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
OCHA  
Haiti  
El Salvador

To: Mr. KIM *hw*

Please find attached, for your approval, the draft SG report to the GA on humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation, which provides a status report on such assistance in Haiti and El Salvador.

*NH*  
Nicholas Haysom  
27 August 2010


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**Note to Mr. Nambiar**

**DRAFT REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON HUMANITARIAN  
ASSISTANCE AND REHABILITATION FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES AND  
REGIONS**

1. Please find attached for you review and approval the draft report of the Secretary-General on 'Humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation for selected countries and regions.' This report has been prepared by OCHA in consultation with UNDP in accordance with General Assembly General Assembly resolutions 64/74 and 64/250.
2. The report provides a status report and an analysis of the current challenges to the delivery of both humanitarian relief and rehabilitation assistance supplied by the United Nations and its partners to Haiti and El Salvador.

John Holmes  
18 August 2010



General Assembly

Distr.: General  
\_\_\_ September 2010

Original: English

*approved on SG's behalf  
JH*

**General Assembly**

**Sixty-fifth session**

**Item 70 Strengthening of the  
coordination of humanitarian and  
disaster relief assistance of the United  
Nations (d) Special economic assistance  
to individual countries and regions**

## **Humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation for selected countries and regions**

### **Report of the Secretary-General**

#### *Summary*

The present report is submitted to the General Assembly in compliance with its requests in resolutions 64/74 and 64/250. It provides a status report and an analysis of the current challenges on the delivery of both humanitarian ~~and~~ relief and rehabilitation assistance supplied by the United Nations and its partners to countries affected by various types of natural and man-made disasters. In keeping with the request of the General Assembly to the Secretariat to consolidate and streamline reports whenever possible, the country reports under the present agenda item have again been consolidated into a single document covering two countries, El Salvador and Haiti.

## **I. Introduction**

1. The present report is submitted to the General Assembly in compliance with its requests in resolutions 64/74 and 64/251. The report covers the period from November 2009 until July 2010.

## **II. Humanitarian assistance, emergency relief and rehabilitation for Haiti in response to the devastating effects of the earthquake in that country**

2. The information provided in sections A and B is largely based on the six-month report of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) on the 'Response to the humanitarian crisis in Haiti' launched at the ECOSOC Humanitarian Affairs Segment 2010 in New York. ✓

### **A. The Disaster**

3. The earthquake occurred at 16.53 local time on 12 January 2010 and reached a magnitude of 7.0. Its hypocentre was located less than 10 kilometres below the earth's surface. The epicentre was close to Léogâne, approximately 25 km from Port-au-Prince. An aftershock of magnitude 6.0 occurred immediately afterwards, and by 24 January, at least 52 aftershocks measuring 4.5 or more had been recorded.

4. While the exact number of deaths and injuries caused by the earthquake may never be known, the Government estimates that 222,750 people (2 per cent of the population) were killed and 300,572 injured. Three million people, out of a total population of 10 million, are estimated to have been affected. ~~One person in fifteen was killed by the earthquake.~~ The human cost of the earthquake in terms of deaths, injuries, and homelessness per capita was far greater than in other recent earthquakes of similar amplitude, primarily because it occurred in a large urban area with many poorly-constructed buildings. It is likely that female casualties numbered much higher, as many women were at home when the earthquake struck, while men were at work and children on their way back from school. The high level of damage to public buildings also resulted in major loss of life among Haiti's civil servants. ✓

### **Infrastructural damage**

5. The earthquake crippled Haiti's capital and economic heart, Port-au-Prince, and also destroyed or severely damaged buildings and infrastructure elsewhere, particularly in the towns of Léogâne, Petit-Goâve, Jacmel, Pétionville, Delmas and Carrefour. The Government estimates that 250,000 homes and 30,000 commercial buildings were severely damaged, while the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) identified 105,000 completely destroyed homes and over 208,000 damaged <sup>homes</sup>. Numerous prominent government buildings, Port-au-Prince's Cathedral and other public buildings were also damaged to varying degrees. In outlying towns affected by the earthquake, municipal administration buildings were also severely damaged. Léogâne, the closest town to the epicentre, suffered close to 80 per cent structural damage. ✓

6. The earthquake seriously damaged the control tower at Toussaint L'Ouverture International Airport and the Port-au-Prince seaport, limiting the use of both the airport and harbour in the initial stages of the response. Many roads were blocked with debris or had their

surfaces broken. There was also considerable damage to the communications ~~infrastructure~~. The earthquake damaged Haiti's only submarine telecommunications cable and rendered ~~unavailable~~ the public telephone system, while two of the largest cellular telephone providers had their services disrupted.

### **Displacement**

7. According to Government figures, approximately 2.3 million people left their homes at the peak of the displacement. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) predominantly settled either as individual households or in small household groupings close to their former area of residence. Many settled in the street, in spontaneous settlement sites varying in population from a handful to 50,000 people, or in collective accommodations. Initially, around 1.5 million displaced people settled in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, while around 600,000 left the affected area, many facilitated by the Government and others using private means, to seek shelter with host communities in non-affected areas. Up to 250,000 of the latter have since returned to Port-au-Prince or surrounding communes, either as households or individually. As of end May 2010, 1,342 IDP sites had been identified in the area affected by the earthquake, the majority with a population of between 100 and 1,000 households. In some cases, these sites are located in gullies or flood-prone zones, adding to the vulnerability of those displaced.

### **Impact on the economy, livelihoods, and education**

8. The total damage and loss caused by the earthquake is estimated at US\$ 7.8 billion, which is equivalent to slightly more than the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2009. The private sector suffered 70 per cent of the damage and loss. Education facilities were severely affected, with 4,992 schools (23 per cent of schools in the country) either damaged or destroyed. Over one million learners and 55,000 teachers were affected, while 38,000 learners and 1,500 educational personnel died.

9. The Haitian health system suffered catastrophic damage to its infrastructure. In the three most affected geographic departments (Ouest, Sud-Est and Nippes), 60 per cent of the hospitals were severely damaged or destroyed, including the only national teaching and reference (tertiary) hospital. The Ministry of Health building itself collapsed, killing more than 200 staff. The initial damage assessment identified 67 affected health facilities in the services network with damage impairing their operations. The already limited drinking water coverage and waste collection capacity in the affected area were further reduced. There were severe consequences also for the agricultural sector. Thirty-two per cent of farmers in earthquake-affected rural areas lost their seed stocks and 4 per cent their livestock. Twenty-nine per cent of farm homes were either destroyed or severely damaged. Furthermore, farmers were affected by falling agricultural incomes, loss of storage and irrigation facilities, distorted markets and reduced availability of revenues.

10. Populations outside the earthquake-affected area were also affected from a socio-economic and livelihoods perspective. Vulnerability in these areas increased due to the massive displacement of population from the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, exerting additional pressure on available resources (e.g. food and firewood), particularly in departments such as Artibonite and Nord-Ouest, which already experienced chronic food insecurity. Over 90 per cent of IDPs in these areas are being supported by host families, with over 80 per cent hosted by immediate family. As a consequence, many host families have reportedly resorted to unsustainable coping mechanisms, such as selling of animals and assets, and consumption of household food reserves in order to be able to support themselves and the IDP households they are hosting.



11. There <sup>which</sup> has been a particularly high impact in the border areas with the Dominican Republic, to ~~where~~ an estimated 160,000 <sup>people</sup> ~~people~~ displaced. Host communities there, particularly in rural areas, are very poor, and with the arrival of large numbers of IDPs, the basic services in these areas - schools, health centres, water supplies - as well as the local economy, are severely overstretched. Humanitarian organisations visiting areas close to the border, such as Fonds Verrettes in the South-East, or Ouanamithe in the North-East, reported households that were previously composed of four to five persons now housing between 12 and 15 individuals.

## B. Humanitarian Response

12. In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, the initial response was led by the Haitian population, and countless ~~live~~ rescues and support to the injured were provided by local communities. Neighbours, friends, family, and strangers helped each other, saving thousands of lives, while the Government and the international **community** mobilized their response and tried to overcome initial constraints. However, local communities faced major constraints in their immediate response capacity, including the absence of electricity, widespread debris, limited first aid skills, and extensive trauma, which was compounded by a pervasive fear of additional aftershocks. Haitian Civil Society Organisations were very active in providing immediate assistance to the affected and displaced population, despite the fact that they themselves were also extensively affected.

13. The destruction of many national and municipal authority buildings, the death and injury of many civil servants, and need for them to prioritize support to their own extended **families**, significantly reduced the Government's capacity, at both national and local level, to lead and coordinate an effective response at the initial stages. The critical National Disaster Risk Management System (NDRMS) sustained heavy losses in terms of human and material resources.

14. International humanitarian organisations that were already established in Haiti prior to the disaster began to provide assistance within the first 72 hours. Almost all were supported by national counterparts within Haitian civil society. Organisations used their pre-positioned relief supplies in-country (mostly contingency stocks left over from 2009 hurricane season preparedness activities) to support initial assistance. However, many humanitarian actors present in-country prior to the earthquake themselves suffered losses – both in terms of staff killed and injured, and offices and homes damaged and destroyed – significantly reducing their response capacities.

15. An initial \$575 million six-month Flash Appeal **was** prepared within 72 hours and launched on 15 January. This amount was to cover the immediate needs of an estimated three million affected people based on preliminary estimates. The Appeal was revised upwards to US\$1.5 billion on 18 February following a more comprehensive needs assessment. At the Consolidated Appeal Mid-year Review on 14 July, requirements still stood at US\$1.5 billion. As of 18 August, the Appeal was 67 percent funded, with another \$18 million pledged. However, it is imperative that full funding of the Appeal is reached if the most vulnerable are to receive the assistance they need.

16. The Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) has allocated a total of \$36 million towards the Haiti response, as well as another \$2 million for operations in the Dominican Republic. The OCHA-supported Emergency Relief Response Fund (ERRF) for Haiti has received about \$80 million, of which \$64 million has already been programmed.

17. The international actors who responded to the earthquake were a remarkably varied group – the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated that 400 ~~such~~ humanitarian actors were operational by the end of January alone. With such a large number of humanitarian actors, effective coordination was critical to the response. The cluster system was ~~re~~activated on 15 January, organising the response operation through 12 clusters and 2 sub-clusters. To the extent possible, the Government appointed Ministry counterparts to co-lead each cluster, and by May had intensified its involvement with clusters in response planning and implementation at all levels.

18. The Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) was established during the first week of February and met twice per week throughout the initial emergency phase to address key strategic issues in relation to the humanitarian response. The HCT is led by the Humanitarian Coordinator and includes the participation of seven United Nations Agencies, seven non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, observers from the NGO Coordination Support Office ~~and~~, and in the case of expanded HCT meetings, humanitarian donors. Strategic coordination was strengthened with the establishment of the positions of a Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator and a Senior Humanitarian Advisor to the Humanitarian Coordinator. The OCHA office was substantially strengthened to provide dedicated support to the humanitarian community on inter-cluster coordination, information management and analysis, mapping, civil-military liaison, donor coordination, advocacy and media outreach.

19. Effective coordination with the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), and with the United States and ~~other~~ foreign militaries, was critical for the humanitarian community in the early stages of the ~~response~~, to fully capitalise on the substantial military and MINUSTAH assets present in the country. A Coordination Support Committee (CSC) was established to oversee strategic coordination. This unique structure, co-chaired by the two Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary General (DSRSGs) of MINUSTAH and the Government, brought together donors, representatives of the humanitarian community, MINUSTAH, and representatives of the US Military to address key strategic issues. Through its planning task force, comprising a Management Oversight Board (MOB) and a Project Management Coordination Cell (PMCC), the CSC tasked complex operations involving multiple stakeholders, addressing critical mitigation measures, debris management, and site preparation for IDP relocation.

20. MINUSTAH, in coordination with OCHA, the Logistics Cluster, and other key partners, established a Joint Operations and Tasking Centre (JOTC), to facilitate the provision of assistance from the broad range of military forces to expedite the activities of the humanitarian community – in essence, to serve as a 'one-stop shop' for humanitarian actors seeking assistance from the MINUSTAH military and police capacities. The JOTC, composed of representatives from OCHA, MINUSTAH, other international militaries, the Logistics Cluster, and Government representatives, served as a centralized coordinating body for the use of military assets for logistics support, security assistance, and technical assistance in support of humanitarian operations, enabling country-wide coordination to avoid a duplication of support efforts. Requests for military assistance with the transport of humanitarian commodities or other such support were vetted through each Cluster Lead Agency.

21. To ensure that the humanitarian response addressed the needs in the affected areas outside Port-au-Prince, including in host communities, coordination capacity was established in Léogâne, Petite Goave, Jacmel and Gonaïves. Eight clusters are operational in Léogâne and seven in Jacmel, and cluster coordination is also taking place in Gonaïves and Petite Goave. At the sub-

national level, there was particular emphasis on reinforcing coordination with ministries and local authorities. The humanitarian community also established six 'shadow clusters' in the Dominican Republic - logistics and telecommunications, health, emergency shelter, Water Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH), nutrition, and protection - essentially to coordinate support services for the Haiti response operations and border or cross-border relief operations. Coordination was strengthened with NGO partners, particularly during the first months of the response, through the establishment of an NGO Coordination Support Office, supported by two NGO consortia, Interaction and the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), to facilitate better communication among NGOs, create linkages and partnerships with local Haitian organizations unfamiliar with the international humanitarian system, and to ensure that key NGO issues of concern were communicated and taken into account in the response.

### **Critical humanitarian challenges**

22. The humanitarian community's response to the earthquake was a considerable achievement in the face of a multitude of challenges. It represented a major test of the capacity, resources, response readiness, and modus operandi of the global humanitarian community. The devastation caused by the earthquake itself was compounded by underlying vulnerabilities in Haiti, including systemic poverty, structural challenges, weak governance, and an almost annual exposure to floods, hurricanes and related disasters. In addition, the earthquake occurred in an urban setting, a context unfamiliar to many humanitarian actors <sup>and</sup> which presented significant logistics and access hurdles. It is worth recalling that those who would normally have been at the frontline of the response in Haiti - the Government, civil society, MINUSTAH, and humanitarian organizations with a presence in Haiti prior to the earthquake - were themselves severely affected in terms of loss of capacities, resources and staff, which seriously undermined their ability to respond effectively and swiftly. Despite the challenging operating environment, the humanitarian operation to a large extent achieved its immediate objectives, and responded effectively to the critical needs identified.

23. Within the first six months of the humanitarian response, approximately 4 million people have received food assistance, emergency shelter materials have been distributed to 1.5 million people, safe water has been made available to 1.2 million people, and 1 million people have benefited from Cash-for-Work programmes. In camps and spontaneous settlements <sup>providing</sup> basic services such as health clinics, educational support, and water and sanitation facilities were provided to approximately 1.5 million IDPs, while joint patrolling by MINUSTAH and Haitian police is helping to protect the most vulnerable. In rural areas, over 142,000 farming families have been supported with critical inputs for the spring planting season, while targeted nutritional programmes have aimed to reduce severe acute malnutrition amongst those affected by the earthquake. Essential to the efficiency of the response have been common logistics services supporting over 90 humanitarian organizations in the delivery of a total of 9,300 metric tons of life-saving relief supplies from the Dominican Republic.

24. In an operation of the size and complexity of the earthquake response in Haiti, coherent and commonly-agreed humanitarian coordination mechanisms were critical from the outset, to help to channel and coordinate the wide-ranging resources and capacities available. The influx of thousands of humanitarian actors with varying degrees of capacity and expertise posed a challenge to the coordination dynamics of the response. The presence and assets of well-resourced and potent military entities, particularly the United States Military but also MINUSTAH, presented both opportunities and challenges for the humanitarian community. Humanitarians <sup>actors</sup> required the support of the military in facilitating the transport and distribution of assistance, but were reluctant <sup>as that would</sup> to risk undermining the humanitarian principles so central to their modus operandi <sup>by engaging too closely</sup>. The swift establishment of clusters to ensure effective



sectoral coordination, and the convening of the Humanitarian Country Team to provide overall strategic guidance, were positive steps towards a strengthened coordination of the response. Meanwhile, the establishment of coordination structures engaging both military and humanitarian actors in a joint decision-making and resource-tasking enterprise was critical to the absorption of extensive military assets into the humanitarian response operation.

25. Despite these significant achievements, there was a perception of a leadership / coordination deficit in Haiti in the initial phase of the response operation, ~~and a sense~~ in which others, for example ~~military actors~~ <sup>they just saw it</sup>, felt they had to step in to supplement humanitarian leadership on the ground, ~~which was not providing~~ <sup>they were not</sup> sufficient strategic vision or overall visible coherence. Critical strategic decisions impacting on the efficacy and appropriateness of the humanitarian response, including, for example, strategies to deal with immediate assistance ~~to~~ <sup>by</sup> and longer-term resettlement of those ~~displaced~~ <sup>displaced</sup>, and a more strategic ~~targeting of assistance~~ <sup>targeting of assistance</sup> to prevent significant population movements, ~~seemed to be~~ <sup>went</sup> slow in coming. ~~Whatever~~ <sup>regardless</sup> the validity of this criticism in the initial weeks following the earthquake, huge strides were made over the subsequent months to strengthen the coordination of the response. Humanitarian leadership was strengthened over time and clusters became increasingly operational, deploying senior and experienced coordinators, and providing effective coordination in a potentially chaotic operating environment. The initial coordination and leadership challenges do not bring into question individual performance, but rather emphasize the need to reinforce endorsed systems and structures and to make sure individuals who are required to lead are provided with the means to do so.

26. In a highly complex context such as Haiti, the humanitarian community ~~is~~ <sup>was</sup> faced with challenging dilemmas in the provision of assistance, not least in identifying the most vulnerable and in distinguishing between those affected by the earthquake and ~~those~~ <sup>those</sup> - the majority of the population in this instance ~~is suffering from chronic poverty~~ <sup>is suffering from chronic poverty</sup>. An equally challenging question related to identifying and strengthening the linkages between the relief operation and the longer-term reconstruction and ~~development agenda~~ <sup>development agenda</sup>. The humanitarian community in Haiti has a critical role to play in supporting ~~a~~ <sup>the</sup> Government which was itself severely affected by the earthquake to lead the reconstruction efforts. Particularly in the initial phase of the response the international humanitarian community's engagement with Haitian civil society and local authorities, and their inclusion in common coordination mechanisms, could have been improved. Had this been achieved in a more systematic manner, it would have significantly improved the humanitarian community's understanding of the operating context, and contributed to a more sustainable provision of assistance, as well as local and national capacity-building.

27. With a cross-sectoral funding appeal revised in June to request almost \$1.5 billion - ~~and this~~ <sup>and</sup> for relief operations alone - it is clear that the needs are still immense, and the challenges facing the response operation potentially daunting. Foremost amongst these challenges is shelter, in particular identifying with the Government durable solutions for secure settlements of the displaced population. Implementing safer shelter alternatives will require significant financial resources, complex legal arrangements, and the mobilization of all actors around a commonly-held vision. The issue of inadequate shelter is particularly worrying during the hurricane season, which is why contingency planning and preparedness activities have been a major focus in recent months.

#### Gender aspects

28. Women and men, girls and boys are impacted differently in crisis and experience different challenges to access humanitarian protection and assistance. In Haiti a Gender Capacity Adviser from the Gender Standby Roster was deployed immediately after the earthquake to provide advice to cluster/sectors on gender mainstreaming. This included guidance on safe food

distribution, safe shelters, separate latrines and bathing facilities, equal access to income generating efforts and inclusion of women in camp management. Moving forward, priority should be given to the creation of economic opportunities for marginalized groups in society in particular women who make up more than 60 per cent of heads of households in Haiti.

29. Poverty is the underlying cause of gender inequity and one of the main causes of sexual violence. This is compounded by the lack of decision-making power of women in the Haitian society and exacerbated by poorly functioning government institutions, including poor service delivery. Sexual violence has been exacerbated by the disaster and from day one efforts to prevent gender-based violence were put in place including protection patrols and improved lighting in camps. Response to victims of gender based violence was also prioritized, including ensuring safe access to medical care and other referral options. The opportunity of the upcoming elections in November 2010 will be seized to advocate at political, social and economic-level for the reformation of government institutions to enforce the rule of law and end impunity of perpetrators of violence.

30. Protecting vulnerable populations from sexual exploitation and abuse by development, humanitarian and peacekeeping personnel remains a priority. In Haiti, work to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse took hold early in the post-earthquake response with the deployment of a full time coordinator who worked with UN agencies and NGOs to put into place awareness raising and complaints reporting mechanisms to prevent and respond to victims. abuses

#### Findings and lessons learned

31. The challenging and complex nature of the humanitarian response to the Haiti earthquake has presented the humanitarian community with some key lessons. Foremost among them is the need to understand better – and to work more proactively with - various actors from outside the humanitarian context, not least military entities, but also the private sector. Linked to this is a pressing imperative to identify ways to engage better with affected Governments and civil society partners. The global humanitarian architecture must be improved to ensure that it is not implemented in such a way as to preclude such partnerships which are critical to the most effective response.

32. Another key lesson learned is the need for the humanitarian community to review how it should adapt to urban responses and to identify the necessary expertise, tools, knowledge, and partnerships to be able to operate effectively in such environments. And more broadly, there is a need to ensure a better understanding of vulnerability and what this means for humanitarian assistance strategies. One way this can be improved is through learning how to communicate better with disaster-affected populations, which would lead to an improved understanding of the operating context.

33. It is clear that strong, decisive and empowered humanitarian leadership on the ground at all levels is essential to the effective functioning of a response operation. With strong and experienced leadership, including within the clusters, providing the required strategic vision, the operational response becomes more efficient, effective, and coherent.

34. As such, the role of the Humanitarian Coordinator is critical to the overall leadership of the response, with s/he responsible for providing strategic vision and guidance to the humanitarian community, establishing and maintaining comprehensive coordination mechanisms inclusive of all operational actors, agreeing on the division of responsibilities amongst agencies, liaising closely with the Government, and ensuring coordination with all other actors relevant to the response. In a context such as Haiti, it is clear that these functions cannot be effectively

could not have been

discharged by one person alone, particularly if that person also maintains responsibilities within an integrated United Nations mission.

35. The swift establishment of a coherent and well-functioning Humanitarian Country Team, particularly in a large-scale sudden-onset emergency, is critical to the efficacy of the response, primarily to provide the necessary strategic guidance to the operational actors engaged in the response through the cluster system. ~~Related to this, Humanitarian Country Team members must be empowered and capacitated to represent not only agency-specific priorities and concerns but to speak on behalf of the respective clusters the agency leads.~~

36. For clusters to become rapidly operational to coordinate the plethora of humanitarian partners in coherent and efficient sectoral structures, it is imperative that they are able to deploy, in the initial stages of the response, experienced and well-resourced cluster coordinators. Cluster lead agencies must be accountable for their responsibilities within the cluster as much as those within their respective agencies. It is critical that they balance these, at times competing, needs and ensure that appropriate and adequate resources are allocated for the effective functioning of the cluster(s) they lead. It is also crucial that cluster lead agencies represent not only agency but also cluster priorities at strategic discussions within the framework of the Humanitarian Country Team. It is equally important that OCHA, as the entity responsible for inter-cluster coordination, deploys appropriate coordination and leadership capacity from the early phase of the operation, to support the clusters to do their job more effectively.

### C. Early recovery and reconstruction

37. From the outset of the humanitarian response as well as during the recovery and reconstruction phases, the United Nations Country Team has integrated and implemented early recovery activities, in consultation with the Government.

385. Given the challenges Haiti was facing before this disaster, recovery efforts aimed also at addressing the wider needs and at 'building back better'. Prior to the earthquake, 55 per cent of the population lived on less than US\$ 1.25 per day, only 51 per cent of the rural population and 70 per cent of the urban population had access to clean drinking water, and less than 32 per cent of the total population had access to adequate sanitation (in rural areas down to 18 per cent). At 72/1000, child mortality rates were extremely high, twice the regional average, and children were afflicted by high rates of stunting (affecting 22 per cent of under-fives) and wasting (affecting 10 per cent of under-fives). Between 28 to 38 per cent of the population were considered acutely food insecure. Forty-four per cent of people requiring urgent healthcare were unable to access health services due to a lack of means to pay for medical fees. Fifty to 55 per cent of children were not enrolled in school resulting in one of the highest illiteracy rate on the continent.

39. Furthermore, unbridled urbanisation has been an emerging hazard in the city and metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince, as well as most towns in the countryside, for several decades. The lack of skills and expertise in the building of reinforced concrete constructions, the failure to maintain building structures, and the non-reinforcement of building codes are the most serious problems facing urban settlements in Haiti. The insufficient quality control over self-built and contractor-built constructions, a lack of regulation and control over land use or urban planning conditions, and the lack of knowledge of risk zoning further increased the vulnerability of urban dwellers. Rapid and unplanned urbanisation also created challenges to the effective provision of public services such as water, energy, sanitation and household waste collection. Most slums have



no road system, while those which do exist are unpaved and annually damaged during the rainy season.

40. Given these underlying challenges, the United Nations' vision is to help the Government build a more decentralized and deconcentrated Haiti where homes, infrastructure and services can withstand natural disasters and people's lives are protected. Following are some of the main rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts conducted so far.

41. **The Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA)**, led by the Government, and supported by the United Nations and the World Bank, assessed the extent of damages, losses and needs for recovery and reconstruction arising out of the direct and indirect consequences of the earthquake. The post disaster needs assessment also identified medium to longer-term recovery and reconstruction needs across a range of sectors, including broadly defined economic recovery needs of directly and indirectly affected populations and the needs to integrate disaster risk reduction into the most vulnerable sectors such as education, health, habitat and the environment.

42. **Cash for Work:** A ~~Cash-for-Work~~ programme was introduced eight days after the earthquake to provide short-term employment opportunities and to inject money into the local economy in areas affected by the earthquake. The programme also aimed at increasing social and economic stability and at improving food security during a period of high vulnerability. It has been implemented in collaboration with key Government partners, the *Direction Nationale de l'eau potable et de l'assainissement*, the ministries of environment and agriculture, local authorities as well as national and international NGOs.

43. As of 1 July 2010, over 116,000 workers have been employed, 40 per cent of whom are women. Working six hour shifts on a 12-24 day cycle, workers have undertaken labour-intensive tasks such as removal and disposal of debris and garbage from the streets, and cleaning drainage systems and canals used as water evacuation routes in preparation for the rainy season. In collaboration with WFP, 19 joint 'Cash/Food-for-Work' projects (the compensation includes 60 per cent cash and 40 per cent food) have been implemented in localities affected directly and indirectly by the earthquake, employing around 13,000 people per month. The projects **focused** on small-scale infrastructure rehabilitation and disaster risk mitigation, such as the rehabilitation or construction of schools, health facilities, water and sanitation systems, market places, irrigation systems, watershed management activities and recreation facilities. Support to the recovery of the private sector and for the development of private-public sector partnerships is also planned.

44. **Disaster Risk Reduction and Preparedness:** The United Nations is continuing its existing efforts to support the Government by strengthening its disaster risk management programme. Efforts focused on strengthening the National System of Risk and Disaster Management and the *Direction de Protection Civile*. The SRSG for Disaster Risk Reduction, Ms. Margareta Wahlstrom, visited Haiti in April to meet with Government Officials and review opportunities to **strengthen** measures to reduce risk both in the context of the ongoing humanitarian efforts and the emerging recovery work. She recommended to focus on the preparedness for the hurricane season, mainly through the strengthening of existing local capacities and warning systems and to establish an independent mechanism to monitor the integration of risk into the recovery efforts in support of the Haiti Interim Recovery Commission.

45. The UN, the World Bank, the International Development Bank, with support from the Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti, initiated a rapid multi-hazard analysis and maps to support the humanitarian actions and longer term recovery. The analysis also provided recommendations



on strengthening national institutions regarding disaster risk assessment. The information produced was integrated into existing national centers for data management and GIS.

46. In preparation for the hurricane season the United Nations also established four logistics hubs around the country, prepositioning two million emergency rations by WFP and stockpiling emergency shelter and other non-food items by the Shelter Cluster. Furthermore, the United Nations conducted risk assessment and mitigation work in over 130 vulnerable camps and explained basic preparedness techniques to those in camps. The United Nations has also set aside \$13 million as emergency funding in the event of a humanitarian crisis.

47. **Land use planning and natural resource management:** As part of the Haitian Government's "programme on territorial information for sustainable development", and as identified by post-disaster needs assessment process as an urgent need, the United Nations supported the consolidation of a National Observatory on Environment and Vulnerability which would gather data, and provide analysis, to support more efficient interventions. The United Nations also played a key role in mobilizing financial resources for environmental programs aiming at improving the management of key watersheds and protected areas as a strategy to increase the resilience of the country.

48. **Debris Management:** The United Nations debris management programme contributed technical expertise to the Government's and humanitarian community's debris removal and recycling strategies. In an effort to promote sustainable recycling, not just demolition and dumping, UNDP, in partnership with the mayor's office of Léogane and the humanitarian community, launched a pilot recycling site for debris and showcased best practices that could serve as a neighborhood-based recovery model for other programmes around the country.

49. **Transfer of Knowledge through expatriate nationals:** In light of the brain-drain from the country since the earthquake, the Government of Haiti expressed during the post-disaster needs assessment exercise the need to engage the Haitian Diaspora to assist in the recovery of the country. Based on previous knowledge and experience through the United Nations Volunteers TOKTEN programme (Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals), UNDP has proposed a three-year programme that allows expatriates to return home for a period ranging from two weeks to three months to contribute their skills and services to their homeland's development. A first consultation workshop, chaired by the *Ministère des Haïtiens vivant à l'étranger* (MHAVE), held on 11 June in Port-au-Prince, brought together representatives from the Diaspora with local authorities, the private sector, civil society, and the international community to explore the best means by which the programme could assist in rebuilding Haiti.

50. **Rule of Law, Justice and Security:** As an immediate response to the destruction of the Ministry of Justice, the United Nations identified the immediate needs and provided basic equipment to the justice, prison and police sector. Four pre-fabricated buildings serving as temporary offices for senior ministry officials were erected, and two 250m<sup>2</sup> tents with 55 workstations for the Ministry of Justice and Public Security and the Haitian National Police were provided. The Ministry was also supported in modernizing the prison at St. Marc and with the provision of internet facilities. In addition, UNDP is supporting the Ministry Cabinet with full office facilities.

51. The United Nations supported the police and judiciary through trainings and capacity-building, including for 15 public prosecutors at the *Ecole de Magistrature d'Haiti*, for magistrates to be trained in autumn 2010 in France, for Ministry's heads of units, and in crime scene management for police and magistrates. In order to respond to the particular needs of displaced

people the United Nations is supporting, as a test pilot, a mobile court to deal with day-to-day criminal cases. The United Nations is further involved in the construction of the maritime base and the Inspection General building of the national police in Les Cayes. It has also supported the Government in strengthening the national database on detainees, which serves as the main tool for the national police and UNPOL to identify the escaped prisoners after the earthquake.

52. **Football for peace:** On 19 June UNDP's Rule of Law programme kicked off its first "Football For Peace" initiative. Set in some of the larger towns outside of Port-au-Prince, the events included a football tournament featuring teams made up of police officers, students, journalists, and teenagers, and the screening of football games and anti-violence movies and documentaries followed by discussion groups. Football for Peace is part of a partnership with UNIFEM, UNESCO, IOM, and UNFPA to sensitize communities throughout Haiti on preventing domestic violence, crime, and gender-based violence.

53. **Aid management and co-ordination:** In the spirit of the Paris Declaration and the Accra Accord, a customized aid information management system was developed and operationalized by the United Nations in 2008 for the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation with the aim to bolster national capacities for planning and monitoring external aid. Due to the upsurge in international aid pledges after the earthquake UNDP scaled up its aid management engagement, brought on board new partners and formulated a new project to support the Ministry, the Office of the Prime Minister, other government bodies and relevant partners, including the private sector, to address challenges linked to the effective and transparent management of external aid.

#### Findings and lessons learned

54. To be successful, the humanitarian response must dovetail into recovery and reconstruction with clear priorities and benchmarks. The establishment of the Interim Haitian Reconstruction Commission is an important step in this regard.

55. It is important to create the right incentives for people to move out of the camps back to their communities and neighbourhoods. While life supporting services such as water will be required by those who have no choice but to stay in camps, it is vital to avoid attracting people to the camps by concentrating services that could be provided elsewhere. Services such as schools and clinics should be based in communities, not camps so those returning home can continue to access help.

56. Rubble removal is a major challenge. The earthquake generated more than 20 million cubic metres of debris, which is also creating a major impediment to reconstruction. The necessary scaling-up of this process, however, requires not just more trucks but more appropriate landfill sites designated by the Government. Beyond the purely physical removal of rubble is the opportunity to stimulate communities with an improved quality of life.

57. Participation is also vital. We must get better at talking and listening to communities, and at involving them as partners in this response. Only with their full participation and involvement of local communities will effective reconstruction be achieved. The people of Haiti must be the architects of their own recovery and future.

58. Deconcentration of population and development beyond Port-au-Prince metropolitan area are essential. Already today, the United Nations have more than 500 civilian personnel located outside the capital, working on humanitarian and recovery initiatives.

59. Reducing the risk of disasters needs to be addressed early in the humanitarian and recovery processes. In order to effectively do this, baseline information is required related to level and distribution of risk, as well as standards, codes and capacity to enforce them. Incentives and capacity for addressing risk across all the sectoral recovery efforts will be an essential first step along with ongoing monitoring.

### **III. Humanitarian assistance, emergency relief and rehabilitation for El Salvador as a result of the devastating effects of Hurricane Ida**

#### **A. The Disaster**

60. On 7 November 2009, the combined effect of Hurricane Ida and a low-pressure system off the Pacific coast led to heavy rainfall (355mm in few hours) causing severe flooding and landslides in 7 of 14 geographical departments (25% of the country) and resulting in 199 casualties. In total more than 120,000 people were affected and around 15,000 people fled to emergency shelters during the first weeks.

61. A post-disaster needs assessment suggested that total damages and losses amounted to around \$240 million, representing 1.1% of the Gross National Product. This includes \$89.4 million in losses associated with infrastructure damage, as well as a slowdown in other productive and social activities. El Salvador also suffered \$42.5 million in agricultural losses, with heavy damages to irrigation systems and losses in harvests and crops such as coffee plantations, sugar cane and red beans. The housing sector registered losses and damages of around \$18.4 million with 20,000 homes destroyed, severely damaged or at risk. The Government estimated that \$343 million was necessary to ensure the recovery of affected areas.

#### **B. Response**

62. Overall, the United Nations System invested a total of \$16 million to provide assistance to over 120,000 people in the aftermath of Hurricane Ida and to support the Government of El Salvador in the coordination of the humanitarian response in ten key areas: food assistance, education, temporary shelter, agriculture, health, water and sanitation, coordination and early recovery.

63. In response to this disaster, the United Nations immediately activated its contingency plan and offered support to the Government to respond and to assess the damage. The Humanitarian Country Team was activated, including IOM and International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent. A United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination team (UNDAC) was deployed immediately to support the Government and the United Nations system with needs assessment expertise, information analysis and initial coordination of relief efforts. Recommendations made by the UNDAC team served to strengthen national disaster response and preparedness capacity beyond the immediate relief phase. In terms of the cluster system, the Humanitarian Country Team activated ten clusters in the areas mentioned above. At the global level, both the Shelter, and the Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) Clusters were activated, which proved crucial in meeting gaps related to these two sectors in the initial response.



64. On 18 November 2009, the humanitarian community in El Salvador, with support from OCHA staff deployed from the OCHA Regional Office in Panama and in close cooperation with the Government, launched a Flash Appeal which requested \$14 million to initially assist 75,000 people over a period of six months. The Humanitarian Country Team also requested and was granted \$2.5 million in rapid response grants from the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). Unfortunately, overall donor funding for the appeal stalled at 46 per cent (\$6.7 million). As is often the case in similar emergencies in Latin America, CERF was the single largest funding source, representing 37% of all resources mobilized by the Flash Appeal and approximately 14% of the overall international humanitarian funding received by El Salvador. The Government also directed significant funding for immediate relief operations. ✓ (spec)

65. **Food Assistance.** WFP provided food assistance to 11,000 people in shelters and to 155 communities in 35 municipalities in 7 departments of the country. More than 55,000 people benefited from food-for-work programmes focusing on rehabilitation and reconstruction. More than 7,000 children under 5 years old, pregnant and lactating mothers and the elderly received supplementary feeding in affected communities and nutritional risk.

66. **Agriculture.** In order to support and reactivate agriculture activities in the affected areas, FAO assisted 1000 families by establishing backyard plots in eight municipalities. More than 1500 small producers received seeds and fertilizer in 13 municipalities and 674 families have implemented modules of breeding birds of dual purpose in four municipalities. ✓

67. **Health:** Health assistance was provided to 122,000 people to reduce morbidity and mortality among the affected population and to improve access to health services. More than 5,015 family kits ~~family~~ and 4,165 personal hygiene kits (for women) were distributed to population located in shelters.

68. **Water, sanitation and hygiene.** UNICEF provided 50,000 plastic containers and disinfectant for water, and the Pan American Health Organization provided 100 latrines and showers for a population of 28,000 and material for the cleaning of 50 community wells.

69. **Education and Protection.** UNICEF provided school furniture and educational material to 22 damaged schools. Additionally, 51 days of training were given to more than 2,000 young people and 500 kits were given for psychosocial purposes.

70. **Shelter.** IOM provided assistance and monitoring activities in 74 shelters nationwide with a total population of 7518 people ~~and 1607 families~~. UNICEF delivered 2,000 kits with essential items to encourage the return of people from shelters to their settlements. ✓

71. **Temporary housing.** UNDP played a <sup>efforts</sup> key role leading the temporary cluster in coordinating with the Government, donors and NGOs to establish temporary housing model and construction. UNDP supported the construction of 763 temporary houses in 19 municipalities of 5 departments. As part of the <sup>work</sup> development projects of temporary housing, community organization and delivery of cash for work <sup>projects</sup> was implemented. ✓

72. To strengthen the **National Civil Protection System** the United Nations supported five technical committees (emergency, infrastructure and basic services, health, logistics and shelter) in preparing and updating their preparedness and response plans. In support of local institutions, the United Nations also supported the establishment of Municipal Civil Protection Commissions in the most affected regions <sup>of</sup> Verapaz, Tetepitan and Guadalupe to strengthen emergency response. ✓



and preparedness capacities with regard to first aid, legal aspects of civil protection, emergency management, inter-institutional communication and the management of temporary shelters.

73. **Disaster Risk Reduction:** The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction Secretariat has been supporting and advising the National Civil Protection Directorate of El Salvador for the development of a National Disaster Risk Reduction Plan and strengthening of the National Disaster Risk Reduction Platform in close consultation with the Central American Coordination Center for Disaster Prevention (CEPREDENAC). Considerable efforts by the United Nations Country Team were devoted to the integration of risk management in a national, urban and rural poverty programme. In two municipalities the initiative built capacity of partner institutions in risk management and prevention and response to emergency. It will be replicated in 25 additional municipalities.