

[1 CONFIDENTIAL]

EL/WG APR 2009

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES S-1120

BOX 66

FILE 7

ACC. 1998/0278

List of electrical equipment to be retain for UNOR

Mr. Dessande	One TV, one video and one Refrigerator
Ms. Isel Rivero	One TV
Mr. Javed Khan	One TV and one video

Mr. Dao	He said that he will return it back
---------	-------------------------------------



UNAMIR-MINUAR

The Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General
P.O. Box 749
Kigali, Rwanda
Telephone: 212 - 963 - 3930
Fax: 212 - 963 - 3090

Date: 20 March 1996

UN Radio

Dear Mr. Dusaidi,

As you know, we decided to suspend Radio UNAMIR broadcasts from 8th March when UNAMIR's mandate ended. Instead, we have requested resumption of the broadcasts under the name of "Radio UN Rwanda" with the same conditions and obligations as were applicable under the two-year agreement signed between the Government of Rwanda and UNAMIR on the radio.

I would like to confirm that Radio UN Rwanda would maintain its non-partisan, independent, UN oriented policy of Radio UNAMIR. In fact, Radio UN would aim to assist in achieving the objectives of the UN Security Council mandate as contained in Resolution No. 1050. These would include encouraging voluntary return of refugees, national reconciliation, measures to rehabilitate Rwanda's infrastructure and strengthening of the judicial process. UN Radio would also continue to project the role of various UN agencies in Rwanda.

In order to achieve a better understanding of the Rwandan Government policies and their implementation, I would welcome regular meetings between our radio officials and their counterparts in the Rwandese media. I would also like to encourage talks, interviews and programmes with Rwandan leaders, officials, journalists and individuals aimed at projecting activities in the fields related to our mandate. The aim, as I stated earlier, would be to give an objective, factual picture of developments in the country and to negate, as far as possible, the effect of negative propaganda that is projected by unlicensed broadcasts in the region that have been mentioned in the recent Addis Ababa Conference Communiqué.


Mr. Claude Dusaidi
Political Adviser to
the Vice-President
Ministry of Defence
Kigali
Republic of Rwanda

.../2

I hope that on the basis of this understanding that the Government of Rwanda's formal agreement for Radio UN to resume broadcasts would be forthcoming.

with best wishes

Yours sincerely,



Shaharyar M. Khan
Special Representative of the
Secretary General

cc: Col. Frank Mugambage
President's Office

H.E. Mr. Anastase Gasana
Minister of Foreign Affairs
and International Cooperation

H.E. Mr. Jean-Pierre Bizimana
Minister of Information

Prime Minister's Office

Speaking notes : Non-paper

Mandate

1. Security Council Resolution 1050 provides the outlines of the mandate for UNOR. In essence, the mandate requires UNOR to undertake the following tasks:
 - a) Encourage voluntary return and rehabilitation of refugees
 - b) National reconciliation
 - c) Strengthen national judiciary
 - d) Infrastructure rehabilitation through effective utilisation of aid
 - e) Coordination of UN Agency activity in Rwanda.
2. The Security Council resolution specifically calls for the retention of UN Radio and the Communications system. [Copy of resolution attached].
3. The Rwandan Government, through the Foreign Affairs Minister's letter of 1 December 1995 to the UN Secretary-General, has already accepted UNOR. However, under Security Council resolution 1050, the Government's formal agreement is required for UNOR to implement its mandate.
4. UNOR's size is being discussed at UN Headquarters but, due to severe financial constraints, the office is likely to be small.

Radio

5. On 8th March, at the conclusion of our mandate, Radio UNAMIR voluntarily stopped broadcasting. On the same day, the Ministry of Information was formally requested to permit Radio UN Rwanda to continue broadcasts. A letter has been written to the Vice-President's office indicating Radio UN Rwanda's willingness for closer cooperation with Radio Rwanda.
6. In view of the importance attached by the Security Council to the continuation of Radio UN Rwanda, the Government of Rwanda's permission to resume broadcasting is requested.

Equipment

7. UN Headquarters New York has now sent the list for the disposal of equipment to UN reviewing bodies. The list is divided, broadly, into the following three categories:

- a) Equipment to be used by other peace-keeping operations including storage at Brindisi or International Tribunal [ICTR].
- b) Equipment to be used by other UN Agencies.
- c) Equipment to be left in Rwanda and for Rwandan NGO's.

8. The proposal takes into account UNGA regulations and Security Council resolutions requesting as much equipment as possible to be left "for use in Rwanda". Equipment in category (b) would be for such use in Rwanda.

9. It is requested that the Government of Rwanda may take the following decisions:

- a) allow equipment, already packed, which is being transferred out of Rwanda and is not available for disposal to be exported without delay. This includes i) category (a) above, ii) lethal equipment, iii) equipment owned by countries and not by UN.
 - b) not to tax companies exclusively servicing UNAMIR.
 - c) appoint officials who would take over equipment to be delivered to Rwanda as it becomes available.
-


REPUBLIQUE RWANDAISE
REPUBLIC OF RWANDA



VICE-PRESIDENCE DE LA REPUBLIQUE ET
MINISTERE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE
CABINET DU VICE-PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF THE VICE-PRESIDENT
AND MINISTER OF DEFENCE
B.P 23 KIGALI

23rd March, 1996



H.E. Ambassador Shariyar Khan,
Special Representative of the United Nations General,
UNAMIR,
KIGALI.

Your Excellency,

In response to your letter of 20th March 1996, I wish to inform you that arrangements have been made to transfer the transmitters at Karongi and in Kibungo to where they can be protected by the RPA.

On the issue of the UN Radio, the Government is of the view that it can start operating after the Government of Rwanda and the United Nations have agreed on the exact mandate of the UN Office.

You also mentioned the generator at the airport. I have consulted with Airport authorities, who informed me that they wish to continue using it because the others they have are not as powerful.

Please accept, your Excellency, my compliments and highest regards.

Yours Sincerely,

Claude DUSAIDI

**POLITICAL ADVISOR TO THE VICE PRESIDENT
AND MINISTER OF DEFENCE**

c.c. H.E. The Vice President & Minister of Defence.

" Minister of Foreign Affairs.

" Minister of Information.

" Prime Ministers's Office.

L. Costa - SRS

UNAMIR

For use of Drafter: A remplir par le rédacteur

DATE 16 March 1996

ALL INFORMATION COMPLETE

ENTERED BY

1996 MAR 28 A 7 30

JCS

PMSS/FALD

S-2280C

3-3744

BY FACSIMILE

UNAMIR

KIGALI

MATTHEW FROM DA COSTA. SUBJECT: STATUS OF UNOR. YOUR
FAX 1412 DATED 25 MARCH 1996 REFERS. WISH ADVISE STAFF MEMBERS
SHOULD MAKE OWN ARRANGEMENTS FOR ACCOMMODATION. BEST REGARDS.
(MEDILI/FALD)NNNN

DO NOT

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REF. DAN

LES MARGE

JOY ZLE

NSTR

A. PRO

Vu
28-3-96
WS

cc SRS

This means NO
UN-provided accommodation
for UNOR.

LM CAO
2813

copy 28 3 96

Reçu le 28 MARS 1996

2813
LM

CAO celo

DATE	16 MARCH 1996
SIGNATURE	Luiz Carlos da Costa, Chief, PMSS/FALD
NAME AND TITLE	PLEASE TYPE NAME AND QUALITY IN DACTYLOGRAPHIC



Reçu le 26 MARS 1996

To: SRSB

26 March 1996

From: CAO

Snatter

Subject: Medical Facilities for UN Personnel in Rwanda

1. As requested, I attended the meeting which took place at 11 a.m. today at the UNDP Conference Room under the Chairmanship of the UNDP Resident Coordinator, Mr. S. Hasegawa. Others present were Dr. Mapatano Mala Ali (WHO), Dr. Bertrand Desmoulins (UNICEF), Dr. Josep Vargas (UNHCR), Mr. Bob Turner (DHA/OHC).

2. The purpose of the meeting was to present to Mr. Hasegawa the report of the Working Group on Medical Facilities for UN Staff in Rwanda. A copy of the Report is attached hereto. Mr. Hasegawa intends to discuss the Report at the next Heads of Agency meeting.

3. There was only a brief discussion of the Report which, essentially, is self-explanatory. The position of UNAMIR/UNOR was explained in respect of our reluctance to support a medical facility similar to the former NORMED; in addition, I undertook to ascertain whether the ambulance currently with UNAMIR/NORMED could be made available for the augmented medical facilities now being proposed for the UN community in Rwanda. [Enquiries on my return to the office revealed that the ambulance at NORMED is part of the NORMED Hospital equipment which has to be repatriated to Norway; however, another ambulance in the UNAMIR fleet has already been earmarked for retention for use by the UN community in Rwanda].

4. No arrangements were made on 26 March for any further meetings on this subject.

5. In view of the concern of ICTR with regard to medical facilities post-UNAMIR, I am copying this memorandum, together with the Report of the Working Group and Mr. Dao's memorandum to the Executive Director dated 21 March 1996, to Mr. George Anderson, Acting CAO, ICTR.

cc: Mr. W. de Souza
Mr. A. B. Sidique Dao

**REPORT FROM WORKING GROUP ON MEDICAL FACILITIES FOR
UN STAFF IN RWANDA
26.3.96**

This working group was established at a meeting of UN agency representatives held at UNDP on 21 March which was convened to discuss proposals for medical facilities for UN staff after the closure of the UNAMIR hospital. The working group was tasked with:

1. assess the present facilities which are available in Rwanda;
2. assess the needs of the UN community;
3. recommend measures to meet those assessed needs.

The working group met on 22 March to discuss this issue.

Participants:

WHO	Dr. Mapatano Mala Ali
UNICEF	Dr. Bertrand Desmoulins
UN Dispensary	Dr. Tshomba Hondo
DHA/OHC	Bob Turner

On 23 March.

Participants:

WHO	Dr. Mapatano Mala Ali
UNICEF	Dr. Bertrand Desmoulins
DHA/OHC	Bob Turner
UNHCR	Dr. Josep Vargas
HRFOR	Ann Carlson

On 25 March

Participants:

WHO	Dr. Mapatano Mala Ali
UNICEF	Dr. Bertrand Desmoulins
DHA/OHC	Bob Turner
UNHCR	Dr. Josep Vargas

On 26 March

Participants

WHO	Dr. Mapatano Mala Ali
UNICEF	Dr. Bertrand Desmoulins
DHA/OHC	Bob Turner
UNHCR	Dr. Josep Vargas

is the worst-case scenario and involves a serious medical emergency.

Provisions for the first category of care are already being made with the opening of the UN dispensary. With the addition of a Lab Technician and the necessary equipment, all out-patient care can be dealt with from the present location in the UNDP compound. For the UN medical examination all tests will be able to be conducted at the dispensary with the exception of x-rays for which the UN staff member will have to go to one of the hospitals.

For the second level of care, it is necessary to make arrangements to create a separate UN room in KFH for the hospitalization of UN staff. This room would be permanently rented by the UN, and would be maintained to the highest level of hygiene. With some strengthening by the international community with the provision of specific equipment and consumables the existing surgical, laboratory, x-ray, blood bank and hospital staff will serve the basic needs of the UN community, with the UN Physician acting as attending physician and directing care.

The third level of care will always require the evacuation of the UN staff member. Under these circumstances the UN Physician will act as attending physician and direct the care of the patient for evacuation. Contacts have already been made with the evacuation services available in the region. The sequence of events in this scenario are;

- 1) communication with Kigali that there is a problem and contacting of the UN Physician who will give direction for the care of the patient and start arrangements for evacuation;
- 2) gaining access to the patient and transportation to the nearest adequate health facility;
- 3) stabilization of the patient for evacuation.

In order to prepare for this kind of emergency, the UN community needs, as a minimum, to augment the facilities outlined above with the procurement of a portable ventilator.

3. Recommendations

- 1) An agreement be made with King Faisal Hospital for the permanent rental of a four bed capacity. This room would be solely for the use of UN staff and care would be under the guidance of the UN Physician. KFH has the advantages over CHK of having a generally higher level of hygiene, less overcrowding and newer equipment. Those services which are not available at KFH, e.g. ophtalmology, fibrescopy, bacteriology laboratory can be obtained at CHK.
- 2) That the equipment listed in annex 2 be procured as soon as possible, with the addition of a portable ventilator;
- 3) An assessment be made of health care facilities and a map be created of all the suitable facilities in Rwanda. This document would be widely distributed to UN staff and would include the procedures on how to contact the UN Physician and back-up measures should that fail;
- 4) The 24 hour radio room which has been proposed become operational as soon as possible;
- 5) All staff who visit the field be given first aid training;

Annex 2

PROGRAMME DES NATIONS UNIES
POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT



MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

UNITED NATIONS
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

Kigali, Le 15/03/1996

A : Sukehiro HASEGAWA
Representant Resident

DE : Dr. TSHOMBA Hondo
Médecin des Nations Unies

Objet : Equipements de l'UNAMIR pour le Dispensaire

Equipements manquant pour le Dispensaire des Nations Unies, Kigali.

A 1. AMBULANCE EQUIPEE
2. VOITURE TOUT TERRAIN ROBUSTE

B BUREAU DU MEDECIN

1. FAUTEUIL POUR LE MEDECIN
2. CHAISES POUR LES MALADES
1. MEUBLE BIBLIOTHEQUE
1. ORDINATEUR + ACCESSOIRES
1. TELEPHONE + FAX
1. PORTE-MANTEAUX
1. NEGATOSCOPE*

C SALLE D'EXAMENS

1. PARAVENT
1. TABLE D'EXAMENS MIXTE (MULTIFONCTION)*
1. SUPPORT SERUM AVEC ROULETTES*
1. TABOURET

- 1. BONBONNE D'OXYGENE
- 1. ARMOIRE VESTIAIRE
- 1. BASSIN
- 1. SCEAU

J SALLE DE STOCKAGE DE MEDICAMENTS

- 3. ETAGERES METAL•
- 1. ARMOIRE + CLEFS
- 1. GRANDE TABLE



MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Abdi Farah
Budget Officer, ISS
TRAFIPRO

FROM: Isel Rivero *Isel Rivero*
Special Assistant to the SRSG

DATE: 28 March 1996

SUBJECT: Furniture and Equipment to be Transferred to UNOR

1. As requested please find attached the list of staff members who presently have electrical equipment in their possession.
2. The Fax machine is installed in the SRSG's Office.
3. Since we do not yet have the exact staffing table nor a budget, I have made tentative calculations and have decided that provision should be made for equipment to be transferred to UNOR to equip maximum 5 professionals and 7 GS/clerks. This excludes the SRSG's Office.
4. Should it be decided not to leave a Political Office in Rwanda, the equipment and furniture could be transferred to the International Criminal Tribunal.
5. Your kind cooperation will be appreciated.

cc: ED ✓
CAO
J. Lombardo

Reçu le 28 MARS 1996

Furniture and Equipment to be transferred to UNOR

Mr. Abdul Jabbar

One TV and one Video (at home)

Mr. Dao

One TV (in the Office)

Ms. Isel Rivero

One TV (in the Office)

Ms. Abeba Kifle

One TV and one Video (at home)

Electric typewriters

Ms. Pauline Urasa
Ms. Fatimata Diarra

PCs/EDP

Mr. D. Zorilla
Mr. I. Tikoca
Ms. Abeba Kifle
Ms. Pauline Urasa
Ms. Isel Rivero
Ms. Amsale Retta
Ms. Betty Kiru
Ms. Fatimata Diarra
Ms. Alice Schacht
Mr. Karim Ismael
Mr. A.B.C. Dao
Ms. Sissay Tadesse
Ms. Jean d'Arc
Mr. Javed Khan

Photocopy machine

Ms. Fatima Diarra
Ms. Amsale Retta

One Fax Machine

ROUTING SLIP

FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

TO:

A: Mr. Khan

FROM:

DE: Wilfrid De Souza

Room No. - No de bureau

Extension - Poste

Date

27/02/96

FOR ACTION		POUR SUITE A DONNER
FOR APPROVAL		POUR APPROBATION
FOR SIGNATURE		POUR SIGNATURE
FOR COMMENTS		POUR OBSERVATIONS
MAY WE DISCUSS?		POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER ?
YOUR ATTENTION		VOTRE ATTENTION
AS DISCUSSED		COMME CONVENU
AS REQUESTED		SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE
NOTE AND RETURN		NOTER ET RETOURNER
FOR INFORMATION		POUR INFORMATION

As discussed last week, please find attached some comments on two of the options suggested in the last report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council.

I won't like to discuss with you

ED

3.3

Done

file

we

**COMMENTS ON THE OPTIONS FOR A SUCCESSOR UN PRESENCE IN RWANDA
OUTLINED IN THE DRAFT SG'S REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL**

The SG's report to the SC suggests a United Nations presence in Rwanda in order:

"To assist the Government of Rwanda in consolidating peace and stability through justice and reconciliation, to support the return of refugees and to contribute to rehabilitation and reconstruction".

The following paper attempts to examine in some detail two of the alternatives proposed for this United Nations presence: a small United Nations office in Rwanda or a successor mission to UNAMIR.

I. THE UNITED NATIONS OFFICE IN RWANDA (UNOR)

The report determines that this office would be headed by the SRSG, who would be entrusted with:

- a) "an enhanced coordination role with regard to the activities of the various United Nations agencies operating in Rwanda, including the HRFOR and some aspects of the Prosecutor's Office of the International Tribunal"; and
- b) "it would also promote and coordinate assistance from the international community to assist the Government of Rwanda in its rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts".

In examining these functions, it is not realistic to assume that UNOR will have greater capabilities than what UNAMIR, a full-fledged peace-keeping operation, has had during its mandate.

The role of coordination of UN agencies in Rwanda is currently being carried out on a day-to-day basis by the UN Resident Coordinator, who is the Resident Representative of UNDP. At a time when the emphasis is put on development assistance programmes, the functions of the ResCoordinator are not likely to be transferred easily to the SRSG heading a small office staffed with mainly political officers.

The relationship of UNOR with HRFOR is also problematic. To subsume HRFOR into UNOR is a difficult operation. It could create strains with HRFOR, which considers that its work should be independent from any political activity carried out by the SRSG. Moreover, it would add an additional layer in the decision-making process without clear benefits.

As regards the Prosecutor's Office of the Tribunal, its operations are independent and will continue to be so. Even its security will be independently coordinated by the Tribunal with the Government of Rwanda. Any "coordination role" of the SRSG will actually be limited to maintaining privileged channels of communication on the Tribunal's activities, nothing more in practical terms.

Finally, the disbursement of international assistance to Rwanda is linked to the programmes this assistance is earmarked for. These programmes are managed, and will probably continue to be managed under UNOR, either directly by the Government or by the Agencies under the coordination of the Resident Coordinator. An example is the process of preparation of the coming Geneva Roundtable, in which UNAMIR's role is very limited. It would not be realistic to expect UNOR to assume an enhanced role in this respect. The role of UNOR would of course be enhanced should a Trust Fund be placed at the disposal of the SRSG; this could however entail the risk of duplication of efforts with the UNDP Trust Fund.

Therefore, the mandate for UNOR would be more realistic if it focused on stressing the political role that the SRSG, as the UN most senior person in Rwanda, can play with respect to promoting national reconciliation and encouraging the refugees to come back, rather than entrusting him with functions which will not be easily carried out; an impossible mandate, in other words.

II. THE SUCCESSOR MISSION (UNCREMIR)

This option contemplates the creation of a mission which will carry out the same functions as UNOR and in addition will be entrusted with new tasks to be carried out by military observers and a military support component.

The functions of the military observers would be to monitor the safe return of refugees and their resettlement in their home communes. 200 milobs would be required to ensure a presence throughout the country.

The military support component could be entrusted with the following tasks:

- undertaking various construction projects in support of the Government, UN agencies and NGOs rehabilitation and socio-economic infrastructural restoration efforts;
- repairing of roads, bridges, communications facilities and water and power supply systems;
- providing transport for materials used in rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts;
- providing transport for returnees;
- assisting with the preparation of facilities and camps for returnees (transit camps and commune-level camps);
- assisting with demining and demobilization projects;
- assisting with the improvement of prison facilities

The military support component is composed of:

- a) specialized engineering, logistics and communications units to assist Rwanda with various reconstruction and rehabilitation activities linked to promoting conditions conducive to the return of refugees (350 all ranks);
- b) formed troops (850 all ranks).

The SG expresses in his report his concerns regarding the scarcity of specialized military units and the possibility that no offers of such units would be received. Two alternatives may be contemplated.

Should the Security Council choose this option and member States fail to provide the specialized military units required, these functions could be carried out by civilian engineering and logistics units contributed by Member States. However, due to the scarcity of these civilian units and the time it would take to deploy them, this option may be considered unrealistic.

Alternatively, some or all of these functions could be contracted out to a private company. In this respect, and as an example, the current contractor providing third line services to UNAMIR is actually ensuring most of the services required by the peace-keeping operation. Capabilities of such private contractors, who are able to deploy or sub-contract locally within 10 days the personnel required to perform all kinds of engineering and logistics functions, should not be underestimated. The difficulty in this case lies in the fact that a new international bidding process will have to be engaged. In the meantime, however, the current contractor could provisionally ensure most of the tasks outlined above.

Whether the Security Council in choosing the militaro-civilian option would also approve the figure of 850 formed troops to protect 350 specialized military personnel is doubtful, not to mention the predictable opposition of the Government to such an arrangement. We must, therefore, be prepared to do with much less by designing contingency plans.

III. COMMON ELEMENTS

In any of the two options contemplated above, a number of elements will have to be included so as to minimize the impact of UNAMIR's departure:

- Maintaining helicopter and fixed-wing lift capabilities. These capabilities would be managed by the SRSG and shared with all UN agencies working in Rwanda;
 - Maintaining a UN Radio to be administered jointly by the UN agencies concerned. This will require an in depth review of both the structure and the programmes of the current UNAMIR radio. Plans should also be drawn for the protection of its transmitters.
-

ROUTING SLIP FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

TO:
A: Mr. Khan

FROM:
DE: Wilfrid De Souza *WS*

Room No. - No de bureau Extension - Poste Date
27/02/96

FOR ACTION	POUR SUITE A DONNER
FOR APPROVAL	POUR APPROBATION
FOR SIGNATURE	POUR SIGNATURE
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MAY WE DISCUSS?	POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER ?
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*I would like to
discuss with you.*

ED *SW*
3.3

COM.6 (2-78)

Recu le 27.2.1996

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In any of the two options contemplated above, a number of elements will have to be included so as to minimize the impact of UNAMIR's departure:

- Maintaining helicopter and fixed-wing lift capabilities. These capabilities would be managed by the SRSG and shared with all UN agencies working in Rwanda;
 - Maintaining a UN Radio to be administered jointly by the UN agencies concerned. This will require an in depth review of both the structure and the programmes of the current UNAMIR radio. Plans should also be drawn for the protection of its transmitters.
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