AMIR

G3 OPERATIONS / PLANS

WITHDRAWL

[1 NOV 1994] - 30 NOV 1995

UNCLASSIFIED

EL/WG JUNE 2009

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

UN ARCHIVES
SERIES S-1062
BOX 147
FILE 1
ACC. 1998/0283

WITHDRAWAL/SEPLDYNENI

1	2

2.

WITHDRAWAL/DEPLOYMENT

1	2	3

02

PLANS 2

01/12

To : OCISS
CPCIU
CPO
CBMES
CCO
CGEN
CMIS
CMCC
G4 Log
[redacted]
SO Maint
SO Accn
SO Sup
SO Tpt/Mov
FEO
Tech Gen Unit
Claims Asst
DCO 95 CMSG

From : Force Signal Officer

Info : DCOS Sp
CISS

Date : 30 Nov 95

Subject : **LIQUIDATION PROCESS ASSET MANAGEMENT WORKING GROUP**

1. Please refer to our letter dated 28 Nov 95 and meeting on 29 Nov 95.

2. A meeting on the Working Group will be held at 0900 hrs on 01 Dec 95 at Conference Room at Force HQ, Amohoro Hotel. Due to paucity of time all are requested to ensure their attendance.

3. As discussed in the meeting on 29 Nov 95, outputs of the Working Group Teams were expected by 1200 hrs on 30 Nov 95. However despite repeated telephonic reminders also the following have not submitted their reports :-

a. CMIS.
b. CGEN.

4. It will be appreciated that despite repeated reminders, if participants do not respond, it will be difficult for the Working Group to meet the deadline set by G3 Plans to compile a viable Asset Management Working Group Instruction. CMIS and CGEN are requested to bring their details positively fo the conference on 01 Dec 95.

5. Best regards.

(AV Malhotra)
Major
FSO

G13 OPS (Incl DCOS OP

TO : ALL MILITARY STAFF (FORCE HQ)

FM : CAMP COMMANDANT

DATE : 10 NOV 95

SUBJECT : MATERIAL FOR PACKING,CRATING AND PELLETIZING

1. Please refer to CAO's letter on the above subject dated 23 Oct 95. (Copy att)

2. I have been tasked by the CMPO to consolidate the requirement for the military staff at the Force HQ. May I thus request the office bearer/secretaries to kindly fwd their respective requirement by 13 Nov 95 to this office.

3. Kindly note that the items to be packed would basically include important files/documents to be sent to UNHQ New York for their records.

4. Thank you.

Dewgun

CS Dewgun
Capt
Camp Commandant
Phone : 11256

G3 PLAN

Pse action this on behalf of the Branch

12/11

Please forward your requirements

17/11

16/11

G3 Ops

G2 Info

G3 Plans

G3 Avi

FEO

United Nations Nations Unies

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

Date : October 23, 1995

To : All Chiefs of Sections/Heads of Units

From : Susan Matthew
Chief Administrative Officer

Subject : Materials for Packing, Crating & Palletizing

As we near the possible closure of the UNAMIR mission, we should evaluate our requirement for packing materials, i.e. plywood, lumber, bubblewrap, and cardboard boxes. In order to adequately meet such requirements, we are requesting all concerned Sections/Units to detail their requirements and forward them to the Chief of Building Management Services, Trafipro by 30 October 1995. Your information must include project, kind of materials required, detailed and accurate description & specifications of materials (quality, sizes/dimensions, etc.), and quantity, using the attached form. It will also be appreciated if you could indicate the number of days/weeks prior to shipment that the materials must be received by you.

cc: Mr. William Clive
Chief, Integrated Support Services

Mr. Minas Lessanu
Chief, Building Management Services

00155

SECTION DATE

PROJECT	Type of material required (sizes, & any other detailed specifications)	UNIT	QTY	Date materials required	YES/NO Construction By BMS Required

SECTION DATE

PROJECT	Type of material required (sizes, & any other detailed specifications)	UNIT	QTY	Date materials required	YES/NO Construction By BMS Required
G3 A.R	4 x 3 x 3 carton	1	1	D+60	No
	FILE Boxes UN Std Size		4	"	No
	Sealing Tape		2	"	No
G3 Plans	File Boxes 0.75M X 0.75X0.9M	1	3	D+50	NO
	Locks	-	3	-do-	NO
G3 ops	File Boxes 0.75mx				
	75 X 09M	1	9	D+60	
FEO	Box 0.75 X 0.75 X 0.9M	-	1	-	NO

G13 OPS (Incl DCOS OP

TO : ALL MILITARY STAFF (FORCE HQ)

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DATE : 10 NOV 95

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Dewgun

CS Dewgun
Capt
Camp Commandant
Phone : 11256

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Pse action this on behalf of the Branch

12/11

Please forward your requirements

16/11

G3 Ops

G2 Info

G3 Plans

G3 Air

FEO

United Nations Nations Unies

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cc: Mr. William Clive
Chief, Integrated Support Services

Mr. Minas Lessanu
Chief, Building Management Services

00155

SECTION _____ DATE _____

PROJECT	Type of material required (sizes, & any other detailed specifications)	UNIT	QTY	Date materials required	YES/NO Construction By BMS Required

Appx E
refers to letter NO
1000.5 dated 15 NOV 95

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

20/11

MEMORANDUM

4001.1(FEO)/OPS/-1

FROM: Maj S Agrawal
G3 Engrs/FEO

TO: Camp Commandant, HQ UNAMIR

DATE: 15 Nov 95

SUBJECT: REQUIREMENT OF PACKING MATERIAL FOR OFFICE OF FEO

1. Reference your letter on the subject.

2. There is a requirement of one box approximately 0.75m x 0.75m x 0.9m for carriage of files of this office.

①

20/11

From : Force Signal Officer

To : DCOS OPS

File No 101/Ind Sigs/Comm

Date : 17 Nov 95

Subject **LIQUIDATION STAFF PLANNING DIRECTIVE**

1. Refer your letter dated 08 Nov 95.

2. Communication Liquidation Schedule as asked vide your letter quoted above is forwarded herewith as desired.

3. Best regards.

(Rajeev Ohri)
Capt
Ops Offr
for Force Signal Officer

Enclosure : Seven only.

② Seen
18/11

PB
Done
20/11

③ G3 Plans

1. Pse compile it with the rest of our Sy Instruction.

2. We should submit our Instns to the HT on 20 Nov 95

18/11

COMMUNICATION LIQUIDATION PLAN

General

1. In order to ensure a smooth liquidation it is imperative to provide infalliable and reliable communication during all stages of evacuation. It is necessary to keep all the coordinating agencies in constant communications with each other till the last phase.

Communication Planning

2. The following underlying principles have been taken into consideration :

   a. One sector is evacuated at any given time.

   b. No overlapping of sector evacuation.

   c. Following comms support will be provided to the Sector HQ during evacuation:

      i. VHF Radio;

      ii. HF Radio;

      iii. INMARSAT-C (Hard Copy).

   d. No telephone facility will be provided except RwandaTel (if existing).

3. A total of three mobile comm dets self contained for 10 days will be created by Force Sig Coy for evacuation duties. The composition of the mobile det is given as per Appx A.

4. The mobile det will reach the sector under evacuation as per the liquidation schedule and releive the static comms det. The details of the sequence of events are given in the communication liquidation schedule at Appx B.

5. The comms eqpt in various sectors will be closed down by the Fd Svcs in coordination with the Force Signals.

6. The security for the Fd Svc technicians and Signal Operators will be the responsibility of the respective contingent.

7. Since security for the FM transmitter and radio repeaters at Mt Karongi is imperative there will be a requirement of providing a replacement to the security guard of Nicoy after their withdrawl. This aspect needs to be ensured by G3.

8. The mobile det will fall back alongwith the rear party convoy of the evacuating sector.

Appx A

COMPOSITION OF MOBILE DET (DCM TOYOTA BASED)

1. **Pers**

   a. 1 x JCO

   b. 3 x OR

2. **Comms Eqpt**

   a. INMARSAT - A/M

   b. INMARSAT - C

   c. RS HC (Simplex RTT)

   d. RS HB

   e. VHF Motorola Base Station

   f. Bty 12V qty 6

   g. Bty charger 500 W

3. **Adm eqpt**

   a. Diesel

   b. Tentage

   c. Rations for 10 days

   d. Water for 10 days

   e. Stove (with kerosene)

   f. Pers bedding and eqpt.

Appx B

COMMUNICATION LIQUIDATION SCHEDULE

	Satl	VHF	Rural Shoots	Land Lines	Remarks
D to D+30					1. Coord with Fd Svc. 2. Preparation of mobile comms det. 3. Coord with 95 CMSG, the requirement of heavy vehs and cranes for mov of comms eqpt. 4. Prepare packing mtrl for comms. 5. Coord with CHU the requirement of heptrs.
D+31					1. Mob det 1 est comms at Gikongoro.
D+32		1. Close VHF comms in Butare/ Gikongoro. 2. Packing of comms eqpt. 3. Close down comms at Wksp in Butare. 4. Close down rptr at Mt Huye.	1. Close down Butare-Gikongoro link.		
D+33		1. Close down VHF comms in Gikongoro and mov to Kigali alongwith adv party of Malicoy.	1. Mov from Gikongoro to Kigali alongwith adv party of Malicoy.		
D+34	1. Dismantle VSAT at Gikongoro.	1. Pack eqpt in Kigali.			
D+35	1. Dismantle VSAT at Gikongoro.				1. Mob det 2 to est comms at Kibungo.
D+36	1. Mov VSAT from Gikongoro to Kigali alongwith rear party of Malicoy.				1. Mob det 1 to mov back to Kigali from Gikongoro alongwith rear party. 2. Instruct RwandaTel to remove tele extn at Butare.

D+37		1. Mov Team 1 to Byumba. 2. Team 2 to Kibungo. 3. Close VHF comms at Byumba and move back to Kigali alongwith UNOE.	1. Close down Kigali-Byumba link and mov back to Kigali alongwith main convoy.	
D+38	1. Dismantle VSAT at Kibungo.	1. Close VHF comms at Kibungo and mov back alongwith adv party of Ghancoy.		
D+39	1. Dismantle VSAT at Kibungo.	1. Mov Team 1 to Kibuye.	1. Mov Team 1 to Kibuye.	1. Mob det 3 est comms at Kibuye.
D+40	1. Mov VSAT from Kibungo to Kigali alongwith UNOE convoy.	1. Close down VHF comms at Kibuye by Team 1. 2. Mov Team 2 to Gisenyi and close down VHF comms. 3. Team 2 mov to Ruhengiri.	1. Close down Kibuye-Gisenyi link. 2. Mov Team 2 to Gisenyi and close rural shoot at Gisenyi.	1. Mob det 1 to est comms at Nyundo.
D+41	1. Reach Kibuye. 2. Dismantle VSAT at Kibuye.	1. Mov of Team 1 from Kibuye to Kigali alongwith main convoy. 2. Team 2 to close down VHF comms at Ruhengiri and mov to Kigali with main convoy.	1. Mov of Team 1 from Kibuye to Kigali alongwith main convoy. 2. Mov of Team 2 from Gisenyi to Kigali alongwith main convoy.	1. Mob det 2 to mov back to Kigali from Kibungo alongwith rear party convoy of Ghancoy-1.
D+42	1. Dismantle VSAT at Kibuye.	1. Team 2 to close down VHF comms at Nyundo.		
D+43	1. Mov VSAT from Kibuye to Kigali alongwith rear party convoy.	1. Team 2 to mov back from Nyundo to Kigali alongwith adv party of Nicoy.		1. Instruct RwandaTel to remove tele ext at Gisenyi and Ruhengiri. *2. Provide replacement of Nicoy guard at Mt Karongi. 3. Mob det 3 mov back from Kibuye alongwith rear party convoy.
D+44	1. Dismantle VSAT at Nyundo.			
D+45	1. Dismantle VSAT at Nyundo.			1. Mob det 2 to est comms at Shagasha.

D+46	1. Bring VSAT from Nyundo to Kigali alongwith rear party of Nicoy.	1. Mov of Team 1 to Shagasha.	1. Mov to Shagasha.		1. Mob det 1 to mov from Nyundo to Kigali with rear party or Nicoy.
D+47		1. Close VHF comms in Shagasha. 2. Reel back land line from prefect Cyangugu - Force Sigs.	1. Close rural shoot Shagasha-Cyangugu.		1. Reel back cable from Prefect Cyangugu.
D+48		1. Close VHF comms in subsector Bugarama and Cyangugu.	1. Mov from Shagasha to Kigali alongwith main convoy from Cyangugu.		
D+49	1. Mov to Shagasha.	1. Close VHF comms at subsector Nyamasheke.			1. Mov det 1 to Gitarama.
D+50	1. Dismantle VSAT at Shagasha.	1. Mov from Cyangugu to Kigali alongwith main body of Malawicoy.			
D+51	1. Dismantle VSAT at Shagasha.				
D+52	1. Bring VSAT from Shagasha to Kigali alongwith rear party of Malawicoy.	1. Close down VHF comms at Gitarama.	1. Close down rural shoot Kigali-Gitarama.	1. Keep tele extn earmarked for shifting of HQs to Trafipro.	1. Reel back cable from Gitarama. 2. Reel back local cable. 3. Provisioning of comms for core group. 4. Mob det 2 to mov from Shagasha to Kigali alongwith rear party of Malawicoy.
D+53	1. Establish VSAT link to NY at Trafipro.	1. Mov back to Kigali alongwith main convoy.	1. Mov back to Kigali alongwith main convoy.		1. Mov of det 1 from Gitarama to Kigali alongwith rear party convoy.
D+54					
D+55		1. Mov to Mt Karongi. 2. Close down VHF comms at Mt Karongi.			

D+56	1. Activate VSAT link to NY from Trafipro. 2. INMARSAT-M and C to be standby.	1. Close down VHF comms at Mt Karongi. 2. Mov back to Kigali.			
D+57					
D+58		1. Established rptrs for VHF comm at Trafipro for following ch - 8,11,			
D+59					
D+60		1. Close down VHF comms at Engr Coy.	1. Close down rural shoot from Mt Rebeiro to Engr Coy.		
D+61		1. Close down VHF comms at Sig Coy.	1. Close down rural shoot from Amohoro - Log Base.		
D+62	1. Close down all VSAT links at Amohoro bldg.	1. Close down VHF comms at Ghancoy-2. 2. Close down VHF comms at Amohoro Bldg.		1. Close down exch at Amohoro Bldg.	1. Instruct RwandaTel to close down RwandaTel tele extn to Amohoro bldg.
D+63		1. Close down VHF comms of INDBATT (elements). 2. Close down VHF comms at CHU.	1. Close down rural shoot to CHU. 2. Provide tele connection (main) and 95 CMSG from Trafipro.		
D+64			1. Close down all rural shoots at Amohoro Bldg. 2. Close down Mt Rebeiro.		
D+65 to D+70					

D+71		1. Close down VHF comms at NORMED. 2. Close down VHF comms for B&R.	
D+72 to D+93			
D+94	1. Close down VSAT at Trafipro.	1. Close down VHF comms at 95 CMSG. 2. Close down VHF comms of INDBATT (main).	1. Comm to NY to be only on INMARSAT-M and C. 2. Close all comms at Trafipro.
D+95 to D+97			
D+98		1. Close down VHF comms of core group.	

02

G3 PLANS 1
2
11/11

TO : ALL MILITARY STAFF (FORCE HQ)

FM : CAMP COMMANDANT

DATE : 10 NOV 95

SUBJECT : MATERIAL FOR PACKING,CRATING AND PELLETIZING

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2. I have been tasked by the CMPO to consolidate the requirement for the military staff at the Force HQ. May I thus request the office bearer/secretaries to kindly fwd their respective requirement by 13 Nov 95 to this office.

3. Kindly note that the items to be packed would basically include important files/documents to be sent to UNHQ New York for their records.

4. Thank you.

Dewgun

CS Dewgun
Capt
Camp Commandant
Phone : 11256

United Nations Nations Unies

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

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Chief Administrative Officer

Subject : Materials for Packing, Crating & Palletizing

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Chief, Integrated Support Services

Mr. Minas Lessanu
Chief, Building Management Services

0G155

SECTION DATE

PROJECT	Type of material required (sizes, & any other detailed specifications)	UNIT	QTY	Date materials required	YES/NO Construction By BMS Required

02

Plans 2

9/11

UNITED NATIONS **NATIONS UNIES**

ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA — MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

FROM	:	**DCOS OPS**
TO	:	**G 3 PLANS**
	:	**G 3 OPS**
	:	**G 3 ENGRS**
	:	**G 3 AIR**
	:	**FSO**
DATE	:	**08 Nov 95**
SUBJECT	:	**LIQUIDATION STAFF PLANNING DIRECTIVE**

1. Please find attached the necessary extracts of the 'Liquidation Staff Planning Directive'. You are required to submit your portions to this office by 16 Nov 95.

2. Clarification, if any, should be addressed to Maj P K Malik, SO Plans.

(c) Organize the return/deployment of COE/UNOE vehicle assets;

(d) Coordinate the movement of COE/UNOE within Rwanda;

(e) Arrange/manage contractor movement of COE/UNOE;

(f) Coordinate the movement of military/civilian staff within Rwanda;

(g) Arrange/manage repatriation of military/civilian staff; and

(h) Process COE/UNOE/Pax customs clearances.

(2) Participants. OCISS, SO PLANS, G4 LOG, G3 PLANS, SO TPT/MOV, SO MAINT, G1, BRSC, CMC, CITMM, CCPO, CFO, CPO. **Co-Chairmen CO 95 CMSG and C MOV CON.**

f. DCOS Ops. Based on LTF direction, DCOS Ops will provide the fol ops input into the OSLI:

(1) G3 Ops.

(a) An assessment of the security concerns during the process of liquidating the mission;

(b) Security arrangements in the sectors while each sector is closing down. A security team consisting of approx one section is to be dispatched during the last stages so as to enable all contingent personnel to carry out their various closure responsibilities. This team will only be responsible for perimeter security until all accommodations have been handed over;

(c) Prepare the schedule for the close down of various security posts in accordance with (IAW) the closure plan;

(d) Provision of security for KIA;

(e) Provision of security for materiel being brought back from all liquidation activities;

(f) Provision of security arrangements for key activities and locations within Kigali including materiel consolidation areas and for the movement of critical materiel during all phases. These will be lucrative targets and may cover large areas which will reqr effective security;

(g) Maintenance of a force level reserve during the period of the liquidation in the form of an RRF;

(h) Maintain the duty ops centre with duty officers drawn from the DCOS Ops and DCOS Sp Branches, until the Core Gp moves to Trafipro during phase 3;

(2) G3 Air. **Provide helicopter support for Phases 1 and 2 until such a time as the CHU ceases ops and subsequently transfer to the Ops Centre as the senior duty officer;**

(3) **FEO**. Plan for and execute the destruction of materiel and the provision of engr sp on an as reqr basis; and

(4) **G3 Plans**. Prepare instructions for the implementation of a contingency security evacuation plan. Also provide SO PLANS to be a member of the LT and Liquidation Cell (LC).

(5) **FSO / CCO**. Develop the Force Signals plan in support of the liquidation to address the fol specific concerns:

(a) Provision of continued comms sp until the last UNAMIR elms are repatriated;

(b) develop the comms liquidation plan IAW the schedule laid out at Annex A, and

(c) Provide input to the OSLI for all signals related matters.

g. **DCOS Sp / CISS**. Based on LTF direction, provide the necessary support input to the OSLI as follows:

(1) Based upon the Concept of Ops, define the sp requirement;

(2) Co-chair the LT;

(3) Ensure during all liquidation phases the sustainability of UNAMIR;

(4) Monitor the preparation of the OSLI;

(5) Monitor and provide advice as reqr on the implementation of the liquidation plan for all admin sp reqr. Provide input to the OSLI for all CAO related matters;

(6) Identify funding sources for the provision of this liquidation plan.

(7) Ensure that provisions to allow financial resources are allocated as a priority to the core liquidation group;

(8) Monitor during the implementation phase the management of O & M costs, and

(9) Provide the G4 LOG and Ops O ISS to be members of the LT and LC

h. **G4**.

(1) Develop and coord the sp portion of the OSLI to include roles & tasks;

(2) Coord with the G4, G1 and FMO staff to obtain their portion of the OSLI; and

(3) Monitor and coord liquidation activity as it relates to the G4 portion of the liquidation;

02

Plans 2

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

KIGALI RWANDA

ROUTINE/PRIORITY/IMMEDIATE/MOST IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED/RESTRICTED/CONFIDENTIAL/ONLY/CRYPTO

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

FAX OUT NO.:

TO: OFFR COMMANDING GHANBATT SECT 2 MR M. MOLATTE CPCO TRAFIPRO	FROM: JAN MCMILLAN CHIEF MOVEMENT COORDINATION CENTRE HQ UNAMIR KIGALI
PREFIX NO.:	DATE: 26 OCT 95
ATTN: LOG OFFR	FAX NO: 111 00 PHONE: 111 00
FAX NO:	FILE NO: MCC/GHAN-611/JM
INFO:	DRAFTER: JAN MCMILLAN TITLE: CMCC
Int Dist: FC,CAO,CISS,G3 PLANS,DCOS SPT,CMOVCON,PCIU	
SUBJECT: REPATRIATION OF GHANBATT CONTAINERS	
REFERENCE A: GH3/067/Q DATED 23 OCT 95	

REPATRIATION OF CONTAINERS

1. THE MCC IS IN RECEIPT OF PACKING LISTS FOR 10 X 20' ISO CONTAINERS. THE CONTAINERS WERE STUFFED WITHOUT PCIU OR MCC SUPERVISION. THE UN IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR MOVING A NUMBER OF ITEMS LISTED IN THE CONTAINERS IE: EMPTY BEER BOTTLES.

2. ALL CONTAINERS MUST BE DE-STUFFED SO AS ALL ITEMS FOR MOVEMENT CAN BE APPROVED. PCIU AND MCC REPS WILL VISIT YOUR LOC ON MON 30 OCT 95 IN ORDER TO MONITOR THE RE-STUFFING OF THE CONTAINERS.

3. AS PREVIOUSLY ADVISED ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS YOUR UNIT WAS REQUESTED TO SUBMIT DPDS SO AS THE MCC AND PCIU COULD CLEAR THE ITEMS FOR MOVEMENT. YOUR UNIT WAS ALSO ADVISED THAT SHOULD THE ITEMS BE LIMITED IN BOTH BULK AND WEIGHT, THEN THE MCC WOULD CONSIDER AIRLIFTING THE ITEMS TO ACCRA. DUE TO LACK OF INFORMATION AND CLEARANCES OF CARGO NO ITEMS CAN BE MOVED AT THIS STAGE.

4. YOU ARE REQUESTED TO ACTION THE DE-STUFFING OF THE CONTAINERS SO AS RE-STUFFING CAN OCCUR ON MON. ETA OF TEAM WILL BE ADVISED AS SOON AS KNOWN.

5. REGARDS JAN.

04

1076/UN/W/ 7 /G

21 Oct 95

From : Force Engr Coy

To : DCOS OPS

Subject : PREP AND CONTAINERISATION OF STORES

1. Please refer your letter No 3000.18(OPS) dated 18 Oct 95.

2. Please clarify which all items will form part of first line of combat supplies/stores and eqpt. The information can be provided after the clarification is provided.

(Devendra Singh)
Capt
2IC
for OC

G3 OPS/PLANS

1. Pse sort this out

27/10

~~Please~~ G3 Ops

1. Please clarify
2. Is there a concept of Front line sup/stores?

02

Plans 1

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA — MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

KIGALI RWANDA

ROUTINE/PRIORITY/IMMEDIATE/MOST IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED/RESTRICTED/CONFIDENTIAL/ONLY/CRYPTO

FAX OUT NO.:

TO: OFFR COMMANDING GHANBATT SECT 2 MR M. MOLATTE CPCO TRAFIPRO	FROM: JAN MCMILLAN CHIEF MOVEMENT COORDINATION CENTRE HQ UNAMIR KIGALI
PREFIX NO.:	DATE: 26 OCT 95
ATTN: LOG OFFR	FAX NO: 111 00 PHONE: 111 00
FAX NO:	FILE NO: MCC/GHAN-611/JM
INFO:	DRAFTER: JAN MCMILLAN TITLE: CMCC
Int Dist: FC,CAO,CISS,[redacted],DCOS SPT,CMOVCON,PCIU	
SUBJECT: REPATRIATION OF GHANBATT CONTAINERS	
REFERENCE A: MCC/GHAN-612/JM DATED 26 OCT 95	

REPATRIATION OF CONTAINERS

1. VIDE REF A, YOUR UNIT WAS ADVISED THAT MOVEMENT OF CONTAINERS BACK TO GHANA COULD NOT BE ACTIONED UNTIL ALL EQUIP WAS CLEARED FOR MOVEMENT BY PCIU AND THE MCC.

2. MCC AND PCIU REPS WILL NOW VISIT YOUR UNIT ON WED 01 NOV 95, TIMINGS TO BE ADVISED.

3. YOU ARE REQUESTED TO HAVE ALL CONTAINERS OPENED AND READY FOR INSPECTION. MCC WILL THEN ADVISE WHICH CONTAINERS WILL NOT BE MOVED AND THOSE WHICH ARE TO BE DE-STUFFED AND CHECKED

4. FOR YOUR ACTION. REGARDS JAN.

WITHDRAWAL FILE

Plans 2

1076/UN/W/4 /G 18 Oct 95

From : Force Engr Coy

To : A/G3 Plans

Subject : **STATE OF CONTINGENT ARMS AND AMMUNITION**

1. Reference your letter No 5000.2(Plans) dated 12 Oct 95.

2. The information as asked for vide your letter under reference in respect of following is furnished as per appendices 'A' and 'B' attached :-

(a) Details of ammunition as per appendix 'A'.

(b) Details of arms as per appendix 'B'.

(Devendra Singh)
Capt
2IC
for OC

Enclosures : (Two only)

Appendix 'A' to Force Engr Coy letter No 1076/4M1 W/ 4 IG dt 18 Oct 95

DETAILS OF AMMUNITION

S/No	Nomenclature	A/U	Qty	Number of carrier	Weight of each carrier	Total Weight	Size of each carrier
1.	Carts SA 7.62 mm BDR	Nos	14720	09	62.000	558.000	70cm x 30cm x 22 cm
2.	Carts SA 7.62 mm CTN	Nos	12072	06	74.000	444.000	70cm x 30cm x 22 cm
3.	Carts SA 9 mm Ball	Nos	7525	02	77.000	154.000	70cm x 30cm x 22 cm
4.	Carts SA 7.62mm TRACER	Nos	840	01	22.000	22.000	42cm x 35cm x 20 cm
5.	Carts of 84 mm ILL,HE, HEAT	Nos	12	02	35.000	70.000	78cm x 58cm x 32 cm
6.	Grenade Hand & Rifle	Nos	72	02	38.000	76.000	70cm x 30cm x 22 cm
			Total	22		1324.000	

Appx 'B' to Force Engr Coy letter
No 1076/UN/W/L/G dt 10 Oct 95

DETAILS OF ARMS

Ser No	Nomenclature	A/U	Qty	Weight of each Box (in Kgs)	Number of Box	Total weight (in Kgs)	Size of Box
1.	Rifle 7.62 mm SLR	Nos	144	95.000	12	1140.000	130 x 50 x 33 cm
2.	Rifle 7.62 mm SLR	Nos	04	55.000	01	55.000	130 x 50 x 33 cm
3.	LMG 7.62 mm & Spare Barrel	Nos	07	115.500	01	115.500	132 x 60 x 32 cm
4.	LMG 7.62 mm & Spare Barrel	Nos	06	104.000	01	104.000	132 x 60 x 32 cm
5.	C/M 9 mm	Nos	20	120.000	02	240.000	118 x 58 x 38 cm
6.	RL 84 mm	Nos	01	55 .000	01	55.000	140 x 48 x 30 cm
7.	Pistol Auto 9 mm, Mini Flair, Spare parts, GL Projector			60.000	01	60.000	118 x 58 x 38 cm
8.	Magazine 1A C/M	Nos	126	90.000	01	90.000	130 x 54 x 50 cm
9.	Magazine 2A SLR	Nos	510	165.000	01	165.000	118 x 58 x 38 cm
10.	Magazine 3A LMG	Nos	318	165.000	01	165.000	133 x 51 x 57 cm
11.	LMG Magazine Box	Nos	16	115.000	01	115.000	110 x 63 x 45 cm
12.	LMG Magazine Box	Nos	05	60.000	01	60.000	110 x 63 x 45 cm
13.	Canvas Material	-	-	70.000	01	70.000	140 x 52 x 55 cm
14.	Cleaning material & assy	-	-	60.000	01	60.000	132 x 60 x 32 cm
15.	Trophy (Iron Box)	Nos	03	25.000	01	25.000	80 x 48 x 33 cm
16.	Spare parts and tools	-	-	60.000	01	60.000	80 x 48 x 33 cm
17.	Document Box	Nos	01	30.000	01	30.000	80 x 48 x 33 cm
		Total		-	29	2609.500	

02 WITHDRAWAL FILE

Plans 2

A. 31/10

UNAMIR

1ST BATTALION

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

328/Q

18 Oct 95

From : INDBATT

To : G3 PLANS

Subject : STATE OF CONTINGENT ARMS AND AMMUNITION

1. Refer to your letter No 5000.2 (Plans) dt 12 Oct 95.

2. State of contingent arms and ammunition in respect of INDBATT is attached as per the following Annexures :-

(a) Details of contingent owned arms. - Annexure - I

(b) Details of contingent onwed ammunition - Annexure - II

(c) Summary of weight and sizes of boxes. - Annexure - III

(MK Ajith Kumar)
Major
Offg Logistics Officer
for Offg CO INDBATT

Annexure - I

DETAILS OF CONTINGENT OWNED ARMS

Ser No	Nomenclature	A/U	Qty	Weight (in kgs)	No of boxes	Size of boxes	Weight of boxes (in Kgs)
1	Rifle 7.62mm IAI	Nos	342	1504	17	51"x21"x18"	612
2	Carbine Machine 9mm 1A	"	168	490	15	32"x30"x15"	540
3	Rifle VZ 58	"	18	72	2	34"x30"x15"	40
4	Pistol Auto 9mm	"	30	24	1	20"x24"18"	10
5	Gun Machine 7.62mm IB	"	20	184	20	39"x11"x11"	360
6	Gun Machine 7.62mm (MAG) 2A	"	4	96	4	31"x8"x11"	64
7	84mm RL	"	6	96	6	47"x11"	90
8	51mm Mor	"	6	28	6	32"x10"x8"	96
9	AGL	"	4	168	4	39"x18"x22"	84
10	7.62mm Dragunov Sniper Rifle (SVD)	"	4	72	4	31"x8"x11"	60
	Total			2734	79		1956

Total No of boxes 79

Total weight of arms 2734 Kgs

Total weight of boxes 1956 Kgs

Total weight of arms with boxes 4690 Kgs

Annexure II

DETAILS OF AMMUNITION HELD BY INDBATT

Ser No	Nomenclature	A/U	First line	2nd line	Total quantity	Size of boxes	No of boxes	Weight in Kgs including packing boxes
1	Carts 7.62mm BDR	Nos	68200	29400	97600	25"x8"x14"	60	3784
2	Carts 7.62mm CTN	Nos	24000	11400	35400	25"x8"x14"	15	1180
3	Carts 7.62mm Tracer	Nos	1600	760	2360	25"x8"x14"	1	62
4	Carts 7.62 mm Belted	Nos	24000	12000	36000	16"x8"x13"	38	1594
5	Carts 7.62mm Sniper	Nos	400	200	600	19"x6"x14"	2	22
6	Carts 84mm RL HEAT	Nos	48	24	72	30"x16"x24"	10	408
7	Carts 84mm RL HE	Nos	24	12	36	27"x16"x16"	6	213
8	Carts 84mm RL ILL	Nos	12	6	18	27"x16"x18	3	108
9	Carts 16mm M/F White	Nos	88	22	110			5
10	Carts 16mm M/F Red	Nos	44	11	55	12"x8"x8"	1	5
11	Carts 16mm M/F Green	Nos	44	11	55			5
12	Carts 9mm Ball	Nos	32130	14190	46320	25"x8"x14"	12	793
13	Carts 30mm VOG-17	Nos	1160	464	1624	14"x10"x25"	14	812
14	Bomb 2" Mor HE/51MM Mor HE	Nos	324	180	504		28	1106
15	Bomb 2" Mor ILL	Nos	72	36	108	23"x10"x10"	6	210
16	Bomb 2" Mor Smk	Nos	72	36	108		6	210
17	Gren No 36M Rif	Nos	108	60	168	25"x8"x14"	5	244
18	Ign Set 7 Sec delay	Nos	108	60	108	25"x8"x14"	1	15
19	Gren No 36M Hand	Nos	1200	500	1700	25"x8"x14"	43	2244
20	Ign set 4 Sec delay	Nos	1200	500	1700	25"x8"x14"	4	150

Ser No	Nomenclature	A/U	First line	2nd line	Total quantity	Size of boxes	No of boxes	Weight in Kgs including packing boxes
21	Mine AP Directional (Claymore)	Nos	50	25	75	23"x12"x15"	15	428
22	Firing Device	Nos	25	12	37	23"x12"x15"	1	14
23	Testing Device	Nos	10	5	15	12"x8"x8"	1	2
24	Flare Trip wire	Nos	36		36	31"x8"x16"	6	145
25	Detonator No 27	Nos	632		632	20"x8"x6"	6	60
26	PEK-I	Kgs	19.6		19.6	17"x11"x10"	2	25
27	Safety Fuze No 11	Mtr	816.5		816.5	25"x8"x14"	3	100
28	Coord Detonating Cordtex	Mtr	714		714	18"x10"x11"	1	80
29	GC Dry Primer	Nos	548		548	14"x7"x6"	5	40
30	Tape Adhesive	Mtr	223.5		223.5	23"x10"x10"	1	5
31	Tube Fuze Sealing	Nos	221		221			5
32	Compound Sealing	Kgs	1		1	12"x8"x8"	1	5
33	Det No 33 Elect	Nos	9		9			2
34	Trip Wire 0.32" Dia	Mtr	183		183			5
35	Trip Wire 0.14" Dia	Mtr	183		183			5
36	Candle Smk Ground	Nos	10		10	18"x15"x18"	1	30
37	Carts 7.62mm Blank	Nos	1631		1631	17"x11"x10"	1	20
38	Switch No 4 Pull	Nos	30		30	12"x8"x8"	1	5
39	Carts VZ-58	Nos	14100		14100	19"x6"x14"	10	605

310 Total weight: 14751

Annexure -III

SUMMARY OF WEIGHT AND SIZE OF BOXES

1. Total weight of arms including packing boxes - 4,690 Kgs

2. Total weight of ammunition including packing boxes - 14,751 Kgs

3. No of boxes for arms :-

Ser No	Length		Height		Width	Total Numbers of boxes
(a)	51"	x	21"	x	15"	17 boxes
(b)	32"	x	30"	x	15"	15 "
(c)	34"	x	30"	x	15"	02 "
(d)	20"	x	24"	x	18"	01 "
(e)	39"	x	11"	x	11"	20 "
(f)	31"	x	8"	x	11"	08 "
(g)	47"	x	11"	x	-	06 "
(h)	32"	x	10"	x	8"	06 "
(j)	39"	x	18"	x	22"	04 "

4. No of boxes for ammunitions :-

(a)	25"	x	8"	x	14"	146 "
(b)	16"	x	8"	x	13"	34 "
(c)	24"	x	10"	x	15"	14 "
(d)	19"	x	6"	x	14"	12 "
(e)	23"	x	10"	x	10"	38 "
(f)	24"	x	12"	x	16"	3 "
(g)	24"	x	16"	x	18"	6 "

Ser No	Length		Height		Width	Total Numbers of boxes
(h)	30"	x	16"	x	24"	10 "
(j)	20"	x	8"	x	8"	6 "
(k)	14"	x	7"	x	6"	5 "
(l)	17"	x	11"	x	10"	2 "
(m)	19"	x	14"	x	9"	1 "
(n)	23"	x	12"	x	15"	15 "
(o)	31"	x	8"	x	16"	6 "
(p)	18"	x	10"	x	11"	4 "
(q)	25"	x	8"	x	11"	3 "
(r)	32"	x	13"	x	13"	1 "

WITHDRAWAL

Plans 2 1
2
17/10

FROM : MALAWI COY

TO : A/G3 PLANS

DATE : 15.10.95

SUBJECT : STATE OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION

REF : MEMO NO 5000.2 (PLANS) DATED 12TH OCTOBER, 1995.

1. The above quoted Memo refers.

2. Attached to this letter please find tabulated returnd.

3. Please note that weapons and magazines are to be taken by individuals as personal weapons.

H N MTAMAUKANENA
Captain
For Leg Officer
MALAWI COY

16/10 '95 08:28 ☎11241 SEC 4 MALAWI COY ☑001

MALAWI CONTINGENT - AMMO AND WEAPON RETURNS

S/NO	TYPE OF AMMO	QUANTITY PER BOX	PACKED WEIGHT PER BOX	NO OF PACKED BOXES	MEASUREMENTS OF EACH BOX	TOTAL WEIGHT OF ALL PACKED BOXES
1.	7.62 MM BALL	1000	27.2 KGS	106 : 106,000	35x27x17 CM	2883.2 KGS
2.	7.62 MM BALL	1260	37 KGS	13 16380	42x28x19 CM	481.0 KGS
3.	7.62 MM LINKS	1000	32 KGS	8 ✓ 8000	52x33x25 CM	256.0 KGS
4.	7.62 MM LINKS	200	8 KGS	100 20000	27x8.5x18 CM	800.0 KGS
5.	ROCKET HAND [illegible] FLARES	18 18	6 KGS 12 KGS	1 / 36	52x33x25 CM	12.0 KGS
6.	40 MM CART (M79)	54	19 KGS	2 / 108	52x33x25 CM	38.0 KGS
7.	HAND GRENADE L/2A2	20	35 KGS	3 / 60	53x53x35 CM	105.0 KGS
8.	GRENADE SIGNAL SMOKE	8	12 KGS	7 56	32x29x18 CM	84.0 KGS
9.	1 INCH CART	120	13 KGS	5 600	32x29x18 CM	65.0 KGS
10.	TRIP FLARES	24	22.5 KGS	2 48	27x30x22 CM	45.0 KGS
11.	TRIP FLARES	12	35 KGS	1 / 12	65x25x24 CM	35.0 KGS
12.	83 HAND GRENADE SMOKE	48	22 KGS	3 / 144	62x25x30 CM	66.0 KGS
13.	SIGNAL SMOKE BLUE	24	17 KGS	1 / 24	59x39x18 CM	17.0 KGS
14.	SET PYRO	SET	13.5 KGS	2 / -	60x24x24xCM	27.0 KGS
15.	CHARGE DEMOLITION M 112	30	47 KGS	5 150 kg	36x30x22 CM	235.0 KGS

2/.....

16.	P R B/ T N T	100	28.5 KGS	2	37x31x24 CM	57.0 KGS
17.	FLARE GROUND INDICATING M 71 WITH PORTFILE FRICTION M 73	20	14.5 KGS	1 20	42x24x24 CM	14.5 KGS
18.	7.62 MM MIXED LOOSE	7,018	189.0 KGS	1	115x45x32 CM	189.0 KGS
					TOTAL WEIGHT = 5,409.7 KGS	

WEAPONS

RIFLES FN = 126x4.3374 KGS = 546.5124 KGS

GUN GPMG = 9 x 10.9 KGS = 98.1 KGS

BARREL GPMG = 9x700gm = 6.300 KGS

MAGAZINE FN = 406x255gms = 103.530 KGS

TOTAL WEIGHT OF WEAPONS = 754.4424 KGS

16/10 '95 08:32 ☎11241 SEC 4 MALAWI COY 002

(1) WITHDRAWAL (2) CLOG

~~LOG~~ Gen

1 your info.
2 Maj Arora has a copy

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

FIELD ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS DIVISION
LOGISTICS AND COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

2472

ROUTING
Please
READ
HANDLE
APPROVE
and
FORWARD
RETURN
KEEP OR DISCARD
REVIEW WITH ME
Date
To
From

FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

oing Fax #:	Date: 11 September 1995
SUSAN MATTHEW UNAMIR	From : HOCINE MEDILI DIRECTOR/FALD/DPK
212 963 3090	Fax #: 212 963 2116
ber of transmitted pages: 1	Ref.: SEE BELOW

: DISPOSAL OF MILITARY VEHICLES UNAMIR

ENCES:
FALD FAX MIR-324 DATED 18 AUGUST 1995 (DAF TRUCKS TO ANGOLA)
SRSG UNAMIR FAX 6100 DATED 22 AUGUST 1995 (CASE FOR RETENTION)

TRUCKS

A DECISION HAS NOW BEEN REACHED WITHIN DPKO TO INVITE ZAMBIA NTRIBUTE TWO MOTORIZED COMPANIES TO UNAVEM. THIS WILL BE A LER CONTINGENT THAN ORIGINALLY ANTICIPATED, AND EQUENTLY ONLY 26 OF THE 50 DUTCH DAF TRUCKS WILL BE REQUIRED GOLA. UNAMIR IS THEREFORE AUTHORIZED TO RETAIN 24 OF THE S UNTIL THE END OF THE PRESENT MANDATE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ENCE B. AT THE END OF THE MANDATE THE BALANCE OF THE NING TRUCKS IS TO BE TRANSFERRED TO UNAVEM.

As we discussed yesterday. S

FC
CPO

7525
96287777

HE RWANDESE GOVERNMENT HAS EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO ACQUIRE S OWNED AND UN OWNED M113S WHEN UNAMIR LIQUIDATES. IF THE US NMENT AGREE, THIS WILL BE A MORE COST EFFECTIVE METHOD OF AL THAN SHIPMENT TO CONUS/UNLB. SHIPMENT OF THESE VEHICLES RWANDA IS TO BE HALTED UNTIL A DECISION IS MADE BY THE US MENT. IF THE US AGREE THEN WE WILL NEED A GARDS. UN DECISION IN THE TRANSFER WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED AS WE PROGRESS

M O'Grady, Current Ops D Hamon, Chief Current Ops T White, Chief Log Ops	Authorized by: A Waldrum, OIC LCS

Francis Bressard

WITHDRAWAL FILE

FROM: MALICOY

TO: G3 PLANS

DATE: 15 OCTOBER 1995

NR 018/MALICOY

SUBJECT: STATE OF CONTINGENT ARMS AND AMMUNITIONS.

1/ - QUANTITY ARMS AND AMMUNITIONS

a) - Arms.

- Pistolet mitrailleurs..... 200
- Fusil mitrailleurs..... 15
- pistolet automatique..... 1
- detecteur de mines..... 10
- Lance-roquettes qnti-char..... 2

b) - AMMUNITIONS

- Grenades..... 200
- cartouches 7,62m/m..... 52.000

2/ - WEIGHT ARMS AND AMMUNITIONS

- Arms..... 1T400
- AMMUNITIONS..... 1T000

3/ - NUMBER OF BOXES

- ARMS: TWO BOXES
- SIZE..... 3 X 2 X 1 m

AMMUNITIONS; TWO BOXES
SIZE 3 X 2 X 1 m.

O.C. MALICOY

LT-COL MAMOUTOU KEITA

Echelon de Mission R.M.

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
AISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

FROM : A| **G 3 PLANS** **5000.2 (Plans)**

TO : **DISTRIBUTION LIST**

DATE : **12 Oct 95**

SUBJECT : **STATE OF CONTINGENT ARMS AND AMMUNITION**

1. The present mandate comes to an end on 08 Dec 95. Thereafter the Force is likely to de-induct either partially or completely. Please provide following information, to enable preparation of plan for the de-induction of troops from Rwanda.

a. The quantity of contingent owned arms (personal and crew served) and ammunition.

b. The total weight of arms and ammunition, separately.

c. The number of boxes these will be packed in and the size of the same.

2. You are expected to provide exact information as the same will decide whether your arms and ammunition will be transported by ship or air craft.

3. Treat the requirement as urgent.

Distribution :

Action :

INDBATT
GHANCOY-1
GHANCOY-2
MALICOY
MALAWICOY
NICOY
FORCE ENGR COY

CMSG

Info :

COS
DCOS OPS
DCOS SP

ANNEX A

DATA TO BE GATHERED FOR THE WITHDRAWAL

Data to be gathered for the withdrawal includes:

a. Number of containers per contingent. At this stage packing lists are not required but an accurate estimate of the number of containers is essential. Contingents should be prepared to provide packing lists when requested, possibly as soon as mid-November;

b. Number of vehicles for each contingent (COE) together with details of length, width, height and weight. All dimensions to be in metric measurements, not imperial;

c. Number of personnel to be moved back to the home country. Contingents are to use 40kg as the planning figure for personal equipment to be moved with the soldiers. This figure may be adjusted slightly, closer to the date of departure;

d. Details of dangerous cargo to be transported, giving all known details including:

   (1) nomenclature

   (2) dangerous goods hazard classification, ie 6.1, 1.4S etc

   (3) special handling requirements

e. Any special requirements that the contingent may feel it has for its move. No agreements are to be entered into by the Movcon staff as this is simply a data gathering exercise. Information on such special requirements is to be included in the report. Contingents should be advised that we will not take necessary staff action for them but will include the possibility of the special requirements in our planning. The contingents must arrange approval of their special requirements separately.

STAFF TABLE FOR GOODS TO BE CONVOYED OUT

ANNEX B

CONTINGENT: _____ CONTINGENT LOCATION: ----------

SER	DESCRIPTION	QTY	LENGTH (M)	WIDTH (M)	HEIGHT (M)	WEIGHT (KG)	SQUARE METERS	CUBIC METERS	VALUE US$
	Number of Personnel								
	Number of Containers								

STAFTABL.XLS

As at _____95

DE COMMISSIONING FILE

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM
MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

To: Lieutenant Colonel M. Keita
Commanding Officer
Malicoy

Date: 10 October 1995

Reference: EAB/1010-3(95)

From: Erich A. Ball
OIC Movcon

Subject: Preparation for Withdrawal Operation

1. UNAMIR may be advised during the next few months that it is to withdraw from Rwanda. Should we be given a short time frame for completion it will be difficult to complete all actions in time. The purpose of this memo is to request your assistance in gathering data so that we may do as much prior preparation and planning as possible.

2. Movcon proposes to use its own staff on this matter as far as possible to ease the administrative burden on your unit. The matter has been discussed with the SO2 Plans, who has agreed. Movcon will use the In-Survey on your unit to complete a summary of information, eg 2 x Landrover II and 20 x Berliet 5 Ton Cargo Trucks. Specific details of each item of equipment are not yet required so long as the quantities and dimensions are accurate.

3. It is anticipated that most of the information will be readily available through your logistics or quartermaster staff. Accordingly, please find attached notes from Movcon detailing information required by us; and the format in which the information is required.

4. In short the plan is that two Movcon members will come to your location on 13 Oct 95 at 0900hr. They will need to discuss the information from the In-Survey with your staff. Information specifically needed from your staff is the dimensions of the equipment, particularly vehicles. Once agreement on the correct information is reached the Movcon staff will leave your unit. The information will be used to establish contracts and plan transport and shipping dates. Accommodation requirements and passport clearances will also be addressed.

5. Your agreement to this arrangement is requested. Direct liaison authority with your staff and advice of the names and contact details is requested. Any questions on this matter should be addressed to myself or Mr Biswas on ext 11149 or fax number 11100. If the date is not suitable please advise this office so that an alternate date/time can be arranged.

cc:
CISS Chief Movements Officer CMPO SO2 Plans E. Ball
File: WITHDRAWAL PLAN

File Copy

INSTRUCTION ON DATA GATHERING EXERCISE FOR WITHDRAWAL PLANNING

Introduction

. As part of the planning process for the withdrawal, Movcon is gathering data on equipment and personnel to be moved. This will allow early completion of administrative planning and preparation. This matter has been discussed with the SO2 Plans in HQ who supports the exercise.

. In order to gather the data, staff from Movcon are to be sent to the various sectors. This paper outlines the various actions required in order to complete the data gathering exercise.

Aim

. The aim of this paper is to outline the actions to be taken in order to gather the data required for all necessary Movcon administrative preparations for the withdrawal to be completed.

General Outline

. Two members of Movcon staff will be sent to the various sectors over a one to two week period. In the sectors they will gather pre-determined data on personnel and equipment. They will make note of any foreseeable problems, such as requirements for flat bed trailers or crane lifting capability.

. The information will also be gathered from units in the Kigali area. This will be done both by use of the same two members and by local liaison between Movcon and the military headquarters.

. The data will be returned to Movcon, where it will be consolidated. Advice will be provided to relevant sections. Necessary administrative actions will be completed by Movcon and the sections, so that when the withdrawal process begins as much as possible of the administrative work will have been completed. It is anticipated that this will allow both smoother control of the movement aspects of the withdrawal and better visibility of the process for accounting and management reporting purposes.

Tasks

. Mr Biswas

a. Coordinate movement arrangements for staff going to sectors.

b. Complete and submit relevant documentation for travel, in conjunction with members concerned. Do any other documentation as required by Mr Ball.

c. Chase the progress of travel, do any necessary liaison to ensure it stays on schedule.

d. Maintain a file on this project.

- Mr Ball

a. Determine the data to be gathered and create staff table format. Establish project timelines including tasks timings and priorities.

b. Provide written instructions to the members travelling and write memos or other documentation required by various sections. This will include but not be limited to:

(1) advice to sector commanders of the visits and requirements;

(2) advice to military sections within HQ of the purposes and timings of the visits; and

(3) providing advice of the consolidated data to interested parties.

c. Liaise with the local military headquarters elements to gather the other information required. Task Movcon staff to complete requisite visits.

d. Raise requisitions as required.

e. Liaise with SO2 Plans and the CMovOffr to obtain rough dates and/or time frame of activities for planning purposes.

f. Spreadsheet or database the information for management purposes. Specific format to be determined by discussion with Chief Movement Officer.

g. Liaise with Procurement and Finance sections as required.

h. Brief CMCC and CMov Offr weekly or as required on the status of the various project tasks.

- Movcon Members

a. Research In-Survey information on the contingents and summarise data before going to contingent locations.

b. Travel to sectors as arranged and gather data per predetermined format.

c. Discuss with the sector staff any specific requirements or special needs they may have.

d. Determine who will be the point of contact in the sectors for the withdrawal. Establish a means of communicating with that person.

e. Provide a written report to Mr Ball within 24 hours of the return from the visit detailing all information, including special requirements, gathered.

Coordination/Timings

. The visits are to be coordinated by Mr Biswas through the relevant military HQ sections. Data gathering and consolidation, as well as local data gathering, are to be coordinated by Mr Ball. Mr Ball is also to have overall responsibility for coordinating relevant documentation and submission of necessary requisitions.

. Timings

a. Visits are to commence on Thursday 12 Oct and be complete by Friday 20 Oct.

b. The final report is to be with Mr Ball no later than 1200hr on Saturday 21 Oct.

c. Mr Ball is to complete submission of relevant paperwork through correct channels by close of business 31 Oct 95, or provide the CMovOffr with a situation brief and and estimated date of completion.

ANNEX:

A. Data to be gathered for withdrawal
B. Staff Table Format

ANNEX A

DATA TO BE GATHERED FOR THE WITHDRAWAL

Data to be gathered for the withdrawal includes:

a. Number of containers per contingent. At this stage packing lists are not required but an accurate estimate of the number of containers is essential. Contingents should be prepared to provide packing lists when requested, possibly as soon as mid-November;

b. Number of vehicles for each contingent (COE) together with details of length, width, height and weight. All dimensions to be in metric measurements, not imperial;

c. Number of personnel to be moved back to the home country. Contingents are to use 40kg as the planning figure for personal equipment to be moved with the soldiers. This figure may be adjusted slightly, closer to the date of departure;

d. Details of dangerous cargo to be transported, giving all known details including:

   (1) nomenclature

   (2) dangerous goods hazard classification, ie 6.1, 1.4S etc

   (3) special handling requirements

e. Any special requirements that the contingent may feel it has for its move. No agreements are to be entered into by the Movcon staff as this is simply a data gathering exercise. Information on such special requirements is to be included in the report. Contingents should be advised that we will not take necessary staff action for them but will include the possibility of the special requirements in our planning. The contingents must arrange approval of their special requirements separately.

02

Plans 2
Plans 3 22/8

22/8

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

From: Col W J Fletcher
DCOS (Sp) Extn 11109

To: DCMO

Info: DFC, G3 Plans, MILOB SOO AND S LOG O

File Reference: 4000.1/LOG-29

Date: 19 Aug 95

Subject: REDEPLOYMENT OF MILOBS - MAJOR ADELKAGUN

Reference:
A. MILOB/POST/6433.21 dated 1 August 1995
B. Conversation G3 Plans/DCOS Sp 19 Aug 95
C. Conversation DCOS Sp/DCMO 19 Aug 95

1. Ref A confirmed the redeployment of Maj Adelkagun from Sector 3B to FHQ-SO2 Plans. As discussed at refs B and C, this requirement has lapsed and Maj Adelkagun is no longer required on the FHQ Staff.

2. It is requested that Maj Adelkagun be employed in MILOB HQ if possible to enable his legal talents to be used by the G3 Plans as may be required from time to time.

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

TO : SEE DISTRIBUTION **FILE REF:** MILOB/POST/6433.21

FROM : MILOBS GP HQ **DATE: 1 August 1995**

SUBJECT: REDEPLOYMENT OF MILOBS

1. The CMO has approved the redeployment of the underlisted MILOBs with effect from Tue 8 Aug 95.

SRL	UNID NO	RANK	NAME	NAT	CURRENT DEPLOYMENT	NEW DEPLOYMENT	REMARKS
1	M-8828	LT COL	ABUBAKAR ISYAKU	NIGERIAN	SECTOR-3B	FHQ, G1(PERS)	
2	M-8821	LT CDR	GUNAT Y D	NIGERIAN	SECTOR-4	FHQ-G3 MED (OPS)	
3	M-7738	MAJ	R K OPOKU-ADUSEI	GHANAIAN	SECTOR-2A	FHQ-SO2(PERS)	
4	M-8829	MAJ	ADELKAGUNL	NIGERIAN	SECTOR-3B	FHQ-SO2 (PLANS)	
5	M-7776	CAPT	STEINER NORBERT	AUSTRIAN	SECTOR-2A	FHQ-SO(ACCN)	

2. Sector Commanders/ Branch Heads are requested to release the officers in good times to enable them to report to FHQ on Tue 8 Aug 95 for an understudy period before assuming office on Tue 15 Aug 95.

3. Please accept for action.

G K ADJEI
Lt-Col
for CMO

Distribution:

External:
Action:

Force HQ (Attn DCOS Sp)
All Sectors
Air Ops Cell, KIA

Internal:
Information:

DFC/ CMO
DCMO
SOO
SLOGO

File
Col
29/Jul 94

UNAMIR
Force HQ
Ops Branch
Kigali Rwanda

29 July 1994

3000.12(Ops)

See Distribution:

SUBJECT: **WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS FROM ENTEBBE**

References:

A. Ops Branch letter No. 3000.12(Ops) Dated 04 July 1994.

B. Ops Branch letter No. 3000.12(Ops) Dated 28 July 1994.

1. It has been decided to withdraw the platoon from Entebbe Air Port, Uganda.

2. You are requested to withdraw the platoon from Entebbe. The withdrawal is to be completed by 30 July 1994. The move will be by road.

3. The MOVECON in Kigali is to arrange necessary clearance from RPF.

4. For C Log O only. Please arrange necessary transports for the movement.

5. You are also requested to treat reference B as cancelled.

MOEEN U AHMED
Col
For Force Commander

Distribution:

Action:

External:

GHANBATT

Internal:

C Log O
MOVCON, Kigali

Info:

External:

MOVCON, Entebbe By FAX

Internal:

FC
DFC
CAO
C plans

UNAMIR
Force HQ
Ops Branch
Kigali, Rwanda

28 July 1994

3000.12(Ops)

See Distribution:

SUBJECT: **WITHDRAWAL/DEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS FROM UNDP**

Reference:

A. Ops Branch letter No. 3000.12(Ops) Dated 10 July 1994.

1. It has been decided to withdraw the troops from UNDP complex with immediate effect and redeploy them at RWANDEX complex for the security of the complex.

2. You are requested to withdraw one section of troops and the APC from UNDP complex and redeploy the section (less the APC) to RWANDEX complex in coordination with C Log O. The deployment in RWANDEX complex is to be completed by 291600 July 1994. The accommodation will be inside the same complex and the section is to be self contained for all purpose.

MOEEN U AHMED
Col
For Force Commander

Distribution:

Action:

External:

GHANBATT

Info:

External:

MILOB Gp HQ

Internal:

SRSG
FC
DFC
CAO
HAC
C Plans
C Log O
CMPO

UNITED NATIONS
Assistance Mission for Rwanda

HQ UNAMIR -- OG MINUAR

NATIONS UNIES
Mission pour l'Assistance au Rwanda

LIQUIDATION / STAFPLAN.DIR

1 Nov 95

Dist List

STAFF PLANNING DIRECTIVE 1/95

Refs: A. SRSG Memo dated 10 October 1995.
B. DCOS Sp Memo 4000.1/LOG-28/1 dated 13 Oct 95.

BACKGROUND.

1. The present mandate comes to an end on 08 Dec 95. Should the mandate not be extended or the mission be restructured, a " worst case " liquidation plan needs to be developed. Such a process requires an immense degree of planning and preparation as well as a systematic approach to enable as smooth a liquidation as possible. A well thought out plan is a pre-requisite if we are to achieve a cost effective and professional de-induction.

AIM

2. The aim of this directive is to define the staff planning actions required to implement the liquidation of UNAMIR.

SCOPE

3. The magnitude of the task at hand is large. An ops and sp liquidation instruction (OSLI) must be developed to discipline the liquidation process. In consultation with the Force Commander, the SRSG has directed at ref A the establishment of a Liquidation Task Force (LTF) at the director level. This will be jointly chaired by the ED and the DFC and have as permanent members the COS and CAO. The LTF's executive arm will be the Liquidation Team (LT) and be established under the joint chairmanship of the DCOS Sp and the CISS. The LT will also include members as reqr to effect the liquidation in the most effective and efficient manner. Working Groups (WG) will assemble in order to develop an OSLI which will subsequently be staffed through the G3 Plans, CISS and G4. The OSLI is to be developed during the 01 Nov to 01 Dec time frame. The fol general points, while not an exhaustive list, need to be addressed in the OSLI.

a. Role & tasks;

b. Operational readiness;

c. Closure element structure;

d. Comd & Con;

e. Personnel plan incl med;

f. Maint and eqpt plan;

g. Supply plan for the return of materiel;

h. Timings and phasing;

i. Transport and movement plan for forces and materiel;

j. Finalization of Boards of Inquiries and Write Offs;

k. Infrastructure rationalization Plan; and

l. Special Requirements.

LTF GUIDANCE.

Concept of Ops. Self protection will be retained while meeting the liquidation schedule as directed by UNNY. Sector Commanders are to maintain their flexibility to conduct current ops, mainly in support of humanitarian activities, to the extent possible. The liquidation of sectors will conform to the prevailing security situations in effect at the time of closure. UNAMIR will retain the capability to perform current ops until such a time as their individual areas of responsibility/accountability are terminated. The provision of security to UNAMIR pers and mat will be retained until full liquidation is achieved.

4. UNAMIR will liquidate all outlying sectors beginning with sector 3 followed by sector 2, 5, 4 and 1. Each sector will be completely closed out prior to activating the next scheduled sector although as much concurrent activity as possible will occur to minimize the time necessary for closure. The drawdown of all UNAMIR elements will be phased in accordance with (IAW) the liquidation schedule attached as Annex A. Each UNAMIR contingent or element will designate a rear party of approximately five personnel to cater to final administrative arrangements necessary for the liquidation. This operation will be executed in four phases as follows:

a. **Phase 1 (D to D+30)**. UNAMIR contracting phase to incl all movement and support contracting in support of the closure. Special liquidation procedures will also be initiated in order to accelerate the closure process;

b. **Phase 2 (D+30 to D+52)**. Liquidation of all outlying sectors;

c. **Phase 3 (D+49 to D+97)**. Liquidation of Sector 1; and

d. **Phase 4 (Phase 2 onwards)**. Movement of all UNAMIR materiel to final destinations and final liquidation activity.

5. **Assumptions.**

a. the liquidation will occur in a controlled and progressive manner, to not start before the 08 Dec 95 although some thinning out of UN warehouse stores may commence prior to this date. Planning must take into consideration a possible compression of the time lines should UNNY accept the risks involved;

b. all of UNAMIR will be liquidated and no elements will be retained once liquidation is completed; and

c. UNNY will provide explicit liquidation guidelines to UNAMIR prior to the initiation of the closure.

TASKS

6. LTF. The LTF will be responsible for all policy decisions relating to the liquidation process. It will be responsible for issuing all directives concerning the OSLI, deal directly with UNNY/FALD on related matters, monitor the liquidation process and resolve any closure issues which the LT bring to their attention. They will also be responsible to brief the SRSG and the Force Commander on the liquidation's progress.

7. LT. The LT will be responsible to execute the liquidation plan. Through its members, they will be responsible for the production of the OSLI and will control and coordinate all aspects of its implementation. As such, they are responsible to the LTF for the complete day to day management of the liquidation process. They will also be responsible to brief the LTF on the progress of the liquidation as well as deal directly with UNNY on any working level related matters.

8. SPECIFIC TASKS.

a. Liquidation Cell.

(1) Tasks.

(a) Develop activities checklist;

(b) Chair WG/Management Board secretariat;

(c) Report to the LT chairmen;

(d) Prepare the agenda for LT meetings;

(e) Prepare the OSLI;

(f) Control and coord the liquidation process;

(g) Control the day to day management of liquidation activities;

(h) Coordinate the implementation of sequencing; and

(i) Ensure security of the liquidation process.

(2) Participants. OCISS, SO PLANS, G3 OPS, G4 LOG.

b. Asset Management Working Group.

(1) Tasks.

(a) Structure/deploy COE out-survey team;

(b) Structure/deploy UNOE clearance team;

(c) Structure/deploy comms decommissioning team;

(d) Structure/deploy generator decommissioning team;

(e) Structure/deploy accommodation and repair decommissioning team;

(f) Coordinate/prepare COE/UNOE for shipping; and

(g) Implement a donation/sale program.

(2) **Participants**. OCISS, SO PLANS, G4 LOG, SO SUP, SO MAINT, SO ACCN, SO TPT/MOV, FEO, CPCIU, CCO, CPO, CGEN, CBMES. **Co- Chairmen CO 95 CMSG and CFSA**.

c. **Property Control Working Group**.

(1) **Tasks**.

(a) Develop a straight-line mechanism between disposing party / PSB / procurement;

(b) Standardization of documentation - packing lists and customs documentation;

(c) Process COE/UNOE UNAMIR clearance documentation; and

(d) Issue instructions/documentation for the disposition of COE/UNOE.

(2) **Participants**. OCISS, SO PLANS, G4 LOG, SO TPT/MOV, CPO, CFO, CPSB, C MOV CON. **Co-Chairmen SO SUP and CPCIU.**

d. **Facilities Management Working Group**.

(1) **Tasks**.

(a) Survey UNAMIR rental/lease properties;

(b) Develop site-specific recommendations for effecting sign-over;

(c) Prepare standardized sign-over documentation;

(d) Structure/deploy sign-over documentation team;

(e) Secure storage lot/vehicle park for liquidation effort; and

(f) Manage/maintain liquidation facilities.

(2) **Participants**. OCISS, SO PLANS, G4 LOG, CFSA, CPO, CFO, Legal Officer. **Co-Chairmen SO Accn and CBMES**.

e. **Transportation Management Working Group**.

(1) **Tasks**.

(a) Coordinate/assess transport requirements for the liquidation;

(b) Ensure availability of the transport fleet for the liquidation

(c) Organize the return/deployment of COE/UNOE vehicle assets;

(d) Coordinate the movement of COE/UNOE within Rwanda;

(e) Arrange/manage contractor movement of COE/UNOE;

(f) Coordinate the movement of military/civilian staff within Rwanda;

(g) Arrange/manage repatriation of military/civilian staff; and

(h) Process COE/UNOE/Pax customs clearances.

(2) **Participants**. OCISS, SO PLANS, G4 LOG, G3 PLANS, SO TPT/MOV, SO MAINT, G1, BRSC, CMC, CITMM, CCPO, CFO, CPO. **Co-Chairmen CO 95 CMSG and C MOV CON.**

f. **DCOS Ops**. Based on LTF direction, DCOS Ops will provide the fol ops input into the OSLI:

(1) **G3 Ops**.

(a) An assessment of the security concerns during the process of liquidating the mission;

(b) Security arrangements in the sectors while each sector is closing down. A security team consisting of approx one section is to be dispatched during the last stages so as to enable all contingent personnel to carry out their various closure responsibilities. This team will only be responsible for perimeter security until all accommodations have been handed over;

(c) Prepare the schedule for the close down of various security posts in accordance with (IAW) the closure plan;

(d) Provision of security for KIA;

(e) Provision of security for materiel being brought back from all liquidation activities;

(f) Provision of security arrangements for key activities and locations within Kigali including materiel consolidation areas and for the movement of critical materiel during all phases. These will be lucrative targets and may cover large areas which will reqr effective security;

(g) Maintenance of a force level reserve during the period of the liquidation in the form of an RRF;

(h) Maintain the duty ops centre with duty officers drawn from the DCOS Ops and DCOS Sp Branches, until the Core Gp moves to Trafipro during phase 3;

(2) **G3 Air**. Provide helicopter support for Phases 1 and 2 until such a time as the CHU ceases ops and subsequently transfer to the Ops Centre as the senior duty officer;

(3) **FEO**. Plan for and execute the destruction of materiel and the provision of engr sp on an as reqr basis; and

(4) **G3 Plans**. Prepare instructions for the implementation of a contingency security evacuation plan. Also provide SO PLANS to be a member of the LT and Liquidation Cell (LC).

(5) **FSO / CCO**. Develop the Force Signals plan in support of the liquidation to address the fol specific concerns:

(a) Provision of continued comms sp until the last UNAMIR elms are repatriated;

(b) develop the comms liquidation plan IAW the schedule laid out at Annex A; and

(c) Provide input to the OSLI for all signals related matters.

g. **DCOS Sp / CISS**. Based on LTF direction, provide the necessary support input to the OSLI as follows:

(1) Based upon the Concept of Ops, define the sp requirement;

(2) Co-chair the LT;

(3) Ensure during all liquidation phases the sustainability of UNAMIR;

(4) Monitor the preparation of the OSLI;

(5) Monitor and provide advice as reqr on the implementation of the liquidation plan for all admin sp reqr. Provide input to the OSLI for all CAO related matters;

(6) Identify funding sources for the provision of this liquidation plan,

(7) Ensure that provisions to allow financial resources are allocated as a priority to the core liquidation group,

(8) Monitor during the implementation phase the management of O & M costs; and

(9) Provide the G4 LOG and Ops O ISS to be members of the LT and LC.

h. **G4**.

(1) Develop and coord the sp portion of the OSLI to include roles & tasks.

(2) Coord with the G4, G1 and FMO staff to obtain their portion of the OSLI; and

(3) Monitor and coord liquidation activity as it relates to the G4 portion of the liquidation;

i. **G1 / CCPO.**

(1) Develop the liquidation policy concerning the return of all UN civilian and military personnel in sp of the liquidation plan and coord as reqr with the Transportation Management WG to coord the repatriation of individual pers not att to a contingent;

(2) Develop the military police plan in support of the liquidation;

(3) Develop and monitor, in conjunction with the CCPO, the implementation of the pers plan to include all fin, welfare and pers matters related to the liquidation; and

(4) Provide input to the OSLI for all pers related matters.

j. **SO Tpt/Mov / CO 95 CMSG / C Mov Con.**

(1) Develop the policy concerning the use of all in theatre transport assets in sp of the liquidation plan. Coord and estb priorities for the use of all sector tpt reqr with 95 CMSG;

(2) Coord the use of the Indian Mov Con unit with the UNAMIR Mov Con Cell in sp of the closure plan. This is to incl coord the overall mov reqr for each of the sector repatriations for pers, COE and UNOE; and

(3) Monitor and provide advice as reqr on the implementation of the liquidation plan for all tpt/mov sp reqr. Provide input to the OSLI for all tpt/mov related matters;

k. **SO Sup / CPCIU.**

(1) Develop the policy concerning the return, conditioning, cataloguing and disposal of all in theatre materiel assets in sp of the liquidation plan as part of the Property Control WG. Coord and estb the priorities for the use of all UNAMIR materiel with 95 CMSG;

(2) Coord the write off of UNOE and COE materiel with PCIU, Procurement and PSB to streamline the process and ensure that all components of UNAMIR are assisted in their departure to the max extent possible; and

(3) Monitor and provide advice, in conjunction with SUMMO, on the implementation of the liquidation plan for all supply sp reqr. Provide input to the OSLI for all supply related matters;

l. **SO Maint / CITMM.**

(1) Develop the policy concerning the return and serviceability of all in theatre maint assets in sp of the liquidation plan. Coord and estb the repair priorities with 95 CMSG;

(2) Coord the use of maint resources in sp of the liquidation plan. This is to incl coord of the overall maint and recovery reqr for each of the sector repatriations for both COE and UNOE; and

(3) Monitor and provide advice on the implementation of the liquidation plan for all maint sp reqr. Provide input to the OSLI for all maint related matters;

m. **SO Accn / CBMES.**

(1) Develop the policy concerning the return of all in theatre accom in sp of the liquidation plan. Coord and estb the priorities for the return of all sector accn with the Facilities Management WG;

(2) Coord the return and repair of accn either rented or leased by UNAMIR; and

(3) Monitor and provide advice as reqr on the implementation of the liquidation plan for the return of all accn. Provide input to the OSLI for all accn related matters.

n. **SO Foods.**

(1) Develop the policy concerning the use of all in theatre ration sp (cbt and fresh) for the liquidation plan. Coord and estb issue and return priorities for all UNAMIR elms;

(2) Coord the return and/or destruction of cbt rations and bottled water which will not be used in theatre and transfer them to other missions as reqr; and

(3) Monitor and provide advice, in conjunction with CMC, as reqr on the implementation of the liquidation plan for all ration reqr. Provide input to the OSLI for all food related matters.

o. **PAFFO.** Develop the Public Affairs plan to support the liquidation plan and provide advice as reqr on the implementation of the closure plan for all public affairs reqr. Provide input to the OSLI for all public affairs related matters.

p. **FMO.**

(1) Develop the policy concerning the provision of med svcs in sp of the liquidation plan. Coord and estb the med priorities for UNAMIR with NORMED;

(2) Coord the use of med resources in sp of the liquidation plan. This is to incl coord the overall med and evac reqr for UNAMIR both before and after NORMED's return; and

(3) Monitor and provide advice as reqr on the implementation of the liquidation plan for all reqr med sp. Provide input to the OSLI for all med related matters.

q. **MILOB and CIVPOL HQs.**

(1) MILOB and CIVPOL HQs are to provide a liaison officer to op con C LOG O to assist in the development of the OSLI until liquidation is completed; and

(2) Nominate a POC for this issue.

COORD INSTRS.

9. **Deliverables.** The draft of the OSLI is at Annex C. All of the Working Groups (WG), their respective sub-WG and/or teams plus the various staff within the combined UNAMIR HQ are to write their applicable portion of the OSLI. Co-Chairmen of each WG are responsible to coord their submissions which are to be provided IAW the schedule at para 11. Submissions are to include an insert for the main document of a general policy nature. Specific details are to be kept within the Annexes to the main document. Reqests for additional Annexes are to be passed to the G4 LOG.

10. **Format**. All submissions for the OSLI, whether from the various WG, their sub-teams or other staff within the combined UNAMIR HQ are to be provided to the G4 LOG in both electronic format along with two hard copies. The electronic format is to be saved as a WordPerfect 5.1 file and provided in the form of a diskette identified as impl-XXX.XXX where the Xs ident the originator's short titles. As an example, the G4 LOG would ident the file as impl-g4l.og. Returns are to be provided as they become available but no later than **20 Nov 95 0900 Hrs**. The format to be used is contained either at Annex C or at Annex A to Annex C which is attached.

11. **Timings.** The fol staff action is to occur as fol:

a. 01 Nov 95 Issue the staff planning dir;

b. 20 Nov 95 Deadline for all UNAMIR staff returns to G4 LOG;

c. 24 Nov 95 Present a rough draft of the OSLI to the LT;

d. 30 Nov 95 Brief LTF and obtain endorsement of the OSLI;

e. 1 Dec 95 SRSG and Force Commander's decision brief; and

f. 1 Dec 95 Issue OSLI.

12. **Liaison**. The LC is the point of contact for all info and will coord all aspects of this implementation. Direct liaison is auth between all staff levels as well as staff-to-UNAMIR elms. The LC is to be kept informed of all such liaisons and their decisions.

W. Clive

Chief Integrated Support Services

W.J. Fletcher
Colonel
Deputy Chief of Staff Support

Annex A: Decommissioning Schedule.
Annex B: Liquidation Schedules by Elm.
Annex C: Draft Implementation Directive Format.

Distribution List

Action

UNAMIR HQ//COS/ CAO/ DCOS Ops
DCOS Sp/ CISS
DCMO/ Commissioner CIVPOL
CO 95 CMSG//

Info

UNNY//FALD//
UNAMIR HQ//SRSG/ FC
Ops O ISS/ **SO PLANS**/ G4 LOG
File//

ANNEX B
TO LIQUIDATION / STAFPLAN.DIR
DATED 01 NOV 95

LIQUIDATION SCHEDULE

SECTOR 3

OTHERS			MOV UNOE	DEF STORES							
			COMMS	REAR PTY MOV							
			REPAIR ACCOM	HAND OVER ACCOM							
	CEASE POL		UNOE CLR	GEN MOV							
			ENV CLEAN UP								
			DESTR / TRANS OF MAT	BOI / WRITE OFF	>>						
	CEASE WATER		WATER BLADDER	POL CNTR MOV							
DAYS	**D+30**	**D+31**	**D+32**	**D+33**	**D+34**	**D+35**	**D+36**	**D+37**	**D+38**	**D+40**	**D+42**
MALICOY	COORD MTG	OUT SURVEY	>>	>>	OUT SURVEY DOCS	>>	REAR PTY MOV	RES DAY			REAR PTY FLT
	MOV CNTRS TO SITE		WATER BLADDER	ADV PTY MOV	CNTR MOV	ENV CLEAN UP	>>				
	CEASE WATER		COMMS	>>	>>	DESTR / TRANS OF MAT	DEF STORES				
	CEASE POL		SECUR TM MOV IN LOC	AMMO/WPNS MOV	UNOE CLR	RTN/ HAND OVER VEHS	POL CNTR MOV				
			CEASE FRESH RATS		PAX MAIN MOV	CUSTOMS PAX	GEN MOV				
					REPAIR ACCOM	HANDOVER ACCOM	>>				
					DISMANTLE TM	CUSTOMS MAT	>>	>>	>>	>>	
					PACKING COMPLETE	MOV UNOE	BOI / WRITE OFF	>>			
							PAX MAIN FLT				

ANNEX B
TO LIQUIDATION / STAFPLAN.DIR
DATED 01 NOV 95

LIQUIDATION SCHEDULE

SECTOR 2

OTHERS					MOV UNOE						
					COMMS						
					REPAIR ACCOM	HAND OVER ACCOM					
					UNOE CLR	REAR PTY MOV					
					DESTR / TRANS OF MAT	DEF STORES					
	CEASE POL				ENV CLEAN UP	GEN MOV					
	CEASE WATER				WATER BLADDER	POL CNTR MOV	BOI / WRITE OFF	>>			
DAYS	D+30	D+31	D+35	D+36	D+37	D+38	D+39	D+40	D+41	D+42	D+ 47
GHANCOY 1	CEASE WATER	MOV CNTRS TO SITE	COORD MTG	OUT SURVEY	>>	>>	OUT SURVEY DOCS	>>	PAX MAIN FLT	RES DAY	REAR PTY FLT
	CEASE FRESH RATS	CEASE POL			WATER BLADDER	ADV PTY MOV	REPAIR ACCOM	HANDOVER ACCOM	>>		
						AMMO/ WPNS MOV	UNOE CLR	MOV UNOE	POL CNTR MOV		
					COMMS	>>	>>	DESTR / TRANS OF MAT	GEN MOV		
							CNTR MOV	ENV CLEAN UP	>>		
					SECUR TM MOV IN LOC		PAX MAIN MOV	RTN/ HAND OVER VEHS	REAR PTY& SECURITY TM MOV		
							DISMANTLE TM	CUSTOMS PAX	BOI / WRITE OFF	>>	
							PACKING COMPLETE		CUSTOMS MAT	>>	>>
									DEF STORES		

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ANNEX B
TO LIQUIDATION / STAFPLAN.DIR
DATED 01 NOV 95

LIQUIDATION SCHEDULE

SECTOR 5

OTHERS								DEF STORES					
					COMMS	>>	>>	REAR PTY MOV					
					REPAIR ACCOM	HAND OVER ACCOM	>>	>>					
						GEN MOV	>>	>>					
						UNOE CLR	>>	>>					
						POL CNTR MOV	>>	>>					
							BOI / WRITE OFF	>>					
		CEASE WATER						DESTR / TRANS OF MAT					
		CEASE POL				WATER BLADDER	>>	ENV CLEAN UP			MOV UNOE		
DAYS	D+31	D+33	D+35	D+39	D+40	D+41	D+42	D+43	D+44	D+45	D+46	D+47	D+ 52
NICOY			CEASE WATER	MOV CNTRS TO SITE	COORD MTG	OUT SURVEY	>>	>>	OUT SURVEY DOCS	>>	PAX MAIN FLT	RES DAY	REAR PTY FLT
	CEASE FRESH RATS		CEASE POL		WATER BLADDER		SECUR TM MOV IN LOC	ADV PTY MOV	REPAIR ACCOM	HANDOVER ACCOM	>>		
								AMMO/WPNS MOV	UNOE CLR	>>	MOV UNOE		
								COMMS		DESTR / TRANS OF MAT	GEN MOV		
									CNTR MOV	ENV CLEAN UP	POL CNTR MOV		
									PAX MAIN MOV	RTN/ HAND OVER VEHS	REAR PTY MOV		
									DISMANTLE TM	CUSTOMS PAX	BOI / WRITE OFF	>>	
									PACKING COMPLETE		CUSTOMS MAT	>>	>>
											DEF STORES		

1 Nov 95

C:\DATA\SOLOG\CLOSURE\NIGERI-1.SCH

ANNEX B
TO LIQUIDATION / STAFPLAN.DIR
DATED 01 NOV 95

LIQUIDATION SCHEDULE

SECTOR 4

OTHER								ENV CLEAN UP	GEN MOV						
								UNOE CLR	DEF STORES	COMMS					
								DESTR / TRANS OF MAT	BOI / WRITE OFF	>>	REAR PTY MOV				
		CEASE POL	CEASE WATER					WATER BLADDER	POL CNTR MOV	REPAIR ACCOM	HAND OVER ACCOM	MOV UNOE			
DAYS	D+37	D+38	D+40	D+42	D+44	D+45	D+46	D+47	D+48	D+49	D+50	D+51	D+52	D+53	D+57
MALAWI COY	CEASE WATER	CEASE FRESH RATS	CEASE POL	WATER BLADDER	MOV CNTRS TO SITE	COORD MTG	OUT SURVEY	>>	>>	>>	OUT SURVEY DOCS	>>	PAX MAIN FLT	RES DAY	REAR PTY FLT
								SECUR TM MOV IN LOC	UNOE CLR	>>	PAX MAIN MOV	BOI / WRITE OFF	>>		
								COMMS	>>	>>	>>	DESTR / TRANS OF MAT	REAR PTY MOV		
										PACKING COMPLETE	CNTR MOV	REPAIR ACCOM	HANDOVER ACCOM		
										AMMO/ WPNS MOV	POL CNTR MOV	>>			
										ADV PTY MOV	GEN MOV	>>			
												MOV UNOE			
										DISMANTLE TM	>>	>>	>>		
												ENV CLEAN UP	>>		
												RTN/ HAND OVER VEHS			
												CUSTOMS PAX			
												CUSTOMS MAT	>>	>>	>>
											DEF STORES	>>	>>		

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ANNEX B
TO LIQUIDATION / STAFPLAN DIR
DATED 01 NOV 95

LIQUIDATION SCHEDULE

SECTOR 1

DAYS	D+43	D+49	D+50	D+51	D+52	D+53	D+58	D+59
MILOB 1A MILOB 1B MILOB HQ CIVPOL HQ MP COY	CEASE WATER	COORD MTG	UNOE CLR	>>	BOI / WRITE OFF	>>	RTN VEHS	PAX MAIN FLT
	CEASE POL	MOV CNTRS TO SITE	WATER BLADDER	MOV UNOE	COMMS	POL CNTR MOV		
		CEASE OPS			DESTR / TRANS OF MAT	GEN MOV		
					ENV CLEAN UP	DEF STORES		
					REPAIR ACCOM	HANDOVER ACCOM		
						REAR PTY MOV		
						ADV PTY MOV		

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ANNEX B
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LIQUIDATION SCHEDULE

SECTOR 1

DAYS	D+47	D+48	D+51	D+52	D+54	D+57	D+58	D+59	D+60	D+61	D+62	D+63	D+64	D+72
ENGR COY	CEASE FRESH RATS	MOV CNTRS TO SITE	COORD MTG	OUT SURVEY	>>	>>	>>	OUT SURVEY DOCS	>>	RTN/ HAND OVER VEHS	GEN MOV	RES DAY		REAR PTY FLT
				CEASE OPS	CEASE WATER	WATER BLADDER		CNTR MOV	DISMANTLE TM	REPAIR ACCOM	HANDOVER ACCOM			
								UNOE CLR	ENV CLEAN UP	>>				
								PACKING COMPLETE	SECUR TM MOV IN LOC	DESTR / TRANS OF MAT	POL CNTR MOV			
								MOV UNOE	COMMS	PAX MAIN MOV	SECUR TM RTN			
										CUSTOMS PAX	PAX MAIN FLT			
										BOI / WRITE OFF	>>			
										DEF STORES				
								CUSTOMS MAT	>>	>>	>>	>>	>>	
										ADV PTY MOV				

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ANNEX B
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LIQUIDATION SCHEDULE

SECTOR 1

DAYS	D+53	D+59	D+60	D+61	D+62	D+63	D+64	D+65	D+66	D+67	D+68	D+70
GHANCOY 2	CEASE FRESH RATS	MOV CNTRS TO SITE	COORD MTG	OUT SURVEY	>>	>>	OUT SURVEY DOCS	>>	BOI / WRITE OFF	>>	RES DAY	REAR PTY FLT
					COMMS		PACKING COMPLETE	DESTR / TRANS OF MAT	DISMANTLE TM	>>		
							UNOE CLR	RTN/ HAND OVER VEHS	PAX MAIN FLT			
								CUSTOMS PAX				
							CUSTOMS MAT	>>	>>	>>	>>	>>

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ANNEX B
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LIQUIDATION SCHEDULE

SECTOR 1

DAYS	D+51	D+54	D+56	D+57	D+59	D+60	D+61	D+62	D+63	D+64	D+65
ELMS INDBAT	CEASE WATER	COORD MTG	WATER BLADDER	SECUR TM MOV IN LOC	PACKING COMPLETE	CEASE FRESH RATS	CUSTOMS PAX	DEF STORES	POL CNTR MOV		
						ENV CLEAN UP	>>	PAX MAIN FLT	COMMS	REPAIR ACCOM	HANDOVER ACCOM
							DISMANTLE TM	>>	GEN MOV		
									RES DAY		

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ANNEX B
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LIQUIDATION SCHEDULE

SECTOR 1

DAYS	D+30	D+53	D+55	D+56	D+57	D+58	D+59	D+61	D+62	D+63	D+64	D+ 69
CHU	CEASE POL	MOV CNTRS TO SITE	COORD MTG	CEASE WATER		BOI / WRITE OFF	>>	PACKING COMPLETE	CUSTOMS PAX	PAX MAIN FLT	RES DAY	REAR PTY FLT
				UNOE CLR	>>	MOV UNOE		CEASE OPS	RTN UN VEHS TO WKSP	REPAIR ACCOM	HANDOVER ACCOM	
									WATER BLADDER	DESTR / TRANS OF MAT	SECUR TM MOV OUT	
										GEN MOV		
										POL CNTR MOV		
										ENV CLEAN UP		
										COMMS		
										DEF STORES		

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LIQUIDATION SCHEDULE

SECTOR 1

DAYS	D+30	D+32	D+33	D+34	D+35	D+36	D+37	D+38	D+39
WKSP BUTARE	CEASE WATER	WATER BLADDER	MOV CNTRS TO SITE	COORD MTG	UNOE CLR	>>	MOV UNOE	BOI / WRITE OFF	>>
	CEASE POL			SECUR TM MOV IN LOC	CEASE OPS	POL CNTR MOV	PAX MAIN MOV	RTN UN VEHS	
						GEN MOV	REAR PTY MOV	RES DAY	
						COMMS	PACKING COMPLETE		
						REPAIR ACCOM	HANDOVER ACCOM		
						DESTR / TRANS OF MAT			
						ENV CLEAN UP			

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LIQUIDATION SCHEDULE

SECTOR 1

DAYS	D	D+17	D+20	D+21	D+22	D+25	D+41	D+42	D+43	D+44	D+45	D+47
TPT WKSP LIGHT		MOV CNTRS TO SITE	COORD MTG	UNOE CLR	>>	>>	>>	PACKING COMPLETE	PAX MAIN FLT	WATER BLADDER	SECUR TM RTNS	
				CEASE OPS	RTN VEHS	CUSTOMS MAT	>>	>>	ENV CLEAN UP	>>	POL CNTR MOV	
							COMMS	MOV UNOE	DESTR / TRANS OF MAT	RES DAY	GEN MOV	
								REPAIR ACCOM	>>	HANDOVER ACCN	>>	
								DEF STORES	BOI / WRITE OFF	>>	>>	>>
	SCRAP DISPOSAL	>>	>>	>>	>>	>>	>>	>>	>>	>>	>>	

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ANNEX B
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LIQUIDATION SCHEDULE

SECTOR 1

AMAHORO BLDG			COMMS	>>	>>									
					REPAIR ACCOM	>>	>>	HAND OVER ACCOM	>>	>>				
					GEN MOV	>>	>>							
					DESTR / TRANS OF MAT									
			WATER BLADDER		POL CNTR. MOV	ENV CLEAN UP		DEF STORES	DISMANTLE TM	>>				
	CEASE WATER		TRANS HQ TO TRAFIPRO	>>	REPAIR ACCOM	>>	>>	>>	HANDOVER ACCOM	>>				
DAYS	**D+59**	**D+61**	**D+62**	**D+63**	**D+64**	**D+65**	**D+66**	**D+69**	**D+70**	**D+71**	**D+72**	**D+73**	**D+75**	**D+99**
SIGS COY	CEASE FRESH RATS		MOV CNTRS TO SITE	COORD MTG		WATER BLADDER	OUT SURVEY	>>	OUT SURVEY DOCS	>>	PAX MAIN FLT	RES DAY		REAR PTY FLT
				CEASE WATER					UNOE CLR	MOV UNOE	BOI / WRITE OFF	>>		
									DESTR / TRANS OF MAT	GEN MOV				
		COMMS	>>	>>	>>	>>	>>		ENV CLEAN UP	RTN/ HAND OVER VEHS				
					REPAIR ACCOM	>>	>>		SECUR TM MOV IN LOC	CUSTOMS PAX				
									CUSTOMS MAT	>>	>>	>>	>>	
									PACKING COMPLETE	DEF STORES				

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ANNEX B
TO LIQUIDATION / STAFPLAN DIR
DATED 01 NOV 95

LIQUIDATION SCHEDULE

SECTOR 1

DAYS	D+60	D+61	D+62	D+63	D+66	D+67	D+80	D+81	D+82	D+83	D+85	D+99
COMMS UNIT & GEN UNIT	CEASE WATER	MOV CNTRS TO SITE	WATER BLADDER	COORD MTG		UNOE CLR	>>	MOV UNOE	PAX MAIN FLT	RES DAY		REAR PTY FLT
		COMMS	>>	>>	>>	SECUR TM MOV IN LOC	PACKING COMPLETE	ENV CLEAN UP	>>	REAR PTY REMAIN WITH CORE GP		
		CEASE OPS				CUSTOMS MAT	>>	REPAIR ACCOM	HANDOVER ACCN	>>		
							RTN UN VEHS	DESTR / TRANS OF MAT	GEN MOV	>>		
									CUSTOMS PAX	SECUR TM RTN		
								BOI / WRITE OFF	>>	>>	>>	
										DEF STORES		

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ANNEX B
TO LIQUIDATION / STAFPLAN.DIR
DATED 01 NOV 95

LIQUIDATION SCHEDULE

SECTOR 1

DAYS	D+69	D+70	D+71	D+72	D+73	D+74	D+75	D+76	D+80
NORMED	MOV CNTRS TO SITE	COORD MTG	CEASE OPS		PACKING COMPLETE	CEASE FRESH RATS	PAX MAIN FLT	RES DAY	REAR PTY FLT
			UNOE CLR	>>	MOV UNOE	HANDOVER ACCOM			
			CEASE WATER		BOI / WRITE OFF	>>			
			GEN MOV		WATER BLADDER	CUSTOMS PAX			
			COMMS		REPAIR ACCOM				
					DESTR / TRANS OF MAT				
					ENV CLEAN UP				
					RTN UN VEHS				
			CUSTOMS MAT	>>	>>	>>			

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LIQUIDATION SCHEDULE

SECTOR 1

DAYS	D+66	D+71	D+72	D+73	D+74	D+75	D+77	D+78
TRANSIT CAMP	COMMS	CEASE WATER	COORD MTG	PACKING COMPLETE	DEF STORES		DESTR / TRANS OF MAT	RES DAY
		CEASE POL		WATER BLADDER	ENV CLEAN UP	>>		REPAIR/HANDOVER ACCN
				BOI / WRITE OFF	>>			
				POL GNTR MOV				
				GEN MOV				
				DISMANTLE TM	>>	>>	>>	
				CEASE OPS				

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ANNEX B
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LIQUIDATION SCHEDULE

SECTOR 1

DAYS	D	D+63	D+67	D+69	D+71	D+72	D+80	D+85	D+86	D+87	D+88	D+90	D+91
B & R	CEASE POL	CEASE FRESH RATS	CEASE WATER	MOV CNTRS TO SITE	COORD MTG		WATER BLADDER	RTN/ HAND OVER UN VEHS	BOI / WRITE OFF	>>	>>		REAR PTY FLT
					COMMS	UNOE CLR	>>	>>	MOV UNOE	RES DAY			
					CEASE OPS				REPAIR ACCOM	HANDOVER ACCOM			
									PAX MAIN FLT	POL CNTR MOV			
									ENV CLEAN UP	>>			
									CUSTOMS PAX	DESTR / TRANS OF MAT			
						CUSTOM S MAT	>>	>>	>>	>>	>>	>>	
									PACKING COMPLETE	SECUR TM RTN			
										GEN MOV			
	SCRAP DISPOSAL	>>	>>	>>	>>	>>	>>	>>		DEF STORES			

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ANNEX B
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LIQUIDATION SCHEDULE

SECTOR 1

DAYS	D	D+60	D+64	D+65	D+68	D+71	D+80	D+85	D+86	D+87	D+88	D+89	D+90	D+91
TPT WKSP HVY	CEASE POL	MOV CNTRS TO SITE	CEASE FRESH RATS		CEASE WATER	COMMS	WATER BLADDER		PACKING COMPLETE	PAX MAIN FLT	RES DAY	REAR PTY SECUR TM MOV		REAR PTY FLT
			COORD MTG	UNOE CLR	>>	>>	>>	>>	MOV UNOE	DESTR / TRANS OF MAT		DEF STORES		
						CEASE OPS			REPAIR ACCOM	HANDOVER ACCN	>>	>>		
									ENV CLEAN UP	>>	>>	GEN MOV		
									HANDOVER UN VEHS	CUSTOMS PAX		POL CNTR MOV		
	SCRAP DISPOSAL	>>	>>	>>	>>	>>	>>	>>	BOI / WRITE OFF	>>	>>	>>	>>	
				CUSTOMS MAT	>>	>>	>>	>>	>>	>>	>>	>>	>>	

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TO LIQUIDATION / STAFPLAN.DIR
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LIQUIDATION SCHEDULE

SECTOR 1

DAYS	D	D+79	D+81	D+82	D+85	D+86	D+88	D+89	D+91	D+93	D+94	D+95	D+96	D+97	D+99
95 CMSG		CEASE WATER	WATER BLADDER	MOV CNTRS TO SITE	COORD MTG	CEASE OPS	OUT SURVEY	>>	>>	>>	>>	OUT SURVEY DOCS	>>		REAR PTY FLT
	SCRAP DISPOSAL	>>	>>	>>	>>	>>	>>	>>	CEASE FRESH RATS	REPAIR ACCOM	HANDOVER ACCOM	>>	>>	>>	
							RTN/ HAND OVER VEHS			DISMANTLE TM	>>	>>	>>		
						UNOE CLR	>>			DESTR / TRANS OF MAT	>>	>>	>>	>>	
							POL CNTR MOV			ENV CLEAN UP	>>	>>	>>	>>	
											COMMS	PACKING COMPLETE	GEN MOV		
												BOI / WRITE OFF	>>		
													DEF STORES		
													CUSTOMS PAX		
						UNOE/COE CUSTOMS MAT	>>	>>	>>	>>	>>	>>		PAX MAIN FLT	

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ANNEX B
TO LIQUIDATION / STAFPLAN.DIR
DATED 01 NOV 95

LIQUIDATION SCHEDULE

SECTOR 1

DAYS	D+81	D+83	D+86	D+87	D+88	D+89	D+91	D+93	D+94	D+95	D+96	D+97	D+99
INDBAT MAIN	CEASE WATER	WATER BLADDER	COORD MTG	UNOE CLR	>>		CEASE FRESH RATS		CORE GP & REAR PTY MOV TO MERIDIEN	REPAIR ACCOM	HANDOVER ACCOM	>>	REAR PTY FLT
		MOVE CNTRS TO SITE			POL CNTR MOV			DISMANTLE TM	>>	>>	DESTR / TRANS OF MAT	MAIN PAX FLT	
					RTN ALL VEHS				COMMS	PACKING COMPLETE	ENV CLEAN UP		
						OUT SURVEY	>>	>>	>>	OUT SURVEY DOCS	>>		
											GEN MOV		
											CUSTOMS PAX		
										BOI / WRITE OFF	>>		
											DEF STORES		
				UNOE/COE CUSTOMS MAT	>>	>>	>>	>>	>>	>>			

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ANNEX B
TO LIQUIDATION / STAFPLAN DIR
DATED 01 NOV 95

LIQUIDATION SCHEDULE

SECTOR 1

DAYS	D+62	D+63	D+79	D+87	D+91	D+92	D+93	D+94	D+98	D+99
CORE GROUP	MOVE TO TRAFIPRO	>>	CEASE WATER	COORD MTG	CEASE FRESH RATS	REPAIR ACCOM	HANDOVER ACCOM	MOVE TO MERIDIEN	DESTR / TRANS OF MAT	PAX MAIN FLT
									COMMS	
									UNOE CLR	
									RTN/ HAND OVER VEHS	
									CUSTOMS PAX	
									CUSTOMS MAT	
									PACKING COMPLETE	

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ANNEX C
LIQUIDATION / STAFPLAN.DIR
DATED 01 NOV 95

4000.1/LOG-28/1 (SRSG/FC)

01 December 1995

Distribution List

UNAMIR OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT LIQUIDATION INSTRUCTION 1/95

References: A. SRSG Memo dated 10 October 1995
B. UNNY XXXXXXX
C. UNAMIR HQ 4000.1/LOG-28/1 dated 13 Oct 95
D. UNAMIR BUDGET ALLOCATION XXX dated XX XXX XX
XX. XXXXX

AIM

1. The aim of this directive is to implement specific UNAMIR Liquidation policies and provide resource allocations to close down all UNAMIR elements, both civilian and military.

SCOPE

2. At reference B, UNNY has directed that UNAMIR cease ops with effect from XXXXX and that all of its inherent components be liquidated no later than (NLT) XXXXX. The liquidation activities will be constrained by planned expenditure reductions identified by UNNY at reference XX and enunciated in our allocated Budget (reference D). UNAMIR Operations and Support Liquidation Instruction (OSLI) 1/95 will give effect to this policy and provide direction on those activities which will be required to effect the liquidation as well as provide resource allocations in the following categories:

a. mission reductions and liquidation as directed by UNNY and further rationalization as a repercussion of liquidation and resource depletion in other categories;

b. movement of personnel and materiel regardless of the means used;

c. materiel returns for both COE and UNOE;

d. personnel policies in effect during the liquidation of UNAMIR;

e. contractor use resulting from both infrastructure liquidation and as a consequence of liquidation and resource depletion in other categories;

f. military reductions resulting from liquidation activity as a distinct component of UNAMIR;

g. civilian reductions resulting from liquidation activities as a distinct component of UNAMIR;

h. MILOB and CIVPOL reductions resulting from liquidation activities as two distinct components of UNAMIR;

i. financial policies to be in effect during the liquidation of UNAMIR;

j. administration policies to be in effect during the liquidation of UNAMIR; and

k. funding reductions to specific programme elements (SPE) such as construction costs, contract management, miscellaneous requirements (MR), procurement and personnel.

3. The underlying theme and objectives of this directive represent a conscious decision by UNAMIR to maximize its available liquidation resources in compliance with our operational and fiscal imperatives. The consequence of this decision is that the capacity of our support infrastructure will be drastically reduced, occasioning a shift towards a methodology which will streamline existing UNAMIR methods of operation, remove administrative impediments to liquidating the mission and provide the Liquidation Task Force (LTF) and its Liquidation Team (LT) with the resources and means to effectively complete its closure tasks within the limitations assigned by UNNY.

4. It is essential that all leaders and administrators recognize the resource management challenge presented by a liquidation of this magnitude. This OSLI will provide direction by linking objectives, resources and desired results.

LIQUIDATION STRATEGY

5. Outlook. There is a requirement for commanders and resource managers to look downstream in their operating plans, with a view to building-in flexibility and manoeuvre room as a precaution against additional budgetary/resource restrictions.

6. Compression of liquidation. The confusion caused by the early identification of a compressed liquidation is acknowledged as a factor which impairs the ability of leaders and managers to assess the impact of reductions and make timely plans for its implementation. This directive will serve to provide a clear picture of the full liquidation programme using a time line which is more realistic.

7. Speed of Execution. The reduction plan contained in this directive is driven by UNNY's need to obtain cash savings over a pre-determined phase line. The heavy burden of personnel adjustments in the early portion of the programme along with the liquidation of infrastructure in the latter portion should allow for the orderly liquidation of the mission. The strategy to be adopted for implementation of the liquidation will be based on:

a. Fastest possible achievement of reduction targets. Where possible,

commanders and resource managers shall take action to realize projected savings in advance of the phase-lines; and

b. Eclipsing of reduction targets. UNAMIR is burdened by inefficient and costly systems and infrastructure. The impact of this burden on a much reduced support structure is substantial. Commanders and resource managers are instructed and encouraged to surpass the targets contained in this directive, particularly as they apply to surplus infrastructure, redundant command and control elements, and excess support capacity. Resource managers, as stewards of all UNAMIR resources assigned to their area of responsibility, are expected to reallocate resources to stabilize and balance their structures and systems. In this respect, CAO retains full discretionary authority to arbitrate resource allocation issues.

OBJECTIVES

8. Financial Reductions. UNAMIR's funding allocation is to be reduced from its current levels. The UNAMIR model at Annex A indicates a net deficiency of $XX Million to meet all of our requirements, a shortfall which is to be absorbed by all components of UNAMIR. Annex A provides a breakdown of reduction targets by categories.

9. Personnel Adjustments - Military Component. Adjustments to the military component of UNAMIR are described in detail at Annex C. Starting at D + 30, these reductions will be applied over a 67 day period, IAW the overall liquidation plan. This plan includes the completion of UNAMIR liquidation activities by D + 99.

10. Personnel Adjustments - Civilian Component. Adjustments to the civilian component of UNAMIR will occur as directed by the SRSG and the CAO and as described in detail at Annex C. Reductions to the local employees will be coordinated with the Liquidation Cell (LC) in keeping with the directives received by the LT.

11. Infrastructure Rationalization. A general assessment of the state of UNAMIR leased or rented infrastructure is required. The cost of maintaining the infrastructure will only be drastically reduced once clear direction has been received from UNNY as to the actual D day.

12. Infrastructure Maintenance Strategy. Infrastructure and its maintenance will be rationalized so that all work of an operational, emergency and/or safety related nature and those constituting health hazards are to continue. In the short-term, all other work needs to be scrutinized by both BMES and SO Accn to ensure that our limited resources are not needlessly expended.

13. Directed infrastructure adjustments are described at Annex B, including site-specific data related to savings targets, liquidation milestones and other guidance. These reductions have been incorporated in the liquidation model at Annex C.

14. Streamlining of C^2 System. The policy basis for streamlining of the C^2 system. calls for a reduction by at least one-third of the resources committed to HQ functions by D+30, and the elimination of two layers of HQs through the liquidation of MILOB and CIVPOL HQs by D+59. UNAMIR HQ will conclude operations in Amahoro on D+62 and transfer to Trafipro until D+94 IAW the De-Commissioning Schedule at Annex C.

DELIVERABLES

15. Impact Assessment - Readiness. The readiness levels and ability to retain an operational response capability must be maintained throughout the liquidation process. Conversely, the availability of resources to achieve the required readiness levels will be significantly reduced as the liquidation occurs. The overall impact must be assessed in detail as soon as practicable so that corrective action can be taken and a cohesive plan developed. The initial assessment of the proposed tasks indicates that many of the tasks will be difficult to achieve based on projected constrained resource allocations. There is a requirement to review all of the stated and implied tasks to determine achievability and, as necessary, establish priorities within the available resource envelope. The G3 Ops and G3 Plans will conduct a detailed assessment of the security requirements. The planning directive to accomplish this task is attached at Annex D.

16. Cost Capturing. Recent initiatives directed that a disciplined approach to liquidation must be imposed throughout UNAMIR. Every activity associated with liquidation must be carefully costed and rigorously controlled so as to maximize the value of each event. Under the current fiscal climate this will be essential to ensure that standards and capability do not suffer.

17. C^2 Adjustment Strategy. With the elimination of UNAMIR HQ by D+62, a new combined Military/Civilian UNAMIR Core Group will be formed to handle remaining liquidation activities. This group will be based in Trafipro until integral liquidation activity is initiated for the remaining units at D+94 at which time the Core Gp will move to the Meridien Hotel. The exact composition of the Core Gp is to be determined by the LT Co-Chairmen.

18. Infrastructure Reduction Strategy. The infrastructure liquidation will temporarily increase the number of sites isolated from Kigali's main support structure. With drastically shrinking personnel resources, the support services provided by the existing network must be rationalized. Some process re-engineering of the provision of support must therefore occur within UNAMIR.

19. The following premises will apply to implementation of the liquidation directed reductions:

a. the bottom line must be met IAW the phasing time lines at Annex C. There is no flexibility in this matter;

b. sector closures must take place not later than the announced time lines (sooner, if possible); and

c. flexibility of transferring funding between allotments will be limited and coordinated through the CAO.

20. All UNAMIR elements must develop their own integral transition plans which will meet the stated liquidation directives. In order to provide as much flexibility as possible to the various liquidation working groups, the maximum use of rental or contracting to supplant/supplement UNAMIR resources will be authorized.

21. Support Services Strategy. The liquidation of infrastructure, as well as the severity of the reduction to the UNAMIR funding envelope, will impose significant and far-reaching constraints on our ability to provide support to the liquidation process. As a result, UNAMIR will:

a. consolidate on Sector 1; and

b. reduce UNAMIR assets to the absolute minimum required to support our dependencies once executive direction concerning the actual D Day is received. This does not preclude a gradual thinning out of second and third line resources prior to the announcement.

22. This may result in a number of changes in the way support is provided. Relative to the existing situation, there will be cases where the level of support or the responsiveness of that support is reduced. Nevertheless, UNAMIR will ensure the well-being of all dependencies on an equitable basis.

23. Annex K establishes general parameters and principles to govern the development of UNAMIR's support plans. Sector and HQ staffs must use Annex K in conjunction with existing support SOPs to develop their own support plans.

24. Information Systems (IS) Strategy. All tactical and non-tactical IS materiel will be relocated to Sector 1 once liquidation occurs. UNAMIR detachments which are closing may be allowed to transfer those IS assets to other UN agencies, NGOs or to the local government as directed at Annex K. Sector Log Os will liaise with UNAMIR FSO/CCO to ensure that they maintain the minimum viable level of IS services until full liquidation occurs.

25. Human Resource Management Strategy. The effects of the liquidation will significantly reduce UNAMIR's available human resources between now and D+97. Recognizing that local personnel and budget allocations will be the principal tools for the implementation of the liquidation, that personnel policy is for the most part controlled by UNNY, and that both military and civilian members deserve to be kept fully informed and be consulted about matters affecting their futures, our human resource management strategy will incorporate three principal elements:

a. allowance of maximum flexibility to resource managers to achieve their liquidation targets in the manner which is best suited to their local circumstances;

b. close cooperation between the military and civilian components of UNAMIR as well as with UNNY who are responsible for the design and implementation of policies aimed at minimizing the impact of the liquidation on our people; and

c. comprehensive, clear and timely communication to all personnel of programme objectives and implementation methodologies as well as consultation at all levels with regard to the design of these methodologies where they affect UNAMIR's workforce.

26. Human Resource Management Plan. Details of the plan are found at Annex H.

27. Welfare / Personnel Support Programmes (PSP). It is anticipated that:

a. the essential quantity and quality of PSP will be preserved until the final liquidation occurs; and

b. adequate local control of PSP will be maintained and that all items will be returned for redistribution to other missions.

28. Communications Strategy. UNAMIR will be pro-active in communicating the developments of liquidation policies and the subsequent resource redistribution. It is particularly important to keep our internal audience well-informed, as well as those external audiences directly affected by the liquidation. Details may be found at Annex I.

MILESTONES

29. Milestones for specific activities are contained in the appropriate annex. Critical staff coordination milestones are as follows:

SERIAL	DTG	EVENT
001	01 Dec 95	ISSUE OSLI
002	15 DEC 95	UNAMIR ELEMENT COMMENTS ON THE OSLI DUE UNAMIR HQ
003	01 Jan 96	SECTOR LIQUIDATION PLANS DUE UNAMIR HQ
004	D	ISSUE TERMINATION NOTICES TO CIV PERSONNEL AND CONTRACTORS. ACTION OSLI
005	D+1	PANIC
006	D+7	WEEKLY BRIEFING TO LTF.

COORDINATION AND APPROVALS

30. SRSG and Force Commander retains approval authority for all policies and plans originating from this directive. Implementation of the liquidation shall be effected through the LT. In coordinating the liquidation, adjustments and strategies contained in this directive, the Chairmen of the LTF and LT shall liaise closely with UNNY on resource allocations. UNAMIR OPIs listed below shall be responsible for the staffing of plans and monitoring of progress through the LC as follows:

a. financial resource reductions and allocations - CAO & CFO;

b. infrastructure closures plan - CBMES & SO Accn;

c. de-commissioning schedule and operational con and coordination of the liquidation - Ops O ISS, SO Plans & G4 Log;

d. human resource management plan - CCPO & G1;

e. support services plan - CISS & G4;

f. C^2 adjustment plan - G3 Plans;

g. IS plan - CCO & FSO;

h. communications strategy and plan - PAFFO;

i. OSLI development - Ops O ISS, SO Plans & G4 Log;

j. transportation plan - C MOV CON & CO 95 CMSG

31. Working Group Co-Chairmen shall inform the LC of the composition of their sub-teams NLT 24 Nov 95.

REPORTING

32. In addition to the critical staff coordination milestones listed above, the requirement to report progress on a daily basis has been identified. After the initial daily report, all subsequent meetings must provide:

a. information on Human Resources (military and civilian personnel). The actual numbers of civilian personnel laid off as a result of the liquidation. Reporting on civilian personnel must include details of the category under which an employee is employed (ie. Expat, LN etc). Military personnel will be reported by type (i.e. MILOB, staff, contingent etc);

b. shortfalls and failure to meet milestones and/or assigned taskings;

c. proposed corrective action;

d. progress towards the achievement of directed liquidations must be specifically mentioned; and

e. any one time costs encountered.

Shaharyar Khan
Special Representative
of the Secretary General

G. Tousignant
Major General
Force Commander

Annexes: Annex A - Finance
Annex B - Infrastructure liquidation

Annex C - De-Commissioning Schedule
Annex D - Readiness and Security Directive
Annex E - Transportation Plan
Annex F - TBI
Annex G - IS Support Plan
Annex H - Human Resource Management Plan
Annex I - Communications Plan
Annex J - TBI
Annex K - Support Plan

Distribution List

Action

Sector 1//CO INDBAT/MILOB Comds 1A & 1B/CO 95 CMSG/CO GHANCOY 2/ CO MP COY/ F Engr Coy/ F Sigs Coy//
Sector 2//CO GHANCOY 1/MILOB Comds 2A & 2B//
Sector 3//CO MALICOY/MILOB Comds 3A & 3B//
Sector 4//CO MALAWICOY/MILOB Comd//
Sector 5//CO NICOY/MILOB Comds 5A, 5B & 5C//
MILOB HQ//DCMO//
CIVPOL HQ//Commissioner//
UNAMIR HQ//DFC/ED/COS/CAO/DCOS Ops/DCOS Sp/CISS/CMPO/CCPO/G2 G3 Ops/CSO/G3 Plans/CFSA/C LOG O/CPO/CFO/CCU/CPSU/FSO/CCO/CMS SO PLANS/OPS O ISS/G4 LOG/SO TPT/MOV/C MOV CON/SO MAINT/CITMM SO SUP/SUMMO/CPCIU/FEO/CBMES/SO ACCN/CMCO/SO FOODS/CGEN CHAO/FMO/FPM//

Information

UNNY//FALD/XXXX//
UNAMIR HQ//AA SRSG/MA FC//
CONTRACTORS//B & R/CHU/NORMED//

Annex A
TO ANNEX C
LIQUIDATION / STAFPLAN.DIR (SRSG/FC)
01 DECEMBER 1995

AIM

1. This Annex contains the specific funding reductions and savings targets as a result of UNAMIR's liquidation.

GENERAL

2. This is an example of the type of paragraph that should be used when preparing your specific response for the OSLI.

a. the paragraph and sub-paragraph numbering should follow the same format as that for Annex C and finish with a ; except for those sub-paragraphs that end the paragraph which end with a period; and.

b. as an aside the last sub-paragraph should include the word and so that we know this is your last sub-paragraph.

3.

4.

RATIONALE FOR ALLOCATIONS

5. The use of headers is encouraged as this will assist the reader in readily identifying the particular subject discussed.

BUDGET REDUCTIONS

6.

CONCLUSION

12. The magnitude of liquidation will certainly require the use of Appendices since it is unlikely that just using the Annexes will allow you to include all of the potential info you may wish to pass on. These should be added to the bottom of the Annex and identified as shown. As well, all of the pages should be identified at the bottom left hand corner of each page by using footers and having the format ½ where 1 is the present page and two is the total amount of pages which the doc (Annex or Appendix) has.

List of Appendices:

Appendix 1 Recapitulation of Reductions by Fiscal Year
Appendix 2 Summary of Reductions by Programme
Appendix 3 Site Closure/Reducti11/1on Summary

FILE 5000.2 (PLANS)

MILITARY PLANNING

IN THE DEMOBILIZATION PROCESS

by

Kieran O'Kelly

November 1994

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

From: Colonel K P O'Kelly
Deputy Chief of Staff (Support)

UNAMIR Force Headquarters
Kigali
Rwanda

4000.1/Log 28

See Distribution

28 Nov 94

MILITARY PLANNING IN THE DEMOBILIZATION PROCESS

1. In situations such as those in which we find ourselves in Rwanda, there is often an understandable desire on the part of many to see an immediate move towards demobilization of the armed forces, in order to release resources from defence to what are perceived as more constructive activities. The armed forces themselves often share this aspiration, so that they can concentrate on their role of providing the best possible forces for the defence of the country against internal or external aggression.

2. In recent years, there has been a considerable amount of study into the demobilization process, leading to the publication of a number of papers. This literature concentrates on the economic and social aspects of the demobilization process, with much useful information on how veterans have been successfully re-integrated into the civilian community in a number of countries and, inevitably, examination of some less successful programmes.

3. As a soldier, I naturally share the concern that the veterans, recognized as *a specially disadvantaged group*, receive as much appropriate assistance as possible in their transition back to civilian life. But it also concerns me that there is little or no published material available on the military aspects of demobilization; for the defence forces, it should come at the end of a long planning process and it is only as a result of that process that the numbers to be demobilized can be determined.

4. I suspect that the non-military community has little understanding of the issues which need to be considered in this process and why governments will see them as important; indeed, important enough to delay demobilization. I have, therefore, produced the attached paper with the aim of explaining what I see as the military considerations involved in demobilization. I must stress that the paper is a personal view and the views expressed should not be attributed in any way to UNAMIR nor to my own national authorities.

5. The paper does not include an executive summary as such but, as it is written in the form of a military service paper, a reading of the introduction, aim and conclusions sections will serve the same purpose.

6. I would be grateful if, as UNAMIR's link with the UN agencies and NGOs, you would circulate the paper to those organizations which you feel may have an interest in any aspect of the demobilization process, including the reintegration of veterans into the civilian community. I would also be happy to discuss any aspect of the paper with you or any other organization and can provide a limited number of further copies, if required.

7. The paper is not specific to any particular situation and certainly does not pretend to address the problems faced by the Government of Rwanda; none the less, I hope that it will be a useful contribution to the current debate on demobilization. In particular, I would draw attention to the need for close cooperation between the armed forces and other bodies which may be involved in the integration of veterans into the civilian community; this cooperation can, and should, begin well before it is possible to start calculating the numbers to be demobilized.

K P O'KELLY
Colonel

Distribution:

Action:

External:

UNREO

Information:

External:

RPA Liaison Officer

Internal:

Office of SRSG
Force Commander
DFC/COS/CMO

MILITARY PLANNING

IN THE DEMOBILIZATION PROCESS

by

Kieran O'Kelly

November 1994

Kieran O'Kelly is a serving officer in the British Army. Although primarily a logistician, he has held United Kingdom Ministry of Defence appointments concerned with the structure (size and shape) of the Army and in an officers' personnel (or manning) branch. He served two tours with the British Military Advisory and Training Team Zimbabwe, shortly after that country's independence, when many of the issues contained in this paper were topical. He has also visited Egypt as part of a team advising on manpower planning and manning policy issues. He is currently Deputy Chief of Staff (Support), with particular responsibility for personnel and logistics matters, in the Force Headquarters of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda.

This paper uses some British terminology and outlines a number of British practices; they are explained where their meaning is not self evident. While the detail of the processes may vary from one country to another, the underlying principles remain valid for any particular situation.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They should not be taken to represent the policy of either the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda or the British government.

MILITARY PLANNING IN THE DEMOBILIZATION PROCESS

INTRODUCTION

1. There is a growing body of literature dealing with the demobilization process, based mainly on the study of exercises to reduce armed forces in countries which have recently passed through internal struggles. This literature appears to assume that the objectives of demobilization are purely social and economic, with the emphasis on the latter. Yet it is an implicit assumption in all this work that not every soldier will be demobilized and, ergo, the countries concerned will continue to have armed forces. None of the works reviewed addresses the issues relating to this aspect of the topic - other than a few passing references to *professionalization* of the remaining armed forces. It may be that, in countries which are emerging from internal security problems, of whatever kind, there is a reluctance on the part of the military authorities to discuss matters which they consider might compromise national security and this could explain why the literature pays scant regard to these topics.

2. Matters such as the appropriate role, size, organization, equipment and level of training of the armed forces for the circumstances of the country concerned are equally as important for future national security - in the widest sense as well as the narrow meaning of the word - of that country as the successful reintegration into society of those who are demobilized. Indeed, such matters must be addressed to some degree before detailed work on the demobilization process can begin because it is only from an examination of them that it becomes possible to begin to calculate how many soldiers are to be demobilized. This work is not only relevant to the demobilization process, it also forms the basis of coherent defence planning; the introduction of mechanisms necessary for planning demobilization will provide a firm framework for much subsequent work.

3. It is possible to identify and discuss the issues involved without reference to any particular situation and, hence, without addressing, still less compromising, the security of any particular state.

AIM

4. The aim of this paper is to consider in outline the military aspects of demobilization of armed forces.

5. The context in which the paper is written is the newly emerging state in a troubled region of the world, a state which will be relying heavily on external advice and funding. But the processes described are essentially the same as those adopted by any state when it carries out a defence review.

6. It is hoped that this work will assist the economic and development communities by demonstrating that:

a. There are valid military concerns which have significance equal to that of the economic and social issues and, like those economic and social issues, their proper resolution is vital for the future well-being and stability of the country concerned.

b. It is essential that appropriate military planning staff are fully involved in the demobilization process.

c. While the processes involved are not difficult to understand, their application does require the use of specialized skills and techniques. It is as appropriate for institutions, aid agencies and donors to provide teams of advisors to assist in this work as it is in the areas in which advice is more traditionally given. Indeed, if such agencies are encouraging demobilisation, they may be considered to have a responsibility to fund that advice.

THE THREAT

7. All military planning takes as its starting point 'the Threat' and the approach to demobilization can not be an exception. It is only by having a thorough understanding of the potential for aggression against the state, whether external or internal, that it becomes possible to start designing the forces necessary to counter that threat and, hence, calculate the numbers for demobilization.

8. Accurate identification of the Threat is fundamental to the success of the exercise yet inevitably involves a considerable degree of speculation, hypothesis and, less sophisticatedly, sheer guesswork, based upon information which may be of dubious accuracy. There is a tendency among some threat analysts to overestimate the Threat; they build in a safety margin so that future events cannot be worse than they have predicted. At the least, prudence demands that they err on the side of caution.

9. The Threat is also dynamic and must be subjected to continual review to ensure that the military planning which depends upon it remains appropriate to the developing circumstances. Once a demobilization programme has been established, however, the consequences of such reviews should result in minor adjustments to numbers rather than radical reappraisals unless, of course, there is a major change in international relationships within the region; such changes would be likely to affect programmes other than those which are essentially military-related and, hence, will probably precipitate policy reviews in other areas as well.

10. There are 2 elements to the Threat: capability and intention[1]. For example, if a neighbouring state has strong, well equipped and trained Armed Forces but enjoys excellent relationships with the country under consideration, considerable commonality of interest exists between the 2 states and there are no border disputes, the military might of that neighbouring country presents little threat. On the other hand, if the

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1 I am grateful to my British Army colleague, Captain Sean Moorhouse, for his assistance with capabilities and intentions.

neighbouring country has small, poorly equipped Armed Forces but there are fundamental policy disagreements, cross-border ethnic tensions and/or long-standing territorial disputes, the threat of a major attack, limited incursions or a counter-insurgency campaign is clearly greater than in the first example. Consideration of capability is naturally a matter in which the military staffs should lead while substantial political advice is necessary when intentions are being assessed; it needs always to be remembered that intentions are effectively limited by capability.

11. It is necessary to carry out a Threat Analysis for each neighbouring country and any other state within the region which might pose a strategic threat. The countries must be considered alone and in the form of potential alliances. It will also be necessary to consider internal elements who may wish to see changes in the constitution, borders or policy of the state. The work must clearly be soundly based in the present but, to have any value, it must make forward projections. It is suggested that for the purposes under consideration the optimal period for review is likely to be in the order of 5 years.

12. **Current Capability.** The assessment of current capabilities is the easiest element of the analysis, despite the fact that many details may be shrouded under a blanket of security. There are published data relating to the armed forces of all states and these may form a useful starting point. Further information will come from observation of a country's military training and ceremonial events and by monitoring the international arms trade to determine what military hardware a country has acquired.

13. **Future Capability.** Projections into the future are clearly more speculative but there will be information available from which inferences may reasonably be drawn. There is a link between perceived intentions and future capability, clearly demonstrating that the political and military aspects of this work are interdependent. The types of indicator which may be used to assess future capability include: the development of a manufacturing base with the potential to produce weapons, the signing of arms deals with other nations and the recruitment of weapons design specialists from more advanced countries.

14. **Current Intentions.** Current intentions may be explicit, such as a publicly announced aim, as in the case of territorial disputes, or they may be more subtle. Intentions are determined by the political leaders of a state but are carried out by the military staff. Purely military indicators which help to determine intentions include the build up of military forces in a particular area or the stockpiling of military materiel. Indicators of a political nature include the deterioration of diplomatic relations between states or the signing of an alliance with a hostile power.

15. **Future Intentions.** As with the assessment of future capabilities, the assessment of future intentions is speculative. Thorough research and an in depth knowledge of the surrounding countries, internally and in regard to the regional situation, is essential in order to produce an assessment of those countries' likely intentions. Given the political nature of intentions, any change of leadership, particularly if it occurs by force, will precipitate a review in this area.

16. **The Threat Document.** From consideration of these aspects of capability and intention, the Threat Document is synthesized. It will contain an assessment of the likelihood of armed aggression (and whether this is likely to be a major or minor incursion), insurrection or civil disorder against the state. It is unlikely that there will be an unequivocal statement of the Threat but, rather, the identification of a spectrum - a low threat best case up to the high threat worst case and, in between, implicitly or explicitly, a most likely worst case.

17. **Need for Regular Review.** The production of such a document involves a considerable amount of skilled and detailed work by many agencies and this needs to continue. It was previously noted that the Threat will change; even in a relatively stable environment, there will be changes of detail and emphasis. The current capabilities and intentions are no more than foundations on which the more important, and much more difficult, future capabilities and intentions are based and, no matter how skillfully the Threat is analyzed, it is unlikely that the Threat Document will be accurate in every detail. These considerations do not invalidate the work but they emphasize the need for regular reviews of the situation. Any fundamental, unforeseen change in the political environment affecting the state will force an immediate Threat Review to consider the new circumstances. While Intelligence staffs should constantly monitor the situation and note relevant information, there should not normally be full reviews more than once each year; even full reviews are unlikely to produce major, unexpected changes from year to year but there will inevitably be changes in detail which will need to be addressed. Ideally, these full reviews will be timed to precede the preparation of the defence element of the national budget by a sufficient amount to allow any changes in the Threat which may be considered sufficiently significant to affect the defence programme to be addressed as part of the budgetary process. It is important that non-defence agencies understand that this process may affect the numbers of soldiers to be demobilized over the planned programme and that this is not because the military planning was faulty; rather that the military decision makers are adapting their plan to meet developing circumstances.

DESIGN OF APPROPRIATE ARMED FORCES TO MEET THE THREAT

SIZE AND SHAPE

18. Once the Threat has been defined, it becomes possible to begin the design of armed forces capable of meeting it. The first step in this design, and all that is necessary for broad budget planning, is the so-called 'size and shape' or structure of the armed forces - size is self-explanatory but shape refers to the division between the branches of the service - navy, army and air force - and within those branches eg, for the army, the proportion which will be infantry, armoured, artillery, military engineers, logistic troops etc (called the capbadge split in many armies[2]).

19. States may be able to rely, to a greater or lesser extent, upon the support of allies or United Nations protection and this support may reduce the need for armed

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2 This is a convenient shorthand, used later in this paper, which derives from those armies in which different arms and services wear distinctive capbadges.

forces of their own. In considering this, it needs to be remembered that alliances may be transient and United Nations protection temporary. The defence of the homeland is both the right and duty of a sovereign state, some would argue that it is the primary responsibility; the Government must be allowed to devote adequate resources to this task.

20. It is not axiomatic that all the forces considered necessary need be fully-mobilized. The Threat Document will identify Warning Periods and it may be possible to mobilize reserve forces (ie civilians with a liability to be called up to full time military service) so that they can be ready where required within the Warning Period. This may also open the way to the employment of formed bodies of troops on non-Defence tasks. It should be noted that systems will be required to activate and deploy the reserve forces, they will be less militarily skilled than full time soldiers (although they may well bring additional skills into the armed forces and may particularly be a source of certain types of specialist), they will require planned training periods and there will be little saving in equipment costs. There are social and other wider matters to be considered (which fall outside the scope of this paper). Clearly, there are many issues to be addressed before this option can be adopted but it can be a valid approach to the provision of adequate defence at minimum cost.

21. It has been noted previously that there may be internal and external threats to security. It is appropriate, therefore, to consider the extent to which the military will be involved in internal security matters. There may be political and presentational advantages in placing as much of this task as possible under the police and, hence, outside the defence budget.

22. The armed forces of developing countries tend to assume that defence capability should rely wholly on military personnel. In the developed world, the trend is in the other direction - military personnel are increasingly being used solely for tasks in which military training and experience are necessary, while civilians, employed directly or through a commercial contractor, are used to provide as much support as possible. Military personnel are generally more flexible than civilians but time spent on military activities reduces their productivity if they are engaged in technical activities; They also tend to be more expensive. Of course, in developing countries, there may not be the necessary pool of qualified civilians who could fill all of the posts appropriate for them. Here, too, there may be political and social considerations to take into account when the balance is struck between military and civilian staff.

23. Taking these and other factors into account, and from consideration of the Threat Analysis, it is possible to design armed forces capable of meeting and containing the Threat, together with all their necessary support functions. This is not a precise science and considerable judgement is required but there are a number of yardsticks and military axioms which are available to assist. Two simple examples: if a well equipped, hostile neighbour has strong armoured forces, there will need to be an anti-tank capability; an attack is usually planned on a 3:1 ratio - a defended position occupied by 100 soldiers will need not less than 300 soldiers to seize it and it follows that if a divisional attack (> 10,000 troops) on the country is considered probable, a minimum of a brigade (ca 5,000 troops) will be needed to resist, although qualitative comparisons will also be necessary.

24. It is not necessary in this paper to explain the detail of how the process is carried out, but it will be appreciated that it is inevitably long and detailed, requiring a high level of military expertise and judgement, together with a sound understanding of the forces to which the process is being applied and the personnel and logistic support functions which will be necessary to support those deployed in the field.

25. The development of a size and shape is inevitably an iterative process. It is almost a foregone conclusion that the first attempt will produce a design - probably providing ample capability to deal with at least the realistic worst case - which will far exceed anything which can remotely be afforded and so it will be necessary to apply judgement, compromise and take considered risks. It should be noted that this does not necessarily imply profligacy to be inherent in the military planning process; rather that military staffs are entrusted with substantial responsibilities for the defence of the homeland and, like most other professionals, do not wish to fail; indeed, they recognize that failure on their part would be more drastic than is the case in many other professions. This first, as it were ideal, design is a necessary part of the work as it is only by constant reference back to it that a sensible view can be taken on the compromises and risks necessary and acceptable to bring the design within budgetary reality.

26. Once developed, the size and shape of the armed forces provides a detailed basis on which a wide range of more specific planning can take place, much of which will have wider, social implications as well as affecting the defence budget. In many cases, some preparatory work can be carried out in parallel with the Threat Analysis and structural work but it cannot be finalized until that has been completed. For example:

a. An operational concept and tactical doctrine - produced in conjunction with the Threat Document to describe how the armed forces will operate in the field.

b. Detailed organization tables for each unit in the armed forces, listing the number of personnel, by rank, capbadge and qualification, together with the major and minor equipment requirements. These may be different for peace and war, to reflect the use of reserves or the redeployment of troops which may take place on mobilization.

c. An equipment programme - what equipment is required and in what quantity, including war reserves; phasing of purchase of that which needs to be procured to match budgetary planning; replacement parts, tools, test equipment etc for existing and planned equipments; disposal of surplus equipment etc.

d. A training programme - individual basic military skills; collective training; functional training to reflect new roles for the armed forces, particularly if those forces have moved from fighting a liberation struggle to keeping the peace; technical and special to arm or equipment training;

e. An accommodation plan - how many troops and their equipment are to be housed, where they would best be located having due regard to likely threats and other considerations, policy on family housing etc.

f. A terms and conditions of service policy - pay and allowances, leave, welfare etc.

g. A manning plan - career patterns, postings, promotion, personal records, indeed, everything relating to an individuals career - the most important document in the demobilization context and thus now examined in more detail.

27. It should, however, first be noted that many of the areas of work are interrelated. The training plan, for example, will need to reflect the manning plan and to feed into the accommodation plan, which will also be affected by the conditions of service policy.

THE MANNING PLAN

28. From a consolidation of the individual unit organization tables, the total military manpower[3] requirement is produced, showing the numbers of troops required under each capbadge, by rank and qualification. This becomes one of the foundations of the manning plan. Before declaring this as the size of the armed forces, it will be necessary to consider the need for additional manpower:

a. **Working Margin.** The Working Margin provides a small reserve of manpower which is available to meet new or temporary commitments.

b. **Supernumerary Allowance.** The Supernumerary Allowance provides manpower cover for personnel who, for whatever reason, are not filling established posts. During a handover/takeover period, for example, both the incumbent and his relief are effectively filling one post and there is only the cover for one. Unless some recognition of this is made in the overall manpower plan, effective handovers will only be possible by creating manning gaps elsewhere in the organization. Other situations covered by this allowance include attendance on long courses, long term sickness and travelling time on posting.

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3. It may be helpful to explain that, in this paper, manpower and manning have distinctly different meanings:

Manpower Planning relates to personnel in the abstract - how many are required and where they are to be employed, ie size and shape or structural issues.

Manning, on the other hand, relates to the filling of the posts listed in the structure by suitable individuals and their career management as they move through those pasts.

29. The total manpower requirement, by capbadge, rank and qualification, is collected together in a Manpower Conspectus, the basic document on which all manning matters are based.

30. In parallel with all of the Threat Analysis and size and shape work, a manning policy should be developed, although it is one of the many policies which cannot be finalized until the processes above have been completed. It is unlikely that the manning policy will be contained in one, simple document; for example: there are likely to be separate policy considerations affecting officers and other ranks; certain specialists may require different treatment from the majority, and so on.

31. A number of considerations arise when the manning policy is being considered. The overall aim of this policy is to ensure that all authorized posts are filled by suitably qualified and experienced personnel, while ensuring that those individuals have a satisfying career in the armed forces, during which their abilities are developed and rewarded, leading to their eventual discharge back into civilian life as useful citizens with skills which will be of value to the community.

THE RECRUITING AND REDUNDANCY APPROACH

32. In the context of this paper, the most important decision to be made is whether, and to what extent, there will be a flow of personnel into the armed forces, through the ranks and back into civilian life; in other words, will positive efforts be made to recruit and train new soldiers, with a compensating redundancy programme (affecting say 5% of the post-demobilization armed forces each year) becoming a feature of the manning policy for a number of years[4]? This will obviously affect the resettlement activities in a necessarily extended programme. While the recruiting and redundancy approach may be more expensive but has a number of social, political and military advantages:

a. Post-revolutionary armed forces, and particularly armies, tend to consist of predominantly young men, indeed often children, whose education has probably not been completed and who are thus not ideal material for military service. Among those who are not demobilized, there will be little natural retirement on grounds of age; natural opportunities for promotion will not arise, meaning that merit will not be rewarded and individuals will become frustrated. A resentful army is not an ingredient for stability within the country. Alternatively, if promotions are manufactured, the armed forces will become over-ranked and more expensive to no useful purpose, without the individuals gaining the enhanced job satisfaction which should come from filling appointments of greater responsibility on each successive promotion.

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4 Although not in the situation covered by the context of this paper, Nigeria has adopted this approach in its current Revitalization Programme. In 1989, the Nigerian Army was some 100,000 strong and, under the programme will reduce to about 60,000 by 1995.

b. The age profile will lead to the armed forces becoming less effective over time. Although the level of military expertise might increase, staleness is a potential problem. More seriously, while there is a place for older men within the armed forces, it is not appropriate for infantry riflemen to be in their late 30s as would happen 15-20 years after the establishment of the armed forces in this context.

c. There will come a time, perhaps some 20 years downstream, when a large proportion of the armed forces will reach retirement age within a short period. Assuming that they will need to be replaced - and if they do not they should previously have been demobilized - this will result in a huge recruiting and training programme. The armed forces will have little or no experience in the management of such activities and there will obviously be considerable turbulence, leading to the formation of essentially new, inexperienced armed forces.

d. Simultaneously with this development, the retiring veterans will all be precipitated onto the job market within a short period. Despite the comments on the aim of the Manning Policy including the return of useful citizens to civilian life, the low level of education of the majority of the veterans will mean that expensive education and resettlement programmes will be necessary, ideally throughout the period of their service but certainly as it nears its end. Even with such programmes, the market may not be able to absorb so many at one time, leading to a potentially destabilizing situation; indeed, a repetition of just the problem which demobilization itself would cause if not carefully managed in the manner described in the literature.

e. The adoption of a recruiting and redundancy policy could, itself, become a destabilizing influence. This disadvantage would be negated if it became clear that those discharged as redundant received the best possible preparation for discharge. This should include remedial education, vocational training and social skills.

f. Having the processes in place will allow the structure of the armed forces to be conveniently and easily adjusted as the work described above is refined and in the event of any significant change in threat.

g. Armed forces should reflect the society which they serve and from which they are drawn, yet in almost all countries they tend to be alienated, or at least set apart, from that society. There are many reasons for this (outside the scope of the paper) but a constant flow of new blood into the armed forces and a steady rate of discharge of personnel into the civilian community would foster greater mutual understanding and prevent the development of the dangerous situation of a military clique or sub-society within society as a whole.

33. Once this basic decision is taken, it becomes possible to complete the development of the manning policy itself. This should lead to the construction of simple mathematical models which will indicate ideal or target age, rank and length of service profiles for the numbers contained in the manpower conspectus.

34. It is typical of liberation armies that administration is at best informal. An essential tool in the administration of the personnel of the armed forces is basic personal documentation and the capture of the necessary data must be achieved as quickly as possible. This will take the form of personal profiles of every soldier, including educational background, previous careers etc, which when collated, will provide much useful management information on which many planning activities can be based.

35. Not only will this provide a basis on which selections for demobilization can be made, the requirement is more fundamental than that. It is only by collecting and collating the data that it will become possible to determine the current size of the armed forces and hence, in due course, how many are to be demobilized. But more immediately, and with significant security implications, it allows for the proper administration of pay (including a reduction in the potential for fraud by paymasters and commanders).

DEMOBILIZATION PLANNING

36. It is only when all of the work described above has been completed that it becomes possible to start addressing the quantitative aspects of the demobilization policy. The following basic information should have become available:

a. The number of personnel within the armed forces, together with at least basic personal details about each individual.

b. The number required for the long term, by capbadge, rank and qualification, with an indication of the target age, rank and length of service profiles.

c. Hence the number to be demobilized immediately.

d. An estimate of the numbers to be declared redundant in any follow up programmes, such as long term recruiting and redundancy, and the time scale over which this will take place.

37. It would be facile to pretend that a liberation army, converting into a conventional force, will have the infrastructure and experience necessary to carry out this planning process, and certainly not to do it quickly enough to satisfy the donor countries and organizations which will be wanting to see speedy progress towards demobilization. This gives rise to the following considerations:

a. The work which needs to be carried out to prepare for demobilization will be necessary to produce the design for appropriate, balanced and properly structured forces to meet the legitimate security concerns of the country. Demobilization considerations may force the pace but many other issues will be resolved through the process.

b. In reality, even developed nations with much experience of similar processes do not complete them quickly - and they have a corpus of policies

covering all the key areas, rather than having to start ab initio.

c. The provision of suitable advisors will thus be essential. They will necessarily become privy to much information which will rightly be regarded as vital to the security of the state. If they are to be effective, they must be acceptable to and trusted by the government; and the command group and strategic and corporate planning elements of the armed forces. Clearly they will need to be selected with care.

d. The development of the necessary policies will be iterative. It will be necessary to first carry out crude analyses of the various issues - thus allowing some broad estimates to be made - and then refine the policies, leading to more accurate figures of those to be demobilized. This strengthens the case for the adoption of the long term recruiting and redundancy approach discussed above, as its adoption would provide the means of adjusting numbers over the long term if the estimates were found to be wildly inaccurate.

e. The start of demobilization does not, however, need to wait for almost any of this work to be completed. There will be priority cases - individuals who should be discharged regardless of the outcome of the full planning process.

PRIORITY CASES

38. There are 2 obvious categories who demand priority treatment: the disabled and underage soldiers. While all veterans may be regarded as belonging to 'a specially disadvantaged group'[5] these 2 groups present particular problems and challenges. In addition, veterans' dependents have also been identified as a special/vulnerable group,[6] but consideration of them falls outside the scope of this paper. In any event, dependents need to be considered at the same time as the heads of their families and they are not, in themselves, priority cases.

39. **Disabled Veterans.** The literature contains much comment on the manner in which disabled veterans might be treated on demobilization and whether they should attract a priority above that of war-disabled civilians. For the purposes of this paper, suffice it to note that these personnel have no long term future within the armed forces, regardless of the overall numbers to be discharged, and it might be beneficial to them to be released ahead of the able-bodied, as soon as they can be supported by appropriate rehabilitation programmes.

40. **Underage Soldiers.** A feature of modern liberation struggles is the youth of many of the combat hardened soldiers - fighters as young as 10 or 12 are not

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5. Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel - Case Studies, Chapter VIII, The Case of Uganda, paragraphs 9 and 10. Nat Colletta and Nicole Ball, World Bank; date not shown.

6. World Bank Discussion Paper: Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel in Africa: the Evidence from Seven Country Case Studies. World Bank, October 1993.

uncommon; many of them are actually or effectively orphans and the army has become their family. It is not clear whether any demobilization exercises have addressed the particular needs of underage soldiers but they obviously represent a group which needs to be demobilized quickly so that their education can be resumed, psychological damage can be repaired and they can be taught social skills and attitudes different from the inappropriate ones they may have acquired during their service. If it is not possible to demobilize all of them, special attention must be directed at the needs of those who remain; perhaps some form of partial demobilization in which military activity is combined with a programme of education and vocational training. Given the recent UNICEF initiative on the employment of underage soldiers[7], donors might be particularly well disposed to fund the necessary programmes for this group as a matter of urgency.

SELECTION FOR DEMOBILIZATION

41. For the balance, it will be necessary to consider which individuals are to be demobilized. On 5 Jun 92 the Ugandan Army Council published the criteria which they had adopted for their demobilization programme:

> a. 'Voluntary resignation is accepted from all officers and men. The Army reserves the right to retain anybody for his or her skills, profession or special talent.
>
> b. Age as contained in the terms and conditions of service.
>
> c. Non-citizens.
>
> d. Services no longer required; this will cover all those who are undisciplined, malingerers, incompetent ones, drug abusers etc.
>
> e. Local defence units: Those interested in the army must be on active service now and have contributed to counter-insurgency operations for at least one year. They will be screened, like the rest of the army, and taken on provided there is room in the establishment. Those found unfit for health reasons shall be discharged.
>
> f. There are officers and men seconded to institutions outside the army. Whereas the secondment of officers will continue, they shall however cease to depend on all army resources. Only officers and specialists will be seconded. those affected [who] are interested will report back to the army for screening.'[8]

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7. Details not yet to hand.

8 'Army Council Issues Criteria for Reducing Army', Kampala Radio, 5 Jun 92, reproduced by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS-AFR-91-110, 8 Jun 92, p11.

42. A number of useful points arise from these criteria:

a. In general, any soldier who wishes to be demobilized should be allowed to do so. The armed forces will, however, invariably reserve the right to retain individuals with particular qualifications for which they foresee a need, in order to prevent the depletion of necessary skills, in order to allow the new armed forces to remain effective. Many of the skills likely to be under consideration will be those for which there is a ready market, and high pay, in the commercial sector; it will be necessary to ensure that the terms and conditions of service policy allows for those with such qualifications to be adequately rewarded within the armed forces. In considering the retention of skilled personnel, it may be appropriate to take account of whether the individuals gained their qualifications before or after joining the armed forces.

b. Underage soldiers have previously been considered as priority cases for demobilization. While the age criterion was absolute in the Ugandan demobilization exercise, ie governed by the terms and conditions of service policy, the ideal manning profiles will also tend to indicate groups of personnel who become prime candidates for redundancy on grounds of age.

c. In moving to smaller and, it is hoped, more professional armed forces, there is a natural and proper wish to remove non-effective personnel and the Ugandan criteria indicate the type of individual who has little to offer the armed forces. These and similar groups are easily identified and should be discharged.

d. There may be auxiliary forces associated with the armed forces who will need to be considered; this will clearly depend on circumstances and any roles they perform will need to be considered as part of the size and shape processes. If, however, such forces are to be demobilized, it is unlikely to be acceptable for all their members to be discharged and, anyway, doing so would eliminate a potential source of the good quality personnel required for the new armed forces.

43. It has been previously recommended that disabled veterans should be demobilized as priority cases but a health criterion might also be adopted for non-disabled personnel. The armed forces should have medical minimum standards; these might usefully be reviewed in preparation for the demobilization programme and enforced as a means of improving the overall standard of health of the forces. This will, in due course, lead to significant savings to the defence budget.

44. It is important to consider the extent to which is necessary or desirable to have ethnically mixed or balanced armed forces. This is essentially a political matter and beyond the scope of this paper but guidance must be obtained before any selection for demobilization can take place beyond those who fail to meet specified criteria.

45. Agreed criteria for selection for demobilization form the final requirement for the implementation of the demobilization plan. Certain groups will have been identified for automatic selection but it is unlikely that there will be sufficient volunteers to meet the balance of the total number required to be demobilized; compulsory demobilization

will be required. Although there is some evidence that, even shortly after leaving the armed forces, 'no matter how difficult economic circumstances may [have been], for both men and women, army life [no longer] seems attractive'[9] it is unrealistic to expect personnel to accept this ante facto. There will need to be an information campaign within the armed forces, stating the facts fairly and honestly, but in such a manner that it does not give rise to alarm or discontent; emphasis must clearly be given to the resettlement package. A published timetable will also be of assistance.

46. It will be necessary for selection boards to be convened to decide which volunteers are to be retained in the armed forces and to select personnel for compulsory demobilization. In the absence of comprehensive records of service, prepared to common standards, it will be difficult to achieve the levels of scrupulous fairness to which the armed forces of developed states would aspire during periods of military retrenchment. Nonetheless, great care should be taken so that the process is as fair as possible and this may be another activity in which the use of external advisors could be beneficial, not least in the presentational aspects of the programme.

MANAGEMENT OF DEMOBILIZATION

47. The scope of this paper is effectively bounded by the discharge of personnel from the armed forces, but the management of programmes for the re-integration of veterans into the civilian community is a subject in which the military authorities have a legitimate interest. The literature reviews the available options and concludes that such programmes are best conducted by private organizations and NGOs; further, the military authorities have much else to do and may consider that they would not wish to assume full responsibility for another major task. But the demobilization process is a continuum and it is clear that considerable coordination and cooperation between the military authorities and the organizations (for there will inevitably be more than one) which will carry out the subsequent work is a vital ingredient for success.

48. The coordination and cooperation cannot begin too early. As soon as the need for a demobilization programme is identified, contact should be established between the defence authorities and potential partners so that possibilities can be identified and appropriate research and planning commenced. There will need to be openness and mutual trust on both sides; they share a common aim.

49. Liaison between the authorities and the implementing organizations will need to continue throughout the demobilization process. This will include discussion of major policy issues, such as the timing of demobilization, management of the transition from military to civilian life, the types of vocational training to be offered, finance etc, but there will also be many minor administrative matters which will need close coordination. If the programme is to be a success, it is essential that discussions take place in an atmosphere of mutual trust and cooperation rather than one of suspicion.

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9 Preliminary Report on the Evaluation of the Uganda Veterans' Assistance Programme by the Evaluation Mission of the German Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development, Kampala, 26 Jul 94, p13.

50. Once the selections for demobilization have been announced, the implementing organizations may need to have access to those concerned, in order to discuss their individual plans and aspirations.

51. If demobilization is to be carried out in phases (and, indeed, the implementing bodies may need to be involved in such decisions), there must be a system of feedback to the military authorities so that problems, which will inevitably arise, can be discussed frankly to identify how they can be avoided in subsequent phases. Information on the successes of the programme should be passed to those still serving to reassure them that life outside the defence forces is not as frightening as they may fear.

INTEGRATION OF PREVIOUSLY WARRING FACTIONS

52. It is perhaps unfortunate that, in the literature relating to demobilization, integration has 2 distinct meanings:

a. Generally, it refers to the reintegration (which is also used) of ex-military personnel into civilian life.

b. But it is a feature of post-independence struggles that at least a measure of integration of the previously warring armies takes place. This section of the paper considers this integration.

53. Integration is a powerful symbol of reconciliation and unity of the new state. It may be defined as the creation of military units which contain a balanced mixture of the previously warring factions, subsequent to a process in which all personnel have received training to the same standards and been inculcated with a common ethos of service and loyalty to the new government and the whole community.

54. The principle and scope of integration are essentially political matters (and hence outside the scope of this paper; indeed, topics worthy of a paper of their own) but from the military perspective, integration provides a greater pool of training, experience and expertise from which to draw for the new armed forces.

55. If integration is to take place, it is a joint political/military matter to consider its timing in relation to demobilization. From a narrow military position, it might be argued that it will be a waste of resources to bring people together for military training, only to discharge them shortly afterwards. But there are other aspects which should be considered:

a. It is clear from this paper that it will take some time before the armed forces will be in a position to declare who is to be demobilized and, probably before it will be possible to deliver resettlement packages. Integration should involve confidence building measures between the various factions and, if the programme is successful, it would be beneficial for some of those who passed through it to take that experience into the civilian community.

b. In the meantime, the integration programme provides a constructive activity in which the larger than now required armed forces can engage and gain a sense of purpose different from those previously held by the different factions. Even if one faction can be seen as having won, it is likely that there will need to be a change of ethos; from liberation army to servants of the new state, its community and, indeed, the country.

c. If one faction can be seen as having won, there will also be a losing side. Many fighters on that side will feel a greater loyalty to their country than to any particular cause and will wish to continue to serve that country in some way. Willing participation in the integration process provides them with an opportunity to demonstrate this, so that they may make a new beginning, whether their eventual post-war career is to be in the armed forces or not.

d. Government will not want the factions to remain apart any longer than necessary, particularly if they remain armed; the political imperative may therefore be to press on with integration so that one, unified defence force is created as quickly as possible.

e. The process of integration may allow better informed selection of individuals for demobilization as training to common standards allows more valid comparisons to be made. Appropriate assessment procedures must be included in the integration training package but this must not be taken to the extent that those passing through the programme come to believe that their performance during that period is the sole, or even main, determinant of their future. It will also be necessary to ensure that the assessments are fair and undertaken by a team in which all factions are represented.

56. It is considered that if the programe for the integration of previously warring factions is well designed and properly conducted, the balance of advantage lies in taking it forward independently of demobilization. This is not to imply that there is not a need for close coordination between the 2 programmes.

CONCLUSIONS

57. While economic and social benefits may result from a demobilization programme, the need for such a programme is primarily driven by military considerations. In the context of this paper, the Threat will normally have reduced and hence armed forces can be reduced commensurately.

58. Before it is possible to produce a definitive figure of personnel to be demobilized, the size and shape of the armed forces of the future need to be defined. This is a complex process and external, independent advisors may need to be provided. But the decision-making responsibility rests with the government as the final structure will be a compromise between perceived defence needs and budgetary reality.

59. In parallel with the design of the structure of the armed forces, a wide range of other policy matters will need to be addressed, although it is unlikely that this work can be concluded before an outline structure is developed. One of these is a manning plan, leading to the identification of target age, rank and length of service profiles for each capbadge within the defence forces.

60. A key decision to be made is whether planned redundancy will become a long term feature of military life.

61. It is important that formal personal documentation of all military personnel is introduced at the earliest opportunity. Inter alia, this will accurately identify the size of the defence forces.

62. Based upon the defined size and shape, it becomes possible to identify the future manpower requirement and, hence, the size of the demobilization programme.

63. Clear, well publicized criteria must be developed for the selection of those to be demobilized. The selection process must be as fair as possible, particularly if ethnic considerations are involved.

64. Fair and honest publicity will alleviate many of the worries felt by those vulnerable for selection for demobilization.

65. If the social aspects of demobilization are to be achieved, it is essential that a close, cooperative relationship is established between the military authorities and any outside organizations who will take on the work of reintegrating veterans into the community. Fundamentally, both sides share a commonality of interest.

66. Two particular groups, disabled veterans and underage soldiers, should be demobilized as soon as the necessary programmes can be put in place.

67. If there is to be an integration of formerly warring factions, this may better take place before demobilization. However integration is conducted, it must be carefully coordinated with the demobilization programme.

68. Demobilization programmes serve many interests and their success may be vital for the future well being of the country. It is essential that they are properly planned and conducted. Much military planning must take place before a programme can begin.