

[9 CONFIDENTIAL]

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES S-10002
BOX 124
FILE 2
ACC. 198/023

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UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDANATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

3 050.37

FROM: MILOB 4C CYANGUGU

DATE: 27 MAR 95

TO: MILOB GP HQ KIGALI
UNAMIR HQ KIGALI//G2/G3//

cc
copy to
28/3
29.3
29/3

SUBJ: SUPPLEMENTARY INFO TO SITREP 27
ACTIVITIES ALONG ZAIRE BORDER

1. IT SEEMS MOVEMENT TOWARDS RWANDA FROM ZAIRE HAS SUBSTANTIALLY DECREASED IN RECENT DAYS, AND ILLEGAL MOVEMENT DURING THE NIGHT HAS INCREASED FROM RWANDA TO ZAIRE.
2. MUCH OF THE PROBLEM IS DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY RELATED TO THE ELEMENT OF FEAR IN THE LOCAL POPULATION ON THIS SIDE OF THE BORDER AND OF THE REFUGEES ON THE OTHER SIDE IN THE BUKAVU CAMPS. MUCH OF THE FEAR AT THE MOMENT IS MORE BECAUSE OF THE POTENTIAL OF ACTIVITIES THAT COULD TAKE PLACE ON AND AFTER 6 APRIL 95, RATHER THAN FEAR OF PERSECUTION BY RPA. IT IS KNOWN FOR CERTAIN THAT REFUGEES IN THE CAMPS HAVE A FEAR OF THEIR FUTURE IF RETURNING TO RWANDA, BUT THAT THE FEAR IS DIRECTLY RELATED TO THOSE WHO RULE THE CAMPS. IT CANNOT YET BE CONFIRMED FROM WHERE AND WHEN THE ILLEGAL MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE FROM RWANDA TO ZAIRE OCCURRED, BUT UNHCR BUKAVU HAVE CONFIRMED AN INCREASE IN THE CAMPS IN THE PAST WEEK. THE PREFET OF CYANGUGU HIMSELF ADMITTED KNOWLEDGE OF THIS SITUATION AND BLAMES IT ON THE SECURITY SIT. UNFORTUNATELY THE TWO BORDERS, THE TERRAIN, THE PROXIMITY OF THE CAMPS, THE EASY PASSAGE FROM IJWI ISLAND, AND THE LACK OF RPA TROOPS AND OBSERVATION EQUIPMENT ARE ALL FACTORS THAT WILL ENSURE THE SECURITY SIT DOES NOT IMPROVE IN THE NEAR FUTURE.
3. THERE IS A SHORTAGE OF FOOD IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS AND...

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IS GROWING CONCERN FOR THE LEVEL OF MALNUTRITION THAT WAS EVIDENT FROM LAST SPRING IN '94. IT IS APPARENT THAT ALTHOUGH UNHCR HAVE CUT BACK SOME OF THE FOOD, THERE IS ENOUGH DELIVERED. THIS DELIVERY TO EACH REFUGEE, HOWEVER, MAY BE DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY FRGF TROOPS WHO TAKE SOME OF THE FOOD. THE SIT IS GETTING WORSE AND AS WAS EVIDENT LAST WEEK IN BUNYAKIRI, ZAIRE, FEARFUL AND HUNGRY PEOPLE WILL REACT. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT IT IS KNOWN THAT ZAIREAN TROOPS RECENTLY SEARCHED A VEHICLE THAT WAS CARRYING FOOD AND FOUND ARMAMENTS UNDERNEATH THE FOOD DESTINED FOR A CAMP. IT WAS A LOCAL TYPE TRUCK AND NOT AN NGO VEH. QUANTITY AND TYPE OF ARMAMENT IS NOT KNOWN AT THIS TIME.

4. UNREST BETWEEN HUTU AND TUTSI IN NORTHWEST BURUNDI ALSO AFFECTS THE SIT HERE IN SECTOR 4C. NGO OF MDM WERE AT THE BURUNDI BORDER DURING ONE SMALL SKIRMISH LAST FRIDAY WHICH SEEMS TO HAVE OCCURRED BETWEEN PERS IN BURUNDI ONLY, RPA WERE NOT APPARENTLY INVOLVED. HOWEVER, THE MOVEMENT OF LOCALS IN BURUNDI TO ZAIRE FEEDS THE NOTION FOR LOCALS IN RWANDA TO SEEK AT LEAST TEMPORARY SAFETY (PERCEIVED) SOMEWHERE ELSE. THERE MAY ALSO BE A GROWING OPPORTUNITY FOR FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF CRIMINAL AND ALSO FGRF ACTIVITY TO OPERATE IN THE AREA. IT WAS REPORTED EARLIER THAT FRGF FUNDING AND TROOPS ARE ASSISTING IN THE UNREST, AND THERE HAS BEEN NO INFO SINCE THEN TO DISCOURAGE THE EARLIER REPORT. IT MUST BE CONSIDERED THAT THE APRIL 6 ANNIVERSARY DATE MAY BE UTILIZED BY EXTREMISTS NOT SO MUCH HERE IN RWANDA, BUT IN BURUNDI INSTEAD.

5. THE BORDER BETWEEN ZAIRE IS MORE SENSITIVE NOW THAN DURING INITIAL UNAMIR DEPLOYMENT. RPA AND ZAIRE EXCHANGE OF FIRE SHOWS MORE A SIGN OF INCREASE THAN DECREASE. RPA ADMIT A SORT OF IMPATIENCE FOR THE SITUATION AND AN OBVIOUS FRUSTRATION OVER THE FRGF'S NATURAL AND SOMEWHAT SYMBIOTIC DEFENCE WITH ZAIRE BORDER TROOPS. ALSO, ZAIRE MILITARY MOVT IN THE CAMPS IS REMAINS EXTREMELY LIMITED TO NON EXISTENT, EVEN AFTER UNHCR ARRANGED PAYMENT FOR ZAIRE TROOPS TO ASSIST IN THE RESTORATION OF CONTROL IN THE CAMPS.

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6. ALTHOUGH RUMOURS CLOUD SOME OF THE FACTS, ALL RUMOURS PRESENT IN SECTOR 4C ARE BEING TAKEN SERIOUSLY, MOSTLY BECAUSE OF THEIR POSSIBILITY, AND PERHAPS, PROBABILITY. THE POPULATION REMAINS INSECURE AND THE GEN SIT IS UNSTABLE. IT WOULD TAKE VERY LITTLE TO CREATE A BIG IMPACT.

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UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDANATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

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DATE: 27 MAR 95

TO: MILOB GP HQ KIGALI
UNAMIR HQ KIGALI//G2/G3//SUBJ: SUPPLEMENTARY INFO TO SITREP 27
ACTIVITIES ALONG ZAIRE BORDER

Sam
28/3
Thom
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DCOS OPS

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To: ~~D COS ops~~
LISTS A, B, D

From: G2

26 March 95

Subject: IR: BURUNDI
INTREP 005

Seam
28.3

Seam
29/3

1.(UN R) The situation in Bujumbura appears to be tense but stabilized. It is likely that the military seized upon the opportunity presented by Friday's violence to launch a cordon and search operation in an effort to disarm extremist gangs. UNHCR Kenya reported that 600 Burundians and 3,000 Zairans fled Bujumbura for the Uvina camp (a known base of operations for Burundian Hutu militia). This may lend credibility to a military report that armed Hutu militia had been entering the city for the purposes of creating instability. If this is the case, current military actions may have helped prevent escalations of violence within the capital and outlying regions.

2.(U) Reports of wholesale European evacuation of European nationals appears to have been exaggerated by the press. Although Italy may have decided to react to Friday's violence in such a way, the French suggestion to withdraw non-essential personnel (around Easter time) appears to have been under discussion prior to the violence and seems a reasonable precautionary measure, not an indicator of a situation beyond control. Belgium has not made such a decision, although Spain may have.

3.(C) As for the possibility of an Army-led coup, one could become a requirement should the government mechanism become counter-productive to the efforts of maintaining stability. To quote recent history, in the last Turkish coup, the government was badly fragmented, nothing was being done or could be done (no real direction or decisions) while a large scale internal security matter was seeing hundreds of people dying each day unchecked. The military took power under its mandate as "protector of the constitution" (3rd coup in 3 decades), sorted out the internal security situation, sorted out government administration then let elections and an elected government return to power. *No indication to support this possibility in the near term.*

1/2

AA
29/3

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U) 1. 27 Mar: Italy had already advised Italian nationals to leave the area before Friday's violence. *132*

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4.(U) As for the actual incident of Friday/Saturday, a synopsis is as follows:

a.(U) Friday, 1500B: Fighting between rival groups of Hutu and Tutsi started. Reports indicated gunfire and grenade explosions, one man killed, several homes in the suburbs (BWIZA and BUYENZI) were set afire and telephone lines cut. The fighting had ceased and streets clear by the 1900B curfew.

b.(U) The military appears to have cordoned and swept at least BUYENZI. Journalists report approximately 50-60 dead in the area.;²

c.(U) The violence appears to have abated by Saturday morning; and

d.(U) UNHCR Kenya reports 600 Burundians and 3,000 Zairans had fled to Uvira as a result of the situation.

C.E. Kamange
Major
G2 UNAMIR HQ
11060

2. (U) BBC Reports figures of 1500 pers dead (27 Mar) BJ

2/2

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MESSAGE

PRIORITY

061750 B MAR 95

FROM : OPS CELL

RESTD

TO : ALL COYS

INFO : UNAMIR HQ
BN HQ

G/105/OPS

SECURITY ALERTNESS PD AT ABOUT 2255 HRS OF 05 MAR 95 THERE WAS
GRENADE ATTACK AT BYUMBA BASE PD ALL COYS ARE ADVISED TO BE
EXTRA VIGILANT AND INCREASE STR AT GD. POINTS // 1830

DRAFTER'S NAME

APPT

TELE

MAJ AY ASSANE

OPS OFFR

11275

RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
WITH RANK

TOC/2000/RT/06/28

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(i)

HQ NIBATT
UNAMIR
BYUMBA CAMP
BYUMBA

UNAMIR/NIBATT/7468.9/A

7 Mar 95

See Distribution

REPORT OF GRENADE ATTACK ON NIBATT GUARD
POST ON 05 MARCH 95

1. Attached herewith, please find a copy of the above mentioned subject for your information and necessary action.
2. Grateful acknowledge.


LA ADEOYE
Lt Col
Cont Comd

Distribution:

External:


Action:

FC
DFC
COS
UNAMIR (OPS) ✓

(2) cc
Fwd to DCS OPS for info ppe
A
9/2
(3) Meeting
9.3

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10/3


10/3

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REPORT OF GRENADE ATTACK ON NIBATT GUARD
POST ON 05 MARCH 95

INTRODUCTION

1. There have been recent attacks on UNAMIR troops and installations which has called for urgent readdress of our Security system. These reports were recorded in TUNBATT location, grenade attack in Kigali and ambush and killing of Prefect of Butare are some of the recent incidences just to mention a few.

RECENT ATTACK ON NIBATT GUARD POST

2. On Sunday at about 052255B Mar 95, NIBATT Guard post No 5 was attacked. Report from the Guards revealed that about 2130 local time, they heard some unusual movement which was challenged and investigated but nothing was found.

3. The guards continued their duty around the warming fire flame in the usual very cold nights experienced in the location. At about 052255B Mar 95, droplets were heard around the Guard post which resulted into explosions some seconds after landing. The soldiers at the Guard post were four. Two were on sentry while the other were resting. The two soldiers on sentry were hit and became unconscious.

4. The explosions alerted the Guards resting, the close-by guard post and the entire Camp who immediately dashed to the direction of the explosion. On closing up, it was discovered that the Guard post was attacked. Officers and soldiers at the scene immediately assisted in the evacuation of the wounded to the Camp medical Room. The soldiers hit are LCpl Godwin Eze M2363 and Tpr Sylvester Egbang M4522. The most hit was Tpr Sylvester Egbang who was attended to by own RMO before further evacuation to Australian Medicals in Kigali by 060200B Mar 95. The other soldier is being treated as an out patient in own Camp. Tpr Sylvester Egbang is expected to be discharged in the next few days.

IMMEDIATE ACTION TAKEN

5. a. The area was cordoned and searched.
b. Local patrols were sent out on suspected routes.
c. Immediate increase in Guard strength.
d. Immediate liaison with RPA Command in Byumba for necessary action.

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DISCOVERY

6. As effort throughout the night could not give detail account of the incident, effort was continued early morning 6 March 95. A close look at the general area revealed three points of impact. A further scanning of the area revealed fragments, three safety leavers and three safety pins at the Northern slope of the Guard post. These discoveries lead to our ascertainment of a three hand grenade attack.

POSSIBLE ATTACKERS

7. As the attack cast doubt and considering recent occurrences, it is believed that the attack could have been carried out by one of the following:

- a. Former Rwanda Government Force (FRGF).
- b. Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA).
- c. Disgruntled Civilians.

8 FRGF. The FRGF recent gurrilla activities to secure money, food and cause confussion in Rwanda is a pointer. Recently a report of their arrest in various places with Arms and grenades have been recorded.

9. RPA. The RPA have shown their discontentment over UNAMIR activities which has been expressed in papers and Conferences.

10. Disgruntled Civilians. There was a retrenchment exercise of Civilian workers in the Camp by Brown & Root Company on 4 March 95. The affected civilians who are mainly youths expressed ill-feelings towards NIBATT, instead of their employer. One of the affected civilians was quoted to have said that "A man who lost his job looses his life". These group of civilians are believed to have the sympathy of RPA.

11. Deduction. Considering Paragraphs 8 - 10, it is believed that the possible attackers are from the RPA.

SECURITY MEASURES.

12. A number of security measures have been tightened to forstall further occurrences:

- a. Movement Restriction:
 - (1) Tps. Troops movement have been temporarily restricted to official engagement only out side the Camp.
 - (2) Visitors. Only visitors on official duties are permitted into the Camp.

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b Physcial security Masures:

- (1) Increase in strength of guards per post.
- (2) Intensified night visibility plan.
- (3) Improved Field of observation.
- (4) Increase night surveillance.

CONCLUSION

13. This type of attack though not new in any theatre of operation of this nature, this incident is un-called for. However, with the number of improved security measures taken, it will be difficult to have a reoccurences.

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UNAMIR - MINUAR

(1)

COS

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TO : ALL SECTORS

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

ATTN : SECTOR CDRs

INFO : CMO
DCMO
FHQ OPS✓

FILE : 123/OPS/SECURITY/2 DATED 6 MAR 95

SUB : SECURITY SITUATION- SECTORS

1. In recent times there has been a sudden decline in the security situation in some sectors. Incidents of 4 Mar 95 in Butare where the prefect was killed and one on 5 Mar 95 at Byumba where an explosion took place injuring two Nibatt soldiers, are an indication towards this fact.

2. The above mentioned incidents in no way should create panic but it calls for better vigilance in all sectors. The DCMO has therefore directed that all sector cdrs should organize their daily activities with utmost care and caution. The aim should be to feel the pulse of the area by close coordinated patrolling and also inculcating a sense of vigilance amongst all Milobs.

3. Sectors are requested to make a whole hearted effort towards this and dwell at greater length on the overall security situation in the sectors in their daily sitreps.

(2) COS
FYI

DCMO OPS
6.3

(5) minute 4
Copied COS
93

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(3) DCOs (ops)

1. Ref all.
2. we may also consider issuing a similar, but more detailed letter to all Sect Comds and local units

(4) COS
msg already sent
to all units 5 Mar.

DCMO OPS
7.3

A 07/3



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TO : ALL SECTORS

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

ATTN : SECTOR CDRS

INFO : CMO
DCMO

~~THQ OPS~~

FILE : 123/OPS/SECURITY/2 DATED 6 MAR 95

SUB : SECURITY SITUATION- SECTORS

Thurmont
06/3

Sen
9/3

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for *A Anochkine*
(A Anochkine)
Lt Col
for CMO

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(2)

FROM CO ETHIOBATT /CYANGUGU/

TO UNAMIR HQ /KIGALI/FC/

INFO UNAMIR HQ /KIGALI/DFC//COS/4

DATE 02 MAR/95

SUBJECT The security situation of our sector and my opinion regarding it

Incl some 8 lines see
UNAMIR - RPA camp
slated for 10/03

Co (ops)

cc
③ Copy to DC
Ops ④ meet
DE
4

It is known that our sector is bordered to Burundi and Zaire. Especially in Uvira, Bukavu and Ijwi island EX-RGF soldiers and militias are concentrated.

There is also high concentration of RPA soldiers in our sector. In view of providing security to the local people, there are 3 threats as follows:

1. Internal threat (primary)

nowadays this threat exists in our sector, But in two forms:

A, An integrated work which stabilizes the peace situation of our sector, returns the sector to the normal condition, increases the confidence of the people, over the government, enhances the economic development of the sector has not been done up to now.

The infrastructure of the government is not stretched up to down.

Judiciary and the security force (police) have not yet started their work. This condition, in addition to leading the people be despaired, it also increases their hostility.

B, The killings and arrests by RPA aggravate the lack of confidence of the population over the government and will also motivate the people destabilize the prevailing peace.

2. An immediate threat form Zaire (secondary)

As is known, Ex-RGF soldiers and militias live in Zaire being scattered in different areas and being organized in camps. Specially those who live being scattered, for life in Zaire is difficult, by coming to the areas in Rwanda where they were, are perpetrating banditry actions and are creating a problem in a life and property of the local people.

3. As is heard in various occasions from different sides and also as is known Ex-RGF officials are concentrating, organizing and training their soldiers. though there is no as such a big and tangible attack as of now, but it is Unquestionable that they can attack any time the condition is fertile for them. There for in long term they are dangerous for the sector.

Threat
07/3

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Accordingly, I suggest the following measures to be taken.

1. To enhance the confidence of the population, to stabilize the security of the sector and to rebuild the economy of the country a work of construction has to start

2. By opening branch offices of administration and police force up to down to create a fertile condition so that the locals could participate in guarding their surrounding areas to sustain the prevailing peace. By establishing a civilian administration to create a condition in which RPA soldiers be in camps and keep their borders.

3. Though the killings and arrests by RPA has improved in comparison with the previous one, but it is still existing sporadically.

Therefore, by contacting RPA officials according to their post, It is necessary to show them the fear that their action is creating up on the local people, the consequences of it in future and generally to avoid these problems.

Podsee J

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UNAMIR
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM


FROM : GHANBATT HQ GH2/014/OPS
TO : UNAMIR FORCE HQ (OPS) ✓
INFO : MILOB GP HQ (OPS) ✓
DATE : 05 MAR 95
SUBJECT : PATROL PLAN/PROGRAMME


1. Attached please, find Ghanbatt patrol routes and programme in respect of individual Coys for the period 06 - 12 Mar 95.
2. Submitted for further action please.



SK GATELI
Lt

for Commanding Officer


07/3

Seen

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GHANBATT PATROL ROUTES
FOR PERIOD 06 MAR - 12 MAR 95

SRL	ROUTE	TOWN/VILLAGE	REMARKS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1.	ALPHA	KIBUNGO TOWNSHIP GR 5961	HQ COY
		BARE GR 5347, MURANGARA GR 5442, SAKE GR 4454, GASHORA GR 2656	A COY
		KANZENZE, NGENDA AND GASHORA COMMUNES	B COY
		GISHALI GR 4788, KAVUMU GR 4594, NYARBUYE GR 4093, BICUMBI GR 3777, GEHENGARI GR 3481 AND NYAGAGAZA GR 3284	C COY
		RUSENYI GR 6862, KANYAMI GR 7463, KIRUHURA GR 7962 AND NKAKWA GR 8062	D COY
2.	BRAVO	KIBUNGO GR 5961 AND KIGARAMA GR 6070	HQ COY
		BARE GR 5347, KABILIZI GR 4868, ZAZA GR 4759, SAKE GR 4454 AND MUGESERA GR 4764	A COY
		KANZENZE, NGENDA AND GASHORA COMMUNES	B COY
		MURAGAGI GR 5686, TWINKWAVU GR 6786, GAHENGARI GR 6879, GISHALI GR 4788, NYARUGALI GR 4487 AND MUNYIGINYA GR 4187	C COY
		RWANTERU GR 7948, BUKANURA GR 7646, NYAMIYAGA GR 7644 AND HUMURE GR 7643	D COY
3.	CHARLIE	KIBUNGO TOWNSHIP GR 5961, KIGARAMA GR 6070, KIYOVU GR 5870, RUBIRA GR 5974 AND GASHORA GR 5875	HQ COY
		KABILIZI GR 4868, MUGESERA GR 4764 AND SAKE GR 4454	A COY
		KANZENZE, NGENDA AND GASHORA COMMUNES	B COY

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
	CHARLIE	BICUMBI GR 3776, MUREHE GR 3178, RUGENDE GR 2885, GISHALI GR 4788, GATI GR 4392 AND NKOMANGWA GR 4289	C COY
		MULINDI GR 7667, GISHANDA GR 7076 AND KABAREI GR 7076	D COY
4.	DELTA	KIBUNGO GR 5961, KIGARAMA GR 6070, GASETSA GR 5671 AND MURUKORE GR 5573	HQ COY
		SAKE GR 4454, ZAZA GR 4759, MUGESERA GR 4764, KABILIZI GR 4868	A COY
		KANZENZE, NGENDA AND GASHORA COMMUNES	B COY
		MURAGAGI GR 5686, GAHINI GR 5796, RUKARA GR 5601, BICUMBI GR 3776, KARENJE GR 3469 AND BIHEMBE GR 2972	C COY
		RUSENYI GR 6862 AND MUTUMBA GR 6769	D COY
5.	ECHO	KIBUNGO TOWNSHIP GR 5961	HQ COY
		KABILIZI GR 4868, KIBUNGO GR 5961, BARE GR 5347, MATONGO GR 4265	A COY
		KANZENZE, NGENDA AND GASHORA COMMUNES	B COY
		GISHALI GR 4788, MUNYIGINA GR 4187, CYIMBAZI GR 4084, MURAGAGI GR 5686 AND RUSETA GR 6282	C COY
		RWANTERU GR 7948, RUSUMO GR 8247, GAMUGARURA GR 8448 AND GISENYI GR 8951	D COY
6.	FOXTROT	KIBUNGO GR 5961 AND KIGARAMA GR 6070	HQ COY
		BARE GR 5347, KIBUNGO GR 5961 AND SAKE GR 4454	A COY
		KANZENZE, NGENDA AND GASHORA COMMUNES	B COY

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
	FOXTROT	BICUMBI GR 3776, GIKORO GR 3786, MUNUNU GR 3293, MURAGAGI GR 5686 AND NYAWERA GR 6390	C COY
		MULINDI GR 7667, NTARUKA JUNCTION GR 8063 AND RUGARAMA GR9066	D COY
7.	GOLF	KIBUNGO GR 5961, KIGARAMA GR 6070, GASEPSA GR 5671 AND MERUKORE GR 5573	HQ COY
		SAKE GR 4454 AND GASHORA GR 2656	A COY
		KANZENZE, NGENDA AND GASHORA COMMUNES	B COY
		MURAGAGI GR 5686, RUKARA GR 5601, GAHENGERI GR 6879, BICUMBI GR 3776, BIHEMBE GR 2972 AND MUREHE GR 3178	C COY
		RUKIRA GR 6658, RUVUZI GR 6352, NYAKABARE GR 6449 AND GATARE GR 6548	D COY

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HQ COY PATROL PLAN/PROGRAMME
FOR PERIOD 06 MAR - 12 MAR 95

SRL	DATE	TIME (HRS)	ROUTE	PURPOSE	REMARKS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
1.	MON 06 MAR 95	0900 - 1300 HRS	ALPHA	DOMINATE AREA	FOOT/MOBILE
2.	TUE 07 MAR 95	1900 - 2130 HRS	DELTA	INSTILL CONFIDENCE IN LOCALS	MOBILE
3.	WED 08 MAR 95	1000 - 1300 HRS	BRAVO	DOMINATE AREA	FOOT/MOBILE
4.	THU 09 MAR 95	1300 - 1600 HRS	CHARLIE	" "	" "
5.	FRI 10 MAR 95	1900 - 2130 HRS	ALPHA	" "	" "
6.	SAT 11 MAR 95	0630 - 1000 HRS 1500 - 1800 HRS	BRAVO	" "	MOBILE
7.	SUN 12 MAR 95	1400 - 1700 HRS	DELTA	INSTILL CONFIDENCE IN LOCALS	FOOT/MOBILE

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A COY PATROL PLAN/PROGRAMME
FOR PERIOD 06 MAR - 12 MAR 95

SRL	DATE	TIME (HRS)	ROUTE	PURPOSE	REMARKS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
1.	MON 06 MAR 95	0800 - 1100 HRS 0800 - 1200 HRS	ALPHA GOLF	DOMINATE AREA " "	FOOT/MOBILE " "
2.	TUE 07 MAR 95	1000 - 1400 HRS 2100 - 0100 HRS	BRAVO HOTEL	INSTILL CONFIDENCE IN LOCALS	MOBILE
3.	WED 08 MAR 95	2100 - 0200 HRS	CHARLIE INDIA	DOMINATE AREA " "	FOOT/MOBILE " "
4.	THU 09 MAR 95	0900 - 1200 HRS 2000 - 2300 HRS	DELTA JULIET	DOMINATE AREA	MOBILE
5.	FRI 10 MAR 95	1900 - 2100 HRS 2000 - 2300 HRS	ECHO KILO	DOMINATE AREA " "	MOBILE "
6.	SAT 11 MAR 95	0900 - 1200 HRS 1000 - 1300 HRS	FOXTROT LIMA	DOMINATE AREA " "	MOBILE "
7.	SUN 12 MAR 95	0800 - 1100 HRS 0800 - 1200 HRS	GOLF ALPHA	INSTILL CONFIDENCE IN LOCALS " "	FOOT/MOBILE " "

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B COY PATROL PLAN/PROGRAMME
FOR PERIOD 06 MAR - 12 MAR 95

SRL	DATE	TIME (HRS)	ROUTE	PURPOSE	REMARKS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
1.	MON 06 MAR 95	0800 - 1230 HRS 1830 - 2230 HRS	ALPHA/2, 1&3 DELTA/5, 2&1	DOMINATE AREA	FOOT/MOBILE
2.	TUE 07 MAR 95	0700 - 1130 HRS	BRAVO/4, 3&5	INSTILL CONFIDENCE IN LOCALS	MOBILE
3.	WED 08 MAR 95	0700 - 1200 HRS	FOXTROT/6, 5&4	DOMINATE AREA	MOBILE
4.	THU 09 MAR 95	1000 - 1500 HRS	CHARLIE/1, 4&2	" "	"
5.	FRI 10 MAR 95	1600 - 2000 HRS	DELTA/5, 2&1	" "	FOOT/MOBILE
6.	SAT 11 MAR 95	0900 - 1300 HRS	ECHO/3, 6&6 ALPHA/2, 1&3	DOMINATE AREA " "	MOBILE "
7.	SUN 12 MAR 95	0800 - 1230 HRS	BRAVO/2, 3&5	INSTILL CONFIDENCE IN LOCALS	MOBILE

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C COY PATROL PLAN/PROGRAMME
FOR PERIOD 06 MAR - 12 MAR 95

SRL	DATE	TIME (HRS)	ROUTE	PURPOSE	REMARKS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
1.	MON 06 MAR 95	0800 - 1230 HRS 1830 - 2230 HRS	ALPHA FOXTROT	DOMINATE AREA " "	FOOT/MOBILE " "
.	TUE 07 MAR 95	0730 - 1130 HRS	GOLF	INSTILL CONFIDENCE IN LOCALS	FOOT/MOBILE
.	WED 08 MAR 95	0700 - 1200 HRS	BRAVO	DOMINATE AREA	MOBILE
4.	THU 09 MAR 95	1000 - 1500 HRS	CHARLIE	DOMINATE AREA	MOBILE
5.	FRI 10 MAR 95	1600 - 2000 HRS	DELTA	DOMINATE AREA	FOOT/MOBILE
6.	SAT 11 MAR 95	0900 - 1300 HRS 1830 - 2130 HRS	ALPHA FOXTROT	DOMINATE AREA	MOBILE
7.	SUN 12 MAR 95	0800 - 1200	ECHO	INSTILL CONFIDENCE IN LOCALS	MOBILE

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D COY PATROL PLAN/PROGRAMME
FOR PERIOD 06 MAR - 12 MAR 95

SRL	DATE	TIME (HRS)	ROUTE	PURPOSE	REMARKS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
1.	MON 06 MAR 95	0900 - 1300 HRS 1830 - 2230 HRS	ALPHA GOLF	DOMINATE AREA " "	FOOT/MOBILE
2.	TUE 07 MAR 95	1900 - 2130 HRS	BRAVO	FIND OUT PROBLEM OF POSSIBLE HARASSMENT	MOBILE
3.	WED 08 MAR 95	1000 - 1300 HRS	DELTA	FIND OUT NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN COMMUNES	FOOT/MOBILE
4.	THU 09 MAR 95	0730 - 1200 HRS 1800 - 2100 HRS	FOXTROT CHARLIE	INSTILL CONFIDENCE IN LOCALS " " " "	MOBILE "
5.	FRI 10 MAR 95	1900 - 2100 HRS	ECHO	" " " "	"
6.	SAT 11 MAR 95	0900 - 1300 HRS	FOXTROT	" " " "	"
7.	SUN 12 MAR 95	1400 - 1700 HRS	GOLF	" " " "	"

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