

[5 CONFIDENTIAL]

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FROM : UNAMIR HQ OPS

3000.12 (OPS)

TO : SENBATT

INFO : MILOB SECTOR 4B  
FEO

DATE : 09 JUN 95

SUBJECT : PROVISION OF SECURITY FOR A DOZER IN BUTATRE

1. A dozer from Force Engr Company has been despatched to Butare to undertake some dozer work within the prefecture.
2. You are requested to provide an armed escort to the team with the dozer until it finishes its tasks in the area.
3. For your necessary action.

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## OTP CONFIDENTIAL

## INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA

KIGALI, RWANDA

## INTERNAL MEMORANDUM

May 29, 1995

TO: COLIN PORT

FROM: JEAN ROMEY

SUBJECT: Limited Security Survey and Housing Recommendations.

1. **Purpose:** To provide you a limited security survey and recommendations.

2. **Summary:** The presently stable and relatively secure situation in Rwanda concerning the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) may change in direct proportion to the effectiveness of our investigative effort. All intelligence sources point to a fluid socio-political situation centering upon a growing insurgency and aggravated by the inevitable reduction of UNAMIR presence after as a measure of accommodation with the government of Rwanda (GOR). OTP security and logistical support depend, by mandate, upon UNAMIR which has the means to provide or coordinate such. While some advantages could be found in the OTP operating independently, the situation demands that the OTP take full advantage of UNAMIR's capabilities to provide for its outer and inner perimeter security. Opposition to the work of the OTP should be expected to take hostile action against the OTP using insurgency tactics including low-skill terrorist actions. Measures to protect OTP personnel, facilities, information, equipment, and communications need be implemented immediately.

3. **Survey Scope**

The scope of the survey comprises the environment in which the OTP is to operate in Rwanda comprises the following areas:

- Physical security of OTP personnel, facilities (offices and housing), vehicles, and equipment, including transportation.
- Communications Security.
- Information Management Systems (automated and non-automated) Security
- Personnel security--vetting of personnel supporting OTP

3. **Sources:**

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*[Handwritten signature]*  
06/06

② G3 Plans

Lets discuss.

*[Handwritten signature]*  
DCAS ops  
6.6.95

Copy sent to G3 plans  
6/6/95

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This preliminary security survey is based on historical multinational/multiagency multisource intelligence (UN/US/UK), UNAMIR civilian and military staff, local human sources, and direct observations and contacts made by undersigned during the period May 15 to 28, 1995. Sources are as follows:

- G-3, UNAMIR
- Security Officer, UNAMIR
- UN Security Officer assigned to OTP (16 months in country)
- Regional Security Officer, U. S. Embassy, Kigali
- OTP staff liaison with RPA/GOR
- CDR, INDBATT

Indicators include an increasing incidence of harassment and criminal activity (auto theft, robberies, residential burglaries) directed against UN personnel, equipment, and facilities.

#### 4. Findings and Recommendations:

##### a. Finding A. Personnel Security.

(1) The personal security (PS)/Executive Protection (EP) of OTP personnel and leadership is inadequate. The present EP/PS resources allocated to the OTP consist of a one man protection detail (PD) working extended hours. The lowest threat conditions require a minimum of three men per principal, each working not more than a nine hour shift. *basis?*

(2) The threat level facing the OTP is expected to increase in direct proportion to the investigative effort put forth, and especially results obtained, by the OTP. The threat source is the ongoing insurgent activity whose main elements and support are externally based and which is conducting an infiltration effort be supported by the Hutu ethnic majority ousted from power. Hostile action against OTP personnel must be anticipated. While this threat applies particularly to high-profile OTP personalities, including the DPR and the DOI, it will no doubt extend to the rest of the investigative staff as their effectiveness is felt. *basis?*

(3) This requires a significantly greater level of executive protection (EP) resources than presently available from the UN (two bodyguards). opposition to the Tribunal, hostile action is likely to consist initially of low-skill terrorist actions against OTP targets of opportunity.

##### Recommendation A:

(1) Obtain a fully trained 12-man protection detail, plus supervisor, and dedicated drivers, to provide simultaneous 24-hour coverage for the

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DPR and two other OTP principals or staff whose particular circumstances requires protection.

(2) Apply Standards of Executive Protection: It should be clearly understood by all concerned that personnel protection (PS/EP) is based primarily on defensive measures, to include security awareness training of the principal, intelligence and advance work, surveillance countermeasures, communications and communications security, well-rehearsed mounted and dismounted (vehicular vs. pedestrian) reaction/evasive action drills, evasive driving, and close-quarter combat (CQC). Support measures include armored vehicles and body armor (for both principal and Protection Detail. The whole purpose of EP is to evacuate the principal quickly and safely out of the hostile area. Offensive measures, i.e. returning hostile fire or using a vehicle as a weapon, make up a very small but critical percentage of EP, and serve only to break contact and gain critical time by not only disabling some of the attackers but creating a surprise shock effect designed to gain reaction time. Supporting EP personnel skills are communications evasive/offensive driving, basic explosives, All OTP personnel should receive basic PS awareness (4 hours) training, to include car bombs/ and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), travel and communications procedures (plan route, travel in twos, insure communications), evasive/offensive driving, and emergency medical/trauma assistance. Fifty percent of OTP personnel should be trained in cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR).

(3) Request a military special operations (Special Forces, SAS) counterterrorist (CT) team as a national contribution to the Tribunal. This will insure proper vetting, standards of training and capabilities, and a timely (immediate upon approval, agreement, and tasking) implementation.

**b. Finding B:** (1) The present OTP location, the UNICEF building has numerous vulnerabilities and will require much work to properly secure, particularly in the long term, with the anticipated increase in threat level against the OTP. as presently installed on the ground floor of this building, OTP facilities and the offices of the DPR are highly vulnerable to intrusion, surveillance, and low-skill terrorist attack and lack in most aspects of physical security.

(2) OTP facilities are located on the ground floor of a three story concrete and brick building located in a flat area, at a road intersection approximately 200 meters south of UNAMIR headquarters.

(3) The building is a three story thin-walled concrete and brick structure with aluminum frame entry doors and windows fitted with integral external aluminum grillwork, and asbestos ceilings. The front (north) and rear (south) sides of the building have extensive window glass areas which extend well below head level. The offices of the DPR are located at the northwest corner.

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(4) The building is situated in a paved courtyard used as a parking lot and surrounded by a five-foot iron grill fence bordered externally with a thick hedge of the same height which obstructs vision and provides concealment both internally and externally.

(5) Dominant features adjacent to the building are tall trees outside the northeast perimeter which dominate the courtyard, and a three story office building 100 meters to the southwest.

(6) The rear (southeast) of the perimeter is most vulnerable to penetration and attack, given the concealment offered by the adjacent roadway vegetation. Building exterior and perimeter lighting is almost non-existent.

### **b. Recommendation B:**

(1) Cut down trees to northeast of perimeter and vegetation in ditch along southeast portion of perimeter.

(2) Install triple stand concertina wire from top to bottom of perimeter fence between fence and hedge, adding 12 foot concertina-covered cyclone fencing along the southeast portion of the fence.

(3) Install high intensity lights high on four sides of the building illuminating the perimeter.

(4) Armor plate all ground floor window/door glass area

(5) Build decorative six foot stand-off brick wall along outer edge of walk bordering DPR offices.

(6) Install net and opaque curtains on all windows of DPR offices.

(7) Install swing barrier on both entry gates.

**c. Finding C.** (1) OTP perimeter manned security is inadequate. Approximately half an infantry squad (4-5 soldiers) have been assigned to secure the UNICEF/OTP building.

(2) The building and building perimeter situation requires 24-hour coverage by a full infantry squad (9-10 men).

**c. Recommendation C.** (1) Assign infantry platoon to OTP/UNICEF building.

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(2) Man perimeter as follows:

Front (north gate) two men plus squad leader

Side (west) gate two men

Rooftop two men, sniper team

Roving patrol two men

NOTE: Access to the building rooftop has not be located and needs be established.

**d. Finding D:** OTP personnel housing will require armed security.

**Recommendation D:** (1) That UNAMIR provide soldiers in sufficient numbers to secure OTP personnel housing outer perimeter.

(2) Elements of PS/EP team will reside with OTP personnel.

**e. Finding E:** OTP travel require armed escort.

**Recommendation E:** That armed soldiers and PD be provided to escort OTP personnel in travels throughout Rwanda.

**f. Finding F:** Armored sedans and escort four-wheel drive vehicles are necessary to support the PS/EP requirements of the OTP.

**Recommendations:** Provide the OTP with the following Personnel Protection Vehicle (PPV) support:

(1) Three armored sedans, to transport three high visibility principals simultaneously. A fourth standby vehicle is highly recommended for transparent reasons--breakdowns and additional VIP visits.

(2) Two dedicated PPV escort vehicles (4X4) with partial armor (doors and floor panels) and independent long distance communications. A third standby vehicle is recommended for the same reasons as stated in (1).

(3) Dedicated drivers. PD personnel should not drive.

(4) All PPV should contain the following minimum equipment and supplies:

o Level 2 ballistics vests for all occupants.

o Emergency trauma treatment kit, including IV materials and oxygen.

o Gas masks for all occupants. These must be stowed as inconspicuously as possible of course, inside the passenger compartment. All PD members must be cross-trained in the use of all equipment.

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FROM : G3 OPS

*[Signature]*

3000.12

TO : SENBATT

INFO : COS  
~~DCOS~~ OPS

*[Signature]* 26/5

DATE : 26 MAY, 1995

*[Signature]*  
26/5

SUBJECT : NIGHT PATROLS

1. At a meeting with RPA staff officers, the issue of night patrolling by UNAMIR troops was discussed. The RPA indicated that they were not in favour of the idea because of the possibility of clashes between RPA and UNAMIR troops.

2. In view of the above, you are requested to stop night patrols in your sector. You are however to continue to deploy your RRF during emergencies at night, to assist UN and NGO personnel when necessary.


3. For your compliance.

*[Signature]*  
27/5



UN RESTRICTED

FROM : G3 OPS



3000.12

TO : SENBATT

INFO : COS  
DCOS OPS

DATE : 26 MAY, 1995

SUBJECT : NIGHT PATROLS

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3. For your compliance.

UNAMIR - RESTRICTED	1	DAOPS
	19 MAY 1995	
	UN RESTRICTED	

3000.12

*Am*

*26/5*

*SPSG 01-17*

UNAMIR/NIBATT 2/7401.9/G

HQ NIBATT 2  
UNAMIR  
BYUMBA CAMP  
BYUMBA  
FAX TO: 234-1-2634752

See Distribution

*See*  
*26/5*

*17*

May 95

SITUATION IN RWANDA

1. The situation in our Area of Responsibility remains generally calm, though minor incidents are reflected in our weekly situation reports to Department of Army Operations. Since the last KIBEHO incident of Internally Displaced People (IDPs) where the Contingent provided Troops Carrying Vehicles (TCV) to assist in transporting the Displaced persons to their various Communes nothing significant has happened. The Contingent continue to carry out United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) assigned tasks satisfactorily. However, one WO Solomon DONKAT of Engrs is sick and was transferred from UNAMIR Hospital Kigali to United Nations Hospital Nairobi, Kenya on 16 May, 1995. A few of the soldiers that were in bad shape due to acclimatization are getting alright. We are still expecting the arrival of the last 15 soldiers from Nigeria.

2. From the experience of the incident of shooting to death of a local when NIBATT 1 was here. To minimize movement of own personnel within and outside the camps:-

a. I have established the Officers, Warrant Officers and Sergeants Messes and the Soldiers Canteen they are all equiped with TVs, VCRs and Fridges, the only shortcoming is seats but the engrs platoon is presently constructing Benches locally to all these facilities.

b. I have also drawn up camp rules which are strictly adhered to.

c. Sporting activities have been intensified, we are providing and featuring 4 teams for the UNAMIR MINI SPORTS which comes up on 21 May, 1995. The games includes Basket/Volleyballs, Soccer and Squash.

d. Daily Muster Parade and Tantoo.

e. Strict routine in defence are also observed in the perimeter of the camps.

3. Since the arrival of the Contingent we have received various visits by VIPs among them are:-

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- a. The Force Commander
- b. The Deputy Force Commander
- c. A Russian General
- d. The Force Medical Officer
- e. Other Nigerian MILOBs Officers serving in Rwanda.
- f. The Prefect of Byumba Prefecture

All the visits were succesful and fully covered. Cordial relationship exist between the Contingent and the locals.

4. On the 13 May, 1995, the Special Representative of the Secretary General in Rwanda (SRSG) Ambassador Shahalya M Khan held a meeting with all Sectors Commanders. The aim of the meeting was for each sector commander to brief him on our activities. At the end of the briefing, the SRSG was impressed and said that we have even gone beyond our UNAMIR assigned tasks. He however employed commanders to start working towards achieving morale building activities for the locals in conjunction with Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) within our Area of Responsibility. I am coordinating these activities while Major AOJ Izebvekhai has been appointed the Contingent Psychological Operation/Humanitarian Officer, details will be communicated to you in due course. He further informed us that the mandate for UNAMIR ends on 9 June, 1995 unless UN HQ in NY; renews it.

5. Both Easter and eid-el-Kabir were jointly celebrated by the Contingents and activities covered by our APRO. For COAS, the Contingent extend their sincere appreciation for the Sallah gift.

6. The major problem of the contingent is that of sleeping kits, the camouflage Uniform (two pairs each) while 83 soldiers still sleep on floor as efforts to loan mattresses from the UNAMIR HQs have proved abortive.

7. In spite of the problems mentioned above, the morale of the contingent remains high particularly with the activities of the Spiritual Leaders attached to the Contingent. We shall remain loyal to the home Government, UNAMIR and the UNO to achieve the objectives for which we are sent here.

8. Please acknowledge receipt.

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SA KATUNG  
Lt Col  
Cont Comd

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