


CONFIDENTIAL
RHWG APR 2009

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES S-1120
BOX 67
FILE 2
ACC. 1998/0278



NOTE TO THE SRSG

Vu
WS

Subject: Position of Burundi on the International Tribunal for Rwanda

1. The statement in the attached DPKO situation Center report claiming that the President of Burundi had refused to cooperate with the International Tribunal is not accurate.
2. In a weekly news summary on Radio Burundi which I personally monitored over this last week end, the question was put to the Burundian President whose reply was roughly the following in French: "Evidemment nous soutenons le Tribunal international, car il faut absolument combattre l'impunité".
3. There must have been a misunderstanding somewhere. You may wish to check this with the Ambassador of Burundi.

WS

Wilfrid de Souza
9 October 1995

Thanks This makes
sense.
11.10

E1)

DPKO SITUATION CENTRE REPORT
UNAMIR - RWANDA
Time: 0800 Hours NYT 06 October 1995


HIGHLIGHTS

- Kenya wants an inquiry into the "root causes" of the genocide, amidst refusal to cooperate with the tribunal.
- The EU asked Burundi to guarantee the safety of foreign nationals.
- The SRSG and President Bizimugu attended the opening of Nsinda prison.
- The Burundian president refused to help the international tribunal.

Has Burundi also refused?
EJ

POLITICAL

On 05 October, War Crimes Tribunal prosecutor Goldstone wrote to Kenyan President Moi, asking him to "clarify or dismiss" news reports about his intent to refuse to cooperate with the international tribunal. Mr. Goldstone stressed that: "...such an action would be regarded as a breach of Kenya's obligations under international law, a matter for the Security Council of the UN." Told about the tribunal's concern over his remarks, and after talks with Burundi's president, Mr. Moi declared, "Kenya is not a signatory to any haphazard process like the tribunal. We agree we are signatories when things are organised properly. As long as things are not in order, we shall not abide." President Moi said that the UN should have appointed a commission of inquiry into the "root causes" of the genocide, specifically, who shot down the plane carrying Presidents Habyarimana of Rwanda and Ntaryamira of Burundi in 1994. France, Zaire and some other francophone African states also want a probe into the origins of Rwanda's civil war. Rwandan President Bizimungu warned of regional chaos in light of Moi's stance. (REUTER)



On 05 October, the SRSG attended the opening of Nsinda prison. President Bizimugu, in the presence of other dignitaries including the minister of justice, various heads of UN agencies and the members of the diplomatic Corps also attended. The SRSG expressed his appreciation to the importance the Rwandan government attaches to fundamental rights in general and improvements of prison conditions in particular. The SRSG stated that with the appointment of a prison commission by the president, a crash programme is in hand for extending existing facilities and building additional detention centres through cooperation between the government, the UN and the donor countries. He recalled the urgency of the need to review the judicial system. The President expressed his gratitude to the SRSG and UNAMIR and requested further assistance from UNAMIR in the provision of prison security.

On 05 October, the SRSG held a meeting with a visiting delegation from the USA, and discussed matters concerning police training and reforms.

Burundi: On 05 October, The EU issued a statement condemning the assassination of Italian priests and an aid worker and requesting the Burundi government to conduct an investigation. EU nations expressed their

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Reçu le - 9 OCT. 1995

ROUTING SLIP

FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

TO: A: Mr. Mr. Rakotomanana		
FROM: DE: Wilfrid de Souza <i>WS</i>		
Room No. - No de bureau	Extension - Poste	Date 03/10/95
FOR ACTION		POUR SUITE A DONNER
FOR APPROVAL		POUR APPROBATION
FOR SIGNATURE		POUR SIGNATURE
FOR COMMENTS		POUR OBSERVATIONS
MAY WE DISCUSS?		POURRIIONS-NOUS EN PARLER ?
YOUR ATTENTION		VOTRE ATTENTION
AS DISCUSSED		COMME CONVENU
AS REQUESTED		SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE
NOTE AND RETURN		NOTER ET RETOURNER
FOR INFORMATION		POUR INFORMATION

Veillez trouver ci-joint un cable code concernant l'affectation à votre Bureau de M. Philip King ressortissant américain, en qualité de fonctionnaire de l'administration.

Je voudrais attirer votre aimable attention sur le fait que l'intéressé arrive demain 4 octobre.

RECEIVED

- 3 OCT 1995

OFFICE OF THE
UNAMI

CNR 282 P 1/1

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNAMIR

95 OCT -3 07 15

TO: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 2 October 1995
NUMBER: 3137



RECEIVED
UNATIONS
OPERATIONS
1995 OCT -2 P 4 17

SUBJECT: Assignment to the Office of the Prosecutor ITR

1. We have been advised by the US Mission that Philip King is being assigned by the US Government to fill a post of administrative officer with the Office of the Prosecutor of the ITR.

2. He will be working with the CAO of the ITR and will arrive in Kigali on Wednesday 4 October.

Best regards.

ED. Sog.
3-10

Reçu le - 3 OCT. 1995



NOTE TO THE SRSG

Subject: Position of Burundi on the International Tribunal
for Rwanda

1. The statement in the attached DPKO situation Center report claiming that the President of Burundi had refused to cooperate with the International Tribunal is not accurate.
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3. There must have been a misunderstanding somewhere. You may wish to check this with the Ambassador of Burundi.


WS

Wilfrid de Souza
9 October 1995

(TWO)

F/in -2484

**PRIORITY
RESTRICTED**

OUTGOING FAX NO: A - 2/GP No VI	DTG: 06 OCTOBER 1995
TO: AS PER DISTRIBUTION	FROM: SITUATION CENTRE UN HQ - DPKO
FAX NO: 9-011-331-4306-7641 3-3090	FAX NO: (212)-963-9053 (PLAIN) (212)-963-9852 (CRYPTO)
SUBJECT: SITUATION CENTRE DAILY REPORT FOR UNAMIR	
ATTN: FORCE COMMANDER UNAMIR MR. ZOUAIN CHIEF OF UNESCO	DRAFTER: Lt Col K. JOBSON 
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS PAGE:	

1. PLEASE FIND THE DAILY UNAMIR REPORT PRODUCED BY THE SITUATION CENTRE.
2. REFER ANY QUESTIONS TO THE DUTY ROOM CLERK ON 3-2690.
3. REGARDS.

W:\FAXES\dailyfax.2

 FC CAD

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DPKO SITUATION CENTRE REPORT UNAMIR - RWANDA

Time: 0800 Hours NYT 06 October 1995


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also refused?
Jeh.
(E)

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Reçu le - 9 OCT. 1995

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"profound uneasiness" about attacks on foreigners and asked the government to guarantee the safety of foreign nationals. (REUTER)

On 06 October, Burundian President Ntubunganya refused to cooperate with the international tribunal set up by the UN to try alleged perpetrators of genocide in Rwanda. (AFP)

MILITARY

On 05 October, the overall military situation in Rwanda was stable and continued to improve. The security situation along the Zairian border remained tense.

HUMANITARIAN

On 05 October, 188 returnees arrived at NDERA camp. UNHCR despatched 142 to their respective communes. A total of 628 people were awaiting evacuation from NDERA camp. Repatriation of refugees continued at a very reduced scale.

LOGISTICS

On 05 October, the force reserve stock levels were:

Water	39 days
Rations	26 days
Fuel	07 days
Mogas	15 days
Jet fuel	37 days

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UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA
UNAMIR - MINUAR

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: ANNAN/GOULDING/ SEVAN UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI *Shahen D. Khan*
DATE: 28 SEPTEMBER 1995
NO.: MIR _____
NO. OF PAGES: 1
SUBJECT: Security arrangements for the Office of the Prosecutor

1. Reference is made to your code cables 3008 and 3058 on the above subject.
2. In this connection, please convey to the Security Co-ordinator that his intention to dispatch a Security Co-ordination Officer to Kigali to review the status of planning for the post-UNAMIR security of the OTP is welcomed.
3. Please confirm whether that mission will take place in early October as announced. Please also note that we have designated Mr. J. Lombardo as the contact person for the mission.
4. Best regards.

FC
ED
Hr Sch. 16-9

Vu
WS

CNR 263 P 1/1

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 15 SEPTEMBER 1995
NUMBER: 3008

[Handwritten signature]

SUBJECT: Security arrangements for the Office of the Prosecutor

UNITED NATIONS
OPERATIONS
15 P 833

1. Re your MIR-3180 and our 2940. The problem of security arrangements for the Office of the Prosecutor for the ITR was discussed on 15 September with the participation of DPKO, OLA, the Office of the Security Coordinator, the Deputy Prosecutor, the Registrar as well as the CAO Of ITR, who, as you know, are in New York.
2. The points outlined in your cable were fully taken into account. In this connection, we appreciate the importance of having adequate protection visibly provided by the UN. On the other hand, the main responsibility for the protection for the OTP must rest with and be assured by the Rwandese Government.
3. You will realize that, with the departure of UNAMIR, authority for the deployment of any UN peace-keeping troops in Rwanda will cease to exist. As a practical matter, the chances of having the SecCo authorize the continued stationing of such troops are virtually nil.
4. In these circumstances, it was agreed to recommend that responsibility for the security of the Tribunal and of the members of OTP after the end of the UNAMIR mandate will be assumed by the UN Security Coordinator. In view of the complexity of the issues at hand, the Coordinator was requested to consider dispatching a special mission to Kigali to examine the problem in all its aspects and to prepare an operational concept for the security of the OTP. We will inform you of the Coordinator's decision regarding the proposed mission. Best regards.

(1)

1995-09-21 01:46

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UNITED NATIONS HQS NEW YORK

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21 SEP 1995

UNITED NATIONS
PEACE OPERATIONS

OFFICE OF THE SRSG

OUTGOING CODE CABLE


UNAMIR

CCNR-269 FP1/2

20 SEP 20 1995

195 SEP 21 07:11


TO: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 20 September 1995
NUMBER: 3058



Further to our cable 3008 (paragraph 4), the Office of the Security Co-ordinator has now advised us of the following:

(a) Upon the termination of the UNAMIR mandate one senior official of the remaining organization will be designated by the SecGen as the designated official, who will undertake overall and special responsibility for the special protection of the organizations' staff members and property in Rwanda, to include that of the OTP. Thus, the Office of the Security Co-ordinator will ensure a coherent response to any emergency situation and be responsible for all policy and procedural matters related to security matters.

(b) Given the complexity of the issue at hand, the Security Co-ordinator is prepared to dispatch a Security Co-ordination Officer in Kigali, subject to the availability of funding and personnel, as well as the advice and concurrence of OLA, to review the status of planning for the post,

CNR-269 P2/2
CNR-269 P2/2

UNAMIR security of the OTP and provide any additional recommendations as may be necessary.

(c) It is expected that this mission will take place in early October.

We will keep you informed of further developments.

Best regards.

++ CYCY ++
AUG-15-1995 23:20

UNITED NATIONS HQ NEW YORK

5601 P.01

RECEIVED

16 AUG 1995

OFFICE OF THE SRSG

TO: KHAN, KIGALI, RWANDA

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

CNR 226 P 1/1

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 15 AUGUST 1995

NUMBER: 2708

SUBJECT: International Tribunal

UNAMIR

15 AUG 15

01

any D.F.C.
ED/SPA

Reply already
sent to NY
Please file
28-8-95
WS

UNITED NATIONS
CABLE OPERATIONS

1. Reference our cable 2683 of 11 August and our conversation yesterday, we would appreciate your proposals for the most effective and economical means to ensure the protection of the Prosecutor and his staff.
2. Please keep in mind that the Secretary-General has decided that the Prosecutor and his staff of 52 must be based in Kigali. Although the Government of Rwanda has the responsibility (which evidently it is prepared to accept) to ensure the security of this office, we should not be dependent on this alone, and should develop proposals for additional security to be provided by the UN. However, this does not imply that this task is to be given to peace-keeping troops. Indeed such troops are not meant to be dedicated to security of UN personnel. Since we have to proceed on the assumption that all UNAMIR troops would be withdrawn by the end of 1995 (unless the Government requests otherwise and the Security Council approves), your proposals for the security of the Prosecutor and his staff should envisage guards either provided by UN Headquarters or contracted internationally or locally.
3. Apart from the security for the Prosecutor and his staff, we also request proposals for the security of staff of other UN agencies in Kigali, after the anticipated withdrawal of UNAMIR at the end of the year.

Kind regards,

SRSG

Reçu le 16 AOUT 1995

ED's office

1995-08-15

23:23

TOTAL P.01
PAGE = 01

16.8.95

RECEIVED

16 AUG 1995

C.F.F.C. OF THE SRSG

TO: KHAN, KIGALI, RWANDA

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

CNR 226 P 1/1

copy DFC
ED/SIA

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 15 AUGUST 1995

NUMBER: 2708

SUBJECT: International Tribunal

15 AUG 15 07 15
J. J. Hughes

I would like
first to discuss
with ED/Sony
and AFC
178

UNITED NATIONS
CABLE OPERATIONS
15 AUG 15 P 7 19

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Kind regards,

SRSG

F D
A cleaner
12.9.96
W.C.

1995-08-15 23:23

CRN 216

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: SEVAN, UN SECURITY COORDINATOR,
UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: TOUSIGNANT, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 29 JUNE 1995

NUMBER: MIR-2390

NO. OF PAGES: 15

SUBJECT: UNAMIR PROTECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL

References:

A. Our FAX MIR 2027 dated 8 June 1995

1. As advised at Reference A, a team was formed to study the security requirements report submitted by the International Tribunal for Rwanda and to determine what security was required and what elements of that security could be provided by UNAMIR. I also advised you that I would forward a copy of the Tribunal Security Requirements report (enclosed) and the findings of the team set up to study that report.

2. The UNAMIR assessment team examined the report on 16 June 95. A copy of their findings is also enclosed. I also found the Tribunal requirements report to be excessive in the requirements that it identified for the protection of the Tribunal personnel and recommend that their request be moderated as per the UNAMIR report.

Enclosures:

1. Security Requirements the Office of the Prosecutor dated 8 June 1995
2. Report on Security Requirements for the Office of the Prosecutor dated 22 June 1995

FC

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12 21 1995
12 21 1995

P.2/15
CRN-216

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

File: 5000.9 (Plans)

To: FC
CAO

From: G3 PLANS

Info: DCOS OPS
CSO
UN Senior Field Security Officer
Special Tasks Officer

Date: 22 Jun 95

Subject: REPORT ON SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE OFFICE OF THE
PROSECUTOR

References:

A. UNAMIR Fax 3992 dated 8 Jun 95

Background

1. As directed at Reference A the report submitted by the Deputy Prosecutor of the International Tribunal for Rwanda (enclosed) concerning the security requirements for the Office of the Prosecutor was examined by a UNAMIR assessment team on 16 Jun 95. That team consisted of the following personnel:

- a. Chief of Security, Paul Ischlika.
- b. UN Senior Field Security Officer, John Cleland.
- c. Special Tasks Officer, Joe Lombardo, and
- d. G3 Plans, LTCOL Stephen Dunn.

Assumptions

2. As a general comment the report was considered to be excessive in the requirements that it identified for the protection of the Tribunal personnel. Having said that, the following assumptions were made by the assessment team when examining the report:

- a. No close protection would be provided to the investigators. If investigators needed protection when conducting field trips it would be provided by UNAMIR/RPA personnel.
- b. Close protection would only be provided to the three principal personnel of the International Tribunal for Rwanda (Prosecutor, Deputy Prosecutor and Director of Investigations).

- c. It would be the exception rather than the rule that the three principal personnel would move outside Kigali into rural Rwanda. (C)
- d. The Rwandan government has made available the UNICEF building to the Tribunal for its office.
- e. The Tribunal does not rely on UNAMIR for funding.
- f. All recommendations of this report are based on the assumption that the Tribunal will fund the incremental cost of implementing any of the recommendations.

Threat

- 3. The current threat to the Tribunal is considered very low, although this may increase in the form of low level terrorist activities against the tribunal participants once trials commence.

Personnel Security

- 4. Close Protection. It is our assessment that the total number of personnel required for close protection is six. This figure is based on the following:

- a. Protection only being provided to the three principal personnel.
- b. A team of two body guards working a 12 - 16 hour shift.
- c. The principal personnel would remain in Kigali for most of their time in Rwanda.
- d. It is highly unlikely that all three principal staff will be in Rwanda at the same time, therefore, a spare capacity will be available for unexpected security tasking.

The close protection teams, once appointed, should conduct their own assessment of the requirement for body armour and other defensive measures.

- 5. Mobile Protection. It is our assessment that three sections will be required for the protection/escort of tribunal members when they are conducting field investigations. This figure may be reduced further depending on what support the government/RPA is going to provide.

- a. Armoured Vehicles. The requirement identified by the Tribunal seems excessive based on the current threat. However, if the Tribunal wishes to allocate the funds then one vehicle could be justified.

- 6. Housing. The provision of security for housing of tribunal personnel has not been addressed because this issue has not been finalised. Nevertheless, it is our assessment that a maximum of three sections would be needed for security of the residence of Tribunal personnel. This is assuming that they are housed in one compound. This figure may be reduced further depending on what support the government/RPA is going to provide. However, it is recommended that the three principal staff share a villa in the Belgian Village to reduce the possibility of security being provided for two additional residences. With the repatriation of the Tunisian and Ethiopian contingents there is a possibility that one villa may become available in July or August and could possibly be allocated for the Tribunal use depending on housing priorities.

P4/15
CRN216**Tribunal Office Protection**

7. The Tribunal has confirmed (verbally) through the Deputy Prosecutor that the RPA Chief of Staff has given his assurance that the Tribunal would be allocated the UNICEF building to use as its office.

8. Troop Requirements. It is our assessment that two sections will be required to provide 24 hour protection to the UNICEF building. This is based on personnel being provided for the following tasks:

- a. North gate manned by two personnel and the West gate closed.
- b. A roving picket of two personnel.
- c. Manning the internal door to the Tribunal offices with one person.

Therefore, five personnel will be required at any one time, which means to run the security for 24 hours, will require two sections.

9. Modifications to the UNICEF Building. The modifications proposed by the Tribunal report are generally supported. However, the assessment team did not agree with:

- a. installation of a triple strand concertina wire from top to bottom of the perimeter fence between the fence and the outer hedge (although it is our assessment that some minor work may be required to the top of the wall);
- b. cutting down of trees to the northeast of the perimeter (it is our assessment the more screen the better), and
- c. installation of swing barriers on both entry gates (it is our assessment that they would not stop a vehicle so they have no useful purpose).

10. Information/Communication Security. While the majority of recommendation are supported regarding information and communication security it is our assessment that the Tribunal should only acquire one secure FAX line and one secure voice line. The requirement for secure communication (portable scramblers) for Tribunal staff while travelling seems excessive and is therefore not supported.

Conclusion

11. The total personnel required to contribute to the security of the Tribunal and provide full time protection to the Prosecutors office has been assessed at a maximum of nine sections or one dedicated rifle company and six close protection personnel. This figure may be reduced further depending on the level of support provided by the Rwandan government/RPA.

Enclosure:

1. Security Requirements Report for the Office of the Prosecutor dated 8 Jun 95

P5/15
CRN 216

UNITED NATIONS

NATIONS UNIES

International Tribunal for Rwanda
Office of the Prosecutor
Kigali

Tribunal International pour Rwanda
Bureau du Procureur
Kigali

UNAMIR Telephone Extensions 11012/11013

MEMORANDUM

From / De: Deputy Prosecutor, Judge Rakotomanana

To / A: Maj. Gen. G. Tousignant
Force Commander & Acting Chief of Mission
UNAMIR, Kigali

Date: June 8, 1995


Subject / Sujet: Security Requirements the Office of the Prosecutor

I am pleased to forward herewith a report from a member of my investigative team, which has been prepared at the request of Mr. Colin Port, Director of Investigations.

The report has been prepared in some detail, and in general terms I support all the proposals, although I accept that there may be important areas for discussion.

I regard the proposals relating to personal domestic security as being perhaps the most pressing, and I should be very grateful if some improved interim measures could be brought into being before the final allocation of suitable residential property for Tribunal staff. I do not anticipate, unfortunately, that we are likely to be able to effect a move from the Meridien Hotel within the next few weeks. Security provided by the hotel has been examined and is admitted by them to be minimal. The hotel entrance is guarded by Rwandan Government troops, but they have no mandate to stop, to search, or to establish the bona fides of visitors. This causes me considerable personal concern, and any advice you may be able to offer in the short term would be very gratefully received.

Your willingness to address these matters urgently has been very much appreciated.



ITR/OTP CONFIDENTIAL

INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA
KIGALI, RWANDA

PG/15
CRN216

INTERNAL MEMORANDUM

May 31, 1995

TO: COLIN PORT

FROM: JEAN ROMEY

SUBJECT: Limited Security Survey on the Office of the Prosecutor, Rwanda

1. Purpose: To provide you a limited security survey and recommendations on the Office of the Prosecutor in Rwanda.

2. Summary: The presently stable and relatively secure situation in Rwanda as it affects the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) may change in direct proportion to the effectiveness of our investigative effort. All intelligence sources point to a fluid socio-political situation centering upon a growing insurgency and aggravated by the inevitable reduction of UNAMIR presence as a measure of accommodation with the government of Rwanda (GOR). There also has been an increase in the incidence of harassment and criminal activity (auto theft, robberies, residential burglaries) directed against personnel, equipment, vehicle, and work and housing facilities of UNAMIR, other UN agencies, and NGOs. OTP security and logistical support depend, by mandate, upon UNAMIR which has the means to provide or coordinate such. While some advantages could be found in the OTP operating independently, the situation demands that the OTP take full advantage of UNAMIR's capabilities to provide for its outer and inner perimeter security. Opposition to the work of the OTP should be expected to take hostile action against the OTP using insurgency tactics including low-skill terrorist actions. Measures to protect OTP personnel, facilities, information, equipment, and communications need be identified and implemented immediately.

3. Survey Scope

The scope of the survey comprises the environment in which the OTP is to operate in Rwanda includes the following areas:

- Physical security of OTP personnel, facilities (offices and housing), vehicles, and equipment, including transportation.

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- Information Management Systems (automated and non-automated) Security
- Communications Security
- Security Awareness Training
- Personnel Security (Change 1 addition)

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3. Sources:

This preliminary security survey is based on historical multinational/multiagency multisource intelligence (UN/US/UK), UNAMIR civilian and military staff, local human sources, and direct observations and contacts made by undersigned during the period May 15 to 31, 1995. Sources are as follows:

- G-3, UNAMIR
- Security Officer, UNAMIR
- UN Security Officer assigned to OTP (16 months in country)
- Regional Security Officer, U. S. Embassy, Kigali
- OTP staff liaison with RPA/GOR
- CDR, INDBATT
- Other personal contacts developed locally, including expatriate nationals with long-term country experience.

4. Findings and Recommendations:

a. Finding A. Personal Security.

(1) The personal security (PS)/Executive Protection (EP) of OTP personnel and leadership is inadequate. The present EP/PS resources allocated to the OTP consist of a one man protection detail (PD) working extended hours to cover the Deputy Prosecutor for Rwanda (DPR) during working hours. The lowest threat conditions require a minimum of three men per principal, each working not more than a nine hour shift for safety and effectiveness under normal circumstances. Under present and foreseeable conditions, a twelve-man team plus supervisor will provide the OTP a close protection capability to complement the military outer perimeter and travel escort assets provided by UNAMIR.

(2) The threat level facing the OTP is expected to increase in direct proportion to the investigative effort put forth, and especially results obtained, by the OTP. The threat source is the ongoing insurgent activity whose main elements and support are externally based and which is conducting an infiltration effort be supported by the Hutu ethnic majority ousted from power. Hostile action against OTP personnel must be anticipated. While this threat applies particularly to high-profile OTP personalities, including the DPR and the DOI, it will no doubt extend to the rest of the investigative staff as their effectiveness is felt. Hostile action against OTP leadership and other

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opportunity. These actions, typical of insurgency situations, commonly range from grenade and sniper attacks to the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) (car and letter bombs being most common). It should be noted that the most dangerous components of the insurgency, the former Rwandese army and their militia (*interhamwe*), in exile, should not lack in arms thanks to their international supporters, and have amply demonstrated their will and effectiveness in the past to attack the most vulnerable and the defenseless.

Recommendation A:

(1) Obtain a fully trained 12-man protection detail (PD), plus supervisor, and dedicated drivers, to provide simultaneous 24-hour one man PD coverage for the DPR and two other OTP principals or OTP investigators/staff members whose particular circumstances will require personal protection. This requirement will apply particularly to the low-visibility escort of unarmed investigators in the field whose interview effectiveness would be negatively affected by the immediate presence of an armed, uniformed military escort. While the latter form the required outer perimeter for all OTP static and mobile situations as the OTP outer perimeter (See Finding/Recommendation E), Travel, our investigators require the availability an inner perimeter of close protection by plainclothes PD assets. Given the increasing, insurgency-driven threat situation developing in areas of Rwanda where our investigative efforts will focus, this requirement should be given the highest priority.

(2) Apply Standards of Executive Protection: It should be clearly understood by all concerned that personnel protection (PS/EP) is based primarily on defensive measures, to include security awareness training of the principal, intelligence and advance work, surveillance countermeasures, communications and communications security, well-rehearsed mounted and dismounted (vehicular vs. pedestrian) reaction/evasive action drills, evasive driving, and close-quarter combat (CQC). Support measures include armored vehicles and body armor (for both principal and PD). The whole purpose of EP is to evacuate the principal quickly and safely out of the hostile area. Offensive measures, i.e. returning hostile fire or using a vehicle as a weapon, make up a very small but critical percentage of EP, and serve only to break contact and gain critical time by not only disabling some of the attackers but creating a surprise shock effect designed to gain reaction time. Supporting EP personnel skills are communications evasive/offensive driving, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). All OTP personnel should receive basic PS awareness (4 hours) training, to include car bombs/ and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), travel and communications procedures (plan route, travel in twos, insure communications), evasive/offensive driving, and emergency medical/trauma assistance. Fifty percent of OTP personnel should be trained in cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR).

(3) Request a military special operations (Special Forces, SAS) counterterrorist (CT) team as a national contribution to the Tribunal. This will

insure proper vetting, standards of training and capabilities, and a timely (immediate upon approval, agreement, and tasking) implementation.

b. Finding B: (1) The present OTP location, the UNICEF building has numerous vulnerabilities and will require some work to properly secure, particularly in the long term, with the anticipated increase in threat level against the OTP. As presently installed on the ground floor of this building, OTP facilities and the offices of the DPR are highly vulnerable to intrusion, surveillance, and low-skill terrorist attack and lack in several aspects of physical security.

(2) OTP facilities are located on the ground floor of a three story concrete and brick building located in a flat area, at a road intersection approximately 200 meters southwest of UNAMIR headquarters.

(3) The building is a three story thin-walled concrete and brick structure with aluminum frame entry doors and windows fitted with integral external aluminum grillwork, and asbestos ceilings. The front (north) and rear (south) sides of the building have extensive window glass areas which extend well below head level. The offices of the DPR are located at the northwest corner and are particularly exposed due to the glass door and windows on the north side. A minor explosion can generate several pounds of glass shrapnel causing major injuries.

(4) The building is situated in a paved courtyard used as a parking lot and surrounded by a five-foot iron grill fence bordered externally with a thick hedge of the same height which obstructs vision and provides concealment both internally and externally.

(5) Dominant features adjacent to the building are tall trees outside the northeast perimeter which dominate the courtyard, and a three story office building 50 meters to the southwest.

(6) The rear (southeast) of the perimeter is most vulnerable to penetration and attack, given the concealment offered by the adjacent roadway vegetation. Building exterior and perimeter lighting is almost non-existent.

(7) Interior north entry door to OTP has no lock and cannot be secured. Exterior south entry door is closed shut since the key to the lock was lost.

b. Recommendation B: In order of priority:

(1) Install lock on interior north OTP door and exterior south door. Use latter as OTP entrance, keeping north door closed. Access to DPR's office should be through south door

(2) Install net and opaque curtains on DPR's office windows.

(3) Install triple strand concertina wire from top to bottom of perimeter fence between fence and outer hedge.

(4) Cut down trees to northeast of perimeter and vegetation in ditch along southeast portion of perimeter.

(5) Replace DPR office window and exterior door glass with armor glass.

(6) Build decorative six foot stand-off brick wall along outer edge of walk bordering DPR's office.

(7) Install laminate on all other ground floor OTP exterior windows and glass doors.

(8) Install high intensity lights high on the four sides of the OTP/UNICEF building illuminating the perimeter, and cut down excess vegetation along roadway and ditch on the southeast side of the perimeter.

(9) Install swing barrier on both entry gates.

c. Finding C. (1) OTP perimeter manned security is inadequate. Approximately half an infantry squad (4-5 soldiers) have been assigned to secure the UNICEF/OTP building perimeter.

(2) The building and building perimeter situation requires 24-hour coverage by a full infantry squad (9-10 men).

c. Recommendation C. (1) Assign infantry platoon to OTP/UNICEF building.

(2) Man OTP perimeter as follows:

- o Front (north gate) two men plus squad leader
- o Side (west) gate two men
- o Roving patrol two men
- o Tribunal north and south door--one man each

d. Finding D: OTP personnel housing will require armed sentry security

Recommendation D: (1) That UNAMIR provide soldiers in sufficient numbers to secure OTP personnel housing outer perimeter.

(2) That elements of PS/EP team will reside with OTP personnel as the situation dictates.

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e. Finding E: (1) OTP personnel travel in country raises the threat level, creates additional security and plain safety problems.

(2) The safety hazards alone of ground travel--due to the local vehicular and pedestrian traffic culture, roads conditions, weather, and lighting--present a major threat to OTP personnel. Accidents and vehicle breakdowns further expose personnel to acts of banditry or terrorism.

(3) Road blocks have, up to this time, represented a form of harassment and UN vehicle theft, conducted probably by disgruntled RPA soldiers. It would be relatively easy for such roadblocks to be taken over or set up in certain areas of the country (border with Zaire) by insurgents. This will raise the threat level and, once identified as a probable threat, require a higher level of security, including military escort and close protection.

(3) Air travel, however convenient and efficient, should be carefully analyzed in terms of the threat. Man-carried, shoulder-launched missiles have made shooting down aircraft a growing sport in all conflicts.

Recommendation E:

(1) Establish and require compliance with the following in-country travel rules. This applies to both local and out-of-town travel.

- o Travel only when necessary. Tourism and leisure are not on the priority list in an insurgency environment.
- o Plan all travel, however short, using all available intelligence sources and common sense. On trips to other UN Sectors, coordinate closely with the G2 (Intelligence) and G3 (Operations) officers of the Sector(s) through which travel will occur, through the UNAMIR G3.
- o Plan, request, and coordinate armed escort and, if necessary, close protection, as early as possible
- o Keep all travel plans discrete, investigative trips confidential. Never discuss travel plans in public places, hotel rooms, or any area not cleared of listening devices.
- o Plan route on the map, carry a map--everywhere.
- o Carry enough water, a good first-aid kit, and a flashlight.
- o Let a colleague who will stay behind at the office know
- o Travel in twos or with a driver, and stay within curfew limits.
- o Drive defensively and according to conditions.
- o Establish and stay in radio communications.
- o Know where you are at all times on the map. If with a driver, be your own navigator. If traveling in twos, one drives, one navigates.

o As the threat increases, do not follow routines and patterns to and from work. Terrorist attacks are always based on sometimes extensive surveillance of the target; and surveillance thrives on the target's routine. This may be the hardest security measure to take for most of us compulsively punctual workers!

(2) That armed soldiers, and PD as the situation requires, escort OTP personnel in travels throughout Rwanda.

f. Finding F: (1) The anticipated threat level environment in which OTP personnel are to operate justifies issuing all personal body armor.

(2) Standard issue "one-size fit all" UN issue vests are too bulky and impractical for civilian wear. They do not provide side protection, not having close fitting side panels; and their bulk alone makes them impractical for wear under civilian clothes. A key consideration in selecting body armor is the level of protection versus practicability and even comfort of wear. Stopping high power rifle or machinegun rounds (7.62mm, 5.56mm) requires a degree of protection, i.e. thickness and weight, totally impractical for most work, including the military. A compromise always has to be reached between all these factors which provides the maximum degree of practical protection within the wearer's tolerance level. Concealability and comfort often tend take precedence) for the wearer over protection. This certainly is the case for OTP personnel. The body armor market offers individually fitted vests thin and lightweight enough for wear under even light clothing, such as tropical shirts. These state of the art models are made of a combination of layers of spectra-shield and kevlar and will stop most large-caliber handgun rounds (9mm, .357 magnum., 45 ACP) and some submachinegun rounds. This partial protection level--in body armor parlance, Level II--is practical for OTP PS/EP applications. Key to the body armor protocol is that all personnel in the same situation (location, mission, circumstances) do the same, wear or not wear (see Recommendation G(4)).

Recommendation F: Provide OTP personnel individually fitted body armor for concealed comfortable wear under civilian clothing, of following specifications:

- o Protection Level II, with Level III heart plate.
- o Wrap-around side panels
- o Ordered by mail, custom-sized.

g. Finding G: Armored sedans and escort four-wheel drive vehicles are necessary to support the PS/EP requirements of the OTP.

Recommendation G: Provide the OTP with the following Personnel Protection Vehicle (PPV) support:

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(1) Three armored sedans, to transport three high visibility principals or other OTP staffers simultaneously. A fourth standby vehicle is highly recommended for transparent reasons--breakdowns and additional VIP visits.

(2) Two dedicated PPV escort vehicles (4X4) with partial armor (doors, windshield, and floor panels) and independent long distance communications. A third standby vehicle is recommended for the same reasons as stated in (1).

(3) Dedicated drivers. PD personnel should not drive if possible.

(4) All PPV should contain the following minimum equipment and supplies:

- o Body armor for all occupants. See Finding and Recommendation F.

- o Emergency trauma treatment kit, including IV materials and oxygen.

- o Gas masks for all occupants. These must be stowed as inconspicuously as possible of course, inside the passenger compartment.

h. Finding H: (1) Information Security is next only to personal/physical security for the OTP.

(2) The OTP has no other means of protecting its information than by the application of basic information security discipline by the staff, including shredding of all discarded paperwork, using diskettes in lieu of the hard drive in computers, storing the latter under lock and key when not in use, and avoiding traveling in country with document. Vehicles and briefcases have been searched at road blocks for contraband mail.

(3) OTP offices and document containers/file cabinets are vulnerable to undetected forced entry from within the building. There are no hard storage containers, such as safes, for securing diskettes and sensitive case documents.

(4) OTP personal computers have only one port, thus requiring the use of the hard drive to transfer files between diskettes.

(5) OTP does not have and needs a computer technician and a Local Access Network (LAN). The OTP needs to establish clear, simple guidelines or a standing information security standing operating procedure (SOP).

Recommendation H: (1) Partially sanitize all computer hard drives by erasing all current information after transfer on diskettes. (Note the "partially": erased information on a disk can still be recalled using more advanced technical applications.)

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(2) Work only on diskettes, do not use the hard drive. Two kinds of diskettes should be used: working disks used by each staff member to draft and create documents and main disks, on which final case documents are stored. Until two port (drive "A" and "B") machines can be obtained, it will be necessary, in the interim, to use the hard drive to transfer documents between diskettes.

(3) Install an alarm system in OTP offices with the following specifications:

- o Triggers on all doors and windows
- o Beam in each room
- o Combination keypad

(4) Obtain six standard, four-drawer, government specification, combination lock document safes, four for Operations and two for Intelligence, for storage of case documents and diskettes.

(5) Replace present one-port personal computers with two port (drives "A" and "B") machines which will allow transferring information or files between diskettes without making full use of the hard drive. While this disk-to-disk transfer through a third disk still requires some hard drive participation, the imprint left on the latter is more difficult to access and read.

(6) Obtain the services of a computer security technician who will maintain the system, including fully sanitizing hard drives and monitoring the LAN.

i. Finding I: (1) OTP has no communications security to protect the transmission of sensitive information.

(2) OTP has no secure telephone for communications with The Hague and other locations. OTP telephone lines have not been swept for electronic intercepts (listening devices/bugs).

(3) OTP offices have not been swept for and are vulnerable to all types of internally emplaced and/or externally directed voice intercept monitoring devices.

Recommendation I: (1) Conduct a complete technical survey telephone lines and install intercept detectors.

(2) Conduct an initial technical survey of OTP offices for voice intercept devices.

(3) Install secure voice telephone, type STUIII, with INMSERSAT system, in OTP offices connecting with a similar system in The Hague.



(4) Install vibration system on windows to counter externally based directional voice intercept measures.

(5) Provide portable scramblers to OTP staff for secure communications while traveling.

j. Finding J: The level of security awareness expected to be encountered among OTP personnel will vary, according to individual background, training, and experience. Given prevailing conditions in Rwanda as described in this survey, OTP staff need a Personal Security Awareness (PSA) orientation.

Recommendation J: Provide a basic Security Awareness Orientation for incoming OTP personnel, including the following topics:

- o Violent crime and Terrorism
- o The local and international work environment of the ITR and OTP
- o Threat Awareness
- o Surveillance Awareness
- o IEDs and Car Bombs
- o Building Security
- o Travel Security
- o Evasive Driving
- o Operational Security (OPSEC)
- o Compromise and Blackmail
- o Personal Risk Assessment

PCRN-213

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: BARIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: *fw* TOUSIGNANT, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 24 JUNE 1995

NUMBER: MIR - 2342

NO. OF PAGES: 27

SUBJECT: PROTECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL PERSONNEL

REFERENCE:

A YOUR CODE CABLE 1989 DATED 15 JUNE 1995

1. THE INFORMATION REQUESTED AT REFERENCE A FOR THE FBI IS AS FOLLOWS:

2. THE EXACT NATURE OF SECURITY THAT WILL BE PROVIDED BY THE UNITED NATIONS, TO INCLUDE:

A. TOTAL NUMBER OF PERS ASSIGNED FOR SECURITY PURPOSES, COMPOSITION OF SECURITY FORCE, RELATIONSHIP TO THE MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURE, AVAILABILITY OF SUPPORTING UNITS AND DISTANCE, ARMAMENT AVAILABLE, AND COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE MILITARY STRUCTURE.

- ONE INDEPENDENT COMPANY (135 PERS) FOR ALL TRIBUNAL MEMBERS UNDER COMMAND OF UNAMIR FORCE COMMANDER LOCATED IN KIGALI WITH ADDITIONAL SUPPORT ELEMENTS. ARMED WITH SECTION AND PLATOON WEAPONS (IE AUTOMATIC WEAPONS, ETC). C&C OF THE MILITARY STRUCTURE IS CURRENTLY UNDER REVISION FOR THE NEW MANDATE BUT WILL PROBABLY CONSIST OF ONE BATTALION AND 5 INDEPENDENT COMPANIES UNDER COMMAND OF THE UNAMIR FORCE COMMANDER AND DIRECTED BY THE UNAMIR HQ OPERATIONS BRANCH.

Two

B. HOURS THAT SECURITY IS AVAILABLE.

- 24 HRS/7 DAYS A WEEK.

C. GEOGRAPHIC EXTENT OF SECURITY.

- THREE SECTIONS AVAILABLE FOR ESCORT DUTIES FOR ALL TRIBUNAL PERSONNEL. ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL AVAILABLE FROM SECTOR UNITS WHEN REQUIRED AVAILABLE. MAY BE AUGMENTED BY RWANDAN FORCES.

D. THE LEVEL OF SECURITY AFFORDED RESIDENCE OF AGENTS.

- DEPENDENT UPON HOUSING CHOSEN FOR TRIBUNAL PERSONNEL. CURRENT CONCEPT CALLS FOR COLLOCATION OF ALL TRIBUNAL PERSONNEL IN KIGALI PROTECTED BY 2 SECTIONS (5 PERS AT ANY TIME). THIS MAY BE AUGMENTED OR REPLACED BY SECURITY PROVIDED BY THE RWANDAN FORCES.

E. THE LEVEL OF SECURITY AFFORDED OFFICE.

- TRIBUNAL OFFICE TO BE PROTECTED BY 2 SECTIONS (5 PERS AT ANY TIME).

F. TYPE AND NUMBER OF SECURITY PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO AGENTS WHILE TRAVELLING OUTSIDE KIGALI.

- SEE C. ABOVE.

G. TYPE OF VEHICLES AVAILABLE FOR TRANSPORTATION DURING INVESTIGATIVE WORK INCLUDING APC AND HELICOPTERS.

- UN LAND ROVER/CRUISER 4X4 TYPE VEHICLES, AND ACCESS TO UNAMIR HELICOPTER SERVICES (5 HUEYS).

H. TYPE OF COMMUNICATIONS AVAILABLE TO AGENT PERSONNEL TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH SECURITY AND/OR MILITARY FORCES.

- UNAMIR USES A NONSECURE MOTOROLA VHF SYSTEM WITH BASE STATIONS AND HANDHELD RADIOS. RADIO ACCESS THROUGHOUT RWANDA IS ACHIEVED VIA REPEATER STATIONS. THIS IS AUGMENTED BY AN HF SYSTEM TO SECTOR HQS PROVIDED BY AN INDIAN SIGNALS UNIT.

I. IDENTIFICATION OF COMMANDING OFFICER IN CHARGE OF SECURITY FORCES AND RANK.

- THE COMMANDING OFFICER DEPENDS ON WHICH COUNTRY WILL ULTIMATELY PROVIDE THE INDEPENDENT COMPANY BUT WILL BE OF MAJOR RANK.

K. COMPLETE ITEMIZATION OF ANY AND ALL INCIDENTS AFFECTING THE SECURITY OF UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL AND VOLUNTEERS IN RWANDA DURING THE PAST YEAR. THIS SHOULD INCLUDE VIOLENCE DIRECTED TOWARD NGO PERSONNEL IN THE COUNTRY.

- SEE ATTACHED.

L. IDENTIFICATION OF NGO'S WORKING IN RWANDA.

- SEE ATTACHED.

M. CURRENT STATUS OF THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY OR MISSION IN RWANDA.

- THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IS CURRENTLY OPERATING AND MAINTAINS A MILITARY LIAISON CELL.

3. THE EXACT NATURE OF ANY EVACUATION PLAN THAT HAS BEEN PUT IN PLACE BY THE UNITED NATIONS FORCES IN RWANDA THAT WOULD ASSIST IN THE EXTRACTION OF PERSONNEL IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS. THIS INCLUDES THE WIDENING OF THE CIVIL WAR OR WIDESPREAD VIOLENCE IN RWANDA OR NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES.

- THE CURRENT PLANS CALLS FOR A PHASED WITHDRAWAL TO KIGALI, OR ADJACENT COUNTRIES FOR SOME UNITS, BY UN PERSONNEL ULTIMATELY, RESULTING IN A TOTAL WITHDRAWAL BY UNAMIR IF THE SITUATION REQUIRES. THIS IS CURRENTLY UNDER REVISION TO CONFORM TO THE NEW MANDATE.

4. THE EXACT NATURE OF MEDICAL FACILITIES AVAILABLE TO PERSONNEL WHILE IN COUNTRY. THIS SHOULD INCLUDE:

A. NUMBER AND TYPE OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL AVAILABLE TO PERSONNEL WHILE IN RWANDA.

- UNAMIR CURRENTLY HAS A 300 PERSON MEDICAL COMPANY SUPPLIED BY AUSTRALIA. UNDER THE NEW MANDATE THIS WILL BE

REDUCED TO 100 PERS AND WILL BE PROVIDED BY ANOTHER COUNTRY (TO BE DETERMINED).

B. NUMBER AND TYPE OF MEDICAL FACILITIES AVAILABLE IN RWANDA.

- THE PRIMARY UNAMIR MEDICAL FACILITY IS LOCATED IN KIGALI. UNDER THE NEW MANDATE THE 4 SECTORS OUTSIDE KIGALI, EACH WITH AN INDEPENDENT COMPANY, WILL HAVE A MEDICAL CAPABILITY CONSISTING OF ONE DOCTOR PLUS SUPPORT STAFF.

C. AVAILABILITY AND RELIABILITY OF HUMAN BLOOD SUPPLY.

- A LIMITED SUPPLY OF RELIABLE BLOOD IS AVAILABLE.

D. AVAILABILITY AND CAPABILITIES OF EMERGENCY MEDICAL EVACUATION PLANS.

- AIR AND ROAD EVACUATION IS PROVIDED BY THE MEDICAL SUPPORT COMPANY AND THE USE OF HELICOPTERS. FURTHER EVACUATION TO NAIROBI IS POSSIBLE THROUGH UN TRANSPORT ASSETS.

LIST OF NGO ORGANIZATIONS IN RWANDA

SERIAL	ORGANIZATION NAME
1	AFRICAN REVIVAL MINISTRIES
2	AFRICAN HUMANITARIAN ACTION
3	AFRICAN MEDICAL & RESEARCH FUND (KENYA)
4	AFRICAN MUSLIM AGENCY
5	AFRICAN REVIVAL MINISTRIES
6	ACORD
7	ACTION TECHNIQUE DIUN DEVELOPMENT COM
8	ADEPR/PMU INTERLIFE
9	ADRA
10	ADRI
11	AEF INTL
12	AIDE ET ACTION
13	AMERICAN JEWISH JOINT DIST. COMM.
14	AMURT (SWISS)
15	ARDI
16	APIDERMUB
17	ARBEF
18	ARTC
19	ARTC FEMMES
20	ASBL DIALOGUE
21	ASSN FRANCAISE DES VOLONTAIRES DU PROGR
22	ASSN OF MEDICAL DOCTORS OF ASIA
23	ASSN POUR LE DEFENSE DES DROITES
24	AUSTRIAN RELIEF PROGRAM
25	AVSI ITALY
26	BAMBINI DEL RUANDA
27	BAPTIST RELIEF SERVICES
28	BARAKABAHO FOUNDATION
29	BORNEFONDEN
30	BRITISH DIRECT AID
31	BUFMAR/MEMISA
32	CARITAS

33	CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES
34	CECA
35	CESAL SPAIN
36	CHILDREN'S RELIEF (GERMANY)
37	CHRISTIAN REFORMED WORLD RELIEF COMMITTEE
38	CHURCH WORLD SERVICE
39	CITIZEN'S NETWORK
40	COMPASSION INTL
41	COMMUNAUTE EMMAUS
42	CONCERN WORLDWIDE
43	COOPERAZIONE INTL
44	COOPIBO
45	CROIX ROUGE BELGIQUE
46	CUAMM
47	DUTERIMBERE
48	ECOTERRA INTL
49	ENFANTS DU MONDE
50	FEED THE CHILDREN
51	FRATERNITE NOTRE DAME INC
52	FRIENDS OF THE WEST INTL (USA)
53	GERMAN EMERGENCY DOCTORS
54	GESELLSCHAFT FUR TECHNISCHE ZUSAMMENARB
55	GLOBAL OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
56	GOAL (IRELAND)
57	HEALTH AID UK
58	HEIN NEBELING ISENSEE (GERMANY)
59	HELP (GERMANY)
60	HOPITAL SANS FRONTIERE
61	HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
62	IFRC
63	IMC
64	INADES
65	INTL ORG FOR MIGRATION
66	INTL RESCUE COMMITTEE
67	INTER SOS

68	INTL COMM OF THE RED CROSS
69	JA OLPHANAGE
70	JAPAN INTL VOLUNTEER CENTRE
71	JOHANNITER UNFALL-HILFE
72	JOINT RELIEF & REHAB SERVICES KENYA
73	KORA ASBL
74	LVIA
75	MALTESER HILFE DIENST
76	MEDECINS DU MONDE
77	MEDECINE POUR LE TIERS MONDE
78	MEDICOS EN CATASTROFE
79	MEDICUS MUNDI (SPAIN)
80	MERLIN
81	MSF
82	NETHERLANDS DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION
83	NORWEGIAN PEOPLES AID
84	ORA INTL
85	ORPHALINS DU RWANDA
86	OXFAM
87	PHARMACIENS SANS FRONTIERS
88	PREFED
89	PREMIERE URGENCE
90	PROG DU SECURITE ALIMANTAIRE AU RWANDA
91	PROMOTIONS INIATIVES LOCALES DEVELPEE
92	REFUGEE TRUST IRELAND
93	RWANDAN RURAL REHAB INITIATIVE
94	SALEMM RWANDA
95	SAMARITAN'S PURSE INTL RELIEF
96	SAVE THE CHILDREN FUND
97	SENTINELLES
98	SERVICE ALLEMAND DE DEVELOPPEMENT
99	SOLIDARITES (FRANCE)
100	SOS CHILDRENS VILLAGES
101	SWISS DISASTER RELIEF
102	SYNESER

103	TRIANGLE GENERATION HUMANITAIRE
104	VISA SANTE
105	VOLCANO VET CTR
106	WORLD FOOD PROGRAM
107	WORLD RELIEF INTL
108	WORLD SOC. FOR THE PROTECTION OF ANIMALS
109	WORLD VISION INTL

F/IN-5338

SECOND TRANSMISSION
15/12/94

ICT

United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
Nations Unies Tribunal Pénal International pour l'Ex-Yougoslavie et pour le RwandaOffice of the Prosecutor
Bureau du ProcureurP.O. Box 13888
2501 HW The Hague
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2501 HW La Haye
Pays-Bas

EXTERNAL RELATIONS OFFICE

BUREAU DES RELATIONS EXTERIEURES

Tel: (31) (70) 344-5353

Fax: (31) (70) 344-5358

To/A: H. E. Ambassador Shaharyar Khan
Special Representative Secretary-General for Rwanda

Attn: Chief of Protocol

AMB. DESSANDE

CONFIDENTIALFrom/De: Donato Kiniger Passigli
External Relations Officer

Number of Pages/

Nombre de Pages: 2

(Including Covering Page/inclusive Page de Couverture)

Date: 13 December, 1994

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Si cette télécopie est incomplète ou illisible, prière de téléphoner (31) (70) 344-5353

Message:

Sir,


We have been advised that the United States Government intends to send a seconded personnel to the setting-up of the Prosecutor's Office in Kigali. The Department of State is therefore sending a fact-finding team of four members who would visit Kigali at the same time as Judge Tadić and the other Tribunal officials.

The Prosecutor appreciates the U.S. Government's willingness to co-operate with him and therefore would be particularly grateful to you if you could assist the U.S. team for the necessary logistical arrangements (i.e.: transportation Nairobi-Kigali-Nairobi and accommodation in Kigali).

The members of the U.S. Government team are the following: Mr. Stephen Mansfield, Attorney, passport # 800 568 893; Ms. Lisa Polisar, Computer Expert, passport # 0147 02082; Mr. Steven Edward Carton, Computer Expert, passport # 150567871; Mr. Jerome Dyer, FBI Agent, passport # *062652040*

With your permission, the above noted officers would fly to Kigali on Monday 19 December with the UNAMIR flight.

Your courteous answer would be appreciated. Respectfully yours,



F/IN-5338

SECOND TRANSMISSION
15/12/94

ICT

United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
Nations Unies Tribunal Pénal International pour l'Ex-Yougoslavie et pour le Rwanda

Office of the Prosecutor
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EXTERNAL RELATIONS OFFICE

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To/A: H. E. Ambassador Shaharyar Khan
Special Representative Secretary-General for Rwanda

Attn: Chief of Protocol

Amb. DESSANDE

CONFIDENTIAL

From/De: Donato Kiniger Passigli
External Relations Officer

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Message:

Sir,


We have been advised that the United States Government intends to contribute seconded personnel to the setting-up of the Prosecution Office. The U.S. Department of State is therefore sending a delegation of officials who would visit Kigali at the same time as the judges and the other Tribunal officials.

The Prosecutor appreciates the U.S. Government's willingness to co-operate with him and therefore would be particularly grateful to you if you could assist the U.S. team for the necessary logistical arrangements (i.e.: transportation Nairobi-Kigali-Nairobi and accommodation in Kigali).

The members of the U.S. Government team are the following: Mr. Stephen Mansfield, Attorney, passport # 800 568 893; Ms. Lisa Polisar, Computer Expert, passport # 0147 02082; Mr. Steven Edward Carton, Computer Expert, passport # 150567871; Mr. Jerome Dyer, FBI Agent, passport # *062652040*

With your permission, the above noted officers would fly to Kigali on Monday 19 December with the UNAMIR flight.

Your courteous answer would be appreciated. Respectfully yours,



CRN-213

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: BARIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: *fa* TOUSIGNANT, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 24 JUNE 1995

NUMBER: MIR - 2342

NO. OF PAGES: 27

SUBJECT: PROTECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL PERSONNEL

REFERENCE:

A. YOUR CODE CABLE 1989 DATED 15 JUNE 1995

1. THE INFORMATION REQUESTED AT REFERENCE A FOR THE FBI IS AS FOLLOWS:

2. THE EXACT NATURE OF SECURITY THAT WILL BE PROVIDED BY THE UNITED NATIONS, TO INCLUDE:

A. TOTAL NUMBER OF PERS ASSIGNED FOR SECURITY PURPOSES, COMPOSITION OF SECURITY FORCE, RELATIONSHIP TO THE MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURE, AVAILABILITY OF SUPPORTING UNITS AND DISTANCE, ARMAMENT AVAILABLE, AND COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE MILITARY STRUCTURE.

- ONE INDEPENDENT COMPANY (135 PERS) FOR ALL TRIBUNAL MEMBERS UNDER COMMAND OF UNAMIR FORCE COMMANDER LOCATED IN KIGALI WITH ADDITIONAL SUPPORT ELEMENTS. ARMED WITH SECTION AND PLATOON WEAPONS (IE AUTOMATIC WEAPONS, ETC). C&C OF THE MILITARY STRUCTURE IS CURRENTLY UNDER REVISION FOR THE NEW MANDATE BUT WILL PROBABLY CONSIST OF ONE BATTALION AND 5 INDEPENDENT COMPANIES UNDER COMMAND OF THE UNAMIR FORCE COMMANDER AND DIRECTED BY THE UNAMIR HQ OPERATIONS BRANCH.

B. HOURS THAT SECURITY IS AVAILABLE.

- 24 HRS/7 DAYS A WEEK.

C. GEOGRAPHIC EXTENT OF SECURITY.

- THREE SECTIONS AVAILABLE FOR ESCORT DUTIES FOR ALL TRIBUNAL PERSONNEL. ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL AVAILABLE FROM SECTOR UNITS WHEN REQUIRED/AVAILABLE. MAY BE AUGMENTED BY RWANDAN FORCES.

D. THE LEVEL OF SECURITY AFFORDED RESIDENCE OF AGENTS.

- DEPENDENT UPON HOUSING CHOSEN FOR TRIBUNAL PERSONNEL. CURRENT CONCEPT CALLS FOR COLLOCATION OF ALL TRIBUNAL PERSONNEL IN KIGALI PROTECTED BY 2 SECTIONS (5 PERS AT ANY TIME). THIS MAY BE AUGMENTED OR REPLACED BY SECURITY PROVIDED BY THE RWANDAN FORCES.

E. THE LEVEL OF SECURITY AFFORDED OFFICE.

- TRIBUNAL OFFICE TO BE PROTECTED BY 2 SECTIONS (5 PERS AT ANY TIME).

F. TYPE AND NUMBER OF SECURITY PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO AGENTS WHILE TRAVELLING OUTSIDE KIGALL

- SEE C. ABOVE.

G. TYPE OF VEHICLES AVAILABLE FOR TRANSPORTATION DURING INVESTIGATIVE WORK INCLUDING APC AND HELICOPTERS.

- UN LAND ROVER/CRUISER 4X4 TYPE VEHICLES, AND ACCESS TO UNAMIR HELICOPTER SERVICES (5 HUEYS).

H. TYPE OF COMMUNICATIONS AVAILABLE TO AGENT PERSONNEL TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH SECURITY AND/OR MILITARY FORCES.

- UNAMIR USES A NONSECURE MOTOROLA VHF SYSTEM WITH BASE STATIONS AND HANDHELD RADIOS. RADIO ACCESS THROUGHOUT RWANDA IS ACHIEVED VIA REPEATER STATIONS. THIS IS AUGMENTED BY AN HF SYSTEM TO SECTOR HQS PROVIDED BY AN INDIAN SIGNALS UNIT.

I. IDENTIFICATION OF COMMANDING OFFICER IN CHARGE OF SECURITY FORCES AND RANK.

- THE COMMANDING OFFICER DEPENDS ON WHICH COUNTRY WILL ULTIMATELY PROVIDE THE INDEPENDENT COMPANY BUT WILL BE OF MAJOR RANK.

K. COMPLETE ITEMIZATION OF ANY AND ALL INCIDENTS AFFECTING THE SECURITY OF UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL AND VOLUNTEERS IN RWANDA DURING THE PAST YEAR. THIS SHOULD INCLUDE VIOLENCE DIRECTED TOWARD NGO PERSONNEL IN THE COUNTRY.

- SEE ATTACHED.

L. IDENTIFICATION OF NGO'S WORKING IN RWANDA.

- SEE ATTACHED.

M. CURRENT STATUS OF THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY OR MISSION IN RWANDA.

- THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IS CURRENTLY OPERATING AND MAINTAINS A MILITARY LIAISON CELL.

3. THE EXACT NATURE OF ANY EVACUATION PLAN THAT HAS BEEN PUT IN PLACE BY THE UNITED NATIONS FORCES IN RWANDA THAT WOULD ASSIST IN THE EXTRACTION OF PERSONNEL IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS. THIS INCLUDES THE WIDENING OF THE CIVIL WAR OR WIDESPREAD VIOLENCE IN RWANDA OR NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES.

- THE CURRENT PLANS CALLS FOR A PHASED WITHDRAWAL TO KIGALI, OR ADJACENT COUNTRIES FOR SOME UNITS, BY UN PERSONNEL ULTIMATELY RESULTING IN A TOTAL WITHDRAWAL BY UNAMIR IF THE SITUATION REQUIRES. THIS IS CURRENTLY UNDER REVISION TO CONFORM TO THE NEW MANDATE.

4. THE EXACT NATURE OF MEDICAL FACILITIES AVAILABLE TO PERSONNEL WHILE IN COUNTRY. THIS SHOULD INCLUDE:

A. NUMBER AND TYPE OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL AVAILABLE TO PERSONNEL WHILE IN RWANDA.

- UNAMIR CURRENTLY HAS A 300 PERSON MEDICAL COMPANY SUPPLIED BY AUSTRALIA. UNDER THE NEW MANDATE THIS WILL BE

REDUCED TO 100 PERS AND WILL BE PROVIDED BY ANOTHER COUNTRY (TO BE DETERMINED).

B. NUMBER AND TYPE OF MEDICAL FACILITIES AVAILABLE IN RWANDA.

- THE PRIMARY UNAMIR MEDICAL FACILITY IS LOCATED IN KIGALI. UNDER THE NEW MANDATE THE 4 SECTORS OUTSIDE KIGALI, EACH WITH AN INDEPENDENT COMPANY, WILL HAVE A MEDICAL CAPABILITY CONSISTING OF ONE DOCTOR PLUS SUPPORT STAFF.

C. AVAILABILITY AND RELIABILITY OF HUMAN BLOOD SUPPLY.

- A LIMITED SUPPLY OF RELIABLE BLOOD IS AVAILABLE.

D. AVAILABILITY AND CAPABILITIES OF EMERGENCY MEDICAL EVACUATION PLANS.

- AIR AND ROAD EVACUATION IS PROVIDED BY THE MEDICAL SUPPORT COMPANY AND THE USE OF HELICOPTERS. FURTHER EVACUATION TO NAIROBI IS POSSIBLE THROUGH UN TRANSPORT ASSETS.

LIST OF NGO ORGANIZATIONS IN RWANDA

SERIAL	ORGANIZATION NAME
1	AFRICAN REVIVAL MINISTRIES
2	AFRICAN HUMANITARIAN ACTION
3	AFRICAN MEDICAL & RESEARCH FUND (KENYA)
4	AFRICAN MUSLIM AGENCY
5	AFRICAN REVIVAL MINISTRIES
6	ACORD
7	ACTION TECHNIQUE DIUN DEVELOPMENT COM
8	ADEPR/PMU INTERLIFE
9	ADRA
10	ADRI
11	AEF INTL
12	AIDE ET ACTION
13	AMERICAN JEWISH JOINT DIST. COMM.
14	AMURT (SWISS)
15	ARDI
16	APIDERMUB
17	ARBEP
18	ARTC
19	ARTC FEMMES
20	ASBL DIALOGUE
21	ASSN FRANCAISE DES VOLONTAIRES DU PROGR
22	ASSN OF MEDICAL DOCTORS OF ASIA
23	ASSN POUR LE DEFENSE DES DROITES
24	AUSTRIAN RELIEF PROGRAM
25	AVSI ITALY
26	BAMBINI DEL RUANDA
27	BAPTIST RELIEF SERVICES
28	BARAKABAHO FOUNDATION
29	BORNEFONDEN
30	BRITISH DIRECT AID
31	BUFMAR/MEMISA
32	CARITAS

33	CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES
34	CECA
35	CESAL SPAIN
36	CHILDREN'S RELIEF (GERMANY)
37	CHRISTIAN REFORMED WORLD RELIEF COMMITTEE
38	CHURCH WORLD SERVICE
39	CITIZEN'S NETWORK
40	COMPASSION INTL
41	COMMUNAUTE EMMAUS
42	CONCERN WORLDWIDE
43	COOPERAZIONE INTL
44	COOPIBO
45	CROIX ROUGE BELGIQUE
46	CUAMM
47	DUTERIMBERE
48	ECOTERRA INTL
49	ENFANTS DU MONDE
50	FEED THE CHILDREN
51	FRATERNITE NOTRE DAME INC
52	FRIENDS OF THE WEST INTL (USA)
53	GERMAN EMERGENCY DOCTORS
54	GESELLSCHAFT FUR TECHNISCHE ZUSAMMENARB
55	GLOBAL OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
56	GOAL (IRELAND)
57	HEALTH AID UK
58	HEIN NEBELING ISENSEE (GERMANY)
59	HELP (GERMANY)
60	HOPITAL SANS FRONTIERE
61	HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
62	IFRC
63	IMC
64	INADES
65	INTL ORG FOR MIGRATION
66	INTL RESCUE COMMITTEE
67	INTER SOS

68	INTL COMM OF THE RED CROSS
69	JA OLPHANAGE
70	JAPAN INTL VOLUNTEER CENTRE
71	JOHANNITER UNFALL-HILFE
72	JOINT RELIEF & REHAB SERVICES KENYA
73	KORA ASBL
74	L VIA
75	MALTESER HILFE DIENST
76	MEDECINS DU MONDE
77	MEDECINE POUR LE TIERS MONDE
78	MEDICOS EN CATASTROFE
79	MEDICUS MUNDI (SPAIN)
80	MERLIN
81	MSF
82	NETHERLANDS DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION
83	NORWEGIAN PEOPLES AID
84	ORA INTL
85	ORPHALINS DU RWANDA
86	OXFAM
87	PHARMACIENS SANS FRONTIERS
88	PREFED
89	PREMIERE URGENCE
90	PROG DU SECURITE ALIMANTAIRE AU RWANDA
91	PROMOTIONS INIATIVES LOCALES DEVELPEE
92	REFUGEE TRUST IRELAND
93	RWANDAN RURAL REHAB INITIATIVE
94	SALEMM RWANDA
95	SAMARITAN'S PURSE INTL RELIEF
96	SAVE THE CHILDREN FUND
97	SENTINELLES
98	SERVICE ALLEMAND DE DEVELOPPEMENT
99	SOLIDARITES (FRANCE)
100	SOS CHILDRENS VILLAGES
101	SWISS DISASTER RELIEF
102	SYNESER

103	TRIANGLE GENERATION HUMANITAIRE
104	VISA SANTE
105	VOLCANO VET CTR
106	WORLD FOOD PROGRAM
107	WORLD RELIEF INTL
108	WORLS SOC. FOR THE PROTECTION OF ANIMALS
109	WORLD VISION INTL

INCIDENTS AGAINST UN AND NGOs
INVOLVING VIOLENCE OR THREATS

NOTES:

1. THE LIST ONLY CONTAINS INCIDENTS WHERE VIOLENCE OCCURRED OR THERE WAS A THREAT OF VIOLENCE. ROUTINE STOPS AND SEARCHES OF UN VEHICLES ARE NOT INCLUDED.
2. INCIDENTS AGAINST LOCAL EMPLOYEES OF UN AGENCIES AND NGOs ARE NOT INCLUDED UNLESS SUCH AN INCIDENT OCCURRED WHILE THEY WERE PERFORMING THEIR DUTIES TO THE ORGANIZATION.
3. NOT ALL INCIDENTS INVOLVING UN CIVILIANS AND NGOs ARE REPORTED TO THIS HEADQUARTERS AS OFTEN THESE ORGANIZATIONS DO NOT WANT THE MILITARY INVOLVED.

INCIDENTS

HARASSMENT 10/06/94 BUTARE GR

AN RPA (PROB OFFICER) ENTERED THE MILOB RESIDENCE AND WALKED ROUND QUIETLY CALLING THE NAME OF THE LOCALLY EMPLOYED CIVILIAN HOUSEBOY. THE HOUSEBOY HID AND THE RPA LEFT IN A VEHICLE SEERAL MINUTES LATER. NOTHING WAS STOLEN. THE HOUSEBOY WAS A TUTSI AND IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE RPA WANTED TO QUESTION HIM OR PERHAPS USE HIM TO MONITOR THE ACTIVITIES OF THE MILOBS. THERE WERE ON FUTHER INCIDENTS.

MURDER 10/17/94 RUYENZI GR 8132

AN EXPATRIATE FRENCH/CANADIAN CATHOLIC PRIEST (FATHER CLAUDE SIMARD) WAS MURDERED IN RUYENZI ON NIGHT OF 17 OCT 94. ALTHOUGH SOME HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS WERE TAKEN, THE MANNER IN WHICH HE WAS KILLED SUGGESTS THAT HE WAS EXECUTED. A LOCAL MENTIONED THAT THE ATTACKERS WORE A UNIFORM. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT HE WAS MURDERED BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN A WITNESS TO ACTIVITIES OR ATROCITY BOTH DURING AND AFTER THE WAR.

HARASSMENT 10/19/94 CYANGUGU GR 7724

AN NGO VEHICLE WAS FORCED OFF THE ROAD BY AN RPA VEHICLE. THE RPA VEHICLE CLOSED UP DANGEROUSLY CLOSE TO HIM, THEN BEGAN TO OVERTAKE HIM AND FORCED HIM OFF THE ROAD. HE ALSO CLAIMED THAT A SIMILAR INCIDENT OCCURRED ON 15 OCT WHEN TWO RPA

VEHICLES 'SANDWICHED' A MOTORCYCLE CARRYING A BDA EMPLOYEE.
BOTH BDA VEHs WERE CARRYING UNHCR PLATES.

HARASSMENT 11/05/94 BUTARE GR 7111

GENDARMES STOPPED AN AUSMED VEHICLE TRAVELLING THE WRONG WAY ON A ONE WAY STREET. THE GENDARMES WANTED THE DRIVER TO FOLLOW THEM TO THE BDE HQ WHERE THEY WISHED TO IMPOUND THE VEHICLE. THE UN VEHICLE REFUSED AND DID NOT FOLLOW THE GENDARME VEHICLE AS DIRECTED.

ARREST 11/03/94 GITARAMA

THREE CARITAS FATHERS WERE ARRESTED BY THE RPA ON 3 NOV IN GITARAMA. THEY AND THEIR VEHICLE WERE RELEASED ON 7 NOV.

CONFRONTATION 11/10/94 MUSANGE GR 5347

A PLATOON OF RPA TROOPS, IN THE PROCESS OF BURNING DOWN A INTERNALLY DISPLACED CAMP, SURROUNDED THE ZAMBATT PLATOON PROTECTING THE SITE. THE RPA CHASED IDPS, BURNED SHELTERS AND FIRED WEAPONS TO SCARE THE LOCALS BUT OFFERED NO HOSTILE ACTION TOWARDS THE UN SOLDIERS.

CONFRONTATION 11/10/94 NYAMAGABE AREA GR 543273

EIGHT RPA SOLDIERS, MOST OF WHOM APPEARED DRUNK, SURROUNDED THE "FEED THE CHILDREN" COMPOUND AND TRIED TO REMOVE 100 PEOPLE WHO HAD TAKEN SHELTER IN THE FACILITY. THE RPA OFFICER WITH THE GROUP CLAIMED THAT THE PEOPLE HAD THROWN ROCKS AT THIS MEN. THE SITUATION WAS DEFUSED BY MILOB AND THERE WAS NO DAMAGE OR INJURY.

THIS WAS THE SECOND INCIDENT AT THIS NGO COMPOUND WITHIN 48 HRS.

CONFRONTATION 11/11/94 KIZI GR 6120

RPA STOPPED A UN OFFICER AT CHECKPOINT AND DEMANDED TO SEARCH HIS VEHICLE. WHEN THE OFFICER REFUSED, THE SOLDIERS HIT HIS VEHICLE WITH A RIFLE. THE OFFICER EVENTUALLY ALLOWED THE SOLDIERS TO SEARCH THE VEHICLE AND WAS ALLOWED TO PROCEED.

ATTACK 11/12/94 MUSEBEYA GR 4033

A STICK GRENADE WAS THROWN BY RPA SOLDIERS TOWARDS THE ZAMBATT PLATOON POSITION. AT THE TIME AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER

OF LOCALS WERE RUNNING FROM EXPLOSIONS AND GUNFIRE IN THE MARKET PLACE TO THE SAFETY OF THE ZAMBATT POSITION. ZAMBATT TROOPS FIRED INTO THE AIR AND DISARMED THE RPA TROOPS. THE RPA COMD CLAIMED THAT CIVILIANS THREW STONES AND HAND GRENADES AT HIS PATROL. CASUALTIES TO THE CIVILIANS CAUGHT OUTSIDE THE POSITION WERE 7 DEAD, 8 SERIOUSLY INJURED AND 9 SLIGHTLY INJURED.

CONFRONTATION 11/13/94 RUGALIKA GR 565067

RPA ATTEMPTED TO ARREST A MALAWI PLATOON COMMANDER BECAUSE HE OFFERED TO GIVE TWO MEN A LIFT IN HIS VEHICLE. RPA CLAIMED THAT THE MEN WERE RGF SOLDIERS AND WANTED THE PL COMD TO HAND THEM OVER. THE ISSUE WAS RESOLVED AND RPA ASKED THAT DISCIPLINARY ACTION TO BE TAKEN.

CONFRONTATION 11/15/94 GIKONGORO GR 5227

RPA GENDARME ORDERED A GHANANIAN MILITARY POLICEMAN TO LEAVE THE PLACE WHERE HE WAS DIRECTING TRAFFIC. WHEN THE GHANANIAN REFUSED, THE RPA FIRED A WARNING SHOT.

ARMED ROBBERY 11/18/94 GIKONGORO GR 5127

TWO UNIDENTIFIED UNIFORMED MEN ARMED WITH AK 47 ATTEMPTED TO BREAK INTO A HOUSE OCCUPIED BY WORKERS OF CARITAS. THE INTRUDERS WERE CHASED AWAY BY RPA.

ATTACK 11/22/94 BUTARE GR 7212

AN AUSMED VEHICLE WAS FIRED ON BY THE RPA WHEN A COLONEL ALIGHTED FROM THE VEHICLE TO TAKE A PHOTOGRAPH OF A DEMOLISHED BUILDING. HE CLAIMS TO HAVE RECEIVED A NOD FROM AN RPA SOLDIER, HOWEVER ANOTHER SOLDIER APPROACHED AND DEMANDED THE CAMERA. THIS WAS REFUSED. THE INFANTRY SECTION 2I/C INTERVENED AND TOLD THE VEHICLE TO DRIVE ON. AS IT DID THE RPA SOLDIER FIRED TWO SHOTS HITTING THE REAR WHEEL RIM AND THE TAILGATE. RPA CLAIMED THAT THE AUSMEDSOLDIERS FIRED FIRST.

CONFRONTATION 11/24/94 KIGALI GR 0483

A UNHCR VEH WAS BLOCKED BY A CIVILIAN VEHICLE. A SCUFFLE BROKE OUT BETWEEN THE DRIVER OF THE UNHCR VEH AND THE OCCUPANTS OF THE UNMARKED VEHICLE. AT LEAST ONE WEAPON WAS COCKED AND POINTED AT THE DRIVER. IT IS SUSPECTED THAT THE ASSAULT WAS CARRIED OUT BY THE RPA, POSSIBLY TO STEAL THE VEHICLE.

CONFRONTATION 11/30/94 GISENYI GR 1712

RPA DETAINED THE UNAMIR BARGE AND INDIRECTLY DETAINED SEVEN UNAMIR PERSONNEL WHO REFUSED TO LEAVE THE BARGE FEARING THAT THE UN GOODS ABOARD THE BARGE WOULD BE LOITED. THE RPA CLAIMED THAT THERE WAS NO WRITTEN APPROVAL OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE FOR THE BARGE TO OPERATE. THE BARGE WAS RELEASED 1 DEC.

HARASSMENT 12/05/94 GIKONGORO GR 5827

RPA GENDARMERIE TOLD TWO FRENCH NGO'S - SOLIDARITE AND EQUILIBRE - THAT THEIR EXPATRIATE DRIVERS HAD TO BE OUT OF THE COUNTRY BY 9 NOV AND THEIR JOBS GIVEN TO LOCAL RWANDAN DRIVERS. COMMENT. HUMINT SOURCES HAVE ALREADY INDICATED THAT SOME OF THE FRENCH (SUSPECTED MILITARY) WHO USED TO USE A KIGALI CAR HIRE FIRM PRIOR TO THE WAR HAVE BEEN SEEN RECENTLY IN KIGALI WORKING AS DRIVERS FOR FRENCH NGO'S. END COMMENT.

HARASSMENT 12/11/94 KIGARAMA GR 682703

A MILOB TEAM WAS SENT TO NEGOTIATE THE RELEASE OF A HUMAN RIGHTS TEAM BEING DENIED MOVEMENT BY LOCAL MILITIA. DURING THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATION, THE MILOB TEAM WAS ALSO HARASSED BY BOTH RPA AND MILITIA. ONCE RELEASED THE TEAM WAS FURTHER DETAINED AT GASETSA. FINALLY A SECTION FROM GHANBATT HAD TO BE SENT TO ESCORT THE MILOB AND HUMAN RIGHTS BACK TO THEIR BASE. THE REASON FOR DENIAL OF ACCESS IS NOT KNOWN.

HARASSMENT 12/13/94 RUSIZI 1 GR 7624

RPA WOULD NOT ALLOW A FRIEND OF THE EMPLOYEE ACCESS INTO MSF AND A FIGHT INVOLVING THE FEMALE EMPLOYEE, AN UNIDENTIFIED MALE FRIEND AND A GROUP OF RPA SOLDIERS. WHEN MSF MEMBERS ARRIVED AT THE SCENE, THE RPA COCKED THEIR WEAPONS.

ARREST 12/30/94 KIGALI GR 6892

RPA ARRESTED A UNAMIR SOLDIER (SENEGALESE) FOR LOITERING AT A LATE HOUR. THE SOLDIER WAS RELEASED TO UN MP CUSTODY. ANOTHER VERSION OF POSSIBLY THE SAME INCIDENT IS THAT RPA CHASED A MEMBER OF THE SENEGALESE CONTINGENT TO THE CANADIAN COMPOUND AT THE AMAHORO STADIUM. THE RPA PATROL LEADER STATED THAT SOLDIER HAD BEEN CAUGHT DRINKING AT A LOCAL RESIDENCE AFTER 2100HRS AGAINST THE LAW ACCORDING TO THE

PATROL LEADER. THE UN SOLDIER WAS HANDED OVER TO UNAMIR MP COY.

ATTACK 12/30/94 KIGALI GR 6892

A GRENADE EXPLODED ADJACENT TO TRANSIENT CAMP AND SIX SHOTS FIRED INTO THE CAMP LOCATED BESIDE THE AMAHORO STADIUM. SEARCH OF AREA FAILED TO PROVIDE ANY FURTHER INFORMATION.

HARASSMENT 01/03/95 GIKONGORO GR 5827

AICF WAS SERVED WITH A LETTER FROM THE GOVERNMENT POSTPONING THEIR ACTIVITIES IN GIKONGORO AND ADVISING THEM TO RETURN TO KIGALI AND THE RPA COMMANDER PLACED AICF UNDER HOUSE ARREST, AFTER NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN AICF WAS ALLOWED TO STAY IN GIKONGORO UNTIL 04 JAN 94. AICF IS TO HAND OVER A LIST OF LOCAL WORKERS FROM THEM TO THE PREFECT ALONG WITH ALL OTHER EQUIPMENT AND LOGISTICS THEY BROUGHT WITH THEM FOR THEIR MISSION.

THREAT 01/04/95 RUSHASHO GR 2917

CARE STOPPED DISTRIBUTING AID DUE TO ATTITUDE OF RETURNEES WHO LEFT RWANDA IN 1959, THEY WANT TO TAKE AID EVERY DAY AND THEY THREATENED CARE WORKERS THEY WOULD TAKE THE AID BY FORCE. CARE WAS PROVIDED ADDITIONAL SECURITY BY TUNBATT.

ASSAULT 01/08/95 KIBUNGO GR 5961

AN RPA LT DETAINED A MEMBER OF WFP NEAR THE UNHCR OFFICES IN KIBUNGO, THREATENED HIM WITH A WEAPON AND SLAPPED HIS FACE FOR ALLEGEDLY OVERTAKING AN RPA VEHICLE. HE WAS RELEASED LATER.

CONFRONTATION 01/09/95 KIGALI GR

A UNAMIR HELICOPTER WAS DETAINED AT KIGALI AIRPORT FOR TWO AND A HALF HOURS FOR OVERFLYING THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE.

CONFRONTATION 01/10/95 NYAGATARE GR 3657

RPA PUNCTURED THE TIRE OF ONE OF NICOYS VEHS CARRYING DP'S AT THE NYAGATARE GR 3657 RPA CHECK POINT.

ROBBERY 01/14/95 BAKAVU © GR

THE CARE HOUSE EXPERIENCED ANOTHER ROBBERY ATTEMPT ON 14 JAN AND THAT TWO BELGIAN OWNERS OF THE ORCHID HOTEL WERE SHOT AND WOUNDED AS THEY DROVE BY THE HOUSE THUS FOILING THE ROBBERY.

CONFRONTATION 02/05/95 KIGALI GR 6892

A HUMAN RIGHTS TEAM GATHERING INFORMATION ON THE ATTACK ON A KIGALI JOURNALIST WAS SURROUNDED BT A NUMBER OF RPA SOLDIERS WHO PREVENTED THEM FROM HAVING ANY CONTACT WITH LOCALS. THE TEAM LATER WAS FOLLOWED FROM THE SCENE BY THREE VEHICLES BELIEVED TO BE CARRYING UNDER COVER AGENTS.

HARASSMENT 02/15/95 KIGALI GR 0685

A MINOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT ODDURRED OUTSIDE THE MAIN GATE OF THE AUSMED COMPOUND BETWEEN AN AUSMED VEHICLE AND AN RPA VEHICLE. AN RPA MAJOR WHO HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN OTHER INCIDENTS CONCERNING AUSMED ARRIVED ON THE SCENE AND PROCEEDED TO ESCALATE THE SITUATION. HE PLACED AN RPA VEH AT THE SECOND EXIT TO THE BARRACKSTO PREVENT ENTRANCE IN OR OUT OF THE COMPOUND. HE MANAGED TO RELATE OTHER UNRELATED INCIDENTS AND THE DISCUSSIONS WENT ON FOR SOME HOURS. ON ONE OCCASION, AFTER ONE RPA SOLDIER COCKED HIS WEAPON, THE AUSMED INF DID LIKEWISE. THE SITUATION WAS RESOLVED PEACEFULLY.

ATTACK 02/16/95 RUNDU GR 5775

ONE GHANANIAN PATROL WAS THREATENED BY SOME UNIDENTIFIED PERSONS WITH A GRENADE. MILOBS FOUND AN RPA SOLDIER WITH GRENADES IN THE AREA AND HE WAS PREVENTING ANY UN VEHICLE FROM PASSING.

ATTACK 02/16/95 KABALI GR 3018

DURING THE NIGHT OF 15/16 FEB, UNKNOWN PERSONS FIRED SMALL ARMS AND A GRENADE AT THE COMMUNICATIONS ANTENNA IN THE TUNBATT LOCATION. THE FOLLOWING MORNING A TUNBATT PATROL TO GATHER EVIDENCE AND THE PATROL STEPPED ON A MINE, POSS FRAGMENTATION TYPE. EIGHT TUNBATT SOLDIERS INJURED.

HARASSMENT 02/16/95 KIGALI © GR 0685

AN AUSMED AMBULANCE WAS DELIBERATELY CHASED BY THE RPA TO THE PRESIDENTIAL HANGER AFTER THE AMBULANCE ACCIDENTALLY STRUCK A TRFFIC PYLON AT THE RPA CHECKPOINT. THE RPA BECAME ABUSIVE AT THE AIRPORT HANGER AND THREATENED TO SHOOT THE AMBULANCE CREW IF THEY DID THE SAME THING AGAIN. THE INCIDENT WAS QUICKLY RESOLVED AND THE RPA DEPARTED.

ARMED ROBBERY 02/16/95 KIGALI GR 0685

THREE ARMED MEN WEARING UNIFORMS WALKED INTO THE CONCERN INTERNATIONAL RESIDENCE DEMANDING "DOLLARS" AND ESCAPED WITH APPROX \$US400 AND ABOUT \$200 WORTH OF RFR.

ARMED ROBBERY 02/17/95 KIGALI GR 0685

AN RPA SOLDIER ATTEMPTED HIJACK OF A UNAMIR WATER TANKER AT GUN POINT.

ATTACK 02/18/95 GISENYI GR 1712

A CONVOY FROM WORLD FOOD PROGRAM STOOPEL AT THE BORDER WAS ATTACKED BY LOCALS AND SIX TRUCKS WERE LOOTED OF FOOD DESTINED FR GOMA. INITIALLY THE RPA SHOT AND KILLED TWO OF THE LOOTERS BUT SUBSEQUENTLY DID NOT TAKE ANY ACTION TO DISSUADE THE LOOTERS LOOTING.

ON 19 FEB ANOTHER INCIDENT OF LOOTING THE WFP AND ICRC TRUCKS IN GISENYI OCCURRED. CROWDS CONVERGED ON THE RPA CHECKPOINT WHERE THE TRUCKS WERE HALTED. MILOBS NEGOTIATED WITH THE RPA FOR RELEASE OF THE TRUCKS. THE CROWD HALTED THE CONVOY AND COMPLETELY LOOTED IT.

ATTACK 02/24/95 KABALI GR 3018

A TUNBATT SENTRY CHALLENGED A CIVILIAN HIDING NEAR THE PERIMETER FENCE. THE CIVILIAN FIRED TWO SHOTS AT THE SENTRY, THE SENTRY FIRED 16 SHOTS.

ATTACK 02/26/95 KAMANA GR 5196

RPA SOLDIERS MAKING ARRESTS IN AN IDP CAMP, FIRED ONE ROUND AT A ZAMBATT SOLDIER WHO TIED TO INTERVENE. THE SHOT MISSED AND THE RPA SOLDIER WAS ARRESTED.

ATTACK 02/27/95 KIGALI GR 6892

A WHITE UN NISSAN PICK UP WAS TRAVELLING ALONG THE RUHENGERI-KIGALI ROAD WAS ATTACKED BY UNIDENTIFIED ARMED AND UNIFORMED MEN. THE VEHICLE RECEIVED CONSIDERABLE SMALL ARMS DAMAGE. NO INJURY WAS SUSTAINED.

ATTACK 02/28/95 GISENYI GR 1712

LOCALS AT GISENYI TRIED TO LOOT AID BELONGING TO UNHCR. A PLATOON WAS SENT TO PROVIDE PROTECTION AND CONTROL THE SITUATION.

HARASSMENT 03/04/95 KIGALI GR 6892

RPA SOLDIERS FROM THE CAMP OPPOSIT THE AUSMED HOSPITAL INTIMIDATE THE GUARD POST BY FLASHING OF CAMERAS, COCKING OF WEAPONS CLOSE TO THE GUARD POST AT NIGHT. DRUNKEN THREATS HAVE BEEN MADE BY RPA TOWARDS AS SOLDIERS AT THIS POST.

ATTEMPTED ROBBERY 03/05/95 KIGALI GR 6892

20 ARMED RPA SOLDIERS IN TWO VEHICLES APPROACHED OWN SENTRY AT UN SERVICE STATION AND DEMANDED HIS RIFLE AND AMMUNITION. ON BEING DENIED GROUP WENT AWAY.

ATTACK 03/06/95 BYUMBA GR 0825

TWO EXPLOSIONS OCCURRED IN THE VICINITY OF A NIBATT GUARD POST AT BYUMBA CAMP. TWO NIBATT SOLDIERS WERE INJURED AND THREE GRENADE LEVERS WERE LATER FOUND IN THE VICINITY OF THE GUARD POST.

ARMED ROBBERY 03/08/95 KIGALI GR 6892

CIVILIAN POLICE MEMBER WAS ROBBED AT GUN POINT BY THREE MEN, ONE IN RPA UNIFORM. THEY TOOK HIS VEHICLE, HAND MOTOROLA, PERSONAL BELONGINGS.

ARMED ROBBERY 03/14/95 KIGALI GR 6892

A MEMBER OF THE HQ UNAMIR TRANSPORT SECTION WAS ROBBED AT HIS RESIDENCE BY THREE ARMED MEN BELIEVED TO BE RPA AS THEY WERE DRESSED IN RPA STYLE CAMOFLAGUE UNIFORMS. ESTIMATED COST OF ITEMS STOLEN IS \$5000.

CONFRONTATION 03/21/95 BYUMBA GR 0825

RPA TROOPS BLOCKED ACCESS ROUTE TO NIBATT POSITION FOLLOWING SHOOTING AND DEATH THE NIGHT BEFORE OF A LOCAL WHO WAS REPORTED ATTEMPTING TO BREAK INTO THE CAMP. THE RPA REFUSED TO ALLOW UNAMIR PERSONEL OUT OF THE CAMP. IT LATER TRANSPIRED THAT THE LOCAL WAS LIKELY MURDERED BY THE NIBATT SOLDIER OVER A DISPUTE.

CONFRONTATION 03/23/95 MUGONGO GR 3024

A DETACHMENT FROM AUSMED REPORTED WAS CONFRONTED BY RPA SOLDIERS AT THE MUGONGO COMMUNE ORPHANAGE (GR 3024) WHO DIRECTED THEM TO LEAVE AS THEY HAD NO AUTHORISATION.

CONFRONTATION 03/24/95 SAKE GR 4248

IRC HAD DIFFICULTIES IN GAINING ACCESS TO AN AREA SOUTH OF SAKE TO CONDUCT A CLINIC. THEY WERE STOPPED AND SURROUNDED 3 TIMES BY ARMED CIVILIANS AND FORCED TO TURN BACK.

ARMED ROBBERY 03/27/95 BUTARE GR 7111

FOUR MEN , ONE ARMED WITH A RIFLE AND TWO OTHERS DRESSED IN MILITARY UNIFORMS, ATTEMPTED TO STEAL A VEHICLE FROM A MILOB OUTSIDE HIS BUTARE RESIDENCE. THE MEN WERE SUSPECTED TO BE RPA SOLDIERS, AND ESCAPED AFTER STRONG RESISTANCE FROM THE MILOB.

ATTACK 03/30/95 KAMEMBE GR 7826

A HAND GRENADE WAS THROWN AND SHOTS WERE FIRED AT AN ETHIOBATT POSITION. THE ETHIOBATT POSITION WAS PROTECTING AN ICRC WAREHOUSE. NO CASUALTIES WERE REPORTED BUT A F1 GRENADE WAS FOUND IN THE AREA.

CONFRONTATION 04/02/95 BYUMBA GR 0825

RPA PREVENTED MOVEMENT OF UN VEHICLE AND PERSONEEL IN BYUMBA FOLLOEWING A MINOR ACCIDENT BY A NIBATT VEHICLE AND A PEDESTRIAN. THE GENDERMERIE WERE DEMANDED THE VEHICLE AND DRIVER INVOLVED IN THE ACCIDENT. EVENTUALLY, THE VEHICLE WAS IMPOUNED BY THE GENDERMERIE AND THE ROAD BLOCK WAS LIFTED.

ARREST 04/03/95 RUHUNDA GR 4691

TWO GHANANIAN SOLDIERS WERE ARRESTED BY THE RPA FOR NOT HAVING PROPER IDENTIFICATION. THE SOLDIERS HAD LEFT THE GHANBATT POSITION ON FOOT TO WASH THEIR CLOTHES AND TO BUY ITEMS AT THE MARKET. THE GHANBATT SOLDIERS WERE TAKEN TO THE RPA BARRACKS FOR IDENTIFICATION AND WERE RELEASED BY RPA OFFICERS WHO RECOGNISED THE SOLDIERS. THE RPA LATER ALLEGED THAT THE SOLDIERS WERE IN A RESTRICTED AREA.

ARREST 04/08/95 BUTARE GR

A MEMBER OF HUMAN RIGHTS WAS ARRESTED BY THE RPA IN BUTARE WHEN HE FAILED TO REPORTED TO THE GENDARMERIE OFFICE FOLLOWING A MINOR TRAFFIC ACCIDENT. REPORTEDLY THE MAN BECAME AFRAID AND ATTEMPTED TO RETURN TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE FOR ASSISTANCE. A GENDARME WHO ACCOMPANIED THE MAN BECAME AFRAID AS WELL AND THREATENED TO EXPLODE A HAND GRENADE. THE MAN WAS RELEASED AFTER UNAMIR INTERVENED.

ARMED ROBBERY 04/09/95 KIGALI GR

A MILOB VEHICLE WAS STOLEN AT GUNPOINT IN THE VICINITY OF THE KIGALI/MILLE COLLINE HOTEL.

ARMED ROBBERY 04/10/95 KAGATARE GR

THREE UNKNOWN ARMED MEN ATTACKED AND ASSAULTED A FEMALE NGO IN HER AND STOLE A NUMBER OF ITEMS.

THREAT 04/10/95 KIGALI GR 0783

TWO INDIAN CIVILIAN STAFF OF UNAMIR LEFT THEIR RESIDENCE BECAUSE THEY WERE THREATENED BY THREE UNKNOWN RPA.

THREAT 04/11/95 KIGALI GR 0783

FOUR UNAMIR HQ PERS WERE THREATENED BY RPA SOLDIERS AT THEIR RESIDENCE. NATURE OR REASON FOR THREAT NOT GIVEN.

CONFRONTATION 04/12/95 GISENYI GR 1712

ANTI-UNAMIR DEMONSTRATIONS WERE CONDUCTED IN GISENYI ON 12 AND 13 APR 95 AND UNAMIR PERSONNEL WERE ASSULTED. AT A ROADBLOCK WAS SET UP BY CIVILIANS IN THE NYUNDO AREA, A PASSING UN MP VEHICLE HAD ITS WINDOWS BROKEN. LATER TWO MILOBS WERE

ATTACKED SUDDENLY AND THEIR RADIO HANDSETS SEIZED. MILOB TEAMS ALSO SUSTAINED LIGHT INJURIES FROM STONES THROWN BY THE CROWD. GENDARMES PRESENT WARNED THE MILOBS AT GUNPOINT NOT TO INJURE ANYONE IN RETRIEVING THEIR HANDSETS. THE GENDARMES FAILED TO TAKE ANY ACTION AGAINST THE DEMONSTRATORS, DESPITE BEING REQUESTED TO DO SO BY MILOBS. THE RPA LO WHO HAD BEEN CONTACTED AT THE START AND PROMISED TO ASSIST, BUT COULD NOT BE CONTACTED WHEN THE SITUATION WORSENEED.

THE FOLLOWING DAY THE DEMONSTRATORS WERE MORE PEACEFUL AND THE RPA AND GENDARMES ITREVENED WHEN THE CROWD ATTEMPTED TO ENTER THE MILOB HEADQUARTERS.

HARASSMENT 04/12/95 KABALI GR 308183

AN ANTI-AIR WEAPON WAS FIRED AT 0550 HRS NEAR THE TUNBATT HQ LOCATION AT KABALI. THE WEAPON WAS FIRED FROM A HILL LOCATED TWO KM NORTH OF THE HQ LOC, AT GR 3018. THE SHOOTING WAS TOWARD THE TUNBATT CAMP AND OVER THE COMMUNICATION CENTRE AND UNAMIR RADIO RELAY.

ARMED ROBBERY 04/14/95 KIGALI GR

FIVE ARMED MEN ENTERED THE UNDP RESIDENCE AND TOOK MONEY AND ELECTRICAL GOODS.

ASSAULT 04/14/95 KIGALI GR

ONE OF THE UNICEF INTERNATIONAL STAFF MEMBERS WAS ASSAULTED BY A DEMONSTRATORS MARCHING THROUGH KIGALI. THE GROUP FROM THE DEMONSTRATORS SPLIT OFF, CROSSED THE STREET AND TRIED TO HIM THE MAN WITH THEIR PLACARDS.

CONFRONTATION 04/15/95 KIGALI GR 0783

PATROLS COMPLAINED OF THE RECENT HOSTILE ATTITUDE OF THE CIVIL POPULATION. THE SECTOR OPS OFFICER WAS STONED IN HIS VEHICLE, EVEN THOUGH HE WAS ALONE IN IT AT THE TIME. CHILDREN WERE ALSO REPORTED TO BE SPITTING AT UNAMIR VEHICLES.

ARREST 04/16/95 BUTARE GR

GENDARMARIE AT BUTARE IMPOUNDED A UNAMIR VEHICLE AND DETAINED ITS ZAMBATT DRIVER FOR OVER 9 HOURS FOLLOWING A VEHICLE ACCIDENT.

ARMED ROBBERY 04/17/95 KIGALI GR

TWO MEN DRESSED IN UNIFORM STOLE AT GUNPOINT, A UNAMIR VEHICLE FROM THE MERIDIEN HOTEL. THERE IS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE MEN MAY HAVE BEEN PART OF THE RPA GUARD AT THE HOTEL.

HARASSMENT 04/18/95 TABA GR 8883

THREE CATHOLIC PRIESTS WERE ACCUSED OF TAKING PART IN THE GENOCIDE. IT WAS RUMOURED THAT THEY WERE TO BE ARRESTED. IT LATER TRANSPIRED THAT THE PRIESTS WERE FALSELY ACCUSED BY AN RWANDAN WHO HAD GRUDGES AGAINST ONE OF THE PRIESTS AND IT IS BELIEVED THAT ANOTHER OF THE PRIESTS MADE COMMENTS REGARDING THE BRUTALITY OF THE RPA.

ARMED ROBBERY 04/19/95 BUTARE GR

A UNHCR VEHICLE WAS STOLEN AT GUNPOINT IN BUTARE. TWO PERSONS IN CIVILIAN DRESS AND TOOK DRIVER IN THE CAR TO NYANZA WHERE THEY LEFT HIM.

ARMED ROBBERY 04/19/95 KIGALI GR 0783

FOUR BROWN AND ROOT EMPLOYEES WERE SURPRISED BY 3 TO 4 ARMED INDIVIDUALS. TWO WERE IN MILITARY UNIFORMS SIMILAR TO THE RPA AND ARMED WITH AUTOMATIC WEAPONS AND ONE WAS IN CIVILIAN ATTIRE. A UNAMIR VEHICLE, SEVERAL COMPUTERS, FAX MACHINES, COMPUTER SOFTWARE, PORTABLE RADIOS, PERSONAL ITEMS AND CASH WERE TAKEN. TOTAL VALUE OF THE ROBBERY (INCLUDING THE COST OF THE VEHICLE) IS APPROX US\$95,000. NO SERIOUS INJURIES WERE SUSTAINED BY THE BROWN AND ROOT EMPLOYEES, HOWEVER THEY WERE PHYSICALLY STRUCK AND VERBALLY ABUSED. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THROUGHOUT THE ROBBERY THEY WERE THREATENED BY THE ASSAILANTS.

CONFRONTATION 04/21/95 BUTARE GR 8482

THREE UN SUPPLY VEHICLES WERE SURROUNDED AND ROCKED WHEN THEY DROVE INTO AN ON-GOING ANTI-UNAMIR RALLY. LOCALS ATTEMPTED TO HAUL THE THE DRIVERS AND CO-DRIVERS OUT OF THEIR VEHICLES BUT THE DEMONSTRATORS WERE BEATEN BACK.

HARASSMENT 04/22/95 KINAMBA GR

RPA STOPPED AND SEARCHED A UNAMIR VEHICLE, THEN INSTRUCTED THE DRIVER THAT HIS VEHICLE WAS BEING IMPOUNDED. AN MP PATROL OBTAINED THE VEHICLES RELEASE.

HARASSMENT 04/23/95 GIKONGORO

A STAFF MEMBER FROM UNICEF GIKONGORO HAD HIS MOTOROLA STOLEN AT GUNPOINT DURING THE EVENING/NIGHT OF 22 APR. THE FOLLOWING DAY, HE WAS STOPPED BY RPA WHILE ENROUTE TO KIBEHO AND TOLD THAT THEY WOULD SOON ARREST HIM AS THEY CLAIM HE WAS COMMUNICATING WITH THE FRGF IN EXILE.

ARMED ROBBERY 04/23/95 KIGALI GR

THREE RPA SOLDIERS WERE CAUGHT ATTEMPTING TO ROB A UNAMIR RESIDENCE. THE SOLDIERS WERE TAKEN TO THE MP COY LOCATION FOR QUESTIONING WHEN AN RPA VEHICLE WITH PERHAPS 10 SOLDIERS ENTERED THE MP COMPOUND DEMANDING THE RELEASE OF THE DETAINED RPA SOLDIERS. AN IMPASS ENSUED AND THE UN READY REACTION FORCE WAS CALLED IN TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK. THE SOLDIERS AND THEIR WEAPONS WERE TURNED OVER TO THE RPA SECTION AND THE GOODS CAPTURED WERE GIVEN TO THE GENDARMARIE WHO ARE INVESTIGATING THE CASE.

ARMED ROBBERY 04/24/95 KIGALI GR

FOUR MEN (TWO IN CIVILIAN SUITS AND TWO IN RPA UNIFORM) ROBBED A GERMAN NATIONAL AT HIS RESIDENCE AT 2000 HOURS.

ARREST 04/25/95 GIKONGORO GR 5827

TWO WORKERS OF A THE NGO "GOAL" WERE DETAINED FOR QUESTIONING, AFTER SECURITY FORCES FOUND A LETTER IN THEIR CAR WHICH REPORTEDLY WAS WRITTEN BY THE FORMER RWANDESE INTERIM PRESIDENT.

CONFRONTATION 04/25/95 BUTARE GR 7111

MILOBs WERE STONED AS THEY ATTEMPTED TO PROTECT IDPs MOVING ON FOOT FROM KIBEHO CAMP FROM CROWDS GATHERED ALONG THE ROUTE.

ASSAULT 04/26/95 GITARAMA GR

A LOCAL DRIVER FOR CRS STRUCK AND KILLED AN RPA SOLDIER WITH THE CRS VEHICLE. THE RPA BEAT THE DRIVER MERCILESSLY AND TOOK HIM TO THE HOSPITAL WHERE HE FLED.

ARMED ROBBERY 04/26/95 KIGALI GR

SIX ARMED MEN (FOUR IN RPA UNIFORMS AND TWO IN CIVILIAN CLOTHING) ROBBED THE HUMAN RIGHTS RESIDENCE NEAR ST FAMILIE CHURCH. THE THIEVES CAME IN A UNAMIR PICKUP TRUCK. THEY THREATENED THE PEOPLE WITH THEIR RIFLES AND TOOK TWO UN VEHICLES, TWO HANDHELD MOTOROLAS, TWO COMPUTERS AND PERSONAL EFFECTS AND MONEY.

CONFRONTATION 04/27/95 KIGALI GR

WHILE INVESTIGATING AN ACCIDENT BETWEEN A UNAMIR VEHICLE AND A BICYCLE, THE MILITARY POLICE PATROL WAS THREATENED BY ONE OF THE ONLOOKERS WHO HAD A PISTOL. THE PERSON CLAIMED TO BE AN RPA SECURITY OFFICER. WHEN THE POLICE TRIED TO TAKE THE CYCLIST TO THEIR STATION, THE CROWD THREW STONES.

ROBBERY 04/27/95 KIGALI GR

FOUR PERSONS DRIVING WHAT APPEARED TO BE A UNAMIR LANDCRUISER CAME TO MILITARY STAFF RESIDENCE. THE INTRUDERS ATTEMPTED TO FORCE THEIR WAY IN BUT WERE DISUADED WHEN ONE OF THE OCCUPANTS FIRED THREE WARNING SHOTS.

ARMED ROBBERY 04/27/95 KIGALI GR

A MAN DRESSED IN CIVILIAN CLOTHING POINTED A RIFLE AT UN VEHICLE CARRYING MILOBS HOWEVER THE VEHICLE SPED OFF WITHOUT STOPPING.

ARMED ROBBERY 04/28/95 KIBUYE GR

A WFP TRUCK DRIVEN BY A LOCAL EMPLOYEE WAS IMPOUNDED BY THE RPA SOLDIERS AT GUNPOINT.

ARMED ROBBERY 04/30/95 KIBUYE GR 2772

A SWISS DISASTER AGENCY VEHICLE WAS STOLEN BY ARMED RPA SOLDIERS. THE VEHICLE WAS RETURNED BY THE RPA.

ARMED ROBBERY 04/30/95 BUTABE GR 7111

UNIFORMED MEN, BELIEVED TO BE RPA TROOPS, SEIZED A CARE AUSATRALIA VEHICLE, AT GUN POINT.

CONFRONTATION 05/02/95 NGARAMA GR 2629

THE RPA MOUNTED ROADBLOCKS AROUND THE NIBATT POSITION IN NGARAMA AND REPORTEDLY FIRED A SHOT WHEN NIBATT REFUSED TO ALLOW RPA TO TAKE THREE BROWN AND ROOT LOCAL EMPLOYEES WHO WERE SEEKING SHELTER IN THE POSITION. THE RPA ALSO CLAIMED THAT THEY WOULD ATTACK IF THEIR DEMANDS WERE NOT MET.

ROBBERY 05/02/95 SECTOR 4A GR

RPA SEIZED A MOTOROLA RADIO FROM THE NGO "GOAL".

THREATS 05/03/95 GITARAMA GR

THE RPA THREATENED TO ARREST THE BISHOP OF GITARAMA FOR ALLEGEDLY NOT TELLING THE LOCAL RPA SECURITY OFFICER WHERE A FEMALE EMPLOYEE OF THE DIOSESE COULD BE LOCATED.

ARMED ROBBERY 05/03/95 GISENYI GR

SEVEN ARMED MEN IN UNIFORM ROBBED THE (NGO) MSF - B HEALTH CENTRE AND STOLE AN UNSPECIFIED AMOUNT OF MONEY AND PERSONNEL EFFECTS.

THREAT 05/03/95 RUGENGE GR 079854

A UNHCR VEHICLE WAS THREATENED BY A ARMED PERSON.

ARMED ROBBERY 05/05/95 KIGALI

AT THE (NGO) GOAL OFFICE BANDITS ROBBED TWO LOCALLY HIRED WATCHMEN OF MONEY, WATCH AND CLOTHING. THE BANDITS DID NOT ENTER THE HOUSE AS AN RPA PTL HAD REACHED THAT LOC AND SHOTS WERE EXCHANGED.

ARMED ROBBERY 05/06/95 KIGALI GR 0783

A UNAMIR VEHICLE WAS STOLEN AT GUNPOINT.

ARMED ROBBERY 05/07/95 BUTABE GR 7111

TWO ARMED MEN ATTEMPTED TO STEAL A CAR FROM A HUMAN RIGHTS.

ARMED ROBBERY 05/07/95 KIGALI GR 0783

SIX ARMED RPA SOLDIERS ATTEMPTED TO HIJACK A UNAMIR VEHICLE.

ARMED ASSAULT 05/07/95 KIGALI GR 0783

THREE ARMED MEN, BELIEVED TO BE RPA, FORCABLY ENTERED THE CARTIAS INTERNATIONAL (NGO) RESIDENCE, ASSAULTED THE OCCUPANTS, RANSACKED THE HOUSE AND ONE MAN ATTEMPTED TO RAPE THE A FEMALE.

ARMED ROBBERY 05/07/95 KIGALI GR 0783

FIVE ARMED RPA SOLDIERS ATTEMPTED TO HIJACK A UNAMIR VEHICLE.

ARMED ROBBERY 05/07/95 KIGALI GR 0783

TEN RPA SOLDIERS HIJACKED TWO UNAMIR VEHICLES AT GUNPOINT AND WHEN MILITARY POLICE PATROLS ARRIVED, THE PATROLS WERE HELD AT GUNPOINT. THE SITUATION WAS RESOLVED WITH A SECTION OF INFANTRY.

ASSAULT 05/07/95 KIGALI GR

THE DEPUTY SUPERINDENT OF UN CIVILIAN POLICE WAS ARRESTED AT A DISCO BY THE GENDARMERIE FOR ALLEGEDLY SMOLING MARIJUANA. WHILE IN DETENTION HE WAS ALLEGEDLY BEATEN AND HAD MONEY AND HIS WATCH STOLEN.

ARMED ROBBERY 05/08/95 KIGALI GR 0783

THREE ARMED MEN DRESSED IN MILITARY CLOTHING ENTERED THE UNHCR COMPOUND AND AT GUNPOINT STOLE A DIESEL GENERATOR.

ROBBERY 05/10/95 KIGALI GR 0783

SIX MEN, BELIEVED TO BE RPA SOLDIERS, ATTEMPTED TO FORCABLY ENTER A FIELD SERVICES EMPLOYEE'S RESIDENCE. THE THIEVES WERE SCARED OFF BY A UN POLICE PATROL.

ARMED ROBBERY 05/11/95 BUTARE GR 7111

TWO ARMED MEN DRESSED IN RPA UNIFORMS ROBBED THE NGO "INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL CORPS" PERSONNEL OF THEIR MONEY, ESTIMATED AT 1,160,000 RWANDAN FRANCS AND \$1300 US.

CONFRONTATION 05/12/95 GOMA ZAIRE GR

THREE UNHCR OFFICERS WERE ILLEGALLY DETAINED BY THE RPA AT THE GOMA BORDER FOR REPORTEDLY BRINGING ILLEGAL/ OBJECTIONABLE DOCUMENTATION INTO RWANDA FROM ZAIRE.

ARMED ROBBERY 05/12/95 KIGALI GR 0783

TWO MEN ARMED WITH KNIVES ENTERED THE RESIDENCE OF THE NGO "WORLD WIDE CARE", TIED UP THE ONLY PERSON THERE AND ESCAPED WITH \$150.00.

ARMED ROBBERY 05/12/95 KIGALI GR 0783

TWO ARMED MEN IN MILITARY CLOTHING AND ANOTHER IN CIVILIAN CLOTHING HELD THE OCCUPANT OF THE NGO "MSF-BELGIUM" AT GUNPOINT AND ESCAPED WITH US\$150 AND 20,000 RWANDAN FRANCS.

ARMED ROBBERY 05/15/95 GITARAMA GR 7370

A UNAMIR VEHICLE STOLEN AT GUN BY THREE ARMED RPA SOLDIERS.

ARMED ROBBERY 05/17/95 KIGALI GR 0783

FOUR MEN DRESSED IN RPA UNIFORM ENTERED THE RESIDENCE OF THE NGO "CHRISTIAN AID" AND STOLE A MOTOROLA RADIO.

CONFRONTATION 05/18/95 BUTARE GR 7111

UNIDENTIFIED PEOPLE THREW STONES AT A UNAMIR VEHICLE DRIVING DOWN THE ROAD.

HARASSMENT 05/21/95 KARAMBO GR 4634

RPA SOLDIERS HARRASSED UNICEF PERSONNEL WHO WERE DISTRIBUTING RELIEF FOOD. RPA DEMANDED A SHARE OF THE FOOD BEING DISTRIBUTED.

CONFRONTATION 05/23/95 KIBEHO GR 5007

A UNAMIR VEHICLE WAS STONED BY PEOPLE WHO SHOUTED "MINUAR GO HOME".

ROBBERY 05/23/95 KIGALI © GR 0783

AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF PERSONS DRESSED IN RPA MILITARY UNIFORMS ATTEMPTED TO FORCE ENTRY INTO THE RESIDENCE OF THE NGO "ARME DE SALUTE". THE ATTACKERS FLED UPON DISCOVERING THERE WAS A GROUP OF PEOPLE IN THE RESIDENCE.

ARMED ROBBERY 05/28/95 KIGALI GR 0783

A UNAMIR VEHICLE WAS TAKEN AT GUN POINT BY THREE PEOPLE IN RPA UNIFORM AND ONE IN CIVILIANS.

ARMED ROBBERY 05/29/95 KAMEMBE GR 7823

A MEMBER OF THE NGO "MEDICINS DU MONDE" WAS STOPPED BY FIVE ARMED CIVILIANS. AFTER A SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE, THE VICTIM WAS FORCED OUT OF THE VEHICLE AT GUNPOINT. HE FLED WHILE THE THIEVES FLED WITH THE VEHICLE.

HARASSMENT 06/01/95 BUGARAMA GR 9907

THE STAFF OF THE NGO "MEDICINS DU MONDE" COMPLAINED OF CONTINUOUS HARASSMENT AT THEIR HOSPITAL BY RPA SOLDIERS.

ARMED ROBBERY 06/01/95 KIGALI GR 0783

TWO RPA SOLDIERS AND ONE PERSON DRESSED IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES ATTEMPTED TO STEAL A PARKED UN MILITARY POLICE VEHICLE. THE PERSON IN CIVILIAN CLOTHING JUMPED INTO THE VEHICLE AND ATTEMPTED TO DRIVE AWAY BUT WAS APREHENDED BY THE MILITARY POLICE.

ARMED ROBBERY 06/01/95 KIGALI GR 0783

THREE ARMED PERSONS, ONE IN RPA UNIFORM, HIJACKED A UNDP VEHICLE AT GUNPOINT.

EXTORTION 06/02/95 RUSUMO GR 7549

FOUR RPA SOLDIERS EXTORTED RFW 5000 FROM AN EXATRIATE STAFF MEMBER OF THE NGO "AEF".

ARMED ROBBERY 06/03/95 KIGALI GR 0783

A UN VEHICLE WAS HIJACKED BY A ARMED MAN DRESSED IN CIVILIAN CLOTHING. THE MAN KNOCKED ON THE WINDOW WITH A PISTOL AND

WHEN THE DRIVER STEPPED OUT OF THE VEHICLE, A SECOND PERSON, IN MILITARY UNIFORM ARMED WITH AN AK-47, POINTED THE WEAPON AT HIM.

ROBBERY 06/08/95 REMERA

RPA SOLDIERS AT A CHECKPOINT ATTEMPTED TO SEIZE A VEHICLE FROM THE NGO "BELGIUM RED CROSS" CLAIMING THAT THE VEHICLE WAS FOR THEIR SENIOR OFFICER. THE MILITARY POLICE INTERVENED AND THE VEHICLE WAS RECOVERED.

ARMED ROBBERY 06/08/95 GITARAMA

FIVE ARMED MEN DRESSED IN MILITARY CLOTHING STOLE A UNAMIR VEHICLE.

ARMED ROBBERY 06/10/95 KIGALI

TWO ARMED MEN IN MILITARY UNIFORMS AND ONE IN CIVILIAN DRESS STOLE A VEHICLE FROM THE NGO "SAVE THE CHILDREN" AT GUNPOINT.

ARMED ROBBERY 06/11/95 NTONGWE

AN UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF ARMED MEN IN RPA UNIFORMS STOLE A UNAMIR VEHICLE AT GUNPOINT.

ARMED ROBBERY 06/12/95 KIGALI

THREE ARMED MEN DRESSED IN RPA UNIFORMS AND ONE ARMED MAN IN CIVILIAN CLOTHING STOLE A UNAMIR VEHICLE AT GUNPOINT.