUER D'EVOQUER TOUT D'ABORD LES TRAGIQUES EVENEMENTS  
DE SEPTEMBRE ET DE DECEMBRE .

NOUS AVONS RENDU HOMMAGE, DANS NOTRE RAPPORT , - A NOS AGENTS

TOMBES A LEUR POSTE ET NOUS AVONS ETE, J'EN SUIS CERTAIN, LES

INTERPRETES DES SENTIMENTS UNANIMES DE NOS ACTIONNAIRES.

CES EVENEMENTS ONT EU DE GRAVES REPERCUSSIONS SUR LA MARCHE DE NOS  
USINES.

LES OPERATIONS MILITAIRES CONTRE NOS INSTALLATIONS ONT SERIEUSEMENT  
ENDOMMAGE CERTAINS CENTRES VITAUX DE NOTRE EXPLOITATION.

SOUCIEUX DE NE PAS TROUBLER L'ATMOSPHERE D'APAISEMENT QUI REGNE

AUJOURD'HUI, NOUS N'AVONS EVOQUE QUE DISCRETEMENT DANS NOTRE RAPPORT  
LES TRAGEDIES DU KATANGA QUE BEAUCOUP VOUDRAIENT OUBLIER. SI J'Y

REVIENS, C'EST UNIQUEMENT POUR RENDRE HOMMAGE A NOTRE PERSONNEL,

SANS DISCRIMINATION DE RACE NI DE RANG HIERARCHIQUE.

MALORE LES DANGERS, LES EPREUVES PHYSIQUES ET MORALES, NOS AGENTS

ONT TEMOIGNE D'UN ATTACHEMENT FAROUCHE A L'OEUVRE COMMUNE ET ONT

CONTINUE LEUR TACHE AVEC UN COURAGE ET UN DEVOUEMENT QUE JE ME FOIS

DE RAPPELER DANS CETTE ASSEMBLEE.

JE N'EN VEUX POUR PREUVE QUE LA RAPIDITE AVEC LAQUELLE NOS USINES

ONT ETE REMISES EN MARCHE APRES LES ATTQUES ET LES PILLAGES AUXQUELS  
ELLES ONT ETE SOUMISES.

NOUS VOUS EXPRIMES A NOTRE PERSONNEL NOTRE APPRECIATION ET NOS

REMERCIEMENTS, ET JE NE DOUTE PAS QUE VOUS VOUS Y ASSOCIEREZ.

VOUS CONSTATEREZ, DANS LE BILAN, QUE NOUS N'AVONS PAS SENSIBLEMENT

MODIFIE LE RYTHME DE NOS INVESTISSEMENTS QUI RESTENT DE L'ORDRE DE  
UN MILLIARD ET QUART.

NOUS NOUS TROUVONS DEVANT UNE ALTERNATIVE DONT LE PREMIER TERME EST

LA REDUCTION DES INVESTISSEMENTS AVEC COMME CONSEQUENCE UNE BAISSSE

PROCHAINE DE NOTRE PRODUCTION, CAR LE MATERIEL DES USINES VIEILLIT

VITE ET LA PRODUCTION MINIERE DIMINUE SI LES MINES QUI S'EPUISENT



NOUS NOUS TROUVONS DEVANT UNE ALTERNATIVE DONT LE PREMIER TERME EST LA REDUCTION DES INVESTISSEMENTS AVEC COMME CONSEQUENCE UNE BAISSSE PROCHAINE DE NOTRE PRODUCTION, CAR LE MATERIEL DES USINES VIEILLIT VITE ET LA PRODUCTION MINIERE DIMINUE SI LES MINES QUI S'EPUISENT NE SONT PAS REMPLACEES PAR D'AUTRES QU'IL FAUT EQUIPER .

LE SECOND TERME DE L'ALTERNATIVE EST LA CONTINUATION D'UN PROGRAMME INDISPENSABLE AU MAINTIEN DU NIVEAU DE LA PRODUCTION.

LES DEUX TERMES PRESENTENT DES RISQUES QUI SONT INELUCTABLES AUJOURD'HUI DANS TOUTE ENTREPRISE AU CONGO. TOUT BIEN PESE, LA CONCLUSION EST EN FAVEUR DU MAINTIEN DE LA PRODUCTION.

JE VOUS L'AI FIT L'ANNEE DERNIERE, ET JE DOIS LE REPETER, NOTRE POLITIQUE SE RESUME EN UN MOT : MAINTENIR. ELLE EST DIFFILE A MENER CERTES, MAIS C'EST, CROYONS-NOUS, LA PLUS CONFORME AUX INTERETS DES ACTIONNAIRES.

NOTRE RAPPORT VOUS DONNE LAISON DE LA BAISSSE DES RESULTATS : DIMINUTION DU PRIX DU VENTE, AUGMENTATION DU PRIX DE REVIENT, ARRETES ET DESTRUCTIONS AU COURS DES HOSTILITES AU KATANGA. MAIS UNE QUESTION PLUS IMPORTANTE SE POSE : LE DIVIDENDE DECLARE ET SI FORTEMENT REDUIT SERA-T-IL AU MOINS PAYE, ET QUAND ?

CETTE QUESTION SOULEVE TOUT LE PROBLEME DU REGIME AUQUEL L'EXPLOITATION ET LES TRANSACTIONS DE L'UNION MINIERE SONT SOUMISES. IL EST TELLEMENT MAL COMPRIS ET A DONNE LIEU A DE TELLES ATTAQUES CONTRE NOUS QUE JE'ESTIME NECESSAIRE DE L' EXPLIQUER UNE FOIS DE PLUS LE HAUT-KATANGA OU S'EXERCE NOTRE ACTIVITE MINIERE ET METALLURGIQUE ET D'OU TOUTES NOS PRODUCTIONS SONT EXPORTEES, SE TROUVE ENTIEREMENT SOUS LE CONTROLE DU GOUVERNEMENT KATANGAIS. LE GOUVERNEMENT DE LEOPOLDVILLE N'A EXERCE, JUSQU'A CE JOUR, AUCUN POUVOIR DANS CETTE REGION.

DEPUIS LA DECLARATION DE L'AUTONOMIE DU KATANGA EN JUILLET 1960, LES AUTORITES KATANGAIS ONT PRIS UNE SERIE D'ORDONNANCES-LOIS, OU DE LOIS, IMPOSANT AUX SOCIETES QUI EXERCENT UNE ACTIVITE DANS LA REGION DE VERSER A CES AUTORITES LEURS IMPOTS, TAXES, DROITS DE SORTIE ET REDEVANCES AINSI QUE LES DIVIDENDS DUS AUX POUVOIRS PUBLICS. EN OUTRE, LES DEVISES PROVENANT DE L'EXPORTATION DE PRODUITS ORIGINAIRES DU KATANGA DOIVENT ETRE TRANSFEREES A LA BANQUE NATIONALE DU KATANGA, EN VERTU DELA REGLEMENTATION RELATIVE AU CONTROLE DES CHANGES.

LA LEGALITE DE LA POSITION DU GOUVERNEMENT KATANGAIS FAIT L'OBJET DE DISCUSSIONS PASSIONNEES DANS LESQUELLES NOUS NE POUVONS NI NE DESIRONS INTERVENIR.

LA QUESTION DE SAVOIR SI LE REGIME KATANGAIS SE JUSTIFIE EN RAISON DE CIRCONSTANCES PARTICULIERES NE DOIT PAS ETRE CONFONDUE AVEC LE

NALE DU KATANGA, EN VERTU DELA REGLEMENTATION RELATIVE AU  
CONTROLE DES CHANGES.

LA LEGALITE DE LA POSITION DU GOUVERNEMENT KATANGAIS FAIT L'OBJET DE  
DISCUSSIONS PASSIONNEES DANS LESQUELLES NOUS NE POUVONS NI NE  
DESIRONS INTERVENIR.

LA QUESTION DE SAVOIR SI LE REGIME KATANGAIS SE JUSTIFIE EN RAISON  
DE CIRCONSTANCES PARTICULIERES NE DOIT PAS ETRE CONFONDUE AVEC LE  
FAIT QUE CE REGIME EXISTE DE FACTO ET QU'IL A, PAR AILLEURS,  
DEMONTRE A DE NOMBREUSES OCCASIONS SA CAPACITE D'IMPOSER SES  
DECISIONS. L'UNION MINIERE NE PEUT DONC QUE SE CONFORMER  
AUX PRESCRIPTIONS DES AUTORITES KATANGAISES. UN REFUS SERAIT INTER-  
PRETE COMME UN ACTE DELIBERE D'INSUBORDINATION ENTRANANT LES PLUS  
GRAVES CONSEQUENCES ALLANT JUSQU'A L'ARRET DE NOS ACTIVITES.

UN TEL ARRET ETOUFFERAIT LA VIE ECONOMIQUE DU KATANGA ET PRIVERAIT  
SES POPULATIONS DE LEURS MOYENS DE SUBSISTENCE. IL FAUDRAIT  
S'ATTENDRE AU DEVELOPPEMENT DE TROUBLES SEMBLABLES A CEUX QUI SE  
SONT PRODUITS DANS D'AUTRES PARTIES DU CONGO METTANT EN PERIL LA  
SECURITE DE NOS AGENTS ET DE LEURS FAMILLES.

DEV NOUS ECLAIRER SUR LE CHOIX DE LA LIGNE DE CONDUITE A ADOPTER,  
NOUS AVONS CONSULTE DES JURISTES DE REPUTATION INTERNATIONALE  
QUI ONT EMIS L'AVIS FORMEL QU'EN RAISON DE L'EXISTENCE DE FACTO  
DU GOUVERNEMENT KATANGAIS, LES PAIEMENTS QUE NOTRE SOCIETE A  
EFFECTUES AUX AUTORITES LOCALES DEPUIS L'INDEPENDENCE SONT ENTIERE-  
MENT VALABLES.

IL NOUS A PAR AILLEURS ETE REPROCHE D'AVOIR MIS FIN AUX EXPORTATIONS  
DE NOS PRODUITS PAR LA VOIE DE PORT-FRANCOU/MATADI. CES EXPORTATIONS  
ONT TOUT D'ABORD ETE RENDUES IMPOSSIBLES PAR L'INSECURITE  
QUI A REGNE PENDANT DE NOMBREUX MOIS AU KASAI. DEPUIS NOVEMBRE  
DERNIER, IL S'Y EST AJOUTE UNE IMPOSSIBILITE MATERIELLE RESULTANT  
DE LA DESTRUCTION DU PONT SUR LA RIVIERE LUBILASH AU COURS  
D'OPERATIONS MILITAIRES.

LES TRAVAUX DE RETABLISSEMENT DU PONT ONT ETE LONGTEMPS ENTRAVES  
PAR L'INSECURITE DE LA REGION FRONTIERE OU IL EST SITUE.

LES TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES A L'ETABLISSEMENT D'UN PONT PROVISOIRE  
VIENNENT ENFIN DE COMMENCER ET LE MATERIEL EST APPROVISIONNE. SI  
LES TRAVAUX NE SONT PLUS TROUBLES, ON PEUT ESPERER LE RETABLISSE-  
MENT DU TRAFIC DANS 3 OU 4 MOIS.

CEPENDANT, NOUS AVONS INFORME LES INTERESSES QUE NOUS ETIONS  
DISPOSES A EFFECTUER, DES QUE LES CONTINGENCES MATERIELLES LE  
PERMETTRAIENT, DES EXPEDITIONS TEMOINS AYANT POUR BUT DE DETERMINIER  
LES POSSIBILITES D'UTILISATION DE LA VOIE DE PORT-FRANCOU/MATADI  
DANS LES CONDITIONS ACTUELLES DE SON EXPLOITATION.

LES POSSIBILITES D'UTILISATION DE LA VOIE DE PORT-FRANCOU/MATADI  
DANS LES CONDITIONS ACTUELLES DE SON EXPLOITATION.

L'UNION MINIERE DEPLORE LA PERSISTENCE DE L'IMPASSE POLITIQUE DANS  
LAQUELLE SE TROUVENT ACTUELLEMENT LES RELATIONS ENTRE LE GOUVERNE-  
MENT CENTRAL ET CELUI DU KATANGA .

CHACQUE FOIS QUE L'OCCASION NOUS EN A ETE DONNEE , NOUS AVONS EXPRIME  
DES VOEUX POUR QU'UN ACCORD INTERVienne ENTRE LES INTERESSES, ACCORD  
DONT DEPEND LE SORT FUTUR D'UN NOMBRE CONSIDERABLE DE RESORTISSANTS  
AFRICAINS ET EUROPEENS.

MAIS, ENTRETEMPS, NOUS DEVONS NOUS CONFORMER AUX DECISIONS DE L'  
AUTORITE QUI A D'AILLEURS LES MOYENS DE NOUS LES IMPOSER. CE SONT  
CES DECISIONS QUI ENTRAINENT DES INCERTITUDES AU SNET DU PAIEMENT  
DU DIVIDENDE.

NOUS AVONS FAIT DES DEMARCHES AUPRES DES AUTORITES KATANGAISES ET  
NOUS LES POURSUIVRONS AVEC LA FERME VOLONTE DE DEFENDRE AU MIEUX  
VOS INTERETS.

CES AUTORITES NOUS ONT DONNE L'ASSURANCE QU'ELLES NE SONT PAS, EN  
PRINCIPE, OPPOSEES AUX TRANSFERTS NECESSAIRES AU PAIEMENT DU DIVIDEN-  
DE ET QUE C'EST SIMPLEMENT UNE QUESTION DE DISPONIBILITE EN DEVISES  
QUI EMPECHE DE LE FAIRE ACTUELLEMENT.

A CETTE INCERTITUDE AU SUJET DU PAIEMENT DU DIVIDENDE S'AJOUTE  
EVIDEMMENT CELLE QUI CONCERNE LES FUTURES DISPOSITIONS FISCALES.  
EN RESUME , LA REPARTITION VOUS EST PROPOSEE AVEC L'ESPOIR QU'ELLE  
POURRA ETRE PAYEE A UNE EPOQUE PAS TROP ELOIGNEE.

TOUTEFOIS, COMME DES CIRCONSTANCES DE TOUTE ESPECE PEUVENT DEJOUER  
LES PREVISIONS, C'EST NECESSAIREMENT SOUS DES RESERVES CONÇUES EN  
TERMES GENERAUX POUR RENCONTRER TOUTES LES EVENTUALITES QUE CETTE  
REPARTITION DEVRAIT ETRE DECIDEE.

SI DES MODIFICATIONS NOTABLES AUX ELEMENTS D'APPRECIATION QUI ONT  
PERMIS DE PROPOSER UN DIVIDENDE VENAIENT A SE PRODUIRE, UNE ASSEMBLEE  
GENERALE SERAIT CONVOCUEE.

UNE DERNIERE QUESTION VOUS PREOCCUPE CERTAINEMENT : CELLE DE SAVOIR  
COMMENT SE PRESENTE L'EXERCICE EN COURS.

LA REPONSE EST EVIDEMMENT SUBORDONNEE A LA SITUATION POLITIQUE,  
MONETAIRE ET FINANCIERE DU KATANGA.

JE NE ME HASARDERAI PAS A FAIRE DES PREVISIONS DANS DES DOMAINES  
AUSSI ALEATOIRES.

PAR CONTRE, SUR LE PLAN INDUSTRIEL, JE PUIS VOUS CONFIRMER QUE  
LA SITUATION RESTE BONNE, LE RYTHME DE PRODUCTION NORMAL SE  
MAINTIENT ET LE COURAGE DE NOTRE PERSONNEL NE FAIBLIT PAS.

ON A DIT AVEC RAISON QUE DANS LE DESASTRE CONGOLAIS, UNE SEULE  
CHOSE RESISTE, C'EST L'ENTREPRISE PRIVEE. L'UNION MINIERE EN EST

LES PREVISIONS, C'EST NECESSAIREMENT COMME DES RESERVES CONÇUES EN TERMES GENERAUX POUR RENCONTRER TOUTES LES EVENTUALITES QUE CETTE REPARTITION DEVRAIT ETRE DECIDEE.

SI DES MODIFICATIONS NOTABLES AUX ELEMENTS D'APPRECIATION QUI ONT PERMIS DE PROPOSER UN DIVIDENDE VENAIENT A SE PRODUIRE, UNE ASSEMBLEE GENERALE SERAIT CONVOCUEE.

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ON A DIT AVEC RAISON QUE DANS LE DESASTRE CONGOLAIS, UNE SEULE CHOSE RESISTE, C'EST L'ENTREPRISE PRIVEE. L'UNION MINIERE EN EST UN TEMOIGNAGE. AVEC SES PUISSANTS MOYENS DE PRODUCTION RESTAURES, SON PERSONNEL COURAGEUX ET COMPETENT, DES OEUVRES SOCIALES ETENDANT LEUR ACTION A TOUTE UNE POPULATION, ELLE POURRAIT ETRE UN FACTEUR DU RELEVEMENT DU CONGO. ELLE EST PRETE A JOUER CE ROLE. MAIS QU'ON NE S'Y TROMPE PAS, BIEN D'AUTRES FACTEURS CONDITIONNENT CE RELEVEMENT . '' V

UNNY DE JSJM ERE TFC '''

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Unofficial translation

Cable

To: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

From: *Union Miniere*

Date: 25 May 1962

FOLLOWING IS PART OF STATEMENT MADE BY GILLET, BOARD PRESIDENT IN UNION MINIERE, 24 MAY.

"I CANNOT AVOID MENTIONING FIRST OF ALL THE TRAGIC EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER AND DECEMBER. WE HAVE PAID TRIBUTE IN OUR REPORT TO THOSE MEMBERS OF OUR STAFF WHO FELL AT THEIR POSTS, AND I AM SURE THAT IN DOING SO WE WERE EXPRESSING THE UNANIMOUS FEELINGS OF OUR SHAREHOLDERS. THOSE EVENTS HAVE HAD SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS ON THE WORK OF OUR FACTORIES. THE MILITARY ATTACKS ON OUR INSTALLATIONS SERIOUSLY DAMAGED CERTAIN VITAL CENTRES OF OUR OPERATIONS. BEING ANXIOUS NOT TO DISTURB THE CALMER ATMOSPHERE WHICH NOW PREVAILS, IN OUR REPORT WE HAVE ONLY TOUCHED ON THE TRAGEDIES OF KATANGA, WHICH MANY WOULD LIKE TO FORGET. IF I RETURN TO THE SUBJECT, IT IS SOLELY IN ORDER TO PAY A TRIBUTE TO OUR STAFF, WITHOUT REGARD TO THEIR RACE OR OFFICIAL RANK. DESPITE THE DANGERS AND THE PHYSICAL AND MENTAL ORDEALS THEY FACED, OUR STAFF SHOWED A FIERCE LOYALTY TO THE COMMON TASK AND CONTINUED THEIR WORK WITH A COURAGE AND DEVOTION WHICH I FEEL IT MY DUTY TO RECALL IN THIS ASSEMBLY. NO OTHER PROOF OF THIS IS NEEDED THAN THE SPEED WITH WHICH PRODUCTION WAS RESUMED IN OUR FACTORIES AFTER THE ATTACKS AND THE LOOTING TO WHICH THEY WERE SUBJECTED. WE WISH TO EXPRESS OUR APPRECIATION AND OUR GRATITUDE TO OUR STAFF, AND I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT YOU WILL ASSOCIATE YOURSELVES WITH US IN THIS.

YOU WILL SEE FROM THE BALANCE SHEET THAT WE HAVE NOT APPRECIABLY ALTERED OUR RATE OF INVESTMENT, WHICH REMAINS AT THE LEVEL OF 1,250 MILLION. WE ARE FACED WITH A CHOICE BETWEEN TWO ALTERNATIVES. THE FIRST IS TO REDUCE INVESTMENT, WHICH WOULD LEAD TO A FALL IN PRODUCTION IN THE NEAR FUTURE, SINCE THE EQUIPMENT OF THE FACTORIES AGES QUICKLY AND THE OUTPUT

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OF THE MINES FALLS IF THOSE WHICH ARE EXHAUSTED ARE NOT REPLACED BY OTHERS, WHICH THEN HAVE TO BE FITTED OUT. THE SECOND IS TO CONTINUE THE PROGRAMME NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN THE LEVEL OF PRODUCTION. BOTH ALTERNATIVES INVOLVE RISKS, WHICH ARE INEVITABLE IN ANY ENTERPRISE IN THE CONGO TODAY. ALL THINGS CONSIDERED, WE HAVE DECIDED IN FAVOUR OF MAINTAINING PRODUCTION. I TOLD YOU LAST YEAR, AND I MUST REPEAT IT, THAT OUR POLICY CAN BE SUMMED UP IN THE WORD "MAINTAIN". IT IS ADMITTEDLY A DIFFICULT POLICY TO CARRY OUT, BUT IT IS, WE BELIEVE, IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF OUR SHAREHOLDERS.

OUR REPORT GIVES YOU THE REASONS FOR THE POOR RESULTS - THE FALL IN PRICES, THE RISE IN COSTS, THE STOPPAGES AND DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE HOSTILITIES IN KATANGA. BUT THERE IS A MORE IMPORTANT QUESTION: WILL THE GREATLY REDUCED DIVIDEND WHICH HAS BEEN DECLARED AT LEAST BE PAID, AND IF SO, WHEN? THAT QUESTION RAISES THE WHOLE PROBLEM OF THE CONDITIONS GOVERNING THE OPERATION AND THE TRANSACTIONS OF THE UNION MINIERE. THESE CONDITIONS HAVE BEEN SO MISUNDERSTOOD AND HAVE GIVEN RISE TO SUCH ATTACKS AGAINST US THAT I FEEL IT NECESSARY TO EXPLAIN THEM ONCE MORE. HAUT KATANGA, WHERE OUR MINING AND METALLURGICAL OPERATIONS ARE CARRIED ON AND FROM WHICH ALL OUR OUTPUT IS EXPORTED, IS ENTIRELY UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE KATANGESE GOVERNMENT. THE LEOPOLDVILLE GOVERNMENT HAS NEVER SO FAR EXERCISED ANY POWER IN THIS REGION. SINCE KATANGA DECLARED ITSELF INDEPENDENT IN JULY 1960, THE KATANGESE AUTHORITIES HAVE ADOPTED A SERIES OF LEGISLATIVE ORDINANCES AND ACTS UNDER WHICH COMPANIES CARRYING ON ACTIVITIES IN THE REGION ARE OBLIGED TO PAY THEIR TAXES, DUES, EXPORT DUTIES AND ROYALTIES TO THOSE AUTHORITIES, AS WELL AS THE DIVIDENDS DUE TO THE STATE. IN ADDITION, UNDER THE CURRENCY CONTROL REGULATIONS, ANY CURRENCY OBTAINED FROM THE EXPORT OF GOODS ORIGINATING IN KATANGA HAS TO BE TRANSFERRED TO THE BANQUE NATIONALE OF KATANGA.

THE LEGALITY OF THE KATANGESE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION IS THE SUBJECT OF A PASSIONATE DEBATE IN WHICH WE CANNOT AND DO NOT WISH TO INTERVENE.

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THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE KATANGESE REGIME IS JUSTIFIED BY SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES MUST NOT BE CONFUSED WITH THE FACT THAT THIS REGIME EXISTS DE FACTO AND THAT IT HAS, MOREOVER, DEMONSTRATED ON MANY OCCASIONS ITS ABILITY TO ENFORCE ITS DECISIONS. THE UNION MINIERE, THEREFORE, CANNOT BUT COMPLY WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE KATANGESE AUTHORITIES. ANY REFUSAL WOULD BE INTERPRETED AS A DELIBERATE ACT OF INSUBORDINATION, ENTAILING THE MOST SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES AND POSSIBLY THE CESSATION OF OUR OPERATIONS."

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Such a stoppage would stifle the economic life of Katanga and ~~the~~ deprive its people of their means of subsistence. We could expect disturbances to occur, similar to those which have taken place in other parts of the Congo, ~~is~~ imperilling the safety of our agents and their families.

In order to <sup>help us in</sup> ~~determine~~ our choice of the line of conduct we should adopt, we have consulted lawyers of international reputation ~~who~~ who have formally advised us that owing to the de facto existence of the Katangese Government, the payments which our company has made to the local authorities since independence are entirely valid.

We have also been reproached for stopping the export of our products <sup>by</sup> ~~through~~ the ~~Matadi~~ <sup>Port of</sup> ~~Port of~~ Francqui/Matadi. <sup>route</sup> These exports were at first made impossible because of the insecurity ~~reigning~~ reigning in Kasai for ~~so~~ many months. Since November last there has in addition been a physical impossibility resulting from the destruction of the bridge over the River Lubilash during military operations.

The work on the reconstruction of the bridge was held up for a long time because of the insecurity of the frontier region where it is ~~situated~~ situated. The preparatory work on the construction of a temporary bridge has at last begun and the material has been supplied. If the work is not held up again it may be possible to restore the use of the bridge in three or four months.

We have however informed those concerned that we are ready, as soon as <sup>we have sufficient quantities</sup> material supplies permit, to make token deliveries with the object of determining the possibilities for the use of the Port-~~of~~ Francqui/Matadi route in present conditions of operation.

The Union Minière deplores the continuance of the political impasse at present affecting the relations between the Central Government and that of Katanga. Whenever we have been able to do so we have expressed the hope that an agreement would be reached between the two, an agreement on which depends the future fate of a considerable number of African and European nationals. In the meanwhile, however, we are compelled to conform to the decisions of the authority, which in any case has the means of imposing them on us. It is these decisions which are causing uncertainty regarding the payment of <sup>the</sup> ~~dividends~~. We have made <sup>representations</sup> ~~approaches~~ to the Katangese authorities and we shall continue them with a firm determination to defend your interests to the best of our ability. These authorities have given us the assurance that they are not, in principle, opposed to the transfers <sup>making</sup> ~~necessary~~ for the



payment of <sup>the</sup> dividend~~s~~ and that it is only the lack of foreign currency which prevents them doing so at the present time.

In addition to this uncertainty regarding the payment of <sup>the</sup> dividend~~s~~ there is, of course, that of future fiscal arrangements. In ~~the~~ <sup>sum</sup> ~~year~~, this distribution is proposed to you in the hope that it will be possible to pay it in the not too distant future. However, as circumstances of all kinds may frustrate our intentions, this distribution must necessarily be decided on subject to the broadest reservations in order to meet all ~~possibilities~~ <sup>eventualities</sup>. If significant changes were to occur in the facts on which we have based our proposal for a dividend, a general ~~assembly~~ meeting would be convened.

There is one last question which is undoubtedly of concern to you: that of the <sup>prospects</sup> ~~possibilities~~ for the <sup>current year</sup> ~~present year~~ financial period. The reply obviously depends on the political, monetary and financial situation of Katanga. I <sup>w</sup>ould not <sup>risk</sup> ~~make~~ <sup>ing</sup> ~~to~~ make forecasts in such problematical spheres. On the other hand, from the industrial point of view, I can assure you that the situation remains good, the normal rate of production is ~~being~~ maintained and the courage of our staff has not <sup>flagged</sup> ~~weakened~~. It has rightly been said that in the Congolese disaster one thing has survived, private enterprise. The Union Minière is evidence of that. With its powerful means of production restored, its staff courageous and competent, <sup>and</sup> <sup>work</sup> ~~social activities~~ being extended to <sup>our</sup> ~~the~~ entire population, it could be a factor in the recovery of the Congo. It is ready to play that role. But we must not deceive ourselves: there are many other factors which will affect that recovery. UNQUOTE

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MOST URGENT

UNLON 371 CONFIDENTIAL TO BUNCHE FROM LINNER. HAVE NOW GOT HOLD  
OF PARTS OF THE BBC BROADCAST ON JUNE 5TH STOP BBC STATE THAT  
THE EXCERPTS IN QUESTION WERE QUOTE BASED ON COLIN LEGUM'S MATERIAL  
UNQUOTE THUS EYE CAN OBVIOUSLY NOT REPEAT NOT BE MADE RESPONSIBLE

P2=

FOR THE TEXT IN THIS BROADCAST STOP LEGUM VISITED BRUSSELS  
RECENTLY BUT WE WERE NOT REPEAT NOT IN TOUCH WITH EACH OTHER

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UNITED NATIONS  
BRUSSELS 14 JUN 75  
TELEGRAPH UNIT

CORRECTION: P1, LINE 2, 8TH WORD SHOULD READ 'JUNE'

CONFIDENTIAL

Brussels, 22nd June 1962

Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

Before leaving Brussels, on July 1st, I feel I would like to sum up in a few words the situation here as regards the Congo, such as I see it.

Concerning Mr. Spaak's position, you will of course, during his stay in New York, have had the opportunity of personally sizing up his ambitions and intentions. May I therefore limit myself to saying that I am still convinced that he is sincerely and doggedly trying to adapt Belgian policies in the Congo to UN principles and endeavours. In spite of his very strong personal influence in the government here it should, however, be borne in mind that he has to cope with an administration which is extremely complicated and rather slow-moving. This is true not the least as regards the part of the administrative machinery which deals with technical assistance. The top man there, M. Brasseur, is personally pro-UN. But he also happens to be Minister of Commerce which, in this country, is in itself a full-time job indeed. He is furthermore hampered in his administration by the traditional conflicts between Flemish and Walloons, and rightists and leftists. One of the consequences of this is, for instance, that months have now passed without his being able to push through the nomination of Professor Van Bilsen as Director of Technical Assistance, and in the meantime things in this sector are rather fluid. Thus it has taken them several weeks, and I have had to remind them over and over again, to produce three candidates for the posts as consultants to the Minister of Public Works in the Central Government.

It is also worth noting that up to date I have received no concrete information or proposal whatsoever from the government side as to claims in connection with losses suffered by private individuals in the Katanga last autumn, although this particular item was given quite a great deal of importance during our first talks here.

As to the Société Générale and the Union Minière, two things seem evident. First, that the government considers itself without any influence whatsoever on the policies and activities of those companies as regards

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U Thant,  
Secretary-General,  
United Nations,  
NEW YORK.

the Congo. The only way it could bring pressure on them would, it seems, be limited to their domestic activities where, through trade unions and other means, the government might influence them. But this is considered a risky, and in any case on the whole, a limited procedure. Secondly, the attitude of the leading mining people here remains basically the same. Thus, whilst now recognizing that Katangese independence or secession is a dead issue, they nevertheless do not want to, or dare not, do anything at the present stage to antagonise Tshombe and his colleagues. They are simply playing for time and trusting that the outcome of the negotiations between Adule and Tshombe will result in such a degree of autonomy for the Katanga that Union Minière could go on more or less as before. They are, however, aware of the fact that, for instance, Swiss financial interests are actively engaged in trying to obtain part of the financial control of their mining operations and I think they also realize that they risk attracting rather embarrassing publicity both in Belgium and abroad regarding their stand. Incidentally, Mr. Marton who, together with Mr. Robillard, was at the head of the Union Minière here, died a few days ago. He was rather anti-UN and pro-independence.

As to public opinion in general, whether in political, financial, industrial or intellectual circles, I think it is fair to say that there is a deeper understanding of and more sympathy for the UN rôle in the Congo. The tendency is to leave past events to the analysis of historians and look ahead towards a constructive collaboration. The consensus of opinion is that in order to save the financial situation of the Congo some kind of monetary trusteeship under UN sponsorship will be necessary, however unpopular such a term and notion would be to most of the Congolese. If UN as such could not assume this task themselves, so the argument goes, some suitable formula and arrangement should be developed together with such institutions as the World Bank or the Monetary Fund.

If my assessment is correct that the attitude of the qualified part of the public opinion has swung over to a much more positive attitude towards the UN it should, I think, on the other hand, be borne in mind that the mass of the Belgian population still suffers from the traumatic shock which events in the Congo have given them, and continues to be rather emotional about the whole affair. Should, for instance, the Ruanda Urundi developments take a bad turn from the Belgian point of view, then we will certainly have to reckon with a new explosion of bitterness and recriminations against the UN, in Parliament and in the press.

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Sechen  
We may  
perhaps  
discuss  
this  
or your  
return  
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In this connection there is one point I would like to submit for your consideration. From various sides Belgians have made it clear to me that they find it would be essential for the UN to maintain some kind of representation here. Of course our Paris Information Office covers also Belgium, but this is not considered sufficient; there should be somebody permanently on the spot to cultivate day-by-day contacts and keep influential circles here continuously au courant with UN policies and developments. Whether this representation should be on the level of a Special Representative or rather in the form of a small Information Office is not easy to say, and I have obviously not broached this matter to Mr. Spaak before knowing your own view.

Before I leave I may come back with some figures and facts about the technical assistance programme such as it is now taking shape here, but already now I wish to thank you very much indeed for the confidence you have shown me in entrusting me with such a delicate mission.

With warm personal regards,  
Yours sincerely,

*René Lemaire*

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INFO COPY

JUN 25 1962

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TO

*Ruedas*

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UNATIONS

NEWYORK=

LL 42 PATRICIO RUEDAS FROM LINNER.

SINCE DIFFICULT FIND TIME FOR EXAMINATION AND CHEST EXRAYS  
HERE BEFORE DEPARTURE , SUGGEST THESE THINGS BE DONE IN GENEVA  
FRIDAY SIXTH OR MONDAY NINTH JULY WHEN I WILL BE THERE FOR  
OPI CONFERENCE . PLEASE CABLE URGENTLY IF YOU AFREE .  
HAVE CONSULTED MARK GENEVA WHO WANTS TO KNOW LENGTH OF  
ASSIGNMENT .

UNITED NATIONS  
1502 JUN 25 PM 8 29  
TELEGRAPH UNIT

Brussels, 26th June 1961

Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

I am just back from a meeting with the Prime Minister. The main purpose for his inviting me was to express his Government's and his own gratitude and satisfaction for your having assigned me here in Brussels as your Special Representative, and for the improvement in the relations between our Organization and the Government and also, more generally speaking, influential political, financial and intellectual circles.

The Prime Minister gave very strong expression to his conviction that Belgium must in the future do everything in her might to strengthen the UN influence in the Congo and elsewhere. He did not hide his concern over possible negative developments in Ruanda Urundi and the adverse effect this would have on Belgian public opinion.

Neither did he make any secret of the serious difficulties his Government is encountering in internal politics, especially over certain fiscal reforms and linguistic problems. I would add that there are many who foresee the downfall of the Government, but the more general opinion nevertheless seems to be that it will somehow weather the storm although with a seriously weakened prestige.

Yours sincerely,

  
S. LINNER

Secretary-General U Thant,  
United Nations,  
NEW YORK.