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IRELAND AND SCANDINAVIA

26 MAR-28 APR 1983

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programme

COMPOSITION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PARTY

The Secretary-General

Mrs. Pérez de Cuéllar

Mr. Brian E. Urquhart, Under-Secretary-General  
for Special Political Affairs (USSR only)

Mr. Viacheslav A. Ustinov, Under-Secretary-General  
Department of Political and Security Council Affairs  
(USSR only)

Mr. Diego Cordovez, Under-Secretary-General  
for Special Political Affairs (USSR only)

Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General for Namibia (Finland only)

Mr. Jan Martenson, Under-Secretary-General for  
Disarmament Affairs (Norway and Sweden only)

Mr. Peter Hansen, Assistant Secretary-General for  
Programme Planning and Co-operation (Denmark only)

Mr. Emilio de Olivares, Executive Assistant to the  
Secretary-General

Mr. Guennadi Yevstaf'iev, Special Assistant to the  
Secretary-General (USSR only)

Mr. Francois Giuliani, Spokesman for the Secretary-General

Mr. John Hrusovsky, Personal Administrative Assistant  
to the Secretary-General

Mr. Michael J. Stopford, Second Officer,  
Executive Office of the Secretary-General

Mr. Gerard Levtchenko, Administrative Officer

Ms. Mary-Ellen Martin, Secretary to the Secretary-General

programme

<u>Place</u>	<u>Hotel</u>	<u>Telephone</u>
London	Excelsior <del>Airport</del> Hotel	7596611
Paris	Plaza Athenee	3598523
Lisbon	Queluz <del>Palace</del>	637141
Dublin	Berkeley <del>Court</del> Hotel	785626
Reykjavik	Hotel Saga	29900
Copenhagen	Hotel Scandinavia	(1)112324
Helsinki	Hotel Kalastajatorppa	488011
Stockholm	Haga Palace	(8)850593
Oslo	Grand Hotel	334870
Moscow	Government Dacha	

23 March 1983  
JH/ddj

ITINERARY FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

<u>Date</u>	<u>Itinerary</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Hours from GMT</u>	<u>Airline and flight no.</u>	<u>Equip.</u>	<u>Stops</u>
Sat 26 March	Lv. New York (JFK) Arr. London (LHR) (Excelsior Airport Hotel)	1000 2140	-5 +1	BA 178	747	0
Sun 27 March	Lv. London (LHR) Arr. Moscow	1125 1705	+1 +3	SU 244	IL	0
Tues 29 March	Lv. Moscow Arr. Paris (CDG) (Hotel Plaza Athenee)	1850 2135	+3 +2	SU 576	IL	0
Fri 1 April	Lv. Paris (ORLY) Arr. Lisbon	1035 1155	+2 +1	AF 501	AB	0
Wed 6 April	Lv. Lisbon Arr. London (LHR) Lv. London (LHR) Arr. Dublin	0905 1135 1445 1555	+1 +1 +1 +1	PT 452 EI 165	727	0
Fri 8 April	Lv. Dublin Arr. Glasgow Lv. Glasgow Arr. Reykjavik	1420 1530 1600 1710	+1 +1 +1 0	Special Aircraft FI 233	727	0
Mon 11 April	Lv. Reykjavik Arr. Copenhagen	0730 1350	0 +2	FI 232	727	0
Wed 13 April	Lv. Copenhagen Arr. Helsinki	1640 1945	+2 +2	AY 814	DC-9	0
Sat 16 April	Lv. Helsinki Arr. Stockholm		+2 +2	Surface by boat		
Tues 19 April	Lv. Stockholm Arr. Oslo	1550 1645	+2 +2	SK 705	DC-9	0
Thur 21 April	Lv. Oslo Arr. Paris (CDG) (Hotel Plaza Athenee)	1640 1850	+2 +2	SK 569	DC-9	0
<del>26 April</del> <del>Tues 26 April</del>	<del>Lv. Paris 1300 hrs. 1300</del> <del>Lv. Paris (CDG)</del> <del>Arr. Frankfurt NY 1445 0835</del> <del>Lv. Frankfurt</del> <del>Arr. Addis Ababa</del>	<del>0725</del> <del>0835</del> <del>1005</del> <del>1910</del>	<del>+2</del> <del>+2</del> <del>+2</del> <del></del>	<del>LH 111</del> <del>LH 536</del>	<del>727</del> <del>707</del>	<del>0</del> <del>1</del> <del>(Khartoum)</del>
Wed 27 April	Lv. Addis Ababa Arr. Nairobi	1600 1745	0 0	KQ 473	DC-9	0
Thur 28 April	Lv. Nairobi Arr. London (LHR) Lv. London (LHR) Arr. New York (JFK)	0030 0705 1000 1235	0 +1 +1 -4	BA 54 TW 709	747 L1011	0 0
Wed 27 April	OR Lv. Addis Ababa Arr. Rome Overnight Panco dei Medici	1300 1820	0 +2	ET 706	727	0
Thu 28 April	Lv. Rome Arr. New York (JFK)	1050 1400	+1 -4	PA 111	747	0



ITINERARY FOR MRS. PEPEZ DE CUELLAR

*my prog  
office prog*

<u>Date</u>	<u>Itinerary</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Hours</u> <u>from</u> <u>GMT</u>	<u>Airline</u> <u>Flight No.</u>	<u>Equipmt.</u>	<u>Stops</u>
Sat. 26 March	Lv: New York Arr: London (LHR) Excelsior Airport Hotel	1000 2140	-5 +1	BA 178	747	0
Sun. 27 March	Lv: London (LHR) Arr: Paris (CDG)	1130 1330	+1 +2	AF 811	AB	0

same itinerary as Secretary-General

Saturday 26 March

10.00 Depart New York

21.40 Arrive London

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Sunday 27 March

11.25 Depart London

17.05 Arrive Moscow

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Monday, 28 March - MOSCOW

morning

conversation with FM Gromyko

LUNCHEON with FM Gromyko - TOASTS

afternoon

meeting with Soviet UNA

evening

show at Palace of Congresses

Tuesday, 29 March

early morning      meeting with General Secretary Andropov

Press conference (optional)

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6.50pm      Leave Moscow (SU-576)

9.35pm      Arrive Paris (CDG)

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Wednesday 30 March - ACC Meets in PARIS (UNESCO)

9.30 ACC - (Special Day on Development)  
(until 13.30)

13.30 Luncheon by Mr. M'Bow for ACC participants

1500 - 1545 - Call on President Mitterrand at Elysée  
Palace

1600 - 1645 - Call on Prime Minister Mauroy

1700 ACC Private Meeting (3 issues:

- 1) Political briefing by Secretary-General;
- 2) ILO Pension Question - proposal to  
ILO Governing Council on supplementary  
pension scheme;
- 3) Appointments -
  - a) Chairmanship of Task Force on Science  
and Technology
  - b) Coordination on New and Renewable  
Sources of Energy
  - c) Chairmanship of IOB

[ 18.30<sup>?</sup> Ambassador of Pakistan to France ]

Thursday, 31 March

9.30 Complete the private meeting, if necessary  
- regular business of ACC:

Item - Interagency cooperation and  
co-ordination

13.00 Buffet lunch by Mr. M'Bow

14.00 Items Emergencies, as requested by FAO  
Staff participation in ACC  
Review of operational activities for  
development (Mr. West)

20.15 Dinner by Foreign Minister Cheysson  
for some ACC members

Friday, 1 April - GOOD FRIDAY

10.35            Leave Paris (Orly) (AF-501)

11.55            Arrive Lisbon

12.30            Leave for Queluz Palace

12.45            Arrive at Queluz Palace

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Saturday, 2 April - private stay in Lisbon

EASTER Sunday, 3 April - private stay in Lisbon

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Monday, 4 April - in Lisbon

11.30 Meet Foreign Minister at Ministry for Foreign Affairs

13.15 (luncheon - private)

16.00 Meet Prime Minister at Sao Bento

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7.00pm Private meeting with the President of PORTUGAL

followed by:

Dinner (with ladies) by the President

Tuesday, 5 April - in Lisbon

11.00 visit to UNIC

13.00 Luncheon by the Prime Minister of Portugal

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16.00 Courtesy visit to President of the Assembly  
of the Republic

8.30pm Dinner by the Foreign Minister of PORTUGAL in honour  
of the SG and Mrs. Pérez de Cuéllar followed by  
dancing.

Wednesday, 6 April

8.15	Press Conference at Airport
9.05	Leave <del>Lisbon</del> (RG-762)
1.30	Arrive <del>London</del>
2.45	Leave <del>London</del> (EI 165)
3.55	Arrive <del>Dublin</del> Greeted by Minister for Foreign Affairs
16.30	Check in at Berkeley Court Hotel
17.15	Reception given in honour of Secretary-General by the Royal Irish Academy and Irish United Nations Association at Iveagh House (Department of Foreign Affairs)
18.30	Depart Iveagh House for Shelbourne Hotel
18.45	Private Dinner in the Shelbourne
20.00	Attend play "Translations" by Brian Friel at Abbey Theatre

Thursday, 7 April

IRELAND

10.00 Meeting with ~~the~~ President of the Republic

11.00 Talks at Iveagh House with Minister for Foreign Affairs

13.00 Working luncheon hosted by Minister for Foreign Affairs (Stag)

15.00 Press conference in Iveagh House

15.40 Visit to Trinity College, Dublin

*Visit to National Gallery of Art*

16.40 Return to Berkeley Court Hotel

20.00 Government dinner at Iveagh House (Black Tie)  
Hosted by Taniste (Deputy Prime Minister)  
Mr. Richard Spring

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Friday, 8 April

9.30 Depart hotel ~~for~~ scenic drive in Co. Wicklow

10.45 Coffee at the Roundwood Inn

12.00 Visit to ~~Russborough~~ House

12.30 Private luncheon at Downshire House Hotel, Blessington

13.50 Depart hotel ~~for~~ Baldonnell Military Airport

14.20 Depart Baldonnell ~~for~~ Glasgow by Irish Air Corps executive jet

15.30 Arrive ~~Prestwick~~ Airport, Glasgow

ICELAND

17.10 Arrival at Keflavik Airport  
(FI-233 from Glasgow)

18.10 Arrival Hotel Saga

19.30 Dinner given by Prime Minister Gunnar Thoroddsen  
at Hotel Borg

23.00 Depart Hotel Borg

23.10 Arrive Hotel Saga

Saturday, 9 April - ICELAND

9.25	Departure from Hotel Saga
9.30	Discussions with the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the Government Guest House
11.00	Departure from the Government Guest House
11.05	Arrival at the Árni Magnússon Manuscript Institute
11.30	Departure from the Árni Magnússon Manuscript Institute for Hotel Saga
12.05	Departure from Hotel Saga
12.30	Luncheon given by the President of Iceland at Bessastadir
14.45	Departure from Bessastadir
15.00	Arrival at the National Energy Authority Headquarters Opening ceremony of the United Nations University Geothermal Training Programme 1983
15.35	Departure for Hotel Saga
16.20	Departure from Hotel Saga
16.30	Lecture given by the Secretary-General in the University of Iceland and, Auditorium (sponsorship: the University of Iceland and the United Nations Association)
17.10	Departure from the University of Iceland
17.30	Press conference and TV interview at the Hotel Saga (Mimisbar)
19.50	Departure from Hotel Saga
19.30	Dinner given by the Mayor of Reykjavik at Kjarvalsstadir
23.00	Departure from Kjarvalsstadir

Sunday, April 10

9.00	Departure from Hotel Saga
9.10	Visit to the Althing where the Secretary-General will be received by the Speaker of the United Althing
9.45	Departure for Reykjavik Airport
10.00	Departure from Reykjavik Airport with a coast guard plane
10.45	Arrival at the Vestman Islands - Sight-seeing tour
12.30	Luncheon given by the Vestmanneyjar Town Council
14.30	Departure from the Vestman Islands. Short landing at Hornafjörður with a sight-seeing tour
17.00	Arrival at Reykjavik Airport
17.15	Arrival at Hotel Saga
18.50	Departure from Hotel Saga
19.00	Informal Dinner given by the Foreign Minister of Iceland and Mrs. Johannesson at the Government Guest House
22.00	Departure from the Government Guest House for Hotel Saga

Monday, 11 April

6.45 Depart Hotel Saga

7.30 Leave Reykjavik (FI232) from Keflavik Airport

DENMARK

13.50 Arrive Copenhagen Airport, Kastrup  
(Flight No. FI 232)

14.10 Arrive Hotel Scandinavia

14.50 Depart from Hotel Scandinavia

15.00 Talks with Mr. Poul Schlüter, Prime Minister,  
and Mr. Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Minister for  
Foreign Affairs, Christiansborg Palace

17.00 Depart for Hotel Scandinavia

19.50 Depart for Christiansborg Palace

20.00 Government dinner at Christiansborg Palace  
(Black tie)  
Hosts: Mr. Poul Schlüter, Prime Minister,  
and Mrs. Lisbeth Schlüter



Tuesday, 12 April - DENMARK

9.30	Depart from Hotel Scandinavia
9.45	Visit to the United Nations Information Office 37, H. C. Andersens Boulevard
10.30	Departure
10.45	Press Conference at Eigtveda Pakhus, 25, Strandgade followed by a radio and TV interview
12.15	Depart for Hotel Scandinavia
12.45	Depart for Frederiksberg City Hall
13.00	Luncheon at Frederiksberg City Hall Host: Mr. John Winther, Mayor
15.00	Departure
15.15	Visit to the UNICEF Packing and Assembly Centre 129, Arhusgade, Free Port
16.15	Departure
16.25	Visit to the Danish Parliament (Folketinget) at Christiansborg Palace
17.10	Departure
17.15	The Secretary-General will address a meeting arranged by the Danish United Nations Association at Fellessalen at Christiansborg Palace
18.30	Depart for Hotel Scandinavia
19.30	Depart for Marienborg
20.00	Informal dinner at Marienborg, Kgs. Lyngby Hosts: Mr. Poul Schlüter, Prime Minister and Mrs. Lisbeth Schlüter

Wednesday, 13 April

9.30 Depart from Hotel Scandinavia  
10.15 Visit to the Museum of Modern Art,  
Louisiana, Humlebak  
11.15 Depart for Elsinore  
11.30 Visit to Kronborg Castle, Elsinore  
12.30 Depart for Fredensborg Palace  
13.00 Luncheon offered by Her Majesty  
Queen Margrethe II NO TOASTS  
at Fredensborg Palace  
15.00 Departure  
16.40 Depart from Copenhagen Airport, Kastrup  
(Flight AY 814)

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4.40 Leave Copenhagen (AY-814)

19.45 / Arrive Helsinki  
Accommodation at Hotel Kalastajatorppa  
20.30 Private supper at Kalastajatorppa

Thursday, 14 April - FINLAND

9.30	Meeting with the Prime Minister
11.45	Visit to the Ministry of Defense (peace-keeping)
12.30	Luncheon given by the Mayor of Helsinki
14.30	Visit to the Parliament
15.30	Return to Kalastajatorppa
18.30	Short lecture by Secretary-General at the "Paasikivi" Society (Foreign Policy Association) in the chamber music hall of the Finlandia House; before or after the lecture a tour of the Finlandia House, if desired
20.00	Prime Minister's dinner (Smolna/Dark suit) (Formal - Black tie)

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Friday, 15 April - FINLAND

9.30 Meeting with the Foreign Minister

10.45 Sight-seeing in Helsinki

12.00 Audience with the President of the Republic

13.00 Luncheon given by the President of the Republic (with ladies)

14.45 Return to Kalastajatorppa

16.30 Press conference (Kalastajatorppa)

17.30 Foreign Minister's reception for representatives of the civic associations (Smolna)

19.00 ~~Opera - (Marriage of Figaro)~~

Saturday, 16 April

10.00	Departure for Turku
11.30	Visit to Turku Cathedral, accompanied by Archbishop John Vikstöm
12.15	Return to the hotel
13.00	Luncheon at "Hamburger Börs"
14.30	Tour arranged by the city of Turku of historically interesting places
19.30	Dinner given by the city of Turku at Turku Castle
21.30	Departure for Stockholm with M.S. "Svea Corona"

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Sunday, 17 April - SWEDEN

7.00	Arrival by boat from Turku - met by FM
7.15	Arrival and accommodation at Haga Palace
8.45	Departure Haga Palace
9.00	Departure Bromma Airport
9.50	Arrival Kalmar Airport
10.30	Visit to Orrefors Glassworks accompanied by Foreign Minister
12.30	Luncheon with the provincial governor (Kalmar) Mr. Erik Krönmark
14.45	Departure from Kalmar
15.30	Arrival Bromma
15.45	Arrival Haga Palace
20.00	Government dinner

Monday, 18 April - SWEDEN

10.00 Meeting with the Prime Minister, Mr. Olof Palme

12.30 Luncheon with H. M. the King - NO TOASTS

14.00 Meeting with the Foreign Minister,  
Mr. Lennart Roström

16.00 Joint press conference with Prime Minister

17.30 Reception for civic associations in Stockholm

Evening: Free for quiet dinner in Haga palace

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Tuesday, 19 April

8.00	Leave Haga Palace for Uppsala, accompanied by Defence Minister
8.45	Wreath-laying ceremony at Dag Hammarskjöld grave
9.00	Short visit to Hammarskjöld Foundation
9.30	Departure from Uppsala for Strängnäs
10.30	Arrive at Strängnäs to visit course for UN officers
11.30	Return to Stockholm
12.45	Meeting with the Speaker, Mr. Ingemund Bengtsson
13.00	Statement at a meeting of the Parliament
13.30	Luncheon given by the Speaker
15.00	Departure from the Parliament building
15.50	Departure Arlanda Airport (SK 705) (accompanied by Prime Minister)

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16.45	Arrive Oslo
16.50	Short meeting with the Norwegian press
17.00	Departure Fornebu
17.15	Arrival Grand Hotel (alternatively Parkveien 45)
19.55	Departure for Akershus Castle
20.00	Government dinner at Akershus Castle Hosts: Mr. Daare Willock, Prime Minister and Mrs. Willoch



Wednesday 20 April 1983

0855 hrs	Departure Grand Hotel for the Government Building
0900 hrs	Political talks with Mr. Kåre Willoch, Prime Minister, Mr. Sverre Strøm, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Anders C. Sjøaas, Minister of Defence
1030 hrs	Press Conference at the Prime Minister's Office
1105 hrs	Departure for the Storting (the Parliament)
1110 hrs	Arrival at the Storting
1115 hrs	Visit to the President of the Storting, Mr. Odvar Nordli
1130 hrs	Meeting with the Foreign Affairs' and Constitutional Committee
1225 hrs	Departure for Grand Hotel
1230 hrs	Arrival Grand Hotel
1300 hrs	Departure for the Royal Palace
1315 hrs	Audience given by His Majesty King Olav V
1330 hrs	Luncheon at the Royal Palace
1530 hrs	Festive meeting arranged by the Norwegian United Nations Association in the Festive Hall, University of Oslo
2000 hrs	Dinner at the Heftye House (Host: Mr. Albert Nordengen, Mayor of Oslo)

Thursday 21 April 1983

1015 hrs	Departure Grand Hotel
1030 hrs	Arrival Munch Museum
1135 hrs	Departure for Grorud Graveyard
1150 hrs	Arrival Grorud Graveyard
1155 hrs	The Secretary General will lay a wreath on the grave of Mr. Trygve Lie, Former Secretary General of the United Nations
1205 hrs	Departure for Gardemoen Military Base
1230 hrs	Luncheon
1340 hrs	Orientation about the Norwegian Peace Keeping activities, South Gardemoen
1620 hrs	Arrival Fornebu
1640 hrs	Departure by SK 569 to Paris

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1850 hours	Arrive Paris (CDG)
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Friday, 22 April - PARIS

Saturday, 23 April - PARIS

Sunday, 24 April - PARIS

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Monday, 25 April - Conference on Namibia in PARIS

Tuesday, 26 April

0725	Depart Paris
0835	Arrive Frankfurt
1005	Depart Frankfurt
1910	Arrive Addis Ababa

## AFGHANISTAN

(Points for general discussion)

1. The recent visit of the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General to the area has achieved the following results:

a) Both sides have accepted the Secretary-General's suggestion for a draft comprehensive settlement as a further basis for negotiations;

b) Agreement has been reached on the time relationship between the four elements of the comprehensive settlement (withdrawal of troops, return of refugees, non-interference in internal affairs, and international guarantees), which is to say, on the timing of the implementation.

c) Agreement has also been reached on the need to proceed with the consultations of the refugees as soon as possible.

d) It was understood that the forthcoming Geneva rounds of indirect talks would focus on further elaboration of the draft comprehensive settlement and on the mechanics of the consultations with the Afghan refugees. (The complexity of this procedure should not be under-estimated, as the Afghan refugees are not organized in one single structure. They are also disbursed in different countries. The timing of these consultations will also be discussed in Geneva.)

2. The support provided by the interlocutors has been encouraging so far, and this is the reason why the Secretary-General's Personal Representative suggested the negotiations be conducted in Geneva.

3. The Secretary-General intends to continue his efforts for a search for a political solution of the problem based on the principles of the United Nations Charter. He could not accept a solution under his aegis which would do away with those principles.

4. The Secretary-General has no reason to believe that the support provided to him by the parties would fade away in the future; the credibility of his own Office requires that concrete results should be achieved within a reasonable time span.

5. The structure of the government in Afghanistan is not the subject of the negotiations under the United Nations' auspices, as this might be interpreted as interference in internal affairs. It might happen, however, that when the four elements of the settlement are implemented, the internal situation in Afghanistan might present some changes with respect to the present situation. However, this should be the consequence of the expression of the free will of the Afghan people.



C Y P R U S

- urgent need for progress in intercommunal talks, whether on comprehensive settlement, stepped approach (first a weak central Government and resettlement of Varosha) or "mini-package";
- recall your recent meetings with President Kyprianou and General Saltik;
- confidentially, both Kyprianou and Papandreou more interested in internationalization;
- any new initiative by you assisted by Gobbi should wait till after the General Assembly debate;
- both sides need to show necessary political will;
- all friendly Governments could help by bringing their influence to bear on both sides, as well as Greece and Turkey.

24 March 1983

NOTE FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Prospects of the Cyprus negotiating process

1. The search, under the auspices of the Secretary-General, for a settlement of the Cyprus problem is entering a critical phase. One year and a half after the submission of the "evaluation" paper, the parties have been brought face to face with the few fundamental issues on which the shape of any settlement will depend. Both sides have stated publicly that if no progress is achieved by September 1983, a new negotiating format will have to be considered. In reality, what may have to be considered is whether, as a practical matter, the parties are ready for a negotiated solution at this time.

2. Three approaches have been used in the intercommunal talks: a comprehensive settlement (package deal, though implementation could come in stages), a stepped approach (one step to be agreed in advance leaving the substance of subsequent steps to be negotiated later), and a mini-package (initial practical measures, including Varosha resettlement, to improve the situation and facilitate later negotiation of the basic issues).

3. With regard to a comprehensive settlement, the talks have proceeded in the framework of the "evaluation" paper. The outstanding issues concern the system of government (presidential or council), safeguards (Turkish Cypriot representation and veto powers), territorial aspect (including Morphou) and related problems such as demilitarization, international guarantees and the "three freedoms" (of movement, residence and property). One illustration: the Turkish Cypriots demand veto rights that would enable them to block both the executive and the legislature, leading

.../2

back to de facto partition, except that the Greek Cypriots would have lost control of the internationally recognized Government of Cyprus. The Greek Cypriots demand a strong presidency and majority rule, leaving the Turkish Cypriots unprotected. In confidential conversations, Mavrommatis has indicated acceptance of veto rights similar in extent to those of 1960, provided there were an impartial conciliation/arbitration procedure to prevent impasse.

4. Concerning the stepped approach, Gobbi has urged a two-step scheme. The first step would involve establishment of a weak central government, in charge only of foreign affairs, with Kyprianou as President and Denktash as Vice President; resettlement of Varosha under UN auspices, enlargement of the buffer zone and partial troop withdrawals. Additional functions would be added gradually. The second step would be negotiated later. This approach circumvents many of the divisive issues, and Gobbi feels it may offer the best available option. The parties have yet to react to this suggestion, under which the Central Government could easily be blocked, and the Greek Cypriots would lose control of that Government.

5. Concerning a mini-package, Gobbi considers that this option could be revived if the others fail.

6. Even if the obstacles on the way to a comprehensive or other type of settlement can theoretically be overcome, it is not clear that the parties have the political will to do so, or the strength required for flexibility.

President Kyprianou meets with Prime Minister Papandreou on 7 April; after that meeting Gobbi hopes to produce an assessment of the prospects. He sees no hope of progress if the Greek Prime Minister insists on troop withdrawals as a precondition for negotiations.

7. As in the past, neither Kyprianou nor Denktash appears enthusiastic about a settlement, though for different reasons. Papandreou feels that a negotiated settlement at this time

is bound to favour the Turkish side. The Turks support continued talks, but have shown no desire so far to make concessions.

8. It is important to get the parties, during the next few months, to show flexibility, and, with the help of the Secretary-General and the SRSG, make an effort to bridge their differences. Specific formulas could be devised under any of the three available options, provided there is the will to compromise. In his forthcoming conversations, the Secretary-General may wish to make the following points:

- (a) Warn all concerned that a failure of the talks would not lead to indefinite maintenance of the status quo; rather it would lead to instability, including possible Turkish Cypriot moves toward UDI and final partition;
- (b) Urge all friendly Governments to bring their influence, and even pressure, to bear on both parties (as well as on Greece and Turkey) to show flexibility.
- (c) Indicate his intention to undertake, after the Cyprus debate in the General Assembly, a personal effort with the assistance of Gobbi to explore with both parties the negotiating margins in respect of the several fundamental issues, with a view to assessing the chances of achieving a breakthrough.

## DISARMAMENT

Have reached a critical juncture in efforts at disarmament;

- Talks in Geneva between US and USSR on intermediate and strategic weapons of utmost importance;
- Both President Reagan and General-Secretary Andropov ~~expressed~~ commitment to serious negotiations. You urge them to seize the current momentum.

Time especially ripe for disarmament with international public opinion calling for a halt to the arms race;

- Note that General Assembly launched a World Disarmament Campaign to promote public support for disarmament objectively in every region.

UN committed to disarmament. Major efforts in First Committee and in Geneva Committee on Disarmament (CD), which you addressed recently;

- In the CD, particularly hope for progress on nuclear-weapon test ban and production of chemical weapons.
- (for USSR). Note great importance attached to disarmament by Soviet Union and various proposals advanced. You share Soviet emphasis on paramount necessity of stopping nuclear arms race;

Appreciate support given by Soviet Union to UN work on disarmament in First Committee and Committee on Disarmament. Recall generous contribution to World Disarmament Campaign.

- (for Nordic countries). Note traditional strong support for disarmament, and emphasis given to link between disarmament and development. Welcome close co-operation Nordic countries in this field.

(For Sweden). Mention Mr. Palme's personal support for disarmament and study on "Common Security". You have asked the UN Disarmament Commission to consider the report.

## EAST TIMOR

1. President Suharto of Indonesia was re-elected for a fourth five-year term on 10 March. In Portugal, general elections are scheduled to be held on 25 April.

2. The political Declaration of the Non-Aligned Summit of New Delhi contains no reference to the question of East Timor.

3. In a speech before the Indonesian Consultative Assembly, President Suharto stated on 1 March that "the people of East Timor are physically and spiritually united with the people of Indonesia". He added that, "in view of the increasing number of other countries that have an objective understanding of the reality of the question, it can be hoped that, with more intensive diplomacy, the matter can be solved internationally in the not-so-distant future".

4. Indonesia has indicated that the camp on Atauro Island, where 3,200 Timorese are presently detained, will be closed by the end of this year. The population of the camp will be relocated in four new regions in East Timor.

5. On 2 February, Indonesia and the ICRC concluded an agreement on family reunion. The implementation of this agreement would allow a number of Timorese to migrate to Australia and Portugal.

6. After the Portuguese elections, the Secretary-General may wish to resume his efforts towards the holding of consultations between the two countries.

25 March 1983

## QUESTION OF THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS ISLANDS

1. The political declaration adopted at the conclusion of the Non-Aligned Summit meeting held in New Delhi contains virtually identical language to that contained in the Managua Declaration as regards the Falklands/Malvinas and thus represents a considerable strengthening of the draft prepared in New York.
2. The Heads of State or Government reiterated their firm support for the Republic of Argentina's right to have its sovereignty over the Malvinas restituted through negotiations with the participation and good offices of the Secretary-General taking into account the interests of the population of the Islands. The Conference recognized that the sovereignty dispute extended also to South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands as integral parts of the Latin American region and expressed its satisfaction with the solidarity and firm support of the Latin American and non-aligned countries to the Republic of Argentina in its efforts to prevent the consolidation of the colonial situation existing in those islands. The Conference also considered that "the massive military and naval presence" and the activities of the United Kingdom in the Malvinas Islands region were a cause for grave concern to the countries in the region and adversely affected stability in the area.
3. Despite these developments it seems doubtful that negotiations can be resumed until after the British and Argentine elections.

## Iran/Iraq

The United Nations has been engaged in mediation efforts since November 1980. Mr. Palme and Mr. Cordovez have made five visits to the area, the last in February 1982.

The UN effort has concentrated on securing an overall settlement in three stages:

- (a) acceptance of principles to govern relations between the two countries;
- (b) cease-fire and phased withdrawals to pre-war lines;
- (c) negotiations on substantive issues under UN auspices and conciliation on the Shatt-al-Arab issue.

Unfortunately, these efforts have not yet borne fruit.

During 1982, Iran launched three major drives and succeeded, at heavy cost, in recovering virtually all its occupied territory. Iraq now eagerly seeks peace. Iran still believes it can force a military settlement to achieve its demands, principally the condemnation of the aggressor and the payment by Iraq of reparations.

The mediation efforts since 1980 of the Non-aligned Movement and the Islamic Conference as well as those of Cuba, India and Algeria have also failed so far.


The seventh Non-aligned Summit at New Delhi was unable to agree on a statement on Iran/Iraq in its Final Declaration, leaving it to its President, Prime Minister Gandhi, to issue an appeal. Mrs. Gandhi has also indicated her intention, in her role as President of the Non-aligned Movement, to undertake a new mediation effort. She has informed the Secretary-General that she would keep him informed of those efforts.

\* \* \*

In your contacts in Moscow, you would wish to reaffirm that the United Nations is ready to reactivate its efforts whenever time is ripe. Mr. Palme, despite his heavy responsibilities, is also ready; his next mission could be undertaken, of course, only with the assurance of a significant outcome. Both parties have indicated their continued confidence in the Secretary-General and his efforts. However, the New Delhi Summit again indicated that Iran was not ready at this point to respond to those efforts. You yourself are ready to travel to the area and have so informed the parties.



You might also wish to refer to the assurances you received from the United States that it was maintaining a neutral stance and keeping its hands off regarding the Iran/Iraq situation. (The United States, as you recall, was particularly concerned that Iraq might mount a major attack on the Iranian oil facilities at Kharg Island.) You might wish to add that you had expressed your gratification to the United States and that you hoped that the USSR would also remain aloof, since an expansion of the war would be extremely tragic.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "D. A. [unclear]". The signature is written in a cursive, somewhat stylized font. It starts with a large, looped capital 'D', followed by 'A', and then a series of connected loops and strokes that form the rest of the name. The signature is positioned in the upper right quadrant of the page, below the typed text.

## KAMPUCHEA

1. The New Delhi Summit of Non-Aligned countries decided that the seat of Kampuchea would remain empty until the next Summit in 1985. The Declaration adopted in New Delhi stresses the urgent need to de-escalate the tensions in and around Kampuchea, through a comprehensive political solution providing for the withdrawal of all foreign forces. It also re-affirms the right of the people of Kampuchea to determine their own destiny and urges all States in the region to undertake a dialogue for the resolution of their differences.

2. Informal consultations held in New Delhi have led to the idea of a dialogue between the five ASEAN countries, Viet Nam and Laos, without the participation of the Heng Samrin régime. This idea has been strongly criticized by China and Democratic Kampuchea, who feel it might lead to a regional conference. In a joint statement issued on 23 March 1983, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers "take note of the idea" of a dialogue but point out that its purpose would be "to bring Viet Nam to the International Conference on Kampuchea". These terms of reference are likely to be unacceptable to Viet Nam.

3. The Chinese "five-point proposal" for a settlement in Kampuchea was made public on 1 March 1983. In this proposal, China indicated, for the first time, that talks on the normalization of relations with Hanoi could, under certain conditions, be resumed before the total withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea.

4. In a statement issued by the Indochinese Summit of 22-23 February, Viet Nam announced a "partial withdrawal" for 1983 and further withdrawals "each year" depending on the improvement of the security situation in Kampuchea. Total withdrawal remains linked to the end of the Chinese and Khmer Rouge "threats".

5. The second round of Sino/Soviet normalization talks ended on 21 March 1983. The Chinese side has indicated that no progress was achieved on Kampuchea, as the Soviet Union reiterated the view that its dialogue with China should not involve "third parties".

6. During talks with the Secretary-General in New Delhi, ASEAN and Viet Nam welcomed the idea of a new mission by Mr. Ahmed to Southeast Asia. Since then, Viet Nam has extended a formal invitation to Mr. Ahmed. The dates of the proposed mission are being discussed with the countries concerned.

25 March 1983

## MIDDLE EAST

Since invasion of Lebanon, several proposals for a solution of Middle East problem (Egypt/France, President Reagan, Fez Summit, Brezhnev);

- US engaged in diplomatic effort for withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon and implementation of Reagan plan with Jordanian participation. Little progress achieved but Hussein still to decide;
- UN not been able play significant role in Middle East recent years;
- But Security Council remains only framework for negotiations between all parties;

Deeply appreciate support given by Nordic countries and Ireland to UN peace-keeping operations;

- As for UNIFIL, mandate expires on 19 July but it may be given task of protecting Palestinian refugees;
- As for reimbursement of troop-contributing countries, you are making every effort to resolve financial difficulties of peace-keeping operations (mention Moscow visit and UNIFIL)

NAMIBIA1. Consultations by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has held consultations aimed at facilitating the implementation of Security Council resolution 435. Since returning from his visit to the Front Line States, he has held consultations on this matter with the Contact Group, South Africa, the Front Line States, Nigeria and SWAPO.

2. "Linkage" or "Parallelism"

This question has been introduced as an extraneous issue. UN position is well-known. However, implementation of Security Council resolution 435 without some movement on Cuban troop withdrawal is highly unlikely. The South Africans are saying "if Cuban question can be solved, we are in business". It is not possible to test South Africa's final attitude and Western governments ability to influence South Africa without some movement on this issue.

3. Front-Line Summit in Harare, Zimbabwe, 20 February 1983

Heads of the Front Line States met in Harare last month. The Angolans indicated that they were engaged in discussing the Cuban and South African troop withdrawals with South Africa and the United States. Decision was made to request a Security Council meeting in May to consider the question of Namibia.

4. Direct bilateral talksa. Meeting between Angola and South Africa in Cape Verde on 23 February 1983

This meeting did not produce concrete results. South Africa lowered the level of their delegation, using SWAPO's infiltration into Namibia (800 soldiers) as an excuse and holding Angolans responsible for this. Angolans have pointed out that the southern-most part of Angola is occupied by South Africa. How then could Angolan troops support SWAPO? President dos Santos has indicated, however, that Angola did not intend to break the contact with South Africa.

b. Meeting between Angola and the United States in Paris on 14-15 March 1983

Talks are said to be at a very critical point and difficult decisions have to be made. These talks are expected to continue in the near future.

c. Talks between the United States and South Africa in Washington during the week of 14 March 1983

Discussion between South African and United States' delegations took place last week for several days. The talks were said to have concentrated on regional and internal questions. The South African delegation consisted of both military and Foreign Service officials.

The Western Five feel that direct talks should be allowed to continue and take their time.

5. Security Council

The Council is expected to meet in May or June. There seems to be a move within the Front Line States to have a Council meeting in June under Zimbabwe's chairmanship.

The OAU summit will take place on 6 - 11 June 1983 in Addis Ababa and consultations will decide whether the Security Council will meet before or after the summit.

## I C E L A N D

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HEAD OF STATE: President Vigdís Finnbogadóttir. Graduated from the Junior College of Reykjavik and later studied French and French literature at the Universities of Grenoble and Sorbonne, and English and English literature at the University of Iceland. After a number of years as a teacher in French, she was Director of the Reykjavik Theatre Company from 1972 to 1980. She was elected President of Iceland in 1980 for a period ending on 31 July 1984. The President is divorced and lives with her adopted daughter Astridur.

PRIME MINISTER: Mr. Gunnar Thoroddsen. Academical career as Professor of Law and Judge of the Supreme Court. Former Mayor of Reykjavik and Ambassador to Denmark and Turkey. Minister of Finance 1959-65 and Minister of Industry, Energy and Social Affairs 1974-78. Parliamentary leader of the Independence Party 1973-79. Prime Minister since 1980.

FOREIGN MINISTER: Mr. Olafur Johannesson. Former Professor of Law. Delegate to the UN General Assembly 1946. Has been chairman and parliamentary leader of the Progressive Party. Prime Minister and Minister of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs 1971-74, Minister of Commerce and of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs 1974-78. Prime Minister 1978-79. Has written several books, mainly on constitutional law. Foreign Minister since 1980.

X MAYOR OF REYKJAVIK: Mr. David Oddsson. He was the Secretary-General of the United Nations Association of Iceland around 1975-76.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND  
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

CONFIDENTIAL

CC:LS:sf

14 March 1983

REPUBLIC OF ICELAND

## REPUBLIC OF ICELAND

### Relationship to the United Nations

Iceland has been a member of the United Nations since 19 November 1946. With a population of only 230,000 and a vulnerable economy heavily dependent on one depletable resource, fish, Iceland has generally maintained a low profile in international relations. However, Iceland has always viewed the United Nations as serving a much needed purpose and the country tries within its limited means to participate fully in the General Assembly and its immediate subsidiary bodies. A second important element of Icelandic foreign policy is cooperation with the Nordic countries, which is much reflected in Iceland's UN participation. A third pillar of Iceland's foreign policy is its membership in NATO, of which it is a founding member despite the fact the country maintains neither a defence ministry nor any armed forces. No changes in this broad foreign policy outline are expected as a result of the national elections scheduled for late April, when it is anticipated that a centre-right coalition will replace the present centre-left government.

Iceland has not held many elective posts within the United Nations, but rather has participated selectively in areas reflecting its special interests. The Law of the Sea has long been Iceland's main UN priority, first through the Sea-Bed Committee and then the Law of the Sea Conference, which it has served as a Vice President. The country is a member of virtually all the UN specialised agencies except WIPO and IFAD. Iceland currently serves on UNCTAD's Trade and Development Board and UNEP's Governing Council, and the country is now putting forward its candidature for the UNESCO and WHO Executive Boards. Iceland has taken an interest from the beginning in the United Nations University. The country's National Energy Authority is an associated institution of the UNU and it conducts training programmes in geothermal energy exploitation for Third World candidates in Iceland. For FAO projects, Reykjavik has over the years provided Icelandic fishing experts.

Iceland's contribution to the regular UN budget is currently assessed at 0.03 per cent, or a gross contribution of \$176,504 for 1983. For its size, Iceland makes significant contributions to UNDP (\$455,696 in 1982) and UNICEF (\$21,062 in 1982), and it has over the years provided \$76,657 for UNFICYP's operating costs. Reykjavik's other voluntary contributions to UN activities include the following pledges for 1983: \$30,200 to the UNHCR; \$20,000 to the World Food Programme; \$9,500 to UNRWA; \$8,700 to the International Emergency Food Reserve; \$6,000 for the Decade for Women; \$5,900 for UNDRG; \$5,000 for UNEP; and contributions to the Trust Funds for both Namibia and South Africa.

Iceland's Permanent Representative is Hördur Helgasson, who presented his credentials to Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar on 7 September 1982.

#### Foreign Policy on Questions before the United Nations

Iceland has traditionally supported efforts by UN Secretaries-General to strengthen the Organisation and the country indicated it will continue to do so when it co-sponsored General Assembly resolution 37/67 on the Secretary-General's Annual Report. During the General Debate, Iceland expressed particular concern over the UN's inability to promote the peaceful settlement of disputes because of Member States' failure to make proper use of the Charter machinery, especially the Security Council. With the Secretary-General's Report in mind, Iceland, in conjunction with the other Nordic countries, is continuing the study initiated in Helsinki last August on ways to strengthen the UN's ability to act in conflict situations - a study which may lead to the presentation of concrete proposals within the next half year.

Iceland signed the Law of the Sea Convention on 10 December 1982 in Kingston. Reykjavik has urged all countries to sign the Convention so as to avoid severe conflicts between States over law-of-the-sea issues and "thus take an important step towards the world structure to which we aspire in the Charter." Iceland has stated that the Convention's provisions on the 200-mile exclusive economic zone represent "formidable results" for a country so dependent on the sea. (Iceland's



gradual extension of its territorial waters to 200 miles in the 1970s brought it into conflict with Britain in cases that came before the International Court of Justice in 1972 and the Security Council in 1975 before being resolved outside the UN context.) Iceland also welcomed the Convention's articles on marine pollution and scientific research.

Iceland is a party to the major international agreements on partial disarmament negotiated within the UN framework over the past two decades, beginning with the Test-Ban Treaty of 1963. It has urged that the test-ban be made comprehensive and has appealed for all countries to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. With the Nordic countries, Iceland promotes UN activities on the relationship of disarmament to economic development. Two disarmament issues that concern Iceland nationally are increased armaments in the oceans, especially nuclear-armed submarines, and the emplacement of arms on the sea-bed. Iceland abstained on both nuclear arms freeze resolutions in the 37th General Assembly.

Iceland's head of state was the first to pay an official visit to the State of Israel after its formation, but the two countries' longstanding friendship has been somewhat affected by recent events, especially the invasion and occupation of Lebanon, which Iceland has directly condemned. Iceland takes the middle position of those expressed by West European countries, i.e., that a lasting Middle East solution must be based on resolutions 242 and 338 and must both safeguard the security of all States in the region and at the same time ensure justice for all peoples. Iceland supports the Palestinians' "right to participate in negotiations on their own future" and has welcomed both the Reagan proposals and the Fez declaration of last September.

Regarding southern Africa, Iceland's position is fully consonant with those of the Nordic group as a whole. It has condemned apartheid for many years; it conducts virtually no trade with South Africa and has taken measures against that country such as imposing visa requirements. Iceland, with its Nordic partners, has worked to discourage investments in South Africa and Namibia and has over the years actively supported

the UN Trust Funds for the region. Reykjavik supports the efforts of the Western Five to attain Namibian independence. Although it has made no explicit offer, Iceland is believed likely to want to play an appropriate role in later stages of implementation of resolution 435, such as providing funds, observers or civilian police for UNTAG.

On the question of Afghanistan, Iceland has voted for all GA resolutions calling for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all foreign military forces. Iceland supports the mission of the Secretary-General's Personal Representative in this context. Concerning Kampuchea, Iceland has stated its wholehearted support for General Assembly resolutions demanding the total withdrawal of all foreign forces.

Iceland has consistently given voluntary contributions to UNFICYP, but has not expressed itself concretely on the Cyprus issue itself. Iceland similarly has taken no strong stance regarding the Falklands/Malvinas dispute, and it abstained on resolution 37/9. Concerning Latin America in general, Iceland has voted for resolutions dealing with the human rights situations in such countries as El Salvador, Guatemala and Chile.

Iceland has ratified all the UN human rights instruments except the Convention against the Crime of Apartheid. It promotes the abolition of capital punishment and, with the other Nordic countries, has worked for the prohibition of torture and establishment and promotion of the Fund for the Victims of Torture. Reykjavik includes among the fundamental human rights "the right of every human being to an equitable share in the world's resources". Iceland was one of the early countries to ratify the Convention on the Taking of Hostages.

Iceland has been only marginally involved in the North-South dialogue, although it has followed with interest the work of the Committee of the Whole and other groups. The country's development aid has always been limited, falling well below the UN target of 0.7 per cent of GNP. The bulk of Iceland's multilateral aid has been channeled through UNDP, but Reykjavik is putting increasing emphasis on bilateral aid programmes, especially with African states. Iceland's major concern for the developing

world focuses on ensuring that every child has sufficient food, health care and education.

List of Principal Government Officials

President	Vigdís FINNBOGADÓTTIR
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Prime Minister	Gunnar THORODDSEN Independence Party (centre-right)
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Minister of Foreign Affairs	Ólafur JOHANNESSEN Progressive Party (centre)
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Minister of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs	Fridjon THORÐARSON Independence Party (centre-right)
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Minister of Finance	Bagnar AÐNÁLDS People's Union (centre-left)
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Minister of Fisheries	Steingrímur HERNÁNSSON Progressive Party (centre)
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*Blue file*

ICELAND

PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME  
(and in its predecessors: the Expanded Programme  
of Technical Assistance and the United Nations Special Fund)

UNDP assistance to Iceland

The Governing Council of the UNDP has approved an Indicative Planning Figure (IPF) of \$1.0 million for Iceland for the period 1972-1976. Iceland has relinquished its IPF for the period 1977-1981.

As of 30 June 1980, 10 UNDP-assisted projects were approved for Iceland. <sup>1/</sup> These projects are estimated to cost upon completion the equivalent of \$1.2 million. Of this amount, the UNDP is contributing \$917,679 and the Government of Iceland is contributing the equivalent of \$238,707 in cash and in kind.

Use of experts from Iceland

During 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980 and 1981, nationals filled respectively 20, 18, 14, 20, 20 and 14 expert assignments in the implementation of UNDP-assisted projects.

Use of equipment from Iceland

During 1980, orders for project equipment placed with suppliers in Iceland amounted to an estimated \$3,000 with the aggregate since 1959 coming to some \$12,000.

Fellowship for advanced training hosted by Iceland

During 1980, 3 fellowships were granted under UNDP-assisted projects for study in Iceland, for a total, since 1959, of 15.

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<sup>1/</sup> Excludes completed projects for which final accounts have been rendered.

## ICELAND

The economy is currently in severe recession caused by a large decline in cod and capelin landings, as well as sluggish foreign demand. Measures were taken in August 1982 to try to adjust to these depressed conditions, including a 13 per cent devaluation of the krona, curbs on prices to fishermen and farmers, and a large reduction in the price compensation of wages due at the

**ICELAND**  
**Demand, output and prices**  
Percentage changes, volume (1980 prices)

	1981 current prices million I. Kr.	1981	1982	1983
Private consumption	13 240	5.0	2	-6
Government consumption	2 455	3.0	2	0
Gross fixed capital formation	5 554	2.1	-4½	-6
Final domestic demand	21 249	4.0	½	-5½
* change in stockbuilding	231 <sup>a</sup>	0.4	½	-1½
Total domestic demand	21 480	4.4	¾	-6½
Exports of goods and services	8 902	2.1	-9½	6
Imports of goods and services	9 910	8.5	¼	-5
* change in foreign balance	-1 008 <sup>a</sup>	-3.0	-4½	5
GNP at market prices	20 472	1.5	-3½	-2½
GNP implicit price deflator	-	50.1	52	55
<i>Memorandum item</i>				
Consumer prices <sup>b</sup>	-	50.9	50	55

\* As a percentage of GNP in the previous period.

<sup>a</sup> Actual amount of stockbuilding and foreign balance.

<sup>b</sup> Consumer price index.

start of December. The prospective indexation rise of wages will be reduced by one-half, on top of a 3 per cent reduction in the September settlement. These reductions will entail a large reduction in real incomes. Consumption, which so far has held up, can therefore be expected to decline substantially. Gross fixed investment has already begun to decline and is expected to fall by over 10 per cent over the two years 1982 and 1983. With government consumption growth weak and a projected negative impact from stockbuilding, total domestic demand could fall by 6 to 7 per cent in 1983. The outcome is however sensitive to the fishing prospects, which are very uncertain. The current balance is expected to deteriorate substantially this year, reflecting a reduction in exports of fish products of around 15 to 20 per cent. With the possibility of some pick-up in exports during 1983 and with the likelihood of a substantial fall in imports, reflecting the depressed state of the economy, the current external deficit could decline from around 10 per cent of GDP in 1982 to about 6 per cent in 1983. This assumes a continuing depreciation of the krona and little change in the terms of trade. The rate of inflation, which accelerated to about 60 per cent in the course of 1982, prompting the August measures, may fall back somewhat. Nevertheless it is still likely to average about 55 per cent for 1983 as a whole.

Quarterly Economic Review of  
**Denmark, Iceland**

U.N.D.P. Reference Unit  
DC 1945

13 JAN 1983

**Annual Supplement 1982**



**The Economist  
Intelligence Unit**

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ICELAND

## GOVERNMENT AND GENERAL

Iceland has been an independent state since 1918. Up to 1944 it was a monarchy, united with Denmark only by possessing the same king, and in that year it became a republic by referendum. The Althing (parliament) consists of 60 members and is divided into two houses. It is elected at least every four years, by proportional representation.

The last general election was held on December 2-3, 1979. The result was a swing to the centre. The election was called by the Social Democrats (who had broken out of the centre left coalition) and the opposition Independence Party (conservative).

Seats in the Althing by Political Parties

	Election <u>Jun 1978</u>	Election <u>Dec 1979</u>
Independence Party (conservative)	20	22
Progressive Party (liberal)	12	17
Social Democrats	14	10
People's Alliance (left wing communist)	<u>14</u>	<u>11</u>
Total	60	60

After the 1979 election five MPs of the Independence Party formed a new coalition with the Progressive Party and the People's Alliance. The prime minister is Mr Gunnar Thoroddsen, aged 70, former deputy leader of the IP. The cabinet consists of four ministers from the Progressive Party and three from each of the other two.

Economic policy

Economic policy is concentrated on reducing inflation and keeping full employment. The turmoil on the labour market resulting partly from the unstable political situation of 1979 prevented any success in reducing inflation in 1980, but new economic measures were introduced at the beginning of 1981 which had some success during the first half of the year. In 1982, however, inflation has increased again following a weakened krona which in turn is due to a reduced fish catch.

The cost of living rose by 6.8 per cent in 1971, 10.4 per cent in 1972, 22.1 per cent in 1973, 43 per cent in 1974, 49 per cent in 1975, 36 per cent in 1976, 37 per cent in 1977 and around 50 per cent per annum over 1978-80. In 1981, it increased by 42 per cent but is expected to climb by about 60 per cent in 1982.

Fishing limits

On September 1, 1972, Iceland unilaterally extended its fishing limits to 50 miles. This led to a dispute, especially with the British and the West Germans, and to British naval intervention. An interim agreement was reached with the UK in 1973.

On October 15, 1975, the fishing limits were extended to 200 miles, leading to another British naval intervention, the third in two decades, but an agreement was reached in April 1976 with the UK which had earlier been reached with other EEC countries. The extension has proved successful in strengthening some fish stocks including the important cod stock but strong conservation measures are still needed to prevent overfishing.

The 1973 eruption

A significant shock to the economy occurred on January 23, 1973, when a volcanic eruption started in Heimaey, temporarily putting out of action the fishing town of Vestmannaeyjar (population 5,300), and destroying about 400 houses and an important fish processing plant, before the eruption ended in June the same year. In addition to the drastic loss of property, this considerably limited the productive capacity of the fish processing industry in 1973, although rising prices on export markets lessened the effects in that year. Reconstruction has almost been completed and most of the inhabitants are back in the town. The fishing harbour there was actually improved by the eruption. The eruption was a considerable contributor to inflation in 1973.

CURRENCY

After a strong period in 1973, when the krona was revalued twice, it was devalued in 1974 and again in February 1975. Since 1975 the krona has continuously fallen in value as inflation has been greater than elsewhere.

In autumn 1981 and 1982 rates for the krona against major currencies were as shown below (sales rates).

	<u>Kronur</u>	
	<u>Nov 17, 1981</u>	<u>Oct 25, 1982</u>
\$1	8.18	15.67
£1	15.609	26.38
DM1	3.638	6.138
1 Danish krone	1.133	1.746

In addition to these rates, tourists going abroad have to pay 10 per cent tax on foreign currency.

On January 1, 1981, a currency change took place, when the new krona was valued at 100 times the old one.



## APPENDIX - 3 FOREIGN TRADE OF ICELAND January-September

mn kronur

	Total		USA		UK		Portugal		USSR	
	1981	1982	1981	1982	1981	1982	1981	1982	1981	1982
Exports, fob										
Fish, fresh, frozen & salted, etc	3,054	3,926	950	1,425	312	469	565	733	256	429
Fish meal & whale meal	232	162	-	-	23	44	3	3	-	-
Fish oil & whale oil	136	132	1	1	99	88	-	-	-	-
Aluminium & alloys	433	542	-	-	98	72	-	-	-	-
Total, including other items	4,487	5,657	1,024	1,522	586	758	568	736	318	489
Imports, cif	Total		W Germany		Denmark		UK		Sweden	
Cereals & products	96	142	10	9	9	16	13	17	5	8
Fruit, vegetables & products	95	174	4	8	5	9	3	4	1	1
Sugar & products	53	53	6	7	35	30	5	7	-	1
Coffee, cocoa, tea & spices	84	108	4	7	3	4	10	14	-	1
Animal feeding stuffs	50	97	2	30	42	55	2	3	-	1
Wood, lumber & cork	104	144	-	1	11	9	-	-	21	46
Metalliferous ores & scrap	127	214	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Petroleum & products	789	1,092	106	8	24	10	39	78	12	1
Chemicals	385	571	56	111	52	77	63	79	34	57
Rubber manufactures	58	103	7	15	3	5	8	13	3	7
Wood & cork manufactures	95	181	4	9	15	34	2	2	16	26
Paper & manufactures	143	233	12	27	7	16	10	20	41	61
Textile yarn, cloth & manufactures	183	282	21	38	19	27	20	29	8	11
Non-metallic mineral manufactures	78	131	8	21	9	20	8	10	9	18
Base metals	176	279	42	65	12	24	12	23	18	35
Metal manufactures	232	315	32	65	21	36	31	48	28	38
Machinery, including electric	968	1,524	168	258	65	113	69	141	138	167
Transport equipment	426	915	57	161	7	96	12	63	61	117
Clothing	170	310	13	30	26	45	30	52	8	10
Footwear	54	83	6	13	2	5	5	6	1	1
Scientific instruments, etc	101	170	19	34	8	12	15	28	4	6
Total, including other items	5,027	8,042	623	1,014	460	781	405	737	451	687

## ICELAND

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HEAD OF STATE: President Vigdís Finnbogadóttir. Graduated from the Junior College of Reykjavik and later studied French and French literature at the Universities of Grenoble and Sorbonne, and English and English literature at the University of Iceland. After a number of years as a teacher in French, she was Director of the Reykjavik Theatre Company from 1972 to 1980. She was elected President of Iceland in 1980 for a period ending on 31 July 1984. The President is divorced and lives with her adopted daughter Astridur.

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OECD  
ECONOMIC SURVEYS  
1981-1982

ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT

ICELAND

ORGANISATION DE COOPÉRATION ET DE DÉVELOPPEMENT ÉCONOMIQUES

JUNE 1982



## II. ECONOMIC POLICY

### *Fiscal policy*

The fiscal Budget has been improving for many years and is expected to be in slight surplus in 1982 for the second year in succession<sup>28</sup>. The revenue balance (total revenue in excess of total expenditure) is projected to amount to 0.7 per cent of total revenue, compared with an outturn of 1.4 per cent in 1981<sup>29</sup>. After taking into account the financial transactions outside the Central Bank, the cash surplus is projected to amount to 1.8 per cent of total revenue, allowing further debt repayments to the Central Bank of 120 million kronur (Table 9). As there has been a cash surplus since 1979—following six years of deficit—the Treasury's outstanding debt with the Central Bank has been greatly reduced. In 1981, the revenue balance turned out to be more favourable than anticipated, the first time that this has happened for many years. The normal pattern has been for both revenues and expenditures to be grossly underestimated in the Budget but with the overruns on expenditure being larger than on revenues.

26. This eventuated in a 7 per cent wage compensation, some 2½ per cent less than the rise in the cost-of-living index.

27. Price controls, which have been used in Iceland for many years, have been relaxed slightly in recent years. Since 1979 the Price Control Board has been able to abolish controls on goods where there is effective competition. At the beginning of this year, a further change was made so that the Cabinet no longer needs to approve decisions of the Board. The intention is to allow some liberalisation to occur, but with the threat of reintroduction remaining to be used if necessary.

28. The fiscal budget is the annual account of central government revenue and expenditure. In addition, there is an investment and credit budget, which describes investment and credit projections for the coming year including net borrowing and lending positions, and a national budget which presents projections for national economic aggregates.

29. The 1982 Budget proposals introduced in October 1981 provided for a revenue balance equal to 1.9 per cent of total revenue; this was revised down to 0.7 per cent in the amended Budget passed in December. In the new measures in January, expenditure cuts of Kr. 120 million have been announced, but as part of the package to pay for the increases in consumer subsidies. These were announced after the Budget was passed.

Table 9. Central government revenue and expenditure, 1977-1982  
Million kronur, cash basis

	1977		1978		1979		1980		1981		1982
	Budget	Outcome	Budget	Outcome	Budget	Outcome	Budget	Outcome	Budget	Outcome <sup>1</sup>	Budget <sup>2</sup>
Revenue	900	956	1 395	1 543	2 090	2 378	3 462	3 681	5 515	5 997	7 967
Expenditure	892	1 011	1 385	1 611	2 023	2 467	3 432	3 766	5 457	5 911	7 909
Revenue balance	8	-55	10	-68	67	-89	29	-85	57	86	58
Financial transactions outside Central Bank	21	34	26	29	14	30	75	75	84	100	102
Miscellaneous liabilities	—	4	—	2	-5	82	-8	72	-13	-14	-15
Cash balance	29	-18	36	-38	76	23	96	62	128	172	145
Of which: Central Bank	23	-21	32	-46	51	22	81	45	100	158	120
Percentage ratios of revenue:											
Revenue balance	0.9	-5.8	0.7	-4.4	3.2	-3.7	0.8	-2.3	1.0	1.4	0.7
Cash balance	3.2	-1.9	2.6	-2.5	3.6	1.0	2.8	1.7	2.3	2.9	1.8

1. Preliminary.

2. Passed in December 1981 with slightly smaller revenue and cash balances than in the October 1981 proposed Budget.

Source: Central Bank of Iceland.

In the latter part of the 1970s, this phenomena led to the outturn on the revenue balance being 6-7 per cent in greater deficit than projected in the preceding Budget. The underestimation of revenue and expenditure continues—in 1981 the outcomes were 8.7 and 8.3 per cent higher than budgeted—but at least the balance, reflecting the gross impact of the Budget on the economy, appears to have been better controlled. Underestimation of both sides of the account is to be expected, given government inflation targets which have consistently proved over-ambitious<sup>30</sup>.

During 1981, revenues increased by 63 per cent whilst expenditures grew by 57 per cent, which may have represented a fall in real terms. The yield of import duties was much higher than expected because of the strong surge in imports in anticipation of the krona depreciation. As a proportion of total revenues, however, import duties are now much lower than they were about ten years ago because of accession to EFTA and as a result of trade agreements with the EEC. The share of direct taxes has been increasing over the last few years but still represents only about 17 per cent of the total (Table 10). Overall, however, the shares of different taxes have remained fairly stable and over the last five years there has been no very significant change in tax structures as occurred in 1974 with the large switch from direct to sales tax or in 1975 with the new special excise tax. Total taxes as a share of GDP have, however, risen gradually from around 23 per cent at the start of the 1970s to over 30 per cent by 1981. Expenditures have similarly risen and there has been no significant imbalance in the Budget in recent years. The main area of increased expenditure has been social security transfers, which rose from 22½ per cent to 27½ per cent of total expenditure between 1977 and 1980. The new measures of January 1982, increasing consumer subsidies by around 350 million kronur, will push up the share of subsidies in expenditure by almost 5 per cent taking them to over 10 per cent of the total.

Table 10. Treasury revenue by category<sup>1</sup>  
Percentage shares in total revenue

	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981 <sup>2</sup>	1982 <sup>3</sup>
Direct taxes	22.9	15.7	12.0	12.9	11.0	17.1	18.6	16.5	15.3	17.1
Indirect taxes	75.9	83.2	86.6	85.5	87.1	81.1	79.3	80.9	83.2	81.4
Of which:										
Sales tax	23.0	31.4	35.0	34.8	36.1	32.7	31.2	34.8	35.1	35.2
Liquor tax	8.9	8.7	9.3	8.6	8.2	7.6	7.0	6.7	6.8	6.7
Excise tax	0.7	0.5	2.7	5.7	6.2	5.5	6.2	7.0	7.4	7.2
Import duties	30.9	29.4	24.4	20.9	21.7	21.1	18.4	16.2	19.7	17.7
Other revenue	1.2	1.0	1.5	1.6	1.9	1.8	2.1	2.6	1.5	1.5
Total revenue as per cent of GNP	25.7	26.7	26.5	26.8	26.3	28.3	29.3	29.6	[29.7] <sup>4</sup>	..

1. Figures for 1973-1980 are on an accruals basis; 1981 and 1982 data are on a cash basis.

2. Preliminary.

3. Approved Budget figures; earlier figures refer to outturns.

4. This figure is on a cash basis; on an accruals basis, the ratio is likely to be about 2 percentage points higher.

Source: Central Bank of Iceland.

30. It would be surprising if the 1982 Budget projections, which indicate increases in revenue and expenditure of around 33 per cent over 1981 outcomes, were not again to be missed by substantial amounts, especially as the government's inflation target is around 40 per cent. This is the target in year-on-year terms as relevant here; the targets are approximately 5 per cent lower in through-the-year terms.



Alongside the conventional fiscal Budget, which covers central government revenues and expenditures, there is a credit Budget which draws together the source and destination for all major types of loans. The role of this special Budget, which is now presented annually to the Althing, is to aid the co-ordination of monetary policy decisions. It indicates both the extent of borrowing envisaged by the Government and the method financing, with obvious implications for the growth of monetary aggregates. The credit Budget is thus an extension of the fiscal Budget<sup>31</sup>. The latter suggests that the policy stance over the last few years has been neutral, whereas if account is taken of the credit Budget, it is clear that the Government has been a strong net borrower of credit—albeit for investment purposes—and that policy has been expansionary.

A large part of government investment is included in the credit Budget. Furthermore, the number of projects covered by the credit Budget has been tending to increase, amounting to around 11½ per cent of budgeted Treasury expenditure in 1981 and nearly 14 per cent in 1982. Much of this expenditure is in energy projects but there are also significant amounts in posts and telegraphs, shipping and the fertiliser company. The credit Budget, however, attempts to describe not only government borrowing for investment purposes but also investment and credit projections for the whole economy. Apart from the Treasury's own expenditure on investment, borrowing projections are given

Table 11. Credit financing of government investment  
Million kronur

	1980	1981 <sup>1</sup>	1982 <sup>2</sup>
<b>Use of funds</b>			
A- Budget	128	239	374
Road construction	95	136	200
Other	33	103	174
B- Budget	268	413	799
Energy investment	152	256	395
Interest cost	42	56	130
Other	74	101	274
Total	396	652	1 173
<b>Source of funds</b>			
Foreign borrowing	146	332	718
Domestic borrowing	250 <sup>3</sup>	320	455
New savings certificates	70	51	150
Savings certificates <sup>4</sup>	98	110	107
Banks and pension funds	49	133	143
Other	20	26	55
Treasury borrowing	396	652	1 173
<b>Memorandum items:</b>			
Foreign borrowing as per cent of Treasury borrowing	37	48	60
Treasury borrowing as per cent of GNP	3.0	3.2	4.1

1. Preliminary outcome.  
2. Credit budget.  
3. Includes Kr. 13 million of provisional financing.  
4. Includes amortisation of rent receipts from previous sales of savings certificates, net.  
Source: Central Bank of Iceland.

31. In most countries, many items of the credit Budget are conventionally included in the fiscal Budget. This is a matter of definition but one which is important in interpreting the stance of fiscal policy.

for other public enterprises, such as the National Power Company and municipal water works, and for investment credit funds for housing and industrial development.

The strictly Treasury part of the 1981 credit Budget represented about one-third of total investment funds, with approximately the same shares being attributable to other public enterprises and to the investment credit funds. The 1982 credit Budget envisages a much larger requirement for funds for investment on the Treasury's A and B budgets rising from 652 million kronur in 1981 to 1 173 million kronur in 1982 (Table 11). Although the expectation is for larger domestic borrowing, arising largely from higher sales of new savings certificates (reflecting the change from five to three-year blocked accounts and a higher rate of interest), the main source of funds is expected to be foreign borrowing. A large rise in foreign borrowing for Treasury-sponsored investment, mainly in road construction and energy investment but also including considerable interest costs, is projected despite the desire of the authorities to try and increase the emphasis of domestic borrowing at a time of rising domestic financial savings. The amount of projected foreign borrowing more than doubles when borrowing on behalf of public enterprises and the investment credit funds are included and represents 60 per cent of all borrowing by governmental and quasi-governmental bodies, the equivalent of one-third of targeted expenditure in the main 1982 fiscal Budget. The overall cash and revenue surpluses projected for 1982 in the fiscal Budget must therefore be viewed in the context of strong and rapidly rising off-Budget borrowing, especially from abroad. This not only complicates the assessment of the fiscal stance, but also has important consequences for monetary growth.

#### *Monetary policy*

The credit Budget sets out monetary and credit targets for the banking system, taking into account the official forecasts of inflation and activity in the coming year and any special institutional factors such as the move to full value-linking of credit terms. The targets, however, are not adhered to if conditions in the economy turn out to be different from those projected. In 1981, the inflation rate was at least 10 per cent more than assumed and all the monetary targets were missed by large amounts; the broad money (M3) target for example was 48 per cent compared with an outcome of over 70 per cent. The 1982 Budget does not include an official inflation target, in part because of the uncertainty concerning the forthcoming wage negotiations. The Budget forecasts are therefore based on provisional inflation assumptions—a 33 per cent average rise between 1981 and 1982 and a 25 per cent rise within 1982—but in the light of the January measures these have already had to be revised up to around 40 and 35 per cent respectively. Accordingly, the provisional targets of a 30 per cent increase in bank lending and of 30 to 35 per cent for the various money supply measures no longer apply.

Despite the authorities' anti-inflation objective, monetary targets have consistently been exceeded. In general, the inflation objective has proved subservient to other goals, most notably export profitability and full employment, whenever conflicts between the various policy objectives have arisen. This occurred in 1981 when it had been hoped that stabilising the exchange rate would put strong downward pressure on inflation. In the early months of the year the exchange rate was held roughly stable<sup>32</sup> and the anti-inflation objective was adhered to,

32. The krona had been linked to the US dollar but with the latter appreciating excessively, a downward adjustment was made and it was decided to try to stabilise the trade-weighted value of the krona instead.



Table 5

UNDP: Number of Experts Serving in the Field,  
by Nationality of Experts <sup>a/</sup>  
1972-1981

Nationality of Expert	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
Afghanistan	4	6	5	7	5	4	3	4	5	6
Algeria	6	5	9	8	11	8	8	9	15	10
Angola	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2
Argentina	161	166	206	252	206	156	137	182	181	181
Australia	210	216	191	270	220	135	139	163	217	210
Austria	73	42	42	82	57	39	48	58	75	76
Bahrain	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Bangladesh	5	5	8	13	12	8	15	14	29	47
Barbados	2	6	5	6	2	1	4	5	4	3
Belgium	330	300	302	273	275	203	222	208	283	290
Belize	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Benin	7	7	8	8	6	6	11	9	16	15
Bolivia	27	31	39	43	35	22	16	18	40	40
Botswana	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
Brazil	60	48	53	62	45	33	23	41	55	69
British Virgin Islands	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
Bulgaria	43	42	40	39	23	18	21	26	23	35
Burma	6	6	4	6	6	2	2	9	12	12
Burundi	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	1	2	1
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic	3	2	3	3	-	-	-	-	-	-
Canada	305	325	373	337	206	162	167	223	275	269
Cayman Islands	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Central African Republic	-	1	1	5	-	-	1	1	1	2
Chad	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	1
Chile	157	153	214	256	227	159	169	222	231	197
China	-	-	-	-	-	7	5	3	9	13
Colombia	69	69	80	110	99	64	59	109	85	117
Congo	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	8
Costa Rica	20	25	19	16	11	11	11	17	18	24
Cuba	6	8	6	7	7	4	9	13	11	16
Cyprus	7	7	8	18	13	11	14	15	14	10
Czechoslovakia	131	68	78	91	66	45	45	47	65	88
Democratic Kampuchea	2	3	7	1	2	2	1	2	1	-
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
Democratic Yemen	-	-	1	4	1	1	1	1	1	-
Denmark	129	109	117	100	94	76	89	70	107	91
Dominica	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Dominican Republic	2	4	3	4	5	4	1	2	2	2
Ecuador	28	31	34	34	30	18	16	27	52	19
Egypt	242	204	231	239	223	170	134	160	169	159
El Salvador	9	15	8	5	10	11	3	7	6	10
Equatorial Guinea	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ethiopia	5	4	6	10	10	8	12	19	30	27
Fiji	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	4	6
Finland	47	54	119	62	53	49	55	63	69	54
France	1,356	1,324	1,169	1,144	806	625	652	783	896	846
Gambia	2	1	-	1	2	3	3	2	3	2
German Democratic Republic	-	-	-	3	3	-	4	26	15	11
Germany, Fed. Rep. of	352	350	355	376	279	249	229	200	316	280
Ghana	6	6	11	25	19	9	9	18	26	44
Greece	30	26	33	29	20	14	11	13	16	28
Grenada	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-
Guatemala	12	8	10	15	15	12	12	12	15	11
Guinea	-	3	1	4	2	1	-	-	2	13
Guyana	9	10	16	10	9	6	6	11	14	24
Haiti	52	45	44	33	27	19	25	26	33	42
Honduras	1	2	2	5	7	7	1	6	20	11
Hong Kong	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	1
Hungary	92	90	59	52	45	40	38	50	62	92
Iceland	25	17	18	22	20	18	14	20	20	14
India	475	446	472	538	465	408	453	469	547	589
Indonesia	34	8	8	13	10	18	19	55	64	55
Iran	13	16	10	6	4	5	3	4	11	12
Iraq	17	19	19	17	12	12	13	16	17	14
Ireland	39	37	36	50	40	28	40	35	44	48
Israel	131	119	100	136	118	77	75	74	78	55
Italy	290	216	233	249	169	160	134	190	259	250
Ivory Coast	2	1	1	8	-	1	-	5	3	1

<sup>a/</sup> Data shown in this table cover projects financed under the Indicative Planning Figures (IPF), Programme Reserve, the Special Measures Fund for Least Developed Countries, the Special Industrial Services and Cost Sharing and include experts who were members of firms and organizations working under subcontract to the Participating and Executing Agencies.

Table 6 (continued)  
UNDP: Equipment Ordered for Projects, by Country or Area of Procurement a/  
1972-1981

(thousand dollars)

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	TOTAL	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	TOTAL	GRAND TOTAL
Iceland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	3	3
India	103	127	301	238	273	1,042	192	392	604	923	2,712	4,823	5,865
Indonesia	4	60	98	153	17	332	57	392	270	194	442	1,355	1,687
Iran	30	22	39	95	84	270	23	48	10	-	-	81	351
Iraq	-	9	-4	2	-	7	1	87	32	40	13	173	180
Ireland	6	-	-	9	17	32	1	-	3	1	3	8	40
Israel	11	77	-1	-	77	164	20	1	16	47	131	215	379
Italy	747	639	1,002	2,560	761	5,709	365	1,559	2,734	2,981	5,341	12,980	18,689
Ivory Coast	58	155	94	213	12	532	2	146	56	16	43	263	795
Jamaica	49	16	64	34	52	215	5	4	14	322	102	447	662
Japan	1,964	2,618	3,000	3,538	1,602	12,722	3,345	7,088	9,429	12,120	15,460	47,442	60,164
Jordan	12	43	17	88	30	190	6	14	57	14	79	170	360
Kenya	195	124	331	303	179	1,132	253	569	780	532	269	2,403	3,535
Kuwait	21	2	5	8	-	36	-	76	142	21	31	270	306
Laos People's Dem. Rep.	-	3	68	89	10	170	2	172	267	212	203	856	1,026
Lebanon	109	48	90	127	13	387	7	16	1	51	167	242	629
Lesotho	20	16	50	24	58	168	204	285	150	95	51	785	953
Liberia	63	78	73	145	8	367	2	137	19	47	110	315	682
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	6	-	9	1	-	16	-	-	-	80	5	85	101
Liechtenstein	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	169	180	38	387	387
Luxembourg	-	-	-	2	1	3	-	3	1	-	-	4	7
Madagascar	22	41	50	214	194	521	108	180	136	92	142	658	1,179
Malawi	18	59	45	36	17	175	66	113	296	284	342	1,101	1,276
Malaysia	89	103	113	37	36	378	36	38	109	51	92	326	704
Maldives	-	-	2	-	-	2	-	19	28	14	50	111	113
Mali	135	109	403	221	50	918	54	304	191	260	377	1,186	2,104
Malta	-	2	-	7	-	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	9
Mauritania	22	126	74	60	9	291	1	10	31	46	73	161	452
Mauritius	12	23	13	38	1	87	-	48	44	27	13	132	219
Mexico	-	13	37	77	36	163	35	68	43	497	109	752	915
Mongolia	2	-	-	2	-	4	-	-	68	-	54	122	126
Morocco	42	55	26	68	1	192	9	48	2	184	-	243	435
Mozambique	-	-	-	195	33	228	10	496	548	359	104	1,517	1,745
Multi-Island Projects	-	-	-	11	7	18	-	20	7	-	32	59	77
Namibia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	56	-	46	-	102	102
Nepal	9	3	17	23	3	55	5	315	53	699	131	1,203	1,258
Netherlands	934	878	890	1,289	568	4,559	809	1,993	2,518	2,124	1,995	9,439	13,998
Netherlands Antilles	3	2	11	24	-	40	-	-	-	-	-	-	40
New Caledonia	-	4	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	2	-	2	6
New Zealand	203	27	5	31	14	280	66	48	71	104	165	454	734
Nicaragua	2	8	25	39	10	84	15	83	25	213	113	449	533
Niger	12	22	66	56	23	179	5	121	118	108	457	809	988
Nigeria	170	159	71	86	115	601	55	152	184	208	51	650	1,251
Niue	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	7	7
Norway	128	198	304	866	378	1,874	65	412	415	464	384	1,740	3,614
Oman	-	-	-	11	1	12	-	14	-	-	10	24	36
Pakistan	2	1	56	18	22	99	45	111	463	282	316	1,217	1,316
Panama	20	9	37	74	-	140	47	17	29	98	91	282	422
Papua New Guinea	9	-	1	30	1	41	-	47	59	26	57	189	230
Paraguay	33	13	43	78	11	178	-23	137	117	2	12	245	423
Peru	18	4	-10	19	32	63	24	506	390	85	61	1,066	1,129
Philippines	19	16	62	96	20	213	79	157	393	1,328	420	2,377	2,590
Poland	46	34	25	2	57	164	82	88	27	47	508	752	916
Portugal	-	-	-	-	87	87	12	58	88	21	55	234	321
Qatar	-	-	-	1	6	7	6	31	6	2	7	52	59
Republic of Korea	3	-	8	20	-	31	-2	7	43	31	25	104	135
Romania	1	2	3	-	-	6	33	164	2	1	223	423	429
Rwanda	19	79	109	157	47	411	263	159	276	95	419	1,212	1,623
Saint Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla	-	-	-	7	-	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	7
Saint Lucia	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	1	7	10	3	26	26
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	-	-	2	2	-	4	-	-	-	-	6	6	10
Samoa	29	59	15	7	-	110	-	12	21	63	67	163	273
Saudi Arabia	7	13	5	21	16	62	-	4	59	-	31	94	156
Scotland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	40	41	41
Senegal	101	78	220	167	84	650	66	369	109	370	1,130	2,044	2,694
Seychelles	-	-	-	11	7	18	-	2	-	-	-	2	20
Sierra Leone	5	7	28	129	10	179	26	114	48	69	99	356	535
Singapore	165	122	123	260	122	792	337	303	554	1,467	1,150	3,811	4,603
Solomon Islands	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	6	2	116	125	125
Somalia	29	29	13	95	10	176	-6	29	1	7	32	63	239
South Africa	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	96	140	-	89	325	325

a/ Data shown in this table cover projects financed under the Indicative Planning Figures (IPF), Programme Reserve, the Special Measures Fund for Least Developed Countries, the Special Industrial Services and Cost Sharing.

Table 7

UNDP: Cost of Subcontracts Awarded, by Headquarters of Contractor a/  
1972-1981

(thousand dollars)

Headquarters of Contractor	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	Total	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	Total	Grand Total
Afghanistan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	97	-	-	97	97
Algeria	-	-	-	4	4	8	-	-	-	-	8	8	16
Argentina	-	10	69	10	17	106	70	161	1,173	82	536	2,022	2,128
Australia	4	617	208	1,484	372	2,685	1,176	938	919	922	1,819	5,774	8,459
Austria	351	120	36	115	171	793	-	3,408	1,275	98	21	4,802	5,595
Bahrain	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	62	13	-	33	108	108
Bangladesh	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	91	296	1,342 <sup>b/</sup>	1,732	1,732
Barbados	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	56	-	58	58
Belgium	1,056	80	1,347	275	245	3,003	856	1,799	1,626	1,815	214	6,310	9,313
Benin	-	-	-	22	24	46	-	64	3	37	52	156	202
Bolivia	20	-	-	-	-	20	35	116	74	101	229	555	575
Botswana	1	-	-	42	-	43	-	-	-	-	-	-	43
Brazil	-	-	-	164	-	164	-	141	621	242	369	1,373	1,537
Bulgaria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24	24	24
Burma	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Burundi	-	49	265	16	-	330	-	-	11	-	-	11	341
Canada	5,068	1,794	4,765	2,803	2,821	17,251	3,291	2,442	2,614	2,300	3,858	14,505	31,756
Central African Rep.	-	3	14	-	-	17	21	-	-	7	-	28	45
Chad	-	4	-	265	225	494	496	18	-	-	-	514	1,008
Chile	-	-	-	15	89	104	374	701	1,489	838	763	4,165	4,269
China	-	-	-	-	-	-	31	-	-	-	-	31	31
Colombia	-	11	62	-55	15	33	1,632	1,834	459	1,027	109	5,061	5,094
Comoros	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	452	3	455	455
Congo	-	-	4	-	-	4	-	-	45	10	110	165	169
Costa Rica	-	29	-	11	19	59	15	-	10	574	253	852	911
Cuba	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	2	-	-	31	133	133
Czechoslovakia	1,504	63	21	1,929	636	4,153	224	875	1,071	150	555	2,875	7,028
Denmark	88	906	2,213	-	-	3,207	-	34	846	1,009	753	2,642	5,849
Democratic Kampuchea	28	2	-	-	-	30	-	-	-	-	-	-	30
Ecuador	-	-	-	-	-	-	20	40	14	48	30	152	152
Egypt	-	-	-	-	30	30	1,843	20	101	431	226	2,621	2,651
El Salvador	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	67	-	-	67	67
Ethiopia	-	-	22	-	-	22	-	4	-	54	-	58	80
Fiji	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	60	-	79	25	164	164
Finland	171	599	534	575	55	1,934	54	850	35	256	17	1,212	3,146
France	8,229	7,818	4,303	3,287	1,693	25,330	1,406	3,699	5,686	4,051	5,645	20,487	45,817
German Dem. Rep.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,222	-	340	1,562	1,562
Germany, Fed. Rep. of	499	2,978	1,988	5,859	91	11,415	6,364	1,903	2,344	4,362	432	15,405	26,820
Ghana	-	101	12	12	-	125	-	-	42	-	-	42	167
Greece	-	28	42	7	-	77	-	-	-	-	-	-	77
Guatemala	-	-	10	-	-	10	-	-	76	2	-	78	88
Guinea	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	59	86	66	221	221
Guyana	-	-	-	10	16	26	215	48	96	1,228	206	1,793	1,819
Haiti	6	8	27	26	-	67	-	-	44	2	8	54	121
Honduras	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	41	-	141	49	231	231
Hong Kong	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	400	400	400
Hungary	56	-	33	-27	-	62	-	175	116	60	715	1,066	1,128
Iceland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	40	-	15	55	55
India	283	32	33	-161	678	867	209	520	237	705	12,321 <sup>c/</sup>	13,992	14,859
Indonesia	45	-	-	-	-	45	49	75	119	458	480	1,181	1,226
Iran	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,850	11	-	-	-	5,861	5,861
Ireland	-	-	-	231	37	268	4	56	115	-	547	722	990
Israel	285	1,397	615	843	160	3,300	818	629	-	200	235	1,882	5,182
Italy	1,630	768	1,263	611	2,520	6,792	524	592	581	1,353	2,563	5,613	12,405
Ivory Coast	22	19	46	219	-	306	-	-	104	3	77	184	490
Jamaica	-	-	-	-	30	30	-	7	-	60	10	77	107
Japan	786	614	1,868	2,893	2,667	8,828	183	126	4,682	600	3,311	8,902	17,730
Jordan	10	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	2	-	2	12
Kenya	258	114	86	8	-2	464	4,531 <sup>d/</sup>	22	288	58	8,011 <sup>e/</sup>	12,910	13,374
Kuwait	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	97	-	97	97
Lebanon	32	-	-	645	312	989	300	560	2,530	755	-	4,145	5,134
Lesotho	-	-	-	81	44	125	3	-	8	51	64	126	251
Liberia	-	-	25	-	8	33	-	-	-	20	-	20	53
Luxembourg	-	182	-	-	-	182	-	-	-	-	-	-	182
Madagascar	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	291	20	316	75	702	702
Malawi	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17	19	10	46	46
Malaysia	32	41	152	15	-	240	-	-	-	150	-	150	390
Maldives	-	42	63	7	-	112	-	131	9	480	238	858	970
Malta	-	-	-	-	272	272	-	-	37	2	-	39	311
Mauritania	-	21	33	58	-	112	-	21	-	20	-	41	153
Mauritius	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20	-	40	60	60
Mexico	-	13	-	368	5,145 <sup>f/</sup>	5,526	63	415	7,087 <sup>g/</sup>	496	493	8,554	14,080
Morocco	20	150	-	246	13	429	-	-	-	-	14	14	443
Mozambique	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	78	94	94

a/ Data shown in this table cover projects financed by the Indicative Planning Figures (IPF), Programme Reserve, the Special Measures Fund for Least Developed Countries, the Special Industrial Services and Cost Sharing.

b/ Includes \$950,000 for a subcontract to the International Centre for Diarrhoeal Disease Research.

c/ Includes \$5,700,000 for a subcontract to the International Crop Research Institute for Semi-Arid Tropics.

d/ Includes \$4,529,000 for a subcontract to the International Centre of Insect Physiology and Ecology.

e/ Includes \$7,925,000 for a subcontract to the International Centre of Insect Physiology and Ecology.

f/ Includes \$5,131,000 for a subcontract to the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre in Mexico.

g/ Includes \$6,735,940 for a subcontract to the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre in Mexico.

Table 8 (continued)

Number of Fellowships Awarded, by Country or Area Receiving Assistance <sup>a/</sup>  
1972-1981

ARAB STATES	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	Total	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	Total	Grand Total
Algeria	79	77	53	71	31	311	59	167	96	101	98	521	832
Bahrain	9	14	26	25	11	85	4	4	13	16	17	54	139
Democratic Yemen	78	49	45	44	25	241	31	41	48	76	62	258	499
Djibouti	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	4	8	15	15
Egypt	174	119	108	161	110	672	93	64	86	136	213	592	1,264
Iraq	101	84	94	93	61	433	12	40	58	52	20	182	615
Jordan	114	118	110	118	53	513	40	57	70	107	102	376	889
Kuwait	10	10	5	4	2	31	-	6	5	18	21	50	81
Lebanon	47	38	22	22	1	130	-	3	5	32	55	95	225
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	27	10	11	16	2	66	-	1	1	-	1	3	69
Morocco	24	17	25	62	41	169	44	42	53	38	37	214	383
Oman	-	4	1	12	18	35	17	14	15	7	6	59	94
Qatar	5	-	5	11	4	25	-	-	1	-	-	1	26
Saudi Arabia	19	10	15	17	13	74	14	18	17	6	68	123	197
Sudan	146	88	113	147	94	588	80	64	64	52	77	337	925
Syrian Arab Republic	63	34	46	53	24	220	9	24	46	42	47	168	388
Tunisia	201	74	33	31	36	375	34	73	66	64	89	326	701
United Arab Emirates	-	-	-	4	3	7	-	-	6	-	2	8	15
Yemen	36	39	42	77	77	271	68	67	112	112	99	458	729
Stateless	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	2	3	3
Undefined	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	1	1	-	5	5
Sub-Total	1,133	785	754	968	606	4,246	506	688	766	864	1,024	3,848	8,094

EUROPE	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	Total	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	Total	Grand Total
Albania	47	21	7	1	1	77	-	4	10	11	25	50	127
Austria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	3	3
Belgium	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1
Bulgaria	162	140	128	122	64	616	57	82	94	130	124	487	1,103
Cyprus	15	12	14	10	3	54	4	3	4	8	10	29	83
Czechoslovakia	78	45	49	99	85	356	68	27	48	108	110	361	717
Denmark	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	1
Finland	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
France	4	-	-	1	2	7	-	-	1	7	11	19	26
Germany, Fed. Rep. of	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	2	2
Greece	24	36	22	18	35	135	22	29	106	182	180	519	654
Hungary	72	124	104	134	180	614	164	137	112	85	43	541	1,155
Iceland	4	9	5	14	5	37	1	-	-	-	-	1	38
Israel	51	29	16	23	96	215	9	-	-	3	1	13	228
Malta	2	-	6	8	-	16	-	-	-	2	10	12	28
Netherlands	-	3	-	-	2	5	-	3	-	2	-	5	10
Norway	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Poland	152	196	239	167	33	787	124	176	143	74	84	601	1,388
Portugal	1	1	-	11	-	13	9	40	68	50	66	233	246
Romania	137	135	113	40	42	467	34	86	83	96	76	375	842
Spain	77	33	24	25	17	176	-	-	-	-	-	-	176
Sweden	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	1
Switzerland	4	-	-	-	2	6	-	-	-	-	1	1	7
Turkey	163	125	96	164	105	653	182	239	208	272	182	1,083	1,736
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	5	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
United Kingdom	37	52	23	27	15	154	10	22	21	45	32	130	284
Yugoslavia	46	121	38	34	15	254	105	114	40	86	62	407	661
Undefined	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	1
Sub-total	1,082	1,082	884	898	703	4,649	789	963	938	1,167	1,019	4,876	9,525

<sup>a/</sup> Data shown in this table cover projects financed by the Indicative Planning Figures (IPF), Programme Reserve, the Special Measures Fund for Least Developed Countries, the Special Industrial Services and Cost Sharing and include participants in seminars, training courses and related projects.

Table 9 (continued)

UNDP: Number of Fellowships Awarded, by Host Country or Area of Study a/  
1972-1981

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	TOTAL	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	TOTAL	GRAND TOTAL
Iceland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	3	3
India	169	117	88	124	133	631	138	349	251	427	559	1,724	2,355
Indonesia	24	5	5	21	3	58	10	26	68	163	115	382	440
Iran	17	30	24	19	10	100	16	6	-	-	-	22	122
Iraq	1	1	2	-	6	10	4	2	5	1	2	14	24
Ireland	10	10	7	30	7	64	9	17	25	30	46	127	191
Israel	68	58	18	16	6	166	16	16	9	9	19	69	235
Italy	517	300	326	367	194	1,704	168	129	1,576	1,275	285	3,433	5,137
Ivory Coast	40	38	34	50	29	191	12	39	20	54	42	167	358
Jamaica	41	23	14	50	37	165	4	29	16	33	11	93	258
Japan	101	60	94	95	57	407	100	85	103	147	246	681	1,088
Jordan	-	-	7	2	2	11	3	6	-	10	45	64	75
Kenya	64	42	52	109	48	315	42	34	63	94	109	342	657
Kiribati	-	-	-	8	-	8	-	-	1	2	2	5	13
Kuwait	2	3	-	1	-	6	1	1	6	3	12	23	29
Lebanon	308	222	265	302	-	1,097	38	30	-	51	9	128	1,225
Lesotho	-	-	3	-	1	4	-	1	-	1	8	10	14
Liberia	-	1	-	-	-	1	3	-	3	11	7	24	25
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	1	-	1	4	1	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	7
Liechtenstein	3	7	13	10	2	35	2	-	-	-	-	2	37
Luxembourg	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	14	23	27	30	103	103
Madagascar	9	8	6	5	3	31	4	3	12	6	2	27	58
Malawi	5	12	45	82	55	199	2	-	-	12	7	21	220
Malaysia	57	28	27	32	30	174	42	49	112	132	105	440	614
Mali	25	7	5	3	1	41	1	4	7	5	1	18	59
Malta	3	5	-	-	-	8	2	-	4	14	25	45	53
Martinique	2	-	-	-	-	2	1	-	-	-	-	1	3
Mauritania	-	1	-	1	-	2	1	-	-	-	-	1	3
Mauritius	6	-	8	2	9	25	5	-	1	3	27	36	61
Mexico	212	143	149	221	52	777	42	57	84	71	125	379	1,156
Morocco	3	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	2	-	2	5
Mongolia	-	-	-	-	25	25	-	1	-	1	-	2	27
Montserrat	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	2	2
Morocco	39	25	18	30	42	154	23	19	13	64	54	173	327
Mozambique	3	1	-	-	-	4	-	20	38	10	1	69	73
Nepal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	5	6	10	22	22
Netherlands	191	265	205	193	121	975	182	182	177	203	254	998	1,973
Netherlands Antilles	1	-	5	7	2	15	1	-	17	3	-	21	36
New Caledonia	-	1	-	1	-	2	-	2	-	1	1	4	6
New Zealand	24	16	35	31	22	128	20	34	18	51	45	168	296
Nicaragua	-	1	12	2	-	15	-	-	-	2	2	4	19
Niger	5	6	8	30	31	80	37	61	51	79	39	267	347
Nigeria	63	26	23	25	25	162	18	22	21	49	15	125	287
Niue	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1
Norway	37	40	31	28	27	163	40	10	11	30	30	121	284
Oman	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	1
Pakistan	5	11	12	14	12	54	12	11	25	13	33	94	148
Paraguay	3	1	16	5	3	28	1	10	11	4	10	36	64
Papua New Guinea	6	14	-	-	-	20	-	6	7	29	57	99	119
Paraguay	13	2	11	4	21	51	1	-	-	-	-	1	52
Peru	15	15	54	81	27	192	6	6	21	51	8	92	284
Philippines	72	23	80	39	38	252	95	140	228	254	409	1,126	1,378
Poland	18	37	26	40	14	135	22	29	24	52	68	195	330
Portugal	9	7	2	12	12	42	19	14	18	56	18	125	167
Puerto Rico	8	7	9	17	3	44	8	6	-	5	20	39	83
Qatar	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	2	2	4	5
Republic of Korea	10	8	18	6	3	45	33	43	30	19	25	150	195
Reunion	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Romania	10	6	17	11	1	45	4	40	13	70	18	145	190
Rwanda	-	-	-	-	1	1	4	1	1	-	-	6	7
Sao Tome and Principe	4	16	1	-	1	22	1	1	7	9	5	23	45
Saudi Arabia	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	2	2
St. Lucia	-	14	1	1	2	18	24	10	19	-	-	53	71
St. Vincent	4	-	1	-	-	5	-	-	22	-	-	22	27
Senegal	83	125	109	110	74	501	30	56	74	76	90	326	827
Sierra Leone	1	1	-	1	-	3	-	-	2	-	-	2	5
Singapore	27	27	28	66	24	172	78	167	211	324	281	1,061	1,233
Solomon Islands	8	2	4	2	-	16	3	5	2	13	6	29	45
Somalia	1	-	-	1	-	2	1	1	1	3	8	14	16

a/ Data shown in this table cover projects financed by the Indicative Planning Figures (IPF), Programme Reserve, the Special Measures Fund for Least Developed Countries, the Special Industrial Services and Cost Sharing and include participants in seminars, training courses and related projects.

10. NATIONALITY LIST (H - ADMINISTERED)

AS AT 31 JANUARY 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

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PART I: UNDP-PROFESSIONAL STAFF AND ABOVE

ICELAND

NAME	SEX	FUNCTIONAL TITLE	ORGANIZATION UNIT	DUTY STATION	APPT TYPE	SEC/LOAN	SPEC LEAVE
P3							
HARALDSSON, HERBERT	M	MANAGEMENT AUDITOR	BFA/DIV FOR AUDIT&MGMT RE USA		100		
	1	GRADE TOTAL					
	1	NATIONALITY TOTAL					

UNDP: ICELAND'S VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS PLEDGED TO UNDP  
CENTRAL RESOURCES; AND ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANGE 1979-83

(in US\$'000 and Local Currency Units-LC)

		1979	1980	% change	1981*	% change	1982	% change	1983	% change
UNDP VC	LC:Old Krona	27,966	36,391	30.12						
	New Krona	280	364	30.12	521	43.13	3,600	590.98	4,788	33.00
	\$	91	85	-6.60	79	-15.00	456	477.22	249	-45.39

\*Operational exchange rate expressed in terms of the "Old Krona" which was replaced by the "New Krona" (New Kr) effective February 1981 at the rate of: one new Krona equals 100 old Krona.

24 March 1983

ICELANDIC POSITION ON DISARMAMENT

1. Iceland is a member of NATO, but it does not have any armed forces of its own. It has solved its defence problem within the framework of NATO by a bilateral defence agreement with the United States. The United States has a military base at Keflavik and a small radar station as well as modest forces, mostly naval. This arrangement has been motivated primarily by security interests, and it has at times been troubled, partly by opposition to NATO in Iceland caused by its fisheries disputes with Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany, and partly by nationalistic and cultural concerns among the Icelanders caused by the presence of foreign troops. In accordance with the opinion of the majority of the population, Iceland has remained loyal to NATO.

2. Iceland's involvement in disarmament efforts used to be limited to concern about its immediate maritime environment, but it has recently increased and been expanded in scope. Iceland closely watches the increasing naval activities of the great Powers off its coasts and in the waters between Iceland and Greenland. In Iceland, concern has been expressed over the possibility that these naval units might include nuclear-armed submarines and that the United States might deploy nuclear weapons at its base in Iceland. This has increased the interest in nuclear issues among the population. The Government has unequivocally announced that it will not accept nuclear weapons on its territory.

3. Iceland is actively interested in the SALT, START and INF negotiations and has underlined the responsibility of the nuclear Powers concerning other nuclear issues, notably the question of a total ban on nuclear-weapon tests. It has furthermore declared its interest in strengthening the non-proliferation

/...



regime. The naval arms race and its nuclear aspects continue, however, to be Iceland's central preoccupation. In the Parliament, a proposal has been made on investigating the possibility of calling an international conference on nuclear weapons in the North Atlantic, and the idea is being studied.

4. At the General Assembly, Iceland has co-operated with the other Nordic countries in submitting inter-Nordic working papers on the subject of disarmament. During the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, it was one of the States submitting a working paper on the follow-up of the study on the relationship between disarmament and development (A/S-12/AC.1/49).

5. Iceland's position in the votes on disarmament issues at the General Assembly has been largely the same as that of Denmark (in 1981 and 1982: one different vote) and Norway (in 1981 one different vote; in 1982 three different votes).

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WORK OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

1. The Committee on Disarmament (CD), the multilateral negotiating body, has been in session since 1 February 1983. Due to the overall international situation, the work of the Committee has been proceeding under a very slow pace. This is reflected in the fact that it was only today that the Committee was able finally to agree on its agenda for this year's session and that only two out of five Working Groups have been able to meet so far. These two Groups are the Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and the Group of Seismic Experts. It is expected that an agreement will be reached soon on the resumption of the work of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons. It is uncertain when the remaining Working Groups on Radiological Weapons and on Nuclear Test Ban will resume their work. There were intensive discussions on the establishment of yet another Working Group to deal with the question of nuclear disarmament but consensus could not be reached on this matter.

2. The discussions in the Committee have so far centered mainly on the question of verification. Western countries, particularly the United States, consider that prior understanding and agreement on the basic provisions for verification, particularly with regard to the test ban treaty and the chemical weapons convention would greatly facilitate all negotiations. The socialist and non-aligned countries feel, however, that verification should be considered within the overall context of the provisions of the given agreement rather than as a first step in such considerations. In addition, these countries consider that nuclear disarmament should be given a prominent place in the work of the Committee.

INFORMATION ON IRELAND'S MILITARY CONTRIBUTION  
TO UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS

1. Irish participation in past U N operations
  - a. UNOGIL (Lebanon 1958)
  - b. ONUC (Congo 1960-1964)
  - c. UNTEA (West New Guinea 1962-1963)
  - d. UNIPOM (India/Pakistan 1965-1966)
  - e. UNEF II (Egypt 1973-1978)
  - f. UNFICYP (Cyprus May 1964-October 1973-Infantry Battalion)
2. Irish participation in current U N operations (756 all ranks)
  - a. UNTSO
  - b. UNFICYP (Cyprus 6 staff personnel since 1973)
  - c. UNIFIL
3. Irish U N Commanders
  - a. Lieutenant-General Sean Mac Eoin - Commander U N Forces in the Congo (Jan. 1961-Nov. 1962)
  - b. Major-General J.J. Quinn - Commander UNFICYP (Dec. 1976-Feb. 1978)
  - c. Lieutenant-General William Callaghan - Commander UNIFIL 15 Feb. 1981 to date
4. Total fatal casualties sustained to date - 52

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND  
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

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18 March 1983

IRELAND

## IRELAND

### Relationship to the United Nations

Ireland joined the United Nations on 14 December 1955 as part of a "package deal" under which sixteen countries were admitted to the Organisation at the same time. Ireland in its Constitution affirms its devotion to the ideals of peace and friendly cooperation among nations founded on international justice and morality, and the country strives to uphold these ideals in its UN participation. A non-combatant in World War II, Ireland declined to join NATO in 1949 and has followed a post-war policy of neutrality. It is primarily within the United Nations context, therefore, that Ireland has sought to contribute to the reduction of international tensions, particularly through its commitment to disarmament and to UN peace-keeping operations. Since it gained independence in 1921, Ireland's relations with the United Kingdom have evolved considerably, while ties with continental Europe have broadened since Ireland joined the European Community in 1973. Since that date, Ireland has expanded its diplomatic relations around the world, particularly with various Arab States and East European countries. When Dr. Garret FitzGerald was elected Prime Minister by the Irish Parliament on 14 December 1982, it marked Ireland's third change of Government in eighteen months. There exists a broad national consensus on most foreign policy issues, but platforms differ widely on how to repay Ireland's foreign debt, which at \$7 billion is higher per capita than that of either Mexico or Poland.

Ireland has participated in almost all the UN peace-keeping operations established since it joined the Organisation in 1955. It formerly took part in UNOGIL, ONUC, the UN Security Force in West New Guinea (West Irian), UNIPOM and UNEF II. At present, Ireland contributes observers to UNTSO and a small number of Headquarters personnel and military police to UNFICYP. An Irish battalion serves with UNIFIL, whose Force Commander is Major-General William Callaghan of Ireland.

Ireland served one split term on the Security Council in 1962 and a second full term in 1981-82. The country at present sits on few elective UN bodies. It is a member of the Advisory Committee for the International Youth Year (1985), the Commission on Human Rights, the FAO Council, and the UPU Executive Council.

Ireland's assessment for its contribution to the regular UN budget has newly been increased from 0.16 to 0.18 percent, for a gross contribution of \$1,059,027 for 1983. A major focus for Ireland's voluntary contributions is UNICEF, to which it donated \$316,456 in 1982. Other significant Irish contributions include the following: \$175,877 to the UNHCR (1982); \$131,000 to UNRWA (1983); some \$79,000 to the International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (1982); over \$55,000 to the various UN trust funds and programmes for Namibia and South Africa (1982); \$26,316 to UNEP (1982); and \$5,514 to UNITAR (1982).

The Permanent Representative of Ireland is Noel Dorr, who presented his credentials to the Secretary-General on 16 September 1980. The number of Irish nationals employed by the United Nations falls within the country's desirable range.

#### Foreign Policy on Questions before the United Nations

Upon issuance of the Secretary-General's Annual Report, Ireland was one of three then-Security Council Members who sought to have the Council address itself collectively and urgently to the issues raised by the Report. Ireland supported the holding of a Security Council meeting at a high level to that end, particularly with a view to developing new method systems and procedures for conflict resolution. Ireland also endorsed greater use by the Secretary-General of his powers under Article 99. Because of its long involvement in UN peace-keeping, Ireland is eager to have the Organisation re-examine, in the context of the Secretary-General's Report, ways to give peace-keeping operations a clear and unambiguous mandate, full political backing, and a strong, assured financial basis.

Ireland is currently active in the Committee on Disarmament as an observer, and would put forward its candidature for full membership if the Committee were expanded. Ireland has long urged the support and strengthening of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It has also advocated a comprehensive test ban and, pending negotiation of a CTBT treaty, has called for a moratorium on all nuclear test explosions. Ireland voted for both nuclear arms freeze resolutions in the 37th General Assembly on the grounds that a freeze would create a climate more favourable to progress in arms reduction talks. Ireland's other disarmament concerns include the need for a chemical weapons convention, the banning of all weapons from outer space, and progress on conventional disarmament. Parallel to the reduction of armaments, Ireland stresses the necessity of developing international institutions which could replace mistrust by collective action and cooperation and thus make weapons less and less necessary.

As President of the Security Council for August 1982, Ireland's Ambassador Dorr played an important role in the Council's attempts to come to terms with Israel's invasion of Lebanon. Ireland has asserted that the full sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon must be restored and that all foreign forces whose presence has not been authorised by the Government of Lebanon must be withdrawn. As a troop contributor to UNIFIL, Ireland has closely followed the Force's changing role in southern Lebanon since the invasion; in mid-March, Irish Defence Minister Cooney, accompanied by Ireland's Chief of Staff, visited UNIFIL Headquarters in Naqoura.

Regarding the global Middle East situation, Ireland is one of the few countries to have publicly endorsed the Secretary-General's suggestion that the Security Council might offer the most appropriate forum for the parties to the conflict to sit at the same table and negotiate seriously. Ireland subscribes to the European Community position that the right of all States to exist within secure and recognised boundaries must be reconciled with the right of the Palestinians to self-determination within the framework of a comprehensive and negotiated settlement reached with the direct participation of the PLO. Ireland does not recognise the PLO as the sole representative

of the Palestinian people, but it has gone further than some of its EC partners in declaring that the Palestinians' right to self-determination could include the right to an independent state. Ireland has forcefully condemned Israel's settlement policies in the occupied territories.

Ireland is fully committed to Namibian independence in accordance with resolution 435, and has expressed concern that the momentum to implement the UN plan might be lost. Ireland has long stated that it might be necessary for the international community to bring greater pressure to bear on South Africa to end its illegal occupation of the Territory through "a series of graduated and carefully chosen measures" adopted by the Security Council. With regard to apartheid, a principal focus of Irish interest this year is the Second World Conference to Combat Racism to be held in Geneva next August. Ireland itself does not have diplomatic, trade, economic or cultural relations with South Africa and has acted firmly to discourage sports links with that country. It has condemned the apartheid system unreservedly and advocates a tightening of the present arms embargo, the formal imposition of an oil embargo, and a ban on new investment in, or loans to, South Africa.

With regard to Afghanistan, Ireland has expressed appreciation for the constructive efforts of the Secretary-General's Personal Representative to achieve a political solution. Concerning Kampuchea, Ireland has abstained on the credentials question. Ireland considers it urgent that all parties to the Kampuchean dispute respond to the call of the General Assembly and Human Rights Commission for negotiations leading to a comprehensive political solution. Regarding both the Iran-Iraq conflict and the Cyprus question, Ireland's views are fully consonant with those of the European Community, that is, the country endorses efforts by the Secretary-General and his Representatives to foster negotiations between the parties.



Concerning the Falklands/Malvinas dispute, Ireland abstained on resolution 37/9 on the grounds that in calling for negotiations on "the sovereignty dispute," the text did not take adequate account of the need to bring all aspects of the question into the deliberations. Ireland does, however, support the resumption of negotiations between Buenos Aires and London, and believes that "it could be useful to involve the Secretary-General of the United Nations in due course in using his good offices to get such negotiations under way." Regarding Central America, Ireland asserts that it is necessary to remedy the underlying economic and social causes of tension there, to end all foreign interferences, and to seek political solutions through dialogue and negotiations.

Currently a member of the Commission on Human Rights, Ireland has long been committed to strengthening the UN's capacity to remedy serious human rights abuses. Ireland has made specific proposals along these lines, including a suggestion that the Secretary-General might report to the General Assembly at regular intervals on the international human rights situation. It has also recommended that the United Nations consider instituting a UN human rights presence in various regions of the world, parallel to already-existing information or assistance offices, to provide early and unbiased field reports. At the recent session of the Human Rights Commission in Geneva, Ireland co-sponsored the resolution on the situation in Poland. Ireland would like to focus greater world attention on the Declaration on Religious Intolerance adopted in 1981. Among Ireland's other human rights concerns are summary or arbitrary executions, involuntary disappearances, and torture.

Ireland has called attention to both the economic and political importance of the North-South dialogue, in which it envisages a vital role for the United Nations. Ireland supports an early relaunching of global negotiations, and the country ratified the Agreement Establishing the Common Fund for Commodities on 11 August 1982. Ireland looks to UNCTAD VI next June as an important forum for improving understanding between the developed and developing

countries, and it plans to define its positions there in close collaboration with its European Community partners. As an island state, Ireland has been very much in favour of the Law of the Sea Convention, which it signed on 10 December 1982 in Kingston. Ireland contends that any shortcomings in the Convention can be met by adaptation and, ultimately, remedied by review. The country has pledged its efforts to help ensure that the International Sea-Bed Authority can begin functioning at the earliest possible time.

Each year in the General Assembly Ireland traditionally outlines its position on Northern Ireland, although the question has not been formally brought before the United Nations proper since Ireland unsuccessfully requested its consideration by both the Security Council and the Assembly in 1969. The present Fine Gael-Labour Government of Prime Minister FitzGerald has made Northern Ireland a priority and it seeks an "honest and positive dialogue" with the United Kingdom. On the Government's initiative, the Irish Parliament has agreed to set up an all-Ireland forum -- open to all political groups of Northern Ireland who reject violence - to discuss how to achieve peace in a united Ireland. Another recent development concerning Northern Ireland is the European Parliament's decision to conduct an inquiry into the situation there.

List of Principal Government Officials

Prime Minister	Garret FITZGERALD (Fine Gael)
Vice-Premier and Environment Minister	Dick SPRING (Leader of Labour)
Foreign Minister	Peter BARRY (Fine Gael)
Finance Minister	Allan DUKES (Fine Gael)
Defense Minister	Patrick COONEY (Fine Gael)
Industry and Energy Minister	John BRUTON (Fine Gael)
Justice Minister	Michael NOONAN (Fine Gael)
Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs	Sean DANLON

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND  
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

POLITICAL AFFAIRS DIVISION

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22 March 1983

NORDIC CO-OPERATION

## NORDIC CO-OPERATION

Since World War II, there has been a dramatic increase in parliamentary and governmental co-operation between the Nordic countries, accompanied by the establishment and strengthening of common institutions. The Nordic Council was founded in 1953 by Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden as an advisory board to their Parliaments and Governments. In 1955, Finland joined the Council with the proviso that it would not take part in the consideration of military problems or of any question that would require it to take sides in a dispute between the major powers. The Council's annual sessions are usually attended by Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers, attesting to the importance the Nordic countries attach to it. In 1971, the five countries established the Nordic Council of Ministers, a new institution vested with decision-making powers within the limits of the Helsinki Treaty of 1962 (which had defined the competence and objectives of various Nordic institutions). The portfolio of the Ministers participating in this Council's deliberations varies according to the matter being discussed.

One major aim of Nordic co-operation has been to develop, as far as possible, converging positions within international organizations. Increasingly, the Nordic countries have demonstrated remarkable unity within the United Nations, often speaking with one voice in substantive debates and explanation-of-votes. During the 37th General Assembly, the five Nordic countries cast identical votes on some 83 percent of the resolutions considered. In certain international organizations, the Nordic countries have agreed to joint representation.

At their Foreign Ministers' meeting of 30-31 August 1982 in Helsinki, the Nordic countries confirmed their strong support "for the UN and for measures aimed at settling international disputes by peaceful means in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter concerning respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of all states." The five appealed to all countries to "respect the internationally accepted rules guiding relations between states" and pledged to "continue to work to strengthen the UN as a universal organization for peace." In this context, the Ministers agreed on the need to examine

with other Member States "measures which could strengthen the possibilities of the UN to act in conflicts and crises."

Because the Secretary-General's Annual Report addressed itself to exactly these issues, the Nordic countries welcomed the Report with a very positive attitude. All five were among the co-sponsors of General Assembly resolution 37/67 on the Report. At the 23-24 March Nordic Ministers' meeting, and at the next bi-yearly session this summer, the five Governments intend to try to work out concrete proposals on strengthening the UN which could then be presented to the Secretary-General and possibly Member States for consideration.

The Nordic countries have given their full support to UN peace-keeping activities. Approximately 2,200 nationals from Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden presently serve with UN forces or observer groups. Since 1964, these four countries have maintained stand-by forces earmarked for UN service. Together they have developed a joint training system to prepare officers, specialists and observers for UN duties. These countries have offered to share their experience with other interested countries and have suggested it would be useful to have made available "guidelines concerning the practical implementation of the different tasks with which the United Nations troops may be confronted." The Nordic countries frequently stress the collective responsibility of all UN Member States for peace-keeping operations, including their financing. All these issues were taken up at a Nordic Defence Ministers' meeting last October in Helsinki devoted exclusively to UN peace-keeping activities.

There has been near unanimity among the Nordics for many years over southern Africa. Traditionally they have condemned apartheid and have jointly taken measures against South Africa such as imposing visa restrictions and maintaining virtually no trade links. Regarding Namibia, they have long given humanitarian aid to SWAPO and significant financial support to UN trust funds and programmes for the territory. There is at present, however, some division among the Nordic countries over how publicly to enunciate disapproval of attempts to link Namibian independence to a withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola: Finland and Sweden

voted for resolution 37/233B which includes such a provision, whereas Denmark, Iceland and Norway abstained.

The Nordic countries have a history of close co-operation in the field of development aid. Sweden, Denmark and Norway are among the industrialized countries with the highest development assistance-to-GNP ratio. All the Nordic countries except Iceland were early ratifiers of the Agreement Establishing the Common Fund for Commodities. Speaking on behalf of the Nordic States in ECOSOC last July, Norway said the five would welcome a more action-oriented and concrete course for the North-South dialogue. Norway stressed that the Nordic Governments from the outset had welcomed and actively supported the launching of a new round of global negotiations and that they considered the Group of 77's draft resolution of March 1982 a good basis for continued consultations. All five Nordic Governments signed the Law of the Sea Convention on 10 December 1982 in Kingston.

The Nordic countries have a long, common tradition of working to strengthen UN machinery in the field of human rights. One Nordic country is always represented on the Commission on Human Rights, where they have all actively participated in efforts to curtail summary or arbitrary executions, involuntary disappearances and torture, among other human rights abuses.

There are some divergences in Nordic positions over the Middle East. Denmark, Iceland and Norway appear less willing to criticize Israel than Finland or Sweden. Sweden has perhaps gone the furthest of the Nordics in suggesting that self-determination for the Palestinians could imply their right to an independent State of their own, and Sweden reportedly is the only Nordic country seriously considering participating in this August's Paris Conference on the Question of Palestine.

The Nordic countries' votes split more regularly over disarmament than perhaps over other issues, reflecting the fact that Denmark, Iceland and Norway are NATO members whereas Finland and Sweden are not. One example from the 37th General Assembly was the nuclear arms freeze resolutions: Sweden, which introduced one of the texts, and Finland voted in favour of a freeze;

Denmark and Iceland abstained; and Norway voted against. On more general questions of disarmament -- such as examination of the relationship of disarmament to development -- the Nordic countries have frequently acted together.

For a more detailed summary of common Nordic positions on issues relevant to the United Nations, see the Communique from the Nordic Foreign Ministers' meeting of August 1982, attached as an Annex.



COMMUNIQUE

from the Nordic Foreign Ministers' Meeting,  
August 30-31, 1982, in Helsinki

The Nordic Foreign Ministers, meeting in Helsinki on August 30-31, 1982, expressed deep concern about the increased tension and uncertainty characterizing both the political and the economic situation in the World. They devoted particular attention to the situation in the Middle East and emphasized that a lasting peace and security can only be achieved through negotiations and not through use of force. They further regretted that the conflicts in Afghanistan and in South-East Asia remain unresolved.

The Ministers confirmed the strong support of the Nordic countries for the UN and for measures aimed at settling international disputes by peaceful means in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter concerning respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of all states. In this context the Ministers again appealed to all countries to respect the internationally accepted rules guiding relations between states. The Nordic countries will continue to work to strengthen the UN as a universal organization for peace. They were in agreement about the need to examine and to discuss with other member states measures which could strengthen the possibilities of the UN to act in conflicts and crises.

The Ministers emphasized the importance of strengthening the dialogue between the major powers in order to promote detente and disarmament. In this context the Ministers welcomed the resumption of negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons.

The Ministers noted that the situation in Poland is still serious. They expressed the hope that the partial release of internees would soon be followed by the release of all internees, resumption of the social dialogue and revocation of the state of emergency.

The Ministers underlined the importance of the stable security-policy situation in the Nordic area, which contributes to the maintenance of peace and security in a wider international context.

The Ministers expressed the hope that the work at the CSCE follow-up meeting in Madrid at the end of 1982 can be concluded with the adoption of a substantial and balanced concluding document comprising concrete progress in all areas of the Helsinki Final Act including a mandate for a conference on disarmament in Europe.

The Ministers noted that the draft for a concluding document submitted by the neutral and non-aligned countries constitutes a good basis for efforts in this direction. They again underlined the importance of further strengthening and expanding co-operation within the framework of the CSCE process. They emphasized in this context the necessity for all participating states to implement the obligations already undertaken in the Helsinki Final Act.

The Ministers emphasized that it was important that the negotiations on arms control and disarmament initiated between the Soviet Union and the United States in the past year would produce progress leading to substantial reductions both with regard to intercontinental nuclear weapons and intermediate-range nuclear weapons.

They expressed their satisfaction that the provisions of the SALT II Agreement are respected. Furthermore, it is important that results can be achieved at the talks in Vienna on Mutual Force Reductions (MBFR).

The Ministers regretted that the Second Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD II) of the UN General Assembly had not succeeded in reaching substantive results, but they noted that the SSOD II had confirmed, in all respects, the validity of the significant concluding document adopted by the General Assembly's First Special Session on Disarmament in 1978 (SSOD I). The Ministers held, against this background, that the continued negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva will be of great significance. In this respect, a great responsibility rests particularly with the nuclear powers. The negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty must be continued. In this context importance is attached to the multilateral negotiations on the verification of a test ban treaty, which were initiated within the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.

The Ministers expressed their continued strong support for efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to any additional countries and emphasized the importance of adherence to the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. They again urged all non-nuclear states to accept control by the IAEA of the entire field of their nuclear-energy activities.

The Ministers exchanged views on the question of a nuclear-weapon-free zone also in the Nordic area and agreed to keep continued contact on this question.

The Ministers associated themselves with the UN expressions of condemnation of the invasion and occupation of Lebanon by Israel and its refusal to obey the resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council. They deeply deplored the sufferings that the civilian population, especially in Beirut, had been faced with. Against this background, they welcomed the fact



that more extensive bloodshed had now been possible to avoid. They expressed continued support for the humanitarian assistance efforts by the UN and other international organizations.

The Ministers expressed their support for Security Council resolutions 508 and 509 and emphasized in particular the importance of a speedy restoration of the respect for the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon.

The Ministers reconfirmed the full support of the Nordic countries for efforts to bring about a comprehensive, just and lasting solution to the conflict in the Middle East. They confirmed their agreement on the principles which, based on Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), must constitute the foundation of negotiations for a comprehensive peace settlement. They emphasized in this context the principles of security for all states in the area, including Israel, and justice for all peoples, including the Palestinian people. They emphasized the necessity of realizing the legitimate national rights of the Palestinians through the exercise of their right to self-determination including their right to participate in negotiations on their own future.

The Ministers emphasized the significance of the UN peace-keeping operations and their importance for the maintenance of peace and security. They emphasized the positive significance that UNIFIL had had as a stabilizing and moderating element in Lebanon. In this context they considered the tendencies to weaken the UN as an organ for peace-keeping alarming, and strongly regretted that the Israeli invasion which had undermined the authority of the UN had changed the basis for UNIFIL's presence in the area. A meaningful peace-keeping role is a prerequisite for continued UNIFIL presence in Lebanon.

The Ministers again condemned the South African Government's policy of apartheid, oppression of the opponents of that policy, its suppression of the majority of the population, its illegal occupation of Namibia and its attacks against neighbouring states. The Ministers underlined once more that increased and effective pressure should be brought to bear on the Government of South Africa as a peaceful means of achieving abolition of the apartheid system. They emphasized in particular the early adoption of binding sanctions against South Africa by the Security Council. The Nordic countries will continue their policy of active involvement to reach this goal and to continue their economic and humanitarian aid to Southern Africa.

They reaffirmed that the people of Namibia must be permitted, as soon as possible, to determine their own future through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the UN in accordance with Security Council resolution 435 (1978). The Ministers considered it important that the Security Council could take measures to implement the UN plan without any further delay. In this context they expressed their appreciation of the efforts undertaken to this end by the contact group and the frontline states.

The Ministers expressed their concern about the international economic situation and emphasized the need for broad international co-operation to improve this situation.

They hoped that the forthcoming GATT Ministerial Meeting would lead to a political manifestation directed against protectionism and to concrete decisions for the preservation and consolidation of the multilateral set of regulations governing international trade and that it would lead to a further liberalization of the world trade.

The Ministers regretted that it had not yet been possible to bring about global negotiations on economic development co-operation within the UN. A global approach to world-wide economic problems is in the interest of both the industrial and developing countries. Negotiations should also be initiated as soon as possible which, without prejudicing a global round of negotiations, might solve some of the most pressing North/South problems, above all those concerning energy, transfer of resources, as well as food and agriculture.

The Ministers were in agreement on the need to continue increased development assistance, especially to the least developed countries. It was important that the International Development Association (IDA) received necessary resources. They deplored the insufficient supply of voluntary contributions to UNDP, which has necessitated a reduction of 40% in the planned programme.

The Ministers considered it important that the Sixth Session of the UN Conference on Trade and Development be well prepared and focussed on a limited number of subjects which were mature for constructive negotiations and decisions.

The Ministers expressed their strong concern about the fact that suppression of the most fundamental human rights continues in large parts of the World.

The Ministers confirmed the Nordic countries' involvement in the work to abolish capital punishment. They expressed the hope that the initiative taken in the UN Commission on Human Rights with a view to combatting the increased use of arbitrary and summary executions will be successful.

The Ministers confirmed that the Nordic countries would continue their policy of active involvement in drafting a convention on the prohibition of torture. They hoped that the UN fund for victims of torture will receive necessary, substantial contributions. The Ministers expressed the hope that the working group newly formed within the UN concerning indigenous peoples would effectively promote the interests of these population groups.

The Ministers noted that the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea had adopted, with an overwhelming majority, a new convention on the Law of the Sea and expressed the hope that it would win the widest possible accession to enable it to serve its purpose in a global context and realize the Declaration of Principles of 1970. The Convention contains important provisions on economic zones and the continental shelf, on the territorial sea and passage through straits as well as on deep seabed mining in areas outside national jurisdiction. The Ministers expressed satisfaction with the fact that the Convention contributed to eliminating the legal uncertainty that had been prevailing in certain areas.

The Nordic countries expressed their support for Denmark's candidacy for membership of the UN Security Council for the term 1983-84.

The meeting was attended by the Danish Foreign Minister, Kjeld Olesen, the Finnish Foreign Minister, Pär Stenbäck, the Icelandic Foreign Minister, Olafur Johannesson, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Sverre Strøm, and the Swedish Foreign Minister, Ola Ullsten. At the invitation of Norway, the next meeting will be held in Oslo on March 24, 1983.