

[ 7 CONFIDENTIAL ]

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SERIES S-1062

BOX 116

FILE 8

ACC. 1998/0283

ANNEX A TO  
TAC HQ  
OP HOMEWARD DATED  
29 SEPT 94

RPA ATTITUDES AND COOPERATION IN OP HOMEWARD

1. The first organizational meeting for OP HOMEWARD on 20 Sep 94 was well attended by the RPA and the civil authorities; the Prefects for Gikongoro and Butare were present as were the Sous-Prefect and the RPA LO to TACHQ. Arriving late for the meeting were two representatives from the Ministries of Rehabilitation and of the Interior. Unfortunately these officials did not get a chance to address the meeting regarding the Government's position towards OP HOMEWARD. Nonetheless Capt Zegara, the Prefect for Gikongoro assured the meeting that the Government fully supported the operation although lacking the resources to take a major part. He emphasized however that security measures would not be compromised for the sake of speed in moving people.
2. Following the meeting, the representatives from Kigali spoke with the Prefects but it is not known what was discussed nor whether their discussion carried on after leaving the OP HOMEWARD meeting.
3. A second organizational meeting was held on the evening of 21 Sep 94 where again the RPA and civil authorities from the previous meeting were in attendance. The position of the government was again reiterated and their concern emphasized that action had to be taken to return people to their homes as soon as possible. At all times it was stressed that the operation was a cooperative venture between UNAMIR, the NGO and the Government of Rwanda.
4. The first coordination conference was held on 23 Sep with the Sous-Prefect for Butare and the RPA LO in attendance. It was identified that the Kizi checkpoint would become a bottle neck to the operation unless additional personnel were assigned to the search of baggage and registration of individuals. The RPA LO in addition to saying that he would be present at the checkpoint also agreed to provide additional personnel and it was suggested to him that two searchers and one register be assigned to each truck load of people arriving at Kizi so as to minimize delay. It was forecast that the convoy packets would likely be 10 vehicles in size however no specific numbers of vehicles could be determined at this point and thus the actual number of people necessary to man Kizi checkpoint could not be given. This detail would only have been available at the Sunday night, 25 Sep, conference.
5. The problem with the physical layout/separation of the security check and registration points was identified and an offer was made by an NGO group to set up a mass processing site at Kizi to handle large numbers of people quickly and with security. It appeared that the RPA LO would not entertain any suggestion of

A-1/3

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changing the layout of the checkpoint nor any explanation of what was envisioned. Consequently, he rejected the offer of resources to process people. Several subsequent attempts by both the military and NGO to explain what was being offered were rejected as was an offer to recce Kizi checkpoint on Saturday afternoon 24 Sep. The reason given for not wanting to recce Kizi checkpoint is that the RPA LO knew what the site looked like.

6. There was no representation at the 24 Sep coordination conference by either the civil authority or the RPA LO; although the LO was at TACHQ several hours before the meeting for 30-40 minutes and did not advise that he would be absent from that night's meeting nor the one scheduled for the following evening.

7. The coordination meeting on 25 Sep 94 was the final coordinating meeting for the lift scheduled on Monday 26 Sep. It was a critical meeting as all tasks were finalized and/or confirmed except those of the RPA at Kizi checkpoint. The only representation from the civil authority was the Sous-Prefect who could not comment upon the manning of Kizi.

8. The operation commenced at 0800 hrs, Monday, 26 Sep and the RPA LO was not available nor was Kizi checkpoint manned with sufficient people to handle the volume of transported persons envisioned. The lift went faster than expected and the first truck arrived at about 0900 and there was only one person searching baggage and one person at the registration point. Attempts to find that RPA LO, Prefect or a responsible individual at RPA Brigade Headquarters (the Commander or a Duty Officer) proved unsuccessful. The LO eventually appeared at about 1030 hrs saying that he had come from Kigali. He was surprised that there was a problem as personnel had been detailed for the checkpoint. Eventually the personnel were found and the problem resolved. It was fortunate though that only half the displaced persons registered for the move in fact showed up for the vehicles.

9. The atmosphere in the following three nightly meetings slowly degenerated between the RPA/civil authority and the NGOs because of a divergence in attitudes regarding the perceived security situation in Sector 3 and who OP HOMEWARD was serving; the people of Rwanda as typified by the displaced people or the Government of Rwanda. This was a situation which had not existed previously as the reluctance of people to return was not known. No senior member of the civil authority was present hence the RPA dominated what was largely a civil affairs matter. The RPA maintained that the NGOs were responsible for spreading rumors/not supporting the legal authority of the Rwanda government including straying beyond their (NGO) mandate if they question people on their state of well being and/or report any suspicions to UNAMIR. The NGOs countered that the RPA were insensitive to the rights of individuals and being purposely difficult to work with.

10. As a result of the friction between the RPA and NGOs, the Prefect Security officer and Maj Wilson (suspected of being the

A-2/3

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TACTICAL HQ  
BUTARE

OPS/22

29 MARCH, 1995

See Distribution:

CONTINGENCY EVACUATION PLAN FOR  
PROTECTED PERSONNEL IN BUTARE

References:

- A. HQ UNAMIR Op Plan NIKE dated 26 December, 1994.
- B. HQ UNAMIR Op Plan JASON dated 26 December, 1994.
- C. Map Reference Butare Serial Z723 Sheet 40 Edition 1.

SITUATION

1. Background Information

- a. UNAMIR HQ has laid down the procedure to be followed to safeguard the life and properties of the protected personnel working in Butare should the situation deteriorate in references A and B. Reference A and B has been condensed together in this plan for easy application.

- (1). Reference A explains the initial action to be taken at the onset when security situation deteriorates in order to secure protected personnel. It envisages passing phases from a low level threat of NIKE Green Phase to Yellow Alfa, Bravo and Charlie and finally NIKE RED. If the situation fails to improve and further worsens, NIKE Red will snowball into Ops JASON.
- (2). Op JASON deals with the procedure to be followed for evacuation of UNAMIR personnel in phases.

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- (3). Protected personnel are workers of UNHCR, HR, UNREO, UNCIV POL, NGO's and other UN agency personnel.
- b. Threat. Likely threat will be:
  - (1). Insurgency that threatened the RPA and Broad Based Government of National Unity (BBGNU).
  - (2). Attacks on UNAMIR personnel/property.
  - (3). Attacks on UN Agencies and NGOs.
- c. Protection. Protection will be provided by:
  - (1). Timely information about security situation as it develops.
  - (2). Physical protection at designated areas.
  - (3). Escort to safe areas.
  - (4). Provision of escort for final evacuation as directed by Force Headquarters.
- d. Designated Areas. Annex 'A'.

AIM

2. The aim of this write-up is to lay down the procedure to be followed by protected personnel in case security situation worsened in the area of operation subject to current instructions.

OPERATION PLAN

3. Op Nike consists of:
  - a. Green. (Low level threat).
    - (1). Normal duties continue.
    - (2). Personnel should gather security information.

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- (3). Prepare for the next level of threat.
- b. Yellow. (Medium Level Threat).
  - (1). Yellow ALFA
    - (a). Continue normal duties.
    - (b). No night movements.
    - (c). Always in contact with HQ for information.
  - (2). Yellow BRAVO and CHARLIE
    - (a). Fall back to designated areas.
    - (b). Perform only skeletal duties as much as situation permits.
    - (c). Prepare for evacuation to Senbatt location from designated areas.
    - (d). Movement in convoy by escort.
- c. NIKE RED
  - (1). All movement restricted.
  - (2). Compilation of the list of people to be moved.
  - (3). Evacuation to Kigali or Burundi as may be ordered in convoys under Senbatt escort.
- d. OP JASON. Evacuation effected from the mission area as all operations become untenable.



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COORDINATION

4. Following should be carefully noted:

a. Designated areas are:

- (1). Area A - Senbatt Log base (safe area).
- (2). Area B - Tac HQ, alternate ICRC Quarters or Senbatt Platoon location (safe area).
- (3). Area C - Care Australia Quarters (safe area).

b. Route

- (1). Butare - Burundi Road.
- (2). Butare - Kigali Road.

5. Code Words.

Serial	Code	Meaning	Issued by
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1.	FAME	Op NIKE to be activated.	Senbatt
2.	AMAMA	Be careful: Threat exists.	Senbatt
3.	TARTA	Stay indoors	Senbatt
4.	DUST	Move to designated safe area	Senbatt
5.	POLLENS	You can move about, all clear.	Senbatt


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6. NICK Names

Serial	Nick Name	Meaning	Issued By
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1.	Top Hat	Tac HQ	Operator
2.	Strong Room	Senbatt Comd Quarter	Anybody in contact
3.	Bendable Iron	Care Australia Quarter	Senbatt
4.	Fine Girl	Butare-Burundi Road	Senbatt
5.	New Baby	Kigali	Senbatt
6.	Sweet Apple	Gikongoro	Senbatt
7.	Random Talk	Butare-Kigali Road	Senbatt
8.	Ground Floor	RPA Soldier	Senbatt
9.	Grass Hopper	RGF	Senbatt
		Butare	Senbatt
11.	Free Juice	Burundi	Senbatt
12.	Snow Ball	Senbatt	Senbatt
		Bn HQ	
13.	Golden Gate	Senbatt	Senbatt
		Pl Loc	
14.	Straight Jacket	Senbatt	Senbatt
		Log Base	

Signal Instructions.

7. Protected personnel to liaise with Senbatt and Tac HQ for up to date Signaller Instructions.

  
H OSAE-ADDAE  
Colonel  
Chief Operations Offr

Authenticated by:

  
Lt-Col  
G3 Ops

Annex

A. Designated safe areas



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Distribution:

External:

Information:

Copy No

Force HQ

1

Action:

Senbatt

2

UNHCR

3

UNREO

4

HR

5

CARE Australia

6

ICRC

7

MSF

8

MILOBS Butare

9


AICF/USA

10

File

11 - 12

BUTARE - VILLE



Senbatt Pl. Loc  
Senbatt Log Base

(B) = Bureau (M) = Mason

*Spans*

UN RESTRICTED

TO : G3 PLANS, UNAMIR HQ,  
KIGALI

INFO : FC, DFC, COS

FROM : COO, TAC HQ, BUTARE

DATE : 4 APRIL, 1995

SUBJECT : FUTURE ROLE OF TACTICAL HEADQUARTERS

1. Tac Headquarters Butare was established in mid-August 1994 as a forward sub-command unit responsible for command and administration of units within sector 4. This role enabled the staff officers to visit units within this sector and examine their operational performances and to evaluate their administrative requirements. The command aspect of this Sub-HQ was later on reverted to UNAMIR HQ at Kigali. It was later assigned the responsibility of monitoring role and became the main co-ordinating centre for OP HOMEWARD. Presently, Tac HQ has a staff of eight (8) officers a clerk and a civilian administrative staff. Attached is the organisation of Tac HQ.

2. With the advent of OP RETOUR in December 1994, this HQ remained the main co-ordinating centre and continued to monitor events in Sector 3 and 4. All occurrence were immediately passed on to UNAMIR HQ.

3. Despite the limited operational resources available to the staff, there exists a good working relationship between the numerous NGOs within Butare and Gikongoro Prefectures as well as the top heiracy of the local RPA.

4. Through the efforts of this Sub-HQ, UNAMIR HQ at Kigali was constantly informed about events such as:

- a. The withdrawal of the French Forces from Sector 4 and the subsequent deployment of UNAMIR Forces in this area.
- b. The movement and deployment of RPA troops in this sector which was followed immediately by the appointments of Prefects for Gikongoro, Kibuye and Cyangugu.
- c. The murder of a Canadian Roman Catholic Priest in November 1994 at Kibiriti in Ntyazo commune within the Butare Prefecture was thoroughly investigated by this HQ and a report on it was accordingly submitted to UNAMIR HQ.

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
- d. The murder of Dr Rwangabo Pierre Claver, Prefect of Butare was the latest incident which was accurately reported to UNAMIR HQ.

5. This HQ could serve the following useful purposes if other logistics including transport are provided:

- a. As a sub-command unit to supervise and administer units within sector 4. If part of command could be decentralised to this Sub-HQ and the necessary logistics provided, the staff officers can pay regular visits to formed troops in Gikongoro and Cyangugu and report accurately to main UNAMIR HQ at Kigali. This will bring command nearer to the formed troops
- b. The presence of this Sub-HQ will facilitate constant consultation between the RPA and Tac HQ regarding the former's operations and movement in this sector. This established machinery is presently working faultlessly in the overall interest of UNAMIR.
- c. Tac HQ/Bde HQ/Liaison Office could serve as contact point for all NGOs operating in this area from Butare through Gikongoro to Cyangugu. This HQ as at now is opened to the public for 24 hours each day of the week to receive complaints and offer assistance where necessary.
- d. This Sub-HQ could act as a centre where all information concerning Human Rights abuses and other vital information on any major events taking or yet to take place could be reported to UNAMIR HQ.
- e. Tactical HQ could serve as a Transit Point for the numerous UNAMIR convoys travelling south to and from Kigali.
- f. The presence of a Senior Civilian Administrative Officer at this HQ also facilitates the job of the Field Officers serving in the units within sector 4.

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- g. The staff can pay regular visits to IDP camps to investigate and report events to UNAMIR HQ as and when required.
6. Tac HQ should not be seen as being responsible for only OP HOPE, OP HOMEWARD or OP RETOUR. Whatever form or re-organisation that this Sub-HQ takes in the future should always reflect the FCs position as far as the leadership is concerned and the good rapport/image established so far.
7. There is the need to review the existence and performance of this Sub-HQ periodically for both operational and administrative purposes. It is also suggested that any immediate major changes in this HQ needs to be deferred in the light of the present events in nearby Burundi and the general tense situation in and around Butare Prefecture.
8. Respectfully submitted for your consideration and further action, please





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TO : G3 PLANS, UNAMIR HQ,  
KIGALI

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INFO : FC  
DFC  
COS

DATE : 4 APRIL, 1995

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
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8. Respectfully submitted for your consideration and further action, please



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TAC HQ  
BUTARE

B.002/A

21 MARCH, 1995

See Distribution

RETENTION OF FOUR (4) GHANAIAI SUPPLY PLATOON  
SOLDIERS AT BUTARE

Reference:

A. LOG/168/95 of 151500B Mar 95.

1. The departure of Malawi Coy and the intended re-deployment of Ghanaian Supply Platoon to Sector 2, has created a serious operational problem for Tac HQ, Butare.


2. The two units have provided radio operators for this HQ since the departure of the Canadians in January, 1995. This arrangement is supposed to be a temporal measure in anticipation of the arrival of the Indian Signallers. The Senegalese who have taken over from the Malawians do not speak English which is the medium of communication on UNAMIR radio net. In view of this, we intend to temporally retain the troops who have performed this duties.

3. It is expected that the Indians will be in location very soon and the affected soldiers will be release to you immediately after that. The troops involved are:

- a. M1360 CPOI Mogya TK
- b. M1350 POII Klutse
- c. M1340 Cpl Addy F
- d. M1338 Sgt Nani CK - Mechanic and Recovery Driver.

4. The fourth person, Sgt Nani CK is responsible for the only recovery vehicle now assigned to this HQ. He is performing a useful task to all and sundry due to the strategic location of this place.

5. Your co-operation is urgently anticipated in this issue.

  
H OSAE-ADDAE

Col

Chief Operations Officer

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UNAMIR TAC HQ  
BUTARE

OPS/22

22 FEB 95

See Distribution:

REVIEW OF OPERATION RETOUR

INTRODUCTION

1. Operation Retour, which was designed to entice massively, Internal Displaced people of Rwanda back into their communes was launched on 29 Dec 94. Since its inception, it has experienced fluctuating fortunes. The daily returns indicate a poor start of about daily lift of less than two hundred which steadily rose up to three thousand per day in the month of Jan 95.

2. The present trend of poor turnout of IDP willing to go home is a serious concern, when viewed with the manpower and logistic put together to make the operation succeed. Fresh reports indicate that the negative response of IDP to Op Retour is as a result of the complex situation in the camps and most especially in the home communes. If we are not to continue to put water into baskets, Operation Retour require thorough appraisal, hence this review.

AIM

3. The aim of this write-up is to make a review of Operation Retour so as to improve on the present achievement.

ACHIEVEMENT

4. Since Operation Retour was launched on 29 Dec 94, more than 36,000 IDP have been moved to various home communes in Rwanda using 20 UNAMIR vehicles and 20 UNHCR vehicles. Medical screening was undertaken by AUSMED and in some cases by MSF and other voluntary organisations.

5. Security was provided by Ghanbatt and Zambatt jointly, until the former was redeployed. While on the spot screening was done by the RPA to avoid unnecessary delays on the road at RPA check points.

6. By the middle of February 95, nearly all the IDP camps in the north have been vacated, notably Runkondo and Cyanika. Less than 3000 IDP are now in the camps in those areas.

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DOWNWARD TREND

7. By the middle of February, a noticeable decrease from all the camps was experienced in the number of IDP leaving. This was despite the coordinated campaigns to entice the IDPs to leave the camps. They were assured of increased presence of UNAMIR and distribution of food within their communes. In fact there now several food distribution points within Gitarama and Butare prefectures but this was not enough to allay the fears of IDPs. The insecurity problems within the communes unfortunately justified fears being entertained by the IDPs. Many IDP interviewed vowed to die in the camps through hunger or disease, instead of going to be killed by RPA soldiers in the commune.

PROBLEMS RETARDING THE SUCCESS OF OP RETOUR

8. It appears that the security problems has deteriorated in the communes which is traceable to the activities of the RPA soldiers. It is evidently clear from the reports of all the UN agents, Non Governmental Organisations and UNAMIR that the RPA soldiers have stepped up a coordinated reign of terror in all the communes. A glance at the daily SITREPS from all the sectors also justify this claim.

9. Sadly, many of IDPs evacuated in January are now back in Ndago and Kibeho camps to tell stories of woes in the communes. Consequently people are not willing to leave the camps. The following activities of the RPA is an illustration of the insecurity in the communes:

- a. It was reported that RPA soldiers have started mass arrest, torture and detention of returnees at Mbazi commune.
- b. Beating and mass arrest of people have been reported at Rwamiko by the RPA.
- c. Brutalisation of people at Kibeho camp has been reported by Zambatt, while UNAMIR wanted to intervene, they were asked to mind their business. The incident was reported on 21 Feb 95.
- d. At Maraba commune, many were said to have disappeared while others were allegedly abducted by the RPA soldiers.
- e. RPA has stepped up mass arrest at night at Huye commune, so many had fled to Kibeho and Ndago camps.

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IDP SCARED

10. We cannot pretend that we do not know what is happening. UNAMIR has been accused of pretence by the NGO. The people are definitely scared of arrest, torture and detention without trial, so they are not prepared to leave the camps. This time around unless something is done, it will not be easy to blockade the IDP that all is well.

OPEN OPTIONS

11. After critical examination of the prevailing situations by all the agents involved in Operation Retour, the proposition made are as follows:

- a. That Operation Retour be suspended for 2 weeks to allow thorough assessment and detailed plan of the next phase.
- b. That cases of mass arrest, torture and detention in the communes be thoroughly investigated to allay the fears of IDP.
- c. That there should be discourse at the governmental level to reduce cases of arrest and beating of the people in the communes.
- d. That those who have been arrested should be tried so as to decongest the prisons.
- e. That RPA soldiers should be advised to stop arrest of people in the nights as the practice is capable of being misinterpreted:
  - (1) People returned and told stories of woe in the communes.
  - (2) Mbazi mass arrest.
  - (3) Arrest of Rwanmiko by RPA soldiers
  - (4) Lack of security.
  - (5) Maraba Commune abducted
  - (6) Beating in the camp - Kibeho 21 Feb 95.
  - (7) People scared of arrest.
  - (8) Justice - none, because of previous crimes.

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RECOMMENDATIONS


12. a. Stop for one or 2 weeks.
- b. Work in the communes to investigate cases.
- c. Promise of trials for those arrested.

CONCLUSION

13. Since the beginning of Operation Retour on 29 Dec 94, many people have been moved out of the IDP camps. However, recent happenings has started militating against complete success.

14. Arrest, abduction and torture of people by RPA soldiers has been identified as the most serious problems facing the Operation Retour since the acts discourages IDP from leaving the camps.

15. These suggestions have therefore been made in order to review the situation so that the smooth flow of IDP from the camps to the communes can start again.

  
H OSAE-ADDAE

Col

COO, Tac HQ, Butare

Distribution:

External:

Action:

UNAMIR HQ OPS

FC

DFC

HAC

Information:

Lt-Col Malacky

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Copy No. 4 of 6

Tactical Headquarters  
BUTARE

OPS/22

12 December, 1994

See Distribution:

APPRAISAL OF OP RETOUR AFTER THREE DAYS

Reference:

A. 3000.15 (Ops) dated 21 Dec 94.

BACKGROUND

1. A new concept to lure Internal Displaced Rwandese back to their communes was launched under a new name on 29 Dec 94 christened 'OPERATION RETOUR'.

2. Operation Retour was intended to ginger mass movement of Internal Displaced people (IDP) back to their communes in dignity and safety. In order to facilitate this, a lot of effort was made to ensure that displaced people go home freely. Consequently, new outfits were created, prominent are:

- a. On the spot registration.
- b. Way station.
- c. Open relief centres.
- d. Awareness campaign in the camps and the communes.

AIM

3. The aim of this write up is to make an appraisal on the operation Retour after three days of its birth.

4. Logistics. Conscious of the need for sound logistic base for such an operation, UNAMIR, all the NGOs and RPA soldiers were involved. Therefore there was enough logistic support. The only deficiency was the construction of Open Relief Centres, however, the need for their use has not arisen.

5. D - Day. The D-Day was 29 Dec 94 and the target camp was Cyanika, all personnel required took part. Initial 32 vehs were made available on 29 Dec 94 with carrying capacity of 1430 IDPs, but only 221 Internal Displaced people turned up and they were accordingly evacuated. The figures so far are:

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a.	29 Dec 94	-	221
b.	30 Dec 94	-	122
c.	31 Dec 94	-	49

6. Reasons for Poor Showings. Agreed that enormous paper work has been done, contrary to expectations, only few IDP were informed about the operation and the entire camps were poorly motivated. The result is that only few people turned up and they were mostly women and children. The poor showing could also be attributed to:

- a. Poor organised campaign in the camps.
- b. Exclusion of some vital UN agents in the campaign.
- c. The large presence of armed RPA soldiers in the camp.
- d. All eggs were put in one basket.
- e. Poor understanding of behavioural attitude of the Displaced People by the planners.
- f. Inflexibility of the plan.
- g. Incomplete facilities at the supposed 12 ORCs (Open Relief Centres).
- h. Planned food distribution in the same camp to coincide with OP RETOUR.

7. Suggestions. In order to revitalise the plan, a new approach to the plan could entail:

- a. Real awareness campaign in the camps. The residents should be involved and should know the duration in which the operation will last in their camps.
- b. Use of Public Address System to sensitise the IDPs.
- c. A minimum of three (3) camps should be targeted at a time. Cyanika as the main camp with two subsidiary camps from different axis.
- d. Rigidity should be avoided in executing the plan.
- e. Emphasis should be shifted to real practical work. Personal/Staff contact as opposed to much paper work.

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- f. Encouragement of more secured communes by the RPA. Unconfirmed report indicates that the RPA are very aggressive in the communes. This fear must be allayed by all means.

CONCLUSION


8. In conclusion, I will like to emphasise that although the three days operation of OP RETOUR failed because the field work was inadequate and directed at probably wrong targets. It was also not wide enough as to attract a large audience.

9. The inflexible nature of the plan made it impossible for the executors to diversify which resulted in wastage of manpower.

RECOMMENDATION

10. It is recommended that:

- a. The present tempo should be increased.
- b. The campaign should be intensified to attract wide audience, the use of loud speakers should be encouraged.
- c. Armed, aggressively looking RPA soldiers in the camp should be reduced during loading of IDPs.
- d. Guarantee of more security in the communes.
- e. More coordination among the UN Agents and NGO should be encouraged.
- f. More camps should be targeted simultaneously.
- g. Food distribution in the camps should cease, especially in the target camps during evacuation period.
- h. More aggressive use of radio broadcast (Radio Rwanda) to sensitise the IDP.

  
H OSAB-ADDAE  
Col

Chief Operations Officer



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