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BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

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TO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK *SK*  
INFO: VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA  
FROM: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB  
DATE: 25 January 1993  
NUMBER: UNPROFOR - 89  
SUBJECT: SPECIAL ASSESSMENT - CENTRAL B-H.

*Alambol*  
*H. Gen*

Copy of cable from Kiseljak on the subject is forwarded for information.

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OUTGOING FAX NO.	DATE: 24 JANUARY 1993
TO: HQ, UNPROFOR ZAGREB	FROM: HQ BH COMMAND KISELJAK
FAX NO.:	FAX:
ATTN: FC, DFC, COS, CIV AFFAIRS, CHIEF MILINFO, BH OFS	FILE REF. NO. : DRAFTER : LTC CASPERS TITLE : DACOS G 2/5 RELEASING OFF. : CORDY-SIMPSON SIGNATURE : <i>[Signature]</i>
INFO : INTERNAL: COMB, DCOMB, COS, CIV AFFAIRS, G 2/5, G 3	
SUBJECT: SPECIAL ASSESSMENT	

SUBJECT: CROAT INTENTIONS FOR PROVINCES 3, 8, and 10

BACKGROUND

1. Since the GENEVA talks in early January, tensions have steadily increased between elements of both the Croat HVO and the principally Muslim Army of BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA (BH) in Central and Southern BH. Discord between these elements seems to increase every time the pressure from Bosnian Serb forces lulls, and is significantly related to ethnic perceptions over the Peace Plan.

2. The tensions seem to be most severe in areas where there is no clear majority of either ethnic group in a particular oblastina. This does not prevent areas like PROZOR (majority Croat) or JABLANICA (majority Muslim) from experiencing the effects of ethnic turmoil. Over the past week, the political and military leaders of the Croatian Community of HERCEG-BOSNA have begun to implement their "understanding" of the proposed settlement for the conflict in BH. This premature and imperfect grab for control of provinces 2, 8, and 10 has resulted in extremely high tensions in these and adjoining areas, and heavy fighting between Muslim and Croat units in and around GORNJI VAKUF.

3. Ethnic perceptions of the meaning of the new provinces as proposed in GENEVA are not just localized. This can be illustrated by 2 orders attached: one from Mr Rajic, Defence Minister for the Republic of BH; the other from Brig Petkovic, Commander of the HVO.

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4. Local tensions express themselves in a variety of ways; from denying Muslim citizens access to government facilities until they sign loyalty pledges to HERCEG-BOSNA (seen in late October 1992 in NOVI TRAVNIK); to the current declaration of control of all military forces remaining in the area, which resulted in the recent fighting between these "allies".

5. At present, ECOMM and UNPROFOR are in the process of trying to bring an end to the violent fighting between HVO forces and BH Army units in the vicinity of GORNJI VAKUF. A ceasefire arranged for 23 January 1993 had only limited effect.

GORNJI VAKUF

6. In summary, BRITBAT believes that the HVO commander from TOMISLAVGRAD, Col Siljeg, is largely responsible for the continued attacks on GORNJI VAKUF. It is understood that Mr Boban has in the course of today ordered Col Siljeg to stop fighting. Further reports indicate that:

- a. The southern part of GORNJI VAKUF is quiet where the Muslims have given way.
- b. GORNJI VAKUF has been struck by BM21 rocket launchers at least 4 times. Artillery and tanks have been continuously employed, with T-55 tanks firing single rounds into houses.
- c. The town of BRISTOL has been ethnically cleansed by the HVO, with all Muslim houses burning.

7. The HVO has also laid down a number of conditions to local Muslims, including the surrender of arms into a joint HVO/Muslim authority (not yet created), and the demand for a number of Muslims to be held accountable for war crimes. The HVO has further stated that Muslims may stay in GORNJI VAKUF if unarmed.

EXTERNAL INVOLVEMENT

8. The current conflict in GORNJI VAKUF and surrounding communities has been exacerbated by the presence of units of both sides from other areas. During the build-up of forces in late 1992 around TURBE, both BH Army and HVO units were rushed into this area to prepare the defense against Serb forces. Many of these units remained in Central BH as that front settled and the Geneva Conference provided a prospect for peace. Most incidents of direct conflict between Muslims and Croats have been initiated by members of these external units.

9. Coincidental with the recent preparations for a return to GENEVA, HVO units from the clearly Croat-dominated southern oblasts have been moved into Central BH. Incidents of civil disobedience in Muslim-owned and -operated businesses and, almost

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certainly, the terrorist bombing of the car belonging to the Muslim Mayor of TRAVNIK, trace back to members of these HVO elements from the South.

10. As tensions increased and HVO demands for control of these areas expanded, Muslim heavy elements from ZENICA and vicinity were moved in to reinforce in-place forces with predictable results. More disturbingly, UN-source reports of soldiers wearing patches identifying them as members of Croatian Army (CA) units in this area have been received. The role of these soldiers is not clear, but the sightings tend to correlate to areas where HVO units from southern oblasts are positioned.

IMPACT ON UNPROFOR/UNHCR OPERATIONS.

11. THE CURRENT SITUATION IN GORNJI VAKUF sits astride the primary resupply route into BRITBAT's area, with HQ B Coy stationed in this town.

12. The recent slaying of a British UN soldier occurred as a result of this internecine fighting, and considerable time, assets and efforts have now been diverted from BH Command's humanitarian mission in order to try to help implement the ceasefire between Muslims and Croats.

13. Primary and tertiary delivery routes for UNHCR relief run through this area. This relief has understandably had to be diverted along the MOSTAR route or suspended for the time being.

14. On 20 January 1993, the MOSTAR UNHCR field officer met with Mr. Tadic, the minister appointed by Mate Boban to coordinate assistance in HERCEG BOSNA, and municipality leaders from the southern and central areas. Mr. Tadic stated that all future deliveries of aid for this region must be made directly to the local government (HERCEG BOSNA) and not to the more ethnically neutral coordinating committees as heretofore. The officer was also informed that if UNHCR declined to comply with this instruction, the HVO would close the border at METKOVIC to UNHCR traffic.

15. Security of UNHCR field offices and convoys in this area is increasingly uncertain. HVO elements have threatened UNHCR representatives and facilities for "feeding the Muslims".

16. Muslims are expressing their resentment for current HVO actions, the killing of the Deputy Prime Minister, and the lack of Western military intervention on their behalf by threats and low-level violence, such as last week's hijacking of a UNHCR vehicle and personnel in JABLANICA. This insecurity is significantly impacting the volume and breadth of coverage of aid deliveries in and throughout this area.

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CRISIS IN CROATIAN UNPAs.

17. A direct connection between the Croat assertion of authority in Central and Southern BH and the outbreak of fighting in UNPA South, with resultant tensions in the other Croatian UNPAs, is difficult to establish. The timing in relation to the resumption of the GENEVA Talks and the presence of CA soldiers within Central BH raises significant concerns.

ASSESSMENT.

18. It is difficult to assess why the Croats should be taking such a hard line. A quieter approach would seem to offer only a slightly longer transition to probable political dominance with international approval. Whether to try to stabilize this tense area, or more likely to remind the Muslim leaders that once peace breaks out they must then deal with the Croats, there are some things which are certain:

a. There is absolutely no doubt that the Croat leaders in BH read the current provincial plan as guaranteeing them control of a three province "ethnic canton". Their protestations that they are only trying to prepare for the implementation of the GENEVA Plan clearly show the hegemonist interpretation they put on the plan.

b. It is equally obvious that the allies against "Serbian Aggression" will, at best, be uneasy rivals during the implementation phases of the GENEVA Plan.

c. Any settlement of the current trouble will lie in the negotiator's ability to convince the Croats to accept the limitations placed on their control of these provinces by the constitutional requirement for free and democratic elections included in the GENEVA Plan.

19. The significant Muslim minorities in the new provinces will inevitably carry considerable weight in the infrastructure of these provinces if the democratic processes are allowed to prevail. Currently, with the exception of Province 3, HVO and Muslim/BH Army forces are not separated in the basic alignment for withdrawal of forces to the provinces. All forces will have to be separated on clear delineation lines to effect any Plan.

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THE REPUBLIC BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
HQ HVO  
No: 01 - 70/93  
Mostar, 15 January 1993.

THE DEFENCE  
MILITARY SECRET  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Based on the decision of HVO HZ II-B. No 01-1-32/93 from 15 January 1993 and the order of the Head of the Defence department No 02- I/1-9 from 15 January 1993, in connection with the agreement about the establishment of BH from Geneva and also the competences of the command of Armed forces in the provinces,

**1 ORDER:**

1. All formations of the HVO Armed forces and the BH Army in the area of the provinces 3, 8, 10 (croat provinces) are under command of the HQ HVO, which means under command of the OZ (Operative zone) Middle Bosnia, SZ (North-west) and II (South-east) Herzegovina.
2. All HVO formations in the areas of the provinces 1, 5 and 9 (muslem provinces) are under command of the HQ BH Army (part of the brigades of OZ Middle Bosnia).
3. The HVO forces in the communes of Kiseljak and Kresevo so far are under command of the HQ HVO, which means OZ Middle Bosnia.
4. The members and formations of the HVO Armed forces and BH Army who will not be subordinated to the command mentioned in the paragraphs 1. and 2. of this order have to leave the areas of the provinces they do not belong to, otherwise they will be treated as paramilitary and disarmed.
5. Officers of the BH Army have to be represented also in the command of the HVO Armed forces at the level of OZ (Operative zone) and brigades according to the number of soldiers in the battlefield.  
This is also the realisation of the common command agreement.
6. Those officers of the BH Army who by their former work made influence on the breaking relations between croatian and muslem populations can not be in the common command
7. OZ commanders are obligated to start negotiations with the BH Army commands and to find the best solutions for forming of the common command
8. The term for the execution of this order is 20 January 1993.

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
Sarajevo, 18 January 1993  
Ref.: 01/93

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According to the agreement suggested and partly signed at the International Conference for the former Yugoslavia, and according to the Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina (Geneva agreements), and with the aim of establishing peace on the whole territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of protecting the citizens and their properties, I declare:

#### ORDER

1. All units of the Croatian Defence Council, which are in this moment settled in provinces 1, 8 and 9 declared as Moslem provinces in accordance with the Geneva agreements, are to be placed under the higher command of the BH Army Headquarters.
2. All units of the BH Army which are in this moment settled in provinces 3, 8, 10 which are declared as Croatian provinces in accordance with the Geneva agreements, are to be placed under the higher command of the HVO Headquarters.
3. All units of the Republic Srpska in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina are to be removed with all personnel and material into the provinces 2, 4, 5, which are declared as Serb provinces in accordance with the Geneva agreements.
4. All units of the Croatian Council of Defence, BH Army and Serb Army which are in this moment settled in the province 7, having a special treatment according to the Geneva agreements, have to stop all conflicts.
5. This order will be valid in all hereabove mentioned points until the final agreement, signature and new order about implementation of the Geneva Peace Agreement.
6. The responsible persons for the fulfillment of this Order are:
  - Brigadier Miroslav Perkovic, Commander of the HVO Headquarters.
  - Colonel Sefer Halilovic, Chief of the BH Army Headquarters.
  - General Ratko Mladic, Commander of the Serb Army in Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.



ICFY/10

**INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA****INTRODUCTION**

In 1990, the Bosnian Parliament adopted Amendment LXXIII to the Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following the outbreak of hostilities in 1992, this provision of the Constitution was invoked and the Presidency was expanded from seven to ten members with the inclusion of the Prime Minister, the President of the Assembly and the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. The powers of the Parliament were transferred to the Presidency.

Following the signing of the peace agreements and their endorsement by the United Nations Security Council, it is proposed that each of the three parties represented at the Conference (the "Parties") nominate three representatives to serve in an Interim Central Government. The confirmation of these nine representatives will be subject to the approval of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (the "Co-Chairmen"). Once the composition of the Interim Central Government has been confirmed, it is proposed that the Presidency, acting in accordance with its powers under Amendment LXXIII, will transfer its powers and authority to this Interim Central Government.

Those aspects of the existing Constitution which relate to the Presidency will then be suspended. To the extent practicable, the other provisions of the existing Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue to apply, in particular those provisions relating to the courts and legal system.

During the interim period, which is defined as the period between the transfer of authority to the Interim Central Government and the holding of free and fair elections, a new Constitution for Bosnia and Herzegovina will be drafted by the parties with the assistance of the Co-Chairmen and will be the basis upon which the elections will take place.

In each Province, there will be an Interim Provincial Government composed of a Governor, Vice-Governor, and ten other members.

Throughout the interim period opstina authorities will retain their existing powers. The opstina boundaries will remain as at present except where they are crossed by provincial boundaries or where the boundaries have been changed by agreement under the auspices of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.

This document contains proposals for the functioning of a International Access Authority, the national power authority, the National Bank, the Post, Telegraph and Telecommunications Authority of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and an independent National Civil Aviation Authority.

## I.

INTERIM CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

- A. In the interim period, there will be a nine-member Interim Central Government.
1. Three Representatives will be nominated by each of the Parties. These nominations will then be confirmed by the Co-Chairmen.
  2. The Interim Central Government will take decisions by consensus. In the event that a decision cannot be reached by the Interim Central Government, the issue will be referred to the Co-Chairmen for their urgent consideration.
  3. The Interim Central Government will be located in Sarajevo, within that opstina designated as the Capital. In addition to its national responsibilities, the Interim Central Government will administer the Capital, and have responsibility for its policing.
  4. The position of President of the Interim Central Government will rotate every four months among the representatives of the Parties. The President of the Interim Central Government will perform the role of Head of State.
- B. The principal responsibilities of the Interim Central Government will be as follows:
1. Preparations for the holding of free and fair elections, on the basis of the new Constitution, under international supervision;
  2. Relations with the Mixed Military Working Group, UNPROFOR (including UNCIVPOL), ECMM and ICFY;
  3. Coordination with UNHCR, ICRC, WHO and other relevant agencies on the return and rehabilitation of refugees and displaced persons;
  4. Foreign Affairs (including membership in international organizations);
  5. International Commerce (customs duties, quotas);
  6. Citizenship;
  7. Raising of any taxes required to carry out its functions.
- C. The Interim Central Government will be responsible for appointing ministers and determining the role of such



ministries as are deemed appropriate.

- D. The Co-Chairmen will be involved with the parties in the preparation of the Constitution for Bosnia and Herzegovina and will also be available to assist the Interim Central Government in its work.

## II.

### INTERIM PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS

- A. During the interim period, each province will have an Interim Provincial Government composed of a Governor, a Vice-Governor, and ten other members. The Governor, the Vice Governor and the ten other members of the Interim Provincial Government will be nominated by the Parties on the basis of the composition of the population of the province\*, provided that none of the three Constituent Peoples will be left unrepresented in any province. The Interim Provincial Governments will be composed as in Annex A.
- B. Decisions will normally be taken by a simple majority, except that the adoption of the provincial constitution and the setting of opstina boundaries will be taken by consensus.
- C. The principal functions of the Interim Provincial Governments will be:
  - 1. The drafting of Provincial Constitutions in accordance with the new Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
  - 2. The preparation of free and fair elections, which should be held as soon as possible, on the basis of proportional representation and under international supervision;
  - 3. Relations with the Mixed Military Working Group, UNPROFOR (including UNCIVPOL), ECMM and ICFY;
  - 4. Coordination with UNHCR, ICRC, WHO and other relevant agencies on the return and rehabilitation of refugees and displaced persons;
  - 5. Supervision of Police Force;
  - 6. Restoration of infrastructure;

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\*

To determine these relative percentages, the 1991 Census will be used.

7. Raising of any taxes necessary to carry out their functions;
- D. There will be attached to the staff of each provincial Governor UNPROFOR Military Liaison, including an UNCIVPOL Liaison Officer, to assist in the carrying out of the above tasks.

## III.

**INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS  
FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS**

- A. The three Parties have accepted Principle 8 of the Constitutional Framework for Bosnia and Herzegovina which states that the highest level of internationally recognised human rights shall be provided for in the Constitution. The international community has repeatedly condemned ethnic cleansing and has demanded that its results be reversed. In order that the provisions of Principle 8 be implemented in the interim period, the following measures will be taken, with particular emphasis placed on reversing ethnic cleansing wherever it has occurred.
1. All statements or commitments made under duress, particularly those relating to the relinquishment of rights to land and property, are wholly null and void.
  2. Four Ombudsmen will be appointed immediately by the Co-Chairmen, as per paragraph VI.B.2 of the Proposed Constitutional Structure for Bosnia and Herzegovina (ICFY/6 Annex).
  3. All citizens, through their representatives, will have the right to request international monitoring in areas where they believe that human rights were being, are being, or are about to be infringed. This may involve the monitoring of the area by UNCIVPOL or other appropriate bodies such as the ECMM, with or without the assistance of UNPROFOR military personnel. In the same way, they will also be able to make representations to the Mixed Military Working Group to request a redeployment of any armed forces in their area.



IV. APPOINTMENT OF A REPRESENTATIVE  
OF THE CO-CHAIRMEN IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

The Co-Chairmen shall appoint a Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who will be resident in Sarajevo and available as and when necessary to the Interim Central Government and the Interim Provincial Governments.

V. ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL ACCESS AUTHORITY

- A. Principle 3 of the Constitutional Framework for Bosnia and Herzegovina states that "full freedom of movement shall be allowed throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, to be ensured in part by the maintenance of internationally-controlled throughways".

In order to implement this Principle, an International Access Authority will be established with representatives from the Interim Central Government and the Interim Provincial Governments, which:

1. will have sole responsibility for all railway lines in Bosnia and Herzegovina and those roads which are declared as internationally-controlled throughways.
2. will regulate the operation of port facilities on the River Sava.

The Authority's essential purpose will be to guarantee full freedom of movement between and within the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina and also to and from these provinces to the Republic of Croatia and to the Republic of Serbia (the proposed routes are set forth in Annex B).

- B. It is intended that the International Access Authority will be in operation as soon as possible during the interim period. Following the endorsement of the Agreement on Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the United Nations Security Council, all designated throughways will come under the responsibility of UNPROFOR. A period of overlapping responsibility is envisaged for UNPROFOR and that of the International Access Authority. During this period of overlapping responsibility, UNPROFOR's involvement will be phased out and its responsibilities assumed by traffic police employed by the International Access Authority. This transfer of responsibility will only happen by agreement of all those involved in the International Access Authority.

## VI.

**FUNCTIONING OF THE  
NATIONAL POWER AUTHORITY**

A Board of Directors will be appointed by the Interim Central Government and the Interim Provincial Governments to manage Elektro Privreda, the existing national power authority, which will be responsible for the transmission and distribution of electricity in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Board will be responsible for ensuring the uninterrupted supply of electricity to the whole of the country and to make appropriate links with neighbouring countries.

1. The Interim Central Government and each of the Interim Provincial Governments will appoint one representative to the Board of Directors of Elektro Privreda.
2. Elektro Privreda will continue to have its headquarters in Sarajevo.

## VII.

**FUNCTIONING OF THE  
NATIONAL BANK OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**

The functions of the Governor and Council of the National Bank (Narodna Banka) of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be taken over by a Board of Governors. The National Bank will continue to have responsibility, inter alia, for issuing currency and for exercising a regulatory function over provincial banks, as well as for relations with international financial institutions.

1. The Interim Central Government and each of the Interim Provincial Governments will appoint one representative to the Board of Governors of the National Bank.
2. The National Bank will remain located in Sarajevo.

## VIII.

**FUNCTIONING OF THE NATIONAL  
POST, TELEGRAPH AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS AUTHORITY**

A Board of Directors will be appointed by the Interim Central Government and the Interim Provincial Governments to manage the National Post, Telegraph and Telecommunications Authority of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It will have responsibility for ensuring



postal and telecommunications services throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, and necessary international links. It will also have responsibility for the allocation of radio and television transmission frequencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

1. The Interim Central Government and each of the Interim Provincial Governments will appoint one representative to the Board of Directors of the National Post, Telegraph and Telecommunications Authority.
2. The National Post, Telegraph and Telecommunications Authority will be located in Sarajevo.

#### IX.

#### ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT NATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY

An independent National Civil Aviation Authority will be established as soon as possible by the Interim Central Government and the Interim Provincial Governments.

The National Civil Aviation Authority will, when appropriate, assume responsibilities for the control of all civilian traffic in the air space of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as for relations with ICAO and other relevant international authorities. Initially, a period of overlapping responsibilities is envisaged for UNPROFOR and the National Civil Aviation Authority.

UNPROFOR will continue operating and controlling Sarajevo airport until other arrangements are agreed with UNPROFOR.

1. The Interim Central Government and each of the Interim Provincial Governments will appoint one representative to the Board of Directors of the National Civil Aviation Authority.
2. The National Civil Aviation Authority will have its headquarters in Sarajevo.

29 January 1993

## Annex A

### STRUCTURE OF INTERIM PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS

For the purposes of this annex, the Parties will be designated "Party A", "Party B" and "Party C", denoting the delegations of Mate Boban, Alija Izetbegovic and Radovan Karadzic respectively.

#### Province Number : 1

Province Capital: Bihac

Governor: Nominated by Party B

Vice Governor: Nominated by Party C

Other Members of Interim Provincial Government:

7 Members nominated by Party B, 2 Members nominated by Party C,

1 Member nominated by Party A

#### Province Number: 2

Province Capital: Banja Luka

Governor: Nominated by Party C

Vice Governor: Nominated by Party B

Other Members of Interim Provincial Government:

7 Members nominated by Party C, 2 Members nominated by Party B,

1 Member nominated by Party A

#### Province Number: 3

Province Capital: Bosanski Brod

Governor: Nominated by Party A

Vice Governor: Nominated by Party C

Other Members of Interim Provincial Government:

5 Members nominated by Party A, 3 Members nominated by Party C,

2 Members nominated by Party B

#### Province Number: 4

Province Capital: Bijeljina

Governor: Nominated by Party C

Vice Governor: Nominated by Party B

Other Members of Interim Provincial Government:

5 Members nominated by Party C, 4 Members nominated by Party B,

1 Member nominated by Party A

#### Province Number: 5

Province Capital: Tuzla

Governor: Nominated by Party B

Vice Governor: Nominated by Party C

Other Members of Interim Provincial Government:

5 Members nominated by Party B, 3 Members nominated by Party C,

2 Members nominated by Party A



Province Number: 6

Province Capital: Nevesinje

Governor: Nominated by Party C

Vice Governor: Nominated by Party B

Other Members of Interim Provincial Government:

7 Members nominated by Party C, 2 Members nominated by Party B,

1 Member nominated by Party A

Province Number: 7

Province of Sarajevo

Because of its special position with the Capital in its midst, it is proposed that each of the Parties will nominate three members in the Interim Provincial Government.

The Opstina boundaries in Sarajevo will be referred immediately to a committee to which each party will nominate a member. The Committee will meet in Sarajevo under the chairmanship of the Co-Chairmen's Representative, and will report to the Co-Chairmen before Sunday, 7 February 1993. The Co-Chairmen will arbitrate in the event of any differences.

It is envisaged that one of the opstinas will be called the "Capital Opstina" and encompass the Government buildings, historic buildings, university, hospital, railway station, sports facilities and will come under the administration of the interim Central Government.

Province Number: 8

Province Capital: Mostar

Governor: Nominated by Party A

Vice Governor: Nominated by Party B

Other Members of Interim Provincial Government:

6 Members nominated by Party A, 3 Members nominated by Party B,

1 Member nominated by Party C

Province Number: 9

Province Capital: Zenica

Governor: Nominated by Party B

Vice Governor: Nominated by Party A

Other Members of Interim Provincial Government:

6 Members nominated by Party B, 2 Members nominated by Party A,

2 Members nominated by Party C

Province Number: 10

Province Capital: Travnik

Governor: Nominated by Party A

Vice Governor: Nominated by Party B

Other Members of Interim Provincial Government:

5 Members nominated by Party B, 4 Members nominated by Party A,

1 Member nominated by Party C

Annex B

**THROUGHWAYS TO BE CONTROLLED  
BY THE INTERNATIONAL ACCESS AUTHORITY**

- that part of the road from Bihac to Livno that passes through Banja Luka province
- that part of the road from Bihac to Jajce that passes through Banja Luka province
- that part of the road from Banja Luka to Brcko that passes through Posavina province
- those parts of the roads from Tuzla to Orasje and from Tuzla to Brcko that pass through Posavina and Bijeljina Provinces
- those parts of the roads from Han Pijesak to Sekovici and from Sekovici to Zvornik that pass through Tuzla Province
- that part of the road from Pale to Kalinovik that passes through Sarajevo Province
- that part of the road from Foca to Sarajevo that passes through East Herzegovina Province
- the road from Sarajevo to Mostar and to the Croatian border towards Split
- that part of the road from Ljubinje to Neum that passes through Mostar Province.

International road border crossings affecting the International Access Authority:

- Bihac Province - Velika Kladusa, towards Karlovac and Zagreb
- Banja Luka Province - Bosanski Gradiska, towards Zagreb-Belgrade autoroute
- Posavina Province - Orasje, towards Zagreb-Belgrade autoroute
- Bijeljina Province - Sremska Raca, towards Zagreb-Belgrade autoroute
- Tuzla Province - Zvornik, towards Zagreb-Belgrade autoroute
- Mostar Province - Osoje, towards Split





# INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA



Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10

TO: See Distribution  
FROM: John Wilson/Graham Messervy-Whiting  
DATE: 22 January 1993  
SUBJECT: Military Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina

## General

1. With the imminent resumption of the BiH Peace Conference and associated discussion of a provincial map, an update of the military situation and possible intentions of military commanders may be of use to the Co-Chairmen. It is likely that short-term military objectives are linked to desired outcomes from the peace process and, in particular, drawing of the provincial map.

## Overview of Military Situation

2. The military situation in BiH is at present relatively stable. This can be attributed to the influence of weather, a desire by all parties not to be seen as disrupting the peace process and an acceptance that major gains are unlikely without significant losses.

3. The most significant fighting at present appears to be along the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) lines of communication in northern and eastern Bosnia. To a lesser extent, fighting has increased around the Bihac pocket in recent weeks. A BiH Army offensive in Sarajevo would appear to remain on hold. Factional fighting between the HVO and BiH Army forces in Donji Vakuf has resulted in Republic wide tension between the two forces. In the air, limited BSA helicopter operations continue and the Croatian resupply effort for the Bihac pocket is unabated.

## The UNPA Experience

4. The failure of the Serbs to implement fully agreements related to the UNPA's in Croatia will not have been lost on the Croat and Muslim leadership. They will anticipate only partial compliance with agreements, particularly those related to weapons control and vital communication routes. We can expect, in the short-term, Croat and BiH Army forces to position themselves to counter non-compliance.

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#### BSA

5. Attempts by the BSA to secure and improve lines of communication in northern and eastern Bosnia will continue. There appears to be some urgency in BSA efforts in eastern Bosnia as reflected by an admission of open involvement by the Yugoslav Army in fighting in the Srebrenica area. A lower level of fighting in the northern corridor probably indicates difficulty in achieving significant gains in the area and greater confidence in being able to strike a "deal" for a corridor with the Croats in the peace process. It is highly likely that, because of the strategic significance of the northern corridor, the BSA has little intention of relinquishing hard-won gains in this area despite any agreements which may be reached in Geneva. They probably also intend to maintain a reserve of heavy weapons, free of UN intervention, for contingencies.

6. No major developments should be expected in the Sarajevo area. Without unacceptable casualties the capture of the city is an unattainable objective for the Serbs. The BSA will remain in a defensive posture and rely on its superiority in indirect fire weapons to deflect any BH Army offensive.

7. In the rest of BH, the BSA will continue with the defensive battle, whilst taking every opportunity to maintain pressure on vital nodes along the Croat:BiH Army south-to-north lines of communication. Maintenance of lines of communications to the Kraijina will remain an important objective. Limited air operations will continue to facilitate the movement of their military and political leadership.

8. In summary, short-term BSA military objectives are assessed as:

- a. Maintenance and improvement of the security of the eastern and northern lines of communication.
- b. Maintain the seige of Sarajevo.
- c. Hold the present line of confrontation, pressuring Croat/Bih Army south to north lines of communication..
- d. Maintain lines of communications to the Kraijina.

#### BiH Army

9. BiH Army forces will, as a priority, continue to apply pressure to disrupt BSA lines of communication and strengthen their links to the Srebrenica and Gorazde pockets in eastern and northern Bosnia. Apart from short-term benefits, any significant gains against these routes would strengthen their position in upcoming negotiations. They would also assist in ensuring BSA compliance with territorial agreements and place BiH Army forces in an advantageous position for a resumption of hostilities which they probably regard as inevitable.



10. BiH Army forces, with Croatian logistics and advisor support, will maintain limited offensive action from the Bihac pocket. Such activity ties down BSA assets which might be employed elsewhere and keeps pressure on the Krajina Serbs.

11. A Sarajevo offensive is unlikely to be successful without substantial Croat support. It is the absence of this support that has probably delayed its launching and has contributed to inter factional tension amongst BiH forces. BiH Army forces may be prepared to launch an offensive using their troops, without Croat support, if they believe their position in peace negotiations is so weak they must provoke foreign intervention.

12. BiH inter factional tension, and on occasions fighting, will continue without a change in the political leadership of the Muslim party to one which is more attuned to Croat aims.

13. In summary, BiH Army forces military objectives are assessed as:

- a. Disrupt BSA lines of communications in eastern and northern Bosnia.
- b. Achieve territorial gains in the eastern and northern corridor to ensure BSA adherence to agreements concluded, to strengthen their links to Grazde/Srebrenica pockets and to strengthen their own bargaining position.
- c. Continue to tie down BSA forces in the Bihac area to prevent their transfer to more critical fronts and to threaten Krajina lines of communications.
- d. Launch an offensive in the Sarajevo area if they consider their bargaining position in negotiations untenable and intervention is the only recourse.
- e. Continue to re-arm and build up forces and resources for a resumption of war when they are in a more advantageous position.

#### HVO

14. The HVO is assessed as being largely satisfied with their existing military situation. This is reinforced by the Croatian Government's stated desire to achieve stability in BiH. This would allow the Croatians to concentrate on securing the Krajina through political and military pressure.

15. The HVO will continue to support BiH Army to interdict the northern corridor. They recognize that the BSA will reluctantly, if at all, hand over the corridor to the Croats. The HVO will accordingly attempt to strengthen their bargaining position in this area.

16. It may also be expected that the HVO will accord priority to securing the confrontation line in the Mostar area. This will be important for their lines of communication to central Bosnia and to their long-term objective of securing the Dubrovnik area. They will also continue to support BiH Army operations from the Bihac pocket but not an offensive in the Sarajevo area as this would disrupt gains they perceive obtainable from the peace process.

17. An important HVO objective will be to support Croatian Army pressure against the Krajina. Hence reinforcement of their forces in the Livno, Kupres and Donji Vakuf areas can be expected.

18. Croat attempts to change the existing Presidency Muslim leadership to one more in line with their views cannot be discounted.

19. In summary, it is assessed Bosnian Croat objectives are:

- a. Continue to apply pressure on the northern corridor.
- b. To hold existing confrontation lines and their own lines of communication.
- c. Apply pressure on the Krajina through limited support to the Bihac pocket and redeployment of forces adjacent to Sector South.
- d. Encourage a change in the political and strategic direction of the BH Presidency.

#### Croatian Army

20. It is expected that the Croatian Army will support the political objective of achieving stability in BiH so that priority can be applied to resolving the Krajina situation. They will continue with their support for the HVO and maintain their own deployments in Pasavino and Mostar regions.

#### Yugoslav Army (JA)

21. The JA will continue to provide limited support to the BSA and can be expected to intervene directly if they believe short-term losses of the BSA will materially affect the peace process. Actions intended to hasten the early withdrawal of Croatian Army units from BiH can also be anticipated. They will avoid complicating the peace process by overt action but will act with a sense of urgency if they perceive that their vital interests are being threatened.



### Conclusion

22. It is probable that Croat and Serb forces will attempt to consolidate their military positions in preparation for political negotiations. The possibility that the BiH Army will initiate offensive actions cannot be discounted, as they perceive their bargaining position to be the weakest amongst the parties involved and their military commanders believe that local gains are achievable.

23. The focus of military operatives will, in the short-term, be related to the eastern and northern BSA lines of communication. We should not overlook the possibility that the Serbs may attempt to achieve a military position which ensures their essential strategic objectives while only partially implementing any political agreement.

## MEMORANDUM

→ JW  
010/9

A/To: LO  
De/From: MW  
Section/Service/Division: \_\_\_\_\_  
Bureau/Room: \_\_\_\_\_ Tel.: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: 22 Jan 93  
Objet/Subject: PROVINCES AND MAJOR INSTALLATIONS —  
POWER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, DEFENCE

Attached as we discussed yesterday is a collation of the major installations in each Province. Those in brackets are in neighbouring republics but which could provide a service across to that province (e.g. power station in SlavonSKI Bred can serve Province 3).

No surprises — main problems likely to centre on Tajica (Sub-held), Brcko (for access by Province 5 to Sava River) and possibly Foca (Sub-held).

John



**MAJOR INSTALLATIONS IN BiH PROVINCES [ADJACENT TERRITORY]**

Province	Power/Fuel	Telecom- munications	Defence Industry	Navy/ River	Army	Air
1	-	-	-	-	Bihac	- Bihac - Cazin
2	Prijedor (Transformer Station)	-	Banja Luka	-	Banja Luka	- Banja Luka - <del>Prijedor</del>
3	[Slavonski Brod]	-	-	[Slavoski Brod]	-	[ <del>Slavonki</del> Brod]
4	[Sabac]	-	-	<u>Brcko</u> <sup>2</sup>	-	Brcko
5	Lukavac/ Zivinice	-	- Gorazde - <u>Foca</u> <sup>*1</sup>	-	Doboj <u>Foca</u> <sup>*1</sup>	Tuzla
6	Trebinje (Transformer Station) [Niksic]	-	-	[Kotor Basin]	-Pale -Trebinje	[Niksic]
7	Sarajevo (Transformer Stations)	Sarajevo	Sarajevo	-	Sarajevo	Sarajevo
8	-Jablanica -Mostar	[Dubrovnik]	Mostar	[-Dubrovnik -Ploce]	Mostar	Mostar
9	Zenica & downstream	-	-	-	Visoko	-
10	<u>Jajce</u> <sup>*1</sup>	[Split]	-New Travnik /Vitez -Bugojno - <u>Jajce</u> <sup>*1</sup>	[Split]	-Travnik/ Vitez	[Split]

**Notes:**
<sup>\*1</sup> Currently Serb-held

<sup>\*2</sup> Rail/river outlet for Province 5

## MEMORANDUM

A/To: LO  
 De/From: MW  
 Section/Service/Division: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Bureau/Room: \_\_\_\_\_ Tel.: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: 21 Jan 93  
 Objet/Subject: ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF PROVINCES

Attached on one document is a comparison of the following ethnic composition percentages:

1. Peter Berka's work based on the 1991 Census ('Our View').
2. The figures used by Prof Berka based on the global magazine article ('The Serbo-Croat View').
3. My rough assessment of the likely Presidency position ('The Preside View').

I have highlighted those percentage which vary more 5% from at least one of the others.

grad

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'Our View'      'Serbo-Croat View'      'Presidency View'

↓                      ↓                      ↓

Province Number 1 - Bihac

<u>Group</u>	<u>Population</u>
Muslim	249,049
Serb	61,437
Croat	13,563
Yugoslav	14,193
Total	341,105

Percentage

73.0	75.0	77
18.0	12.0	18
4.0	5.0	4.5
4.2		

Province Number 2 - Banja Luka

<u>Group</u>	<u>Population</u>
Muslim	155,347
Serb	517,538
Croat	72,440
Yugoslav	40,442
Total	799,695

Percentage

19.4	17.0	22
64.7	65.0	73
9.1	10.0	5
5.1		

Province Number 3 - Posavina

<u>Group</u>	<u>Population</u>
Muslim	46,985
Serb	73,786
Croat	125,575
Yugoslav	13,239
Total	265,949

Percentage

17.7	12.0	30
27.8	32.0	16
47.2	50.0	54
5.0		

Province Number 4 - Bijeljina

<u>Group</u>	<u>Population</u>
Muslim	86,691
Serb	105,540
Croat	5,961
Yugoslav	10,709
Total	215,337

Percentage

40.2	34.0	39
49.0	60.0	56
2.7	1.0	5
4.9		

Province Number 5 - Tuzla

<u>Group</u>	<u>Population</u>
Muslim	519,307
Serb	202,307
Croat	38,191
Yugoslav	42,638
Total	831,476

Percentage

62.4	66.0	68
24.3	24.6	28
4.6	4.2	4
5.1		

'Our View'      'Serbo-Croat View'      'Presidency View'

↓                      ↓                      ↓

Province Number 6 - Nevesinje

<u>Group</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Percentage</u>		
Muslim	38,901	25.4		
Serb	108,896	71.1		
Croat	897	0.5		
Yugoslav	2,876	1.8		
Total	153,102			

24.1      25  
70.7      74.5  
0.5      0.5

Province Number 7 - Sarajevo

<u>Group</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Percentage</u>		
Muslim	270,759	49.8		
Serb	148,290	27.3		
Croat	49,229	9.1		
Yugoslav	56,303	10.4		
Total	543,369			

49.2      57  
27.2      34  
9.6      9

Province Number 8 - Mostar

<u>Group</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Percentage</u>		
Muslim	102,277	28.7		
Serb	39,430	11.1		
Croat	192,617	54.1		
Yugoslav	16,291	4.5		
Total	356,175			

28.8      31  
11.1      12  
54.2      57

Province Number 9 - Zenica

<u>Group</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Percentage</u>		
Muslim	270,341	57.9		
Serb	72,777	15.6		
Croat	85,313	18.3		
Yugoslav	28,743	6.2		
Total	466,522			

58.3      64  
15.6      16  
18.0      20

Province Number 10 - Travnik

<u>Group</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Percentage</u>		
Muslim	149,571	38.1		
Serb	40,902	10.4		
Croat	169,936	43.2		
Yugoslav	14,367	3.6		
Total	390,924			

38.0      41  
13.0      13  
43.6      46



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Palais des Nations

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Page 1 of 5.

CZN-086  
CZG-062

TO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: VANCE, UNOG, GENEVA

FROM: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: 21 JANUARY 1993

NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z-064

SUBJECT: PROTEST LETTERS TO PRESIDENT IZETBEGOVIC

Please find attached a fax from BH COMD SARAJEVO, dated 21 Jan 1993 on the above subject, for your information.

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HQ BH COMMAND SARAJEVO

Page 1 of 4

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OUTGOING SERIAL NO:	DATE: 210910A JAN93
TO: HQ UNPROFOR ZAGREB BH COMMAND KISELJAK HQ SECTOR SARAJEVO	FROM: BH COMD SARAJEVO /CBMD
FAX NO:	FAX: 871 111 2475
ATTN: ZAGREB: FORCE COMMANDER KISELJAK: COS, CAC SARAJEVO: SC	FILE REF. NO : BHCS/8806 DRAFTER : MAJ TUCKER TITLE : CHEF DE CABINET RELEASING OFF. : MAJ TUCKER SIGNATURE : <i>[Signature]</i>

SUBJECT PROTEST LETTERS TO PRESIDENT IZETBEGOVIC

Sir,

Please find attached copies of 3 protest letters sent to President Izetbegovic by Maj Gen Morillon.

MHHQ 590

MHSA 840

*[Handwritten signature]*

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DCM CRHOPS  
DFC CMO  
COS REG  
COD AIE



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UNITED NATIONS  
PROTECTION FORCE



HEADQUARTERS  
BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA  
COMMAND, SARAJEVO

19 January 1993

President A Izetbegovic  
Presidency of the Republic of  
Bosnia and Herzegovina

*to President*

SUBJECT: BREAKING OF GENEVA CONVENTION

You will I am sure be aware that the firing of weapons from a hospital is against the Geneva Convention. I regret to have to inform you that for some time now I have been receiving reports that some mobile mortars have been operating from the vicinity of KOSEVO Hospital. This has sadly been confirmed and I now have concrete evidence from witnesses with signed statements that this was in fact the case at 1430 hours on Monday 11 January.

An 82 mm mortar had been set up on the western side of KOSEVO Hospital, within the hospital grounds. This mortar and its crew then proceeded to fire nine rounds, using the hospital as a screen. The direct consequence of this disreputable and cowardly act was that shortly afterwards the hospital came under fire from anti-aircraft gun fire, artillery fire and mortar fire.

I must point out to you the harm that such blatant disregard of the Geneva Convention does to your cause and insist that you take the strongest measures to prevent reoccurrences taking place. I am also becoming increasingly concerned at the recent increase in indications of a lack of discipline amongst your forces. I must urge you to take immediate preventive action.

I regret also to have to inform you I have been asked to pass the details of this particular incident to the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva.

*With warm regards -*

P MORILLON  
Major General  
Commander  
Bosnia Herzegovina  
Command

*M. Morillon*

21-01-1993 18:52

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BH COMD Kiseljak

P4  
P. 03

UNITED NATIONS  
PROTECTION FORCE



HEADQUARTERS  
BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA  
COMMAND, SARAJEVO

13 January 1993

President A IZETBEGOVIC  
Presidency of the Republic  
of Bosnia-Herzegovina  
Sarajevo

*Mr President,*

SUBJECT: SHOOTING OF UN SOLDIER IN GORNJI VAKUF

You will no doubt be well aware of the fatal shooting of a British soldier, a member of UNPROFOR, on United Nations duty in Gornji Vakuf at approximately 1047 hrs this morning.

While the details of the incident are still being investigated, it would seem clear that this was a deliberate act of murder of a United Nations soldier by forces either from the HVO or from the Army of Bosnian Republic in Gornji Vakuf, possibly with a view to inflaming the local situation and preventing UNPROFOR from carrying out its mission.

You should not need to be reminded that such incidents, if they were indeed carried out by your forces, do untold damage to your cause in the eyes of the world and, if repeated, could jeopardise our humanitarian work in your country.

I demand that you look into this matter personally, initiate an inquiry to ascertain responsibility, both individual and collective, and advise me of the result. I also demand an assurance that you have issued clear direction to all those you command to ensure members of UNPROFOR are no longer put at risk in any way.

*With warm regards,*

*P. Morillon*

P MORILLON  
Major General  
Commander



21-01-1993 10:54

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UNITED NATIONS  
PROTECTION FORCE



HEADQUARTERS  
BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA  
COMMAND, SARAJEVO

19 January 1993

President Ali Izetbegovic  
Presidency of the Republic of  
Bosnia and Herzegovina

M<sup>r</sup> President,

SUBJECT: PROTEST - FIRING OF MORTARS AT SARAJEVO  
AIRPORT

I regret to be having to write to you on a serious matter concerning the apparent behaviour of some of your forces. At 1645 hours on 16 January 1993 ten mortar rounds impacted at Sarajevo Airport. 5 mortar bombs landed around the Northern Checkpoint, 4 around the Airport Control Radar and the last one landed on the weather station. The result was that 3 of my soldiers were injured and 2 trucks damaged.

Crater Analysis of the impact craters showed that the rounds had all been fired from the direction of HRASNICA. There are no Serb positions along the lines stretching back from the various points of impact towards HRASNICA. The evidence sadly clearly indicated that this attack on United Nations forces on territory under the control of the United Nations was carried out by forces answerable to you.

You will of course understand the damage that the revelation of this incident could do to your cause. I must therefore demand that you investigate this attack, the perpetrators be brought to justice and I be informed of the results. I also request assurance from you that the forces under your control will henceforth respect the neutrality of the United Nations.

I look forward to an early response.

with warm regards -

P MORILLON  
Major General  
Commander  
Bosnia Herzegovina  
Command

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Page 1 of 4

CODE RESTRICTED

TO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: 20 JANUARY 1993

NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z- 057SUBJECT: SPECIAL ASSESSMENT: EFFECTS OF INTERETHNIC FIGHTING  
BETWEEN HVO AND MUSLIM ELEMENTS

Please find enclosed cable on the subject received from HQ BH  
Command, Kiseljak for your information.

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**HQ BH COMMAND - KISELJAK**

Page 1 of 3

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OUTGOING FAX NO.	DATE: 191800 JANUARY 1993
TO: HQ UNPROFOR, ZAGREB	FROM: HQ BH COMMAND KISELJAK
FAX NO.:	FAX:
ATTN: FC, DFC, COS, CHIEF MILINFO, CHIEF BHC LO DET	FILE REF. NO. : DRAFTER : LTC CASPERS TITLE : DACOS G 2/5 RELEASING OFF. : CORDY-SIMPSON SIGNATURE : <i>R. Cordy-Simpson</i>
INFO : INTERNAL: COMD, DCOMD, COS, DCOS, G 2/5, G 3	
SUBJECT: Special Assessment: Effects of Internecine Fighting Between HVO and Muslim Elements.	

Despite all efforts to diffuse tensions, fighting between HVO and Muslim elements in central BH continues to escalate. Currently focused on the Gornji Vakuf area the indications of spill over to both the North and South are mounting. International mediators, with ECOMM taking the overall lead and UN personnel supporting on the local level, are maintaining contact with political leaders and military commanders on both sides. Prospects for near term cessation of these factional fights are not good but the negotiators remain reasonably hopeful.

The issues which resulted in the current conflict are relatively simple to identify but will not be simple to resolve. The same basically ethnic divisions which initiated the larger civil war are now the source of the conflict within the HVO/Presidency alliance. Evidence strongly suggests the current conflict is actually between CROAT and MUSLIM elements rather than the political aspects of the alliance against the Bosnian Serbs. However it is defined, the fighting between these groups manifests equal violence, cruelty, and lethality to that with the Bosnian Serb forces.

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The HVO clearly initiated this conflict by beginning to take control of the areas they feel are promised to them under the Geneva proposal. HVO civil leaders and military commanders assert they are only stabilizing the area in expectation of the implementation of the Geneva plan. To date they have directed the following measures:

1. Army of BH forces, essentially Muslim units, associated with this area fall under the command and control of the HVO military.
2. Army of BH forces deployed from other areas must return to their areas of origin.
3. HVO issued an ultimatum with a 20 Jan 93 deadline for these force alignments and movements to be accomplished.
4. Curfews on business and movements of the civilian population are in force in cities and towns through out the area in conflict. HVO and in some cases joint police patrols are enforcing these control measures.
5. Traffic control in the area is increased and the HVO is redirecting movements away from points of conflict.

HVO leaders claim the measures are temporary, to be in force only until the Geneva plan is signed. They further state their government has accepted the proposed plan and they will fight to preserve it.

The Muslim perception of these actions is understandably negative. Negotiations in the Gornji Vakuf area are being handled by Mr. Topcic, the president of the Muslim Party for Democratic Action (BDA). The ultimatum from the HVO was reportedly refused and strong opposition to the HVO's actions stated. Military leaders in the area feel these events prove the ultimate failure of the Geneva plan and state they see the plan as unfair to Muslims.

These civil measures, the continuing conflict, and the stated positions of the two "allies" lead to the following conclusions:

1. A brokered ceasefire in central BH will be difficult to achieve and almost impossible to sustain without a completed Geneva accord. Fighting between HVO and Muslim elements is more likely to spread.
2. This conflict supports expected resistance on the part of Mr. Izetbegovic over the province structure on the proposed map with the Geneva plan.

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PAGE 3 OF 3

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3. UNPROFOR and UNHCR efforts will face growing difficulties. The HVO will increasingly adopt the tactics of the Bosnian Serb Army and deny the free passage of humanitarian aid through the provinces they control if it is going to provinces in which there is a Muslim majority. The ease with which they (and the Serbs) can strangle central Bosnia-Herzegovina should not be underestimated.

4. The HVO perception that Provinces 3, 8, and 10 of the Geneva plan are areas in which they will have hegemony will be difficult to counter without drastically altering their willingness to accept the plan.

5. Bosnian Serb forces face a dilemma. Militarily, the temptation to take advantage of this situation must be great. Politically, restraint for the moment will probably be more important as they look for further concessions in Geneva, should their assembly give qualified acceptance of the plan.

The current events mean little to the major question of accepting or rejecting the proposed plan. The Serbs will undoubtedly believe their position sufficiently strong to insist on any desired adjustments to the province structure if any adjustments are made to ameliorate the current conflict. The Muslim supported Presidency delegation can be expected to demand adjustments most likely looking for a mixed-majority province in the northern portions of the currently proposed provinces 8 and 10. The HVO representatives will strongly oppose this and possibly any proposed adjustments. What ever the impact on the Geneva conference, the current conflict makes it inevitable that very difficult tripartite negotiations on the implementation of any settlement plan lie ahead.

UN CONFIDENTIAL

NL BURUM LES 492041040= ECMM X 20-JAN-1993 18:54:41 111072

TO DAVID LUDLOW, PRIVATE SECRETARY TO LORD OWEN  
 FROM TOM COLBORNE-MALPAS, HCC TUZLA .ECMM.  
 DATE 20 JANUARY 1993

SUBJ BESLAGIC/TUZLA ROUTES.

010/9 LO

*Beslagic's full  
 reply - he does  
 envisage using the  
 ports.*

*guda*

1. A rather lengthy reply from Mr. Beslagic concerning routes. This is not his normal style and I suspect it is the work of a committee.

2. Hope this is in time to be of use. Hard copy to follow.

3. Depart for Zagreb tomorrow but Team here will hand on any messages for Beslagic that you may have.

4. Met today the leading lights of the Reform Party in Tuzla. During the election for Regional President, Beslagic stood as an independent but in effect he is de facto leader of the Reform Party. This seems to be the party of economic/business interest but for the time being remains in the shadow of SDA.

Dear Lord Owen,

I am grateful for your letter. I am also very grateful for the successful arrival of humanitarian aid to the Zepa region.

I would like to mention that I have carefully studied all the aspects of the Geneva proposals and in answer to your questions I will point out the following.

The long border with Serbia does not represent an advantage to the Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina because it is a border with an aggressor and we do not expect cooperation, trade or traffic there - only continual fear and genocide; that which has come to the Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina from Serbia.

The only logical communication for Tuzla province foreseen is a transportation link with Western Europe.

The possible rail link is, Sarajevo-Zenica-Doboj-Tuzla-Brcko. ✓

The possible road link is, Sarajevo-Olovo-Kladanj-Tuzla-Orasje-Zupanja  
 Orasje-Brcko ✓

With these transport links we will be able to activate the river port. ||

I would like to mention that this mining centre (Tuzla) together with its industry must transport coal, salt, etc by railway and Tuzla cannot exist without direct link to the River Sava, Croatia and Western Europe. This means it is essential for the municipality of Brcko to be part of the Tuzla province. ||

The reasons for this are because of transportation, industry and agriculture (it would be the only granary in the Tuzla province) and finally on ethnic grounds because the Muslims are the majority in Brcko. It is especially important as an ethical principle because genocide of a most brutal nature has been committed against the Muslims of Brcko.



Over 80% of soldiers who have control of most of the Brcko territory are Muslims and representatives of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina.

Brcko is a symbol of aggression against Bosnia Herzegovina, the symbol of genocide against Muslims and a symbol of the effort to divide the Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina between Serbia and Croatia to the detriment of the Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina and especially at the expense of the Muslims.

In general I think that the level of provincial autonomy with the existence of separate police, dual citizenship etc, plus the fact that those provinces with a Serb or Croat majority will naturally move closer to Serbia and Croatia, will result in the enlargement of these two countries to the detriment of Bosnia Herzegovina.

Even if the Muslims are in the majority they will have only a small isolated ghetto.

In any case I do not see the solution being the cantonisation of Bosnia Herzegovina which would additionally be to the satisfaction of the Power that is already accused of aggression.

I think that it is necessary to punish the aggressor for the aggression and develop this State for the common good of all people. All of this is possible and evidence can be found in Sarajevo and Tuzla, because of that I invited you to come and so you can witness this for yourself.

With deep respect.

Selim Beslagic

President of Tuzla Municipality Parliament.

UNITED NATIONS  
PROTECTION FORCE



010/9  
HEADQUARTERS  
BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA  
COMMAND, SARAJEVO

BHCS/8606

General Sefer Halilovic  
Commander in Chief  
Army of Republic of  
Bosnia and Herzegovina

20 January 1993

*General,*

I thank you for your letter 02/106-1 dated 19 January 1993. I note that you state that artillery gas projectiles were used against Dobrinja and that this is the 11th chemical attack since 1 Jan 93 and that this is your 6th protest. I have to inform you that this is the first time I have received any such protest.

You are indeed correct that any use of chemical weapons is serious and would be something that the United Nations would wish to know about immediately.

I have indeed heard rumours on a number of occasions about the use of chemical weapons. Not once however have my troops been able to find any evidence to support such claims. Your liaison officers have in fact repeatedly been asked to substantiate such claims with hard evidence, something they have up until now never done. I appreciate that it is very difficult in war to counter-act rumours.

I must request you to give firm instructions to your forces that on the first hand they should not spread unsubstantiated rumours which only serve to distress a population which has already suffered enough and secondly that they should only pass on accurate information, for which there is proof.

Should you however be able to furnish us with unbiased and concrete proof of any these claims, then of course I shall have them investigated immediately and will take whatever action necessary.

*Yours sincerely*

P MORILLON  
Major General  
Commander  
Bosnian Herzegovina Command

CC: ICFY GENEVA  
HQ UNPROFOR ZAGREB

*P. Morillon*



REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
SUPREME COMMAND HQ OF THE ARMED FORCES  
S A R A J E V O

Ref. 02/106-1

Sarajevo, 19.01.1993

TO: UNPROFOR

Mr. Cyrus Vance and Mr. Lord Owen

P R O T E S T

On January 19<sup>th</sup>, 1993, at 17,00 hours, the aggressor fired by his artillery gas poisons on the following villages: Mravići, Ularice and Alibegovići ( north of Tešanj ), and on the settlement Dobrinja ( west part of the city of Sarajevo).

On that occasion, losses were caused to the civilians, causing fear and panic.

By the use of poison gases, the aggressor continues with further violation of international conventions on prohibition of the use of chemical weapons on unprotected civilian population.

We want to mention that this has been the 11<sup>th</sup> chemical attack of the aggressor since January 1<sup>st</sup>.

In spite of so far five protests which we have submitted since January 1<sup>st</sup>, no measures have been taken against the aggressor in order to make him stop with the use of this kind of weapons.

Therefore, for the 6<sup>th</sup> time we express our protest and bitterness, because the international community takes no steps to protect the integrity of the internationally recognized state of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to ease off the torment , suffering and killing of our people.

CHIEF OF STAFF  
OF SUPR. COMD. HQ OF AF OF R B&H  
Sefer Halilović

## MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Vance  
From: Peter Beshar  
Re: Ethnic Composition of Individual Provinces  
Date: January 20, 1993

Employing data from the 1991 pre-war census, I have computed the rough population and ethnic composition of each province.<sup>1</sup> Where the proposed map crosses opstina boundaries, I have attempted to factor in the population of individual cities, the ethnic dispersion of the population, and the relative density of population.<sup>2</sup>

Professor Buha has alleged that a disproportionate number of Serbs will be forced to live under Muslim or Croat rule. In a letter dated January 16, Buha asserts that "between 650,000 and 700,000 Serbs would remain in the Muslim and Croat provinces, whereas around 260,000 Muslims and 80,000 Croats would remain in the Serb provinces."

These figures appear suspect. If we adhere to the idea that Sarajevo will be an open city with a 3/3/3 government, this province should not be included in any calculation of ethnic

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<sup>1</sup> Though the Croatian Globus magazine compiled an ethnic analysis of the ten provinces, I thought that we should check these figures. A copy of the Globus summary is attached.

<sup>2</sup> As an illustration, our map incorporates roughly 25 percent of the opstina of Prijedor in Province Number 1. To compute the total population of Province Number 1, I have taken roughly 45 percent of the overall population of the opstina of Prijedor because the City of Prijedor with a population of 34,627 falls within Province Number 1. While not exact, these population estimates should be reasonably close.



groups living under the control of others. Excluding Sarajevo, 490,639 Serbs (35.8 percent of the total Serb population) will live in provinces controlled by Muslims or Croats.

If Province Number 10 (Travnik) is considered a Croat province, then 580,160 Muslims (30.4 percent of the overall Muslim population) will live in provinces controlled by the Serbs or Croats. If Travnik is considered a mixed province, the number drops to 430,589 Muslims (22.6 percent of the population). The Croats are more concentrated in their key areas. Thus, under the proposed ICFY map, 216,365 Croats (28.6% of the total Croat population) will live in areas predominated by the Serbs or Muslims.

Province Number 1 - Bihac

<u>Group</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Muslim	249,049	73.0
Serb	61,437	18.0
Croat	13,563	4.0
Yugoslav	14,193	4.2
Total	341,105	

Province Number 2 - Banja Luka

<u>Group</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Muslim	155,347	19.4
Serb	517,538	64.7
Croat	72,440	9.1
Yugoslav	40,442	5.1
Total	799,695	

Province Number 3 - Posavina

<u>Group</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Muslim	46,985	17.7
Serb	73,786	27.8
Croat	125,575	47.2
Yugoslav	13,239	5.0
Total	265,949	

Province Number 4 - Bijeljina

<u>Group</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Muslim	86,691	40.2
Serb	105,540	49.0
Croat	5,961	2.7
Yugoslav	10,709	4.9
Total	215,337	

Province Number 5 - Tuzla

<u>Group</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Muslim	519,307	62.4
Serb	202,307	24.3
Croat	38,191	4.6
Yugoslav	42,638	5.1
Total	831,476	



Province Number 6 - Nevesinje

<u>Group</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Muslim	38,901	25.4
Serb	108,896	71.1
Croat	897	0.5
Yugoslav	2,876	1.8
Total	153,102	

Province Number 7 - Sarajevo

<u>Group</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Muslim	270,759	49.8
Serb	148,290	27.3
Croat	49,229	9.1
Yugoslav	56,303	10.4
Total	543,369	

Province Number 8 - Mostar

<u>Group</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Muslim	102,277	28.7
Serb	39,430	11.1
Croat	192,617	54.1
Yugoslav	16,291	4.5
Total	356,175	

Province Number 9 - Zenica

<u>Group</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Muslim	270,341	57.9
Serb	72,777	15.6
Croat	85,313	18.3
Yugoslav	28,743	6.2
Total	466,522	

Province Number 10 - Travnik

<u>Group</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Muslim	149,571	38.1
Serb	40,902	10.4
Croat	169,936	43.2
Yugoslav	14,367	3.6
Total	390,924	

# B-H - THE PROPOSAL OF PROVINCES AND DATA ASSESSMENT

PROVINCE	KM	POPULATION	MOSLEMS	CROATS	SERBS
Bihac	3300	345 000	75%	5%	12%
B.Luka	13 000	800 000	17%	10%	65%
Odzak	2000	240 000	12%	50%	32%
Bijeljina	1600	180 000	34%	1%	60%
Tuzla	8000	815 000	66%	4.2%	24.6%
Nevesinje	7000	146 000	24.1%	0.5%	70.7%
Sarajevo	1800	540 000	49.2%	9.6%	27.2%
Mostar	6000	355 000	28.8%	54.2%	11.1%
Zenica	3400	475 000	58.3%	18%	15.6%
Travnik	5500	384 000	38%	43.6%	13%

## Territory of B-H (%)

Moslem units	28.8%	56.1% of Moslems in B-H
Croatian units	25.4%	63.4% of Croats in B-H
Serbian units	42.3%	52.8% of Serbs in B-H
Sarajevo	3.5%	14% of Mosl., 10.7% of Serbs, 6.9% Cro.

Outside their own units and Sarajevo: 36.5% of Serbs, 29.9% of Moslems and 29.7% of Croats



CZG - 055  
CZN - 075

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M O S T I M M E D I A T E

**MOST IMMEDIATE**

106/93  
COMMUNICATIONS  
ZAGREB

19 93 JA 18 05Z

Page 1 of 5

TO: VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA  
INFO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
FROM: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB  
DATE: 19 JANUARY 1993  
NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z- **053**  
SUBJECT: ATTACHED REPORT EX-KISELJAK

*Hamil*  
*H. G.*

For your information.

DISTRIBUTION:	
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**MOST IMMEDIATE**

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'93 JUN 19 19:12



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HQ BH COMMAND IN KISELJAK

Page 1 of 7

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ROUTINE/PRIORITY/IMMEDIATE/MOST IMMEDIATE/  
UNCLASSIFIED/RESTRICTED/CONFIDENTIAL/CRYPTO/ONLY

UNPROFOR Z-053

2/5

DATE: 17-17:55 A. JAN. 73
FROM: VICTOR ANDREEV, CAC BH COMMAND KISELJAK
FAX:
FILE REF NO : DRAFTER : TITLE : RELEASING OFF : SIGNATURE :
INFO : CAC, BELGRADE, FORWARD HQ, SARAJEVO
FAX NO :
SUBJECT: SIT-REP # 1

## MESSAGE

I MET "VICE PRESIDENT" KOLJEVIC FROM THE SERB SIDE. AT LUKAVICA BARRACKS THIS MORNING. HE INFORMED ME THAT MEETING OF PARLIAMENT WILL BE FROM 2-00, TUESDAY, 19.1 AT PALE. HE EXPECTS THAT THE DELEGATES WILL MEET FOR TWO DAYS. THEY DECIDED AGAINST HAVING ANY BELGRADE PRESENCE AT THE MEETING BECAUSE IT WILL BE PSYCHOLOGICALLY BETTER FOR THE SERBS IN BH TO MAKE THIS DECISION THEMSELVES. HE POINTED OUT THAT ANY PRESSURE FROM BELGRADE (AND LATER HE MADE THE SAME POINT CONCERNING UNPROFOR) WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE.

KOLJEVIC SAID IT WAS GOOD THAT KARADZIC WAS PUBLICLY STATING THAT THE PARLIAMENT WOULD ACCEPT THE AGREEMENT AND ALSO POSITIVE THAT HE OFFERED TO RESIGN IF THEY DO NOT. KOLJEVIC SAID THAT AS KARADZIC'S AUTHORITY IS SO GREAT, IT WOULD MAKE FOR A DIFFICULT CHOICE. WHEN I ASKED HIM WHETHER HE THOUGHT THERE WOULD BE A POSITIVE ANSWER FROM THE PARLIAMENT, HIS RESPONSE WAS NON-COMMITTAL.

KOLJEVIC STATED THAT BECAUSE OF THEIR PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE PRIOR TO THE RECOGNITION OF BH, WHEN THE SERBS WERE CHEATED BY THE LISBON AGREEMENT, THAT FOR THIS CONSTITUTIONAL PAPER, THEY WANT A WRITTEN GUARANTEE FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND IN PARTICULAR BY THE CO-CHAIRMAN.

DEM

R

F



CONCERNING THE MAP, KOLJEVIC SAID IT IS HARD TO ACCEPT IT 100%. HE SAID THAT THE 3 SIDES SHOULD TRY AND AGREE ABOUT THE DEFINITION OF ALL THE ARBITRARY OR CONTENTIOUS AREAS i.e. THE QUESTION OF THE CORRIDOR. (WHICH THE PRESENT MAP DOES NOT INCLUDE.) HE STATED THAT THE BEST APPROACH, ACCORDING TO THEM, WOULD BE TO FIRST DEFINE THE AREAS WHICH ARE NOT CONTENTIOUS, AND THEN TO DEFINE THE CONTENTIOUS AREAS. KOLJEVIC SAID THEY WILL TRY AND MAKE THIS CONTENTIOUS AREA AS SMALL AS POSSIBLE i.e. 10% OF ALL THE TERRITORY. A LOCAL REFERENDUM SHOULD THEN TAKE PLACE AFTER THE RETURN OF REFUGEES. HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF TIME - THAT IT WOULD BE BEST TO BE ABLE TO POSTPONE THESE DECISIONS.

MY FEELING IS THAT THE DECISION AT PALE WILL BE YES, BUT WITH SOME RESERVATIONS REGARDING CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE MAP - WHICH CAN THEN BE SORTED INTO IN THE FUTURE - IF THIS AGREED TO BY ALL 3 SIDES. IT DOES NOT EXCLUDE THAT EVEN IF THE SERBS AGREE, THE PRESIDENCY WILL FIND SOME PRETEXT FOR HINDERING FURTHER PROGRESS.

I BROUGHT UP THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE ZEPA CONVOY AND REQUESTED HIM LOOK INTO THIS URGENTLY. KOLJEVIC SAID THAT A RADIO CONVERSATION HAD BEEN OVERHEARD THIS MORNING AND SARAJEVO WAS INSTRUCTING ZEPA WHAT TO REPORT IN ORDER TO DRAMATIZE CONDITIONS IN ZEPA, IN AN APPARENT EFFORT TO FAN THE PROPAGANDA FLAMES. I INFORMED HIM OF THE CONTENT OF OGATA'S LETTER TO THE S.G. - HE SAID HE WOULD LOOK INTO ZEPA AND TRY AND MAKE IT EASIER TO REACH ALL MUSLIM AREAS. (WE HAVE JUST BEEN INFORMED THAT ZEPA CONVOY GOT THROUGH ON SERB ROUTES.)

2. ON OUR RETURN TO KISELJAK, WE WERE BLOCKED BY A GROUP OF UP TO 150, MOSTLY ELDERLY SERB WOMEN WHO WERE DEMANDING THE RELEASE OF ALL PRISONERS FROM MUSLIM CONCENTRATION CAMPS. (ATTACHED FIND TRANSLATION OF THEIR DEMANDS). THE COS OF BH COMMAND, CORDY-SIMPSON, WAS PRESENT WHEN I ARRIVED NEGOTIATING FOR PASSAGE OF CONVOY WHICH HAD BEEN STOPPED SINCE 10 AM. THE WOMEN WANT TO DRAW THE ATTENTION OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY, ESPECIALLY GENEVA, TO THE EXISTENCE OF THESE CAMPS - PARTICULARLY KRUPA. THEY SAY THEY ARE PREPARED TO STOP ALL TRAFFIC BETWEEN KISELJAK AND SARAJEVO. IT IS 5:00 PM AND THERE STILL IS NO MOVEMENT. THEY DEMAND THAT SOMEONE OFFICIAL FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY COME AND HEAR THEIR DEMANDS AND ASSURE THEM THAT THEY WILL WORK FOR THE RELEASE OF ALL PRISONERS.

THIS NEW TACTIC COULD POTENTIALLY BE VERY DANGEROUS FOR UNPROFOR/UNHCR MOVEMENT IN THE AREA. I RECOMMEND THAT THIS ISSUE BE BROUGHT IMMEDIATELY TO THE ATTENTION OF ICRC. ON OUR PART, WE INTEND TO INFORM THE REP OF ICRC CURRENTLY IN SARAJEVO WHO WE WILL CALL UPON TO INTERVENE. WE ARE ALSO BRINGING THIS TO THE ATTENTION OF PALE BY LODGING A PROTEST AND DEMANDING THEIR INTERVENTION.



4/5  
4/5  
Z-053  
3. IT IS ALREADY APPARENT THAT WHAT APPEARS TO BE A CONSTANT  
STREAM OF VISITORS, AND KISELJAK, IS SIGNIFICANTLY  
HAMPERING IMPROVING FOCUS ON OTHER VERY PRESSING  
MATTERS. EXPECTING TO PROVIDE TRANSPORT, SECURITY, AND  
ACCOMMODATION IS UNDESIRABLE DUE TO OUR LIMITED PERSONNEL AND  
RESOURCES. PLEASE NOTE THAT FOR BOTH SECURITY AND PRACTICAL  
REASONS, THERE IS A NEED FOR MUCH STRICTER CONTROL OVER THESE  
VISITS AND MORE ADVANCE PLANNING FOR ALL VISITS.

Best regards

V. C. [Signature]



Translation from Serbian.

UN PROTOR 2-053

5/5  
5/5

# OUR REQUESTS:

## 1. To release:

- SILOS TAREN 450 PRISONERS
- KRLPA ZUM 200 PRISONERS
- CELEBICI 200 PRISONERS

## 2. To open a corridor for all Serbs who want to abandon occupied territories of

There are 1000 prisoners without taking part in any fighting activity, they were took away from their homes and imprisoned as they are animals, seven of them have already died of hunger and disease in these camps.

Three women are kept in this camp also, even a pregnant woman has been there for six months.

Civilians were banished out of their homes, women and children are being mistreated, they have no food, they have no freedom of movement.

Now, they are trying to hide their tracks by transporting people from SILOS to KRUPA which is not registered as a camp in the International Red Cross. In this camp in KRLPA chemical agents were stored before.

Muslims, civilians, live in HADZICI having all rights as we do, they live from their pensions, humanitarian aid, freedom of movement and everything else.

750 People were released according to the agreement made in UNPROFOR to go wherever they want. The opposite side did not release anyone.

78 Prisoners were released because of good will, the opposite side did not release anyone.

My Ref: Kiscijak request 1.doc

CZN-56  
CZG-42 P/2  
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010/9  
17 93 JA 14 07Z

**CODED CABLE**

**OUTGOING CODE CABLE**

UNOG Telecomm. Unit  
Palais des Nations

TO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
INFO: VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA  
FROM: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB **MOST IMMEDIATE**  
DATE: 17 January 1993  
NUMBER: UNPROFOR-34  
SUBJECT: MILITARY SITUATION IN GORNI VAKUF

*Handwritten signature*  
17 Jan

"Most Immediate" cable of today's date from Kiseljak is attached for information.

DISTRIBUTION:	
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COMMUNICATIONS

B/2

## HQ BH COMMAND - KISELJAK

Page 1 of 1

MHT 655 TV2 1319 V7

MHSP 715 TV2

MHH 6499 TV2


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ROUTINE/PRIORITY/IMMEDIATE/MOST IMMEDIATE/

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17 17 03 A 93

OUTGOING FAX NO.	DATE: 17 JAN 93
TO: BH Fwd UNPROFOR Master SP BAT	FROM: BH COMMAND KISELJAK
FAX NO.:	FAX:
ATTN: Gen HALLILOVIC Brig PETKOVIC	FILE REF. NO. : DRAFTER : EDWARDS TITLE : MAJ RELEASING OFF. DCOS SIGNATURE : 
INFO : Force Comd HQ UNPROFOR FAX NO.:	
SUBJECT: MILITARY SITUATION IN GORNI VAKUF	

## MESSAGE

1. Information has been received in BH Command that an ultimatum has been given by the commander of the HVO in the GORNI VAKUF operational zone to the Bosnian Presidency forces. The ultimatum requires Bosnian Presidency forces from other areas to withdraw from the GORNI VAKUF area and remaining Bosnian Presidency units to be subordinated to HVO control. We understand that the commander of Bosnian Presidency forces in ZENICA, responsible for the area of GORNI VAKUF, has rejected this ultimatum which has now been extended to 2359 hours on 17 Jan 93. We further believe that both the Bosnian Presidency forces, and the HVO, are moving reinforcements into the area in preparation for hostilities.

2. UNPROFOR strongly condemns this action, and holds you each personally responsible. At a time when a settlement to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina is being sought by all sides in GENEVA, these actions in GORNI VAKUF for which you are responsible, threaten to halt this peace process. UNPROFOR therefore requires you to liaise with your local commanders in this area in order to diffuse this most threatening situation, and prevent open hostilities between the Bosnian Presidency Forces and the HVO.

FC/DCH/DFC/COS/CAO/CMO/R/F



# INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA



Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10

TO: Mr Vance  
FROM: John Wilson *J. Wilson*  
DATE: 13 January 1993  
SUBJECT: Fighting in Eastern Bosnia

1. We have received reliable information from non-UNPROFOR source of recent fighting in Bratunac area:

- a. The village of Voljavica (South East of Bratinac) was shelled from the area of Ljubivoje which is located inside Serbia.
- b. A plane took off from Ljubivoje (Serbia) and overflew the area of Voljavica inside BH. No report of offensive action.
- c. A convoy of Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) vehicles was observed moving on the road between Zvornik and Vzice inside Serbia. This is probably used to reinforce BSA units in the Bratunac area from other areas in Bosnia.



CZN 016

CZG 013

1/4  
010/9OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK 12 53Z

INFO: VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: 6 January 1993

NUMBER:

UNPROFOR 2-558

SUBJECT:

HEADQUARTERS BH COMMAND FORWARD  
COMMAND ASSESSMENT OF 5 JANUARY 1993

Subject fax is attached for information.

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93 JAN -6 13:52

UNOG Telecom Unit  
Palais des Nations

CZ N 016

CZG 013

2/4

HQ BH COMMAND SARAJEVO

Page 1 of 3

IMMEDIATE  
RESTRICTED-5 93 JAN 14 09 00Z  
R0583

OUTGOING SERIAL NO:	DATE: 051630AJAN93
TO: HQ UNPROFOR ZAGREB BH COMMAND KISELJAK	FROM: HQ BH COMD FWD SARAJEVO
FAX NO:	FAX: 871 111 2475
ATTN: ZAGREB: FC KISELJAK: COS	FILE REF. NO : 8443/8712 DRAFTER : MAJ TUCKER TITLE : CHEF DE CABINET RELEASING OFF: MAJ GEN MORILLON SIGNATURE : <i>[Signature]</i>

SUBJECT: COMMANDERS ASSESSMENT - 5 JAN 93

MESSAGE

PLEASE FIND ATTACHED COMMANDERS ASSESSMENT DATED 5 JAN 93.

FC/COS / R/F.      Two 1945  
FAX      VJ3

BW Political



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UNITED NATIONS  
PROTECTION FORCEHEADQUARTERS  
BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA  
COMMAND, SARAJEVO

TO: HQ UNPROFOR ZAGREB      ATTN: Force Commander  
INFO: BH Comd KISELJAK      ATTN: COS  
FROM: BH Comd SARAJEVO      Maj Gen Morillon  
File No: BHCS/8712  
SUBJECT: COMMANDER'S ASSESSMENT - 5 JAN 92

1. Introduction. I am increasingly frequently approached inside SARAJEVO by people more and more opposed to the regime currently exercising power at the Bosnian Presidency.

2. Demonstration during the visit of UN Secretary General. These protests started before the visit of the Secretary General of the United Nations. The lack of support for the 50 or so orchestrated demonstrators outside the Presidency during his visit was evident to all. Expressions of friendship and gratitude towards UNPROFOR from politicians, journalists and prominent local citizens have increased significantly since that event.

3. "GANIC Dictatorship" People like Mr LASIC (No 2 Croat at the Presidency), Mrs MIJATOVIC (No 2 Serb in the Presidency) and Mr KRESEVLJAKOVIC (the Muslim Mayor of SARAJEVO), are complaining increasingly openly about the "GANIC Dictatorship". They give the impression that they believe that the disastrous situation within the city is largely attributable to Dr GANIC's policies. They have recognised that the continuation of offensive activities by the B-H Army around the perimeter of SARAJEVO is simply increasing and prolonging the suffering of the population.

4. Reaction by Dr GANIC. Dr GANIC is a clever man and is well informed and therefore may have begun to realise which way the wind is now blowing. I yesterday felt for the first time since

CZV 016

CZV 013

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the beginning of December that he might be prepared to be more genuinely cooperative. Based on this assumption it is possible that our continued efforts to re-establish the supply of electricity and water to the city could bring fruit in the near future - a subject which remains my top priority.

5. Lifting of Siege of SARAJEVO. The project to lift the siege of SARAJEVO which was prepared in the Mixed Military Working Group could at last come to fruition. I will myself take charge of this issue.

6. Return to Democracy. I am making every effort to support and encourage a return to a more representative and democratic way of government. It is for this reason that I insisted that the BH Parliamentary Delegation (with representatives from all 3 ethnic groupings) which has requested help in travelling to PARIS and STRASBOURG to meet fellow parliamentarians, be afforded every assistance.

7. Outlook. An almost abnormal calm appears to have established itself in SARAJEVO and throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina in anticipation of the resumption on Sunday 10 Jan 93 of the GENEVA Conference and the Assembly of the Bosnian Parliament in MOSTAR on 21 Jan 93.

- May it Last -

1



CNZ 002 CYZ 002 P1/2

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010/9

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB  
INFO: VANCE, GENEVA  
FROM: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
DATE: 4 JANUARY 1993  
NUMBER: MSC-007  
SUBJECT: Letter of President Izetbegovic

*NK*

93 JAN 11 PM 38

UNATIONS

Attached for your attention please find a letter from President Izetbegovic to the President of the Security Council regarding a Serb military convoy entering the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

DISTRIBUTION:

<i>V. K. Sedy</i>	<i>O</i>
<i>HO</i>	<i>PH/mw</i>
<i>MA</i>	<i>DB/BR</i>
	<i>JW/sm</i>

UNPROFOR Unit  
Palais des Nations

'93 JAN -5 -0 :12

- 2 -

Annex

Letter dated 30 December 1992 from the President of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Security Council

~~Dear Sir,~~

④ Yesterday a military convoy from Serbia (eight tanks, fifteen military trucks with soldiers) entered the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina crossing the bridge on the river Drina near Bratunac, Eastern Bosnia. Many foreign agencies have independently reported about this.

④ We urge you to use your influence so that these troops be returned to Serbia.

④ All this would not have happened if the conclusions of the London Conference and the previous UN Resolutions had been implemented.

~~Yours sincerely,~~

~~for B. Janic~~

(signed) ALIJA IZETBEGOVIC  
President

~~CC: Mr Boutros Boutros Ghali  
UN Secretary General~~



FAX OUT 019

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OUTGOING SERIAL NO:	DATE: 021730A JAN 93
TO: UNCTY GENEVA - INFO: HQ UNPROFOR ZAGREB BH COMD KISELJAK	FROM: HQ BH COMD ZAGREB
FAX NO: 00 41 227 335861	FAX: 871 111 2474
ATTN: GENEVA -LT GEN NAMBIAR ZAGREB - DFC KISELJAK - COS	FILE REF.NO : BHCS 8603 DRAFTER : MAJ TUCKER TITLE : CHEF DE CABINET RELEASING OFF.: MAJ GEN MORILLON SIGNATURE : <i>[Signature]</i>

SUBJECT: REPORT - MEETING MRS MIJATOVIC - MAJ GEN MORILLON -  
2 JAN 93

## MESSAGE

1. PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATELY TO FORCE COMMANDER UNPROFOR, LT GEN S NAMBIAR.
2. SEASON GREETINGS!

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To: UNCFY Geneva Attn: Lt Gen S Numbler  
Info: HQ UNPROFOR Zagreb Attn: DRC  
BH Command Kiseljak Attn: COS  
From: BH Command Sarajevo, Maj Gen Morillon  
Date: 02 Jan 93  
File No: BHCS/8603  
SUBJECT: REPORT - MEETING MRS MIJATOVIC -  
MAJ GEN MORILLON - 2 JAN 93

*A. Morillon*

1. Introduction. Mrs Tatjana MIJATOVIC is a new Serb Member of the Presidency and asked me for a meeting at the Presidency on 2 Jan 93.

2. Return to Democracy. Mrs. MIJATOVIC stated that an urgent return to properly representational democracy was urgently required in SARAJEVO. At present all decisions were made by a select few. She believed that the situation within the city could soon degenerate into complete anarchy. The Government of B-H is therefore trying to convene the Assembly on 20 Jan 93.

3. Request for Assistance in convening the Assembly. Mrs MIJATOVIC therefore requested assistance in moving Members of Parliament out of and back into the city in preparation of this Assembly on 20 Jan 93.

a. I am making arrangements for 18 Members of Parliament and 8 staff to leave SARAJEVO on 4 Jan 93 and to return on 10 and 18 Jan 93.

b. I am further making arrangements for a 7 man delegation to take up an invitation from the French parliament to visit PARIS.

4. Comment. Mrs MIJATOVIC's remarks appear to support the line we are hearing from Prime Minister AKMADZIC. I am therefore supporting it to the best of our available resources.

5. Evacuation of 1 x 500. Dr GANIC joined half way through the meeting. He said that he did not like the ethnic discrimination being made in specifically identifying 500 from each of the 3 ethnic groups. This means that the arrangements previously made have effectively been undermined and are now dead in the water.



pisa i opšteg akta o pitanjima o kojima ravnopravno odlučuju.

2. Vijeća odlučuju na sjednicama.

Svako vijeće odlučuje na sjednici kojoj prisustvuje većina delegata i to većinom glasova ukupnog broja delegata, ako ovim ustavom nije drukčije određeno.

Kada vijeća učestvuju ravnopravno u odlučivanju o određenom pitanju, mogu na zajedničkoj sjednici razmatrati to pitanje, ali o njemu odlučuju na odvojenim sjednicama, ako ovim ustavom nije drukčije određeno.

Vijeća Skupštine SRBiH odlučuju na zajedničkoj sjednici kojoj prisustvuje većina delegata svakog vijeća. Odluke se donose većinom glasova ukupnog broja delegata, ako ovim ustavom nije drukčije određeno.

O pitanjima izbora, imenovanja i razrješenja vijeće, odnosno Skupština na zajedničkoj sjednici odlučuje većinom glasova prisutnih delegata.

3. Ako nadležna vijeća ne usvoje u istovetnom tekstu zakon čije bi nedonošenje dovelo do narušavanja stabilnosti tržišta ili bi prouzrokovalo znatnu štetu za društvenu zajednicu, predlog zakona iznosi se na zajedničku sjednicu svih vijeća, a odluka se donosi većinom glasova svih delegata u Skupštini.

4. Kad skupština samoupravne interesne zajednice učestvuje u donošenju zakona, drugog propisa i opšteg akta sa nadležnim vijećima, taj akt se smatra donesenim ako je usvojen u istovetnom tekstu.

Ako se saglasnost o istovetnom tekstu ne postigne ni nakon ponovnog pretresa spornog pitanja, obrazuje se zajednička komisija od jednakog broja delegata svakog vijeća i članova skupštine samoupravne interesne zajednice, radi rješavanja spora. U slučaju da se u zajedničkoj komisiji ne postigne saglasnost ili da jedno vijeće, odnosno skupština samoupravne interesne zajednice ne usvoji tekst koji je predložila komisija, sporni akt skida se sa dnevnog reda, a može se ponovo staviti na dnevni red tek po isteku roka od šest mjeseci. Ako se ni po isteku ovog roka ne postigne saglasnost o istovetnom tekstu, predlog zakona, drugog propisa i opšteg akta iznosi se na zajedničku sjednicu nadležnih vijeća i skupštine samoupravne interesne zajednice, a odluka se donosi većinom glasova svih delegata vijeća i delegata skupštine samoupravne interesne zajednice.

5. Skupština SRBiH ima poslovník. Poslovníkom se uređuju pitanja unutrašnje organizacije i rada Skupštine, način obrazovanja radnih tijela, utvrđuju uslovi za rad delegata, kao i druga pitanja od značaja za rad Skupštine.

6. Kandidate za predsjednika Skupštine SRBiH utvrđuje i predlaže Republička konferencija Socijalističkog saveza radnog naroda Bosne i Hercegovine.

7. U Skupštini SRBiH obrazuje se Komisija za pitanja izbora i imenovanja, koja nakon prethodnih konsultacija i pribavljenih mišljenja nadležnih organa i organizacija utvrđuje i predlaže kandidate za funkcije čiji je izbor, imenovanje i razrješenje u nadležnosti Skupštine SRBiH, ako ovim ustavom nije drukčije utvrđeno.

Ova komisija razmatra i druga pitanja kadrovske politike koja su u nadležnosti Skupštine SRBiH.

8. Vijeća Skupštine na zajedničkoj sjednici biraju i opozivaju tajnim glasanjem članove Delegacije Skupštine u Vijeću republika i pokrajina Skupštine SFRJ, na način utvrđen zakonom.

Delegaciju Skupštine u Vijeću republika i pokrajina sačinjavaju delegati svih vijeća, u čijem sastavu je najmanje polovina delegata iz udruženog rada.

9. Tačkom 1. zamjenjuje se stav 1. člana 332; tačkom 2. zamjenjuju se čl. 333, 334, 335. i 336; tačkom 3. zamjenjuje se stav 5. člana 337; tačkom 4. zamjenjuje se član 338; tačkom 5. zamjenjuje se stav 1. člana 346; tačkom 6. dopunjuje se član 343; tačkom 7. zamjenjuje se član 342. i tačkom 8. dopunjuju se odredbe Glave IX Ustava SRBiH.

## AMANDMAN L

1. Skupština Socijalističke Republike Bosne i Hercegovine bira i razrješava člana Predsjedništva Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije tajnim glasanjem na zajedničkoj sjednici svih vijeća Skupštine na predlog Republičke konferencije Socijalističkog saveza radnog naroda Bosne i Hercegovine. Kandidate za člana Predsjedništva SFRJ predlaže i utvrđuje Republička konferencija poslije provođenja prethodnog postupka izjašnjavanja o kandidatima za članove Predsjedništva SFRJ u Socijalističkom savezu radnog naroda Jugoslavije.

2. Skupština Socijalističke Republike Bosne i Hercegovine može po sopstvenoj inicijativi, na predlog Republičke konferencije Socijalističkog saveza radnog naroda Bosne i Hercegovine ili na predlog Skupštine SFRJ, nakon sprovedene prethodne rasprave u Socijalističkom savezu radnog naroda Jugoslavije, razriješiti člana Predsjedništva SFRJ i prije isteka vremena na koje je biran.

3. Tačkom 1. zamjenjuju se st. 1. i 2. člana 347; tačkom 2. dopunjuje se član 347. Ustava SRBiH.

## AMANDMAN LI

1. Predsjedništvo Socijalističke Republike Bosne i Hercegovine:

1) predstavlja Socijalističku Republiku Bosnu i Hercegovinu;

2) razmatra pitanja o sprovođenju utvrđene politike u oblasti opštenarodne odbrane, državne bezbjednosti, društvene samozaštite i međunarodne saradnje i predlaže Skupštini SRBiH preduzimanje odgovarajućih mjera za sprovođenje te politike i u slučaju kad nastupe vanredne prilike koje onemogućuju ili bitno otežavaju ostvarivanje ustavom utvrđenog društvenog poretka, predlaže Skupštini SRBiH preduzimanje neophodnih mjera za otklanjanje nastalih poremećaja;

3) utvrđuje plan odbrane Republike i u vezi s tim daje odgovarajuće smjernice, saglasno zakonu;

4) u skladu sa stavovima i predlozima Skupštine SRBiH razmatra pitanja učešća Socijalističke Republike Bosne i Hercegovine u utvrđivanju i ostvarivanju spoljne politike Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije, saradnje Republike sa drugim republikama i autonomnim pokrajinama u ostvarivanju međunarodne saradnje u okviru utvrđene spoljne politike SFRJ i međunarodnih ugovora i, na osnovu obavljene prethodne konsultacije u Republici, predlaže kandidate za šefove diplomatskih misija i o tome obavještava Predsjedništvo SFRJ i Skupštinu SRBiH;

5) utvrđuje, na osnovu obavljene prethodne konsultacije u Republici, predlog kandidata za predsjednika i sudije Ustavnog suda Bosne i Hercegovine;

6) utvrđuje, na osnovu obavljene prethodne konsultacije u Republici, predlog kandidata za članove Savjeta Republike;

7) utvrđuje predloge za odlikovanja koja dodjeljuje Predsjedništvo SFRJ i dodjeljuje odlikovanja i druga priznanja Republike, saglasno zakonu;

8) daje pomilovanja, saglasno zakonu;

9) donosi poslovnik Predsjedništva.

2. Predsjedništvo saraduje sa Predsjedništvom Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije i sa predsjedništvima drugih socijalističkih republika i socijalističkih autonomnih pokrajina, kao i pokreće inicijative i preduzima odgovarajuće aktivnosti u cilju razvijanja i unapređivanja ove saradnje.

3. Predsjedništvo je dužno da na zahtjev Skupštine SRBiH izloži stavove o pojedinim pitanjima iz svoje nadležnosti.

4. Poslije svakog konstituisanja Skupštine SRBiH bira se Predsjedništvo SRBiH.



Predsjedništvo Socijalističke Republike Bosne i Hercegovine sačinjava sedam članova.

Članove Predsjedništva bira Skupština Socijalističke Republike Bosne i Hercegovine na predlog Republičke konferencije Socijalističkog saveza radnog naroda Bosne i Hercegovine i po pribavljenom mišljenju skupština opština i skupština gradskih zajednica, tajnim glasanjem, na zajedničkoj sjednici svih vijeća Skupštine SR BiH.

Članovi Predsjedništva biraju se na četiri godine i ne mogu biti birani još jedanput uzastopno.

Ako članu Predsjedništva SRBiH prestane mandat prije isteka vremena na koje je biran, mandat novoizabranog člana traje do isteka mandata člana Predsjedništva SRBiH čiji je mandat prestao.

Predsjednika Predsjedništva bira Predsjedništvo iz reda svojih članova na jednu godinu i može biti biran još jedanput uzastopno na ovu funkciju.

Predsjednik Predsjedništva saziva i predsjedava sjednicama Savjeta Republike.

U slučaju ratnog stanja ili neposredne ratne opasnosti, mandat članova Predsjedništva i predsjednika se produžava dok ne budu stvoreni uslovi za izbor novih članova Predsjedništva.

Član Predsjedništva ne može biti delegat u skupštini društveno-političke zajednice, sudija Ustavnog suda i drugih sudova, ni izabran, odnosno imenovan funkcioner drugog državnog organa.

Član Predsjedništva uživa imunitet kao i delegat u Skupštini SRBiH.

O imunitetu svog člana odlučuje Predsjedništvo.

5. Za vrijeme ratnog stanja sastav Predsjedništva se proširuje sa predsjednikom Skupštine SRBiH, predsjednicima vijeća Skupštine, predsjednikom Izvršnog vijeća Skupštine SRBiH, predsjednikom Predsjedništva Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Bosne i Hercegovine, predsjednikom Republičke konferencije SSRN BiH, predsjednikom Vijeća Saveza sindikata BiH, predsjednikom Republičkog odbora SUBNOR-a, predsjednikom Republičke konferencije Saveza socijalističke omladine Bosne i Hercegovine i komandantom teritorijalne odbrane Republike.

Predsjedništvo SRBiH u proširenom sastavu za vrijeme ratnog stanja organizuje i rukovodi opštenarodnom odbranom i svim oblicima opštenarodnog otpora na teritoriji Republike.

Predsjedništvo za vrijeme ratnog stanja ili u slučaju neposredne ratne opasnosti, na predlog Izvršnog vijeća ili po svojoj inicijativi, donosi uredbе sa zakonskom snagom o pitanjima iz nadležnosti Skupštine SRBiH i bira, odnosno imenuje i razrješava funkcionere koje bira, odnosno imenuje i razrješava Skupština SRBiH, ako ne postoji mogućnost da se sazovu nadležna vijeća. Predsjedništvo podnosi ove uredbе odnosno odluke o izboru ili imenovanju i razrješanju na potvrdu Skupštini čim ona bude u mogućnosti da se sazove.

Uredbom sa zakonskom snagom donesenom za vrijeme ratnog stanja mogu se, izuzetno, dok to stanje traje, i ako to zahtijevaju interesi odbrane zemlje, obustaviti pojedine odredbe ovog ustava koje se odnose na donošenje zakona, drugih propisa i opštih akata i preduzimanje mjera od strane republičkih organa i na pojedine slobode, prava i dužnosti čovjeka i građanina i prava samoupravnih organizacija i zajednica, mijenjati sastav i ovlaštenja izvršnih organa i organa uprave, obrazovati oblasti, okruzi, srezovi i druge društveno-političke zajednice i utvrditi organizacija njihovih organa.

6. Predsjedništvo SRBiH za svoj rad odgovara Skupštini SRBiH i podnosi Skupštini izvještaj o svom radu najmanje jedanput godišnje.

7. Ovim amandmanom zamjenjuju se čl. 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, tačka 2. Aman-

dana I, u dijelu koji se odnosi na Predsjedništvo SR BiH, Amandman II, Amandman VIII, stav 3. tačke 2. Amandmana IX i tačka 2. Amandmana XVI na Ustav SRBiH.

#### AMANDMAN LII

1. Sudiji Ustavnog suda mandat prestaje i kad mu prestane radni odnos po sili zakona zbog sticanja uslova za penzionisanje.

2. Ovim amandmanom dopunjuje se član 393. Ustava SRBiH.

#### AMANDMAN LIII

1. Vrhovni sud Bosne i Hercegovine obavještava Skupštinu Socijalističke Republike Bosne i Hercegovine o zapažanjima u praćenju društvenih odnosa i pojava i o ostvarivanju zakonitosti u radu redovnih sudova.

2. Ovim amandmanom dopunjava se član 408. Ustava SRBiH.

#### AMANDMAN LIV

1. Svečanu izjavu prilikom stupanja na dužnost daju delegati u Skupštini SRBiH, članovi Predsjedništva SR BiH, predsjednik i članovi Izvršnog vijeća Skupštine SRBiH, republički sekretari i drugi republički funkcioneri koje bira ili imenuje Skupština SRBiH, predsjednik i sudije Ustavnog suda Bosne i Hercegovine, predsjednik i sudije Vrhovnog suda Bosne i Hercegovine i drugih sudova određenih zakonom.

Članovi Predsjedništva SRBiH, predsjednik i članovi Izvršnog vijeća Skupštine SRBiH i sudije Ustavnog suda Bosne i Hercegovine daju svečanu izjavu na zajedničkoj sjednici svih vijeća Skupštine SRBiH.

Tekst svečane izjave glasi:

»Izjavljujem da ću dužnost koja mi je povjerena vršiti savjesno i odgovorno, da ću se pridržavati ustava i zakona i da ću se zalagati i boriti za razvitak socijalističkog samoupravnog društva, za ostvarivanje vlasti radničke klase i svih radnih ljudi i za bratstvo i jedinstvo i ravnopravnost naroda i narodnosti Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije i Socijalističke Republike Bosne i Hercegovine«.

2. Ovim amandmanom zamjenjuju se čl. 394. i 412. Ustava SRBiH.

#### AMANDMAN LV

1. Zakoni se proglašavaju ukazom.

Ukaze o proglašavanju zakona donosi predsjednik Skupštine Socijalističke Republike Bosne i Hercegovine.

2. Ovim amandmanom dopunjuje se član 343. Ustava SRBiH.

#### AMANDMAN LVI

1. Predlog da se pristupi promjeni Ustava Socijalističke Republike Bosne i Hercegovine mogu podnijeti svako vijeće Skupštine SRBiH, Predsjedništvo SRBiH, Izvršno vijeće i najmanje 30 delegata u Skupštini.

O predlogu da se pristupi promjeni Ustava Socijalističke Republike Bosne i Hercegovine odlučuju vijeća Skupštine SRBiH ravnopravno.

Ako Skupština odluči da se ne pristupi promjeni Ustava, predlog za promjenu Ustava ne može se staviti na dnevni red prije isteka jedne godine od dana kada je predlog odbijen.

2. Nacrt akta o promjeni Ustava Socijalističke Republike Bosne i Hercegovine utvrđuju vijeća Skupštine SRBiH ravnopravno.

Nacrt akta o promjeni Ustava stavlja se na javnu diskusiju.

3. Po provedenoj javnoj raspravi o Nacrtu akta o promjeni Ustava SRBiH, vijeća Skupštine ravnopravno utvrđuju predlog akta o promjeni Ustava i ravnopravno odlučuju o tom predlogu.



Sjednice Savjeta saziva i predsjedava im predsjednik Skupštine.  
Članove Savjeta bira Skupština iz reda istaknutih društveno-političkih, naučnih i drugih javnih radnika i proizvođača.  
Članovi Savjeta biraju se na četiri godine i mogu biti ponovno birani.  
Organizacija i način rada Savjeta uređuju se zakonom.

## Glava X

### PREDSJEDNIŠTVO SOCIJALISTIČKE REPUBLIKE BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE

#### Član 349.

Predsjedništvo SRBiH:

- 1) predstavlja Socijalističku Republiku Bosnu i Hercegovinu;
- 2) razmatra pitanja od opšteg značaja za Republiku i predlaže Skupštini SRBiH i drugim republičkim organima njihovo razmatranje i rješavanje;
- 3) razmatra opšta pitanja sprovođenja utvrđene politike u oblasti narodne odbrane, državne bezbjednosti i spoljne politike i predlaže nadležnim republičkim organima preduzimanje mjera za sprovođenje te politike;
- 4) stara se o usklađivanju stavova o pitanjima i odnosima o kojima organi federacije odlučuju na osnovu usaglašenih stavova republika i autonomnih pokrajina;
- 5) proglašava ukazom zakone;
- 6) daje pomilovanja, saglasno zakonu;
- 7) dodjeljuje odlikovanja Socijalističke Republike Bosne i Hercegovine;
- 8) predlaže kandidata za predsjednika Izvršnog vijeća;
- 9) predlaže izbor predsjednika i sudija Ustavnog suda Bosne i Hercegovine;
- 10) predlaže izbor i razrješenje članova Savjeta Republike;
- 11) donosi poslovnik o svom radu.

Republički organi kojima Predsjedništvo upućuje svoje predloge obavještavaju Predsjedništvo o svom stavu o tim predlozima i o preduzetim mjerama.

Predsjedništvo obrazuje Savjet za narodnu odbranu i Savjet za pitanja bezbjednosti.

#### Član 350.

Predsjedništvo SRBiH u proširenom sastavu sa predsjednikom Skupštine SRBiH, potpredsjednicima Skupštine, predsjednicima vijeća, predsjednikom Izvršnog vijeća i komandantom republičkog štaba narodne odbrane za vrijeme ratnog stanja rukovodi opštenarodnom odbranom na cijeloj teritoriji Republike. Predsjedništvo za vrijeme ratnog stanja ili u slučaju neposredne ratne opasnosti, na predlog Izvršnog vijeća ili po svojoj inicijativi, donosi uredbe sa zakonskom snagom o pitanjima iz nadležnosti Skupštine ako ne postoji mogućnost da se sastanu nadležna vijeća, Predsjedništvo podnosi ove uredbe na potvrdu Skupštini čim ona bude u mogućnosti da se sastane.

Uredbom sa zakonskom snagom mogu se, izuzetno, ako to zahtijevaju interesi odbrane zemlje: obustaviti pojedine odredbe ovog ustava koje se odnose na pojedine slobode, prava i dužnosti čovjeka i građanina i prava samoupravnih organizacija i zajednica; mijenjati sastav i ovlaštenja izvršnih organa i organa uprave; obrazovati oblasti, okruzi, srezovi i druge društveno-političke zajednice i utvrđivati organizacija njihovih organa.

#### Član 351.

Predsjedništvo SRBiH sačinjava devet članova.

Osam članova Predsjedništva bira Skupština SRBiH. Predsjednik Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Bosne i Hercegovine član je predsjedništva po položaju. Predsjedništvo bira predsjednika iz reda svojih članova.

#### Član 352.

Članovi Predsjedništva SRBiH biraju se na vrijeme od četiri godine.

Niko ne može biti biran više od dva puta uzastopno za člana Predsjedništva.

#### Član 353.

Član Predsjedništva ne može biti delegat u skupštini društveno-političke zajednice, sudija ustavnog suda i drugih sudova i imenovani funkcioner drugog državnog organa.



Član 354.

Članovi Predsjedništva SRBiH daju na zajedničkoj sjednici svih vijeća Skupštine SRBiH svečanu izjavu. Nakon davanja svečane izjave, Predsjedništvo se konstituiše i preuzima dužnost.

Član 355.

Predsjedništvo SRBiH za svoj rad odgovara Skupštini SRBiH.

Član 356.

Član Predsjedništva SRBiH uživa imunitet kao i delegat u skupštini društveno-političke zajednice.

O imunitetu svog člana odlučuje Predsjedništvo.

Član 357.

Predsjednik u ime Predsjedništva SRBiH predstavlja Socijalističku Republiku Bosnu i Hercegovinu i Predsjedništvo, saziva sjednice Predsjedništva i rukovodi njihovim radom, potpisuje akte koje donosi Predsjedništvo i stara se o sprovođenju akata i zaključaka Predsjedništva.

Član 358.

U slučaju ratnog stanja ili neposredne ratne opasnosti mandat članova Predsjedništva SRBiH se produžava dok ne budu stvoreni uslovi za izbor novih članova Predsjedništva.

Glava XI

**IZVRŠNO VIJEĆE SKUPŠTINE SOCIJALISTIČKE REPUBLIKE  
BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE**

Član 359.

Izvršno vijeće Skupštine SRBiH je izvršni organ Skupštine.

Izvršno vijeće je, u okviru prava i dužnosti Republike, odgovorno Skupštini za stanje u svim oblastima društvenog života, za sprovođenje politike i izvršavanje republičkih zakona i drugih propisa i opštih akata Skupštine kao i saveznih zakona i drugih propisa i opštih akata za čije su izvršavanje odgovorni organi u Republici i za usmjeravanje i usklađivanje rada republičkih organa uprave.

Izvršno vijeće vrši svoja prava i dužnosti na osnovu i u okviru ustava i zakona.

Član 360.

Izvršno vijeće:

1) prati stanje i ostvarivanje politike Skupštine SRBiH i predlaže Skupštini utvrđivanje politike;

2) predlaže zakone, druge propise i opšte akte i ima pravo da daje mišljenje o predlozima zakona, drugih propisa i opštih akata koje Skupštini podnose drugi ovlašćeni predlagači;

3) utvrđuje predlog društvenog plana Bosne i Hercegovine, republičkog budžeta, republičkog završnog računa i republičkog opšteg bilansa sredstava;

4) stara se o sprovođenju politike i izvršavanju republičkih zakona, društvenog plana Bosne i Hercegovine, republičkog budžeta i drugih propisa i opštih akata; stara se o izvršavanju saveznih zakona i drugih propisa i opštih akata za čije su izvršavanje odgovorni organi u Republici;

5) utvrđuje predlog prostornog plana Bosne i Hercegovine;

6) donosi uredbe, odluke i druge propise za izvršavanje republičkih zakona i drugih propisa i opštih akata i za izvršavanje saveznih zakona i drugih propisa i opštih akata za čije su izvršavanje odgovorni organi u Republici;

7) stara se o izvršavanju politike opštenarodne odbrane i o sprovođenju priprema za odbranu u Republici;

8) usklađuje i usmjerava rad republičkih organa uprave i daje im smjernice za rad, radi obezbjeđenja izvršavanja zakona, drugih propisa i opštih akata; vrši nadzor nad radom tih organa;