

UNAMIR

BULLETINS AND DIRECTIVES OF THE FORCE COMMANDER

1 OCT 1994 - 17 MAR 1995

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

UNCLASSIFIED
RM 1995 APR 2009

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES	<u>51063</u>
BOX	<u>15</u>
FILE	<u>7</u>
ACC.	<u>1998/0278</u>

Shayal Maameet Khan

ISIS

International
Security
Information
Service

An interesting
document by my friend
Gen Ramsbotham.

Sad
28.11

18/11

UN Peacekeeping: the Art of the Possible

✓ CC. FC
30/11/94 IR

82

SUMMARY OF MAIN POINTS:

- The UN is 50 years old in 1995. Is this not an ideal opportunity to update the UN Charter to ensure its relevance for re-ordering its tasks in the post-Cold War world?
- Strategic direction of Peacekeeping operations still leaves much to be desired. The Military Staff Committee was envisaged as fulfilling this function. Should it not be re-initiated?
- Should post-conflict peace re-building be mandated by the Security Council in the same way as conflict resolution?
- What immediate measures need to be taken to improve the command and control of Peacekeeping operations?
- The author suggests answers to all these questions, emphasizing that lack of political will is the greatest enemy of the UN, which can only do what is required of it with the resources that it is given.

Published by:

ISIS

***International
Security
Information
Service***

Carrara House
20 Embankment Place
London WC2N 6NN
Tel: 071 839 7772
Fax 071 925 0861

ISIS is a non-partisan
information service to
Parliamentarians and
other interested parties.
ISIS takes neither a
corporate view nor a
campaigning stance.
Authors of ISIS
publications speak only
for themselves and within
their own particular field
of expertise.

Since retiring from the
Army, General Sir David
Ramsbotham has been
employed as a consultant
on the management of
UN Peacekeeping
Operations by the MoD
and DPKO. Currently
consultant on UN matters
with Defence Systems
Limited and Trustee of
the World Memorial Fund
for Disaster Relief.

Introduction

To judge from much of the media coverage of the United Nations (UN), one could be forgiven for presuming that there is an orchestrated campaign of criticism, and indeed vilification, of the one global organisation with a mandate to keep international peace. As a critic, but not a vilifier, my thesis is that the UN can only do what is required of it if it is given the means, and that it is not simply the UN that is failing, but the global community which alone is able to provide those means. There is, of course, considerable disagreement about what improvements are required. Based on practical observation as much as theory, I should like to put forward a wide-ranging package, conscious that it suffers from one major deficiency that is beyond my ability to rectify. No improvements are possible without the political will to provide them; it is lack of political will that is the biggest single enemy of the UN.

History

Three statements, made at the opening session of the UN Security Council, in Church House, Westminster, on 17 January 1946, are the basis of my thinking, and bear repeating. Each encapsulates part of the problem, and indicates areas where improvement is required. I must emphasise that, throughout this paper, I am thinking of the three 'Action' phases, described by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 'Agenda for Peace' - Preventive, Conflict Resolution and Post Conflict Peace Building.

The first was made by its first Chairman, the Australian Mr Makins:

'their [the Security Council's] work must be based on the Charter'.

That is still the case, and the Charter remains the UN's bible. To remind readers of its tone and style, I quote:

'We, the peoples of the United Nations, determined

To save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind and

To establish conditions upon which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law

And for these ends

To unite our strength to maintain international peace and security and

To ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest

Have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims.'

This was written after World War II, and the failure of the League of Nations, and expresses a determination to prevent international conflict. Out of it grew the various principles that governed the conduct of Peacekeeping operations between then and 9 November 1989 when the Berlin Wall came down, effectively signalling the end of the Cold War. It remains just as relevant a mission statement today, and it is on the Charter that the Security Council bases those Resolutions that make up its Mission mandates.

UN Charter — Peacekeeping and Peacemaking

But are the subsequent Chapters of the Charter as relevant as this preamble? Two of them cover Peacekeeping.

(i) Chapter VI

Chapter VI authorises the Security Council to take action designed for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes if:

'Continuance is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security'

Throughout the Cold War period, maintaining international peace and security was seen largely in terms of preventing regional conflicts from triggering off a major East-West conflict. The Cold War nations, with the notable exception of the Soviet Union, largely supported this concept. Those principles governing the conduct of international state Peacekeeping operations which were not defined in the Charter, grew, ad hoc, out of those operations that the UN was required to carry out. Although imperfect in many ways, these principles remain viable today. The current military definition of Peacekeeping operations, sometimes called Chapter VI operations, is that they are:

'Operations carried out with the consent (my underlining) of the belligerent parties, in support of efforts to achieve or maintain peace, in order to promote security, and sustain life, in areas of potential or actual conflict'.

(ii) Chapter VII

Chapter VII, in cases of Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression, authorises the Security Council to:

'Take such action, by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security'.

The current military definition of Peace Enforcement operations, or Chapter VII operations as they are sometimes called is:

'Operations carried out to restore peace between belligerents who do not consent (my underlining) to intervention and who may be engaged in combat activity'.

The problem, however, is that many UN operations, such as those in Somalia, Rwanda or Yugoslavia, are neither wholly

one thing or the other. Following the break-up of the old world order, the UN is now intervening not so much in inter-nation conflicts as in intra-nation ones. There is consent for some of what is being attempted, but force has also had to be used in certain circumstances. Peacekeeping operations are now multi-functional in their make-up and tasks; there are military, humanitarian and political elements in every mandate, not to say underlying implications of a post-conflict strategy, which will also require international sanction.

This tempts some people to talk about "Chapter VI and a half" operations, which is muddling and unnecessary. It also ignores the problems of Commanders on the ground, who have to convert Security Council resolutions into practical orders that make sense to the individual soldier, or observer. But what it suggests is that the details of the post-1945 Charter may not be wholly appropriate for the requirements of the post Cold War world. The problems involved in revising it should not be underestimated, but if it is to remain the bedrock of the UN, they should be tackled.

Intra-nation state, or communal, conflict is frequently described as civil war. Interference in a civil war has to be justified in legal as well as political, humanitarian and military terms. Just intervention is not as easy to define as just war. Nevertheless, because such definition is pertinent to an increasing number of current UN operations it should be attempted now, in order to prevent the efficacy of the UN from being further degraded. As far as practicalities are concerned, a team responsible for bringing forward proposals could be appointed (as has been done with financial procedures). I am wholly at one with Sir Brian Urquhart when he said:

'Either the UN is vital to a more stable and equitable world, and should be given the means to do its job, or peoples and governments should be encouraged to look

elsewhere. But is there really an alternative?'

There appears to be no alternative.

The second and third statements from 1946 were made by our then Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin:

'We must be in a position to enforce each decision, and that means that each member must take his full responsibility for supplying the necessary forces, funds and supplies, to carry out swiftly the Council's decisions against any aggressor'.

and

'HMG welcomes the formation of a Military Staff Committee, under the Security Council, so that the experience gained by the military Chiefs of Staff in the war can be placed at the disposal of the United Nations. The new objectives that they will be given, which is not to fight a narrow nationalist war, but to defend the peace of the world, will be a great asset to the UN.'

Re-defining the National Interest

Much has been done to establish a Stand-by Forces data base in New York, which will enable the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to plan, organise and deploy appropriate military forces when and where required, and a detailed logistics study has also been completed. The United Kingdom played a full part in both exercises.

But knowing who owns and who could provide particular assistance, does not overcome the problem of political will, or national self-interest, which ultimately will determine whether the UN's needs are provided. Common sense dictates that it must often be in the national interest to participate in, or enable, an international initiative to resolve a problem. If the UN decides that it is in the international interest to keep the peace somewhere, and it makes a request for resources that only a particular

member state possesses, then it has a right to expect that, except if currently required for national purposes, that resource will be provided. Yet, all too often narrow national self interest is applied to each request, rather than availability. Such an attitude is wholly unhelpful to the cause of the UN, which has to request all that it needs.

Standing or Stand-by Forces?

If preventive action is to work, the UN must be able to deploy preventive means, including perhaps a military presence. Sir Brian Urquhart, and others, call for some form of UN standing force, to be ready for immediate deployment in such cases. But I do not think that it is practical or cost-effective to keep a force (perhaps 50,000 strong) in such a state of readiness. I cannot see soldiers joining a force that is committed solely to Chapter VI activities and making a career out of it. If they are to be employed on Chapter VII tasks, they must be militarily competent to do so, which implies training and equipment, which is expensive.

Far better to invite those nations who already maintain short notice forces, such as the UK, to make them available to the Secretary-General, for him to ask for if required. Of course a member state has the right to say no, if its force is needed for national purposes, in which case the forces of another member state should be invited to replace it. Thus, the UN would be guaranteed availability of highly trained troops, without additional expense. Such a response would be entirely in the spirit of what Ernest Bevin outlined, and HMG agreed, in 1946. In theory, it can happen now.

Funding

Much has been written and said about the failure of certain member states, particularly the US, to pay its dues. Without money nothing can be done properly, and it is appalling to read of the Department of

Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) possibly running out of funds at a time when the world is crying out for its co-ordinated humanitarian effort in Rwanda, for example.

There is much talk of the appointment of an Inspector General, to examine financial procedures and practices, to counter corruption and waste within the UN, both of which are alleged to be rife. Bearing in mind the sums involved, and the amount which seems to be unavailable for Peacekeeping. It is surprising that the General Assembly does not call UN Agencies, and other bodies who are granted moneys in the name of the UN, to give a public account of their activities. There are too many stories about unnecessary activities, bloated bureaucracies within bureaucracies, and numbers of ineffective or inefficient staff drawing large salaries, for the global community not to be concerned about what is going on in its name. What is more, such stories and allegations besmirch the reputation of all those people, from every member state, who work very hard for the organisation. I believe that there are sacred cows to be sacrificed, and bubbles to be burst, which would allow a redistribution of assets to Departments such as the DHA and DPKO. The UN could then be in a better position to take the action required of its members.

Building Military Credibility

Ernest Bevin's other statement, about the Military Staff Committee (MSC), also impacts on wider issues within the UN. One of the factors affecting the credibility of the UN is that too many of the Security Council's resolutions are, frankly, undeliverable. This is mainly because they are the product not of a carefully worked out strategic plan, as envisaged when the World War II Chiefs of Staff (COS) were appointed to that role, but of the compromise possible among the Permanent and Rotating members at the particular time. That is an accident of history, but it is an ever-present fact.

Nothing is more difficult for a Force Commander on the ground than to be asked to execute an undeliverable Resolution, with inadequate resources, especially if it is one which contradicts or runs counter to, a previous resolution upon which he is already embarked. Every Force Commander is agreed that the UN must establish some form of strategic overseeing capability at UN HQ; the role that was originally envisaged for the MSC. An MSC, made up solely of the Chiefs of Staff of the Permanent Five (P5), or those of Security Council members only, is not the way forward. At present, an MSC is resisted on the grounds that it would add yet another layer of bureaucracy. This suggests that a re-organisation of the existing structure is required, rather than any additions to it.

I recommend, therefore, that the Secretary-General should be given a full-time Military Adviser, of similar status to the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, but possibly an ex-Force Commander, with UN status. He will also be the permanent Chairman of the MSC, which would not have a permanent membership, but would be made up of the Chiefs of Staff of contributing nations to a Mission. These could come together, on an "as required" basis, for the purposes of determining the strategic direction of that Mission, and to supplement the regular meetings of contributing nations that are held now under the auspices of the DPKO. In addition to giving strategic direction, they would be required to determine Mission orientated matters, such as Rules of Engagement, or guidelines on the rights of Force Commanders over national contingents. This would eliminate the current practice whereby too many orders are referred to national capitals before being obeyed - a nonsense from which Force Commanders should be spared. The Military Adviser will need a small staff, on the lines of the International Military Staff in NATO, who will work very closely with the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), DPKO and DHA in particular.

MSC endorsement of draft resolutions should be a pre-requisite before they are put to the Security Council. This would ensure that what was laid down could be delivered by the resources available, or the Security Council told what additional resources would be needed to implement them. Although, in an emergency, the Chairman and his staff would have to act on behalf of the Committee, such a new procedure would go a long way to improving and protecting the credibility of the organisation as a whole.

Post-Conflict Peace Re-building

It is important that Security Council resolutions should be issued for Post Conflict Peace Rebuilding as well as for Conflict Resolution. The aim must be to assist a country to so reconstruct itself that it is able to take, or resume, its place as a UN member state, as an economically free-standing nation in its own right. This means tailoring the assistance provided by UN Agencies and other Agencies not usually associated with Peacekeeping, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, as well as the private sector, to both the short- and long-term needs of the country concerned.

But, rather than wait until conflict is resolved before determining the content of a reconstruction process, there must be concurrent activity. It could be that during this process certain ultimate reconstruction requirements dictate elements of the way in which conflict resolution is ordered, both in time and space. This requires the very closest co-operation and co-ordination, orchestrated by UN HQ, and involving all Agencies concerned.

Coordination at UN HQ

Co-ordination is, of course, one of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General, but it is questionable whether the scale of the job, even without the additions I am

suggesting, is not too much for any one man. To be the global Ambassador is role enough; to preside over the Security Council is another; to co-ordinate the activities of the Secretariat is a third. Can one man have adequate time for all three?

In New York co-ordination of the activities of the Secretariat depends on all Under-Secretaries-General working together as a team, and their staffs co-operating with each other rather than duplicating work.

Coordination in the field

In the field it requires the appointment of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General, who, for Conflict Resolution, has two immediate subordinates - a Military Force Commander, with a Headquarters into which all military elements will plug, and, possibly and hopefully, a Humanitarian Co-ordinator, from the department of Humanitarian Affairs, with a separate Headquarters, into which all affiliated Humanitarian Agencies will plug. This solution is being arrived at now, with each Mission making progress as a result of lessons learned in another. But, until such a structure becomes the norm, and people, including Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) become used to it, direction of effort will be unsatisfactory. It also requires the provision of personnel and equipment, particularly communications equipment, to enable unified command and control to be exercised from UN HQ, to wherever it is needed, through a recognised and efficient chain.

For the Post-Conflict phase, a Director of Reconstruction could be appointed. Drawn from the UN Development Programme (UNDP), of equal status to an Under-Secretary in New York, and to the other two subordinate commanders in the field, the Director would be responsible for drawing up a plan for others to implement. Obviously he, or she, would be required to work very closely with organisations such as the World

Bank and the International Monetary Fund, as well as with Regional Organisations such as the Organisation of American States and the Organisation of African Unity, UN Agencies, the country concerned, the private sector - particularly those firms with interests in the country concerned - and those nations donating aid.

I mention this because the weakest part of any exit strategy (the term used currently to describe what is being considered in countries such as Mozambique, for example) is its lack of coherence and direction. When conflict ends, there will be an immediate window of opportunity for injecting peace rebuilding strategies. The longer the delay in injecting them, the more time there is for armed militia, for example, to recover their breath, and deny peace. Surrendering your Kalashnikov for \$50 does not amount to disarming. Militia must be put to work for the good of their country, so that they lay down their arms in order to be able to pick up whatever tools are appropriate for the job that has been created for them. This has worked in the past, and must be structured for the future. Initially, work will be related to the reconstruction of their country, but will then move on to economic development. The lack of a reconstruction strategy is as dangerous to the long-term credibility of the UN as is any ineffectiveness in conflict resolution.

Interim Conclusion

All this implies that the global community needs to develop a better machinery for establishing and laying down plans of action, not just wishful and undeliverable resolutions based on the consensus possible in the Security Council. If lack of political will to provide it with the necessary means, is one of the principal enemies of the UN, inadequacies in the co-ordinating machinery needed to direct the use of those means is another. This is not the fault of the hard working officials in New York, many of

whom are run off their feet, but of the UN bureaucratic system which makes change to existing practises so difficult to accomplish. 'Agenda for Peace' set out areas where change was needed, and many countries, including the UK, have responded with detailed memoranda. To date, no agenda has emerged, possibly because of the sheer weight of work on the Secretariat, but possibly also because the overall strategy to be pursued is not yet agreed. But the longer the delay, the more people criticise the UN, so it must be to its advantage to press on. What internal co-ordination improvements are needed?

The Way Forward

I propose to limit my suggestions to five which will help to deliver the programme I have outlined above. Some were discussed at a command and control seminar in New York in November 1993, initiated and chaired by Kofi Annan, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, attended by experienced Force Commanders. Others have been aired in public in a variety of fora. Some are in hand. All need attention.

• Contingency Planning

Firstly, the contingency planning organisation in New York needs strengthening. Improvements are in hand now, with regional desks in the DPA, and a 24 hour Situation Room, established to ensure that permanent contact between HQ and every Mission in the field is maintained. But the time taken to establish a Force, as currently to be witnessed in Rwanda, shows that much needs to be done to accelerate this process. This should include such personnel procedures as maintaining a register of potential Force Commanders, who, having been identified early, can be included in the reconnaissance and have some say in the establishment of their own Mission. This happened with UNTAC in

Cambodia, and the Force Commander continues to express this as a lesson.

- **Information Gathering and Analysis**

But, to achieve better contingency planning, there has to be a sea change in the UN's attitude to the intelligence on which it is based. Fears that information gained in a UN Mission may be put to nefarious use by one country against another are understandable. However, if that information is presented as 'Mission critical', on the grounds that it is needed to enable the Mission to achieve its aim, (as a consequence of a careful analysis of what is required) then refusal should be more difficult. An intelligence analysing capability is being developed slowly, and the US has made a secure communications system available so that Missions can talk direct to UN HQ. But this will continue to be an area of difficulty unless forces in the field are structured to conduct a co-ordinated intelligence gathering and analysis operation. Additionally, all parties in a Mission (including UN Agencies and even NGOs) must be educated to understand that any information they may gather could be vital to the success or otherwise of a Mission, and should be passed on to those who need to use it or have asked for it. No operation of any kind can be effective without information, and intelligence is really only operational information in UN terms.

- **Common Doctrine**

Next, there needs to be a common doctrine, upon which all national contributions can be based. This is nearing fruition, and a document entitled 'Wider Peacekeeping', drafted in the UK, is receiving wide acceptance. This has been described by one senior Foreign Office official as being of more use to diplomats than soldiers, but that is because it sets out what soldiers need to know in terms that diplomats should be able to understand. It is based on the rubicon of

consent, and describes the many tasks that can be included in Peacekeeping before it becomes Peace Enforcement. There is nothing secret about this doctrine, and, once New York has announced whether it is to be the UN doctrine as it stands, or whether there are to be certain additions and amendments before publication, steps should be taken to have it printed and published as widely as possible, to educate politicians, whose will is such an important factor.

On the military side, in addition to the MSC, the Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, who already has a Military Adviser, should have an Inspector General of Doctrine and Training, again preferably an ex-Force Commander, with UN credibility. His role would be to oversee common training around the world, by use of UN syllabi in both training establishments and staff colleges. The UN must establish what those syllabi should be, and nations, such as the UK, should volunteer to assist in the training of those from other countries who do not have the necessary facilities. Civilian staffs also need to be trained, alongside their military counterparts, to accustom them to working together.

- **Improved Interoperability**

In addition to this responsibility, the Inspector General could be made responsible for inspecting equipment around the world, to ensure interoperability. One of the scourges of current operations is the proliferation of equipment types, which makes maintenance and repair extremely problematic. It will always be a problem, but eventually it should be possible to establish some commonality and standardisation, at least in the delivery and use of common items such as fuel and water. However, someone must be made responsible for laying down, and overseeing the standards.

• **Public Information**

Finally I believe that the UN must develop a better Public Information system, linked to the command and control chain, in order to build attitudes in a world that is dominated by the media. There are more people in Public Affairs at the UN than there are in Peacekeeping. But Public Affairs officials are not trained or equipped to function in the field, where the UN needs to conduct deliberate public and operational information campaigns, to obtain local support and co-operation by making it abundantly clear what it is trying to do. That requires both a clear declaration of intent and the means of disseminating it. It is of interest that the first piece of equipment asked for by the Special Representative in Rwanda was a broadcasting station, to counter the propaganda being put out that was encouraging the population to leave the country. The same was true in Somalia, and Public Information was an essential element in the electoral process in Cambodia.

Constant pressure from the 'do something' media is something that neither governments, nor the UN, have yet learned to handle. public information is such an essential ingredient of any Preventive Action, Conflict Resolution or Post-Conflict

Reconstruction, that, in view of its current bad press, one would have thought that delivering it in a professional, directed and structured way would be one of first attentions of the UN, rather than leave it to chance, and ad hoc development. This worm is turning, but slowly.

Conclusion

All this will take time; the difficulties should not be under-estimated. There are many who say that it is all too difficult, and many more who have different priorities. But I am minded by Sir Anthony Eden's remarks on the occasion of the signing of the Charter on 16 April 1945:

'In the last six terrible years, un-numbered men have died to give humanity another chance. We have a job to do if we are not to fail those men. Let us do it with courage, modesty and dispatch. Let us do it now'.

Next year sees the 50th Anniversary of this signing. What an opportunity for launching a deliberate and structured attempt to ensure that the UN is enabled to play its global role effectively in the post Cold War world, by honouring this appeal, and ensuring that the Charter, and the Organisation, are equipped so to do.

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

AA
NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

Office of the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General
UNAMIR - MINUAR

17 March 1995

BULLETIN NO. 1

1. I am addressing all United Nations civilian, civil and military personnel in Rwanda with the objective of stressing the need to comply with Rwandese laws and regulations. It is also incumbent upon us to respect the cultural, traditional and social customs of the Rwandese People.
2. With regard to the official exchange rate for the Rwandese Franc, the Rwandese Government decreed a flexible exchange rate as of 6th March 1995. Currency must therefore be changed only through official channels. All personnel must avoid inducements to obtain local currency through private or unofficial channels.
3. I am concerned that United Nations privileges and immunities intended to assist officials in performing their official duties, are being misused. It has been brought to my attention, that some alcoholic beverages and electronic equipment have found their way into the open market. I deplore efforts to misuse the privilege for financial gain and should this trade continue, I shall not hesitate to stop duty-free imports of such items. United Nations personnel are requested to keep a meticulous check on duty-free imports and utilize them exclusively for their own use.
4. United Nations Personnel are also requested to drive with great care, to respect traffic laws and to observe speed regulations. Care must be taken not to drive following consumption of alcohol. Drivers not familiar with the rule of "priorité à droite" (priority from the right) are required to take a driving course from the Chief Transport Officer.

5. An increasing number of United Nations personnel are renting private residential accommodation. All rental agreements must be registered with UNAMIR for purposes of Security. In addition, an attestation should be obtained from the Prefecture prior to entering into any contractual arrangements.

6. Moreover, the Government's regulations must be respected in that rent should be paid to the real, approved owner of the house and not directly to a foreign bank in favour of a person with unchecked credentials. A visit to the corresponding Prefecture will ensure the correct ownership of the property.

7. Finally, all United Nations personnel are requested to respect the social and cultural customs of the Rwandese people, and United Nations Civilians are to abide by the Standards and Conduct of International Civil Servants and military personnel, by the Force Commander Directive's No.1. Conduct must always be dignified and respectful towards Rwandese citizens. Anyone who does not abide by these standards and behaves himself/herself in an unbecoming manner will be subject to disciplinary measures.

8. I am asking UNAMIR Military Police to keep a careful watch on all United Nations personnel's conduct regarding local traffic/driving regulations. UNAMIR Military Police has been empowered to take action against those drivers that are patently in breach of the law with respect to civilian staff, the Military Police have authority to detain only the vehicle of those suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol. In the event a staff member is suspected of drunken driving, the Military Police shall take custody of the vehicle, but drive the suspect to his/her residence before impounding the vehicle.



Office of the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General

UNAMIR - MINUAR

17 MARS 1995

BULLETIN No. 1

1. JE M'ADRESSE À TOUT LE PERSONNEL CIVIL, CIVPOL ET MILITAIRE DES NATIONS UNIES AU RWANDA POUR LEUR SOULIGNER LA NÉCESSITÉ DE RESPECTER LES LOIS ET RÈGLEMENTS RWANDAIS. NOUS NOUS DEVONS ÉGALEMENT DE RESPECTER LES COUTUMES CULTURELLES, TRADITIONNELLES ET SOCIALES DU PEUPLE RWANDAIS.
2. POUR CE QUI EST DU TAUX DE CHANGE OFFICIEL DU FRANC RWANDAIS, LE GOUVERNEMENT A ANNONCÉ PAR DÉCRET UN TAUX DE CHANGE FLEXIBLE À PARTIR DU 6 MARS 1995. IL EST DONC DEMANDÉ À TOUT LE PERSONNEL DE NE PAS SE PROCURER DES DEVISES LOCALES PAR DES CANAUX PRIVÉS OU SUR LE MARCHÉ PARALLÈLE.
3. J'AI PEUR QUE LES PRIVILÈGES ET IMMUNITÉS VISANT À PERMETTRE AUX PERSONNES À REMPLIR LEURS FONCTIONS OFFICIELLES SOIENT PARFOIS INVOQUÉS À MAUVAIS ESCIENT. J'AI APPRIS QU'ON AVAIT RETROUVÉ SUR LE MARCHÉ DES ALCOOLS ET DU MATÉRIEL ÉLECTRONIQUE NON DEDOUANÉ. JE DÉPLORE QUE CERTAINS TENTENT D'OUTREPASSER CES PRIVILÈGES POUR LA RECHERCHE D'UN PROFIT ET SI CE TRAFIC DEVAIT CONTINUER, JE N'HÉSITERAI PAS À METTRE UN TERME AUX IMPORTATIONS DE PRODUITS NON DEDOUANÉS. IL EST DEMANDÉ AU PERSONNEL DES NATIONS UNIES DE CONTRÔLER MÉTICULEUSEMENT TOUTES IMPORTATIONS DE MARCHANDISES NON TAXÉES ET D'UTILISER CES MARCHANDISES À DES FINS PRIVÉES UNIQUEMENT .

4. IL EST ÉGALEMENT DEMANDÉ AU PERSONNEL DES NATIONS UNIES DE CONDUIRE AVEC ÉNORMÉMENT DE PRUDENCE, DE RESPECTER LE CODE DE LA ROUTE ET LES LIMITATIONS DE VITESSE. IL EST IMPÉRATIF DE NE PAS PRENDRE LE VOLANT APRÈS AVOIR CONSOMMÉ DE L'ALCOOL. LES CONDUCTEURS QUI N'ONT PAS L'HABITUDE DE LA RÈGLE DE LA PRIORITÉ À DROITE SONT INVITÉS À PRENDRE UN COURS AUPRÈS DU RESPONSABLE DES TRANSPORTS.

5. UN NOMBRE DE PLUS EN PLUS IMPORTANT D'AGENTS DES NATIONS UNIES LOUE DES HABITATIONS PRIVÉES. UN EXEMPLAIRE DE CHAQUE BAIL DOIT ÊTRE REMIS À LA MINUAR POUR DES RAISONS DE SÉCURITÉ. DE PLUS, UNE ATTESTATION DOIT ÊTRE DEMANDÉE À LA PRÉFECTURE AVANT TOUTE SIGNATURE DE CONTRAT.

6. EN OUTRE, LES RÈGLES ÉDICTÉES PAR LE GOUVERNEMENT DOIVENT ÊTRE RESPECTÉES EN MATIÈRE DE LOYER, LEQUEL DOIT ÊTRE VERSÉ AU PROPRIÉTAIRE RÉEL ET LÉGITIME DE L'HABITATION, ET NON AUPRÈS D'UNE BANQUE ÉTRANGÈRE EN FAVEUR D'UNE PERSONNE INCONNUE. UNE VISITE AUPRÈS DE LA PRÉFECTURE CONCERNÉE PERMETTRA DE CONTRÔLER QUEL EST VÉRITABLE PROPRIÉTAIRE DE LA MAISON.

7. ENFIN, TOUT LE PERSONNEL DES NATIONS UNIES SE DOIT DE RESPECTER LES COUTUMES SOCIALES ET CULTURELLES DU RWANDAIS, ET LES AGENTS DES NATIONS UNIES DOIVENT SE PLIER AUX STANDARDS DE CONDUITE DES FONCTIONNAIRES INTERNATIONAUX, QU'ILS SOIENT CIVILS OU MILITAIRES. IL EST ESSENTIEL D'AVOIR UNE CONDUITE DIGNE ET RESPECTUEUSE ENVERS LES CITOYENS RWANDAIS. QUICONQUE REFUSERAIT DE RESPECTER CES STANDARDS ET SE CONDUIRAIT D'UNE MANIÈRE INDIGNE S'EXPOSERAIT À DES MESURES DISCIPLINAIRES.

8. JE DEMANDE A LA POLICE MILITAIRE DE LA MINUAR D'ETRE VIGILANTE ENVERS L'ATTITUDE DU PERSONNEL DES NATIONS UNIES EN MATIERE DE CONDUITE AUTOMOBILE ET DE RESPECT DU CODE DE LA ROUTE. LA POLICE MILITAIRE DE LA MINUAR A LE POUVOIR D'AGIR CONTRE TOUT CONDUCTEUR

IR

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

Office of the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General
UNAMIR - MINUAR

17 March 1995

BULLETIN NO. 1

1. I am addressing all United Nations civilian, civil and military personnel in Rwanda with the objective of stressing the need to comply with Rwandese laws and regulations. It is also incumbent upon us to respect the cultural, traditional and social customs of the Rwandese People.
2. With regard to the official exchange rate for the Rwandese Franc, the Rwandese Government decreed a flexible exchange rate as of 6th March 1995. Currency must therefore be changed only through official channels. All personnel must avoid inducements to obtain local currency through private or unofficial channels.
3. I am concerned that United Nations privileges and immunities intended to assist officials in performing their official duties, are being misused. It has been brought to my attention, that some alcoholic beverages and electronic equipment have found their way into the open market. I deplore efforts to misuse the privilege for financial gain and should this trade continue, I shall not hesitate to stop duty-free imports of such items. United Nations personnel are requested to keep a meticulous check on duty-free imports and utilize them exclusively for their own use.
4. United Nations Personnel are also requested to drive with great care, to respect traffic laws and to observe speed regulations. Care must be taken not to drive following consumption of alcohol. Drivers not familiar with the rule of "priorité à droite" (priority from the right) are required to take a driving course from the Chief Transport Officer.

5. An increasing number of United Nations personnel are renting private residential accommodation. All rental agreements must be registered with UNAMIR for purposes of Security. In addition, an attestation should be obtained from the Prefecture prior to entering into any contractual arrangements.

6. Moreover, the Government's regulations must be respected in that rent should be paid to the real, approved owner of the house and not directly to a foreign bank in favour of a person with unchecked credentials. A visit to the corresponding Prefecture will ensure the correct ownership of the property.

7. Finally, all United Nations personnel are requested to respect the social and cultural customs of the Rwandese people, and United Nations Civilians are to abide by the Standards and Conduct of International Civil Servants and military personnel, by the Force Commander Directive's No.1. Conduct must always be dignified and respectful towards Rwandese citizens. Anyone who does not abide by these standards and behaves himself/herself in an unbecoming manner will be subject to disciplinary measures.

8. I am asking UNAMIR Military Police to keep a careful watch on all United Nations personnel's conduct regarding local traffic/driving regulations. UNAMIR Military Police has been empowered to take action against those drivers that are patently in breach of the law with respect to civilian staff, the Military Police have authority to detain only the vehicle of those suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol. In the event a staff member is suspected of drunken driving, the Military Police shall take custody of the vehicle, but drive the suspect to his/her residence before impounding the vehicle.



Office of the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General
UNAMIR - MINUAR

17 MARS 1995

BULLETIN No. 1

1. JE M'ADRESSE À TOUT LE PERSONNEL CIVIL, CIVPOL ET MILITAIRE DES NATIONS UNIES AU RWANDA POUR LEUR SOULIGNER LA NÉCESSITÉ DE RESPECTER LES LOIS ET RÈGLEMENTS RWANDAIS. NOUS NOUS DEVONS ÉGALEMENT DE RESPECTER LES COUTUMES CULTURELLES, TRADITIONELLES ET SOCIALES DU PEUPLE RWANDAIS.
2. POUR CE QUI EST DU TAUX DE CHANGE OFFICIEL DU FRANC RWANDAIS, LE GOUVERNEMENT A ANNONCÉ PAR DÉCRET UN TAUX DE CHANGE FLEXIBLE À PARTIR DU 6 MARS 1995. IL EST DONC DEMANDÉ À TOUT LE PERSONNEL DE NE PAS SE PROCURER DES DEVISES LOCALES PAR DES CANAUX PRIVÉS OU SUR LE MARCHÉ PARALLÈLE.
3. J'AI PEUR QUE LES PRIVILÈGES ET IMMUNITÉS VISANT À PERMETTRE AUX PERSONNES À REMPLIR LEURS FONCTIONS OFFICIELLES SOIENT PARFOIS INVOQUÉS À MAUVAIS ESCIENT. J'AI APPRIS QU'ON AVAIT RETROUVÉ SUR LE MARCHÉ DES ALCOOLS ET DU MATÉRIEL ÉLECTRONIQUE NON DEDOUANÉ. JE DÉPLORE QUE CERTAINS TENTENT D'OUTREPASSER CES PRIVILÈGES POUR LA RECHERCHE D'UN PROFIT ET SI CE TRAFIC DEVAIT CONTINUER, JE N'HÉSITERAI PAS À METTRE UN TERME AUX IMPORTATIONS DE PRODUITS NON DEDOUANÉS. IL EST DEMANDÉ AU PERSONNEL DES NATIONS UNIES DE CONTRÔLER MÉTICULEUSEMENT TOUTES IMPORTATIONS DE MARCHANDISES NON TAXÉES ET D'UTILISER CES MARCHANDISES À DES FINS PRIVÉES UNIQUEMENT.

4. IL EST ÉGALEMENT DEMANDÉ AU PERSONNEL DES NATIONS UNIES DE CONDUIRE AVEC ÉNORMÉMENT DE PRUDENCE, DE RESPECTER LE CODE DE LA ROUTE ET LES LIMITATIONS DE VITESSE. IL EST IMPÉRATIF DE NE PAS PRENDRE LE VOLANT APRÈS AVOIR CONSOMMÉ DE L'ALCOOL. LES CONDUCTEURS QUI N'ONT PAS L'HABITUDE DE LA RÈGLE DE LA PRIORITÉ À DROITE SONT INVITÉS À PRENDRE UN COURS AUPRÈS DU RESPONSABLE DES TRANSPORTS.

5. UN NOMBRE DE PLUS EN PLUS IMPORTANT D'AGENTS DES NATIONS UNIES LOUE DES HABITATIONS PRIVÉES. UN EXEMPLAIRE DE CHAQUE BAIL DOIT ÊTRE REMIS À LA MINUAR POUR DES RAISONS DE SÉCURITÉ. DE PLUS, UNE ATTESTATION DOIT ÊTRE DEMANDÉE À LA PRÉFECTURE AVANT TOUTE SIGNATURE DE CONTRAT.

6. EN OUTRE, LES RÈGLES ÉDICTÉES PAR LE GOUVERNEMENT DOIVENT ÊTRE RESPECTÉES EN MATIÈRE DE LOYER, LEQUEL DOIT ÊTRE VERSÉ AU PROPRIÉTAIRE RÉEL ET LÉGITIME DE L'HABITATION, ET NON AUPRÈS D'UNE BANQUE ÉTRANGÈRE EN FAVEUR D'UNE PERSONNE INCONNUE. UNE VISITE AUPRÈS DE LA PRÉFECTURE CONCERNÉE PERMETTRA DE CONTRÔLER QUEL EST VÉRITABLE PROPRIÉTAIRE DE LA MAISON.

7. ENFIN, TOUT LE PERSONNEL DES NATIONS UNIES SE DOIT DE RESPECTER LES COUTUMES SOCIALES ET CULTURELLES DU RWANDAIS, ET LES AGENTS DES NATIONS UNIES DOIVENT SE PLIER AUX STANDARDS DE CONDUITE DES FONCTIONNAIRES INTERNATIONAUX, QU'ILS SOIENT CIVILS OU MILITAIRES. IL EST ESSENTIEL D'AVOIR UNE CONDUITE DIGNE ET RESPECTUEUSE ENVERS LES CITOYENS RWANDAIS. QUICONQUE REFUSERAIT DE RESPECTER CES STANDARDS ET SE CONDUIRAIT D'UNE MANIÈRE INDIGNE S'EXPOSERAIT À DES MESURES DISCIPLINAIRES.

8. JE DEMANDE A LA POLICE MILITAIRE DE LA MINUAR D'ETRE VIGILANTE ENVERS L'ATTITUDE DU PERSONNEL DES NATIONS UNIES EN MATIERE DE CONDUITE AUTOMOBILE ET DE RESPECT DU CODE DE LA ROUTE. LA POLICE MILITAIRE DE LA MINUAR A LE POUVOIR D'AGIR CONTRE TOUT CONDUCTEUR

MA/FC

1502

5000.45 (Plans)

7 Nov 94

Distribution List

FORCE COMMANDER'S DIRECTIVE NO 01/94
ON
UNAMIR CONDUCT, DRESS AND WEAPON CARRIAGE POLICY

References:

- A. Force Routine Order No 12 - Commander's Policy on Alcohol
- B. Status of Mission Agreement
- C. UNAMIR Driving Regulations
- D. UNAMIR Standard Operating Procedures

GENERAL.

1. This document states the current UNAMIR policy on conduct, dress and the carriage of personal weapons. It will be updated from time to time, and must be read in conjunction with current ROE.

2. All members of UNAMIR are required to be aware of this policy. Contingent/Unit Commanders/Branch Heads are to ensure that their personnel are fully briefed on the contents of this document, are kept current on any reviews which might take place, and that personnel rotating into Rwanda are briefed on arrival. It should be noted that this Directive sets a minimum standard. As such, it is intended to augment, not replace Nationally imposed contingent regulations. Any reduction in standards to conform with this Directive is not required.

CONDUCT

3. **Image.** All personnel in Rwanda represent their units, their countries and the UN. Considerable effort must be expended to ensure that the best possible image is conveyed to the local population and civilian agencies with which they may come in contact. Personnel are particularly reminded that they should:

- a. Adhere to all local laws which have been enacted by the legitimate government.
- b. Deal courteously and politely with those with whom they come in contact.
- c. Avoid any source of conflict in which a dispute might develop.

d. If employing Rwandan personnel, provide fair and honest terms of service.

4. Behaviour. UNAMIR personnel should be aware that their behaviour can affect the success of the UN mission. Many hours of patient work can be eroded by one thoughtless act; the efforts of many can be undone by the poor behaviour of a few. All personnel should be reminded to act maturely and professionally at all times, whether in or out of uniform. This should particularly apply to:

a. Driving. UNAMIR personnel must drive carefully and use the road with courtesy. They are to adhere to Reference C.

b. Alcohol. Personnel are reminded that their behaviour must not be impaired by alcohol. All personnel must be briefed on UNAMIR alcohol policy, which is outlined below and whose tenets are:

(1). No drinking and driving.

(2). No driving for eight hours after consuming alcohol.

(3). No drinking in unit messes when in the possession of ammunition/weapons (depending on unit policy, patrons of unit messes may be required to secure weapons or ammunition).

(4). No drinking in other areas when in the possession of weapons.

(5). No drinking to excess.

5. Other Countries. The conduct of UNAMIR personnel in Other Countries, such as Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Zaire, must be impeccable. UNAMIR personnel represent the Mission abroad in Africa and only the highest standards will be accepted. UNAMIR has no special legal relationship with Other Countries in the region. Any alleged offence committed by UNAMIR personnel abroad will be dealt with under the civil law of that country and may lead to prosecution by the civil authority. Individuals from UNAMIR who find themselves in such a position should contact their national consulate, embassy or High Commission immediately. They should also contact the UN representative in that country. It is anticipated that Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) can be signed with the governments of Other Countries in the region, to cover the contingency of legal proceedings being conducted against UNAMIR individuals. DCOS (Ops) is to ensure that appropriate MOU are drafted in consultation with Other Countries' governments.

DRESS & BEARING

6. **Deportment.** All personnel are to ensure that their deportment meets the highest possible standards. A smart, well-groomed alert appearance and a helpful and positive demeanour are essential elements of this.

7. **National Uniform.** National uniform is to worn in accordance with Part 8, Section 6, of Reference D.

8. **UN Accoutrements.** UN accoutrements are to be worn in accordance with part 8, Section 6, of Reference D.

9. **Ballistic Helmet/Body Armour.** When ballistic helmets and body armour are ordered to be worn, UN blue covers are also to be worn.

10. **Webbing.** Policy on the wearing of webbing, or its equivalent, and rucksacks it to be ordered by Commanding Officers/Contingent Commanders. Personnel are to wear and carry personal equipment sufficient to fulfil their mission.

11. **Wearing of Uniform on Duty.** All UNAMIR personnel are on operations and are considered to be on duty at all times in Rwanda. Under the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA), Reference B, UNAMIR personnel who are not wearing uniform carry minimal authority and may not be fully protected under the terms of the Agreement. For the purposes of participating in organised sport or PT, the sporting clothing authorised by Contingent/Unit Commanders/Branch Heads is deemed to be uniform. UNAMIR military personnel are only permitted to wear civilian clothes in the following circumstances:

- a. Within the confines of a unit or mess location which is guarded by armed guard(s); and
- b. At the discretion of Contingent/Unit Commanders/Branch Heads.

12. **Other Countries.** Under certain circumstances, UNAMIR personnel are on duty in Other Countries. When on duty, UNAMIR personnel are to wear uniform in accordance with Paragraphs 6 and 7 above.

CARRIAGE OF WEAPONS

13. **MILOBS.** Under Article VI of the UN Convention, defined in Reference B, MILOBS are described as "experts". They do not carry weapons and further policy, described below, on the Carriage of Weapons, does not apply to them.

14. Principle. As UNAMIR military personnel are on duty at all times, and as they are entitled to carry weapons for their own protection, or the protection of those whom they have a duty to protect, the principle to be applied is that UNAMIR military personnel will carry weapons when so issued. Current ROE further dictate the readiness of UNAMIR personnel. This policy does not apply to medical and religious personnel. The protection of those personnel will be as directed by the Contingent/Unit Commanders.

15. Exceptions. The occasions on which military UNAMIR personnel are prohibited from carrying weapons are as follows:

- a. When consuming alcohol; and
- b. When leaving Rwanda.

16. Consumption of Alcohol & Carriage of Weapons. UNAMIR personnel are not to consume alcohol when carrying weapons. Alcohol may only be consumed in the following circumstances:


- a. In a unit location or mess which is guarded by armed guard(s); or
- b. At the discretion of Contingent/Unit Commanders/Branch Heads.

17. Carriage of Weapons. UNAMIR personnel are not permitted to carry weapons abroad. Personnel who are going abroad must be afforded Personal Protection, consistent with the provisions of paragraphs 16 and 17 above, to their point of departure, and on return to Rwanda, from their point of return. Should it become necessary to authorise the carriage of weapons to Other Countries, HQ UNAMIR will issue appropriate instructions. Personnel departing Rwanda on duty, CTO or leave will ensure the security of their personal weapon through their respective Contingent/Unit Commander.

18. Personal Protection. Contingent/Unit Commanders/Branch Heads are to ensure that adequate protection is provided for themselves and their subordinates during social and recreational activities.

19. Level of Personal Protection. Contingent/Unit Commanders/Branch Heads are to determine the level of personal protection afforded. The minimum alert/readiness requirements are detailed at Annex A to UNAMIR Rules of Engagement. Additional requirements are detailed at Annex A.

20. Restrictions. The establishment Kigali Night is out of bounds to all UNAMIR personnel. Contingent/Unit/Sector Commanders who identify other local establishments which constitute a similar security risk may recommend to the FC the imposition of a commensurate restriction.



GC TOUSIGNANT
MGen
FC

Distribution:

External:

Action:

List D

Internal:

Action:

List A

List B

ANNEX A TO
UNAMIR RO
DATED 7 NOV 94

ROE STATE

RESPONSE

GREEN

All movement between 2300 hrs and 0600 hrs to be restricted to essential duty or, when specifically authorized by Contingent/Unit Commanders/Branch Heads. Personnel on essential duties are to be armed and in uniform. Continuous (radio) communications with Sector Net Control Station is to be maintained. PT and sporting activities outside unit perimeter to be restricted to daylight hours.

YELLOW

All movement between 1800 hrs and 0600 hrs to be restricted to essential duty. All UNAMIR military personnel are to be continuously armed and in uniform. Alcohol consumption is permitted in unit messes only. PT and sporting activities restricted to unit perimeter.

RED

All movement is restricted to essential duty only. All UNAMIR military personnel are to be continuously armed and in uniform. Alcohol consumption is prohibited. PT and sporting activities restricted to unit perimeter.



INFORMATION CIRCULAR NO. 1
OFFICE OF THE FORCE COMMANDER

DATE: 6 February, 1995

TO: ALL UNAMIR INTERNATIONAL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PERSONNEL

FROM: Major General G. C. Tousignant
Force Commander

SUBJECT: TRAFIPRO STEERING COMMITTEE

A steering committee on the move of UNAMIR Headquarters has been established as follows:

Chairmanship Col. Tutt, DCOS (Supp) and Peter Hornsby, CISS will Chair the Committee.

Composition Representatives from the office of the SRSG, FC and CAO, as well as from the CBMS, CCO, CIVPOL, CMO and EDP sections will form the Committee.

Terms of Reference

1. The representatives present at the meeting shall come prepared with details such as how many people are in the section, how much office space is currently held by the section as well as the section's anticipated requirements assuming that all their staffing needs are met according to the proposed manning table that will be presented in the next budget.

2. The committee will propose, by Friday February 10, close of business, options for the allocation of all office space, both prefabricated and existing, as well as all other offices and open spaces at the Trafipro complex.

3. The implications of the mission's move into the Trafipro as regards the ownership and continued utilization of the Amahoro hotel will be investigated by the Committee.

4. The Committee will look into the rationalization of various UNAMIR components with a view to accomodating the entire UNAMIR organization within the Trafipro compound.

5. The Committee will take into account UN scales of accomodation as proposed by UNHQ.

6. The Committee will also recommend additional office furniture/equipment that may be required, over and above that which is already in theatre and taking into consideration that promised to UNAMIR by UNOSOM. Consideration must also be given to the furnishing of Amahoro Hotel back into living accomodations.

7. In the options it will present, the Committee will take into account the possibility of having to provide office accomodation to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.



INFORMATION CIRCULAR NO. 1
OFFICE OF THE FORCE COMMANDER

DATE: 6 February, 1995

TO: ALL UNAMIR INTERNATIONAL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PERSONNEL

FROM: Major General G. C. Tousignant
Force Commander

SUBJECT: TRAFIPRO STEERING COMMITTEE

A steering committee on the move of UNAMIR Headquarters has been established as follows:

- Chairmanship* Col. Tutt, DCOS (Supp) and Peter Hornsby, CISS will Chair the Committee.
- Composition* Representatives from the office of the SRSG, FC and CAO, as well as from the CBMS, CCO, CIVPOL, CMO and EDP sections will form the Committee.

Terms of Reference

1. The representatives present at the meeting shall come prepared with details such as how many people are in the section, how much office space is currently held by the section as well as the section's anticipated requirements assuming that all their staffing needs are met according to the proposed manning table that will be presented in the next budget.
2. The committee will propose, by Friday February 10, close of business, options for the allocation of all office space, both prefabricated and existing, as well as all other offices and open spaces at the Trafipro complex.
3. The implications of the mission's move into the Trafipro as regards the ownership and continued utilization of the Amahoro hotel will be investigated by the Committee.
4. The Committee will look into the rationalization of various UNAMIR components with a view to accomodating the entire UNAMIR organization within the Trafipro compound.
5. The Committee will take into account UN scales of accomodation as proposed by UNHQ.
6. The Committee will also recommend additional office furniture/equipment that may be required, over and above that which is already in theatre and taking into consideration that promised to UNAMIR by UNOSOM. Consideration must also be given to the furnishing of Amahoro Hotel back into living accommodations.
7. In the options it will present, the Committee will take into account the possibility of having to provide office accomodation to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.