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Meeting No. 61
31 October 1961
ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON THE CONGO

Informal Meeting at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Tuesday, 31 October 1961, at 10 a.m.

<u>In the Chair:</u>	Mr. BARNES	Liberia
<u>Members:</u>	Canada	Mr. RITCHIE
	Ceylon	Mr. MALAIASEKERA
	Ethiopia	Mr. GEBRE-EGZY
	Federation of Malaya	Mr. ZAKARIA
	Ghana	Mr. YOMEKPE
	Guinea	Mr. MAKA
	India	Mr. BHADKAMKAR
	Indonesia	Mr. MASFAR
	Ireland	Mr. BOLAND
	Mali	
	Morocco	
	Nigeria	Mr. NGILERUMA
	Pakistan	Mr. HAMDANI
	Senegal	
	Sudan	Mr. SULEIMAN
	Sweden	Mrs. ROSSEL
	Tunisia	Mr. CHELLI
	United Arab Republic	Mr. SIDKY
	Congo (Leopoldville)	Mr. BOMBOKO

The CHAIRMAN: This meeting has been called to accommodate a request by the representative of Ethiopia who, at our last meeting, expressed the wish to put some questions to Mr. Linner touching on the administration of the civilian operations in the Congo. At that time Mr. Bunche mentioned also that Sir Alexander MacFarquhar had expressed the wish to make a report on the civilian operations in the Congo. Accordingly, I shall call on Sir Alexander first, to make his report, and thereafter I shall call on the representative of Ethiopia. Before doing so, however, I call on Mr. Bunche.

Mr. BUNCHE: I should like to add that, after a report on the civilian operations programme by Sir Alexander MacFarquhar, with such additional comments as Mr. Linner may wish to make and such questions as the members of the Committee may wish to put, the Secretariat then proposes to bring the Committee up to date on the most recent developments having to do with renewed aerial activity by the Katangese, the incidents involving the escape or attempted escape of two mercenaries and the death of one, some new information on the Stanleyville situation, and Mr. Tshombe's surprise visit to Geneva.

The CHAIRMAN: Does the representative of the Congo (Leopoldville) wish to raise a point of order?

Mr. BOMBOKO (Congo (Leopoldville)) (interpretation from French): I simply wish to make a suggestion. President Léopold Sédar Senghor is going to speak within the hour. Would it not, therefore, be preferable to hear the report on recent events in the Congo first, before we deal with the civilian operations?

The CHAIRMAN: Is the representative of the Congo (Leopoldville) proposing that we should hear the report on the recent disturbances in the situation in the Congo, then adjourn the meeting to hear the President of Senegal, and then reconvene afterwards? Is that his proposal?

Mr. BOMBOKO (Congo (Leopoldville)) (interpretation from French): That is not necessarily my proposal, but of course if everyone wishes to listen to the President we might act in that manner. What I was proposing was simply that we should reverse the order and begin the proceedings with a statement on the recent events in the Congo, so that those who wished to go to listen to President Senghor thereafter would have the opportunity to do so.

The CHAIRMAN: I would like to accommodate the Foreign Minister of the Congo, but I wish to point out that Sir Alexander MacFarquhar has been endeavouring to make this report to the Committee for a long time. I do not believe that he should be denied an opportunity to do so. So I would respectfully ask the representative of the Congo not to insist upon his request and we will follow our procedure for this morning. I will now ask Sir Alexander MacFarquhar to proceed with his report.

Sir Alexander MACFARQUHAR: I hope that members of the Committee have had an opportunity to read the tenth report on the civilian operations which were circulated some time ago and which reviews the activities for the first year. I do not propose to repeat what is in the report. I would just like to draw attention to a number of salient points.

When the civilian operations started it had to cope largely with an emergency, and most of the activities were devoted to that purpose. However, even at a very early date there was a disposition to try and look ahead and particularly to forecast what we thought would be required.

We decided that we would follow, as far as possible, technical assistance principles by trying to give the Government what it wanted. However, for some time there was no parliamentary government and, during that period, we then moved on the principle that we would deal with de facto authorities as far as possible. Where there was no problem involved we would accept requests from them. However, we allowed ourselves two deviations from that.

One was in the case of requests which involved the whole constitutional principle. For example, when we were asked to provide judges, we felt that in the absence of a parliamentary authority we could not give people to serve with power of imprisonment and so on in the Congo. Similarly, in the case of a request to advise and help in the negotiation of a debt settlement, we had to stand back. We were able to give a fact-finding team, but we had to stand back from going beyond that point.

With the arrival of the Government of Prime Minister Adoula we have been able to enter into both these fields and in fact we are now in process of providing judges who will be servants not of the United Nations but of the Congolese authorities. The other deviation we permitted ourselves was in cases where there

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was a possibility of administrative break-down if we did not intervene. The best examples of that, of course, are the Kasai famine and the programme of relief works to reduce unemployment. But through all this we had already, at a very early stage, decided that an absolute priority should be given in as many fields as possible to the training of Congolese for administration, and so on.

When the Government of Prime Minister Adoula was formed, there was some thought given to the reorientation that this would involve in the programme. We assumed that the Congolese objective would be, what I might call, the decolonization in practical terms: in other words, the development of its own technical and administrative manpower; the establishment of new targets in such fields as agriculture, foreign trade, education and health; the repairing of the economic and financial ravages of the previous year and, as a stop-gap, the employment, very temporarily, of a supplement of foreign technicians.

On our side we decided that we should show ourselves ready to assist, particularly in sensitive areas where advice is particularly important. But we should express this readiness to assist in a clearly expressed context of an objective of getting ourselves as well as other people out of the Congo. The United Nations should not be a permanent picture of the landscape. If I may particularize that a little, just to give you examples, we thought that we should continue to give all possible assistance to training outside and inside of the country and the provision of fellowships. The Congolese Government had honoured us earlier by requesting us to establish a fellowship placement office which takes care not only of United Nations fellows, but also of bilateral officers of fellows for which we make selections on their behalf. We thought we might also be useful in providing a technical secretariat for any economic committee or Congo development board that the Government wished to set up.

Another field was obviously the Public Service Commission where it would be useful to have an international secretariat. The national bank and the financial settlement, of course, were other areas where assistance would be useful. But we also thought that we should negotiate the United Nations out of the operational picture as early as possible. For example, we should continue to provide doctors and teachers, aviation and telecommunications technicians or judges directly. We would be available to recruit, to get the best possible people where they were needed, but they should quite definitely be servants of the Congolese Government.

(Sir Alexander MacFarquhar)

Just to give some idea of the situation at the moment, at the end of September we had in the civilian operation 356 people. But out of these 266 were operational; 113 were doctors, 55 were teachers, and about 70 were engaged in various forms of civil aviation and telecommunications activities. Another 25 people were engaged in training activities, and the advisory teams amounted to 65. So that the great weight of the operation at the moment is operational, and that is a phase which should pass to the control and direction of the Congolese Government.

We have had conversations with the Congolese authorities on these views that I have expressed and I would like to read to the Committee a letter that has recently come in describing the conversations which Mr. Hammarskjold had on this subject with Prime Minister Adoula while he was in the Congo. It says that the following guiding principles were arrived at:

"Inventory of Needs:

"It is necessary for the Congolese Government, with the assistance of United Nations experts, to establish an inventory of basic needs particularly in the field of administration, economics, education and health. This is to be the point of departure in determining the joint programmes of development, technical assistance and financial aid.

"As to a programme of development in the light of the assessed needs of the country, attention will be given not only to the stabilization of the economy but also to its future development.

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"Administrative mechanisms will have to be worked out between the United Nations and the Congolese Government assuring the proper discharge of this function.

"The third point was the elimination of waste. Whatever programme of stabilization and development is agreed upon, it will have to be financed and administered internally by the Congolese authorities with some financial and technical assistance from outside. It is highly important, therefore, that wasteful public expenditure be eliminated. In this direction the Congolese authorities will undertake reduction in expenditures of the army, the civil service, political public functions and para-statal organizations.

"As to the training of Congolese personnel"-- the fourth point -- "the joint aim of the United Nations and the Congolese authorities is to provide the country as quickly as possible with competent, well-trained Congolese cadres. Therefore, the United Nations will continue to give priority to the training of Congolese administrative and technical personnel at all levels.

"On technical assistance. As a transitional measure the Congolese authorities will undertake to absorb in the national budget, as already, as far as possible, of foreign assistance in operation or executive functions. The United Nations will continue within its ability to lend assistance at the level of planning and policy making. The aim is to eliminate as quickly as possible the extraordinary features of the present programme of technical assistance and reduce it eventually to the normal type of United Nations programme of the technical assistance followed in many other countries. The move in this direction will be done in constant co-operation with the Congolese authorities.

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Finally, the sixth point, financial aid.

"The United Nations, in co-operation with the Congolese authorities will seek financial aid from a variety of sources and in a variety of ways, including loans for helping out in budget and balance of payment difficulties, as well as in projects of development. It is understood that the desire of the Congolese Government is to seek financial aid as far as possible through the channel of the United Nations in order to avoid political difficulties. If that is not always possible, foreign aid will be at least co-ordinated internally with the help of the United Nations whose assistance will be solicited for the recruitment of international experts necessary for the carrying out of such aid."

Finally, I should like to give the Committee some figures on the state of the Congo Fund, which, I think, is not directly mentioned in the tenth report.

You will recall that this is a voluntary fund, it is a matter of voluntary subscriptions; it is not based on a United Nations assessment, its purpose being the restoration of economic life and the maintenance of the public services. In round figures, our receipts in the Congo Fund have been \$34 million, out of which, \$13 million came in the form of what I might call an import credit tied to imports from a particular country. Out of these \$34 million, \$23 million have been transferred to the account of the Monetary Council -- that is the Congo Central Bank -- for the support of the essential programme of imports developed during Mr. De Seynes negotiation with President Kasa-Vubu in June. This left us with a balance of \$11 million against which we have project authorizations for these operational and advisory activities which I mentioned. We have project authorizations slightly ahead of our balance, \$12 million, in fact, but expenditures to the end of September for only \$5.6 million. We shall need further finance, but I would like to try and break up the requirement into three parts.

First, we shall have to continue for these six months the essential import programme for which the IMF estimate was that \$60 million worth of goods would be needed. The system there was that we provide the dollars for this import programme; those dollars are sold to the importers and the resulting Congolese francs are made available for budgetary support to the Government. Against that

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\$60 million we had, as I said, already provided \$23 million, and we have an immediate prospect of perhaps another \$10 million.

Secondly, in regard to the 1962 budgetary support, this is a matter which will have to be discussed; it is not immediate. We understand that the Congolese Government is busily engaged now in its budgetary calculations for 1962; the moment these are ready, we shall enter into discussions. It may well be that this will have to be a matter of some form of international loan, or a loan, at least internationally underwritten.

If I may express a personal opinion, I think it would be salutary to separate the element of budgetary support and its requirements from the third element which I now come to, and that is the project costs.

In the case of project costs, it might be as well to have an appeal once and for all for what we think will be required until we get on to a conventional programme basis. Just to repeat the situation on projects. We have a balance of \$11 million. We have authorized projects of \$12 million, and expenditures toward that, \$5.5 million. Of course, there are other demands on the way at the moment, for example, another 70 doctors are required; we have agreed to train another 55 medical assistants; there will be the training of ANC; plus a 1962 contents for some of the projects which are not yet covered for that year.

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee is thankful to Sir Alexander for his report on the civilian operations in the Congo. I am wondering whether this report satisfies the representative of Ethiopia or whether he would wish to call upon Mr. Linner to amplify or elucidate further on this report. If so, we shall give the floor to Mr. Linner after we have heard from the representative of Ethiopia.

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): I think the report covers the period up to 1961, and the first thing that impressed me is that I could not distinguish what is permanent and what is not permanent. In other words, reading through the report I began to wonder with respect to some of the projects which are included there--unfortunately, I do not have the book with me here--whether it was possible for the United Nations to differentiate what is normally given in terms of technical assistance to other countries and to ask the Congolese to pay for the

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other. In other words, what is conventionally given, let us say, to any other Member would be, of course, technical assistance; but in view of the fact that the country is rich and it has prospects for repayment, I was wondering whether it was possible to distinguish them now so that a request could be made in the future. I say this not because I wish to harm the Congolese in that respect, but as I see it, there is no prospect for getting more money. It may be that you may have a better idea, but the sentiment seems to be that nobody is willing to give, and if that is the case, I am also wondering whether it is possible to make a category of what can be considered normal technical assistance and what cannot be considered normal technical assistance, and to ask the Congolese Government if it would be willing to pay in the future that part which it could then use as normal technical assistance in the Congo again. That is my first question, that is the first thing that struck me.

(Mr. Gebre-Egzy, Ethiopia)

Secondly, I should like to have some information concerning the aspect of personnel. We have a feeling that there are too many people involved in this operation -- too many clerks, too many secretaries, and so forth. In some areas, in fact, there is a feeling that a great deal of money is being wasted on purely administrative purposes. Of course, I cannot hold that that is a correct statement, but I am bound to ask that we should receive a breakdown of the administrative personnel involved.

Sir Alexander MacFARQUHAR: I shall deal with the first question put by the representative of Ethiopia.

As I have explained, the whole of the operation is a stop gap in that any operational work is unusual for a new programme. The provision of doctors, the provision of teachers, the provision of airport controllers, the provision of telecommunications personnel, and so forth: all that, we hope, will go into the budget of the Congolese Government; we shall play ourselves out of it as quickly as we can, subject to avoiding a breakdown. We should then be left with the advisory and training functions which, I would hope, would be the more permanent mark of the operation.

Thus, with regard to the figures I gave earlier, the ideal situation will come when we move the 266 operational people, out of the 356, over to be servants of the Congolese. That depends on negotiating contracts which will satisfy people from other countries. We had a contract arranged for the case of the judges because, not having been in that business, we wanted to put it straight into the hands of the Congolese Government from the beginning, thus avoiding a difficult change-over later on. In any case, it should be clear that as regards the judiciary the authority comes from the Congo.

I would therefore say that the operation is already oriented in the direction of pulling out into a normal form.

The main feature will, of course, continue to be training. As is known, there are over 1,000 people already trained or now under training this year in the Congo. More than 100 have already been sent out on United Nations fellowships alone, and there must be quite a number more on bilateral fellowships, for which

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we have helped to select the people. By the end of this year, the number of people outside will be well over 155 -- and that is the matter on which we must concentrate.

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): That is very good, but my point is this: Perhaps we could request the Congolese Government to re-examine the past expenditure. Perhaps it would be willing to repay the United Nations for those services.

Sir Alexander MacFARQUHAR: It will be recalled that in the agreement of June 1961, when we promised to advance certain sums, we did make the statement that the expenditure would be regarded as a loan in the first instance and not as a grant. As I have said, we hope to be able to negotiate budgetary support, which will undoubtedly be necessary for at least a year. We hope to negotiate that on the basis of a loan and not an outright grant. I think we are all agreed -- and this was the basis of the Secretary-General's presentation last September to the General Assembly, when the fund was instituted -- that the Congo is a rich country and will in time be able to pay its way.

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): I think that there is some confusion. I thought that the \$10 million was an outright loan and therefore did not come into the calculations concerning the doctors, and so forth. Am I mistaken about that?

Sir Alexander MacFARQUHAR: The \$10 million is a loan. We have not determined how or when or on what terms we should try to recover it. Perhaps we shall not try to recover at all that early sum, which was given at a very difficult period. But we shall certainly try to negotiate in advance the terms of any future loans.

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): Thus, there is the \$10 million which is clearly a loan and for which repayment is clearly indicated. On top of that, there are various expenditures for hiring doctors, and so forth, which have already been

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made. My point is that this unconventional, as it were, form of technical assistance should be brought to the attention of the Congolese Government. Because of all the help which has been given to the Congolese Government, perhaps it would be willing to consider repayment even of that form of assistance, so that in due course we should be able to give the money back in the form of conventional technical assistance.

Sir Alexander MacFARQUHAR: That is a matter for discussion with the Congolese Government, and, of course, with the organs of the United Nations. I think that, in view of the bad year that the Congo has had, we might want to have a cut-off date ahead of us rather than behind us. But, again, that is a personal opinion.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall call on Mr. Linner to answer the second question put by the representative of Ethiopia, with regard to the number of administrative employees in the Congo.

Mr. LINNER: The representative of Ethiopia has no doubt drawn our attention to a point which is well worth serious consideration.

As all members know, our activities in the Congo were established in July 1960 on a kind of crash basis, and the main objective for us all was to get things done. We did not have too much time to think about administrative niceties. As time has gone on, we have realized the necessity of revising our administrative structure there. As a matter of fact, quite some time ago I asked Headquarters to make available a top-rated administrative expert who could come to the Congo for a certain period and, completely freed from day-to-day routine business, could look over the whole administrative organization. This was done. We had several weeks of most fruitful discussions in the Congo, and a report was produced which has since had the close attention of both Headquarters and ourselves.

We in the Congo do not like Parkinson's Law more than anyone else, and we are certainly aware of the risk that there are people who may not be as fully employed as we should like them to be in certain sections. On the other hand, in certain other areas we are desperately fighting for assistance.

(Mr. Linner)

I do not want to take up the Committee's time by giving figures and details. I would only assure the representative of Ethiopia that we are actively concerned with this problem, have already produced some considerable cuts, and are strongly determined to continue in that direction.

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): I am glad to hear that, but if Mr. Linner is in a position to give us the details, I think, quite frankly, that we should have them. If it is not possible to give us the information today, perhaps it could be given at the next meeting. For there is a feeling -- and I think we should know about it and move fast in order to meet it -- that a very heavy administrative machinery is involved and that a great deal of the money is being spent on personnel. That feeling is prevalent in many quarters. I know that it is the case with practically any administrative machinery that once it begins to grow there is no limit: the secretary wants a secretary, and the secretary's secretary wants a secretary, and so on. I am dead set against that, and for a number of reasons.

(Mr. Gebre-Egzy, Ethiopia)

First, it will be against your interests: it will tend to create a feeling of richness on the part of the United Nations, and no doubt some nice buildings. Then a feeling of being apart from that, and apart from the Congolese. I think it is something which we should guard against immediately -- something which, if it exists, and I have a feeling that it does, we should put an end to immediately, before it destroys the whole thing. So what I want to say today is that I would very much appreciate, if you do not mind -- and I know that it is not strictly an Advisory Committee subject, but it is no use crying later on and saying that we were not advised on this subject -- not necessarily today, but at your leisure, some details of what you propose to do to streamline it so that at the end, if the criticism arises, we would be in a better position to meet it.

The CHAIRMAN: I understand that the figures desired by the representative of Ethiopia are available and I call on Sir Alexander MacFarquhar to give that information.

Sir Alexander MacFARQUHAR: These figures have been taken from a staff listing of last month. They do not, however, represent the same date in every case. Some of them, for example, are as of mid-July, in some of the field offices, and some of the economies that Dr. Linner has spoken about may have taken effect already. But taking them all together -- finance, personnel, documents translation, accommodation, field offices, and so on, we have a table of 102 professional staff and 295 general service staff. Then we have locally recruited staff to the number of 1,068, as at various dates around June and July. This staff is designed to service the whole operation, military and civil, all over the Congo. It takes care of accommodation, finance, personnel and procurement, including the purchase of food for the forces and all the field offices.

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): In view of what was said earlier, would you not agree with me that perhaps the machinery was too heavy? You must have arrived at some conclusion.

Dr. LINNER: It was precisely because I felt the need for a revision of the administrative structure that I requested Headquarters to have a man come down. So the answer to your question is, "Yes".

Mr. CHELLI (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): First, I should like to thank Sir Alexander MacFarquhar and Dr. Linner for the information and explanations which they gave us in regard to the civil operations in the Congo. I should also like to associate myself to a great extent with the suggestions made by the representative of Ethiopia, in particular his suggestion that it is time the United Nations thought about effecting a transfer of duties in civil matters to the Government of the Congo. To carry out this transfer account must be taken of the difficulties in which the Congo found itself recently, and the difficulties that it will have to face in the future. At the same time we must take into account the financial difficulties confronting the United Nations themselves. This aspect must not be neglected in the transfer of the powers -- or some of the powers -- of the United Nations to the Congo. In this respect I should like to ask Sir Alexander for an explanation.

He spoke of the development of the Congo and the fact that there was approximately \$11 million in the accounts, but that the engagements had already exceeded \$12 million. I wonder whether Sir Alexander knows where the million dollars still wanting in the fund will come from. Everyone knows that the financial situation of the United Nations in all fields is extremely difficult. I do not know how we can incur expenditures when we do not know whether they can be recouped within a reasonable period of time.

The CHAIRMAN: Does Sir Alexander MacFarquhar wish to comment?

Sir Alexander MacFARQUHAR: May I say right away to the representative of Tunisia that in the administration of the Congo Fund we have always had before us, as it was a voluntary fund, the simple basic point that it could never

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afford to be insolvent: it must always be in funds. Therefore during the last three months we have had to go slow, or hold back, on very good and necessary requests from the Congolese authorities; but recently we had a fresh subscription of \$3 million to the Fund, and have received an indication that we are likely to have another, similar, sum coming into the Fund within the next few weeks. Therefore, although we are ahead on our authorizations I would draw attention to the fact that we have gone only half way towards the spending of the \$11 million. Our actual expenditures at the end of September amounted to \$5.5 million. They have been running at the rate of about half a million dollars a month on the civilian operation. They may go up a little towards the end of the year, partly from new purchases, partly from the specialized agencies catching up with their billing. They may be rather behind at the moment because they bill us monthly.

The other point that I should make perhaps is that when I speak of authorizations of expenditure amounting to \$12 million, some of that money will not come up for expenditure for perhaps two or three years. For example, when we give a fellowship for the training of a medical assistant for three years, or for the training of a doctor for six years, we commit that money right from the beginning because we know that we have to find it. That does not, of course, invalidate the representative of Tunisia's point that we must always be inside the money that we have in sight. I think that is the situation now. We hope to have another \$3 million or so within the next few weeks.

Mr. DOBELL (Canada): I wanted to put one further question to Sir Alexander. He mentioned the IMF estimate, of \$60 million being required to support the budget of the Congo. For what period was that?

Sir Alexander MacFARQUHAR: I am sorry: it was not an estimate of the amount required to support the budget of the Congo. It was an estimate of the essential imports required, between July and December 1961, to repair the decline in imports of such essentials, as spare parts and machinery -- for this half year.

The CHAIRMAN: I think we can now pass on to the report of the Secretariat upon recent developments in the Congo. I call upon Dr. Bunche to give it.

Mr. BUNCHE: First I will give a little of the background to the latest activity, involving particularly aerial attacks by Katangese aircraft. At an earlier meeting, this Committee has been informed of certain activities along the frontier of Katanga. It may be recalled in this regard that prior to 28 October there had been reports of two incidents, which might be described as small raids, involving ANC troops of the Congolese Government, into Katanga territory. But we also know that General Mobutu stated that the platoon commanders concerned -- which gives an idea of the size and strength of the troop units involved in these incidents -- had acted by themselves and without authority.

(Mr. Bunche)

We also know that on 20 October there had been a radio report announcing an ANC invasion of Katanga. But General Mobutu himself, when asked about this, had stated that on 18 October an ANC platoon from Luiza had crossed the Katanga border without orders and had been engaged by the Katanga gendarmerie, and, on 25 October, the commander of the Nigerian brigade at Luluabourg had reported that there had been some probing by both sides on the border east of Mwene Ditu.

But yesterday we received two very disturbing reports from General McKeown. One of these said that, on or about 22 October, a Katangese aircraft had attacked the ANC troops in the Luiza area, causing one wounded. On 27, 28 and 29 October, he states, further attacks were carried out by Katangese aircraft on troops -- that is, ANC troops -- civilians and railway communications in the Luputa area, causing a number of casualties to civilians and also to ANC troops. The report goes on to say that the attack on 29 October was witnessed by a United Nations officer who had accompanied two helicopters of the United Nations to the Luputa area. These helicopters had landed on the air strip at Luputa but had been warned by the ANC there to move to a field some distance away because an attack was expected by Katangese aircraft. Shortly after this, after the helicopters had landed on the field, a black two-engined aircraft, flying from the direction of Kaniama, crossed the border at an altitude of about 1,000 feet, came in and dropped a bomb which landed just about 100 yards from the helicopters. This bomb killed two civilians and wounded several others. The crews of the helicopters felt that their craft must have been clearly visible to the pilot of the Katangese plane.

The second report received yesterday is based on the information given by the pilot of a United Nations DC-4 after its return to Leopoldville from a flight to Elisabethville on 29 October. This pilot made the following observations: He saw a small twin-engine aircraft, thought to be a Havilland Dove, dropping bombs on the railway tracks near the area of the village of Kadve-Katanda, which is inside the Kasai border and is about four to five kilometres northwest of Kaniama. The pilot said that the aircraft was flying at a low altitude -- an altitude of about 200 feet -- and was heading southeast. He said that at least four bombs were seen actually dropped, and white and black smoke was seen coming from the points of explosion.

(Mr. Bunche)

The captain of the United Nations plane decided to follow this aircraft engaging in offensive activities, and the pilot of the Katangese aircraft, apparently aware that the DC-4 was following him, started to take evasive action, flying under low clouds and trying to dodge the DC-4, which followed this craft all the way to the Kaniama airport, where it landed. The DC-4 continued to circle near the Kaniama airfield for a total of one hour and fifty minutes, for observation purposes, and, in the course of this circling, observed a second aircraft parked on the field. It was believed to be a single-engine Dornier-27, or possibly a two-engine Dornier-28. In this regard, it will be recalled that there had been earlier reports of Dornier aircraft destined for Katanga. This is the first actual instance of observation of one of them since these reports began to circulate. We have information that would indicate that five such Dorniers did actually leave West Germany for immediate delivery to a Belgian firm, and it appears that at least one of them has made its way to Katanga.

While the United Nations DC-4 was circling over the airport at Kaniama, this second aircraft, the presumed Dornier, took off and tried to reach the DC-4. The DC-4, fearing that the Dornier might be armed, itself took evasive action, entered rain-clouds, reversed its course, and out-distanced the Dornier. But the DC-4 later returned to the Kaniama airfield and saw both of the aircraft, the Dove and the supposed Dornier, on the ground.

Then the DC-4 departed for Leopoldville. On its way back, the crew of the DC-4 noticed a village, which was probably the village of Kasongo, in Kasai -- about 30 kilometres northwest of Kaniama -- on fire. About fifty huts were seen destroyed by fire and a large building -- something like a church or possibly a warehouse -- was also on fire, presumably caused by aerial bombing. The crew of the plane has pictures of the Kaniama airstrip and the burning village.

The pilot also reported that these two Katangese aircraft were painted white, resembling United Nations aircraft. General Mobutu, in fact, has informed Brigadier Goulson, at Luluabourg, that these aircraft carried United Nations markings. This has not been confirmed by our observation. But that the planes painted white, to resemble United Nations planes, has been confirmed.

(Mr. Bunche)

Yesterday afternoon Prime Minister Adoula made a statement on the Congolese radio in which he referred to the Katanga situation, on the basis of these new attacks, as grave, and in which he noted that a "police operation" was being carried out by the ANC for the purpose of re-establishing order and peace in an area which he described as troubled by outlaws armed with modern weapons. In this regard, he made reference to the public statement by Mr. Tshombe to the effect that modern weapons had been distributed to 150,000 villagers.

(Mr. Bunche)

On 28 October, Mr. Adoula pointed out, Mr. Tshombe had accused the ANC of genocide and had condemned the police operation but, at the same time, Mr. Tshombe had reaffirmed his unshakable desire to find a solution with the Central Government by peaceful means. But Mr. Adoula observed that at that very moment several air raids had been ordered by the Katangese authorities along the Kasai border and he noted that since Sunday areas twenty kilometres from the border had been bombarded as well as the Luluabourg-Kamina railroad. He went on to state that another village in Kasai had been machine-gunned from the air. The UN aircraft had been pursued by Katanga aircraft based at Kamalengi and people had had to take refuge in a church and were machine-gunned from the air there.

This morning we received a cable from Leopoldville in which the Commander of the Nigerian battalion at Luluabourg states that General Mobutu had reported to him that the ANC troops had been subjected to four attacks on the morning of 31 October in the Mwene Ditu area by Katangese aircraft.

Yesterday afternoon in a meeting with Mr. Khiary Prime Minister Adoula had informed Mr. Khiary that in view of these attacks he was under the obligation now to withdraw the order which he had given to the ANC troops to cease fire in the Kasai border area.

The latest report we have received this morning from the now acting Commander of the UN Force in the Congo, General Yacob of Ethiopia -- General McKeown has gone on a brief trip to Ireland in pursuance of a long-standing plan -- states that ANC headquarters this morning reported that their troops were moving towards Kaniama and had actually reached the village of Kitengo in Katanga. The ANC headquarters also stated that their troops were moving towards Kapanga and had reached the village of Tohabula in Katanga. The village of Kitengo is approximately thirty kilometres inside Katanga and the village of Tohabula is approximately sixty kilometres inside Katanga.

Finally, I may say that this activity obviously raises new problems for the UN Force and operation in the Congo. The basic position which our military and civilian people in Leopoldville have been instructed to take is that all necessary counteraction by the UN Force should be taken against Katangese aircraft when these aircraft can be positively identified as engaging in offensive military

(Mr. Bunche)

operations in territory where ONUC exercises its functions, which means, in fact, anywhere in the Congo. This use of counter force would be in proportion to the seriousness of the threat and would constitute, as we see it, a necessary and justified activity in self defence essential to ensure the protection of the UN operation in these territories.

We point out also, of course, that such offensive activities by the Katangese aircraft are covered by paragraph A-1 of the Security Council resolution and also by paragraph A-2 of the resolution of 21 February, in view of the fact that the crews of these aircraft are clearly mercenaries. They are not Congolese. We have instructed our people, and this has been carried out, to give a most serious warning to the Katangese authorities that if these offensive aerial activities do not immediately cease, the UN aircraft will take all necessary counteraction to stop such activities.

That is a summary of all the information that we have on these latest unfortunate developments.

May I now just say a few words about Mr. Tshombe's surprise visit to Geneva, after which Mr. Narasimhan will tell you of the facts involving the attempted escape of the mercenaries and will give you certain very late information on developments in Stanleyville.

The visit of Mr. Tshombe to Geneva came as a surprise to us, but not as a complete surprise for the reason that on Saturday, General Rikhye, en route from New York to Leopoldville, at our instructions stopped in Brussels to take up with the authorities of the Belgian Government the question of the twelve Belgian officers in the so-called Belgian Consulate in Elisabethville, a consulate which we stated before we do not recognize as having validity in view of the fact that it is not sanctioned by the Central Government of the Congo. In the course of his conversation with Mr. Rothchild of the Belgian Government, General Rikhye was informed that Mr. Tshombe might come to Geneva for the purpose of consulting with representatives of the Congolese Government. This was news to us in view of the fact that Mr. Khiary had been making intensive efforts to induce Mr. Tshombe to come to Leopoldville to consult with the Leopoldville Government, and indeed had some reason to hope that he would succeed. In fact, it had been thought that it would be quite likely that Mr. Tshombe would appear in Leopoldville within a fortnight.

(Mr. Bunche)

I may say, however, that the efforts made by Mr. Khiary to bring about a rapprochement between Leopoldville and Elisabethville, including Mr. Tshombe's prospective visit, have been dealt a severe blow by the events along the Kasai frontier.

(Mr. Bunche)

The only news we have about Mr. Tshombe in Geneva is that he asked for and obtained from the Swiss Government a visa for a short stay in Geneva for medical reasons. We know that he has already consulted two medical specialists in Geneva. We know also that his contacts in Geneva are being made through Mr. Olivier de Ferron, a French businessman who also holds the title of honorary Consul of Iceland in Geneva. Mr. de Ferron has been Mr. Tshombe's representative in Geneva since the summer of last year.

Perhaps now Mr. Narasimhan would carry on with the other two points.

The CHAIRMAN: Before I call on members of the Committee who wish to speak in connexion with the report of Dr. Bunche, I will call on Mr. Narasimhan who will report on the Stanleyville situation and the mercenaries who were captured and killed.

Mr. NARASIMHAN: The Committee will recall that at its last session Dr. Linner gave an account of the situation in Stanleyville. He referred to the changes that had taken place there in regard to the Provincial government. He particularly reported that Mr. Manzikala was no longer the Provincial President, that he was still in his residence but under surveillance of the gendarmerie. Later that day we received information through our representative in Stanleyville that former President Manzikala escaped from his residence on the 26th, early in the morning, and that he sought, and was granted, United Nations protection. He was apparently pursued by the gendarmes, but the Ethiopian soldiers took him under their care. Medical examination showed that Manzikala had been beaten though not severely. Our representative in Stanleyville then visited General Lundula who knew the facts regarding Manzikala's escape and of our having given him protection; but he took the news indifferently. Our representative told him that ONUC had granted him protection for humanitarian reasons.

We later received a report -- this was on the 27th -- that it had been suggested that Mr. Khiary could perhaps visit Stanleyville again to meet Mr. Gizenga who, as you know, has been away for quite a few days, and also to discuss the proposal to which Dr. Linner referred when he spoke to the Committee last week. He said then:

(Mr. Narasimhan)

"I think I am not too indiscreet if I say that what he envisages ... is the setting up of the post of Inspector-General (of the army) ... directly under the orders of the Minister of Defence". (60th meeting of the United Nations Advisory Committee on the Congo, pps.11, 12)

This was the post envisaged for General Lundula. The expectation was that Mr. Khiary would discuss the acceptability of this proposal to General Lundula. But before he made this trip to Stanleyville, he sent us a further message. This was dated 28 October, stating that the Central Government had sent an urgent cable to Mr. Gizenga requesting him to return to Leopoldville immediately and also that, in case of need, facilities for transportation could be provided if ONUC was approached. He reported further that Mr. Gbenye, the Minister of the Interior, might also be going to Stanleyville today, Tuesday. Since that time we have received a report, this morning, from our representative in Stanleyville which says that the Chief of the Sûreté, Massudi Marcel, was granted United Nations protection yesterday. Apparently members of the ANC, accompanied by the gendarmerie, penetrated the Sûreté offices and arrested Mr. Massudi's deputy and brought him to the military camp. But Massudi escaped to ONUC headquarters. We have a subsequent report that he stayed at the ONUC camp for only eight hours and that he managed to return to his own residence on the basis of his security being guaranteed by General Lundula.

Our representative has also reported that former Provincial President Manzikala' chef de cabinet Ateto had been arrested and maltreated. This happened yesterday, in spite of the promise by the President of the Assembly and the Provincial Government that nothing would happen to him. The subsequent report says that he was also released from the military camp by General Lundula.

The third report is that the first burgomaster of Stanleyville was arrested, beaten and maltreated by a mob, the reason given being that workers had not been paid their salaries. Apparently the proprietor of the bakery supplying bread to our troops -- meaning ONUC troops -- and his assistant were also beaten and arrested. The workers in this case were also beaten up and the bakery was closed.

(Mr. Narasimhan)

There has been some violence and disturbance amongst the workers who cannot get their salaries because the ANC has seized the cash in the banks. Our representative has been trying to meet the President of the Provincial Assembly but he was not available and our representative has lodged a strong protest.

Colonel Teshome, the Commander of the Ethiopian contingent, and our representative have talked to General Lundula, requesting his interference. General Lundula has promised to take immediate action to quell the mob and to make the ANC behave. Our representative concludes that the town is bordering on the verge of lawlessness. He has further reported that the American Consul, Mr. Cassilly, was taken into protective custody by ONUC. Apparently the United States Consul was persuaded to leave his room in the Congo Palace Hotel by a youngster who claimed to be the President of the local jeunesse, pretending to consult him on an important affair. The consul then proceeded to the first floor of the hotel building where some fifty youngsters attacked him. The UN troops patrolling the town rushed to his rescue and brought him to Brigade Headquarters. The Commanding Officer informed General Lundula, who arrived there immediately and who also sent a platoon in advance to help control the situation at the hotel. General Lundula and the Brigade Commanding Officer proceeded to the hotel with the Consul, Mr. Cassilly, to study the situation. Apparently all their assailants had managed to escape, but the ringleader, presumably the boy who went to Mr. Cassilly's hotel room and who persuaded him to leave it, was caught and brought in front of General Lundula who personally punished him. Mr. Cassilly is reported not hurt and to have returned to his room.

Our representative has reported that protection has also been provided to the British Consul, Mr. Ballantine. Colonel Teshome has appealed for immediate reinforcements since the situation is grave and reinforcements are essential.

(Mr. Narasimhan)

He has been instructed that he can move the Ethiopian battalion presently located at Bunia if he sees fit, and the Force Commander's office is arranging for whatever transport is necessary in case that battalion from Bunia has to be moved to Stanleyville. This is the situation in Stanleyville.

I should now like, Sir, with your permission, to deal with the reported escape of the mercenaries from Leopoldville. I have to go back a little in this case, because one of the prisoners who attempted to escape has been in our custody for some time. We received a report on 6 October that the United Nations was holding in Leopoldville one Lieutenant Chalmers, a British national, who was arrested at Manono on 28 August while serving as a Lieutenant in the Katanga gendarmérie. He claimed to be the person who shot the late Prime Minister Lumumba and in the course of his interrogation he had stated that he had, in safe custody, with a friend of his in Elisabethville, the original written order signed by three important people, whose names he would not disclose. He was prepared to be taken back to Katanga under escort to pick up his personal possessions, including this order, and to show the very spot where the deed was supposed to have been committed.

His detention was prolonged, in view of the uncertainty of the movements of the Lumumba inquiry Commission, and ONUC had not informed the Commission of the statement of Lieutenant Chalmers and wanted to know what our views were. I must stress that our interrogator in Leopoldville who questioned Lieutenant Chalmers detected many flaws in the plausibility of his story and also had some reservations regarding his mental balance. Our colleagues in Leopoldville felt that his whole story might well be a ruse to enable him to return to Elisabethville and to regain possession of his belongings there before he was expelled. In regard to the advice that our colleagues in Leopoldville sought from us, we told them that we believed that both the Commission in Geneva and the central Government should be informed of the statements made by this gentleman. We also asked whether it would be practical, in the very difficult circumstances then prevailing, to take him back to Katanga under escort to test the story that he had given us.

(Mr. Narasimhan)

Some days later we got a first report saying that arrangements were being made to escort Lieutenant Chalmers to Elisabethville around the 23rd, but this plan was subsequently given up, because, as you may remember, there was all this hitch about the cease-fire and the release of prisoners, and the whole situation was still very uncertain at Elisabethville then. This was as of 23 October. Then we got yesterday this cable -- and the information has also been reported in the newspapers, in fact, yesterday. We got a report from ONUC, regretting that they had to report a concerted escape attempt from Camp Martini in Leopoldville by three prisoners who were held under the provisions of paragraph A 2 of the Security Council resolution, resulting in the death of André Cremer, a Belgian national, aged 40. A British subject, Lieutenant Chalmers, escaped but subsequently reported to the British Embassy in Leopoldville and was returned to the prisoners camp. They gave details of the attempted escape. Apparently the break occurred around 10.30 p.m. GMT on 28 October, when Cremer and Chalmers pretended to be escorted 25 yards across open ground to the toilet. There was a third plotter, a Frenchman, who pulled the fuses, but he abandoned any possible attempt to join the other two, who ran in the darkness and in the rain for a gap in the wall. The Ethiopian guard at Camp Martini called on them to halt and then fired in the air. Chalmers made good his escape, but the Ethiopian patrol was passing outside as Cremer, the Belgian, just emerged through the gap. Then the lead man in the Ethiopian patrol shot low and hit him on the side, and Cremer dropped dead. Our colleagues have asked us to note that Cremer was struck and dropped dead in his tracks outside the enclosure, thus corroborating his intent to escape, as also the fact that both Chalmers and Cremer were fully clothed rather than wearing their usual shorts.

The Belgian and United Kingdom Consuls were informed of this escape. The Belgian Consul arrived with the local doctor and a member of the French Embassy staff, representing the Belgian interests. With ONUC assistance, they visited the body in the Indian hospital, and the Nigerian police began their search for Chalmers, who, as I reported earlier, was subsequently returned to us when he reported to the United Kingdom Embassy.

With regard to Lieutenant Chalmers, the British Ambassador has apparently urged that the British Embassy be permitted to evacuate Lieutenant Chalmers promptly, but our people have stated that this could be done only after they had concluded our interrogation. They repeat that they consider Lieutenant Chalmers at best a very unstable personality and do not credit his boast in regard to having been the man who committed the assassination. The United Kingdom Consul himself seems to think that perhaps Lieutenant Chalmers is manufacturing some kind of excuse which would enable him to go back to Elisabethville to collect his belongings before his evacuation. Our own colleagues feel that last night's attempted escape itself suggests that he perhaps thought of escaping to Elisabethville in the first instance and he had concocted the whole story to enable him to get there under our protection, and again they asked for instructions in regard to Lieutenant Chalmers.

Meanwhile this story had of course been reported in Geneva, and the Commission having read the newspapers, sent a cable to our colleagues in Leopoldville saying that the Commission had seen these press reports which indicated that one Chalmers, now in ONUC custody, had information pertinent to their report, and they wanted this information to be checked and a reply sent immediately. We instructed our colleagues in Leopoldville that the Commission of Investigation be informed immediately of the statement made by Lieutenant Chalmers and also of the evaluation of this statement by military information officers and our own reservations regarding the credibility of the whole story.

(Mr. Narasimhan)

They have also been advised to inform the Commission of the risk involved in sending Lieutenant Chalmers to Geneva since they would have no authority to detain him in Switzerland or elsewhere en route. And it is also possible that, once he arrives in Geneva, he may be unwilling to testify. It was suggested that the Commission might be asked if it wished, on the basis of the available information, to send a fresh interrogatory on which Lieutenant Chalmers would be questioned in Leopoldville itself, and the answers could be forwarded to the Commission. Meanwhile, the British Consul should be advised of the need to detain Lieutenant Chalmers in view of the request made by the Investigation Commission.

I may add, while on this subject, that we have information that the Commission, having learned of the presence of Mr. Tshombe in Geneva, has invited him to a meeting with them as soon as one can be arranged.

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee thanks Mr. Narasimhan for his exhaustive and comprehensive report concerning the situation in Stanleyville, as well as the capture of mercenaries and the one who was shot. I presume that representatives would wish to make comments on the statements of Mr. Narasimhan.

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): Would you say that the cease-fire agreement and the protocol do not exist any more because of the activities of Mr. Tshombe's gendarmerie?

Mr. BUNCHE: I would say that the cease-fire has been violated, but it has not been denounced by us or by the Katangese. We have protested to the Katangese authorities about the violation -- violations actually -- of the cease-fire, but it could not be said that it no longer exists.

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): Let me put it differently. Would it be correct to say that you are no more bound by it?

Mr. BUNCHE: We are observing it thus far. As I indicated in my statement, we have given a warning to the Katangese authorities that if these aerial activities -- which are in fact a violation of the cease-fire -- continue, then we will take counter-action and, of course, will not consider ourselves bound by the provisions of the cease-fire.

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): This leads me to ask whether it is not to your advantage to get out of this cease-fire and protocol at the first opportunity? Obviously, the Central Government does not like it, and, obviously, most of us here do not like it, and I have a feeling -- which, I hope, will be confirmed -- that you are in a position to get away from it.

Mr. BUNCHE: Our position is that we would not wish to take responsibility for either violating or renouncing the cease-fire, but we will not be hampered by it; we will not be bound by it if the other party to the agreement does not keep it. But the onus for that will rest on those who wantonly violate its provisions, and this, we think, puts us in a stronger position.

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): Would you say, then, that there must be some material advantage for you to think so? I do not believe that any moral feeling is involved. There must be some sort of material advantage for you to protest.

Mr. BUNCHE: We think that there is a moral advantage too to the extent to which it is possible to keep faith with a word given. We thought there were other advantages, as we have explained, in the cease-fire itself -- advantages for us -- and so we have that in mind, but if the cease-fire is not going to be observed by the Katangese, I repeat, it will not be permitted to hamper our activities.

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): My second point refers to the prisoners. As far as I remember -- and I think I was here from the beginning -- the United Nations, according to Mr. Hammarskjold's direction, was not to interfere or to take part in any of the investigations of the death of Mr. Lumumba, and I am a little taken aback and would like to know under what authority your people, whether military officers or civilians, can interrogate the man. The direction which I remember Mr. Hammarskjold gave was that they would have nothing to do with it. That is what I remember. My feeling is, in the first place, that the prisoners should be detained and, secondly, if there is any fear that once they go abroad they will refuse to be interrogated, I would say that they should be detained until someone from the Commission interrogates them. I do not believe that interrogation should be referred, but should be done by the Commission itself.

Mr. NARASIMHAN: I should like to make a point here. The interrogation of these captured mercenaries is a matter of course; they are all interrogated, and not because we suspect them of having anything to do with the work of the Commission. In the course of the interrogation, this information came to us and I have given you a faithful account of the subsequent exchanges that took place between us and our colleagues in Leopoldville and the Commission. If the Commission says that it would like to send an interrogatory and let our people in the Congo put the questions and record the answers and send them back to the Commission, as has been done before, and if the Commission decides that one of its members should interrogate Lieutenant Chalmers personally, I would not see any strong objection to it from our side, or from any other side. As a personal opinion, I would say that there should be no objection to that.

Mr. BOLAND (Ireland): I just wanted to say, **first** of all, that I quite agree with what Mr. Bunche said to the effect that ONUC would be wise to be careful about taking any initiative in the direction of treating the cease-fire as being at an end. I think it would be better to be careful about that. But there is one question which I wanted to ask in that connexion.

(Mr. Boland, Ireland)

Am I right in thinking that the authority which has now been given to ONUC to use the aircraft at its disposal relates merely to the protection of Kasai Province and ONUC positions outside Katanga from attacks by aircraft coming from Katanga, or does it extend to authorizing ONUC to use its aircraft to make attacks in Katanga Province?

Mr. BUNCHE: The basic position which we are taking is that our counter-action would relate to offensive aerial activity by Katangese aircraft, wherever that might take place, whether in Kasai or in Katanga itself.

Mr. BOMBOKO (Congo (Leopoldville)) (interpretation from French):

When we were examining the draft protocol at a previous meeting I pointed out that Mr. Tshombe did not observe agreements or other instruments which he concluded. For him they are mere scraps of paper to be thrown into the wastepaper basket. What is disturbing is that at the very time when the protocol was being discussed here -- that is, on 20 October -- Mr. Tshombe was already in the process of attacking positions of the Central Government in Kasai Province. I think it would have been preferable at that time to have informed the Advisory Committee about these aerial attacks, and it is a pity that it is only now that we are being told that on 20 October there was already a first attack.

With regard to these air raids it is clearly demonstrated that the aircraft are not piloted by Congolese. They are machines supplied to Katanga by mercenaries or by those who have hired mercenaries and who wish to perpetuate the situation in the Congo.

In these conditions I do not see why legal subtleties should be allowed to delay the seizure of these aircraft and the punishing of the mercenaries who pilot them. My Government wishes very much that that could be done because if the pacification operation of the United Nations has met with difficulties in Katanga it is because of these aircraft.

The aircraft were supplied by various companies, because Katanga itself could not buy so many machines. They are aircraft which were purchased by the financial powers in Katanga, as everybody knows. Furthermore, in the reports which have just been read to us it is stated that the latest aircraft, at least, were bought by a Belgian company and then delivered to Katanga. What is more, that same Belgian company bought six other airplanes which, fortunately, were stopped by the German Government before delivery.

Thus, as I say, these aircraft have been purchased by Belgians, by foreigners, and I do not see why an offensive cannot be undertaken to seize them and to punish the pilots who are busily engaged in killing the civilian population of the Congo. Whether those who suffer are Congolese in Katanga or Congolese elsewhere in the country, they are all Congolese. There would be no civil war now and no need for a police operation at all if it were not for the fact that there were foreigners preventing the United Nations from accomplishing its mission and preventing the Central Government from exercising its sovereign rights.

(Mr. Bomboko, Congo (Leopoldville))

For my part, I wish to make the following proposal. Measures should be taken to seize these aircraft and to capture the pilots and place them at the disposal of the Congolese Government so that they may be punished.

As regards the protocol, I share the opinion of the representative of Ethiopia. The protocol has no longer any raison d'être since Mr. Tshombe does not comply with it. In any agreement there is always a stipulation implying the principle of reciprocity. The United Nations has until now respected the protocol, but since Katanga has violated it I feel that on this occasion the United Nations must prove itself to be energetic, otherwise Mr. Tshombe will think that everything is permitted to him and that he can continue to humiliate the international Organization before the world.

Mr. BUNCHE: May I just say a word for the benefit and information of the representative of the Congo, in view of the fact that he has made some reference to earlier attacks by Katangese aircraft which might have been reported to the Advisory Committee at the time the protocol was being considered. As I indicated at the beginning of my statement, the first reports we had received on Katangese aerial activity came yesterday afternoon in cables dated 30 October. One of those cables, giving information which had been received by our people from ANC sources in the area, stated that on or about 22 October a Katangese aircraft attacked ANC troops in the Luiza area. We had no direct knowledge of this. It is information given subsequently to our people by ANC sources. Other attacks had been reported as having occurred on 27, 28 and 29 October, but the first that was actually observed by any United Nations personnel was the one on 29 October, which was observed by a United Nations officer who had accompanied the two United Nations helicopters, about which I had reported, in the Luputa area.

Thus it was not possible to give this Committee any information about these aerial attacks prior to yesterday afternoon because no information was available here on them. In fact we must assume that prior to 29 October no such information was available to our people in the area. In this connexion I might add also that we note that in Mr. Adoula's statement on the radio yesterday reference was made to attacks on 28 October, but no reference to any earlier than that date.

Mr. NGILERUMA (Nigeria): I wish to thank Mr. Bunche for giving us information about the civilian operations and the military and political situation in the Congo, but I have to confess that the political and military situation about which we have been informed this morning is very gloomy. I have been optimistic all the time, but as I see it now developments in the Congo are again getting out of hand. In the first place, there is the surprise visit of Tshombe to Geneva. It is really very remarkable that, with the presence of the United Nations in Katanga, Mr. Tshombe should have been able to get out of the country without the knowledge of the United Nations. It is possible that he is

(Mr. Ngileruma, Nigeria)

now in Geneva planning to get some modern weapons again with which to come and attack ONUC and the ANC. Also, the situation, not only in Katanga but also in Stanleyville, is really very serious now. I should like to ask whether Mr. Gizenga is now back in Leopoldville or whether he is still in Stanleyville. Perhaps I could have an answer to that later.

In addition to the mercenaries, it is also very curious that in Katanga modern weapons are being distributed to -- if I have the figure correctly -- 150,000 villagers. If that figure is correct, and if this has really happened, the situation will be very, very serious indeed.

(Mr. Ngilleruma, Nigeria)

The army in Katanga is not organized, but there are villagers with weapons wandering about in the country. They are being furnished with modern weapons. Therefore, I do not know what the result of the anarchy in the country will be. Many representatives who have armies in the Congo have warned on many occasions that the situation is very grave and that the armies are being put in a very embarrassing position.

I agree entirely with the representative of Ethiopia that the Protocol has been violated. It is not only being violated, but I would say that it is being denounced by Katanga. Even from the beginning the Central Government was not in favour of the Protocol. They did not like the idea very much and now it is very plain that Tshombe himself has not observed it. The United Nations can do very little since the army in Katanga is attacking the Central Government and the villagers are joining hands and air raids are being directed against the Central Government and ONUC.

Therefore, I would like to know in detail about the situation in Stanleyville because the situation in Katanga is now very plain. It is getting out of hand again. But as regards Stanleyville, unless Mr. Gizenga comes back to Leopoldville and declares his loyalty, with all sincerity and honesty, to the Central Government, I am quite sure that both Stanleyville and Katanga will be against the Central Government and that the situation will get out of hand. Then we will get back to the chaotic situation again. I am very unhappy because the situation is deteriorating badly. What happened there this morning really presents a gloomy picture. I would now like to know about Mr. Gizenga and the situation in Stanleyville before I ask further questions.

The CHAIRMAN: I will call on Mr. Narasimhan to reply to the queries of the representative of Nigeria.

Mr. NARASIMHAN: Whatever information we have in regard to the situation in Stanleyville we have shared with the Committee. We have informed the Committee that Mr. Gizenga is still in Stanleyville. We have authorized Mr. Khiary to offer his good offices, as always, on behalf of ONUC, in case it is considered by both sides that he could play a useful part.

(Mr. Narasimhan)

We have also reported the information that we had that the Central Government has requested Mr. Gizenga to return urgently to Leopoldville, and we also had information that Mr. Gbenye, the Minister of Interior -- who I believe is a close personal friend of Mr. Gizenga -- was proceeding or planning to proceed to Stanleyville this very day to talk to Mr. Gizenga and, presumably, to use his influence also to persuade him to return to Leopoldville.

In reply to the distinguished representative of Nigeria, I regret to say that we have no additional information. But I have no doubt that Mr. Linner, who as the Committee may know is returning to Leopoldville this evening, will try to get all further information possible in regard to the Stanleyville situation. He will no doubt report to us and when he does so, once again this information will be made available, in all frankness and candor, to the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: I will now call on Mr. Bunche who would like to make a statement.

Mr. BUNCHE: With regard to the question raised by the representative of Nigeria about the statement of Mr. Tshombe on the distribution of arms to 150,000 villagers, we have no knowledge at all as to the truth of this statement. There is no information in our possession which indicates that any such action has really taken place.

As to the statement at the beginning concerning our lack of knowledge about Mr. Tshombe's visit to Geneva, I may only say that we have never made any pretense of being able to keep up with Mr. Tshombe's movements. We do not have him in custody. He is free to go and come as he pleases. He is in and out of Elisabethville and indeed in and out of Katanga very frequently. Whether he took off for Europe from Elisabethville or from an airport in Rhodesia we cannot say. We did not know he was gone until reports came in that he had actually arrived in Geneva.

I know of no way in which we could in fact keep him under surveillance unless we had a very large force and authority to do so in view of the area involved.

Mr. NGILERUMA (Nigeria): I would like to point out to Mr. Bunche that at our last meeting the question of intelligence was discussed thoroughly and the situation now takes us back to the same question. Mr. Tshombe is now distributing modern weapons to 150,000 villagers. According to our information in New York, the weapons are being manufactured by the mercenaries in Katanga. I do not know how true it is, but that is what we are hearing from many sources. But what is true is that Mr. Tshombe is an enemy of the United Nations and that he is the enemy of the Central Government. Therefore, when you are dealing with your enemy, although you do not keep him in custody, you do watch his activities. One should be vigilant. The United Nations must be vigilant when it comes to the activities of Mr. Tshombe, because it is no secret now that Mr. Tshombe is the enemy of the whole world since he has not been co-operating with the United Nations and he is not co-operating with the Central Government.

Therefore, with all due respect to Mr. Bunche, we must consider this United Nations operation in a country like the Congo and that you are dealing with a very strong enemy like Mr. Tshombe. I do not think it is a good thing not to know what Mr. Tshombe is doing when he says he is going to Europe or that he is going somewhere else. I do not think that this is a good thing.

(Mr. Ngileruma, Nigeria)

But, again, the question of the mercenary who is British and who made an attempt to escape and is now arrested; he was telling us about the question of his evacuation. It would be very useful that the Commission should interview him to find out from him -- this is very good indeed. But all the same, if he, himself, admitted killing Mr. Lumumba or any other human being, to me the question of evacuation should not arise. Therefore, I should like to hear the comments of Mr. Bunche and Mr. Narasimhan.

Mr. BUNCHE: I have noted very carefully what the representative of Nigeria has said. I would simply call to his attention that it was only last week that Mr. Khiari was carrying messages back and forth from Mr. Adoula to Mr. Tshombe, and from Mr. Tshombe to Mr. Adoula in the effort which, I take it, everyone favoured, to bring about a rapprochement between Leopoldville and Elisabethville to protect the territorial unity of the Congo, and through United Nations good offices to try to bring Mr. Tshombe and his provincial government fully under the umbrella of the Central Government. Mr. Khiari was in direct touch with Mr. Tshombe in this effort. But, I certainly agree, as I have previously said, that our intelligence is weak and defective on matters of this kind, particularly in matters of political intelligence. Even the Press was fooled. I would suppose we would have been able to learn of Mr. Tshombe's intentions only by having someone well-planted in the inner circle of his advisers, because as things go in the Congo usually the Press is aware of such matters, but the Press itself was scooped in this instance. And as I indicated earlier, we did have only the one inkling that something of this kind might develop as a result of General Rikhye's visit to Brussels and what was said to him there by Mr. Rothschild.

Mr. NGILERUMA (Nigeria): The reason why I raise this matter is, as I said earlier, Mr. Tshombe is making himself the enemy of the whole world since he is the enemy of the United Nations. So, if Mr. Tshombe is in a position to have an office and a representative in New York to watch your activities and to know what you are doing, why should not the United Nations co-operate with the

(Mr. Ngileruma, Nigeria)

Central Government, and with the intelligence we have, to find out what he is doing -- this is the whole point. I am quite sure that Mr. Tshombe in Katanga, having a representative in this country, is in a position to know what the United Nations is doing in this country. So, it will not be difficult for the United Nations, with the co-operation of the Central Government, to know everything that he is doing -- distribution of arms, purchases of aircraft and his own movements will not be very difficult to follow -- I have to repeat -- with the co-operation of the Central Government. This is the point which I want to make to Mr. Bunche.

The CHAIRMAN: I am sure that the entire Committee shares the anxiety of the representative of Nigeria and the Secretariat will certainly take the warning that he has been good enough to give and some arrangements may be made to keep an eye on Mr. Tshombe's activities. Before I call on the representative of India, I will give the floor to Mr. Narasimhan who wishes to make a statement in connexion with Lieutenant Chalmers.

Mr. NARASIMHAN: Even on the very first occasion when we replied to the cable regarding the statement made by Lieutenant Chalmers, we informed our colleagues in Leopoldville that the Government should be informed immediately of his statement, and that if he was able to go back to Katanga and produce all this evidence, the Government should be informed of the situation and asked for authority to take Chalmers to Geneva under escort, with a promise to bring him back to Leopoldville; the Commission should also be informed of this and asked whether it wishes to question Lieutenant Chalmers in Geneva provided the Central Government agrees to his removal to Geneva for this purpose. This was on 6 October. Yesterday, we informed our colleagues in Leopoldville that there should be no question of releasing Lieutenant Chalmers and arranging for his evacuation at this stage. The British Consul should be informed of our necessity to detain him in view of the request by the Investigation Commission and, even though we may have reservations about the confession, in the event that the confession should be verified, it would be necessary to turn Chalmers over to the Government authorities in Leopoldville.

(Mr. Narasimhan)

These are the instructions that were given to our colleagues in Leopoldville. It is only if the Central Government permits, that there will be any question of taking him to Geneva for the purpose of being interviewed by the Commission.

Mr. BHADKAMKAR (India): During our last meeting, Mr. Bunche said something that this word "intelligence" should not be read in the context of the United Nations. We would broadly agree with that in the sense that we do not really feel that the United Nations is or really should put itself in a position of gathering intelligence or seeking intelligence. I had no criticism, but I would say that any information which assists them militarily or otherwise, and which they can collect in a reasonably normal manner is, of course, not to be despised. I mean that effort, I believe, is being made and should continue to be made.

The other thing is our concern which we expressed last time and which has again been hinted at by the Ambassador of Nigeria when he said that it is not good that many things which are not good are happening in the Congo. We are equally concerned with that.

To come back to something we mentioned last time. It is again this question of mercenaries who may have committed crimes and therefore should not be considered as mercenaries in the term of paragraph A 2, but that they should become people who have committed crimes and are criminals. I hope our feeling is entirely unjustified, but the feeling is that somehow or other these people have been getting away with it -- if you know what I mean; even some of them who may have committed acts of crime -- actual crime involving injury or killing of people, under paragraph A 2 where it speaks of evacuation, may already have been evacuated -- some have been anyway and others may also be evacuated. But what we stressed last time was that paragraph A 2 refers specifically to military and para-military personnel and political advisers; and in a similar context mercenaries who have also possibly been operating behind the scenes or working as advisers or inciting military persons to act not in their best interests or in the best interests of the Congo, but the mercenaries -- or, in fact, anybody else -- even foreign advisers, and so forth, if they happen to commit a crime, I think they should be treated differently. I do not think they really fall under paragraph A 2.

(Mr. Bhadkamkar, India)

This is something which may merit deep thinking, or rethinking. Of course, if it is perfectly clear that advisers, para-military personnel, military personnel and mercenaries who are apprehended have not committed crimes, they should be evacuated. If, however, there is the slightest suspicion that they have committed crimes, then we support the present United Nations practice of holding them for interrogation. I hope that we shall not succumb to pressure from any consular or other diplomatic officials in Leopoldville or elsewhere and let these people go without having satisfactorily completed the interrogation.

Thus, whether it is a question of Lieutenant Chalmers or of anyone else, we hope that ONUC will not succumb to pressure of consular authorities. Such consular authorities should not and must not be allowed to exercise functions which are beyond their very specific consular functions. I think that the consuls will realize that these persons have not appeared in the Congo as a result of normal consular arrangements, with good passports or visas granted by the Central Government, and that they are not in the Congo in connexion with any kind of activity with which consuls should normally be concerned. This is an extraordinary situation, possibly without precedent. We hope that consular pressure, wherever it is considered unwarranted or unreasonable, will be fully resisted. We must not give in to this kind of pressure.

My next question relates to the Fouga jets, which are again in the news -- I do not personally have an answer to this question, but I have a feeling about it. In the view of ONUC or the Secretariat here, what is the status of these Fouga jet fighters? Are they part of the military forces of Katanga? Are they a legal part of the military forces of any section of the military formation of the Government of the Congo?

So far as I am aware -- and the Foreign Minister of the Congo might be able to confirm this -- the Central Government of the Congo has no military jet fighters in its military formation. If that is so, such fighters obviously could not be part of the Katanga Provincial formation, even as rebels. What I mean is this: It might be said that the part of the Congolese army which is now in Katanga is in a sense a rebel army, but still a Congolese army. But are these Fouga jet fighters also a Congolese military formation? If not, I do not believe

(Mr. Bhadkamkar, India)

that the cease-fire or the protocol applies to them at all. And, if that agreement does not apply to them, I believe that ONUC is free to take action against them. These Fouga jet fighters are there in an unauthorized way; they are not part of any military formation of the Government of the Congo; they have the status neither of rebels nor of an organized military formation. In that case, as I have said, it is, I believe, possible for ONUC to take specific action, action confined to these Fouga jet fighters. I do not know what that action should be -- perhaps they should be shot down or attacked on the ground. The Provincial authorities of Katanga, with whom the cease-fire agreement was negotiated, should be informed that this or that action is being taken because these Fouga jet fighters are not part of the military or para-military forces of the Katanga Provincial authorities.

We should like to know whether ONUC now considers that it has the aerial capability of taking any such action. Of course, when I use the words "Fouga jet fighters", I am using a generic term: I mean any kind of unauthorized military aircraft operating against ONUC -- or, in fact, against anybody else -- without the authority of the Central Government of the Congo. This may apply to Doves or Dorniers, or any other aircraft. I mention the Fouga jet fighters because they have been the most damaging. I have flown in a Dove myself, and I know that it has a very limited capacity; it can be used only when there is little aerial opposition.

We should like to know what the present thinking is in this respect. Or is it considered that this is not an appropriate time to give the matter any specific thought? We should certainly like to have information on that.

I come to my next question. I believe that it was at a meeting of this Committee on 3 August -- at any rate, it was soon after we had received information on the formation of the Central Government of the Congo, after Parliament had been convened -- that I asked the late Secretary-General this question: Now that a Central Congolese Government had been formed and been approved by Parliament, would paragraph A 1 of the Security Council resolution, which urged that:

"the United Nations take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo..." (S/4741),

be regarded as applying to any action involving the use of military forces? I was thinking of any move or engagement ordered by the Central Congolese Government.

(Mr. Bhadkamkar, India)

My recollection is that the Secretary-General replied that now that the Central Government had been formed, any action which it took in regard to its own military forces anywhere in the Congo would not fall under the meaning of paragraph A 1. We should like to know what is the present thinking of the Secretariat on that matter.

Mr. BUNCHE: With regard to the question of Katangese aircraft which has been raised by the representative of India, I would say that this causes us no distress at all. So far as we know --

Mr. BHADKAMKAR (India): I would merely note that it would be preferable not to refer to "Katangese aircraft"; they should be referred to as aircraft in Katanga.

Mr. BUNCHE: They are aircraft flown in Katanga and outside of Katanga. As we indicated this morning, our problem is that they have been carrying on bombing activities outside of Katanga, in Kasai.

When I say that this problem causes us no distress, I mean that we have no knowledge of any aircraft being attached to the Katangese gendarmerie which could properly be regarded as forming part of the regular military apparatus of the Province. Thus, any aircraft based in Katanga which carried out offensive aerial activities of the kind encountered in recent days would be included in the counter-action which our aircraft are instructed to take.

Moreover, it is obvious that the crews of any Katanga-based aircraft engaged in such activities would be mercenary crews.

The representative of India mentioned the Fouga jets. We do not know what has become of the remaining Fouga jets because in the activities of these recent days no jets of any kind have appeared. The aircraft which have been observed in the aerial activities and on the ground have been the two mentioned: the Dove and the single Dornier, which may be a one-engine Dornier-27 or a two-engine Dornier-28. But we do not know the whereabouts of the one jet that was causing so much trouble for us in the September fighting or of the infamous pilot, Captain Deullen. They have not participated in any aerial activity known to us since September.

(Mr. Bunche)

But whether they are jets or not, the counteraction would be taken by our planes in the air or on the ground, the only condition being that they would be aircraft that had been identified as engaging in activity of an offensive kind. On the second question I would defer to my colleague, Mr. Narasimhan.

Mr. NARASIMHAN: I believe that our Indian colleague is right in the view that he has attributed to the late Secretary-General -- that any military move by the Central Government in Leopoldville within the territory of the Republic of the Congo is a move which it is entitled to make: that such a move would not constitute an occasion for ONUC to interfere under paragraph A-1 of the Security Council resolution, which enjoins it to prevent civil war by using force, if necessary, in the last resort.

Mrs. ROSSEL (Sweden): I agree with previous speakers that we are again faced with a very serious situation indeed in the Congo. Like the representative of Ireland, and a few other representatives, I would like the United Nations to act under a great sense of responsibility when we face this situation again. Ten out of nineteen members of this Committee are engaged in the ONUC forces, and we certainly have responsibilities in the Congo, as well as towards our Parliaments, public opinion and so on. I think it is a tightrope exercise to find out how far we can go under A-1 and A-2. If I understood Dr. Bunche rightly, he means that counteraction against flights from Katanga is action against mercenaries?

Mr. BUNCHE: Yes.

Mrs. ROSSEL (Sweden): And not taking sides in a possible civil war between the ANC and the Katanga gendarmerie?

Mr. BUNCHE: Yes, the basic justification being defence.

Mrs. ROSSEL (Sweden): Have they attacked the United Nations Forces?

Mr. BUNCHE: Yes.

Mrs. ROSSEL (Sweden): Because we are there for the prevention of civil war and should only take action for self defence, and self protection. I would like to have this clarified a little, if I may, by the Secretariat.

Mr. BUNCHE: Yes, we would say that aerial attack of this kind, for example on the railroad, on communications, or on airfields, would fully justify counteraction for defensive purposes, even without raising the question of A-1 or A-2; because we cannot exist there as an operation, we cannot hope to fulfil the requirements of the Security Council's resolution, either in A-1 or A-2, unless we are in a position to maintain our freedom of movement, and our communications, and to be free from bandit attacks from the air. And since these planes are, as indicated, certainly manned by mercenaries, this, we feel, strengthens our justification for defensive action. So, in this context, defensive action cannot be limited to action which could be taken only when a particular Katangese plane attacks a particular United Nations plane. That would be straining the limitation on defence.

Mr. MKA (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I should like to seek a clarification concerning Mr. Olivier de Ferron. If I have understood correctly what has been said, it would seem that he is a representative of Mr. Tshombe in Geneva, or someone who also has certain consular status. I should like an explanation, or some clarification, to be given concerning this gentleman.

Mr. BUNCHE: I know no more about him than I have indicated. We are informed that Mr. Tshombe's contacts in Geneva were made through this man, Mr. Olivier de Ferron, who is a French businessman and also has the title Honorary Consul of Iceland. It is said that he had been Mr. Tshombe's contact man--his informal representative in Geneva--since the summer of 1960. We had never heard of him before. We have no relations, of course, with Mr. Ferron, and have learned of his relationship with Mr. Tshombe only since the latter's arrival the other day in Geneva. I myself have deprecated the lack of what might be called

(Mr. Bunche)

skilled and efficient intelligence on the part of the United Nations, but I think members of the Committee will realize that all of the information that we are able to give at our meetings does in fact come from our sources -- most of the time from information-gathering activities carried on by our people. This is the case with regard to the information that we have been able to give this far concerning Mr. Tshombe in Geneva. I can assure you that we will have more information later on his activities in Geneva, and that, we can be sure, will be reliable information.

Mr. MAKA (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I should like to return to this question of Mr. Tshombe, who is shown as a person incapable of fulfilling his obligations -- who signs agreements and denounces them twenty-four hours later. Like the representative of Nigeria, I am personally very concerned about the turn of events in the Congo, particularly following the aerial attacks and the journey of Mr. Tshombe. I should like to ask whether representatives of the United Nations in the Congo are sure that they will be able to make Mr. Tshombe see reason. It is time that we went into this specific aspect of the question and found some person other than Mr. Tshombe to address in the Congo.

Mr. BUNCHE: I can only answer: no, we cannot be sure that we can make Mr. Tshombe see reason, even less that we might make Mr. Munongo see reason. Our hope is to help the Central Government ensure that reason and order will somehow prevail in the Congo. I quite agree that, if Mr. Tshombe does not see reason, there would be good grounds for hoping that someone else in Katanga might.

Mr. BAHIZI (Congo (Leopoldville)) (interpretation from French): As far as Mr. Tshombe's trip to Geneva is concerned, it was carried out in defiance of the Central Government of the Congo. The Central Government in Leopoldville wonders with anxiety how this trip escaped the surveillance of ONUC which is exercised over airports in Katanga.

Speaking of airports in Katanga, one thing surprises us, and that is the fact that ONUC would not seem to be exercising the necessary control over airfields in Katanga. Otherwise, how can one account for the air raids by Katanga planes?

To return to Tshombe's trip: We are in a position to inform the Advisory Committee that information given to General Rikhye by the representatives of the Belgian authorities is not accurate. The Central Government of the Congo never agreed to meet Tshombe anywhere else than in Leopoldville. We have learnt from the newspapers that Tshombe went, inter alia, to Geneva in order to deposit \$15 million in a safe place there. According to Mr. Bunche's statements, the source of which is information furnished by General Rikhye, the Belgian authorities were informed of Mr. Tshombe's trip. This demonstrates once again the friendly bonds linking Mr. Tshombe with the Belgian Government.

The Belgian interests in Katanga are well known to all, and it would by no means surprise us if the Belgian Government had arranged for or fostered the furnishing of fighter aircraft and their pilots to Katanga. It is high time for the United Nations to make an effort to neutralize the military operations of Katanga. For that purpose, the Katanga fighter aircraft must be immobilized. We should like to know what the authorities of the international Organization intend to do in order to immobilize the offensive operations of the Katanga aviation. We fail to understand why Mr. Bunche would want to wait for more

bombings, for further losses of life, before undertaking appropriate action against the Katanga fighter aircraft.

Must the most recent bombings therefore be regarded as approved? And, if they are not approved, why wait for more bombings? Why not prevent such action in good time?

As the representative of India has pointed out, the Central Government in Leopoldville owns no Fouga aircraft or other fighter aircraft. The Fougas of Katanga belong to the rebellious Government of Katanga. These aircraft which have already caused all too great loss of life both to ONUC and to the Congolese, are doomed to destruction. We do not know what ONUC is waiting for before destroying them.

Dr. Bunche seems to believe that this kind of aircraft no longer exists. If that is so, there are other types of fighter aircraft which have replaced the Fougas and which should be destroyed.

We should like to know how the Secretariat understands its responsibilities in the Congo, whether it is willing to act urgently or whether it will continue to hesitate to act -- a hesitation which compromises the situation in the Congo and also compromises the honour of our whole Organization.

Are we expected to buy fighter aircraft to combat the fighter aircraft of Katanga? Or can we continue to count on the presence of the United Nations in the Congo?

We are awaiting your answer, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BUNCHE: First of all, may I repeat that we do not know by what means Mr. Tshombe got to Geneva. I have noted the assumption of the representative of the Republic of the Congo that he did take off from an airfield in Katanga. We have no knowledge of whether he took off from an airfield in Katanga or from some other territory such as Rhodesia, which would be quite available to him.

We have never made any claim to be able, with the force we have at our disposition in the Congo, to patrol the entire Congo or even the entire Katanga. There is a border line, with Rhodesia alone, of 2,000 miles. So it is quite possible for anyone to move from Katanga across the border and have access to aerial travel there.

I can only repeat that we do not know by what means Mr. Tshombe left Katanga, whether by plane or by road, and by what airline he reached Geneva.

As to the question about United Nations counteraction, I have indicated that, in taking such actions, we must always be mindful of the basis for the United Nations operation in the Congo, the purposes and limitations of which are defined in the first instance by the invitation of the Congolese Government itself, and basically, of course, by the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council which account for its presence there. This, as you know, has always inhibited the United Nations from taking what might be called offensive initiatives and has limited its use of force necessarily to defensive actions. And, as I think I indicated earlier in response to a specific question by the representative of Sweden, there would be some basis for assuming that we are now making a rather liberal interpretation of what may be considered to be defensive action in the counteraction which is contemplated if these aerial activities are resumed. We did feel, in view of the fact that we had made an agreement with them, that it was the proper thing to warn the Katangese authorities fully and directly that, if such activities continued, this counteraction would be taken, so that there would be no doubt and no confusion on their part as to what the position of the United Nations would be.

(Mr. Bunche)

I might add, finally, that it has been only very recently, as the representative of the Congo well knows, that the United Nations itself has been in a position -- and he pointed out that the Congo Government is not in a position -- to take aerial counteraction of any kind against such depredations and that we suffered very greatly through inability to do so in the course of the fighting in September. We do not intend to suffer that situation again.

Mr. SIDKY (United Arab Republic): In view of the gravity of the situation arising from air activities of the Katangese against the Central Government and possibly again against the United Nations in violation of the cease fire protocol agreement, we hope that instructions given to the United Nations command and United Nations people in the field concerning possible counteraction will be carried out with vigilance and firmness. We are afraid that the distribution of arms to border villagers would complicate the situation. The United Nations has to take urgent steps in co-operation with the Central Government, if necessary, in this connexion.

We hope too that the United Nations will be able to check Tshombe's activities in case he should be seeking to reinforce his military position. It is rather disturbing that Mr. Tshombe's visit to Geneva coincided with Katangese air attacks and renewal of hostilities.

Mr. HAMDANI (Pakistan): I associate myself with the previous speakers in recording appreciation for all the information that we have received this morning.

My delegation finds itself in agreement with the representative of Ireland that we should exercise the utmost caution in doing anything that would nullify the cease fire agreement and protocol. It is true that only yesterday we received information about the violations of the cease fire. But paragraph 4 of the cease fire agreement and paragraph 2 of the protocol envisage some machinery to take care of the cease fire. I would therefore like to ask the following questions:

What action is proposed to counteract these violations of the cease fire? Is it intended to apply paragraph 2 of the protocol procedure? Has a protest been lodged? If so, in what form and with what content? We suggest that the strongest possible protest should be made drawing attention to the grave consequences of such violations. What steps are being envisaged for the expulsion of the mercenaries? My delegation believes that the Foreign Minister of the Congo made a very valid point when he said that without mercenaries the Katanga planes would not be flying.

Mr. BUNCHE: With regard to these two questions, the counteraction that we would contemplate would be, first to destroy Katangese aircraft identified as being or having been engaged in offensive aerial activity in or outside Katanga, to destroy them on the ground or in the air, as the case may be, and to justify this, as I indicated earlier, on the basis of necessary defence.

As to the expulsion of mercenaries, as has been reported to this Committee at previous meetings, Mr. Linner has approached the Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo with a view to the adoption by his Government of a new ordinance which would call upon the United Nations to turn over to the custody of the Congolese Government the mercenaries which are taken by the United Nations and which heretofore have been first held by the United Nations for interrogation and then, at the request of the Congolese Government, expelled to their home countries. It was felt that if these mercenaries realized that they are going to be punished in the country in which they carried on their depredations, it would be a greater deterrent to them. This also would prevent any of them from returning, as some few have done after having been expelled, particularly where countries have not yet developed legislation which makes it possible for them to take their passports away and thus prevent them from travelling.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to point out to the representative of Pakistan that at our meeting on the 26th this question was discussed and Mr. Bomboko, the Foreign Minister ...

Mr. MAKA (Guinea) (interpretation from French): Before the Chairman adjourns the meeting, I should like to clarify a point.

I noted from the reply of Mr. Bunche that he perhaps did not quite understand my thought when I spoke of our interlocutor. Mr. Tshombe is very influential in Katanga. I had begun by asking questions relating to a person who had to perform counsellor functions with Mr. Tshombe. I want to say that I think it is time for the United Nations to deal with the Katanga problem through those who handle and manoeuvre Tshombe. We believe that Tshombe is an instrument who is controlled by others. He is not acting on his own. If we do not act in this way we shall remain paralysed. I wanted to clarify this point.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to point out to the representative of Guinea that I was not in the process of adjourning the meeting. I shall return to his point after I have called on the speakers on my list.

I was merely trying to point out to the representative of Pakistan that at our last meeting the question of the disposition of mercenaries was discussed, and Mr. Bomboko gave the assurance that if the United Nations wanted these mercenaries to be sent to Leopoldville to be incarcerated and treated as criminals, his Government saw no objection to that.

Mr. BOLAND (Ireland): I spoke so briefly on the last occasion that there is perhaps a danger of my having been misunderstood. It is quite clear to me that Mr. Tshombe is a completely lawless person with little or no respect for his pledged word. He has already broken the cease-fire, I think, and he will probably continue to do so. The point may come, therefore, at which the cease-fire will have to be formally denounced.

What I am anxious about is that when the point comes the responsibility for the break-down of the cease-fire should be clearly seen to rest on the shoulders of Mr. Tshombe and not on the shoulders of the United Nations. Mr. Tshombe has a very effective propaganda machine which has already done a certain amount of harm to the United Nations, and I think we must be careful not to provide it with fodder for its operations. I do not say that the cease-fire should be observed on the part of the United Nations if Mr. Tshombe continues to break it. What I do say is that if the cease-fire is going to break down we should look for circumstances in which the responsibility for that will rest firmly on the shoulders of Mr. Tshombe and not on the United Nations.

Mr. WACHUKU (Nigeria): I think there was a clarification which the Ambassador wanted with regard to Tshombe's movements. It is reported that he left the country without the knowledge of the United Nations. How could that happen? Certainly if he travelled by train the United Nations ought to know it. If he travelled by plane he must have left from one of the airports. And even if he escaped over the border to Northern Rhodesia and went somewhere else from there, it is rather surprising to learn that the United Nations did not do anything about it. I wonder whether a clarification could be given on this aspect of the matter before any further comment on the Katanga situation is made.

Then there is this report about the bombing that is going on. It is reported in the newspapers that a Nigerian officer actually saw this from a helicopter. This is of particular interest to me. It was not only this officer who saw it but there were some other United Nations officials too. We should like to have some clarification about that before any comments are made.

Mr. BUNCHE: I might answer the last question first. In the course of my report this morning I pointed out the fact that part of the information we have about these aerial activities came from a report by a Nigerian officer, and the latest report comes from the Nigerian Commander at Luluabourg.

As to the first question, I might say again that frankly we do not know how Mr. Tshombe went to Geneva, but I would only point out that he very often travels about in a car from Elisabethville to Ndola, which is just across the border; it has been happening all the time. As a matter of fact, I think that Mr. Linner will corroborate that he has a villa which is very close to the Rhodesian border and he goes to it frequently. For Mr. Tshombe to leave Katanga is a very easy thing. We have not had Mr. Tshombe under guard. We have never held Mr. Tshombe in any form of custody. We have been in touch with him, as you know; there have been telephonic exchanges in Mr. Khiary's negotiations on the cease-fire and, as I pointed out earlier, an exchange of messages has taken place between Mr. Adoula and Mr. Tshombe on the question of the rapprochement.

Mr. WACHUKU (Nigeria): What about the bombing?

Mr. BUNCHE: We have had a very full report on the bombing and we have given all the information we have on it. We have also indicated what our people are doing and what their instructions are. Their instructions are to stop it, to take all necessary counteraction which we put on the basis of essential defensive action on our part to stop any such activities in or outside of Katanga by planes based in Katanga, the only condition being that we identify those planes as aircraft being engaged in offensive action of this kind; and the instructions would then be to destroy them in the air or on the ground, wherever found. The Katangese authorities have today been warned to this effect very specifically by a message from Mr. O'Brien on instructions from Leopoldville to Mr. Kimba of Katanga.

Mr. WACHUKU (Nigeria): I do not know what steps the United Nations has taken about the settlement of the Congolese financial question with the Belgians, the question of the portfolio, the payment by the Union Minière to the Central Government. What is being done about that? We have talked about mercenaries. In our view, there are two things which the United Nations must do now to bring to get this whole question under control.

We have been talking about the question of the mercenaries and the method of handing them over to the Central Government to deal with them.

The CHAIRMAN: Sir Alexander has made a report on the civilian operations in the Congo, but I will call on him to repeat this to answer the question which has been raised by the representative of Nigeria.

Mr. WACHUKU (Nigeria): Before he makes his statement, I should like to say how my mind is working in that respect. I think that the United Nations has sufficient information about this: that the Congo was not as poor before its independence as people said. I think, in fact, that in the Union Minière and in all those statutory corporations running the various organs that developed the economy of the country, it has about 50 per cent of the shares in those concerned. Therefore, revenue coming from them at the rate of 50 per cent should be coming into its coffers.

Then there is the question of the portfolio. The Congo treasury became bankrupt overnight after independence. So long as these companies with financial interests support the Provincial Government or refuse to pay what they are supposed to pay to the Central Government -- either they pay it in Belgium or they pay it to the Provincial Government -- so long will you have a weakness on the part of the Central Government. I want to know what the United Nations is doing to get the financial aspect settled so that the Central Government will derive the fullest benefit in making the Union Minière and other companies pay their taxes and their due to the Central Government and so that Belgium should settle the question of the financial relations of Belgium and the Central Government. I believe that if that problem is attacked and if Tshombe's Provincial Government has no further source of recouping itself, it would weaken Tshombe financially and economically. And if it is also weakened from the point of view of the mercenaries with these two-pronged attacks, they will be compelled to co-operate with the Central Government.

(Mr. Wachuku, Nigeria)

I would like to know what steps the United Nations is taking on the other line. We have been talking of mercenaries, and we seem to have been finding our way to dealing with that effectively, but the financial aspect is the key to everything. Otherwise Tshombe will not have the means of financing his mercenaries and purchasing his lethal weapons to distribute to tribesmen. That is important to us.

Sir Alexander MacFARQUHAR: At an earlier stage of the operations we established a number of people to find the facts on the taxation situation and on the relations to the para-statal organizations and their accounts in Belgium. At that stage we were unable to assist the Government in the form of advice or negotiations, because there was no parliamentary government. The moment we got that, we had a request from President Kasa-Vubu, and we acted on it immediately. The IBRD -- the World Bank -- has undertaken, at the request of President Kasa-Vubu, to go into the whole of this question, both of the debt settlement and of the portfolio. We hope that, even before a settlement is reached -- and these settlements do take time -- that we will be able to get some payments of foreign exchange for the Congolese treasury from the portfolio.

Mr. WACHUKU (Nigeria): What of the current taxes that are supposed to be paid by Union Minière regularly to the central Government and which they have refused to pay? I will put it this way: either they have refused to pay or they have paid it to the Katanga Government.

Sir Alexander MacFARQUHAR: The situation on that has been that there has been no tax collecting machinery in the first place in the Congo. Most of these companies -- I think, all of them -- have paid their taxes through a tax collection agency in Belgium. This is a thing which we have tried to help the Congo Government to establish in their own country. We are putting in people on the taxation side, on the customs side and in the treasury and budget sections of the finance ministry to assist in getting this completely under Congolese control. Again we are only at the beginning of it.

Mr. WACHUKU (Nigeria): Yes, but what of the tax collecting agency which existed in Katanga even during the Belgian regime? There was a system whereby they collected money, apart from whatever might be done now through Belgium. There was a system that was going on there. It was really the central Government of Leopoldville, because the areas were governed by Deputy Governors-General. That system in Katanga existed and was still in existence under the provincial Government. It was supposed to be on behalf of the central Government. What attempt has the United Nations made in order not to allow Tshombe to use it as apparently he has been using it, on the basis of which he is backing his currency? Or has that aspect not been looked into at all? I know very well that this particular machinery was in existence. Has nobody investigated that?

Sir Alexander MacFARQUHAR: I think the answer to the representative on that point is that we are dealing here with a factual situation in which certain things are possible and certain things are not. Until the political situation is cleaned up, the ordinary local tax collecting is outside the compass of the United Nations.

Mr. WACHUKU (Nigeria): But would you say that the tax collections from the companies are outside the assistance of the United Nations?

Sir Alexander MacFARQUHAR: I thought we were talking of --

Mr. WACHUKU (Nigeria): I am not talking of local rates. I am thinking of the tax collected from the companies which under their law is due to the central Government.

Sir Alexander MacFARQUHAR: On that situation, we are very hopeful, because we expect that there will be complete records in Belgium and that these will be made accessible to the World Bank -- the Belgian Government has agreed to co-operate fully in this investigation -- and that, if any payments have been mismade, the companies will be liable to the central Government. They cannot set aside their liability to the central Government merely by making payments to the wrong authority.

Mr. BHADKAMKAR (India): I know the hour is late but I have a very small question which might be an interesting question, in the sense that I am only asking for information. We have heard here that Mr. Tshombe, a Congolese national -- that is important, a Congolese national -- a nationality that he has not denied so far as we are aware, has presumably without the permission of the authority of the Government of the Congo left the territory of the Congo. So the only interpretation we can really put on this is that he has been smuggled out of the Congo with the assistance and support of a certain number of foreign Governments. I should like to know if I am wrong in that assumption, because, if he has left the Congo without a passport granted to him by the central Government -- and presumably the passport should have an endorsement making that passport valid for travel to Geneva and wherever he has gone through whichever territories he has gone -- then he has gone in an unauthorized manner. That means that he has gone with somebody's help. This means, in vulgar language, that he has been smuggled through to Geneva. Now the question is this. Is the United Nations considering any kind of advice, because it is giving all sorts of advice to the central Congolese Government, as Sir Alexander has stated, on customs and financial matters, agriculture and so forth? Are we considering any advice on administrative matters of this kind? For instance, if there is not already a Congolese law, either a decree or a law passed by Parliament, which prevents or prohibits the movement of persons of Congolese nationality outside the territory of the Congo without a passport or without some specific travel document, are we thinking of advising the Congolese central Government to organize such arrangements, if they do not already exist? In this case no Congolese national should leave -- as all of us in our countries do leave our territories -- the territory of the Republic of the Congo without a valid passport granted to him by the central Government. Any other Government or territory or authority that does not honour this obligation -- in all our countries we do not permit foreigners to enter our countries without a passport except in very special cases where there may be a bilateral or multilateral agreement -- if that is the case, would not the central Congolese Government be justified in assuming that acts which may be considered as unfriendly have been committed by certain bordering territories, the international

(Mr. Bhadkamkar, India)

responsibility for which may rest on one or more States? We do not know. So we should like to ask that question. Is there a passport regulation already existing in the Congo, or, if not, do the United Nations agencies operating there in this particular field of administration and so forth plan or propose at some date -- and the earlier the better so as to prevent Mr. Tshombe from going without authority -- to advise the central Government on those lines?

The CHAIRMAN: What is your question: whether there exists a law with regard to these powers?

Mr. BHADKAMKAR (India): No, about the passports primarily.

The CHAIRMAN: Or whether the United Nations intends to give advice on this? In respect to the first question I will give the floor to Mr. Bahizi, because I think he is in a better position to answer the question, if I may.

Mr. BAHIZI (Congo, (Leopoldville)) (interpretation from French): There is a passport law. Persons are not permitted to leave the Congo without the Government's authorization. One thing which the Central Government of the Congo could request of the United Nations would be assistance in finding out how a person like Mr. Tshombe who has left the Congo without authorization could be punished, because, according to Congolese law, he is punishable for having left the territory of the Republic without due authorization.

The CHAIRMAN: In the circumstances, it appears that the initiative ought to come from the Congo to the United Nations Secretariat for some advice on the matter.

Mr. YOMEKPE (Ghana): I wonder whether Sir Alexander could clarify a point for me. I do not think that he made the situation clear in regard to the question asked by the Foreign Minister of Nigeria.

Is it the understanding that, at this moment, there is no tax collecting agent either in Belgium or in the Congo for taxes from the mining companies?

Sir Alexander MacFARQUHAR: My understanding is that the main taxation agencies for mining companies and all the major companies is still in Brussels, and part of the effort of the bank mission and of our own effort also will be to get these offices quickly moved to the Congo. This does not mean, however, that no taxation has been imposed in the Congo. Last year, for example, at the request of our financial adviser, a number of the larger companies paid in taxes on an ad hoc basis subject to subsequent assessment of what was really due from them.

Mr. YOMEKPE (Ghana): Was this done with the consent of the Central Government and, if so, is the money collected sent back to the Congo?

Sir Alexander MacFARQUHAR: You refer to tax-collecting in Belgium?

Mr. YOMEKPE (Ghana): Yes.

Sir Alexander MacFARQUHAR: We are not certain that it is still being collected in Belgium, but the basic fact is that the machinery of taxation has not been switched over after independence. This was one of the things left for settlement after independence, but it has not been settled. We hope that the bank will be able to intervene successfully in the matter.

The CHAIRMAN: I wish to thank the members of the Committee for their presence here today. We have had the pleasure of the presence of Mr. Linner at our meetings on 26 October and today. I understand that he leaves for the Congo this afternoon, and I am sure that the members of the Committee would wish me to express our thanks to him, to wish him a safe return to the Congo, and to hope that he will continue the good work which he has undertaken in the interests of ONUC.

I wish also to thank Mr. Bunche, Mr. Narasimhan and Sir Alexander MacFarquhar for having been with us this morning.

The meeting rose at 1.25 p.m.

CORRIGENDUM

United Nations Advisory Committee on the Congo

Verbatim Record of meeting No. 61, held on Tuesday,
31 October 1961, at 10 a.m.

Sir Alexander MACFARQUHAR

Page 6, 10th line

For "were" read "was"

Page 6, 13th line

For "operations" read "operation"

Page 7, 9th line

For "decolonization" read "decolonialization"

Page 7, 15th line

For "areas where advice is" read "areas where objective advice is"

Page 7, 16th line

For "a" read "the"

Page 7, 18th line

For "picture" read "feature"

Page 7, 24th line

For "officers of fellows" read "offers of fellowships"

Page 7, 31st line

For "we should continue" read "we should not continue"

Page 12, 26th line

For "for only \$5.6 million" read "were only \$5.6 million."

Page 12, 31st line

For "was" read "is"

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Page 13, 1st line

For "we had" read "we have"

Page 13, 19th line

For "contents" read "component"

Page 16, 11th line

For "new programme" read "UN programme"

Page 23, 11th line

For "purchases" read "projects"

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY OF THE SIXTY-SECOND MEETING OF THE UNITED
NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CONGO, HELD AT UNITED
NATIONS HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK, ON FRIDAY, 17 NOVEMBER 1961

(For the information of members of the Security Council)

The acting Secretary-General expressed regret that his first meeting with the Committee was taking place under the shadow of the tragedy at Kindu. Those who were guilty of that crime must be punished. He welcomed General MacEoin and Dr. O'Brien to the Committee; they would answer any questions put to them by members of the Committee.

Two points must be made clear with respect to the statement he was about to make. First, it was not directly related in any way to the current debate in the Security Council. Secondly, he was not putting forward a fully-fledged plan, but merely an idea. He had discussed the idea with General MacEoin and Dr. O'Brien and it had the support of Secretariat officials at Headquarters, both civilian and military, who were concerned with the Congo operation.

Whatever solution to the situation in the Congo was adopted must be in accordance with the terms of reference for the operation, as had been defined by the various resolutions which had been adopted or were likely to be defined by new resolutions. In addition, no more must be required of the United Nations Force in the way of military action than Governments were willing to have their contingents undertake in the light of the conditions in which they had originally been provided. A paper solution which, while attractive, would lead to the dissolution of the Force would be worse than meaningless and even if such a solution were feasible it would still have to be weighed carefully in terms of priorities, since it might not be possible for the Force to do all that was asked of it at one and the same time.

The essential need in the Congo at the present time was to eliminate foreign mercenaries from Katanga. Their presence was perpetuating the crisis, for without their leadership the Katangese gendarmerie would be too weak to sustain secession against the opposition of the Central Government. Once they were eliminated, moreover, the United Nations Force could be substantially reduced, which would greatly diminish the cost of the Congo operation as a whole. In describing that as the key issue, he was not minimizing the importance of other objectives, such as the maintenance of law and order and the reorganization and disciplining of the ANC. But some such move was necessary if the Congo was not to sink into civil war and chaos.

The United Nations had some authority under existing resolutions to act against the mercenaries, and that authority was likely to be reinforced in any new resolution. The question was whether it had the physical means to take such action quickly and decisively. There was little hope at present of increasing the strength of the Force, so that a choice would have to be made between, on the one hand, maintaining law and order and continuing other assistance given at present, and on the other hand, taking effective action against the mercenaries. Perhaps the decision should be left to the Central Government.

If the Central Government decided that the elimination of mercenaries should have priority, the Katanga authorities should be informed in advance that the United Nations intended to remove the mercenaries once and for all and that although it hoped to do so peacefully and would observe the provisions of the cease-fire agreement, it would use all means at its disposal to overcome any resistance by force. The Katanga authorities should also be advised that the United Nations intended to go wherever its task required and to search, if necessary, the persons and premises of all non-Africans. Obviously, many of the mercenaries would try to go underground and pose as civilians, so that a thorough search of all non-African groups and areas would be required. Every precaution would have to be taken to ensure that the ONUC troops conducted themselves in a proper, although determined, manner.

To discourage the mercenaries from remaining in Katanga or returning after evacuation, a deterrent was needed. It might take the form of a request by the Central Government to the United Nations to hand over all mercenaries taken into custody to the Government for internment. To avoid ill-treatment,

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those mercenaries could be guarded jointly by ONUC and ANC troops. Improved procedures should be devised for screening suspected mercenaries and determining which of them were subject to paragraph A-2 of the Security Council resolution of 21 February. A clear explanation of the reasons for the operation should be given to the people of Katanga in advance. That could be done through the use of mobile transmitters, broadcasting in French and the principal African dialects. The psychological aspects of the operation should be given greater attention; for instance, whenever a foreign mercenary was apprehended and interrogated, the whole proceedings, together with his photograph and other details, should be publicized as widely as possible. Some improvement was also necessary in the field of intelligence, a question which he would discuss in greater detail at the following meeting. An operation of the kind he had outlined would entail a major redeployment of the United Nations Force. It would therefore have to be made quite clear to the Central Government that disturbances in areas temporarily vacated by ONUC would have serious implications for the continuance of any United Nations effort in the Congo. It might also be necessary to prevent the ANC from moving in behind the United Nations troops, in order to avoid a breakdown of law and order.

Those were the provisional ideas which he wished to put forward. The question of whether ONUC would be able to mount such an operation was under study and as yet undecided.

He wished to circulate to members of the Committee informal copies of a message he had received from Mr. Tshombe, and of messages cabled by Mr. Tshombe to various delegations.

The Representative of Ghana endorsed objectives which the acting Secretary-General had just set before the Committee and expressed the view that United Nations action in the Congo should be characterized by firmness and a sense of purpose.

It was important that the Committee should have more detailed information concerning the situation in Orientale Province, and particularly concerning the position of Mr. Gizenga, in view of Press reports that some form of secession was taking place there. Moreover, since an attempt had been made to link Mr. Gizenga with the atrocities committed at Kindu, although no such charge was made in the report (S/4940/Add.13), he felt that the Committee was entitled to further information on that point. In connexion with the atrocities that had

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occurred at Kindu, he wished to convey his Government's condolences, through the Chairman, to the Italian Government. His country had suffered a similar experience at Port Francqui, and was anxious for the United Nations to devise ways and means of preventing such incidents.

The acting Secretary-General said that all the relevant information pertaining to events in Orientale Province was contained in the report to the Security Council. There was no official information available concerning Mr. Gizenga's alleged role in the tragic events of 11 November, but the entire matter was being investigated.

The Representative of Ethiopia wished to associate his delegation's condolences with those that had been extended to the Italian Government in connexion with the recent massacre of thirteen Italians.

His Government was much disturbed over Press reports concerning Orientale Province, and had no reservations in condemning secessionist attempts, wherever they might originate. A thorough investigation should be made, so that there could be no attempt by certain groups to implicate the United Nations in matters for which it was not responsible. Naturally, any member of the Central Government of the Congo had the right, as an individual, to dissociate himself from that Government if he so wished. If Mr. Gizenga did not wish to participate in the Government, however, it was to be hoped that he would refrain from causing trouble and that the acting Secretary-General would impress upon him and other Congolese leaders that they would only stand to lose by attacking the Central Government.

He hoped that no attempt would be made to engage inadequate forces in any action in which they might be outnumbered by unruly Congolese troops. To avoid any recurrence of such situations, Members of the United Nations should be urged to provide additional forces, and adequate weapons should be furnished so as to avert further defeats.

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In connexion with the statement made by the acting Secretary-General, he would suggest that all leaders in the Congo should be urged to co-operate with the Central Government and the United Nations for the salvation of their country. For the United Nations would be unable to deal with the Congo's external problems if it dissipated its energies in trying to arbitrate internal dissensions.

Lastly, since a number of delegations had sharply attacked the United Nations, he felt that a reply should be made in the Security Council, for public defamation of countries that were contributing troops to the Congo operation should not be allowed to go unanswered. Also, as some confusion seemed to prevail in the Security Council concerning the situation and possible courses of action, he wondered whether the acting Secretary-General would be willing to clarify the situation there.

The Acting Secretary-General said that he would bear in mind the observations which had just been made.

He would ask General MacEoin to inform the Committee about the prospects for supplying the United Nations forces in the Congo with additional weapons.

He had already given consideration to the possibility of asking other Member States to provide troops; the response would presumably depend on the nature of the decisions taken by the Security Council.

He did not intend to make a statement in the Security Council until immediately after it had arrived at its decisions, since he did not wish to give the impression that he was participating in a political debate.

General MacEoin said that some progress had been made in equipping the United Nations Force in the Congo. The Force now had three jet fighter squadrons with a total of fifteen aircraft, which endowed it with striking power that it had not had before. In the past several weeks, it had received from Sweden additional armoured personnel carriers as well as anti-aircraft guns which were vital to the protection of its fighter aircraft. An additional ten armoured cars were on the way, and they would be followed soon afterwards by fifteen more armoured personnel carriers. The result was a great increase in mobility. The Force had also acquired additional medium and heavy anti-tank guns.

Except in Katanga, the United Nations was spread very thin in terms of manpower. Although Headquarters in New York had been most co-operative in requesting Member States to provide additional troops, the available manpower was slowly declining because certain countries which had made large contributions in July and August 1960 were now being compelled by domestic circumstances to withdraw some of their units. As the acting Secretary-General had said, it would unquestionably be necessary to establish priorities in any future planning. Of the three tasks of removing the mercenaries, maintaining law and order, and assisting in the training of the ANC, the United Nations would be unable with its present forces to undertake more than one at a time.

It was unfortunate that assignments often had to be given to detachments of no more than 200 to 250 men; but there was no alternative if the United Nations was to carry out its mission of protecting human life. He would prefer never to send troops of less than battalion strength to any given place, but in the conditions of manpower shortage which had so far prevailed, to have moved more than 200 to 250 troops would have meant leaving a vacuum at the place they vacated.

The Representative of Tunisia said that the acting Secretary-General's suggestions were very constructive. He particularly approved of the proposal that any operation in Katanga should be given full publicity, so that all those involved would be fully aware of the situation and of their responsibilities; such precautions would permit greater firmness of action. As General MacEoin had confirmed, the proposed operations would require an increase in the number of troops at ONUC's disposal, even though the situation as regards equipment had improved. He agreed with General MacEoin that detachments of less than battalion strength could hardly serve a useful purpose, particularly when their being moved to an emergency area meant depriving another area of their protection. His country regretted that it had been obliged in the summer of 1961 to withdraw its contingent owing to the attack launched against Tunisia. It would be happy to see a positive response to an appeal by the Secretary-General for the provision of further contingents for the United Nations Force. Until it was known how many troops the Force would be able to deploy, it would be difficult to decide on the feasibility of the Secretary-General's plan.

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The acting Secretary-General said that the United Nations already had ample strength at its disposal to remove the foreign mercenaries from Katanga, provided that the operation was given priority. If the Force could be increased, however, the operation would take less time.

The Representative of India suggested that, in a general way, it would be desirable if, with regard to the Congo operations, where the Secretary-General acted as an organ of the United Nations and as such had been charged with certain functions, he were to come out into the open more and provide the information he alone possessed and the answers he alone could give. It was very difficult for delegations to work in the dark.

As to the specific question of the mercenaries, his delegation was as much opposed to foreign intervention as any other, but it felt that the United Nations should not allow itself to become the victim of slogans in such matters. The number of Katangese officers who had been trained in Belgium was increasing, and the time might come when Mr. Tshombe found that he could easily dispense with the services of foreign mercenaries. Moreover, there were many white Belgians who could claim to be Katangese. The real question was the secession of Katanga and what part the United Nations Force was to play. Katanga had now shown itself to be the belligerent opponent of the United Nations. Yet the United Nations soldiers were forbidden to fight. As a result, some of the world's best fighting men, Irish and Indian, had been compelled to suffer the humiliation of being taken prisoner, or were lying wounded in hospitals. As his country's Minister of Defence he felt very strongly about that. The United Nations had asked for fighting troops, but if they were not to fight it would be better to send Red Cross personnel instead. It was very important to maintain the morale of an army, and it would demoralize any troops to be sent into battle with their hands tied behind their backs. In that connexion, he would like a clear explanation of why the force, consisting largely of Indian units, which was advancing in Katanga and could have brought the action to a successful conclusion, had suddenly been pulled back. He asked for that explanation because he was accountable to the Indian Parliament on the matter.

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With regard to the size of the United Nations Force in the Congo, he would have thought it adequate. He understood that it numbered some 15,000 in all, of whom about 11,000, he supposed, would be combat troops. More troops would get in each other's way; moreover, increasing the size of the Force would entail problems of logistics and create further financial difficulties. Of course, if the United Nations was going to try to guard every inch of a two-thousand-mile frontier and put a picket in every village, then it would need a force larger than the whole of the Indian army. Some reorganization of the present Force was perhaps called for. He wondered whether there was sufficiently close liaison between the Secretary-General's office at Headquarters and the responsible officers in the Congo. Unity of command and consistency of aim were absolutely essential.

Comments had been made on the fact that troops had been deployed in detachments of 250. Whether or not that was a good idea depended on the terrain, the troops to be sent, and the equipment and vehicles they had. He would like details from the United Nations military advisers on all those points.

With regard to the air force units made available to the United Nations, his delegation felt concern at the fact that some of the airfields in the Congo, including Katanga, were still not under United Nations control. But it should not be difficult for the United Nations Force to put such airfields out of action, and thus avoid any necessity of becoming involved in air warfare.

The restoration of law and order in the Congo appeared to have been largely accomplished, and it was perhaps time to hand over that task to the Congolese. The main problem now, it seemed, was the lawlessness of the Central Government's own troops, which was due to insufficient training and discipline. Such incidents as the recent killing of Italian airmen might be averted in the future if the Congolese themselves assumed responsibility for the maintenance of law and order.

The Secretary-General had suggested that further forces for the Congo might be sought from other countries. The question was, from which countries? It was desirable that such forces should not be drawn from the "committed" nations. But the "uncommitted" countries all had small armies, which they needed for their national defence. They had made sacrifices in order to provide the late Secretary-

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General with the troops he had asked for. There was also the problem of lack of standardization of equipment.

The Government of India would continue to assist the United Nations to the best of its ability in the action it had undertaken in the Congo. It was, however, deeply concerned about the fate of the 6,000 men it had sent to that country, and felt that Governments which had contributed to the United Nations Force should be kept closely informed of events and operations in the Congo and should not have to rely on Press reports which might or might not be true.

The acting Secretary-General said that the statement of the representative of India covered three aspects: political questions, military matters, and the question of liaison and transportation. He (the acting Secretary-General) felt strongly that the Secretary-General should not intervene in a Security Council debate of a purely political nature; but when definite decisions had been reached by the Council, he would inform the latter of his interpretation of its resolution and state how he would implement the decision. He would like to make it clear that no information had been received of any intention or desire on the part of Mr. Gizenga to secede from the Central Government. General MacEoin and Mr. Bunche would be better able to comment on military matters and on transportation and liaison questions respectively.

General MacEoin recalled that the United Nations Force had originally been sent to the Congo for the purpose of assisting in the maintenance of law and order, and had accordingly been disposed in the main towns and at other vital points. Although an attempt had been made to adhere to that disposition, reductions in the Force had made it necessary to give up certain places. The Force had also had many other tasks to perform, such as the occupation of airfields essential to its freedom of movement and the protection of vital installations throughout the Congo. Great risks had been incurred in giving up many of those places; where small detachments had been left, the Force had in many cases paid the penalty. The suggestion that troops would get in each other's way was difficult to understand, considering that the Force was so thinly spread. He had accepted the present disposition of the troops, with tremendous reservations, because the United

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Nations was still obliged to carry out its mandate of giving all possible assistance to the Congolese authorities in maintaining law and order; but the greatest lesson of the operation had been that if a military force was dispatched to a country like the Congo, it must be in such strength that there would be no small detachments to invite attack and incur defeat, thereby causing serious damage to the prestige of the United Nations.

Mr. Bunche said that there was not merely liaison, but continuing consultation by cable through the communications facilities of the United Nations itself, on the basis of which policy matters were decided at Headquarters by the Secretary-General. On the military side, General Rikhye went to Leopoldville from time to time for consultations with General MacEoin and his staff, in order that personnel at Headquarters and in the field might better appreciate each other's problems and views. One unsatisfactory aspect, which had applied to every United Nations field operation, was the absence of a fully satisfactory system of keeping Headquarters in touch with all aspects of information available in the field. Two of the reasons were that the United Nations had no intelligence units and that the personnel in the field, unlike the Press, liked to have the fullest confirmation before sending information to Headquarters.

The transport problem was very serious. The United Nations had a small fleet of aircraft for use in the Congo, but for large airlifts outside that country it must either negotiate transport with a Government supporting its action - the United States in most cases - or charter commercial planes from private companies, with all the resulting limitations. That situation was irritating to countries providing troops and equipment, but it was entirely beyond the control of the United Nations.

The acting Secretary-General expressed the hope that, for obvious reasons, members of the Committee would not press questions relating to future military plans.

The Representative of Nigeria joined other members in welcoming the acting Secretary-General and said that his statement of policy had made two very important points. The question of intelligence was a matter of very serious concern, to which he hoped the acting Secretary-General

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would pay great attention. For instance, Mr. Tshombe made frequent visits to neighbouring countries, at least one of which was hostile to the United Nations, and he had recently made a surprise visit to Geneva, perhaps to purchase weapons, while at the same time dispatching telegrams to a number of delegations stating that he would like to co-operate and had recognized President Kasa-Vubu as Head of State. His true intentions were unknown, but it was very important for the United Nations to watch him closely.

The second point related to mercenaries. It was agreed that when they were brought to the Congo they should be arrested and handed over to the Central Government for punishment; but again the question of the neighbouring countries arose. In going to the Congo the mercenaries must use an airport or vehicular transport, and if the countries concerned were co-operative, they would take measures to prevent their departure in accordance with the Security Council's resolution of 21 February 1961 (S/4741). He would say no more on the serious question of mercenaries, pending a decision of the Security Council on the matter.

As requested by the acting Secretary-General, he would not go into the question of military arrangements, but he wished to express concern on the subject of sending small detachments to isolated localities. He was sure that the Malayan troops at Kindu would have rescued the Italians, had their numbers not been too small to do so.

The problem of Katanga was no longer political, but economic, and the co-operation of all the big Powers having investments in Katanga was essential. It was difficult to obtain full information concerning the distribution of arms in Katanga, but both in that province and throughout the Congo there was disorder among the ANC forces. He also wished to ask the representative of the acting Secretary-General whether it was true that Mr. Tshombe was distributing arms to about 150,000 civilians in Katanga and, if so, where the weapons came from. If the report was true, the situation would be most serious.

The acting Secretary-General said that in mentioning the need for more intelligence activities, he had been thinking primarily of the gathering of accurate information in the Congo, and not of intelligence activities in other countries. The United Nations was trying to obtain information concerning Mr. Tshombe's visit to Geneva, but it could not legitimately engage in intelligence activities outside the Congo.

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Mr. O'Brien said that as the acting Secretary-General had stated, the mercenaries were now the main problem in Katanga. The first reason why that was so was that they constituted the armature of the Katangan armed forces. The Indian representative had raised the question whether Mr. Tshombe might be able to rid himself of the mercenaries and to rely on an exclusively African gendarmerie; but Mr. Tshombe certainly did not seem to believe that he could. In general, the better trained and more intelligent Africans in Mr. Tshombe's army were less reliable from his point of view, and more accessible to the idea of Congolese nationalism. In particular, the officers who had been trained in Brussels had shown a marked tendency to rally to the Central Government. As a result, it was the more backward elements, based on the Lubanda tribe, which were given more rapid promotion, with the consequence that the mercenaries had to be relied on for the continued effective functioning of the army.

The second reason why the mercenaries were important was that they were the most tangible manifestation of foreign interference in the affairs of Katanga, although there was reason to believe that such interference was very general. As had been said, the lack of an adequate intelligence system was a great handicap to the United Nations operation in Katanga, and the acting Secretary-General was now looking into that matter. Up to 28 August the mercenaries had gone about in uniform, but since then they had ceased to wear uniforms except in remote areas. Some were working with the gendarmerie in civilian clothes and had been observed by members of the consular corps giving orders in the gendarmerie centres. In addition, there were fully employed civilians who formed virtually a reserve for the gendarmerie. It should also be remembered that the European civilian population was for the most part armed, and had taken an important part in the recent fighting. The task of seeking out the mercenaries was therefore a difficult one, and would remain so even if the mandate of the Force was strengthened in that regard.

With regard to Mr. Tshombe's movements, the lack of an intelligence service made it difficult for the United Nations to be well informed about his movements or his intentions; for example, nothing had been known in advance about his visit to Geneva.

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There were many routes by which mercenaries could enter Katanga. However they arrived, it was always on the pretext of being recruited for civilian work. In present circumstances it was extremely difficult to control such a disguised influx of mercenaries, particularly as to arrest men who claimed to have been recruited for civilian work would inevitably lead to an outcry that the United Nations was exceeding its mandate.

The Representative of Nigeria wished to explain that his reference to the improvement of intelligence services had not been meant to apply to intelligence regarding Mr. Tshombe's movements outside the Congo; his point was that the United Nations should be in a position to know of such a projected visit before Mr. Tshombe left the country.

Referring to the acting Secretary-General's remarks concerning Mr. Gizenga, he would like to know whether Mr. Gizenga intended to return to Leopoldville to take up his post as Deputy Prime Minister, or whether he would remain at Stanleyville and undermine the authority of the Central Government. Mr. Gizenga had separate forces under the command of General Lundula, and until those forces were unified with those of the Central Government, the situation would be dangerous and would be a matter of grave concern to the countries having contingents in the United Nations Force.

The acting Secretary-General said that while the United Nations representatives were doing their best to persuade Mr. Gizenga to return to Leopoldville, they naturally could not say whether he would decide to do so or not.

With regard to Mr. Gizenga's supposed intention to secede, all he could say was that the United Nations had no information of any such intention on his part.

Some progress had recently been made towards the unification of the Stanleyville and Central Government forces, and General Lundula, as would be recalled, had pledged his full support to the Central Government.

The Representative of Mali noted with satisfaction the acting Secretary-General's statement regarding measures for the removal of the mercenaries and the strengthening of ONUC's information services. It was important to keep in mind that the Katanga problem was the crucial issue in the Congo. The question had been raised of a supposed secession of Orientale Province; but until more precise information was received on that point, the matter should not be allowed

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to distract attention from the Katangan problem. Since the ending of the Katangan secession was clearly the main objective of the United Nations, the means of attaining that objective must be determined. He noted in that connexion that the means at the disposal of the United Nations had recently been reinforced.

General MacEoin had rightly said that the United Nations force was numerically too weak for its task, and the recent sad death of Italian airmen in the service of the United Nations had underlined that fact. His delegation regretted that certain young African States, such as Mali, had been obliged to withdraw their troops, but the fact was that such States had their own independence and territorial integrity to defend. In any case, even before the death of Mr. Hammarskjold, the ending of the Katangan secession had been a clear objective of the United Nations.

It should also be remembered that, if ONUC took steps to co-operate more closely with the Central Government, the Congolese people themselves could be mobilized to support it in putting an end to Katanga's secession, and the United Nations troops could guide the operation. The Congolese Foreign Minister had himself raised that point recently. Apart from Katanga, all the Provinces of the Congo were co-operating with the Central Government. Moreover, the United Nations would thus escape any suspicion of interference in the Congo's internal affairs, since it would be co-operating with the Central Government, at whose request it had sent troops to the Congo. The Committee should consider such measures, and the Security Council might follow up the proposal.

The Representative of the Sudan asked whether the telegram dated 14 November received from Mr. Tshombe would be circulated to members of the Security Council, since it might enlighten them regarding Mr. Tshombe's attitude.

The Representative of Liberia considered it imperative that the telegram should be made available to the Security Council, in view of the efforts which were being made to bring about negotiations between Mr. Tshombe and the Central Government regarding the unity of the Congo. The telegram in question insisted on the sovereignty and independence of Katanga; and on that basis, clearly, such negotiations could not take place.

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The Acting Secretary-General said that, while he was ready to follow the advice of the Committee, he felt that it would not be correct to circulate the message in question as an official document, since Mr. Tshombe was not the Head of a recognized Government. Perhaps a member of the Advisory Committee who was also a member of the Security Council could bring the telegram to the attention of the Council, or could ask for it to be distributed to the Council's members.

In reply to a question from the Representative of Liberia, the acting Secretary-General said that even if no resolution was adopted by the Security Council, he believed that he had a sufficient mandate under the resolution of 21 February to take steps to remove the mercenaries from Katanga.

The Representative of Guinea said that his country had always considered that the presence of mercenaries in Katanga was one of the fundamental problems in the Congo and that their removal would greatly help to solve the question of Katanga's secession. It accordingly believed that priority should be given to an operation designed to eliminate the mercenaries by all possible means. The United Nations should not be led astray by the attempts which were being made to divert its attention to another problem, the existence of which had not been confirmed - which might indeed have been entirely fabricated. He asked whether the Committee could be given any information on the equipment at the disposal of Mr. Tshombe's army and whether the Secretary-General intended to reply to his message.

The acting Secretary-General said that the United Nations Command in the Congo had full knowledge of the types of weapons possessed by Mr. Tshombe, but it would not help them in their operations if that information were revealed. He did not intend to reply to Mr. Tshombe's message.

The Representative of Guinea suggested that the message should be brought to the notice of the Security Council, in order to clarify the debate and dispel any misapprehensions about Mr. Tshombe's true intentions.

The acting Secretary-General proposed, in response to a suggestion by the representative of Ireland, that the Committee should meet again immediately after the Security Council had concluded its work.

The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL

18 November 1961

To Members of the Security Council

In accordance with the request of some members of the Security Council and with the agreement of the Advisory Committee on the Congo, the attached confidential summary of the 62nd meeting of the United Nations Advisory Committee on the Congo is circulated to members of the Security Council for their information.

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY OF THE SIXTY-SECOND MEETING OF THE UNITED
NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CONGO, HELD AT UNITED
NATIONS HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK, ON FRIDAY, 17 NOVEMBER 1961

(For the information of members of the Security Council)

The acting Secretary-General expressed regret that his first meeting with the Committee was taking place under the shadow of the tragedy at Kindu. Those who were guilty of that crime must be punished. He welcomed General MacEoin and Dr. O'Brien to the Committee; they would answer any questions put to them by members of the Committee.

Two points must be made clear with respect to the statement he was about to make. First, it was not directly related in any way to the current debate in the Security Council. Secondly, he was not putting forward a fully-fledged plan, but merely an idea. He had discussed the idea with General MacEoin and Dr. O'Brien and it had the support of Secretariat officials at Headquarters, both civilian and military, who were concerned with the Congo operation.

Whatever solution to the situation in the Congo was adopted must be in accordance with the terms of reference for the operation, as had been defined by the various resolutions which had been adopted or were likely to be defined by new resolutions. In addition, no more must be required of the United Nations Force in the way of military action than Governments were willing to have their contingents undertake in the light of the conditions in which they had originally been provided. A paper solution which, while attractive, would lead to the dissolution of the Force would be worse than meaningless and even if such a solution were feasible it would still have to be weighed carefully in terms of priorities, since it might not be possible for the Force to do all that was asked of it at one and the same time.

The essential need in the Congo at the present time was to eliminate foreign mercenaries from Katanga. Their presence was perpetuating the crisis, for without their leadership the Katangese gendarmerie would be too weak to sustain secession against the opposition of the Central Government. Once they were eliminated, moreover, the United Nations Force could be substantially reduced, which would greatly diminish the cost of the Congo operation as a whole. In describing that as the key issue, he was not minimizing the importance of other objectives, such as the maintenance of law and order and the reorganization and disciplining of the ANC. But some such move was necessary if the Congo was not to sink into civil war and chaos.

The United Nations had some authority under existing resolutions to act against the mercenaries, and that authority was likely to be reinforced in any new resolution. The question was whether it had the physical means to take such action quickly and decisively. There was little hope at present of increasing the strength of the Force, so that a choice would have to be made between, on the one hand, maintaining law and order and continuing other assistance given at present, and on the other hand, taking effective action against the mercenaries. Perhaps the decision should be left to the Central Government.

If the Central Government decided that the elimination of mercenaries should have priority, the Katanga authorities should be informed in advance that the United Nations intended to remove the mercenaries once and for all and that although it hoped to do so peacefully and would observe the provisions of the cease-fire agreement, it would use all means at its disposal to overcome any resistance by force. The Katanga authorities should also be advised that the United Nations intended to go wherever its task required and to search, if necessary, the persons and premises of all non-Africans. Obviously, many of the mercenaries would try to go underground and pose as civilians, so that a thorough search of all non-African groups and areas would be required. Every precaution would have to be taken to ensure that the ONUC troops conducted themselves in a proper, although determined, manner.

To discourage the mercenaries from remaining in Katanga or returning after evacuation, a deterrent was needed. It might take the form of a request by the Central Government to the United Nations to hand over all mercenaries taken into custody to the Government for internment. To avoid ill-treatment,

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those mercenaries could be guarded jointly by ONUC and ANC troops. Improved procedures should be devised for screening suspected mercenaries and determining which of them were subject to paragraph A-2 of the Security Council resolution of 21 February. A clear explanation of the reasons for the operation should be given to the people of Katanga in advance. That could be done through the use of mobile transmitters, broadcasting in French and the principal African dialects. The psychological aspects of the operation should be given greater attention; for instance, whenever a foreign mercenary was apprehended and interrogated, the whole proceedings, together with his photograph and other details, should be publicized as widely as possible. Some improvement was also necessary in the field of intelligence, a question which he would discuss in greater detail at the following meeting. An operation of the kind he had outlined would entail a major redeployment of the United Nations Force. It would therefore have to be made quite clear to the Central Government that disturbances in areas temporarily vacated by ONUC would have serious implications for the continuance of any United Nations effort in the Congo. It might also be necessary to prevent the ANC from moving in behind the United Nations troops, in order to avoid a breakdown of law and order.

Those were the provisional ideas which he wished to put forward. The question of whether ONUC would be able to mount such an operation was under study and as yet undecided.

He wished to circulate to members of the Committee informal copies of a message he had received from Mr. Tshombe, and of messages cabled by Mr. Tshombe to various delegations.

The Representative of Ghana endorsed objectives which the acting Secretary-General had just set before the Committee and expressed the view that United Nations action in the Congo should be characterized by firmness and a sense of purpose.

It was important that the Committee should have more detailed information concerning the situation in Orientale Province, and particularly concerning the position of Mr. Gizenga, in view of Press reports that some form of secession was taking place there. Moreover, since an attempt had been made to link Mr. Gizenga with the atrocities committed at Kindu, although no such charge was made in the report (S/4940/Add.13), he felt that the Committee was entitled to further information on that point. In connexion with the atrocities that had

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occurred at Kindu, he wished to convey his Government's condolences, through the Chairman, to the Italian Government. His country had suffered a similar experience at Port Francqui, and was anxious for the United Nations to devise ways and means of preventing such incidents.

The acting Secretary-General said that all the relevant information pertaining to events in Orientale Province was contained in the report to the Security Council. There was no official information available concerning Mr. Gizenga's alleged role in the tragic events of 11 November, but the entire matter was being investigated.

The Representative of Ethiopia wished to associate his delegation's condolences with those that had been extended to the Italian Government in connexion with the recent massacre of thirteen Italians.

His Government was much disturbed over Press reports concerning Orientale Province, and had no reservations in condemning secessionist attempts, wherever they might originate. A thorough investigation should be made, so that there could be no attempt by certain groups to implicate the United Nations in matters for which it was not responsible. Naturally, any member of the Central Government of the Congo had the right, as an individual, to dissociate himself from that Government if he so wished. If Mr. Gizenga did not wish to participate in the Government, however, it was to be hoped that he would refrain from causing trouble and that the acting Secretary-General would impress upon him and other Congolese leaders that they would only stand to lose by attacking the Central Government.

He hoped that no attempt would be made to engage inadequate forces in any action in which they might be outnumbered by unruly Congolese troops. To avoid any recurrence of such situations, Members of the United Nations should be urged to provide additional forces, and adequate weapons should be furnished so as to avert further defeats.

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In connexion with the statement made by the acting Secretary-General, he would suggest that all leaders in the Congo should be urged to co-operate with the Central Government and the United Nations for the salvation of their country. For the United Nations would be unable to deal with the Congo's external problems if it dissipated its energies in trying to arbitrate internal dissensions.

Lastly, since a number of delegations had sharply attacked the United Nations, he felt that a reply should be made in the Security Council, for public defamation of countries that were contributing troops to the Congo operation should not be allowed to go unanswered. Also, as some confusion seemed to prevail in the Security Council concerning the situation and possible courses of action, he wondered whether the acting Secretary-General would be willing to clarify the situation there.

The Acting Secretary-General said that he would bear in mind the observations which had just been made.

He would ask General MacEoin to inform the Committee about the prospects for supplying the United Nations forces in the Congo with additional weapons.

He had already given consideration to the possibility of asking other Member States to provide troops; the response would presumably depend on the nature of the decisions taken by the Security Council.

He did not intend to make a statement in the Security Council until immediately after it had arrived at its decisions, since he did not wish to give the impression that he was participating in a political debate.

General MacEoin said that some progress had been made in equipping the United Nations Force in the Congo. The Force now had three jet fighter squadrons with a total of fifteen aircraft, which endowed it with striking power that it had not had before. In the past several weeks, it had received from Sweden additional armoured personnel carriers as well as anti-aircraft guns which were vital to the protection of its fighter aircraft. An additional ten armoured cars were on the way, and they would be followed soon afterwards by fifteen more armoured personnel carriers. The result was a great increase in mobility. The Force had also acquired additional medium and heavy anti-tank guns.

Except in Katanga, the United Nations was spread very thin in terms of manpower. Although Headquarters in New York had been most co-operative in requesting Member States to provide additional troops, the available manpower was slowly declining because certain countries which had made large contributions in July and August 1960 were now being compelled by domestic circumstances to withdraw some of their units. As the acting Secretary-General had said, it would unquestionably be necessary to establish priorities in any future planning. Of the three tasks of removing the mercenaries, maintaining law and order, and assisting in the training of the ANC, the United Nations would be unable with its present forces to undertake more than one at a time.

It was unfortunate that assignments often had to be given to detachments of no more than 200 to 250 men; but there was no alternative if the United Nations was to carry out its mission of protecting human life. He would prefer never to send troops of less than battalion strength to any given place, but in the conditions of manpower shortage which had so far prevailed, to have moved more than 200 to 250 troops would have meant leaving a vacuum at the place they vacated.

The Representative of Tunisia said that the acting Secretary-General's suggestions were very constructive. He particularly approved of the proposal that any operation in Katanga should be given full publicity, so that all those involved would be fully aware of the situation and of their responsibilities; such precautions would permit greater firmness of action. As General MacEoin had confirmed, the proposed operations would require an increase in the number of troops at ONUC's disposal, even though the situation as regards equipment had improved. He agreed with General MacEoin that detachments of less than battalion strength could hardly serve a useful purpose, particularly when their being moved to an emergency area meant depriving another area of their protection. His country regretted that it had been obliged in the summer of 1961 to withdraw its contingent owing to the attack launched against Tunisia. It would be happy to see a positive response to an appeal by the Secretary-General for the provision of further contingents for the United Nations Force. Until it was known how many troops the Force would be able to deploy, it would be difficult to decide on the feasibility of the Secretary-General's plan.

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The acting Secretary-General said that the United Nations already had ample strength at its disposal to remove the foreign mercenaries from Katanga, provided that the operation was given priority. If the Force could be increased, however, the operation would take less time.

The Representative of India suggested that, in a general way, it would be desirable if, with regard to the Congo operations, where the Secretary-General acted as an organ of the United Nations and as such had been charged with certain functions, he were to come out into the open more and provide the information he alone possessed and the answers he alone could give. It was very difficult for delegations to work in the dark.

As to the specific question of the mercenaries, his delegation was as much opposed to foreign intervention as any other, but it felt that the United Nations should not allow itself to become the victim of slogans in such matters. The number of Katangese officers who had been trained in Belgium was increasing, and the time might come when Mr. Tshombe found that he could easily dispense with the services of foreign mercenaries. Moreover, there were many white Belgians who could claim to be Katangese. The real question was the secession of Katanga and what part the United Nations Force was to play. Katanga had now shown itself to be the belligerent opponent of the United Nations. Yet the United Nations soldiers were forbidden to fight. As a result, some of the world's best fighting men, Irish and Indian, had been compelled to suffer the humiliation of being taken prisoner, or were lying wounded in hospitals. As his country's Minister of Defence he felt very strongly about that. The United Nations had asked for fighting troops, but if they were not to fight it would be better to send Red Cross personnel instead. It was very important to maintain the morale of an army, and it would demoralize any troops to be sent into battle with their hands tied behind their backs. In that connexion, he would like a clear explanation of why the force, consisting largely of Indian units, which was advancing in Katanga and could have brought the action to a successful conclusion, had suddenly been pulled back. He asked for that explanation because he was accountable to the Indian Parliament on the matter.

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With regard to the size of the United Nations Force in the Congo, he would have thought it adequate. He understood that it numbered some 15,000 in all, of whom about 11,000, he supposed, would be combat troops. More troops would get in each other's way; moreover, increasing the size of the Force would entail problems of logistics and create further financial difficulties. Of course, if the United Nations was going to try to guard every inch of a two-thousand-mile frontier and put a picket in every village, then it would need a force larger than the whole of the Indian army. Some reorganization of the present Force was perhaps called for. He wondered whether there was sufficiently close liaison between the Secretary-General's office at Headquarters and the responsible officers in the Congo. Unity of command and consistency of aim were absolutely essential.

Comments had been made on the fact that troops had been deployed in detachments of 250. Whether or not that was a good idea depended on the terrain, the troops to be sent, and the equipment and vehicles they had. He would like details from the United Nations military advisers on all those points.

With regard to the air force units made available to the United Nations, his delegation felt concern at the fact that some of the airfields in the Congo, including Katanga, were still not under United Nations control. But it should not be difficult for the United Nations Force to put such airfields out of action, and thus avoid any necessity of becoming involved in air warfare.

The restoration of law and order in the Congo appeared to have been largely accomplished, and it was perhaps time to hand over that task to the Congolese. The main problem now, it seemed, was the lawlessness of the Central Government's own troops, which was due to insufficient training and discipline. Such incidents as the recent killing of Italian airmen might be averted in the future if the Congolese themselves assumed responsibility for the maintenance of law and order.

The Secretary-General had suggested that further forces for the Congo might be sought from other countries. The question was, from which countries? It was desirable that such forces should not be drawn from the "committed" nations. But the "uncommitted" countries all had small armies, which they needed for their national defence. They had made sacrifices in order to provide the late Secretary-

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General with the troops he had asked for. There was also the problem of lack of standardization of equipment.

The Government of India would continue to assist the United Nations to the best of its ability in the action it had undertaken in the Congo. It was, however, deeply concerned about the fate of the 6,000 men it had sent to that country, and felt that Governments which had contributed to the United Nations Force should be kept closely informed of events and operations in the Congo and should not have to rely on Press reports which might or might not be true.

The acting Secretary-General said that the statement of the representative of India covered three aspects: political questions, military matters, and the question of liaison and transportation. He (the acting Secretary-General) felt strongly that the Secretary-General should not intervene in a Security Council debate of a purely political nature; but when definite decisions had been reached by the Council, he would inform the latter of his interpretation of its resolution and state how he would implement the decision. He would like to make it clear that no information had been received of any intention or desire on the part of Mr. Gizenga to secede from the Central Government. General MacEoin and Mr. Bunche would be better able to comment on military matters and on transportation and liaison questions respectively.

General MacEoin recalled that the United Nations Force had originally been sent to the Congo for the purpose of assisting in the maintenance of law and order, and had accordingly been disposed in the main towns and at other vital points. Although an attempt had been made to adhere to that disposition, reductions in the Force had made it necessary to give up certain places. The Force had also had many other tasks to perform, such as the occupation of airfields essential to its freedom of movement and the protection of vital installations throughout the Congo. Great risks had been incurred in giving up many of those places; where small detachments had been left, the Force had in many cases paid the penalty. The suggestion that troops would get in each other's way was difficult to understand, considering that the Force was so thinly spread. He had accepted the present disposition of the troops, with tremendous reservations, because the United

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Nations was still obliged to carry out its mandate of giving all possible assistance to the Congolese authorities in maintaining law and order; but the greatest lesson of the operation had been that if a military force was dispatched to a country like the Congo, it must be in such strength that there would be no small detachments to invite attack and incur defeat, thereby causing serious damage to the prestige of the United Nations.

Mr. Bunche said that there was not merely liaison, but continuing consultation by cable through the communications facilities of the United Nations itself, on the basis of which policy matters were decided at Headquarters by the Secretary-General. On the military side, General Rikhye went to Leopoldville from time to time for consultations with General MacEoin and his staff, in order that personnel at Headquarters and in the field might better appreciate each other's problems and views. One unsatisfactory aspect, which had applied to every United Nations field operation, was the absence of a fully satisfactory system of keeping Headquarters in touch with all aspects of information available in the field. Two of the reasons were that the United Nations had no intelligence units and that the personnel in the field, unlike the Press, liked to have the fullest confirmation before sending information to Headquarters.

The transport problem was very serious. The United Nations had a small fleet of aircraft for use in the Congo, but for large airlifts outside that country it must either negotiate transport with a Government supporting its action - the United States in most cases - or charter commercial planes from private companies, with all the resulting limitations. That situation was irritating to countries providing troops and equipment, but it was entirely beyond the control of the United Nations.

The acting Secretary-General expressed the hope that, for obvious reasons, members of the Committee would not press questions relating to future military plans.

The Representative of Nigeria joined other members in welcoming the acting Secretary-General and said that his statement of policy had made two very important points. The question of intelligence was a matter of very serious concern, to which he hoped the acting Secretary-General

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would pay great attention. For instance, Mr. Tshombe made frequent visits to neighbouring countries, at least one of which was hostile to the United Nations, and he had recently made a surprise visit to Geneva, perhaps to purchase weapons, while at the same time dispatching telegrams to a number of delegations stating that he would like to co-operate and had recognized President Kasa-Vubu as Head of State. His true intentions were unknown, but it was very important for the United Nations to watch him closely.

The second point related to mercenaries. It was agreed that when they were brought to the Congo they should be arrested and handed over to the Central Government for punishment; but again the question of the neighbouring countries arose. In going to the Congo the mercenaries must use an airport or vehicular transport, and if the countries concerned were co-operative, they would take measures to prevent their departure in accordance with the Security Council's resolution of 21 February 1961 (S/4741). He would say no more on the serious question of mercenaries, pending a decision of the Security Council on the matter.

As requested by the acting Secretary-General, he would not go into the question of military arrangements, but he wished to express concern on the subject of sending small detachments to isolated localities. He was sure that the Malayan troops at Kindu would have rescued the Italians, had their numbers not been too small to do so.

The problem of Katanga was no longer political, but economic, and the co-operation of all the big Powers having investments in Katanga was essential. It was difficult to obtain full information concerning the distribution of arms in Katanga, but both in that province and throughout the Congo there was disorder among the ANC forces. He also wished to ask the representative of the acting Secretary-General whether it was true that Mr. Tshombe was distributing arms to about 150,000 civilians in Katanga and, if so, where the weapons came from. If the report was true, the situation would be most serious.

The acting Secretary-General said that in mentioning the need for more intelligence activities, he had been thinking primarily of the gathering of accurate information in the Congo, and not of intelligence activities in other countries. The United Nations was trying to obtain information concerning Mr. Tshombe's visit to Geneva, but it could not legitimately engage in intelligence activities outside the Congo.

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Mr. O'Brien said that as the acting Secretary-General had stated, the mercenaries were now the main problem in Katanga. The first reason why that was so was that they constituted the armature of the Katangan armed forces. The Indian representative had raised the question whether Mr. Tshombe might be able to rid himself of the mercenaries and to rely on an exclusively African gendarmerie; but Mr. Tshombe certainly did not seem to believe that he could. In general, the better trained and more intelligent Africans in Mr. Tshombe's army were less reliable from his point of view, and more accessible to the idea of Congolese nationalism. In particular, the officers who had been trained in Brussels had shown a marked tendency to rally to the Central Government. As a result, it was the more backward elements, based on the Lubanda tribe, which were given more rapid promotion, with the consequence that the mercenaries had to be relied on for the continued effective functioning of the army.

The second reason why the mercenaries were important was that they were the most tangible manifestation of foreign interference in the affairs of Katanga, although there was reason to believe that such interference was very general. As had been said, the lack of an adequate intelligence system was a great handicap to the United Nations operation in Katanga, and the acting Secretary-General was now looking into that matter. Up to 28 August the mercenaries had gone about in uniform, but since then they had ceased to wear uniforms except in remote areas. Some were working with the gendarmerie in civilian clothes and had been observed by members of the consular corps giving orders in the gendarmerie centres. In addition, there were fully employed civilians who formed virtually a reserve for the gendarmerie. It should also be remembered that the European civilian population was for the most part armed, and had taken an important part in the recent fighting. The task of seeking out the mercenaries was therefore a difficult one, and would remain so even if the mandate of the Force was strengthened in that regard.

With regard to Mr. Tshombe's movements, the lack of an intelligence service made it difficult for the United Nations to be well informed about his movements or his intentions; for example, nothing had been known in advance about his visit to Geneva.

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There were many routes by which mercenaries could enter Katanga. However they arrived, it was always on the pretext of being recruited for civilian work. In present circumstances it was extremely difficult to control such a disguised influx of mercenaries, particularly as to arrest men who claimed to have been recruited for civilian work would inevitably lead to an outcry that the United Nations was exceeding its mandate.

The Representative of Nigeria wished to explain that his reference to the improvement of intelligence services had not been meant to apply to intelligence regarding Mr. Tshombe's movements outside the Congo; his point was that the United Nations should be in a position to know of such a projected visit before Mr. Tshombe left the country.

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The acting Secretary-General said that while the United Nations representatives were doing their best to persuade Mr. Gizenga to return to Leopoldville, they naturally could not say whether he would decide to do so or not.

With regard to Mr. Gizenga's supposed intention to secede, all he could say was that the United Nations had no information of any such intention on his part.

Some progress had recently been made towards the unification of the Stanleyville and Central Government forces, and General Lundula, as would be recalled, had pledged his full support to the Central Government.

The Representative of Mali noted with satisfaction the acting Secretary-General's statement regarding measures for the removal of the mercenaries and the strengthening of ONUC's information services. It was important to keep in mind that the Katanga problem was the crucial issue in the Congo. The question had been raised of a supposed secession of Orientale Province; but until more precise information was received on that point, the matter should not be allowed

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to distract attention from the Katangan problem. Since the ending of the Katangan secession was clearly the main objective of the United Nations, the means of attaining that objective must be determined. He noted in that connexion that the means at the disposal of the United Nations had recently been reinforced.

General MacEoin had rightly said that the United Nations force was numerically too weak for its task, and the recent sad death of Italian airmen in the service of the United Nations had underlined that fact. His delegation regretted that certain young African States, such as Mali, had been obliged to withdraw their troops, but the fact was that such States had their own independence and territorial integrity to defend. In any case, even before the death of Mr. Hammarskjold, the ending of the Katangan secession had been a clear objective of the United Nations.

It should also be remembered that, if ONUC took steps to co-operate more closely with the Central Government, the Congolese people themselves could be mobilized to support it in putting an end to Katanga's secession, and the United Nations troops could guide the operation. The Congolese Foreign Minister had himself raised that point recently. Apart from Katanga, all the Provinces of the Congo were co-operating with the Central Government. Moreover, the United Nations would thus escape any suspicion of interference in the Congo's internal affairs, since it would be co-operating with the Central Government, at whose request it had sent troops to the Congo. The Committee should consider such measures, and the Security Council might follow up the proposal.

The Representative of the Sudan asked whether the telegram dated 14 November received from Mr. Tshombe would be circulated to members of the Security Council, since it might enlighten them regarding Mr. Tshombe's attitude.

The Representative of Liberia considered it imperative that the telegram should be made available to the Security Council, in view of the efforts which were being made to bring about negotiations between Mr. Tshombe and the Central Government regarding the unity of the Congo. The telegram in question insisted on the sovereignty and independence of Katanga; and on that basis, clearly, such negotiations could not take place.

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The Acting Secretary-General said that, while he was ready to follow the advice of the Committee, he felt that it would not be correct to circulate the message in question as an official document, since Mr. Tshombe was not the Head of a recognized Government. Perhaps a member of the Advisory Committee who was also a member of the Security Council could bring the telegram to the attention of the Council, or could ask for it to be distributed to the Council's members.

In reply to a question from the Representative of Liberia, the acting Secretary-General said that even if no resolution was adopted by the Security Council, he believed that he had a sufficient mandate under the resolution of 21 February to take steps to remove the mercenaries from Katanga.

The Representative of Guinea said that his country had always considered that the presence of mercenaries in Katanga was one of the fundamental problems in the Congo and that their removal would greatly help to solve the question of Katanga's secession. It accordingly believed that priority should be given to an operation designed to eliminate the mercenaries by all possible means. The United Nations should not be led astray by the attempts which were being made to divert its attention to another problem, the existence of which had not been confirmed - which might indeed have been entirely fabricated. He asked whether the Committee could be given any information on the equipment at the disposal of Mr. Tshombe's army and whether the Secretary-General intended to reply to his message.

The acting Secretary-General said that the United Nations Command in the Congo had full knowledge of the types of weapons possessed by Mr. Tshombe, but it would not help them in their operations if that information were revealed. He did not intend to reply to Mr. Tshombe's message.

The Representative of Guinea suggested that the message should be brought to the notice of the Security Council, in order to clarify the debate and dispel any misapprehensions about Mr. Tshombe's true intentions.

The acting Secretary-General proposed, in response to a suggestion by the representative of Ireland, that the Committee should meet again immediately after the Security Council had concluded its work.

The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL

Meeting No. 62
17 November 1961
ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON THE CONGO

Meeting at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Friday, 17 November 1961, at 11 a.m.

In the Chair:

U THANT

The acting SECRETARY-GENERAL

Members:

Canada

Mr. RITCHIE

Ceylon

Mr. MALALASEKERA

Ethiopia

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY

Federation of Malaya

Mr. KAMIL

Ghana

Mr. QUAILSON-SACKEY

Guinea

Mr. ACHKAR

India

Mr. Krishna MENON

Indonesia

Mr. WIRJOPRANOTO

Ireland

Mr. BOLAND

Liberia

Mr. BARNES

Mali

Mr. BA

Morocco

Mr. BENHIMA

Nigeria

Mr. NGILERUMA

Pakistan

Mr. HAMDANI

Senegal

Mr. CISSE

Sudan

Mr. SULEIMAN

Sweden

Mrs. ROSSEL

Tunisia

Mr. BOURGUIBA

United Arab Republic

Mr. LOUIFI

The acting SECRETARY-GENERAL: First of all, I wish to thank our colleague, Ambassador Barnes of Liberia, for having presided over the meetings of the Congo Advisory Committee during the interregnum. I was informed that Ambassador Barnes presided over four meetings of the Committee, with great success and distinction.

And, of course, this is my first opportunity to meet with this Committee, but I have heard much about the very helpful role you have all played in guiding the United Nations through the hazards of the Congo maze, if I may say so. I have been told of the important assistance you regularly gave to my predecessor. I am happy to join you and I look forward to this unique form of collaboration. I wanted to lose no time in getting acquainted. I am sorry that my first meeting with you comes under the shadow of the tragedy at Kindu. This was a crime for which the guilty must be punished. United Nations personnel have suffered too many such tragedies in the Congo, including the shocking massacre at Port Francqui.

This morning I wish first to welcome two of the top men in ONUC, who have come here at my request on very short notice for important consultations. I believe you know them both -- General MacEoin and Dr. O'Brien. They will gladly respond to any questions you may wish to put to them -- of course, a little bit later on. I intend also to touch briefly on one aspect of some thinking I have been doing about the United Nations in the Congo.

Ever since the unhappy chain of events in Katanga in September, everyone is asking, "What next for the United Nations in the Congo? Is there a next step that can be taken, or has a dead end been reached for the United Nations?" In seeking an answer and a way I have been mindful that a feasible way must be one that is possible within the existing mandate of the operation, as defined by the various resolutions, or likely to be defined by any new resolutions, and which will not require more in the way of fighting action by the Force than Governments providing the contingents are willing to have them undertake in the light of the conditions on which they were originally provided. A paper solution, which, though appearing very attractive, would lead only to the dissolution of the Force, would be even worse than meaningless.

There may be such a course, but it must be most carefully weighed in terms of alternatives, overall impact and priorities. I say "priorities" advisedly for it may not be possible for the Force to do all that the resolutions called for at one and the same time.

(The Acting Secretary-General)

With regard to what I am about to say, I wish to make two things entirely clear. First, the statements I am going to make here are not in any sense to be interpreted as in response to or otherwise related to the debate now under way in the Security Council. Secondly, I am exposing only an idea, not fully refined and certainly not a plan yet. My Secretariat associates on the Congo front at Headquarters, both civilian and military, endorse the idea and consider it practical.

For this and other purposes I have asked General MacEoin and Dr. O'Brien to come here for consultations, and they are helping me to assess the feasibility of this idea. I had the opportunity of discussing it with them at some length last night and again this morning, and I am now in a better position to come to a definitive formula than I was before.

It seems to me that among the objectives of the United Nations resolutions, the one which has been most incompletely fulfilled by ONUC is the elimination of mercenaries in Katanga. This is now a key issue in the Congo complex for a number of reasons, among which, it seems to me, are the following. The continued activity of the mercenaries in Katanga is the major factor in perpetuating the Congo crisis, for without the leadership of the mercenaries the Katangese gendarmerie would be a weak fighting force which could not long sustain secession against the opposition of the Central Government and its own weak army. It is inconceivable that the peace in the Congo, and even the broader peace, should continue to be threatened by the irresponsible activities of a few hundred unscrupulous non-African adventurers who fight only for money.

The present concentration of most United Nations Members is on the mercenaries out of a sense of outrage that the Security Council resolution of 21 February is being so flagrantly flouted. The elimination of the mercenaries would make possible an early and substantial reduction in the size of our Congo force, thereby greatly reducing the financial burden of the whole Congo operation.

In saying this, however, I do not in the least minimize the vital importance of other objectives, such as the first and fundamental one of assisting in the maintenance of law, order and security, or the necessity of reorganizing and retraining the ANC, since the country can never be secure from the savage brutalities of a large number of heavily armed but undisciplined and largely uncontrolled army men who every now and then in one place or another run amok.

(The acting Secretary-General)

There must be some new move, for ONUC cannot stand idly by while the Congo's internal situation, including the Adoula Government itself, deteriorates and dissolves all around it, leading to dead-sure civil war and ultimate chaos. The United Nations, it seems to me, has at least some measure of authority to act against mercenaries under the existing resolutions, and one gathers that this authority would most surely be reinforced in any new resolution.

The controlling question, however, is whether ONUC has the physical means to take, at an early date, decisive action in the elimination of all mercenaries from Katanga. I hope to obtain that answer from General MacEoin in the course of our consultations. With the United Nations Force at its present strength -- and there seems to be little hope of increasing its manpower at present -- a decision on priorities would have to be made as between continuing assistance on the present scale and the maintenance of law and order throughout all provinces and undertaking an effective operation for the elimination of the Katanga mercenaries.

Perhaps such a decision on priorities should be made by the Central Government itself. There should be no illusions about what the Force at its present strength can accomplish.

The Katanga authorities should be informed in advance of the United Nations intention to remove the mercenaries once and for all, and should be told convincingly that, while the United Nations will observe the provisions of the cease-fire and will hope to be able to achieve its objective of eliminating all mercenaries peacefully, it will swiftly counter any armed resistance with hard-hitting force, both ground and aerial.

The United Nations round-up operation would require that the United Nations have and employ free access to all places. The Katangese authorities should be advised that the United Nations intends to go wherever its task requires, to search, as necessary, the persons and premises of all non-Africans, and if in this effort it should in any place meet resistance by force it will undertake by all means at its disposal to overcome that resistance.

It may be taken for granted that many, perhaps most, of the Katanga mercenaries would try to go underground on learning of the round-up, would perhaps don civilian clothes and pose as employed. A thorough search of all

(The acting Secretary-General)

non-African population groups and areas would therefore be required, and every precaution should be taken to ensure proper, although determined, demeanour by the ONUC troops. This would be a task of great scope and, of course, very great difficulty.

Our experience thus far has shown that a greater deterrent is needed to discourage the mercenaries from holding out and returning after evacuation. This might be found in a request to the United Nations by the Central Government to hand over to the Central Government for internment all mercenaries which the United Nations takes into custody. These mercenaries, who would then be under the authority of the Central Government and subject to its own laws, could be guarded jointly by detachments of ONUC and ANC troops to avoid any mistreatment of them.

ONUC should devise improved procedures for screening suspected mercenaries and determining those who are subject to paragraph A-2 of the Security Council resolution of 21 February. An operation of this magnitude and complexity would require a major redeployment of ONUC's detachments in order to be prepared to meet resistance by force.

Another thing is that mobile radio transmitters and other transmitters, if available in North Katanga, and wherever else they may be effective, should, in advance of the operation, broadcast to the people of Katanga, in French and in the principal African dialects, clear explanations and justifications of the operation. I think this is very important.

Another idea I have in mind is the intensification of the psychological aspects of the operation. For instance, whenever a foreign mercenary is apprehended and interrogated, I propose to make known the whole proceedings of the interrogation, of course, as well as his photographs and other details, to the public as widely as possible. I think this aspect of the operation has not received as much attention as it should have.

One other aspect of the operation, in my thinking, is related to our own intelligence. After some discussions with my colleagues who came from the Congo, I got the impression that our intelligence aspect of the whole operation needs to be reinforced. Of course, on this particular aspect, I will go into some further detail at our next meeting.

(The acting Secretary-General)

I have a very strong feeling that these are also very important in the achievement of our objectives in the whole United Nations Congo operation. In carrying out such an overall operation it would be necessary to make it completely clear to the Central Government that disturbances in areas temporarily vacated by ONUC, in order to reinforce the Katanga effort, would have more serious implications for the continuance of any United Nations effort in the Congo. It may also be necessary, in order to avoid the breakdown of law and order, to prevent the ANC from moving in behind the United Nations action.

Of course, as you all are aware, Albertville has been a valuable lesson. I repeat that this is still in the idea stage. The question of ONUC's ability to mount such an operation is under close study and is as yet, of course, unanswered.

(The Acting Secretary-General)

Before calling for discussion on what I have said or on any other matters you may wish to raise with me or with General McKeown or Dr. O'Brien, I may inform you that Mr. Tshombe has sent a message to me which I think you should see, although I am not circulating it as a document. We have some informal copies here, and they may now be passed around.

I also learned yesterday of messages which Mr. Tshombe cabled to certain delegations here, namely China, Ethiopia, France, India, Nigeria, the United Kingdom and the United States, and there may have been others. Copies of this message will likewise be passed around.

Now the floor is open for discussion.

Mr. QUARSON-SACKY (Ghana): I must say at once that my first reaction to what you have said is that the objectives which we have set ourselves are the objectives which we think the United Nations should set itself in regard to the present situation in the Congo, and, even before I relate what you have told us to Accra, I endorse it. There should be some firmness and some purpose in the actions which are taken in the Congo.

However, I have taken the floor to ask for more information in regard to the situation, and this refers particularly to Orientale Province. I should like us to be informed about Mr. Gizenga and his position. Press reports indicate that there is some form of secession taking place in Orientale. I think it is very important that we should discuss the whole situation in the Congo in its completeness, and therefore I am sure that the Committee will be grateful to know what is happening in that area.

Secondly, there has been an attempt to link Mr. Gizenga with the murders which took place in Kindu. I think the Committee is entitled to know the facts, although the report which is contained in document S/4940/Add.13 does not say anything about the complicity of Mr. Gizenga in the atrocities which took place in Kindu. As regards the atrocities, my Government would like me to express our condolences through you, sir, to the Italian Government. We ourselves have had an experience of our soldiers being massacred in the same way, at Port Francqui. I think that all these incidents should decide us -- that is, we who form the Organization and those in the operational headquarters in the Congo -- to devise

(Mr. Quaison-Sackey, Ghana)

ways and means of preventing such incidents. I think it would be a sad commentary on our efforts if from time to time people were allowed to run amuck and massacre in such a brutal way. So, sir, if you could throw some light on the situation in Orientale, in time I would come in again to express any views which I have.

The Acting SECRETARY-GENERAL: All the relevant information regarding the happenings in Orientale Province has been incorporated in our report to the Security Council -- addendum 13 released yesterday -- and we have no more information regarding the type of allegations raised by the representative of Ghana. All we have from our own sources is contained in that addendum 13. Of course, regarding some specific insinuations or allegations in the Press about the involvement or non-involvement of Mr. Gizenga in these tragic events of 11 November, we have no official information. Naturally, we are investigating into the whole of the tragic events but so far we have no information on which to come to any definitive conclusion one way or another.

I think that this will satisfy our colleague from Ghana.

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): First I wish to associate my delegation and my Government with the expression of condolences you have sent to the Italian Government on the massacre of the thirteen Italians. We share with you the view that it was a brutal act and we have no reservations in condemning such acts, whoever may commit them.

Second, we are of course very much disturbed about the press reports about Orientale Province. I can say on behalf of my Government that it matters not to us who secedes or who thinks he will secede from the Congo. They stand on equal ground, and again we have no reservations in condemning, no matter who it is. Of course, it is only a press report, and we very much hope that it will never come to pass. I think a thorough investigation should be made, as you have indicated, of the situation, because certain groups may wish to exploit this and involve us in what is not our task. We consider that a member of the central Government has a right, like any other individual, not to be part of the Government, if he so wishes. It is not our concern who joins and who does not join.

(Mr. Gebre-Egzy, Ethiopia)

As a matter of political sagacity we would very much like to see Mr. Gizenga participate, if nothing else, for the sake of his country. However, if he does not wish to do so, then we very much hope that he will stay quiet wherever he may be and we very much hope that you, Mr. Secretary-General, will impress upon Mr. Gizenga and indeed all the leaders in the Congo that they are the ones who are going to lose if they begin to attack the central Government and take us back to a situation which prevailed a few months ago. Of course I suspect that all this is simply a press report, but all the same we feel in duty bound to express our views.

Thirdly, I should like to make a few remarks about troops. We have said in the past that we would not wish to see a small number of troops involved in any action, and therefore once more I have to repeat what I have said in the past. We would not like to see 200 or 300 troops being outnumbered by unruly Congolese troops. Such a situation simply should not happen.

Then again, sir, with regard to the statement you have made, we very much hope that all the weapons that are necessary for the task will be provided -- all the weapons, heavy, small or whatever is required -- so that we shall not face another disaster. I am in duty bound to warn about this, because we have already seen defeats and it should not be repeated.

(Mr. Gebre-Egzy, Ethiopia)

As you will recall, Sir, I have raised the question of additional troops and I hope that it will be possible for you to request the Members of the United Nations to provide them. I hope that it will be possible for you to urge all Members very strongly to help us in this direction.

I wish to say that, in connexion with your statement, all the leaders in the Congo should be told that it is their country and that, if they want to save it, they must co-operate with the Central Government and with the United Nations and that we cannot be scattered all over the country trying to arbitrate their differences when our main task is to take care of external differences.

I have one last point which concerns the Security Council -- I do not wish to raise it there. A number of delegations have attacked the United Nations very severely. We do not share in such attacks, but we feel that it is not for us to reply to their statements, but if anything can be done in that regard, we would like it to be done in the Council. We have our own people in the Congo operation, although, it is true, they are under your command and, therefore, we are not involved. Nevertheless we would not wish their good name to be sullied publicly in the Security Council.

Finally, there seems to be some confusion in the Security Council regarding the situation and what is required. Possibly you may give some thought as to whether you would be willing to clarify the situation there.

The acting SECRETARY-GENERAL: I shall certainly keep these observations in mind.

Regarding the inquiry about the weapons, my understanding is that we have some good news in the offing, but I think that I had better give the floor to General MacEoin so that he may inform the Committee about the prospects of additional weapons for our force in the Congo.

With reference to the request for additional troops from other Members of the United Nations, I have already had this in mind and it seems to me that the response will be related to the nature of the decisions which the Security Council may make.

(The acting Secretary-General)

As to the inquiry about my intervention, or statement of policy, or statement of intentions in the Security Council, I have decided to make my own intervention immediately after decisions have been arrived at in the Council -- and not before, of course. I do not wish to give the impression that I am participating in a political debate; therefore, I propose to make my statement only after the decisions have been reached.

Perhaps General MacEoin might wish to make certain clarifications concerning the weapons and arms.

General MACEOIN: Some progress has been made and is being made with regard to equipping the United Nations Force in the Congo. The greatest respect in which our Force has been stiffened has been in the matter of providing us with three small squadrons to a total of fifteen jet fighters. That has made a tremendous difference to the Force. It now has a striking power that it never had before. In actual fact, until these jets arrived we could say that we had no striking power or force other than the ability to place men physically on the ground in certain threatened places. That derives from the role of the military mission when the Force was established in July 1960.

We have in the past few weeks received additional armoured personnel carriers and anti-aircraft guns from Sweden which are necessary and vital in the protection of our fighter aircraft. A further ten armoured cars are on their way and they will be followed closely by an additional fifteen armoured personnel carriers. That means a great improvement in our mobility in that we are free to move soldiers around well protected against small arms and heavier fire. We have improved our anti-tank position in that we have got additional anti-tank guns, both medium and heavy.

With regard to the manpower situation, I think that calls for a few comments from me. I have never felt that we did have enough troops in the Congo, and certainly at the moment we are very thinly spread out on the ground, with the exception of Katanga. I would like to say that Headquarters here has responded in the fullest sense to every request which we made for additional troops by making requests to Member States of the United Nations. Unfortunately,

(General MacEoin)

they have been unable to increase our manpower strength to any marked degree. On the contrary, our strength is slowly dwindling because of the fact that certain countries which made big contributions in July and August 1960 now find that, because of domestic situations within their own defence forces, they have got to withdraw some of their United Nations units, so that now we have a steady drop in our manpower strength. This, as the Secretary-General said, will certainly call for a stating of priorities in our planning.

Concerning the removal of mercenaries, the maintenance of law and order and taking steps to assist in the training of the ANC, we certainly cannot undertake any two of these tasks at a time with our present force. That must be clearly understood.

There is one last point which I should like to make. We regret very much that on many occasions -- and I greatly fear that this will happen also in the future -- we have had to use detachments as small as 200 and 250 men. Nobody realizes the weakness of a step of that kind as I do. But we have no alternative in the interests of protecting human life. I should like to be in a position in the Congo to move nothing less than a battalion group to any one place. I have never been able in the past ten months to do that. In fact, when we did have a threat in any one place to the lives of non-Congolese or Congolese, we were never in a position to move more than 200 or 250 troops, because of low strength, without leaving a vacuum at the place vacated.

These are the only points which I should like to make at this stage unless there is anything else you would like me to mention.

Mr. BOURGUIBA (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): First of all, Mr. Secretary-General, I should like to address to you the very best wishes of my delegation on this occasion when you are beginning officially to deal with the Congo question here, although I am sure that it has already been before you. This is a gamble which, unfortunately, the United Nations has been called upon to undertake for more than a year.

May I ask you also, in my name and in the name of my Government, to convey to the Italian Government, and through it to the families of the victims of the recent massacres at Kindu, all our sympathy and our most sincere condolences, together with the expression of our gratitude to these men who died while discharging the peace mission assigned to them by the United Nations.

I was going to ask you to endeavour to give us some additional information with regard to the situation as it exists following recent events, and particularly regarding the possibilities of implementing the suggestions which you have just put forward -- suggestions which I, personally, find to be very useful and very constructive. I wish to emphasize particularly the fact that, without lessening in any way the firmness of the action which you envisage, you have been careful to take all necessary precautions so that this action may be well publicized in such a way that all potential protagonists in the drama in Katanga may be fully appraised of the situation and of the responsibilities.

Indeed it is my belief that such precautions will permit an even greater firmness in this action if -- which God forbid -- it should prove to be necessary.

I believe that General MacEoin has replied in part to some of the questions which I had intended to put to you, and without going to the point of exercising the right of reply -- for that is not the object of my intervention and this would not be the place for it -- I would point out that we were among the first to regret that, contrary to our wishes, we had to take part in the weakening of the United Nations force in the Congo.

I shall not revert to the unfortunate situation which, last year, obliged us to request the repatriation of our contingent. Our country was attacked. I shall not say any more.

(Mr. Bourguiba, Tunisia)

Nevertheless, as you have said, and as General MacEoin has just confirmed, these suggestions call for greater manpower. If, from the point of view of material, there is an improvement in the situation, it is still necessary to have more manpower, and I would be inclined to agree with General MacEoin that technically, as he has just emphasized, detachments of less than battalion strength can hardly serve a useful purpose, particularly when one locality has to be deprived of their presence because of an emergency situation elsewhere. I should be happy to see a positive response to any appeal you made for an increase in the United Nations Force in the Congo, and perhaps that will make it possible for us also to approve it and discuss it. That is, indeed, the reply to the question which you yourself raised: are your suggestions feasible, and is it possible to implement them. That certainly requires detailed study of the possibilities before we can expect any response to your suggestions.

The acting SECRETARY-GENERAL: I have been advised by the relevant authorities -- comprising, of course, my colleagues both at Headquarters and in the Congo -- that these intentions can be fulfilled with the existing strength at our disposal. But when I say that, the time factor should be borne in mind. The main problem facing the United Nations today is the problem of foreign mercenaries. I have been advised that we have ample strength, if certain priorities are given, to give effect to the decisions of the principle organs of the United Nations, including the resolutions of the Security Council. Here I am referring, of course, to the apprehending, the detaining and the deporting of the foreign mercenaries in Katanga. As far as this problem is concerned, we have the means at our disposal. But, as I have just said, it is a question of time. It will take some time with our existing strength. If our strength can be reinforced the time factor will be reduced. We can achieve these results in less time.

With regard to the over-all attitude towards the whole problem I shall, of course, as I have just said, make a brief intervention as soon as the Security Council comes to a decision, either tonight or tomorrow.

I call on the representative of India.

Mr. K. LALU MANNON (India): This is the first public occasion when I have had the opportunity to be present with you in your new capacity, Mr. Secretary-General, although perhaps I am mistaken in saying that it is a public occasion. I hope that it is not. However, some people have been saying that you have received nothing but praise since you came here, and since it would not be very good for a Secretary-General to receive any more I shall not add anything at the moment.

With regard to what you have just been speaking about, my delegation will intervene this afternoon in the Security Council, and therefore I do not want to go through a dress rehearsal here, but at the same time I do not want the Secretariat to be unaware of some of our essential attitudes in this matter.

First, I should like to make a preliminary observation. My delegation has never changed its view -- and it took issue with Hammarskjöld on several occasions -- that the Secretary-General, in the context of these operations in the Congo, cannot remain in purdah. That is to say that, as Secretary-General,

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

you are conducting a political and military operation. You are making decisions yourself every time. Then we come to these meetings, either with material derived from the newspapers or with material from our own national sources -- because we scrupulously refrain from interference in the activities of international civil servants -- and I think that it is not getting a fair debate or a fair understanding of this problem. After the debate of the Security Council, when there is data which is only in your possession, or when there are answers which you alone can give -- and here, of course, I do not mean you personally -- it is not a healthy situation. The Secretary-General in this case is not like the secretary of a committee or a civil servant in that sense. He is an organ of the United Nations, and he has been charged with certain functions.

There are only two ways of doing this. Either we start interrogating the Secretary-General, which would be a somewhat unseemly procedure, or else we go without his assistance. This matter is well worth considering. Last December, when this matter came up with regard to certain internal matters in the Congo, certain decisions were taken, and we said to the Secretary-General, "If you had intervened at that time in the Assembly and expressed the views to the Assembly which you expressed to us, then probably the situation in the Congo might have changed". That is the view of our Government and of ourselves.

Now we come to these matters which you referred to, Mr. Secretary-General. One is with regard to mercenaries. We do not yield to any delegation in the United Nations in our desire to get rid of foreign intervention in that country or, for that matter, in any other country, but we are likely to become the victims of slogans in these matters.

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

But I can quite foresee a time when Tshombe will turn around and say, "I do not want any mercenaries," because he has got numbers of his officers who were trained in Belgium who have come home. There are a large number of Belgian Katangese who can produce certificates and whatnot. Since Mr. Spaak has already kind of blazed the trail by saying "it is a white manhunt", we will be in a very awkward position.

While these mercenaries are very important, they are the symptom instrument of something else. The real problem is the problem of the secession of Katanga. If you look at it, as you have no doubt done, the large number of resolutions, decisions, steps taken are all really pointed towards the secession of Katanga or any other secessionist element. But this other secessionist element, until we have any other information, is talking purely in terms of abstract justice. The main problem is: Why the secessionist element? We can go further today; that is to say, there is a belligerent opponent against the United Nations. What is all this talk about not using force and using force and whatnot? If you don't want to use force, put them all in Red Cross uniforms and let's not use it. But do not ask us to send fighting troops to be humiliated. Each Government has to take this into account. After all, we have to maintain the discipline of our forces. As the Minister of Defence, I have very great difficulty in maintaining the position with regard to the supply of resources to the Congo. Therefore, when there is a war against the United Nations, when a party with whom you conclude a truce -- which I am not going to examine at the moment -- when they have violated, when there are large numbers of wounded in the hospitals as a result of action where competent, qualified and courageous men in response to your commands and the mandate of the United Nations have not fought them when they were being shot at in the post office, when these Irish persons were taken prisoner -- if an Irishman can do anything, it is to fight, is that not so? Let the Ambassador contradict that.-- all this is due to the fact that you are sending people into battle with their hands tied behind their backs. That is the first point.

The second point is that while we must concentrate on these mercenaries -- and we for our part will certainly give all the credit to Mr. Spaak for what he is trying to do to avert this process -- we may not be satisfied with the results and then we shall say so. But there is a great danger in continuing to push against an open door. The steps must be taken. The main thing that should not

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be forgotten is that we are operating in the implementation of United Nations resolutions to maintain the independence, the integrity of Katanga and to prevent a civil war. Unless that is done and action is taken and unless we have in mind also that mercenaries may become superfluous in certain contexts as these young men come back from Belgium trained -- and both sides have them I believe. How competent are they? After all, competence is a matter of opportunity. If you put a man in a place he becomes competent. He must either shoot the fellow in front of him or get shot from behind. Therefore it isn't that way at all.

After all, the colonial regime of Belgium was different from the colonial regimes in Burma, India or any of these countries where they regarded the territory as part of Belgium. Large numbers of Belgian families were settled there. There might have been racial mixtures and whatnot and there may have been a large number of white Katangese, if you like, and some of them may have been politically produced; I do not mean biologically produced, but politically produced. They will produce the necessary provisions and then we will be up against this problem of who is a national. Then you will tell us, "it is not for us to interfere in the domicile legislation of the Belgian Congo and things of that character". And so while we must keep on both for the sake of public opinion and for the sake of resisting these mercenaries, this attempt to draw back on the main problem of secession has to be resisted. That will be the position of our Government.

We should like to know in the afternoon for what reason and why when the troops, who are largely from the Indian Army, were advancing in Katanga and would have brought the action to a successful conclusion, you pulled them back. I ask this because I am accountable to my Parliament. We should like to know how these men who are in the hospital, as I have said, suffering from gunshot wounds inflicted only by white persons -- we have got evidence of this which we are not at the present moment prepared to publish -- as no Congolese shot Indian soldiers in resisting the taking of the post office. As you know, these men are accustomed to handling bayonets very well, but your instructions to them were to fight. We tell them when they go and the Indian Army goes out to battle. These poor devils have been shown how to fight and resist and then they are told, "don't do this, don't do that," and now all these wounded men are lying in the hospital. As the General will tell you, there is nothing an army regards as more humiliating as large numbers of wounded in action; they would sooner be killed in doing so. The honour of an army is much more important to it than even its own guns.

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Now we come to the question of the size of the troops in the United Nations. I know nothing about acts of war or warfare; that is why I am the Minister of Defence. If I know anything about warfare, they would not put me there. They would say, "You would try to put your own knowledge against that of the Generals." You do not make doctors Ministers of Health. Similarly, we should not make devils ministers of defence. I know nothing about it but I should have thought, considering the size of the armies that we have and the frontiers to be protected and the opponents we have to deal with -- or at least be ready for -- that there are large numbers of troops in the Congo. They would get in each other's way. I should like to ask the General, if he is going to get reinforcements, how long will it take them to get there? We are told that these troops take off from an airport on twenty-four-hours notice or whatever it is, and then they go all the way to Africa and reach the place two months afterwards not in the condition they should arrive in. Therefore, taking the logistics into account, considering that logistics are dependent on extraneous sources, is it possible within the measure of time and distance, unless you are thinking of a long drawn-out war, to take on more people? Now you have asked to turn Indian troops around, that is, to withdraw these and put new ones in. That means an operation lasting over a month. We have for the moment halted it until after the Security Council meetings. So we should like a little more from your own side, from your own advisers as to the usefulness of large numbers of troops. Modern armies try to cut down numbers because they get in the way. You have some 15,000 personnel; I suppose that about 11,000 or so are combat troops -- that is, apart from the air force.

Another point is that there will be financial difficulties in the way of further commitments in this matter because even though countries may contribute, the carrying out of these operations -- I am not saying it should not be undertaken if we can afford it -- and so in this matter we express no opinion -- but we are not at the present moment prepared to accept the view that the troops are not adequate for the purpose, and it is not for us to accept it in fact; it is for you who conduct the operations.

If it is a question of trying to guard every inch of a 2,000-mile frontier, if you are going to post a picket in every village, then you will want much more than the whole of the Indian army. The Congo is one million square miles; we are 1.2 million square miles, and no country can afford this. It is a question of

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giving some thought to this, what re-organization is possible. I want to pose this question as delicately as possible. We should like to know what degree of harmony, I would say what degree of liaison, what degree of inter-working access there is between the 38th floor and the field of the Congo because there must be somebody responsible for these things such as the unity of command, the potency of striking power and the confidence of the troops that they will not be just thrown up against something and pulled back when they are going to win. This is important to us. I will give an instance. We were asked to send air support. As you know, our Government was very much against sending our air forces outside of India for reasons we need not go into. Ultimately we decided -- I know, because I handled this matter myself -- I do not know how many times we went backwards and forwards, whether it was going to be X or X-plus, whether airplanes would be able to take off. Then they were switched off. There must be a lot of conflict of views in the field itself. If the General is going to be made responsible for something, he must have the feeling that he is carrying on with it and that he is not going to have to ask some accountant or some politician or somebody around the place about it; there must be unity of command in that way in regard to unity throughout.

Something was also said about parties of 250 going out. That largely depends on the terrain and which troops are going out and what equipment they have. We should like to know whether your military advisers consider that this equipment is adequate, whether the kind of vehicles that you are going to move into this territory are adequate and what protection they are provided.

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

In placing at your disposal the Fighter Command, we have been rather concerned about the protection of the airfields. We were rather concerned that the airfields in the Congo are still, all of them, including Katanga, not in your possession. If they are not in your possession, it should be comparatively easy to put them out of action, even before this. So long as the United Nations Air Force has a potential resistance from the air, then we are going to face a problem. Are we going to involve ourselves in air warfare when we have the time and the opportunity to put the other side out of action? It may be inconvenient for United Nations officials to go to Katanga for truce purposes, but even then, it is far better to put that airfield out of action. As I said, I do not know about the military operation.

With regard to law and order -- and I am sure Mr. Bomboko would not mind my saying this -- they have a great deal to account for themselves in the beginning, with all the troubles that we had -- but now that situation having more or less come to an end, there are enough personnel in the Congo to make use of the Congolese themselves for this purpose, partly to maintain law and order in the sense you meant and partly in order to avert actions of the kind which the Congolese Prime Minister spoke of yesterday as being heartily ashamed of in regard to the Italian prisoners, that is to say, their own forces are, instead of being a safety factor for them, are being a menace, because there has not been the proper application of training facilities and things of that character.

You asked about the augmentation of the troops in the Congo. Where are they going to come from? If the pattern of assistance hitherto given is followed, they are to come from the uncommitted countries because troops from the committed countries will probably project the cold war more into the Congo situation. That was, I suppose, the idea, because as I look at this pattern, I find, as far as the combatant troops are concerned, they mainly come from the so-called uncommitted countries. The uncommitted countries, by definition, are countries with small armies, because they are not part of military alliances; their military strength is dependent upon their own resources. And what is more, I am speaking from my own experience, every single officer and all personnel are committed normally to national defence, and there is no surplus

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floating about anywhere. So, if you, and the late Secretary-General asked us to commit these troops, irrespective of our difficulties, we did so. Now, how many more countries can in this way produce these troops, not only quantitatively but qualitatively for an international action.

There is this further difficulty. We all have equipment of one kind. Some other armies, for example, from the former French empire have equipment of some other kind. The whole of this organization is as if it belonged to a separate world altogether. Now if it is to be effective, it has got to meet all these points.

Anyway, we are going to intervene this afternoon in the Security Council. We were mainly concerned with this problem of secession. I wanted to be acquainted with that situation. And also with the regard to the utilization of the strength there, because, after all, we have been there now for a year and a half. India has over 6,000 personnel in that territory. These men are far away from their homes. There have been no complaints from them of any kind -- they never do complain. But how long is this to go on, unless we are prepared to take action. For example these places, like the post office and so on, that have been taken once, and have been handed over, and under the truce agreement you are supposed to go and see places; they are supposed to go and see places; but it all seems to be one-sided: They are seeing what they want to see, and you are not allowed to see what you want to see. If that is the position, we are going to be in a very difficult situation. I want to say that we are extremely concerned about this, not only from the point of view of our commitments, but the whole of the United Nations is involved in this matter.

Generally speaking, the action is undertaken under the United Nations, and it must be conducted by somebody obviously. But we, ourselves, have very little knowledge of what goes on. For example, yesterday it was said that there was another secessionist movement. And it was said by a very responsible country with large sources of information. Either it is so or it is not so. The only people who can tell us this are the United Nations. By not telling it now either because the United Nations does not have the knowledge or because there is some restraint that you impose upon yourself, you give the entire Press of the country one day's start -- the entire Press of this country gives the lead to others. And if people like ourselves intervene, then it is said that we have

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a double standard. After all, if we cannot at least have the weapon of fact and truth from the United Nations, where do we stand in this matter?

Since I am speaking this afternoon, I want to say, that so far as the Government of India is concerned, with regard to this action and the decisions of the United Nations, we shall assist in carrying them out to the best of our ability. And you, Mr. Secretary-General, who have just come into this business, we understand the necessity of time for you to appreciate and assess all this. As far as my Government is concerned, you and your colleagues will have all the support we can give.

The acting SECRETARY-GENERAL: The statement just made by the Defence Minister of India, Mr. Menon, I think, can be classified into three categories: political, military, and the question of liaison and transportation.

Regarding the political aspects of his observations, my feeling is that the Secretary-General should not intervene in the debate of a purely political nature in the Security Council. I feel rather strongly about that. Because, a Secretary-General should not give the impression in any way that he has some side to take or that he has some views of his own which may be contrary to the views of certain members of the Security Council. I have in mind one instance when Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld intervened in the case of the Tunisian-French dispute on Bizerte. Because at that time the discussions were stalled and there was a complete deadlock, I think perhaps he felt that it would be helpful for the Council if he gave vent to certain views regarding a cease-fire. I think that was the only instance I could remember. But in the present debate, of course, my interpretation is, when we come to some definitive decisions at the conclusion of the meeting, and once the Council arrives at a certain definite decision, then, I think, I should inform the Council how I would implement this decision and my own interpretation of the resolution. I think this would be acceptable to all the members of the Security Council.

(The acting Secretary-General)

Regarding the intimation made yesterday evening by the United States representative to the effect that a certain political section in a certain Province of the Congo was contemplating secession, I should like to make it clear once again that we have no such information. As I have said, all the information we have concerning the Congo, including Orientale Province, is incorporated in addendum 13 to document S/4940, the addendum which was released yesterday afternoon. That contained all the information we had received up to mid-day yesterday, and I may say that we received no further information last night or this morning.

Thus, as Secretary-General, I can say that we have no information whatsoever of any intention or desire on the part of Mr. Gizenga to secede from the Central Government.

As regards the military aspects of the issue raised by the Defence Minister of India, I think that General MacEoin is in a better position to throw some light on the subject. And as regards the transportation and liaison aspects, I think that Mr. Bunche is in a better position to answer than I am.

I therefore shall first call on General MacEoin to deal with the military aspects.

General MacEoin: I shall deal very briefly with the main points of a military nature raised by Mr. Krishna Menon.

I should like to go back to the time, in July-August 1960, when the United Nations Force was sent to the Congo, with the mission of assisting in the maintenance of law and order in the Congo. The Force was accordingly disposed for that purpose in the main cities and towns of the Congo and at other vital points. Until very recently we had attempted to adhere to that disposition. Reductions in the Force, however, made it necessary for us to give up certain places -- in one case a complete Province; of course, this was a peaceful Province -- Equator -- and giving it up did not involve any risks.

In addition to disposing the troops in the Congo to assist and support the Congolese authorities in the maintenance of law and order, we have a good many other tasks to perform. The airfields in the Congo are vital to the United Nations Force. If we do not have the airfields, we have no freedom of

(General MacEoin)

movement, and we cannot operate or control our Force. We are compelled to occupy such places as the Kamina and Kitona airbases because of Security Council decisions. We have very many other tasks, such as the protection of vital installations throughout the Congo, which are too numerous to enumerate now.

We have had to give up many of these places, and have incurred great risks in doing so. In some cases we could not completely evacuate, and we were obliged to leave small detachments merely as a token force. We paid the penalty for that in a good many instances.

With regard to the suggestion that troops were in each other's way, I can only say that at my end in the Congo it is difficult to understand such a suggestion. Every day the various unit commanders ask for reinforcements. This applies to Katanga as much as to any of the other Provinces or capitals. Every day I receive requests for reinforcements that I am not in a position to meet. I shall give two very brief examples of our weakness at the moment. In a few short weeks we shall have in Leopoldville two companies to hold and look after Ndjili airfield in Leopoldville and the city of Leopoldville -- a total of about 350 men. In Kasai we have at the moment three companies, one Nigerian battalion, one company at the airfield, one company in the town of Luluabourg and one company in Lodja. That is about as thin as we could possibly be. Certainly, I have accepted these dispositions with tremendous reservations and fully conscious of the fact that we are incurring great risks in doing this. But we must hold on to these airfields. I think that we are still obliged to carry out our mandate of giving all possible assistance to the Congolese authorities in maintaining law and order.

In fact, the very regrettable incidents we have had throughout the Congo have been brought about by our very weakness. I think that the greatest lesson the United Nations has learned in the Congo is that if it decides to put a military force into a country like the Congo to implement a mission such as that given to the Force a year and a half ago, it must go there in sufficient strength to ensure that small detachments will not invite attack and incur defeat, thereby causing very serious damage to the prestige of the United Nations.

(General MacEoin)

I think that members here should realize and very fully appreciate that point. We have incurred serious damage to the prestige of the United Nations by the very fact of the weakness of the Force sent to the Congo. The Force sent to the Congo was as strong as the Secretariat could make it, but it was never strong enough. If we have incurred defeats and disasters and very serious loss of life, it has been because the Force is not strong enough to implement its mission.

The acting SECRETARY-GENERAL: I shall now call on Mr. Bunche to make some comments on liaison and transportation.

Mr. BUNCHE: First, I shall make some brief remarks on the question of liaison.

Of course we have liaison -- but we have much more than that. We have continuing consultation by cable, clear and code, over our own communications facilities. When I say that our consultation is never-ending, that may be taken quite literally to mean twenty-four hours a day; some of us can attest to that fact rather ruefully because -- and the Secretary-General is already beginning to learn about this -- important cables sometimes awaken us in the middle of the night.

On the basis of such consultation, policy matters are decided at Headquarters by the Secretary-General after a full interchange.

As regards liaison on the military side particularly, General Rikhye customarily goes to Leopoldville every now and then for purposes of direct consultation with General MacEoin and his staff; in fact, General Rikhye has just returned from a visit to the Congo of about two weeks. Thus, through this interchange we can better appreciate the problems and views of the people in the field, and they can have direct contact with Headquarters problems and views.

(Mr. Bunche)

I would say that there is one aspect of this that we would like to see improved, but this has been the case in every United Nations operation, every United Nations field operation. We have never been able to develop what we would call a fully satisfactory system of reporting; that is, of keeping Headquarters informed on all aspects of information that is available to the operation in the field.

But the reasons for that are many. In the first place, as you know, we do not have intelligence set-ups with these operations. General MacEoin would very much like to have one. He presses us on it constantly. Secondly, there are problems of communication in the field. We cannot compete with the Press in this regard, as I have indicated in this Committee before, because the information that our people send in to us they like to have confirmed to the fullest extent possible, whereas the information which the press agencies put on the wires is most often not confirmed in any sense -- is often based upon rumour and gossip, and is much more spectacular than any information we would ever put out. That is all I need say, as to liaison and reporting.

As regards transport, the problem is a very serious one, in the sense that the United Nations does not have its own aerial transport, particularly for external air lift -- external to the Congo. We have a small fleet of planes for internal purposes in the Congo, but when big lifts occur outside the Congo we must depend upon transport obtained from one of two sources. Either we try to negotiate this transport with some friendly Government -- some Government friendly to the operation -- which has the transport: This usually turns out to be the United States, though we have used planes from other countries for this purpose -- from Ethiopia, from Canada, from Sweden, and from the United Kingdom; but the biggest fleet available, of both planes and boats, is that of the United States. If we cannot -- and it often happens that we cannot -- negotiate an arrangement with them, we turn to arrangements for the charter of commercial planes from private companies, with all the limitations that are involved in that sort of arrangement. If we had our own fleet of transport planes we could get around many of these inconveniences. These schedule changes, which we cannot control, and which we quite understand, are irritating to the countries providing troops and equipment for us. But this is often, I assure you, something that is quite beyond our control. We do the best we can, but in this regard we are pretty much in the position of having to beg -- not being able to control the situation ourselves.

The acting SECRETARY-GENERAL: I am sure the Committee will agree with me that, for obvious reasons, we should not discuss the military dispositions or future plans, and I hope members of the Committee will not press further concerning our military plans and the proposed operations.

Mr. NGILERUMA (Nigeria): First of all, I would like to associate myself with all those who have welcomed you to your new seat in the Advisory Committee, in coming to preside over it. It is your Committee, and we are members of your Committee. All of us are dedicated to give you advice to the best of our ability and to express our frank and honest opinion without any hesitation. Therefore, I would like to say that we are very glad to see you.

I must also say that we appreciate very much your statement of policy before the Committee. I have been following it very closely and will take note of all that you have said to us, but I would like to say that my first reaction is that you made two very important points in your statement.

First, you mentioned the question of intelligence. The question of intelligence is a matter of very serious concern to all of us. At our previous meeting we expressed opinions about intelligence and your representatives, Dr. Bunche and others, made it plain to us that the intelligence in the Congo was not satisfactory. I hope that now you have been appointed you will pay great attention -- much greater attention than has been paid in the past -- to that question. We were informed at our last meeting that Mr. Tshombe had made a surprise visit to Geneva. I know that he is not a United Nations prisoner. He is not in your custody, but Mr. Tshombe makes frequent visits to neighbouring countries. This is our information. I do not know how true it is, but we know at least one of the neighbouring countries is anti-United Nations and very unco-operative. This is our information. As I said at our previous meeting, when you are dealing with a very strong enemy like that you should always watch his activities. We made it plain that he went to Geneva, perhaps with the idea of buying weapons. And now he is sending telegrams to a number of delegations saying that he would like to co-operate, and that he had already recognized Kasa-Vubu as the President, or Head of State. Well, if he was sincere, and if what he said was genuine, why did he not go to Leopoldville to say this to Mr. Adoula and Mr. Kasa-Vubu? What is the purpose of sending telegrams now to the Secretary-General, and to a number of delegations

(Mr. Ngileruma, Nigeria)

after making a surprise visit to prepare himself, and coming back? We do not know whether it is a tactic, or a genuine desire but , all the same, it is very important for the United Nations to watch him very closely.

In your statement you made a very important point with regard to the mercenaries. Of course, it is agreed that the mercenaries -- when they are back -- should be arrested and handed over to the Central Government for punishment, but I would like to go back to the question of the neighbouring countries. In the Security Council resolution of 21 February it was clearly stated that all States should, "take immediate and energetic measures to prevent the departure of such personnel for the Congo from their territories, and for the denial of transit and other facilities to them" (S/4741).

We are not quite sure what is happening in the neighbouring countries. We have made many inquiries and have been informed that the territory is very large; that it could not be controlled. But I believe strongly that these mercenaries, if they return to the Congo, do not travel in the bush. They must either fly back from some airport or use transport vehicles. Therefore, if the neighbouring countries are co-operative, I am quite sure they will do something to prevent them from coming.

(Mr. Ngileruma, Nigeria)

The question of mercenaries is very serious, and if there is a resolution now before the Security Council it is our own Afro-Asian resolution. We have participated in it and we are fully in agreement with it. The representative of Ethiopia expressed an opinion which was acceptable to all of us, and therefore, I should not like to say anything further with regard to mercenaries. I should like to wait and see the decision of the Security Council.

However, Mr. Secretary-General, you have warned us not to go into the question of your military arrangements. I do not want to go into it; I must accept your advice. But I should like to express concern, as has the representative of Ghana, in respect of the redeployment of soldiers. If you send a small number of troops to isolated localities, you will be putting them in a very embarrassing position.

I am quite sure that if the Malayan troops at Kindu were in a position to rescue the Italians they would have done so. I am also quite sure that the number of troops was very small and that they were not in a position to intervene or rescue them. Therefore, the deployment of a small number of troops into isolated areas should be looked into very carefully.

Mr. Secretary-General, the problem of Katanga is not political now; it is economic. The Foreign Minister of Belgium, in a statement before the Security Council, said that Belgium is a free and prosperous country. If Belgium is a free and prosperous country, how did it gain this prosperity? Is he trying to say that they have nothing to do with the Union Minière? Are they not concerned with the economic and financial aspects of the Union Minière? Are they not interested? If Belgium is a free country, why do they not see to it that the Congo should be free? It is very difficult for us Africans to understand this point. The problem of Katanga is very very serious. As I said, it is not political, it is economic. The co-operation of all the big Powers which have investments in Katanga is very essential.

With regard to intelligence and distribution of arms, it is very difficult for us to get full information as to what is going on in a place like Katanga; but in Katanga and in the whole of the Congo there is disorder among all ANC forces. Further, according to our information, it is necessary that I ask your

(Mr. Ngileruma, Nigeria)

representative to tell us whether or not it is true that in Katanga Mr. Tshombe is distributing arms to about 150,000 civilians. If this is true, your representative should be in a position to know where these weapons came from. If it is true, this situation would be the most serious of all.

I shall terminate my remarks at this time. However, I reserve my right to ask further questions after these points are clarified.

The acting SECRETARY-GENERAL: Before I give the floor to Dr. O'Brien, who will deal with this aspect of Mr. Tshombe and Katanga, I should like to say that I am grateful to the representative of Nigeria for bringing up the question of intelligence.

Of course, when I mentioned the need for more intelligence activities, I was thinking primarily of information operations in the Congo along the lines of gathering accurate information there. I was not thinking in terms of intelligence activities in countries other than the Congo.

In respect of Mr. Tshombe's visit to Geneva, we are trying to gather as much information as possible. However, for obvious reasons, it is not proper for the United Nations to operate intelligence activities in countries other than the Congo, and in the Congo only to a limited extent.

With regard to Mr. Tshombe and his activities, the distribution of arms and the general situation in Katanga, I think Dr. O'Brien is the person who is in the best position to elucidate on this.

Mr. O'BRIEN: I think, in replying to the representative of Nigeria, it might be well to say a few words generally about this problem of the mercenaries as it now presents itself in Katanga because, of course, it has changed very much since 28 August.

The Secretary-General has rightly said that the mercenaries are now the main problem. I think it is well to try and state why that is so. They are the main problem for two reasons. First of all, they are the armature of the Katangan armed forces. Mr. Krishna Menon did raise the point that it would be possible for Mr. Tshombe to change that, that is to say, that he could genuinely get rid of the mercenaries. Of course, he now says that he has got rid of all the mercenaries; but that is not true. Could he then get rid of the mercenaries but rely on an exclusively African gendarmerie? I think he certainly does not think so.

(Mr. O'Brien)

The point was made about the Brussels-trained officers. It is true that a certain number of officers -- I think the number was sixteen -- went to Brussels for training. The Brussels-trained officers have shown the highest proportion of rallying, of changing their allegiance and going over to the Central Government, of any group of officers in the Katangan forces. The indications are that after what from his point of view was a disastrous experiment -- the Brussels training -- he is relying more on mercenaries than on any training of Katangese.

On the whole, the situation there tends to be that in the army the more intelligent, better trained elements are less reliable from Tshombe's point of view. They tend to be more accessible to Congolese nationalism and are treated with some suspicion. The more backward elements, mainly based on the Lubanda tribe, are given more rapid promotion, and those who have high training -- good certificates -- are set aside. That means that they must depend on the mercenaries for the continued effective operation of their armed forces, and they do.

The second reason, of course, why the mercenaries are important is that the mercenaries are the most tangible aspect of foreign interference in the affairs of Katanga, which we have reason to believe is very general, through the international combines centred on the Union Minière. It is very difficult to put one's finger on that interference.

Many speakers have referred to our lack of an intelligence system, which we very much hope will be remedied. It has almost been a crippling feature of our operation in Katanga -- our almost total lack of any antennae -- and I know that is an aspect which the Secretary-General is now considering. I do not want to go into it more.

Further about the mercenaries, the fact is that, of course, up to 28 August the mercenaries were going around in uniform. You could visit Elisabethville or any other centre and there they were in their uniforms.

(Mr. O'Brien)

After that date, and especially after 13 September, except in remote areas like Mitwaba and Kabongo, they ceased to wear uniform and they are now in civilian clothes. They are of course in several categories. There are the few that are in uniform in the field, in the bush areas. There are some in civilian clothes and permanently with the gendarmerie, in charge of gendarmerie centres at Jadotville and Kolwezi, where members of the consular corps have actually observed them giving directions. Then there is a third category, and that is those who are fully employed civilians who form virtually the reserve of the gendarmerie. People have been observed by returned prisoners -- people now employed in civilian tasks in Elisabethville and elsewhere who were seen during the événements in uniform at that time fighting in the ranks of the gendarmerie. Then you have the phenomenon that the European civilian population generally is armed. There is no need for Tshombe to distribute arms to them; they are armed already. In places like Jadotville the entire adult male European community came out and fought and did virtually all the fighting that was done there.

So the problem of getting after the mercenaries is a considerable one. If we get this strengthening of the mandate, which now seems to be open, we will still have our problems in putting that into force, welcome as the strengthening of the mandate would be for the operation there.

As regards Mr. Tshombe's movements, there again Mr. Tshombe is a man who is pretty constantly on the move. I would say he spends no more than two days a week in Elisabethville, sometimes less. He travels to Jadotville and Kolwezi. From Jadotville and Kolwezi he can, without our being informed of his movements, go anywhere else he wishes. He very often travels to Kipushi and he goes from Kipushi over the border into Rhodesia. He never lets a week go by without a visit to Rhodesia. Because of our lack of an intelligence service, to which I referred before, we are not as well informed about his movements or his intentions as we should be. That is a definite defect in our operation, and the representative of Nigeria has put his finger on it. It cannot, I am afraid, be remedied without that strengthening that I referred to. We did not know of his impending visit to Geneva, and we are not fully informed, I think, about what its results were and what he got down to doing there.

Mr. BUNCHE: We are now.

Mr. O'BRIEN: Thank you. As regards the mercenary routes into Katanga, there are certainly many of them. Some go via Sakania and Kipushi by road. Some go in by rail. Some fly in. Of course, in present circumstances, they never go in as anything else but people who are recruited for work: say, to take one recent case, a house painter employed by an electric corporation, and that kind of thing. Without having almost a detective and thorough interrogation set-up, it is now difficult to control the mercenary flow. I am certainly not saying it is impossible; it is not impossible. It is something that will have to be done, but it is quite a formidable task in present circumstances because it is a disguised influx. Of course, the first time we arrest a supposedly innocent house painter, a man with a family, who is coming to take up a job with a civilian firm in Elisabethville, there will be a general outcry that the United Nations is far exceeding its mandate, that we are attacking technicians and so on, but I am afraid that that is something we will have to face.

Mr. NGILERUMA (Nigeria): I should like to correct a small misapprehension. When I said that the intelligence should be strengthened I did not mean to say that the activities of people like Mr. Tshombe should be known outside the Congo. I meant in the Congo. With regard to Mr. Tshombe's movements either to Northern Rhodesia or to Geneva, or to any part of Europe, what I have in mind is that, if the United Nations is very vigilant, you would be in a position to know it before he left the country. At our previous meeting we were told that his visit to Geneva was a surprise visit, that the United Nations did not know about it and nobody knew why he went. After his arrival in Geneva he said he went to see a doctor. We do not know whether it was true or not. This is what I meant to say.

Now, Mr. Secretary-General, with regard to Mr. Gizenga, you told us that he had never intended to secede from the central Government. This is very nice to know, but what I should like to know further is this. Is he intending to come back to Leopoldville or is he intending to stay out in his province? We have had word from time to time saying that the forces in Stanleyville, which are intact,

(Mr. Ngileruma, Nigeria)

are very dangerous for the United Nations and for the central Government. Mr. Gizenga has a high military officer in Mr. Lundula. Whether he is a commander or anything else, I do not know, but he is the head of the military forces. He has separate forces. We do not know his intentions, whether he will come back to Leopoldville to take up his office as Vice-President or whether he will remain in his province to undermine the authority of the central Government. This is very important for us to know because, unless the forces of Orientale are unified with the forces of the central Government, the danger will continue and it will be a matter of grave concern to all of us countries that have forces in the Congo. Therefore I should like to know the intentions of Mr. Gizenga.

The acting SECRETARY-GENERAL: Yes, Mr. Ambassador. Of course, all of us gathered here want him to come back to Leopoldville, and I personally, of course, with the help of my colleagues here, have been trying my best to induce him to come back to Leopoldville. However, regarding Mr. Gizenga's intentions, whether he would like to come back to Leopoldville or not is of course up to him. There is no means of ascertaining his intentions and his future plans, but we here are trying our best to bring him back to Leopoldville.

All we have to say regarding an earlier query about the news of his intention to secede is that it is not true so far as the United Nations knows. As far as our reports are concerned, we have no information that he is planning to secede or that he is planning to make Orientale Province autonomous or independent.

With regard to your query about his intention to come back to Leopoldville: of course all of us want him to come back and we are trying our best -- our representatives in Leopoldville and Stanleyville are trying their best also -- to induce him to come back to Leopoldville, but his decision, of course, cannot be ascertained now.

Mr. NGILERUMA (Nigeria): What about the unification with the forces of the Central Government?

The acting SECRETARY-GENERAL: That has been our objective; we are working on it. There has been some progress of late with regard to the unification of the troops in Stanleyville with those of the Central Government. As you will recall, General Lundula has pledged his full support to the Central Government. I think that is a very good step.

Mr. OUSMAN (Mali) (interpretation from French): I should like to stress two points which are of particular concern to my delegation.

First of all, I wish to associate myself with those representatives who spoke earlier in expressing sincere condolences on the occasion of the death of the Italians who were murdered in the service of the United Nations. They died, no doubt, because of maltreatment suffered at the hands of their captors, but their death is due also to the inadequacy of forces of the United Nations in the face of all the tasks which have been assigned to them in the Congo.

My delegation notes with satisfaction your declaration regarding the steps which you propose to take in order to remove the mercenaries and to strengthen the intelligence service of the United Nations. But I should like to stress one point. I think we are all agreed in recognizing that the crucial issue as far as the Congo is concerned is the problem of Katanga. I think that this point should always be emphasized because, since yesterday or the day before, a new element of confusion has been introduced, or is to be introduced, which may drown out our objectives, namely, the hypothesis of the secession of Orientale Province. This secession has not been proved and you have just said that there was no precise information in this regard; I think that those who have advanced this hypothesis have no more information than we have and I believe, therefore, that we should disregard this whole matter until further information is received. Katanga remains the number one problem as far as the Congo is concerned. Our first target must be to bring this secession to an end. We are not strategists, of course, but we feel that if a target is set, it will be possible to see what means should be utilized in order to attain the objective.

(Mr. Ousman, Mali)

We have been told that the United Nations Force has been strengthened and that they have additional equipment. This may help to pursue this number one target.

The second point which I wish to stress is that something fundamental is lacking in order to implement our wish to put an end to the secession of Katanga. General McKeown pointed this out to us. He said that we lacked manpower. Of course we lack manpower and very much regret that lack. If certain countries decided to remove their troops who were fighting in the Congo under the United Nations flag, it was because these countries, such as Mali, have wide boundaries and young States to defend. My country is surrounded by many States which are not always friendly. We have a frontier of 1500 kilometres with Algeria. We regret that these States were obliged to remove their troops. Nevertheless, even before the death of Mr. Hammarskjold, I think that the United Nations had a definite target and that was to bring an end to the secession of Katanga.

Although when it is said that the manpower of the United Nations is inadequate, there are certainly quite a number of Congolese forces. I think that the United Nations Force should go further in co-operating with the Central Government. If fuller co-operation with the Congolese authorities is planned, I think it will be found that the Congolese people themselves wish to put an end to the Katanga secession and will be willing to give assistance and manpower.

It seems that, with the exception of Katanga, all the provinces of the Congo have come to an agreement with the Central Government and are giving their support to that Government, with which our operation must co-operate. Therefore, to the extent to which the accent was placed on the allegiance of General Lundula to the Central Government, I do not think he ever said that he would not recognize that Government. I think that General Lundula is only doing his duty. If the whole of the Congo, with the exception of Katanga, is behind the Central Government, the United Nations should co-operate with that Government, and then perhaps the problem of manpower will be less serious. The Central Government, which called upon the United Nations for help in facing the problems of the Congo, will be able, within the framework of such co-operation, to supply manpower. In that event, the United Nations and its forces can serve as an armature for this larger force, the main responsibility for which would rest on the Congolese. If we

(Mr. Ousman, Mali)

adopt that course I think that most of the provinces of the Congo, with the exception of Katanga, and all the Congolese people will place themselves at the service of the United Nations. If there is such co-operation, we would never be accused of interference in the domestic affairs of the Congo since all we would be doing would be co-operating with the Central Government which called us to the Congo in the first place. Then we shall be able perhaps to solve the manpower problem. I repeat that if all the forces which are under the control of the Central Government are ordered to co-operate with the United Nations, there will be no shortage of military personnel. I would stress that aspect of the problem, which was already raised by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Congo (Leopoldville) a few days ago. I think that we shall have adequate manpower in the Congo if there is real co-operation between the United Nations forces and the forces of the Central Government -- with the one exception of Katanga.

(Mr. Ousman, Mali)

Of course, the Security Council will have to accept this concept of closer co-operation with the Central Government, and I think that if it did take such steps it would be possible to solve rapidly the one problem which, in the view of my Government, is the primary condition for the restoration of law and order in the Congo, namely, the ending of the Katangese secession.

Mr. SULEIMAN (Sudan): I should like to associate my delegation with the other delegations which have welcomed you to preside over this Committee, Mr. Secretary-General. I should just like to ask a question about this telegram you have received from President Tshombe dated 14 November. Is it intended that it should be kept as an informal document, or would it be advisable to have it circulated to the members of the Security Council in order to enlighten them on Mr. Tshombe's stand?

The acting SECRETARY-GENERAL: Mr. Tshombe is not considered by the United Nations as the head of a recognized government, so I think it would be incorrect for the United Nations to circulate this paper as an official document.

Mr. SULEIMAN (Sudan): My question is really this. We know that Mr. Tshombe cannot be treated as a Head of State, so that this document should not be circulated. But I thought that if the document were brought to the attention of the Security Council, which is now meeting to deal with this question of Katanga, it might throw light on Mr. Tshombe's stand on the matter.

The acting SECRETARY-GENERAL: My first reaction is that it might perhaps be more proper if any member of the Security Council which happens to be a member of this Advisory Committee should care to raise this or include it in the course of its intervention. I think it might be more proper.

Mr. BARNES (Liberia): My comments were not directed only to the question which has been raised by the representative of Sudan. I want to find out, Mr. Secretary-General, whether the statement you have made that you have no official knowledge that a secession movement has taken place in Oriental Province, instigated by Mr. Gizenga, is a sufficient answer to the question I

(Mr. Barnes, Liberia)

raised in the Security Council yesterday regarding official information of the Secretariat on this point. My second point is that I think that it is imperative that this telegram from Mr. Tshombe should be made available to the Security Council, because there is an effort, as we heard in various statements, to have negotiations take place between Mr. Tshombe and the Central Government with regard to the unity of the Congo. But this telegram, as far as we can see, insists upon the sovereignty and independence of Katanga as a national entity. And in that context, since the Security Council does not support that secession, such negotiations could not take place. Therefore, I think it would be helpful to the members of the Security Council if this telegram were made available to them.

The acting SECRETARY-GENERAL: As I have just pointed out, I think that it might be a way out if any member of the Security Council which also happened to be a member of this Committee cared to bring this to the attention of the Council. But if it is the wish of this Committee, and if the Committee advises me that this document should be made available to all the members of the Security Council, I shall be very happy to comply. Another way in which it could be done, perhaps, would be if a member of the Security Council were to tell me in the Council that this document was in its possession and ask whether it could be made available to the other members of the Council. In that case I should be glad to distribute it. I think that either way is possible.

Mr. BARNES (Liberia): The next point I want to raise is this. I have noted, Mr. Secretary-General, that you propose to make a statement in the Security Council after a decision has been reached -- I presume on the draft resolution that is before the Council now. I cannot prophesy what will be the outcome of the Security Council meeting because I understand that other draft resolutions are contemplated, but if there should be a stalemate there and if the resolution were not adopted would you feel that, within the context of the Security Council resolution of 21 February, you had the authority to enforce your plan to eliminate these mercenaries from Katanga?

The acting SECRETARY-GENERAL: Yes. Even if no fresh resolution is adopted at this series of meetings of the Council, I am fully convinced that I have a sufficient mandate under the resolution of 21 February to deal with the mercenaries.

Mr. ACHKAR (Guinea) (interpretation from French): It is quite late, so I shall be very brief. First, Mr. Secretary-General, I should like to say how gratified we are to have you with us. We are very happy about it, and we want to thank you also for the very useful information that you have been kind enough to give us. May I add that, as has been stated here, my delegation considers that priority should be given by all possible means to the elimination of mercenaries from Katanga. We, for our part, have always been of the view, which we have made clear repeatedly, that this is one of the fundamental problems of the Congo, and that the liquidation of the mercenaries would, to a large extent, pave the way for a solution of the Katanga secession which is the element which led to all the unfortunate developments in this connexion. We stand by this view despite the diversionary attempts which are being made at present to focus the attention of the United Nations on a problem which seems to be fabricated or which has not yet been confirmed. We cannot go along with that manoeuvre. The problem which arises and which is being debated in the Security Council is that of finding a solution to the question of the Katanga secession.

With your permission, Mr. Secretary-General, I should like to put two questions. First, could we be told something about the nature of the weapons and equipment in the hands of Tshombe's army at the present time? Second, do you propose to reply to the telegram which has been addressed to you, and, if so, shall we have an opportunity to see your reply before it is dispatched?

The acting SECRETARY-GENERAL: In reply to the first question, I think it would not be to the advantage of the United Nations operations if we were to reveal the type of weapons employed by Tshombe and his troops. Of course, our military command in the Congo has full knowledge of the type of weapons he uses.

In reply to the second question, I do not propose to reply to Mr. Tshombe.

Mr. ACHKAR (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I am satisfied with your reply, Sir, but I did want to say that possibly this document might be made known to the Security Council. If the representative of Liberia -- I hope he is listening -- could ask that it be distributed so as to throw light on the debates which are taking place at the present time and so as to dispel any ambiguity regarding the true intentions of Mr. Tshombe, it would be useful. The Foreign Minister of Belgium has unfortunately acted as spokesman for Mr. Tshombe in the Security Council.

The acting SECRETARY-GENERAL: I call on the representative of Ireland on a point of order.

Mr. BOLAND (Ireland): It is not actually a point of order; I thought that the meeting was just coming to an end and I wanted to say that some of us would appreciate it if you would ask the Committee to meet you again as soon as possible after the Security Council has reached a conclusion.

The acting SECRETARY-GENERAL: The representative of Ireland has just made a proposal and there is another element in this also. I am giving a lunch to about sixty-five or seventy people today at one o'clock in the Library and I have asked someone to deputize for me for a short time. It is already one-thirty and I feel that I ought to be there. There are still three speakers on the list, Canada, Malaya and the Congo, and if the Committee agrees and those three gentlemen are willing I suggest we meet again immediately after the Security Council concludes its work. That seems to be the concensus of the Committee.

The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.

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(63rd meeting)
28 November 1961

Speech made by Mr. Moise Tshombe
on 25 November 1961

CORRIGENDUM

The text distributed to the Advisory Committee at its 63rd meeting, which was monitored by ONUC at Leopoldville, contains the following error:

In paragraph 4, the phrase "it is war which has just been decided on in New York by idiots whose knowledge of the Congo is either entirely non-existent or very sketchy" should read:

"it is war which has just been decided on in New York by eleven nations whose knowledge of the Congo is either entirely non-existent or very sketchy."

CORRIGENDUM

United Nations Advisory Committee on the Congo
Verbatim Record of meeting No. 63, held on Tuesday,
28 November 1961, at 10.30 a.m.

Page 7

7th line from the bottom - the underlined words should read:
"Parti solidaire africain".

Page 43-45

4th line from the bottom - replace the word "revolt" by "type of operation".

The Secretary-General

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CONFIDENTIAL

P. 43-45

Meeting No. 63
28 November 1961
ENGLISH

~~Sec 53-55~~

UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON THE CONGO

Meeting at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Tuesday, 28 November 1961, at 10.30 a.m.

In the Chair:

U THANT

The acting SECRETARY-GENERAL

Members:

Canada

Mr. DOBELL

Ceylon

Mr. MALALASEKERA

Ethiopia

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY

Federation of Malaya

Mr. KAMIL

Ghana

Mr. DADZIE

Guinea

Mr. DIALLO

India

Mr. JHA

Indonesia

Mr. WIRJOPRANOTO

Ireland

Mr. BOLAND

Liberia

Mr. BARNES

Mali

Mr. BA

Morocco

Nigeria

Mr. NGILERUMA

Pakistan

Mr. HAMDANI

Senegal

Mr. CISSE

Sudan

Mr. SULEIMAN

Sweden

Mrs. ROSSEL

Tunisia

Mr. CHELLI

United Arab Republic

Mr. SIDKY

The Acting SECRETARY-GENERAL: I have called this meeting because it was agreed at the end of the last meeting, when there were three speakers waiting to be heard, that the Committee would meet again soon after the Security Council completed its consideration of the current Congo question, and also because it will always be our purpose to keep the Committee up to date on important information relating to the Congo. In addition to this there is a specific matter on which I wish to seek your advice at a later stage.

For the Committee's information, there are a number of messages and statements of some importance which have been reproduced informally and may now be distributed around the table. These papers are the following:

First, a letter dated 13 November 1961 from the Minister of the Interior of the Congo to Mr. Linner, transmitting the new Ordinance on mercenaries.

Second, a telegram dated 19 November 1961 from Mr. Tshombe to the Secretary-General, in which he transmitted a long legal study on the question of Katanga and also proposed a meeting between Mr. Bomboko and Mr. Kimba in New York, prior to a meeting between Mr. Adoula and himself.

Third, a telegram dated 25 November 1961 from Mr. Tshombe to the Secretary-General announcing that Katanga would oppose force by force.

Fourth, a statement made by Mr. Tshombe on 25 November 1961 announcing that Katanga would fight to death.

Fifth, a note dated 27 November 1961 from Mr. Linner setting forth a proclamation by one Colonel Alain threatening ONUC personnel.

Sixth, an exchange of letters between Prime Minister Adoula and Mr. Linner concerning the Kindu incident.

(The acting Secretary-General)

Since we last met, the Security Council, on 24 November, adopted the latest resolution on the Congo question. I was happy to see that resolution adopted, for I think it would have been a distinct setback for the United Nations in the Congo had the Security Council failed to take action.

At this time I have nothing more to add to my statement in the Security Council last Friday other than to assure you that I am giving serious consideration to the next steps to be taken in the Congo in terms of the latest resolution as well as of all previous resolutions. On these steps I will wish to consult you before very long.

I will call first on Mr. Bunche to present briefly the important items of information covering developments since the last meeting of this Committee; and following that, I will ask Brigadier Rikhye to report briefly on the military situation. But of course, before hearing these reports, before Mr. Bunche and Brigadier Rikhye, I must call on two of the three representatives who were inscribed on my list as speakers at the end of the last meeting. They are the representatives of Canada and Malaya. I understand that the representative of the Congo (Leopoldville) does not wish to make any statement at this juncture.

I now call upon the representative of Canada.

Mr. DOBELL (Canada): Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary-General, but the statement we had planned to make would have been appropriate before this meeting of the Security Council, and we have nothing more to say now.

The acting SECRETARY-GENERAL: I call now on the representative of the Federation of Malaya.

Mr. KAMIL (Federation of Malaya): I should like first to go on record, in behalf of my delegation and myself, to express our deepest sympathy and condolences to the families of the thirteen Italian airmen who were massacred in Kindu. Our grief is all the greater because the occurrence took place in the mess of the Malayan troops in Kindu and because our soldiers there were unable to do anything to assist the airmen.

In this connexion may I say that there was a lot of false reporting in the newspapers, here especially, of the events that occurred there, with the result that it has caused a lot of misunderstanding abroad and especially in Malaya, and the members of our parliamentary opposition have been rather hard on the Government.

(Mr. Kamil, Federation of Malaya)

I was wondering, Mr. Secretary-General, whether in the future, should any event of this nature occur, you would give earnest consideration to seeing to it that a correct report goes to the public as quickly as possible. I do appreciate that the newspapers would naturally, of course, like to come out as quickly as possible with glaring headlines, whatever the truth or falsity of any occurrences, and that on our part, before we do anything, we of course have to make a good, thorough check-up. I mention this, sir, because the quicker we get the truth to the public the better. Not that we need make any apologies, but what I am trying to stress is that we should get the truth out as quickly as possible. May I therefore suggest that you give earnest consideration to what steps we should take in order to get to the public as quickly as possible factual news of what happens in the Congo.

Whilst I have the floor, may I make two observations. First, I would like to support what my friend the Ambassador of Ethiopia said, that we would like, if possible, to see a much bigger detachment of our troops on the ground. I certainly appreciate General McKeown's difficulty in increasing the number of our detachment. Of course, for reasons well known, our forces have been depleted, and so forth. We would certainly not like to be a party towards the humiliation of our troops, and I know that neither my country nor any other country represented here and that has troops on the ground wishes to see its boys killed on the ground there because of their small numbers. So I do hope that you, sir, will be successful in getting more contributions of personnel from other countries, in so arranging that the number of our troops on the ground there is of such size that, if anything were to occur, we could at least stand a reasonable chance of fighting back.

The second point that I have in mind to bring up again is the question of the dissemination to the public in the Congo of our purpose there. I brought this matter out, last year I believe, to Mr. Hammarskjold in the course of one of our meetings because I feel that it is necessary for the people of the Congo to know exactly why we are there. I have a feeling that while the members of the Government and those in the know appreciate our presence there, it is probable that the bulk of the public thinks that we are a conquering force, engaged in trying to invade and fight them. Therefore I think that the more information we could transmit over the radio or by means of a news sheet in the various languages that are spoken there, the better it would be for our operation in the Congo.

I will close my remarks with these two observations, and if I find that I have anything to contribute of a useful nature later in the debate, may I then again have permission to speak?

The acting SECRETARY-GENERAL: Thank you. Regarding the desirability of prompt news hand-outs by the United Nations personnel in the Congo, in the case of this particular incident in Kindu, it is a fact that our men there did not get the correct news in time. As the representatives will recall, it took our men in the Congo three days to get the truth of the situation regarding the incidents at the mess near the Kindu airport. Sometimes, of course, these things do happen and I have issued instructions to our men in all parts of the Congo to report to us at Headquarters immediately after the incidents occur. In this case, of course, as will be understood by the members of this Committee, the circumstances were peculiar. The incident took place about four miles from the airport where our troops were based, and when the incident did take place there were no practical means of ascertaining what happened. Even the fate of the Italian air crew was in doubt for three days. There were conflicting reports. I have taken the necessary measures to correct this deficiency and I hope that in the future our news dispatches from the Congo will be more prompt.

(The acting Secretary-General)

Regarding the military situation and the need to have more ground forces in the Congo, I am sure that Brigadier-General Rikhye will raise this issue in his intervention.

Regarding the dissemination of information and the means of imparting true information on the real purpose of the presence of the United Nations in the Congo, I am taking a very close look at the entire situation and, as I have stated in a previous meeting of this Committee, I hope that I shall be able to formulate a definitive plan regarding the more concrete measures that it is necessary to adopt in the Congo in order to acquaint the people of that country with the real purposes of the United Nations presence there. Of course, the mere exploitation of the radio communications will not accomplish the desired purposes, as I am certain that the members will agree, because there is a very limited number of radio receivers in the Congo and whatever information we may put out over the radio transmitters will not reach as vast an audience as we desire. So we are thinking in terms of pamphleteering also, on a very wide basis, and on this particular aspect I hope to be able to present my plans at a later meeting.

I now call upon Dr. Bunche to present the entire situation with regard to the civilian operations.

Mr. BUNCHE: I have only a few reports to make, on scattered subjects. First of all, I might call attention to the fact that we have received a confirmation of the reports in the press and on the radio to the effect that yesterday the Congolese Parliament, as Mr. Linner has reported, overwhelmingly voted for the resumption of diplomatic relations with Belgium. The motion was presented by Mr. Kimvay of the Partie solidaire africaine, Mr. Gizenga's party, and he was supported by Mr. Bolikango. This information was given to Mr. Linner this morning by Mr. Adoula himself.

We can also confirm to the Committee that all of the twelve Belgian officers in the Belgian mission in Elisabethville have now left the Congo; we learned that one officer had left at the end of October and the remaining eleven departed on 17 November.

(Mr. Bunche)

I should say a word about a quite serious incident that recently occurred in the refugee camp at Elisabethville. The members of the Committee will recall that in the past their attention has been drawn to the potentially very dangerous situation in that refugee camp. United Nations representatives in Elisabethville reported the occurrence of a serious incident in the camp on 20 November, a conflict between Balubas from Kasai and the Balubas of Katanga, which resulted in 37 killed and 36 wounded in the camp. The incident seemed to have started with a dispute over a water faucet. This quickly turned into violent fighting which lasted almost an hour. As soon as shots were heard, a United Nations patrol rushed to the scene of the fighting. They found that most of the weapons in use were what are known as pangas (which are short spears), clubs and bicycle chains. But there were also in evidence a few automatic rifles, small machine-guns and hand grenades, and these had probably been seized by the Balubas in the course of a raid on the Katangese police on 18 October. Some twenty members of the Jeunesse Balubakat, who were involved in the fighting, were held in United Nations custody. The atmosphere in the camp is reported to be very tense and the United Nations has had to increase its patrolling in order to avoid further incidents.

I may say a word on the follow-up to the tragedy of Kindu. The request which had been submitted by Mr. Linner at the instruction of the Secretary-General to Prime Minister Adoula for identifying and punishing the ANC members responsible for the massacre of the thirteen Italian airmen, and Mr. Adoula's reply, are set forth in full in one of the informal papers circulated to you this morning. As you will note from Mr. Adoula's reply, the response has in general been negative.

The acting Secretary-General has also instructed Mr. Linner to urge Mr. Adoula to carry through on the establishment of a Mixed Commission of Enquiry and Mr. Bomboko, in a meeting with the acting Secretary-General yesterday morning, promised to support this position with his Government on his return. He left for Leopoldville last night. In this connexion, I may mention that ONUC has already nominated its members on the proposed Commission, five members, including an Italian officer, and has informed Mr. Adoula of these members. But we have not

had any reciprocal word from Mr. Adoula. Brigadier Rikhye will bring you up to date on the strength of the ANC and of the United Nations Force in Kindu. With regard to Stanleyville and Orientale Province, I may say that during the month of October a number of reports were heard of attempts by Mr. Gizenga to merge the existing nationalist parties into a single party under his leadership, which would be the Pana-Lumumba party, or Panalu as it is known. The information so far available on the development of this party is fragmentary and vague.

On 4 October, Mr. Gizenga left Leopoldville, you will recall, for Stanleyville on leave from the Government, ostensibly to settle certain domestic affairs. He was granted a leave of absence for two weeks by the Council of Ministers, but he has not yet returned to Leopoldville, although yesterday morning Mr. Bomboko voiced the belief that Mr. Gizenga would be soon returning to Leopoldville.

On 24 October the UN representative in Stanleyville reported that recruiters for Panalu, this new party, were resorting to ruthless methods and that people opposing it were often threatened with violence and sometimes were even severely maltreated.

Now, according to reports received from ONUC on 3 November, Mr. Gbenye was strongly opposed to the creation of Panalu in Oriental Province and held that the National Congress of the MNC must be held before any decisions could be taken. Mr. Gbenye was said to have prepared an ordinance declaring Panalu illegal. However, so far we have received no confirmation that the ordinance has been promulgated.

In the afternoon of 14 November, Mr. Gizenga, who until that time had remained in Stanleyville, was reported to have arrived at Kindu where, in the morning of the same day, the ANC Commander reported the escape of the thirteen Italian airmen, a report which we soon learned to be totally untrue.

On 22 November, Mr. Gizenga may have left Kindu for Kasongo, though this is not confirmed. Parliament was then reported to have decided, on that very day in fact, to send an emissary to see Mr. Gizenga and to give him forty-eight hours to return to Leopoldville, failing which he would be ousted from the Government. We have no further word of this.

According to further unconfirmed reports from ONUC, Mr. Gizenga arrived at Stanleyville on the morning of 23 November. Later he left Stanleyville for Kailo by road with two officers and thirty soldiers. After arriving in Kailo he signed an order forbidding further requisition of trucks by the ANC and told the police that Europeans should be allowed to move freely in the area. The last word we have had is that Mr. Gizenga is said to have left Kailo, but there is no further knowledge of his whereabouts.

Finally, I should like to draw attention to a development that is reported in the press this morning, namely, that yesterday morning the acting Secretary-General and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo, Mr. Bomboko, signed in this building the status agreement between the United Nations and the Republic of the Congo. Negotiations on this agreement between United Nations representatives and those of the Government of the Congo began a few days after the arrival of the first contingent of the United Nations force in the Congo in July 1960. A preliminary agreement was initialed in Leopoldville on 27 July 1960 by Mr. Gizenga and Mr. Bomboko, for the Republic of the Congo, and by myself, for the United Nations. Negotiations on the final agreement were nearly completed at the beginning of September last year when the constitutional crisis broke out in Leopoldville and broke off the negotiations. They were resumed only after the Adoula Government was set up at the beginning of August this year.

On 25 November, Prime Minister Adoula informed the acting Secretary-General that in order to avoid further delay in completion of the agreement, he had authorized Mr. Bomboko to sign the agreement in New York and that the agreement would then be formally confirmed -- the French term used by Mr. Adoula was "sera entériné" -- by the Council of Ministers in Leopoldville.

That is all that I have to report.

The acting SECRETARY-GENERAL: Now I call upon Brigadier Rikhye to make a statement on the military aspects.

General RIKHYE: Sir, the report on the military situation in the Congo covers the period from 17 November to date.

I would first like to inform the Committee of ONUC's actions in Kindu to apprehend the perpetrators of the crime against the thirteen Italian airmen killed on 11 November. The UN troops in Kindu were about 200 Malaysians who were completely overwhelmed by the presence of about 1,000 Congolese troops in transit from Stanleyville to North Katanga, in addition to the already existing normal Kindu garrison of about 500 Congolese troops and 500 Congolese gendarmerie. When the Central Government and ONUC declared their intention to apprehend the criminals and also certain officers in command of these Congolese troops, Colonel Pakassa,

Commander of the Congolese troops in Kindu, got in touch with various Congolese army garrisons to prevent any action by the UN. ONUC considered the use of their jet aircraft in support of their action in Kindu. Since the Congolese barracks and living quarters are in close proximity to the residential area of the local population, action by ONUC aircraft was ruled out. Any action by aircraft against Congolese soldiers in Kindu would also result in unnecessary loss of life, and therefore on humanitarian grounds action by ONUC aircraft was stopped. It was, however, decided to bring additional UN troops into Kindu to seal off the Congolese troops, which would facilitate the work of the mixed Congolese-UN commission to inquire into the crime.

Meanwhile, Congolese troops in Bukavu, Goma, Stanleyville and Luluabourg, on learning of possible ONUC air action against their criminal comrades in Kindu, caused a serious law and order situation for ONUC. On 16 November, the Congolese garrison at Luluabourg prevented the use of the airfield by UN jet planes. The situation was only restored to normal when Prime Minister Adoula, accompanied by Mr. Khiari, visited Luluabourg and gave orders to Colonel Njoko, Commander of the Congolese garrison, to remove all Congolese troops from the airfield. By 18 November, UN troops had fully restored their control over the Luluabourg airfield where our jet aircraft are stationed. Congolese troops in Luiza and Port Franqui, both places in Kasai, also reacted, but quieted down after a few days.

In Kivu the situation became equally tense, and on 17 November, Congolese troops attempted to confiscate a UN plane at Goma airfield. Malayan troops intervened and prevented this. On ONUC's request, General Lundula and Minister Gbenye visited Bukavu and Goma to ease the situation.

(General Rikhye)

Meanwhile, the Congolese garrison in Goma has given orders that they would shoot at all United Nations planes. It was not until 20 November that the Malayan force was able to restore the situation to normal.

The United Nations reinforcements to Kindu are the 35th Ethiopian Battalion from the Bunia area who completed their move on 26 November and have succeeded in bringing the town of Kindu under their control. They were welcomed by the local residents but it soon became apparent that the Stanleyville Congolese troops, perpetrators of the crime against the Italians, had already left Kindu for the south. The situation in Kindu is normal and the ground is set for the Mixed Enquiry Commission to start its investigation.

In Kasai, ANC troops which had been brought for the attack against Katanga have remained in their previous locations. There is a Congolese battalion each at Mwene Ditu, Liputa, Luiza and Kazumba. As you will observe, they are therefore still deployed along the Katanga border. We are informed that a fifth battalion has been formed in Lubumbashi from the spare troops available from the local military camp. The Congolese troops, however, have remained inactive against Katanga.

In Albertville, the situation has improved notably. The civilian and military personnel arrested by ANC troops were liberated on the intervention of the local United Nations Commander. Captain Mika, the Commander of the Congolese troops, has been reasonably co-operative and has declared his collaboration to the Central Government. The Jeunesse have been dispersed by the United Nations troops and the local authorities. The Congolese garrison in Albertville on 26 November had increased to 800 men, the largest part of this battalion was transported by two Air Congo DC-4 aircraft.

In Manono area there has been some indication of Katanga gendarmarie activity and it is believed that ten white mercenaries secretly visit Katanga troops there at night. A strong note was sent in this regard to the Katanga authorities.

ONUC reports confirm that the original Katanga garrison in Albertville, which was evacuated a few months ago, under United Nations pressure, has joined Katanga's Baudouinville garrison and numbers about 1,000 men. There are unconfirmed reports of twenty to thirty white mercenaries being present at Baudouinville.

(General Rikhye)

A rotation of troops is in swing again. The Irish infantry group has been repatriated to Dublin. Nigerian troops' rotation is in progress as is also the rotation of the Irish Battalion in Elisabethville.

The representative of the Federation of Malaya raised a question of the size of the United Nation detachments in the Congo. After Matadi and Port Francqui incidents, the Secretary-General instructed the Force Commander to ensure that the size of any United Nations detachment must be compatible with its security. These instructions have again been repeated. The Force Commander is meticulous in its application, but has certain limitations which are known to you all here.

Malayans were in control of Kinshasa. The incident that led to the murder of the Italian airmen was a case of violent eruption on the part of the Congolese troops, which has been so typical of them throughout our experience in the Congo.

ONUC has never been in a position to match Congolese, or for that matter, Katangese troops in size. The total of these two armies is something like 36,000. ONUC attempts to achieve parity through its efficiency and better leadership, and makes its attempt towards keeping the Congolese troops calm and disciplined.

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): The statements which we just heard, to me at least, indicate a serious difficulty in the Congo, that is, if something is done in one place, then all the soldiers, all over the Congo, seem to look at the United Nations as their main enemy -- which is regrettable. It seems to me that this sort of thing cannot be contained by force; there is no doubt about this in my mind. Therefore, I was wondering whether it is not time now to go out in full scale and explain to the soldiers that if they want to fight someone, they have a good enemy of their country right there. The United Nations is there to help them. It seems to me that their attention to the United Nations activities must be somehow diverted towards somewhere else. I do not believe they do this out of complete knowledge of the situation. I think it is a misunderstanding of the activities of the United Nations. And I think the best way to handle it is to make it clear to them that the United Nations is there to help them maintain the integrity of their country; and this has to be done, I think, rather quickly, because I do not believe that the United Nations troops, all over the Congo --

(Mr. Gebre-Egzy, Ethiopia)

15,000 of them -- can contain the 36,000; it is simply not a feasible proposition. I would very much be against the use of force against these troops for the simple reason that it can never go anywhere, that it can never achieve anything at all.

Therefore, I would very much beg that a special effort should be employed to explain to them the purpose of the United Nations presence in the Congo. And if they have enough energy, and they are well-organized, they can take care of the enemy of their country right there in the Congo, instead of taking it out on the United Nations. We take quite a serious view that it is not possible to keep law and order if 36,000 Congolese soldiers do not co-operate with the United Nations. I would very much beg that a special effort should be undertaken to explain to them and to direct their energies somewhere else.

The Acting SECRETARY-GENERAL: In reply to the point raised by the representative of Ethiopia, the fact is that the Central Government of the Republic of the Congo is fully aware of the intentions of the United Nations and of the nature of United Nations Operations in the Congo. But these isolated incidents which occur are due primarily to the indiscipline of certain members of the Congolese forces, and in some cases because of the lack of leadership in some of the ANC troops. Of course, Headquarters will keep in mind the points raised by the representative of Ethiopia. If we go into the record of the United Nations Operations in the Congo, since the beginning of the operations, it will be noticed that the United Nations forces in the Congo had no trouble whatsoever with the Congolese people. So, I think that there is a very encouraging feature of our operations in the Congo. Perhaps General Rikhye has something to supplement this.

General RIKHYE: The Secretary-General has already made two main points on the matter raised by the representative of Ethiopia. The chief problem which we face in the Congo is the total lack of discipline and absence of leadership of the Congolese Army, and the Government is very alive to this. Hence, it is very important for us to proceed with the reorganization and training of the Congolese Army. As soon as we can do that, it will improve their state of discipline and reduce our commitment in this respect. There is a complete understanding of this matter so far as the Congolese Government is concerned, and they have been co-operating fully with us to bring an end to situations such as the one which was created at Kindu. As I stated earlier, the Prime Minister himself visited Luluabourg and had to intervene personally. Similarly, the Minister of Interior and General Lundula very gladly went all the way to Bukavu and Goma in order to calm their troops. I repeat that it is really a matter of lack of discipline and leadership. Therefore, the sooner we can concentrate on reorganizing and retraining the Congolese Army, the better it will be for all concerned.

Mr. JHA (India): I have been cursorily going through the several documents circulated to us, and I should like to have some clarification, if I may, and I should also like to make some observations, based on what we feel is the importance of these documents and certain trends that they indicate with which the United Nations must deal in the Congo.

The first document is Ordinance No. 83, of 13 November, issued by the Central Government of the Congo. I have read this Ordinance, but without understanding what is meant by Book II, Section VIII, of the Congolese Penal Code. I am really unable to understand it, and I would be very grateful if one of the Secretary-General's advisers could throw some light on the meaning of this document. What is meant by the operative paragraph, which merely states:

"All non-Congolese officers and mercenaries serving in the Katangese forces who have not accepted an engagement under contract with the Central Government of the Republic of the Congo shall also be liable to the penalties of imprisonment prescribed in Book II, Section VIII, of the Congolese Penal Code."?

(Mr. Jha, India)

Then, of course, some other penal sections, already existing sections, are referred to in this Ordinance.

I would be grateful for some clarification. I should also like to know what sort of responsibility this document throws on the United Nations in the Congo.

We then come to this long document by Mr. Tshombe. He addresses the Secretary-General as if he, Mr. Tshombe, were a Head of State. I do not wish to comment on this, and I presume that the Secretary-General will file the document in the archives. Naturally, no reply to it is necessary.

Mr. Tshombe seems to make out that the Loi fondamentale has no validity because it has not been approved by the Parliament. I do not have a copy of the Loi fondamentale with me but, as far as we understand, it is the interim Constitution of the Congo unless and until the Parliament, in due course, approves of another Constitution in the usual democratic way. I therefore do not see the validity of this study and of the conclusions placed before the Secretary-General.

Mr. Tshombe also suggests that Mr. Kimba should meet Mr. Bomboko, and he then says, on page 6 of the document that has been circulated:

"After this first approach, the President of Katanga will meet Mr. Adoula in order to follow up the agreements on principles reached under the auspices of the United Nations at New York."

I am not aware of what agreements on principles have been reached between Mr. Tshombe and the United Nations. I do not know what sort of agreement is referred to there. Maybe there is no agreement -- but that is how Mr. Tshombe wants to mislead us.

I should be grateful if some light could be thrown on what might be the possible meaning and the motive of that statement.

As regards the correspondence between Prime Minister Adoula and Mr. Linner, we very much hope that the joint commission of inquiry which the United Nations representative has suggested will come into being as the result of further efforts that are being made in this connexion in consultation with the Central Government in Leopoldville.

Thereafter we come to some very extraordinary documents. One is headed "Anti-United Nations Proclamations in Katanga". The second one is "Speech made by Mr. Moise Tshombe on 25 November 1961". This is a most extraordinary document.

(Mr. Jha, India)

Fortunately, it seems more like the ravings of a maniac, because Mr. Tshombe calls everybody -- the eleven members of the Security Council -- idiots; heaps abuse on everybody, right and left; and then threatens the United Nations -- this is the most important part -- with reprisals. And these reprisals, I read here, "may even go as far as the collective poisoning of the United Nations colony". That probably means the poisoning of the sources of water supply, and so on. I do not know what he means.

It is also stated here:

"The proclamation ends with an appeal to the Irish and Swedish soldiers to sabotage the ONUC operations and not to join forces with the Indian soldiers".

As far as my information goes, the Indian soldiers and the Irish and Swedish soldiers are all acting in the greatest camaraderie in the common cause of the United Nations, and this is an impertinent suggestion which we can only treat with contempt. I am sure that our Irish and Swedish colleagues here will feel exactly the same as I do on this matter.

Then comes another cablegram to the acting Secretary-General from Mr. Tshombe, giving his views on the resolution of the Security Council. Mr. Tshombe says that the Security Council, "after deprecating what it calls the secessionist activities of our country -- which is entirely at variance with the right of peoples to self-determination ...". Well, this is very interesting. It reminds me of a good deal of talk that took place yesterday in the General Assembly. This is how the principle of self-determination, itself a very noble principle, is being invoked by people like Mr. Tshombe for their nefarious secessionist activities and to serve their hostility to the United Nations.

Then comes a speech by Mr. Tshombe. Nobody is spared in this: that is its only consoling factor. It attacks the United Nations, the Secretary-General, the members of the Security Council, the Belgians, the Americans, and everybody concerned. Then it says:

"Tomorrow afternoon" -- the speech was made on 25 November --
"there will be a trial of strength. Let us then be prepared. When the time comes, let all the fighters of Katanga arise, in every street, at every window, on every highway, in every village. You cannot all

(Mr. Jha, India)

have automatic weapons or rifles. But we still have our poisoned arrows (prolonged applause), our spears, our axes for cutting down trees, our picks for digging ditches, our hearts to beat with courage. Not one road must remain passable, not one United Nations mercenary must feel himself safe in any place whatever."

It goes on in this vein. As I have said, it seems very much like the ravings of a maniac. Nevertheless, my reason for taking the liberty of quoting these very unholy sentences and these mischievous sentences is that the United Nations in the Congo should not altogether ignore this. It indicates certain trends, it indicates possible attacks, conflicts, and possible denial of facilities -- maybe the poisoning of wells, and all that kind of thing.

(Mr. Jha, India)

I feel that the United Nations Command in the Congo must be fully prepared and must have some kind of planning for the forestalling of any of this kind of activity. It may not come about in the same form, or with the same intensity, that Mr. Tshombe threatens, but we feel that these things cannot be ignored and that, really, the United Nations has to be prepared for the worst. Naturally, it is not the function of the United Nations to go and wage war against the Congolese, whether they are in Katanga or in any other part of the Congo, but these are rather ominous statements and might indicate that the United Nations command in the Congo -- the United Nations personnel -- face very severe difficulties and I would request you, when you consider the further measures to be taken in the Congo to bear these aspects in mind -- aspects which really cause a lot of difficulties and affect the morale of the forces. This could have repercussions in the home countries of the personnel serving the United Nations in the Congo.

Referring to the statement that General Rikhye made, I find myself generally in agreement with what our colleague from Ethiopia has said. The United Nations in the Congo cannot afford to be caught between two or three fires. We have already our troubles with Tshombe, with his mercenaries and his gendarmerie, or at least a certain section of them, and we cannot afford to get into large-scale troubles with ANC forces.

Therefore, if I may make an observation without being really critical, I do not quite appreciate the wisdom of trying to bring into submission the ANC forces at Kindu or elsewhere with the help of United Nations aircraft. I think the aircraft have been sent to the Congo by various Governments for a very specific purpose. That was, largely, to counteract the war-like activities -- the mischief done -- by some fighters in the Katanga; and to counter any possible air attack. I am against any idea of bringing any section of recalcitrant ANC forces to submission by the use of United Nations aircraft. I think the aircraft could be used on other occasions, much more legitimately, and in operations of a more serious nature, where the United Nations is actually being attacked.

Now the real problem, as General Rikhye and our colleague from Ethiopia have pointed out, is that these forces are undisciplined. That brings into relief the whole question of reorganizing these forces, and the need for training. We had very eloquent appeals from Mr. Bomboko in the Security Council

(Mr. Jha, India)

that this should be done and you, Mr. Secretary-General, are I believe equally willing to give all assistance in this direction. It seems to us that no time should be lost in offering this assistance, and in organizing it with the help of the Central Government of the Congo, because, in the final result, it is the Central Government which is really in the best position to control its own forces, and which has to take all the action to see that contingents of the ANC forces do not get out of hand in remote localities, as they have unfortunately done, often, against the United Nations. So perhaps it would be a good thing to give immediate attention to the Security Council's resolutions -- both that adopted on 24 November and the previous one of 21 February, under both of which it is possible, even though the reorganization clause was not adopted -- there was a good vote in favour of it -- to take immediate steps to afford the necessary facilities and assistance to the Congolese army and to accede to the request of the Central Congolese Government.

Now I also believe that if the ANC forces at various places get out of hand the United Nations will require very much larger forces to really deal with this situation, and I do not know if the time has not come to organize some kind of a joint liason machinery at various places -- not merely Leopoldville -- in order that there will be no misunderstandings by these forces: that they will understand the motives of the United Nations and possibly there will be an avoidance of the most regrettable type of incident, which took place the other day and resulted in the killing of Italian airmen.

I think that aspect should also be considered swiftly because we really are not in a position to bring to order, by means of force, all the various recalcitrant elements in the ANC and, as was pointed out, if something happens at one place, news will supposedly reach other contingents and out of sheer comradely spirit they too will begin disturbances against the United Nations forces at remote places.

I am sorry that I have taken up so much time. I would only like to conclude my remarks by referring to the resolution adopted on 24 November. This resolution gives a further mandate to the Secretary-General. Of course, paragraph 4:

(Mr. Jha, India)

"Authorizes the Secretary-General to take vigorous action, including the use of requisite measure of force, if necessary, for the immediate apprehension, detention pending legal action and/or deportation of all foreign military and para-military personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations Command, and mercenaries as laid down in paragraph A-2 of the Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961;"

You, Mr. acting Secretary-General, have also observed here and in the Security Council that you will take all possible steps to give effect to the authorization contained in this resolution, and which I have just read out. Paragraph 5 states:

"... requests the Secretary-General to take all necessary measures to prevent the entry or return of such elements under whatever guise and also of arms, equipment or other material in support of such activities;"

So far as this paragraph is concerned, it may be necessary to enter into consultation with some Governments, and also to devise such measures, not necessarily coercive, as might result in the prevention of arms, mercenaries etc. entering the Congo.

Paragraph 6 asks the States to undertake certain measures for the purpose of denying transportation and transit facilities across their territories, and also to refrain from the supply of arms, equipment or other material which could be used for war-like purposes. I would venture to suggest that a communication might be addressed to Member States drawing their specific attention to this paragraph and requesting them to undertake the necessary measures, as contemplated therein, and to inform the Secretary-General of what action has been taken, because we feel quite sure that if the States really take effective measures -- and they can take effective measures: we are not satisfied that such measures cannot be taken -- to prevent the departure and supply of arms from their territories for the Congo, whether directly or indirectly, and also to deny transport and transportation facilities through their territories, we shall be effectively weakening the power of Mr. Tshombe. These are some of the suggestions which I would venture to place before you for consideration.

The acting SECRETARY-GENERAL: Regarding the first point raised by the representative of India, we are looking into the legal provisions referred to in the Ordinance. Of course they have not been made available as of right now, but I will see to it that the Committee is supplied with the relevant documents in due course.

Regarding the query about the so-called agreement between the Secretary-General and Mr. Tshombe, I can assure the Committee that there is no such agreement. There has been no such agreement whatsoever between the Secretary-General and Mr. Tshombe. When I say the Secretary-General, of course, it includes my predecessor also.

As regards the use of United Nations aircraft, I think that such use is considered only in the defence role. That means that if the Congolese troops started fresh acts of violence against the United Nations forces, our instructions are to retaliate by all possible means as a defensive measure. This is only in case the United Nations troops are attacked. Of course, happily, this is no longer necessary and there is no question of using United Nations jet aircraft.

As regards the military training programme which was just brought up, I made it clear in my statement, after the adoption of the Security Council resolution, that I was convinced that the Secretary-General was perfectly legitimate in providing military training to the Central Government of the Congo, that such provision was covered by the previous resolutions of the Security Council, especially in the context of the provision of technical assistance to the Central Government of the Congo. So we are pursuing this matter in right earnest.

As regards the need of communication to the States Members of the United Nations, in relation to paragraph 5 of the Security Council resolution, I am giving immediate attention to this and I hope to be able to report on that aspect of the resolution at the next meeting of the Committee. Of course, as I have just stated, since the adoption of the Security Council resolution on Friday evening, I have been going into the problem of taking the next steps regarding the United Nations operations in the Congo and I hope to be able to present these steps in the form of a programme at a subsequent meeting of the Committee.

(The acting Secretary-General)

Concerning Mr. Tshombe's long thesis on the Loi fondamentale and his interpretation, I do not think any remarks on my part are called for. His observations last Saturday by way of a reaction to the Security Council resolution and to my observations are, of course, the rantings, if I may say so, of a very unstable man. I think that this has been the view of all whom I came in contact with and of those who are primarily concerned with the operations of the United Nations forces in the Congo, as well as from the civilian side. Of course his reactions did not surprise me and I do not think they surprised anybody at Headquarters.

I shall now call on the next speaker on my list, the representative of Congo (Leopoldville).

Mr. KAPONGO, (Congo (Leopoldville)) (interpretation from French): As you have indicated, Mr. Secretary-General, the representative of the Republic of the Congo did not intend to speak and I apologize for taking your time now. We simply wish to express our gratitude because it is thanks to the Secretary-General and to the representatives here that the Security Council was able to adopt its decision on the Congolese question. The Congo wants nothing better than, as Foreign Minister Bomboko stated in the Security Council, to continue in its relationship of confidence in the United Nations by which it asked the United Nations to assist it and by which it also now asks United Nations assistance at a time when it is necessary to eliminate the Katanga secession.

We are happy to note that the Security Council has adopted the resolution relating to the cancellation of the Katanga secession by peaceful means -- and I repeat, by peaceful means -- because the people of Katanga are after all the same people of the Congo; they are Congolese. We thank you for this momentous act. We hope that now as in the past the Congo will continue to co-operate with you in this important humanitarian work which has to be carried out in our country.

May I conclude by expressing my delegation's feelings of gratitude toward those present here and to the entire Organization.

Mr. NGILERUMA (Nigeria): I must say that we are very happy to see that the Security Council has adopted the very important resolution of 24 November in order to strengthen you, Mr. Secretary-General, in carrying out your duties in the Congo. I say that this is a very important resolution because the Foreign Minister of the Congo and the Foreign Minister of Belgium had participated in the discussions. They are directly interested in the affairs of the Congo and therefore I feel that their presence was very important. I hope that both of them will co-operate with the Secretary-General in the carrying out of his duties by offering him concrete and sincere proposals, not only in the Security Council but also outside the United Nations in their countries, and particularly now that the Congo Government is renewing its diplomatic relations with Belgium. Therefore, the participation of Mr. Spaak is very important, I am quite sure, as the former administrative authority of the Congo. If Belgium is sincere and honest, it can do a lot to bring peace and tranquillity to the country. We used to be a colonial territory and we know about these things. If the Administering Authority wishes it, they can bring a lot of difficulty into a country, but they can do the same thing if they wish to bring in some tranquillity and peace.

(Mr. Ngileruma, Nigeria)

Therefore I would suggest that both Mr. Spaak and Mr. Bomboko must co-operate with the Secretary-General -- although I know very well all States are to support you.

In this resolution which was adopted on 24 November, S/5002, I would like to refer to paragraphs 5 and 6 of the operative part, particularly to paragraph 6 where it says:

"Requests all States to refrain from the supply of arms, equipment or other material which could be used for war-like purposes" -- and here is what I wish to emphasize -- "and to take the necessary measures to prevent their nationals from doing the same".

Here also the Belgian Government will do a lot better if they co-operate. This is because the Union minière in Katanga is very important and I am quite sure that there are many Belgians working in that firm.

I would like to mention in connexion with this certain rumours which have been running around to the effect that West Germany was supplying Dornier aircraft to Katanga during the past months. I know very well that West Germany has denied this, but in spite of their denial, I think West Germany has made some important statements in saying that civilian planes had been sold to many customers outside of Germany in the past few months and that among the customers there was a Belgian firm; and they went on to say that they were not sure whether the Belgian company had transferred some aircraft to Katanga. Of course they denied it, but West Germany again explained that Dornier airplanes are small to medium civilian aircraft generally used by businessmen, for sports, for transporting doctors, and so on. If this is the case, it is very important to implement this paragraph in order to prevent "arms, equipment or other material in support of such activities" under any guise from reaching there, because there are possibilities that certain arms can come to Katanga under the guise of civilian activities. I would like to stress this point.

I would also like to ask the Secretary-General if he intends to make available a copy of the agreement, signed by him and Mr. Bomboko in New York, for the information of the Advisory Committee. We would like to see a copy, and I would like to know if it is the Secretary-General's intention to circulate this document. We have had a number of important documents distributed to us this morning. We have not had time to study them as yet. We will study them in our delegations and then, at our next meeting perhaps, we may find time to raise some points.

(Mr. Ngileruma, Nigeria)

As far as Mr. Tshombe's communications are concerned, the Security Council resolution has strengthened the hand of the Secretary-General, and I am quite sure that the Secretary-General will take action to deal with this matter. Therefore there is no need for us to go into this very deeply. We prefer to wait and see what will follow.

However, I would like to refer again to the question of Mr. Gizenga. Dr. Bunche has explained to us that he is now wandering about. But what I want to know is, what is his position in the Government now? Is the Central Government thinking of getting rid of him, or is he still considered to be one of the Vice-Premiers of the Government although he is not co-operating with the Central Government?

Also in connexion with this, it is very important for us to know whether the Army, the ANC, in Orientale Province is loyal to Mr. Lundula. Unless the ANC is loyal to Lundula -- I notice that Lundula is co-operating with the Central Government, but what is his relation to the ANC? Are they loyal to him? -- because if the Army in Orientale is not loyal to anyone, not to Mr. Lundula and not to Mr. Bomboko, then we do not know which way to face. This is very serious.

We have been reading in the papers about some difficulties between the United Nations and the Central Government concerning inquiries into the incident at Kindu. I do not know whether what has been published in the papers is true, but they have been saying that the Central Government is not co-operating with the United Nations to make it possible to conduct the inquiries. We would, therefore, like to be enlightened on this particular matter.

Finally, I would like to know what is the cause of the quarrel among the Baluba in the United Nations refugee camp. Why are they quarrelling? Is it that they have taken sides, some of them supporting Mr. Tshombe, some of them supporting the Central Government? Or is it a personal matter among themselves?

I would like, Sir, to reserve my right to raise any point again.

The acting SECRETARY-GENERAL: Regarding the resumption of diplomatic relations between the Central Government of the Congo and Belgium, of course my own feeling is that it is a step in the right direction, because the Central Government of the Congo has to do a lot of things with the co-operation of the Belgian Government. For instance, the Central Government's claim to

(The acting Secretary-General)

40 per cent of the shares in the Union minière and 15 per cent export duty on copper -- all these matters, including of course other aspects of the negotiations and associations, can be settled only with the possibility of the full co-operation and understanding of the Belgian Government. So my personal feeling is that the Central Government of the Congo has done the right thing.

Regarding the agreement between the Foreign Minister of the Congo, Mr. Bomboko, and myself, signed yesterday, I think the full text of the agreement was released as an official document yesterday, A/4986-S/5004. It is already a public document.

Regarding the German-built Dornier planes purchased by Katanga, I think the matter was raised in one of the previous meetings of this Committee and I believe Mr. Bunche explained it to the members in some detail. I will, of course, ask Mr. Bunche to repeat this information again after I have concluded my statement.

Regarding the matter of the conflict in the refugee camp, I will ask Mr. O'Brien to present his views in the matter of this incident to the Committee at a later stage.

Regarding Mr. Gizenga's status vis-a-vis the Central Government, I think the representative of the Congo (Leopoldville) is in the best position to enlighten this Committee, if he wishes to take the Floor after my statement.

Regarding his further question about the relations between Mr. Adoula and the ANC troops, I think that I had better leave that to the representative of Congo (Leopoldville), if he cares to make a statement.

I will give the floor to Mr. Bunche now so that he may give his views and interpretations regarding the Dorniers purported to be in use by the Katanga Government.

Mr. BUNCHE: I can recapitulate very quickly the information previously given to the Committee about the Dorniers. You will recall that there had been reports of the appearance of some of these Dorniers at various airports, presumably en route to Katanga. We spoke to the German observer to the United Nations about this and had confirmation from him that an order for six Dorniers had been placed with a West German firm, that these were civilian planes. There were no laws in West Germany by which the Government could prevent the order. The planes were consigned to a Belgian company and apparently the Belgian company was then to deliver them to Katanga. We know that five of these Dorniers did in fact leave West Germany for delivery to the Belgian company before our protest, our demarche, was made. After that demarche, the German Government somehow managed to stop the delivery of the sixth Dornier and, to the best of our information, four of the five Dorniers actually reached Katanga.

As you know, our people have seen one or two of them, have spotted them on airfields in Katanga. What became of the fifth, we do not know. We do not know where in Europe, if to any place, they went after they left Germany. All we know is that they were consigned to a Belgian firm.

The acting SECRETARY-GENERAL: I shall ask Mr. O'Brien to explain the conflict between the Balubas of Kasai and the Balubas of Katanga in the refugee camp.

Mr. O'BRIEN: I think it would be rather difficult to give a complete explanation of what happened in such a conflict as that between the Balubas of Kasai and the Balubas of Katanga. The background to it, of course, is the very great sense of frustration that is experienced in the camp by these people, probably near 45,000 in number, living in quite miserable conditions and now finding it impossible, as they used to do, to go in and out to work.

(Mr. O'Brien)

That frustration is greatly increased by the provocative tactics of the Katanga authorities, who use their radio to work up resentment between groups in the camp among themselves, and between the refugees as a whole and the United Nations. They increase that by actual provocative acts, occasionally firing on the refugees, driving fast in gendarmerie jeeps on the edge of the camp at night and so on. That is the background to the war of nerves which brings people to the point where they are able to do these dreadful things.

The Balubas of Kasai and the Balubas of Katanga are of course related, but differentiated. There are linguistic differences between them and they are quite markedly different groups. The Balubas of Kasai are much the more numerous group in the camp. They include among them virtually the entire white collar class of Elisabethville. They had a very high tendency to go to work from the camp.

The Balubas of Katanga, who are less developed because they are from rural areas, are very highly and, in fact, fanatically political and they were opposed to having their people go to work or return to their homes. The Balubas of Katanga are the more political; the Balubas of Kasai are relatively passive. But the Balubas of Kasai, being more numerous, felt that they had a right to a say in the direction of the camp. The Balubas of Katanga felt that they were the natural political leaders.

The matter does not develop around any real political difference. All these people in the camp, with the possible exception of a few suspected agents provocateurs, who are likely to be planted there, are all opponents of Mr. Tshombe. The Katanga Balubas are more fanatically so and it is probable that they contain a higher proportion of Lumumbaists. There is that difference between them. But the fact is that the camp is something of a powder keg and that there are people who are busy throwing matches into it.

The problem is now being given very active consideration here but it is certainly one of the most dangerous problems in Katanga, and perhaps in the whole of the Congo.

Mr. NGILERUMA (Nigeria): I would like to ask a general question with regard to the Baluba refugees in the camp. I know very well that the United Nations is giving great attention to the whole situation, but I wonder how long they will remain in the camp, because it is a very heavy burden on the United Nations. I wonder if we may be enlightened as to how long they will remain in the camp, whether that time is indefinite.

The acting SECRETARY-GENERAL: I think I can give a brief answer to that question. Of course, apart from other considerations, the maintenance of a huge refugee camp, comprising about 45,000 people, imposes a very heavy strain on the financial resources of the United Nations. Therefore, I am giving very active consideration to this question and my feeling is that we should free our hands of this undertaking gradually but by all possible means, without disrupting the civic life of these people. I am giving very close attention to this and my personal feeling is that the United Nations should be less and less involved in this (revolt) in the Congo.

I was wondering whether the representative of Congo (Leopoldville) wishes to make a brief statement on the relationship between Mr. Gizenga and the Central Government.

type of question

Mr. KAPONGO (Congo (Leopoldville)) (interpretation from French): Yes, Mr. Secretary-General. It seems to me that with regard to the situation of Mr. Gizenga in the Congo, we do not have much to say. We have received here a telex message saying that Mr. Gizenga was on leave and went to Stanleyville to obtain some of his personal belongings. Afterwards, we learned that he was trying to form Panalu. There was some talk about the question of Panalu at Lovanium during the negotiations on the formation of a new Government. It was not much, but still there was some discussion about it.

The exact situation of Mr. Gizenga in Stanleyville is not clearly known. We only know that Mr. Gizenga left Leopoldville for about a week in order to obtain his personal belongings in Stanleyville. The attempts which have been attributed to him today to separate himself from the Congo are only the results of political machinations of opponents in the Congo who always say that the Security Council must examine the secession of Katanga. Furthermore, I learned yesterday from the newspapers that Gizenga wants to return to Leopoldville. That is all we know, but to say that Gizenga was there is very difficult.

You know that this question aroused many objections in Parliament and that it was said that the Adoula Government might lose the confidence of Parliament. Why? Because Mr. Adoula had spoken against the soldiers and against Gizenga. But in the course of the discussions, Mr. Adoula won his point. The Government is in agreement, but to say that Gizenga was there is very difficult.

With respect to the relationship between the Congo Government and General Lundula, I can say that since his return to Leopoldville General Lundula has been very faithful to the Central Government. He follows the Prime Minister wherever he goes. I think that the Stanleyville garrison is mainly under the supervision of Pakassa, a cousin of Gizenga. According to the latest information, he also said that the soldiers who killed the unfortunate Italians are wicked and should be arrested. It seems that he has given orders according to which everyone must now recognize the United Nations and that the United Nations is there to help us. Apart from that, General Lundula remains under the orders of Leopoldville.

That is all the information that I am in the position to give you. If any new information is received, I shall transmit it to the Secretary-General for the information of the Advisory Committee.

Mr. NGILERUMA (Nigeria): Thank you very much indeed, Mr. Secretary-General, for referring my question to the representative of the Congo (Leopoldville). I appreciate it because this is a political issue. The reason why we take such a keen interest in the movement and activities of Mr. Gizenga is because we Africans and of course all the Members of the United Nations, want to see peace and tranquillity prevail in the Congo. We Africans are always very careful about handling matters in the Congo, because whoever forms the Central Government, that Government must be supported. Our information is, and I do not know to what extent it is true, that Mr. Gizenga is not really co-operating with the Central Government and that his activities are directed towards undermining its authority. If the Adoula Government fails, then he might take over the position. In such an event, I do not know what would happen in the Congo. All of us Africans have a deep interest in the Congo. It is located in Central Africa and we are always thinking of the dangers and fears of communism creeping into Africa. That is why we view this matter with deep concern and why we wish to know all his activities.

Of course, Mr. Secretary-General, you were quite correct in referring me to the representative of the Congo (Leopoldville). All the same, since the United Nations is in the Congo to help the Central Government to function, we believe that we ought to raise this matter. We are your advisers and, as I said earlier, we must express our views in all sincerity and honesty so that you may know how to use our advice.

The acting Secretary-General: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I just want to add a few words. We have given to this Committee today all the information that we have regarding Mr. Gizenga, and whatever information that was necessary was added by our colleague from the Congo (Leopoldville). Of course, from time to time I shall see that all relevant information regarding the Congo, including of course Stanleyville, will be made available to the Committee.

Mrs. RUSSEL (Sweden): Once the Security Council was again faced with the Congo question, I think it was necessary that its meetings should conclude with the adoption of a resolution. This is not the time to make a full analysis

(Mrs. Rössel, Sweden)

of the contents of that resolution nor to compare it with the contents of previous resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council. I have full confidence in you, Mr. Secretary-General, and in those who work with you, that the interpretation will be such that we shall continue to remember that the main purpose of United Nations activities in the Congo is to restore peace, law and order, and that negotiation and conciliation should be one of the main purposes.

There is no doubt that the character of United Nations activities has changed since the beginning of our work there. We can all see quite easily the difference between operative paragraph 2 of the resolution of 21 February and operative paragraph 4 of the recent resolution. Previously we could use force only for self-defence. We have taken steps away from that position, and I am sure that careful judgement and caution will be used in all instances when it may be necessary to resort to force.

Like all others here, Sweden regrets and is very sorry about the incident in Kindu. We are happy to see that there is now an agreement to undertake a joint inquiry by the Government of the Congo(Leopoldville) and ONUC. I am sure that we shall soon receive the results of this inquiry.

I would like to say a few words about the refugee question. The late Secretary-General, if I remember rightly, said at one of the meetings of the Advisory Committee, that ONUC could take care of about 15,000 refugees, but that if that figure was exceeded, it would be very difficult. We now hear that there are 45,000 refugees. Also, we know from the new resolution that the forces in Katanga may be very necessary and important for activities other than those which tie them down to the refugee camp.

(Mrs. Rössel, Sweden)

Having myself been very actively involved with the question of refugees for many years, I would be the last one to say that we should not take care of them. But I am happy to hear that you are paying much attention to this question. And I think that the earlier we can get other organs of the United Nations, or outside the United Nations, to play the main role in that question, the better it would be. I hope that the International Red Cross, the League of Red Cross Societies and others can be asked to step in very actively. I hope that money and other means -- personnel and what else may be necessary -- will come from FAO, WHO, UNICEF and others; also, that money can come from such sources. We already have a very difficult financial situation and we also have a very difficult principal question of getting agreement on how to finance the Congo action. If we also have to take too much of that money for the refugees, it will even overburden more our financial situation. I appeal very strongly to you that a great deal of attention is paid to this question -- the financial, the human, the equipment, and also the question of where to have these refugees located. Perhaps the housing problem is one side of it; perhaps, also the removal of some of them from Elisabethville to other parts of the Congo is important -- I do not know -- but all these questions have to be studied very carefully. Besides, the fact that money, the money we have for the Congo activities, or do not have, must be used for these appropriate activities, and the troops have to be used for what they are there for, perhaps we also will have a big part of the refugees turning against the United Nations and so we will have another front which is not exactly friendly towards the United Nations activities. I think all these things should be taken into account when you discuss further the question of how to solve the refugee problem.

There is another question which I would like to underline here. It has been stressed by General MacEoin and by you that we need more troops in the Congo in order to be able to implement the resolutions, not least, the last one. We have noted, all of us, that Ghana has promised to give troops again, we are very grateful. I hope that your approaches to other Governments will be answered in a positive manner and that you soon will be able to have troops so that we can exceed the present number with some thousands more. I do not know how many you estimate you need in order to implement the resolution before us, but I had the feeling

(Mrs. Rossel, Sweden)

that we would need five or six thousand more, besides all the reinforcements we have of weapons and other kinds of useful material.

Then I come to the question of information. The representative of Malaya spoke a little bit about it -- the information to the Governments when incidents occur so that at least the Governments involved, who happen to have their troops in a trouble-spot are given correct information as soon as possible; I know that it is your desire to do that. But we also again have to talk about the information within the Congo to the population. I know it is much easier to make statements, to have a public appeal, when the people are as irresponsible as Mr. Tshombe, and it is much more difficult to catch the attention of the population when you give completely correct information; correct information is much more dull than the exaggerated one. Nevertheless, I think this is a very important question indeed, and has to be executed as quickly as possible.

We have just gotten the Status Agreement. Of course, like the others, we have not been able to study the material we were given. My delegation, like the others, I am sure, will pay much attention to them. I can only say that we are very happy that at long last we have the Status Agreement. That will be a very important part in our co-operation with the Congolese Government, and we certainly welcome it.

Finally, a few words about the ordinance that we have just gotten. I have not been able to study it in full, but I hope that article 1 does not exclude what you said the last time, Sir, namely, that if and when you are going to handle the mercenaries and other people mentioned under operative article 4, you will see to it that the United Nations has a certain influence on the manner in which they will be treated. I do hope that for humanitarian reasons and for the wording of the Charter, under which we all are working, that this will come true.

The representative of India mentioned the appeal in one of Mr. Tshombe's statements to the Irish and Swedish troops to join with him. I do not think that needs any comment whatsoever. We know why we are there and what our duty is -- and that we will stick to it.

The acting SECRETARY-GENERAL: I just want to make one very brief observation on these very helpful suggestions just made by our colleague from Sweden. Regarding the refugees, as I have stated earlier, my intention is to get ourselves less and less involved in this type of operation. Apart from other considerations, it imposes a very great financial strain on us. Only yesterday I had preliminary discussions with the representatives of WHO and FAO on this.

About the request for troops, as a result of the Security Council resolution of last Friday, I had already made initial contacts with representatives of some countries. I am happy to report that the Foreign Minister of Indonesia yesterday indicated his Government's willingness to help augment the United Nations troops in the Congo. Of course, I will proceed with further negotiations with the Government of Indonesia and I am hopeful that they will yield positive results.

I now have six speakers on the list. I was wondering whether we can dispose of our business this morning. I will give the floor first to our colleague from Indonesia.

Mr. WIRJOPRANOTO (Indonesia): Mr. Secretary-General, we are entering a new page in the history of the Congo, we are even entering a new stage. There is a new page because we have already a new national Central Government which has been accepted by the people and by the world. We are entering a new stage because a few days ago the Security Council approved a new resolution which is a new mandate for the United Nations Command.

(Mr. Wirjopranoto, Indonesia)

Therefore, what we are expecting now is action. This action should be firm and it calls for co-operation and co-ordination, particularly between the United Nations Command and the Central Government of the Congo. What we need now is an expression of one will and one wish -- even a strong will and a strong wish. We should avoid any hesitation in taking steps in the implementation of the resolution of the Security Council. Any kind of hesitation is a "minus" in the Congo operation. Between the new Central Government and the United Nations Command in the Congo there is one strong unifying point which is the common aim. The representative of Sweden has just mentioned that the United Nations Force is in the Congo at the request of the Central Government of the Congo in order to assist that Government in restoring law and order -- because law and order have been violated. And who has violated this law and order?

I am not going to talk about the past, but what we are confronted with now is, in the first place, the presence of foreign mercenaries, and so on. This group of people have violated and are violating law and order. Therefore, we must expel these people as soon as possible. They are, however, involved in a movement in Katanga -- what may be called the separatist movement. I believe that now that we are facing this problem with a new mandate, with a renewed will, it is a matter, as I said before, of co-ordination and co-operation, as well as a matter of firmness.

My delegation is not advocating bloodshed or strong military action. We are always in favour of peaceful means. This means that we are in favour of conciliation and persuasion, and in this connexion I should like to recall one of the suggestions which I made a few months ago, namely, to have a public relations unit in the Congo for the purpose, in the first place, of convincing the people who do not understand the duty of the United Nations Force.

In any event, what the United Nations must do now in the Congo is to protect the national self-determination of the Congolese people and to fight against a false self-determination instigated by foreign countries or foreign people. In this struggle the United Nations should not hesitate. And I speak now from our own experience. In this connexion you have mentioned the statement of our Foreign Minister and I think it would be well to quote what he said yesterday in plenary meeting:

(Mr. Wirjopranoto, Indonesia)

"We support fully the national integrity of the Republic of the Congo and, after the adoption of the resolution a few days ago by the Security Council, Indonesia is now reconsidering its previous policy of withdrawal of Indonesian contingents and is instead now considering the despatch of another contingent of troops to the Congo in order to assist the United Nations and give support to the Central Government of the Congo in defence of its national integrity." (A/PV.1065, page 77)

Thus, we have expressed our preparedness to move again into the Congo -- Indonesian troops are not strangers in the Congo -- in spite of our own country's difficulties. As the Committee is aware, the Netherlands is continuing with the implementation of a plan which we reject strongly. Nevertheless, in order to fight a false self-determination, we shall find ways and means to help another country -- in this case, an African country -- which is fighting against a false self-determination instigated externally.

Mr. SULEIMAN (Sudan): I should like a clarification as to the implementation of operative paragraph 6 of the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 24 November. It reads:

"Requests all States to refrain from the supply of arms, equipment or other material which could be used for war-like purposes, and to take the necessary measures to prevent their nationals from doing the same ...".

How would this be applied to the Central Government if it has decided to enter into bilateral transactions for equipment or perhaps also to receive military aid bilaterally? I would want this clarification from the point of view of the United Nations authorities and their implementation of this provision.

The Acting SECRETARY-GENERAL: In answer to that question, I think the resolution is self-explanatory, because it says, in the last phrase of that same paragraph, "except in accordance with the decisions, policies and purposes of the United Nations". The Central Government is quite legitimate and it has the power to enter into bilateral negotiations. This only refers to the request of the United Nations to "all States to refrain from the supply of arms, equipment or other material which could be used for war-like purposes, and to take the necessary measures to prevent their nationals from doing the same, and also to deny transportation and transit facilities for such supplies across their territories, except in accordance with the decisions, policies and purposes of the United Nations".

If the Central Government wishes to enter into bilateral negotiations with any sovereign Government, it has the legitimate right to do so. But these transactions should not infringe the provisions of the resolutions of the United Nations. Obviously, then, the Central Government has to consult with the United Nations in its transactions, because this phrase, "except in accordance with the decisions, policies and purposes of the United Nations", is self-evident. So long as these transactions do not conflict with the decisions of the United Nations, it is perfectly legitimate for the Central Government to enter into bilateral negotiations, because among other reasons, the United Nations has recognized the Central Government as the only legitimate Government of the Congo. Therefore, the Central Government obviously is in a position to enter into any transactions with any sovereign country.

Mr. HAMDANI (Pakistan): I should merely like to give expression to our satisfaction with the progress made in the Security Council and the reassuring statements which you, Mr. Secretary-General, have made both at the last meeting and at the present meeting of the Advisory Committee and also at the Security Council. We are looking forward to your statement on programme and plan of the United Nations operation, which you have promised, and I hope that it will include some amplification of your views and plans on national reconciliation by peaceful means in the Republic of the Congo.

The Acting SECRETARY-GENERAL: I will present my views on the steps we propose to take at the next meeting of the Committee. I am giving very close attention to that.

Mr. BA (Mali) (interpretation from French): Despite my desire not to prolong this meeting, I cannot postpone my statement because, in the light of what I am about to say, I am going to ask for some information from the Secretariat, and that information is somewhat urgent.

To begin with, Mr. Secretary-General, I must say that we are gratified to note that the way is seen more clearly in the Congo, thanks to the realistic attitude which marks action in the Congo on your part and on the part of those who are supporting your activity -- and that is to put an end to the secession of Katanga. We are happy to note that everyone now agrees, both in the Security Council and in this Committee, and your experts and yourself -- that there is agreement on all sides that peace in the Congo can become effective only when the secession of Katanga has been ended, a secession which is fortified and fed by the colonialists and their agents. We are in favour of the energetic action which you are going to take against the mercenaries who are in the pay of the trusts and the Union Minière. This action must be taken against Katanga's secession, to the exclusion of any other diversionist phenomenon, because, as regards the Katanga secession, there is something which is concrete, which is tangible, which is extant, which everyone has emphasized, and whose daily misdeeds we are familiar with.

We see in Tshombe's last statement, which calls all of us -- the Security Council and all of us -- the idiots of the United Nations, who have taken

(Mr. Ba, Mali)

decisions without knowing anything about Katanga, a manifestation of the bellicose hysteria of an irresponsible person, unless, of course, he is totally neurotic. This is an additional reason for carrying out action to put an end to the secession of Katanga. And, as the representative of the Congo has made clear, it is our position that the other alleged secessions which have been alluded to, and in regard to which no clear information has been given to us over the past two weeks, are nothing but slogans put forward by the foes of the Congo.

In the light of this, and of the development of our action in regard to Katanga, which must be the fundamental objective, I should like to ask a question, because there are some rumours in circulation and some tendentious information which purport to show that Congolese troops from Kindu and perhaps from Kasai have been moving toward Katanga, and these reports further insinuate that United Nations forces have tended to oppose this march toward Katanga.

We know very well that there are Machiavellian aspects of the reports that circulate and there are also those who fish in troubled waters and who trouble the waters for the purpose by putting forth misleading information. But we want to know about this alleged United Nations action designed to stop or delay or hamper the movement of Government troops toward Katanga, since we feel that some sort of action -- military, if need be -- has to be taken against Katanga.

May I add, since the problem of refugees in the Congo has been raised, that, as everyone knows and as has been emphasized in the report of the High Commissioner for Refugees, there are in the frontier regions, in parts of the Congo near Angola, large numbers of Angolan refugees -- about 48,500 of them, according to the figures given by the High Commissioner for Refugees in his speech in the Third Committee.

(Mr. Ba, Mali)

The League of Red Cross Societies and other voluntary organizations, as well as the Central Government of the Congo, have endeavoured to face up to the problem created by the existence of those refugees. We agree that you should avoid managing this action which, in addition to being extremely costly, may develop further, so that one may be overwhelmed by it. I believe that the solution of the problem would be to put an end immediately to the colonialist war waged by Portugal in Angola. It is the root cause of the exodus of the people who in fleeing from massacres in Angola, of course stream into the nearest safe territory, which is the Congo.

If the resolution voted last night is properly implemented it will make it possible to bring the Angola war to an end as quickly as possible, thus putting an end also the problem of the refugees entering the Congo from Angola. Their number is far too large. If material assistance from the United Nations is to be given, the problem may develop further and constitute a serious impediment to our Organization. These are some of the points that I wished quickly to emphasize. I apologize for having taken up your time for so long.

The Acting SECRETARY-GENERAL: As to the first query, to the effect that United Nations troops are reported to be hampering the activities of the ANC forces, my answer is that these reports are absolutely groundless, absolutely untrue. Our United Nations troops in the Congo have never hampered any activities of the Congolese troops in the Congo.

As regards the second observation, concerning refugees, these remarks will be given very close attention.

Mr. CHELLI (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): In view of the lateness of the hour I shall limit my statement to the following: we await impatiently the report which you have announced for the next meeting of our Committee, and I should like simply to suggest that among the steps which you contemplate in giving effect to paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Security Council's resolution, you consider seriously the question of the introduction of arms and weapons into Katanga from Northern Rhodesia. Inasmuch as my delegation recalls, the last representation made to the United Kingdom Government, for transmission to the Northern Rhodesia Government, brought a reply that the boundaries were long and difficult to control. It was said that measures should be taken to control this border. If you contemplate some démarché in Rhodesia, or some possibility of controlling this border-line from the Rhodesian side, that would bring us nearer to the building of restrictions around Katanga.

The acting SECRETARY-GENERAL: I will certainly take note of these observations for the purpose of my presentation at the next meeting of the Advisory Committee.

Before we disperse, I want to take up a point to which I have been giving attention since my assumption of office. It relates to the question of the distribution of the records of the Committee. I understand that the verbatim records have been treated as confidential, and have been just confined to the members of the Committee, plus, of course, those in charge of Security Council affairs; but I have a feeling that since the question of the Congo has been engaging the attention of the Security Council as well as the General Assembly, and since all the members of the Committee are in possession of the records and the top officials of the Security Council are also in possession of them—I was wondering whether it was time that these records were made available to all members of the Security Council and of the General Assembly also, if the Committee deemed fit.

(The acting Secretary-General)

I have a feeling that it would be very helpful in considering the question of the Congo if members of the Security Council, especially, were in possession of the verbatim records; and in actual practice, too, I feel that there is no difference between the present procedure and that proposed by me now, because the fact that all members of the Committee are in possession of the verbatim records means that any Member of the United Nations who is more or less connected with any member of this Committee can have the benefit of those verbatim records. So, in actual practice, if any one wants to study the verbatim records I think that more or less any of the Members of the General Assembly is perfectly in a position to take advantage of this.

I understand that the matter once came up for discussion before this Committee and it was decided to defer consideration of it. The existing practice has been that the summarized versions -- the summary records -- have been made available to the members of the Security Council, and I was wondering if this matter should be given reconsideration.

Mr. GEBRE-MEZAY (Ethiopia): This comes a little suddenly, and I was wondering whether we could have some time to think over the subject, because it is quite difficult, at least for me, to decide right away. If you could do it next time I would much prefer it.

The acting SECRETARY-GENERAL: Our friend from Ethiopia suggests that this matter needs further consideration -- that this should be taken up at the next meeting.

Mr. JHA (India): I think that there need be no great hurry about it. We will, I suppose, have a meeting before long, and this could be the first item taken. When the matter came up a short while ago we discussed it and at that time it was felt that summary records should be made available to members of the Security Council only, not to all Members of the United Nations. That practice has been followed. The difficulty with summary records is that they are delayed and also that they do not give a very correct picture always of all the nuances of statements and so on. Even at that time our delegation said that

(Mr. Jha, India)

we had no objection to anything that we said here being known by anyone, because there was nothing secret about it. We have open views on questions concerning Katanga.

I think we can consider it at the next meeting. The only question that we might turn over in our minds is as to whether, for the time being, we should send verbatim reports to the members of the Security Council only, or to all Members of the United Nations. That is the only point that one may have to think about. Speaking for ourselves, we would like to say that we have kept these records very confidential. Nobody has asked to see them and we have not really shown them to anybody. We have treated it as a secret document, since it has a marking on the paper and we have numbered copies.

The acting SECRETARY-GENERAL: If the Committee agrees, this matter will be taken up at our next meeting.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.

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CORRIGENDUM

United Nations Advisory Committee on the Congo
Verbatim Record of meeting No. 63, held on Tuesday,
28 November 1961, at 10.30 a.m.

Page 7

7th line from the bottom - the underlined words should read:
"Parti solidaire africain".

Page 43-45

4th line from the bottom - replace the word "revolt" by "type of operation".

SUMMARY OF THE SIXTY-THIRD MEETING OF THE UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON THE CONGO, HELD AT HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK, ON
TUESDAY, 28 NOVEMBER 1961, AT 11 a.m.

(For the information of members of the Security Council)

The Acting Secretary General drew the Committee's attention to a number of messages and statements which had been reproduced informally and circulated to members of the Committee. They comprised:

- a letter dated 13 November 1961 from the Minister of the Interior of the Congo to Mr. Linner, transmitting the new Ordinance on mercenaries;
- a cable dated 19 November 1961 from Mr. Tshombe to the Secretary-General transmitting a legal study on the question of Katanga and proposing a meeting between Mr. Bomboko and Mr. Kimba in New York, prior to a meeting between Mr. Adoula and Mr. Tshombe;
- a cable dated 25 November 1961 from Mr. Tshombe to the Secretary-General announcing that Katanga would oppose force by force;
- a statement by Mr. Tshombe on 25 November 1961 announcing that Katanga would fight to the death;
- a note dated 27 November 1961 from Mr. Linner setting forth a proclamation by one Colonel Alain threatening ONUC personnel;
- an exchange of letters between Prime Minister Adoula and Mr. Linner concerning the Kindu incident.

He was giving serious consideration to the next steps to be taken in the Congo in the terms of the latest resolution (S/5002) - the adoption of which he welcomed - as well as of all previous resolutions.

Before asking Mr. Bunche to give information concerning recent developments and General Rikhye to report on the military situation, he would invite the representative of the Federation of Malaya to make a statement for which there had been no time at the previous meeting.

The Representative of the Federation of Malaya said that he wished first of all to express his own and his delegation's deep sympathy to the families of the thirteen Italian airmen who had been massacred in Kindu. His delegation's sorrow was the greater because the Malayan troops in Kindu had been unable to assist the airmen.

As a good deal of misunderstanding had been caused by false reports in the newspapers concerning that event, he wondered whether, if anything similar occurred in the future, the Secretary-General would consider ensuring that factual report reached the public as soon as possible; he appreciated, of course, the need to check the facts thoroughly beforehand.

He felt it necessary that ONUC should have more troops on the ground. It was well known that the strength of the Force had been depleted, but neither his country nor any other country having troops in the Congo had any desire to see its soldiers killed because of their small numbers. He hoped therefore that the Acting Secretary-General would be successful in obtaining more contributions of personnel from other countries and in so arranging matters that the number of troops on the ground was such that, if anything were to occur, they would have a reasonable chance of fighting back.

He thought it desirable that the people of the Congo should know precisely why the United Nations was in the country. His impression was that, while the members of the Congolese Government and certain others appreciated the United Nations presence, the bulk of the public regarded it as a conquering force. The more information the United Nations could transmit over the radio or by means of a news sheet in the various languages, the better it would be for United Nations operation in the Congo.

The Acting Secretary-General said that, in the case of the Kindu incident, the circumstances had been peculiar. It had taken place about four miles from the airport where United Nations troops were based and no means had been available of ascertaining what had happened; even the fate of the Italian air crew had been in doubt for three days. He had given instructions to United Nations representatives in all parts of the Congo to report such incidents immediately to Headquarters.

The need for more ground forces in the Congo would be dealt with by General Rikhye.

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With regard to the need for imparting true information on the real purpose of the United Nations presence in the Congo, he was examining the entire situation very closely and hoped to be able to formulate a plan regarding the adoption of more concrete measures in the Congo to that end. Mere dissemination over the radio would not accomplish the desired purpose, as the number of radio receivers in the Congo was very limited. Consequently, the United Nations was thinking in terms of distributing pamphlets on a very wide basis.

Mr. Bunche said that, in the first place, he would invite attention to the fact that reports to the effect that the Congolese Parliament had overwhelmingly voted on 27 November in favour of the resumption of diplomatic relations with Belgium had been confirmed. The motion had been submitted by Mr. Kirway of the Parti solidaire africain, Mr. Gizenga's party, supported by Mr. Bolikango.

All the twelve Belgian officers in the Belgian Mission at Elisabethville had left the Congo; one had left at the end of October and the remaining eleven on 17 November.

United Nations representatives at Elisabethville had reported the occurrence of a serious incident in the refugee camp at Elisabethville on 20 November, namely, a conflict between Baluba from Kasai and Baluba from Katanga, as a result of which thirty-seven persons had been killed and thirty-six wounded in the camp. The incident had begun with a minor dispute and had quickly developed into violent fighting which had lasted for almost an hour. On hearing shots, a United Nations patrol had rushed to the scene. They had found that, although most of the weapons in use were short spears, clubs and bicycle chains, a few automatic rifles, small machine-guns and hand grenades had also been in evidence; they had probably been seized by the Baluba in the course of a raid on the Katangese police on 18 October. Some twenty members of the Jeunesse Balubakat who had been involved in the fighting were in United Nations custody. The atmosphere in the camp was reported to be very tense and the United Nations had had to increase its patrols.

As members of the Committee would see from Mr. Adoula's reply, the response to the Secretary-General's requests for the identification and punishment of the ANC members responsible for the massacre of the thirteen Italian airmen had in general been negative. The Acting Secretary-General had instructed Mr. Linner to urge Mr. Adoula to press on with the establishment of a mixed commission of enquiry; Mr. Bomboko, in the course of a meeting with the Acting Secretary-General on 27 November, had promised to support that position with his Government on his

return. The ONUC members of the proposed commission, including an Italian officer, had already been nominated and their names communicated to Mr. Adoula.

With regard to Orientale Province, there had been a number of reports during the month of October of attempts by Mr. Gizenga to merge the existing nationalist parties into a single party under his leadership, to be known as the Pana-Lumumba or PANALU; as yet however the available information on the development of that party was fragmentary.

Mr. Gizenga, who had been granted two weeks leave of absence by the Council of Ministers, had left Leopoldville for Stanleyville on 4 October but had not yet returned. On 24 October, the United Nations representative at Stanleyville had reported that persons recruiting members for PANALU were resorting to ruthless methods and that persons opposing that party were often threatened with violence and sometimes severely maltreated. According to ONUC reports, Mr. Gbenye was strongly opposed to the creation of PANALU in Orientale Province on the ground that the national congress of the MNC should be held before any decision could be taken; he was said to have prepared an ordinance under which PANALU would be declared illegal, but as yet no confirmation had been received that the ordinance had been promulgated.

Mr. Gizenga was reported to have arrived at Kindu on the afternoon of 14 November. On the morning of that day, the ANC commander had announced the escape of the thirteen Italian airmen - a report which had turned out to be totally untrue. It was possible, though not confirmed, that Mr. Gizenga might have left Kindu for Kasongo on 22 November. It had been reported that, on the same day, Parliament had decided to send an emissary to see Mr. Gizenga and to give him forty-eight hours to return to Leopoldville, failing which he would be removed from the Government. Nothing further however had been heard on that point. According to further unconfirmed reports from ONUC, Mr. Gizenga had arrived at Stanleyville on the morning of 23 November and had later left for Kailo by road with two officers and thirty soldiers. Beyond a report that Mr. Gizenga had left Kailo, nothing further was known of his whereabouts.

Finally, he wished to draw attention to the fact that the Acting Secretary-General and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo had signed at Headquarters on 27 November the status agreement between the United Nations and the Republic of the Congo. On 25 November, Mr. Adoula had informed the Acting Secretary-General that in order to avoid further delay in completion of the agreement, he had authorized Mr. Bomboko to sign it in New York; it would then be formally confirmed (entériné) by the Council of Ministers at Leopoldville.

General Rikhye, reporting on the military situation in the Congo for the period since 17 November, said that in seeking to apprehend the persons guilty of the murder of the thirteen Italian airmen on 11 November, the United Nations troops in Kindu consisting of approximately 200 Malaysians, had been faced with about 1,000 Congolese troops in transit from Stanleyville to north Katanga, in addition to the normal Kindu garrison of about 500 Congolese troops and 500 Congolese gendarmérie. When the Central Government and ONUC had declared their intention to apprehend the criminals and certain Congolese officers, Colonel Pakassa, commanding the Congolese troops in Kindu, had got in touch with various Congolese army garrisons in order to prevent any United Nations action. The United Nations had considered the possible use of jet aircraft in support of its action but, as the Congolese barracks and living quarters were close to the residential area of the local population, the idea had had to be abandoned. The United Nations decision had been prompted, above all, by a desire to avoid unnecessary loss of life. It had, however, been decided to bring additional United Nations troops into Kindu, in order to seal off the Congolese troops and thus to facilitate the work of the mixed Congolese-United Nations commission of inquiry.

Meanwhile, Congolese troops at Bukavu, Goma, Stanleyville and Luluabourg, on learning of possible United Nations air action in Kindu, had created a serious situation for ONUC. On 16 November, the Congolese garrison at Luluabourg had prevented the use of the airfield by United Nations jets and the situation had only been restored to normal by the arrival of Prime Minister Adoula and

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his giving orders to the commander of the local Congolese garrison to remove all Congolese troops from the airfield. By 18 November, United Nations troops had regained full control over Luluabourg airfield. Congolese troops in Luiza and Port Francqui, both in Kasai Province, had also reacted, but had calmed down after a few days. An equally tense situation had arisen in Kivu, where on 17 November Congolese troops had attempted to confiscate a United Nations aircraft at Goma airfield. That attempt had been foiled by Malayan troops, and General Lundula and Mr. Gbenye had visited Bukavu and Goma, at ONUC's request, to ease the situation. But the Congolese garrison at Goma had meanwhile given orders that they would shoot at all United Nations planes. Only on 20 November had the Malayan force been able to restore the situation to normal.

The United Nations reinforcements sent to Kindu had brought the town of Kindu under their control, but it had soon become apparent that the Stanleyville troops guilty of the crime against the Italians had already left Kindu for the south. The present situation in Kindu was normal and the mixed commission of inquiry could proceed with its investigation.

In Kasai, ANC troops brought up for the attack against Katanga had remained in their previous locations. Congolese battalions were still deployed along the Katanga border, at Mwene Ditu, Liputa, Luiza and Kazumba, and a fifth battalion had been formed in Luluabourg from locally available reserves. However, no action against Katanga had developed.

In Albertville, the situation had improved notably. The civilian and military personnel arrested by Congolese army troops had been liberated after intervention by the local United Nations commander. Captain Mika, the local Congolese commander, had been reasonably co-operative and had declared that he would collaborate with the Central Government. The Jeunesse had been dispersed by United Nations troops and the local authorities. The Congolese garrison at Albertville had on 26 November increased to 800 men, mostly flown in by two Air Congo DC-4 aircraft.

In the Manono area, there had been some indication of activity by the Katanga gendarmerie and ten white mercenaries were believed to be visiting the Katangese troops under cover of night. A strong note had been sent on that

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subject to the Katanga authorities. ONUC reports also confirmed that the original Katanga garrison at Albertville, which had been evacuated a few months previously under United Nations pressure, had joined the Katangese garrison at Baudouinvillle and numbered about 1,000 men. According to unconfirmed reports, there were some twenty to thirty white mercenaries at Baudounville.

The representative of the Federation of Malaya had raised the question of the size of the United Nations detachments in the Congo. After the Matadi and Port Francqui incidents, the Secretary-General had instructed the Force Commander to ensure that the size of any United Nations detachment was compatible with its security. The Force Commander was determined to carry out those instructions, despite the difficulties of which the Committee was aware.

The incident that had led to the murder of the Italians had been a typical case of violent eruption on the part of the Congolese troops. ONUC had never been in a position to match the Congolese, or for that matter Katangese, troops in numbers. Those two armies together comprised approximately 36,000 men. ONUC attempted to achieve parity through efficiency and better leadership and strove to keep the Congolese troops calm and disciplined.

The Representative of Ethiopia observed that every incident in the Congo which displeased the Congolese troops seemed to provoke action on their part against the United Nations. An early attempt should perhaps be made to explain to those troops that the United Nations was there to help them and that their energies would be better directed against the real enemy in their own country. The Congolese troops appeared to misunderstand the role of the United Nations. The true facts of the situation should therefore be presented to them without delay. Any attempt to contain the Congolese army by force would be futile, since the non-co-operation of 36,000 Congolese soliders would render the maintenance of law and order totally impossible.

The Acting Secretary-General said that the Central Government of the Congo was fully aware of the intentions of the United Nations and of the nature of the United Nations operations in the Congo. The isolated incidents which had occurred had been due primarily to the indiscipline of certain members of the Congolese forces and sometimes to the lack of leadership. It was a matter of record that, since the beginning of its operations in the Congo, the United Nations had had no trouble whatever with the Congolese people.

General Rikhye said that the chief problem facing the United Nations forces in the Congo was the total lack of discipline and absence of leadership in the Congolese army. The Congolese Government was keenly aware of that fact and had been co-operating fully with the United Nations in order to prevent situations such as the one which had arisen at Kindu. The United Nations forces should accordingly proceed as soon as possible with the reorganization and training of the Congolese army.

The Representative of India asked the Acting Secretary-General to clarify some of the documents which had been circulated to the Committee. The first of those was Ordinance No. 83 of 13 November, issued by the Central Government of the Congo, which provided that all non-Congolese officers and mercenaries serving in the Katangese forces would, in certain circumstances, be liable to the penalties prescribed in Book II, Section VIII, of the Congolese Penal Code. The full significance of that provision and the responsibility thereby imposed on the United Nations were not readily apparent.

Further questions arose in connexion with the long document submitted by Mr. Tshombe. The latter seemed to contend that the Loi fondamentale had no validity because it had not been approved by Parliament. In reality, however, that statute seemed to be the interim Constitution of the Congo until such time as Parliament approved another Constitution by normal democratic process. Mr. Tshombe's contentions thus seemed devoid of substance.

Mr. Tshombe had also suggested that, after a preliminary approach between Mr. Kimba and Mr. Bomboko, the President of Katanga should "meet Mr. Adoula in order to follow up the agreements on principles reached under the auspices of the United Nations at New York". Since he was unaware of any agreement on principles having been reached between Mr. Tshombe and the United Nations, he would be grateful if some light could be thrown on the possible meaning of that statement.

Some of the other documents, such as the one headed "Anti-United Nations proclamations in Katanga" and "Speech made by Mr. Moise Tshombe on 25 November 1961", seemed to consist exclusively of abuse, hurled indiscriminately at all and sundry, and threats of reprisals against the United Nations. Those communications seemed to betray a seriously disturbed

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mind, but the possibility of attack, conflict and possible denial of facilities could not be wholly discounted. In considering the further measures to be taken in the Congo, the United Nations must bear those aspects in mind and guard against possible difficulties which might affect the morale of its forces and other personnel and cause repercussions in their home countries. As for the impertinent appeal in the proclamation to the Irish and Swedish soldiers not to join forces with the Indian soldiers, that would be treated with the contempt it deserved.

With regard to the use of United Nations aircraft, he believed that those aircraft had been sent to the Congo by various Governments for a very specific purpose, namely, to counteract the warlike activities of some fighter aircraft in Katanga and to provide defence against possible air attack. He was certainly against any idea of using such aircraft for the purpose of bringing to submission any recalcitrant sections of the Congolese army.

The real problem, as General Rikhye and the Ethiopian representative had pointed out, was the lack of discipline among the Congolese troops. Mr. Bomboko had appealed in the Security Council for United Nations help in reorganizing those forces; he understood that the Acting Secretary-General was willing to give all possible assistance for the purpose. That assistance should be furnished without delay and should be organized with the help of the Central Congolese Government, which, in the final analysis, was in a better position to control its own troops than anyone else. Immediate attention might therefore be given to the Security Council resolutions of 21 February and 24 November 1961, each of which, despite the narrow rejection of the reorganization clause, authorized the taking of immediate steps to afford facilities and assistance to the Congolese army in conformity with the Central Government's request. On the other hand, if the ANC troops again got out of hand in certain areas, the United Nations would require much larger forces. Some kind of joint liaison machinery at selected points, not merely at Leopoldville, might prevent future misunderstandings and incidents of the type that had taken place at Kindu.

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Lastly, he suggested that the Acting Secretary-General might address a communication to Member States drawing their particular attention to paragraphs 5 and 6 of the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 24 November 1961 (S/5002) with a request that they undertake the measures contemplated therein and duly inform the Secretary-General of the action taken. Effective measures were perfectly possible and they alone could prevent the movement of mercenaries and weapons to the Congo and thus weaken the power of Mr. Tshombe.

The Acting Secretary-General, replying to the first point raised by the representative of India, said that the legal implications of Ordinance No. 83 of 13 November were being studied and the Committee would be supplied with the relevant documents in due course.

As to the alleged agreement between the Secretary-General and Mr. Tshombe, he could assure the Committee that no such agreement had ever been entered into either by himself or his predecessor.

With reference to the use of United Nations aircraft, he said that those aircraft were intended only for defensive purposes. If the Congolese troops started fresh acts of violence against the United Nations forces, the instructions were to retaliate by all possible means as a defensive measure. Such retaliation was fortunately no longer necessary, and there was therefore no question of the jet aircraft being used.

So far as the military training programme was concerned, he had already stated, after the adoption of the Security Council resolution, that, in his view, the Secretary-General was fully authorized to provide military training to the Central Government of the Congo and that such action was covered by previous Security Council resolutions, especially in the context of the provision of technical assistance to that Government. The matter was therefore being vigorously pursued.

He was giving immediate attention to the need of addressing a communication to Member States with regard to paragraphs 5 and 6 of the resolution of 24 November 1961 and he hoped to be able to report on that aspect at the Committee's next meeting. Since the resolution's adoption, he had naturally been considering the whole problem of the next steps to be taken by the United Nations in the Congo; a programme thereon would be submitted at a subsequent meeting of the Committee.

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Mr. Tshombe's submissions on the Loi fondamentale called for no comment. Similarly, Mr. Tshombe's observations by way of reaction to the Security Council resolution seemed to be the rantings of a very unstable man. That view was shared by all those primarily concerned with United Nations operations in the Congo, whether military or civilian.

The Representative of the Congo (Leopoldville) thanked the members of the Committee and the Acting Secretary-General for having brought about the adoption of the resolution of 24 November 1961. As the Congolese Minister for Foreign Affairs had stated in the Security Council, the Congo had placed its trust in the United Nations in inviting it to restore peace and order in the country and to bring about the reintegration of Katanga. The Security Council resolution had duly called for an end to Katanga's secessionist activities. The means employed, however, should be peaceful, for the men dying in Katanga were the same as those living elsewhere in the national territory.

The Representative of Nigeria welcomed the adoption of the Security Council resolution of 24 November 1961. The resolution was particularly important because the Foreign Ministers of both the Congo and Belgium - the two States most directly concerned - had participated in the discussions. If Belgium was sincere and honest, there was much that it could do to bring tranquillity to the Congo. It should co-operate with the Secretary-General and the Central Government of the Congo in carrying the resolution into effect. In particular, the Belgian Government would do well to co-operate in the matter envisaged in operative paragraph 6.

He had heard rumours that Dornier aircraft had recently been supplied to Katanga from the Federal Republic of Germany. The Government of the Federal Republic had denied those rumours, but had admitted that some civilian aircraft had indeed been sold abroad, that the customers had included a Belgian firm, and that they were not sure whether the Belgian concern had transferred some aircraft to Katanga. He would remind the Committee that the Security Council resolution called for measures to prevent the supply of all materials which could be used for warlike purposes, under any guise whatever.

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The acting Secretary-General might tell the Committee whether he intended to circulate a copy of the agreement signed by him and Mr. Bomboko. So far as Mr. Tshombe's communications were concerned, the Security Council resolution had strengthened the Secretary-General's hand and the necessary action would doubtless be taken.

There were certain other points requiring clarification. First, there were some doubts regarding Mr. Gizenga's current position in the Government. Was the Central Government proposing to get rid of him, or was he still, despite his non-co-operation, regarded as one of the Vice-Premiers? Secondly, he would like to know whether the army in Orientale Province was loyal to General Lundula. If those troops disclaimed all loyalty, to General Lundula and Mr. Bomboko alike, the United Nations might be in a dilemma.

There had been some unfavourable comment in the Press regarding the inquiries into the acts at Kindu. Since he did not know whether the allegations of non-co-operation on the part of the Central Government were correct, he would welcome some information on the matter.

Lastly, what was the cause of the quarrel among the Baluba in the United Nations refugee camp? Was that quarrel political, with some supporting Mr. Tshombe and others supporting the Central Government, or was it merely a personal dispute?

The Acting Secretary-General said that the resumption of diplomatic relations between the Central Government of the Congo and the Belgian Government was in his view a step in the right direction. There were many matters which the Congolese Government could only settle in co-operation with the Belgian Government; for example, its claim to 40 per cent of the shares in the Union minière and to a 15 per cent export duty on copper. Secondly, the agreement between the Congolese Minister for Foreign Affairs and himself had been published as document A/4986-S/5001. Thirdly, the question of the Dornier aircraft purchased by Katanga would be dealt with by Mr. Bunche, who had already given some information on the subject, at a previous meeting. Finally, Mr. O'Brien would give his views on the disturbances in the refugee camp.

The Representative of the Congo (Leopoldville) would be in the best position to answer the questions concerning Mr. Gizenga, and concerning the relations between Mr. Adoula and the ANC troops.

Mr. Bunche said that, following reports that Dornier aircraft were on their way to Katanga, the Observer for the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations had confirmed that an order for six Dorniers, which were civilian aircraft, had been placed with a firm in the Federal Republic and had stated that there were no laws by which the Federal Government could prevent the order. The aircraft had been consigned to a Belgian company, apparently for transfer to Katanga. Five of the Dorniers had left the Federal Republic for delivery to the Belgian company, but a United Nations protest had stopped delivery of the sixth. Four of the five had actually reached Katanga, but it was not known where in Europe they had gone after leaving the Federal Republic, nor what had become of the fifth.

Mr. O'Brien said that underlying the conflict between the Baluba of Kasai and the Baluba of Katanga in the refugee camp was the frustration caused by their position. There were nearly 45,000 refugees in the camp, living in miserable conditions and unable to go in and out to work. Their frustration was greatly increased by the provocation tactics of the Katanga authorities, who used their radio to arouse hostility between the groups in the camp and resentment against the United Nations and conducted a war of nerves, for example by occasionally firing on the refugees. The two groups of Baluba were related, but distinct; there were differences of language between them. The Kasai Baluba were far more numerous; they included almost all the "white-collar" class of Elisabethville and most of them had previously gone to work outside the camp. The Katanga Baluba, being from rural areas, were less developed and were opposed to the refugees working or returning to their homes. They were fanatically political, in contrast to the relatively passive Kasai group; but the latter felt that their greater numbers entitled them to a role in the direction of the camp. There was no real political issue dividing them. All the refugees, with the exception of a few agents provocateurs, were opponents of Mr. Tshombe, although the Katanga Baluba were probably more Lumumbist. The situation was explosive and extremely dangerous, and was receiving active consideration.

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The Representative of Nigeria asked how long the refugees were expected to remain in the camp.

The Acting Secretary-General said that, apart from other considerations, the camp imposed a heavy strain on the financial resources of the United Nations. He was therefore giving the problem close attention and considered that the United Nations should gradually free itself of its responsibility in the matter, without disrupting the lives of the people concerned. In general, the United Nations should become less and less involved in that type of operation in the Congo.

The Representative of the Congo (Leopoldville) said that all that was known about Mr. Gizenga was that he had gone on leave to Stanleyville for about a week to collect some personal belongings. The allegations that he was planning a separatist movement were merely the result of political intrigue by enemies of the Congo. It had been stated in the Press the previous day that Mr. Gizenga intended to return to Leopoldville. After some discord in the Congolese Parliament concerning the Kindu affair, it had been agreed that an attempt must be made to identify those responsible. But it would be very difficult to state positively that Mr. Gizenga had been at Kindu.

As far as General Lundula was concerned, since his return to Leopoldville, he had shown himself very loyal to the Central Government and accompanied Mr. Adoula wherever he went. He should not be sent back to Stanleyville. The garrison at Stanleyville was under the supervision of Colonel Pakassa, Mr. Gizenga's cousin, who had said that the soldiers responsible for the murders at Kindu should be arrested and that the United Nations should be recognized by everyone, since it was in the country to help the Congo.

If he received any further information, he would communicate it to the Secretary-General.

The Representative of Nigeria said that whoever formed the Central Government, that Government must be supported. There had been reports that Mr. Gizenga was not co-operating with the Central Government and was seeking to undermine its authority; if the present Government fell, he might take over the leadership, with unforeseeable consequences. Mr. Gizenga's activities were thus a matter of great concern to all African countries and to all Member States who wished to see peace and order prevail in the Congo.

The Acting Secretary-General said that he had given the Committee all the information he possessed concerning Mr. Gizenga. Any further information regarding the Congo, including Stanleyville, would be made available to the Committee.

The Representative of Sweden expressed her confidence that the Secretary-General, in interpreting the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 24 November 1961 (S/5002), would remember that the main purpose of United Nations activities in the Congo was to restore peace, law and order and to bring about a conciliation. The greater freedom to use force which the resolution allowed made it particularly necessary to act cautiously and judiciously.

She welcomed the agreement for a joint inquiry into the events at Kindu. As far as the refugee camp was concerned, the late Secretary-General had said that ONUC could take care of about 15,000 refugees, whereas the camp now held some 45,000. That was a very serious situation; the forces in Katanga might be required for other activities, and it was to be hoped that other bodies, both inside and outside the United Nations, including the International Red Cross and the specialized agencies, could be persuaded to provide money, personnel and other requirements. The refugees were an extra strain on the Organization's financial resources, which were already overburdened. Some solution must be found, not only for financial reasons, but also on humanitarian grounds. Housing, in particular, seemed to be important, and it might be advisable to remove some of the refugees to other parts of the Congo. If a satisfactory solution was not found, many of the refugees might turn against the United Nations.

It seemed that 5,000 or 6,000 more troops were needed in the Congo, apart from extra equipment and weapons. She was glad to note that Ghana had promised to provide a further contingent and hoped that the Secretary-General's appeals to other Governments would yield positive results. As the representative of Malaya had said, Governments should be given information on incidents involving their troops as soon as possible; but it was also important that the people of the Congo should be given correct information on matters of public importance, despite the fact that distorted information had more popular appeal.

She was glad that the Status Agreement had finally been concluded. It would have an important influence on co-operation between the United Nations and the Congolese Government. As regards the Congolese President's Ordinance No. 83, she hoped that article 1 did not mean that the United Nations would be unable to exert some influence in connexion with the manner in which the mercenaries would be treated.

Finally, Mr. Tshombe's appeal to the Irish and Swedish troops to join him required no comment, except that those troops knew their duty and would do it.

The Acting Secretary-General, commenting on the suggestions made by the representative of Sweden, said that his intention was to diminish the role played by the United Nations with regard to the refugees; apart from other considerations, it imposed a great financial strain on the Organization. He had held preliminary discussions on the subject with the representatives of WHO and FAO the day before.

In regard to the request for troops, as a result of the Security Council resolution (S/5002), he had already made initial contacts with representatives of certain countries. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia had indicated his Government's willingness to augment the United Nations troops in the Congo. Negotiations with the Government of Indonesia would be continued and he was hopeful that positive results would accrue.

The Representative of Indonesia said that the history of the Congo was entering upon a new stage. The new Central Government had already been accepted by the people and by the world, and the Security Council's recent resolution had given the United Nations Command a new mandate. Firm action should therefore follow, and such action would call for co-operation and co-ordination, particularly between the United Nations Command and the Central Government. There should be no hesitation in implementing the Council's resolution. The new Central Government and the United Nations Command were united by a common aim. The United Nations Force was in the Congo at the request of the Central Government in order to assist that Government in restoring law and order. That law and order had been violated, and was still being violated, by foreign mercenaries who must be expelled as soon as possible. The mercenaries, however, were involved

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in the separatist movement in Katanga. The Indonesian delegation was not advocating bloodshed or strong military action; it was always in favour of peaceful means. Hence, it was in favour of conciliation and persuasion, and in that connexion he recalled his suggestion of a few months previously to set up a public relations unit in the Congo primarily to convince people who did not understand the aims of the United Nations Force. From now on, however, the first task of the United Nations in the Congo must be to protect the national self-determination of the Congolese people and combat false self-determination instigated by foreign countries or foreign persons. Indonesia's own experience had convinced it that the United Nations must not hesitate in that struggle. The Indonesian Foreign Minister had told the General Assembly at its 1065th meeting that Indonesia was reconsidering its previous policy and was contemplating the despatch of another contingent to the Congo. Despite Indonesia's own difficulties, caused by the fact that the Netherlands was continuing with the implementation of a plan which Indonesia strongly rejected, the Indonesian Government would find ways and means of helping the Congo which was also fighting against a false self-determination instigated from outside.

The Representative of the Sudan asked for a clarification of operative paragraph 6 of the Security Council resolution (S/5002). He wondered how that paragraph would apply to the Central Government if it decided to enter into bilateral transactions for equipment for military aid.

The Acting Secretary-General drew attention to the last phrase of the paragraph which ran "except in accordance with the decisions, policies and purposes of the United Nations". The Central Government, which had been recognized by the United Nations as the only legitimate Government of the Congo, was obviously entitled to enter into bilateral negotiations with any other sovereign Government, but the United Nations should be consulted over any transactions of that kind, which must clearly not be such as to conflict with the decisions of the Organization.

The Representative of Pakistan expressed satisfaction at the progress made in the Security Council and the Acting Secretary-General's reassuring statements to the Advisory Committee and in the Security Council. He looked forward to the promised statement on a programme for the United Nations operation and hoped that it would include an amplification of the Acting Secretary-General's views on and plans for national reconciliation in the Republic of the Congo.

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The Acting Secretary-General said that he was giving close attention to the matter and would present his views on the steps that it was proposed to take at the Committee's next meeting.

The Representative of Mali said that he was glad to note that there was now agreement on all sides that peace in the Congo could only become effective when the secession of Katanga was ended, a secession supported by the colonialists and their mercenaries. It was welcome news that it was proposed to take energetic action against the mercenaries in the pay of the colonial trusts of the Union Minière. Such action should concentrate exclusively on Katanga and ignore all attempts to create a diversion by means of allusions to other alleged secessionist movements. As the representative of the Congo (Leopoldville) had said, the other cases of secession, which had been talked about for two weeks without anyone being able to supply specific details, were simply propaganda by the Congo's enemies. The bellicose ravings of Mr. Tshombe were a further reason for putting an end to the secession of Katanga.

Rumours were circulating that Congolese troops from the Kindu region, and possibly from Kasai, were moving towards Katanga and that ONUC forces were opposing them. He realized that such rumours were often deliberately spread in order to sow discord, but he would like an assurance that no action would be taken to halt the advance of the Central Government's troops on Katanga.

The refugee problem in the Congo related chiefly to Angolan refugees, of whom there were 48,500, the High Commissioner for Refugees had told the Third Committee, in the frontier region between Angola and Katanga. The League of Red Cross Societies and other voluntary organizations, and the Central Government, were dealing with the problem for the time being. He agreed with the Acting Secretary-General's decision not to extend United Nations activities in that direction because, apart from the cost, the scope might become overwhelming. The only solution to the problem lay in the immediate cessation of the colonialist war being waged in Angola by Portugal which was responsible for the mass flight of refugees to the Congo. If the resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its 1066th meeting was implemented, it would make it possible to put a speedy end to the colonialist war in Angola and to settle the question of the enormous influx

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of Angolan refugees into the Congo. Moreover, if the United Nations gave assistance, the number of refugees might rise very rapidly and constitute a serious handicap to the Organization.

The Acting Secretary-General said that reports that United Nations troops were hampering the activities of the Central Government's forces were absolutely untrue. He would give close attention to the representative of Mali's observations on the refugee problem.

The Representative of Tunisia thought that serious attention should be given, in connexion with the implementation of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Security Council's resolution, to the question of the entry of weapons and military supplies into Katanga by way of Northern Rhodesia. As far as he could recall, the most recent approach by the United Nations to the Government of Northern Rhodesia through the United Kingdom Government had elicited the reply that the length of the frontier made complete control too difficult and that steps were being taken to restrict the traffic as far as possible. If provision could be made for a United Nations presence or inspection unit inside Rhodesia itself, either at the border or in some other form as might be suggested, it would make it possible to draw the net a little tighter around Katanga.

The Acting Secretary-General said that he would bear those remarks in mind in his next statement to the Committee.

He asked the members of the Committee for their views on the distribution of the Committee's records. He thought that the time had perhaps come for the verbatim records to be made available to all the members of the Security Council, and of the General Assembly also, if the Committee deemed it appropriate.

After a brief discussion, the Acting Secretary-General indicated that the Committee would take the matter up again at its next meeting.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.