

MIR

G3 OPERATIONS/PLANS - BRIEFS

12 APR-20 NOV 1995

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EL/WG JUNE 2009

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES S-1062

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PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

HR OVS

BILL: UN MARKED BEEHCRAFT INTO GOMA 27 NOV? RPA APPREHENSIVE

KENT: TWAGIRAMUNGU: HIS UNSUBSTANTIATED CLAIMS REFUTED BY UN AND RWANDAN GOVT

KEN: WOULD YOU COMMENT ON THE PROTEST AS BROWN AND ROOT REP? (OR PASS TO LCOL PRIMEAU OR D COS SP): THIS NOTE IS SOMETHING I KNOCKED OFF:

...THE PROTEST AT IVECO AND IVECO CONSTRUCTION SITE WAS BASED UPON WHAT COULD BE CONSIDERED A BONA FIDE GRIEVANCE. HOWEVER, RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE IS UNLIKELY TO PREVENT FUTURE ACTION AS PEOPLE ATTEMPT TO SIEZE AS MUCH AS THEY CAN BEFORE OUR PULL-OUT.

KIBUYE: 28 1430: INDICATION THAT COMMUNES MAY BE UNDER ORDERS TO REGISTER ALL NGOS PROBABLY IN A COUNTRY WIDE ATTEMPT TO ASSESS EACH ORGANIZATION'S CONTRIBUTION/USEFULNESS TO RWANDA.

KENYA: THE US STATE DEPARTMENT HAS CLASSIFIED NAIROBI AS A CRITICAL CRIME AREA, THE HIGHEST CRIME RISK CATEGORY FOR AMERICAN DIPLOMATS OVERSEAS. THIS IS IN THE WAKE OF ESCALATING CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES WHICH HAVE INCLUDED LAST FRIDAY'S SHOOTING OF A BRITISH DIPLOMAT IN AN APPARENT CAR-JACKING ATTEMPT, THE BEATING OF THE INDIAN AMBASSADOR DURING A BREAK-IN AT HIS HOME, ATTACK OF THE DEPUTY PAKISTANI ENVOY AND THE ROBBERY OF THE ARGENTINE EMBASSY.

THE KENYAN GOVERNMENT HAS BLAMED THE INCREASING CRIME ON THE REFUGEE POPULATIONS LIVING IN THE AREA AND HAS ALLUDED TO LINKS BETWEEN THESE ATTACKS AND RWANDAN REFUGEES ACTING ON BEHALF OF KIGALI IN AN ATTEMPT TO DISCREDIT THE KENYAN GOVERNMENT. SOURCES ARE SKEPTICAL ABOUT THESE CLAIMS AND ASSESS THEM TO BE AN ATTEMPT TO DEFLECT ATTENTION TO KENYA'S INABILITY TO CURB RISING CRIME.

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UNAMIR HQ WEEKLY INFOSUM 13-19 NOV 95

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1. (U) THE SITUATION IN RWANDA REMAINS STABLE. IN THE WEST, THE INSURGENCY WAS MARKED BY A NUMBER OF MINE INCIDENTS, POSSIBLY SPARKED BY THE INSURGENTS LOSS OF IWAWA ISLAND TO RPA FORCES ON 5-6 NOV. FIGHTING BETWEEN THE BURUNDI ARMY AND HUTU REBELS IN NORTHERN BURUNDI HAS PROMPTED THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT TO TAKE MEASURES TO PREVENT REFUGEES FLEEING THE FIGHTING FROM ENTERING RWANDA ILLEGALLY. ON 12 NOV, THE ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT REPORTED THAT AN ATTEMPT TO ASSASSINATE THE ZAIRIAN MILITARY COS TOOK PLACE AT GOMA AIRPORT. THE PERPETRATORS WERE ALLEGED TO BE FROM RWANDA.
2. (U) INSURGENT ACTIVITY IN THE WAKE OF THE NOV 5-6 RPA ASSAULT AND VICTORY OVER EX-FAR FORCES ON IWAWA ISLAND HAS SHOWN NO APPRECIABLE CHANGE IN ITS NATURE OR SCOPE. EXPECTATIONS THAT THE INSURGENCY'S ORGANIZERS MIGHT QUICKLY MOVE TO RESTORE THE CREDIBILITY OF THEIR FIGHTING FORCES HAVE SO FAR GONE UNFULFILLED.
3. (U) COMMENT. THE LOSS OF IWAWA ISLAND IS A SERIOUS BLOW TO THE EX-FAR INSURGENCY CAMPAIGN IN RWANDA. HOWEVER, THE IMMEDIACY OF ITS EFFECTS WILL DEPEND ON THE STOCKPILES OF WEAPONRY AND MATERIEL ALREADY CACHED INSIDE RWANDA. MORE IMPORTANTLY THOUGH, IS THAT RWANDA HAS SO FAR DEMONSTRATED ITS ABILITY TO MARGINALIZE THE INSURGENCY. STABILITY IS NOT ASSURED, BUT WITH EACH PASSING DAY, THE INSURGENT THREAT IS MORE DIMINISHED. THE INSURGENCY'S ORGANIZERS WILL LIKELY BE FORCED INTO SIGNIFICANT ACTION IN ORDER TO REVERSE THIS TREND.
4. (U) THE SITUATION IN BURUNDI REMAINS UNSTABLE. CIVIL WAR

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IS A REAL POSSIBILITY. PAST FIGHTING IN NORTHERN BURUNDI BETWEEN THE BURUNDI ARMY AND HUTU REBELS HAS RESULTED IN THOUSANDS OF HUTUS FLEEING TO RWANDA, TANZANIA AND ZAIRE. THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN STEPS TO PREVENT THE UNCONTROLLED MIGRATION OF REFUGEES INTO RWANDA FROM BURUNDI, INCLUDING WHAT APPEARS TO BE A HEIGHTENED RPA PRESENCE ALONG THE SOUTHERN BORDER WITH BURUNDI. A NUMBER OF REFUGEES HAVE TRIED TO ENTER RWANDA AFTER FIRST FLEEING INTO TANZANIA. RELATIONS BETWEEN BURUNDI AND TANZANIA HAVE SOURED OVER ALLEGED BURUNDIAN ARMY INCURSIONS INTO TANZANIA TO ENGAGE FLEEING BURUNDIAN HUTU REBELS.

5. (U) COMMENT. BURUNDI'S PROBLEMS ARE A BLOW TO HOPES FOR REGIONAL STABILITY, BUT HAVE HAD NO DIRECT IMPACT ON STABILITY IN RWANDA. THERE ARE ABOUT 250,000 RWANDAN REFUGEES IN BURUNDI, BUT DESPITE THE WORSENING CONDITIONS, RWANDAN AUTHORITIES APPEAR DETERMINED THAT ANY REPATRIATION BE CONTROLLED.

6. (U) ON SATURDAY, 11 NOV 95, A PACKAGE CONTAINING THREE BOMBS WAS DISCOVERED AT GOMA AIRPORT, IN ZAIRE. ACCORDING TO ZAIRIAN AUTHORITIES, THE BOMBS WERE INTENDED TO DESTROY AN AIRCRAFT CARRYING TOP ZAIRIAN GENERALS, INCLUDING THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL ELUKI MONGA. THE ZAIRIANS CLAIM THAT RWANDAN NATIONALS WERE BEHIND THE PLOT.

7. (U) ON TUESDAY, 14 NOV, ZAIRE ACCUSED THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA OF BEING BEHIND A NETWORK RESPONSIBLE FOR THE RECENT BOMBING CAMPAIGN IN THE GOMA REGION THAT HAS INJURED AID WORKERS AND LOCAL PEOPLE. IT WAS ALSO ANNOUNCED THAT RAIDS WERE CONDUCTED IN THE GOMA AREA AND A NUMBER OF RWANDAN TERRORISTS OF TUTSI ORIGIN WERE ARRESTED AND THAT A QUANTITY OF LAND-MINES, GRENADES, EXPLOSIVES AND FUSES WERE SEIZED. ACCORDING TO THE ZAIRIANS, ALL THE MILITARY EQUIPMENT FOUND WAS OF "ANGLO-SAXON ORIGIN".

8. (U) THESE EVENTS HAVE OVERSHADOWED A NUMBER OF OTHER RECENT DEVELOPMENTS INCLUDING THE POSSIBLE SUSPENDING OF THE NORTH KIVU GOVERNOR, THE ROTATION OF CAMP SECURITY FORCES, AND A POSSIBLE INCREASE IN THE NUMBERS OF PRESIDENTIAL GUARD TROOPS FROM KINSHASHA.

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9. (U) COMMENT. THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN ACTIVELY CRITICIZING THE ZAIRIANS FOR THEIR ALLEGED COMPLICITY IN AIDING THE EX-FAR INSURGENCY. WHETHER OR NOT THE BOMBING INCIDENT AT GOMA ACTUALLY OCCURRED, THE ZAIRIANS HAVE SEIZED UPON IT TO ACCUSE RWANDA OF INCITING UNREST IN THE RELIEF ZONE. THE CONTROVERSY COMES AT A TIME WHEN THE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE FLOW OF ARMS IS DUE TO ARRIVE IN ZAIRE TO INVESTIGATE ARMS SHIPMENTS TO THE EX-FAR. ZAIRE IS BELIEVED BY MANY TO BE A PRIMARY ARMS SUPPLIER TO THE EX-FAR. THE INCIDENT IS A CONVENIENT OPPORTUNITY FOR ZAIRE TO DEFLECT ATTENTION AWAY FROM ITSELF AT A VULNERABLE TIME.

10. (U) FURTHERMORE, ABSENT FROM THE OFFICIAL ZAIRIAN ACCOUNT OF THE BOMBING INCIDENT AT GOMA AIRPORT IS THE REPORTED PRESENCE ONBOARD THE PLANE OF GENERAL AUGUSTIN BIZIMUNGU, THE FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE RWANDAN ARMY, AND POSSIBLY THE TARGET OF THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT. BIZIMUNGU IS ONE OF THE MOST PROMINENT HUTU EXILES WANTED ON SUSPICION OF INVOLVEMENT IN LAST YEAR'S GENOCIDE. ZAIRE MAINTAINS THAT IT HAS NO CONNECTION WITH THE FORMER RWANDAN REGIME. THE PRESENCE OF BIZIMUNGU ON A ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT PLANE BOUND FOR KINSHASHA WOULD CAST CONSIDERABLE DOUBT ON THAT ASSERTION.

11. (U) KINSHASHA'S AUTHORITY IN THE RELIEF ZONE IS UNDERMINED BY A LESS THAN COOPERATIVE KIVU LEADERSHIP. HOWEVER, KINSHASHA IS HELD ACCOUNTABLE BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FOR THE ACTIONS OF THE LOCAL POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERSHIP. RECENT ACTIVITY SUGGESTS THAT KINSHASHA HAS UNDERTAKEN TO EXERCISE MORE DIRECT CONTROL OVER THE KIVU REGION. THIS COULD BE A HARBINGER OF FURTHER ZAIRIAN ACTION IN THE RELIEF ZONE.


12. (U) FOOTNOTE: THE EXPECTED ANTI-TUTSI DEMONSTRATION IN GOMA THIS PAST WEEKEND WAS POSTPONED UNTIL WEDNESDAY. PRESIDENT CARTER WILL BE VISITING GOMA TUESDAY.

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GENERAL

1. (U) AT FIRST LIGHT ON SUNDAY, 5 NOVEMBER 1995, THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC ARMY (RPA) LAUNCHED AN AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT ON ISLE IWAWA, FIFTEEN KILOMETRES WEST OF THE RWANDAN MAINLAND ON LAC KIVU. THE ISLAND LIES 2 KILOMETRES FROM THE BORDER WITH ZAIRE, AND 4.5 KILOMETRES FROM IJWE ISLAND, IN ZAIRE. THE ISLAND IS 2.5 KILOMETRES LONG, AND 800 METRES WIDE. IT CONSISTS OF A LARGE SOUTHERN LAND MASS, CONNECTED TO A SMALL NORTHERN MASS BY A NARROW ISTHMUS. THE SOUTHERN MASS IS A SINGLE FLAT HILL COVERED WITH HEAVY JUNGLE, AND THE NORTHERN MASS IS DOMINATED BY A 1500 FOOT ELEVATION HILL AND AN OPEN PINE FOREST.
2. (U) COLONEL CHARLES NGOGA, THE BRIGADE COMMANDER OF THE RPA'S 211 BRIGADE, SAID THAT HIS TROOPS MADE THE CROSSING AT NIGHT USING THREE HIGH-SPEED PATROL BOATS AND TWO LARGE FISHING BOATS. THE FISHING BOATS WERE TOWED TO A POSITION NEAR THE ISLAND, AND THEN ROWED IN BY THE SOLDIERS. THE RPA USED TWO COMPANIES OF SOLDIERS, OR APPROXIMATELY 200 MEN.
3. (U) ACCORDING TO THE RPA BATTALION COMMANDER WHO LED THE OPERATION, THEY KNEW THAT THE EX-FAR HAD PERIMETER DEFENCES CONSISTING OF A BUNKER SYSTEM JUST ABOVE THE VEGETATION LINE AROUND THE SOUTHERN MASS OF ISLE IWAWA. THE NORTHERN MASS HAD A DEFENSIVE POSITION ON THE HIGH GROUND. THE BATTALION COMMANDER SAID THAT THE EX-FAR BELIEVED THAT ANY ATTACK WOULD COME VIA THE NORTHERN EXTENSION CROSSING THE ISTHMUS ON TO THE SOUTHERN MASS OR DIRECTLY AGAINST THE NORTHERN END OF THE SOUTHERN MASS. THERE

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WERE 500 EX-FAR DEFENDING THE ISLAND.

4. (U) TO AVOID THE EX-FAR POSITIONS ON THE DOMINANT TERRAIN ON THE NORTHERN MASS, THE RPA DECIDED TO ATTACK ON TWO BEACH HEADS FROM THE SOUTH. THE TWO LANDING SITES USED WERE A SMALL BAY JUST WEST OF THE SOUTHERN-MOST TIP OF THE ISLAND, AND A SIMILAR BAY ON THE SOUTHWEST FACE OF THE ISLAND APPROXIMATELY 600 METRES NORTHWEST OF THE FIRST LANDING SITE.

5. (U) THE RPA USED THE TWO LANDING SITES TO BREAK THROUGH THE SOUTHERN END OF THE EX-FAR PERIMETER. THEY EFFECTIVELY SPLIT AND FLANKED THE EASTERN AND WESTERN DEFENSIVE LINES ALONG THE EDGES OF THE ISLAND. THIS ALLOWED THE RPA TO ROLL UP THE EX-FAR AS THEY MOVED NORTH TO ATTACK THE MAIN DEFENCES ON THE DOMINANT TERRAIN FROM THE REAR. THE ASSAULT PLAN WORKED. THE RPA SURPRISED THE DEFENDERS ON THE SOUTHERN FACE AND IN QUICK BUT CLOSE FIGHTING PUSHED INLAND AND NORTHWARD. MOST OF THE RPA CASUALTIES OCCURRED IN THIS PHASE.

6. (U) ONCE INTO THE CENTRE OF THE ISLAND, THE RPA ASSAULT MOVED NORTH AGAINST SPORADIC RESISTANCE THAT STRENGTHENED AS THE EX-FAR PULLED BACK ON BOTH FLANKS AND ATTEMPTED TO RE-ORGANIZE FOR A COUNTER-ATTACK. AT THE MID-POINT OF THE SOUTHERN ISLAND, THE EX-FAR MANAGED TO GET A 75 MILLIMETRE RECOILLESS RIFLE INTO THE BATTLE USING HIGH-EXPLOSIVE ANTI-TANK AMMUNITION, BUT THE RPA TOOK THEM OUT AFTER ONLY A FEW ROUNDS WERE FIRED. AS THE EX-FAR BECAME MORE DESPERATE, THEY BEGAN SCATTERING ITALIAN TS-50 ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES TO DELAY THE RPA ADVANCE WHILE THEY WITHDREW TO THE MAIN POSITIONS ON THE NORTH PART OF THE ISLAND. THE FIGHTING STABILIZED UNTIL THE NEXT MORNING.

7. (U) THE RPA CLOSED IN ON THE FINAL DEFENCES OF THE EX-FAR THE NEXT MORNING. THE RPA ASSAULT OVERWHELMED THE DEFENDERS AND SOME 100-PLUS EX-FAR RETREATED WEST ALONG THE NORTHERN EDGE OF THE ISLAND AND ENTERED THE WATER. MOST DROWNED OR WERE SHOT AS THEY TRIED TO SWIM THE 4.5 KILOMETRES TO IJWE ISLAND. THE ISLAND WAS DECLARED SECURE ON THE EVENING OF 6 NOVEMBER. THE RPA COUNTED 171 DEAD EX-FAR ON THE ISLAND, NOT INCLUDING THOSE THAT DIED IN THE WATER. THE RPA BELIEVE THAT ANOTHER 200 ESCAPED THE FIRST EVENING OF THE FIGHTING, INCLUDING THE EX-FAR COMMANDER. THE RPA LOST FIVE DEAD, AND 18 INJURED.

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8. (U) ON THE MORNING OF 8 NOVEMBER, THE CREW OF AN RPA PATROL BOAT CARRYING BELGIAN JOURNALISTS SPOTTED TWO EX-FAR TRYING TO SWIM TO IJWE ISLAND. THEY ORDERED THEM TO STOP AND TO GET INTO THE PATROL BOAT. WHEN THE EX-FAR REFUSED AND TRIED TO DIVE, THEY WERE SHOT IN THE WATER AND LEFT.

9. (U) WE TOURED THE ISLAND ON 8 NOVEMBER, ACCOMPANIED BY THE UNITED STATES DEFENSE ATTACHE TO THE US EMBASSY IN KIGALI, THE G2 AND G3 OF THE RPA, THE BRIGADE COMMANDER, AND AN OFFICER FROM THE VICE-PRESIDENT'S OFFICE. WE FLEW BY UNAMIR HELICOPTER TO GISENYI, WHERE WE WERE PICKED UP BY ONE OF THE RPA'S NEW 30-FOOT LONG RIGID-HULL INFLATABLE BOATS. THE BOAT IS ARMED, EQUIPPED WITH RADAR, AND IS POWERED BY TWO 200-HORSEPOWER OUTBOARD ENGINES. WE MADE THE 25 KILOMETRE TRIP TO THE ISLAND IN 20 MINUTES.

10. (U) WE CIRCLED THE ISLAND ONCE, WHICH GAVE US AN OPPORTUNITY TO SEE AND PHOTOGRAPH THE DEFENSIVE WORKS ON THE SHORELINE. WE ALSO OBSERVED WHAT APPEARED TO BE AN EX-FAR TRAINING AREA. WE LANDED ON THE WESTERN SIDE OF THE ISLAND, AT THE NARROWEST POINT OF THE ISTHMUS.

11. (U) AT THE LANDING SITE WERE AN ARRAY OF CAPTURED EX-FAR WEAPONS. THEY INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING;

- A. TWO 12.7MM TRIPOD-MOUNTED HEAVY MACHINE GUNS;
- B. ONE 75MM RECOILLESS RIFLE;
- C. FIVE G3 7.62MM RIFLES;
- D. ONE FAL 7.62MM RIFLE;
- E. ONE SG542 RIFLE; AND
- F. TWO BELGIAN FN 7.62MM GENERAL PURPOSE MACHINE GUNS.

12. (U) WE OBSERVED 15 PRISONERS AT THE BEACH. THEY APPEARED TO BE IN GOOD HEALTH, AND SEEMED TO ALL BE IN THEIR MIDDLE TO LATE TEENS.

13. (U) WE THEN MOVED UP INTO THE VILLAGE WHERE WE WERE SHOWN A LARGE NUMBER OF CLOTH SACKS. THEY CONTAINED WEAPONS COMPONENTS, MOST STILL IN THE ORIGINAL POLYETHYLENE PLASTIC WRAPPING, AND COVERED IN COSMOLINE. THESE WEAPONS HAD NEVER BEEN ASSEMBLED, LET ALONE USED. WE FOUND COMPONENTS OF THIRTY-SEVEN R-4 ASSAULT RIFLES. OF PARTICULAR INTEREST, THERE WERE NO SERIAL NUMBERS OF ANY SORT ON

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THE BARRELS OR RECEIVERS.

14. (U) AT THIS SITE WE FOUND COMPONENTS OF BETWEEN TWENTY AND THIRTY FN 7.62MM GENERAL PURPOSE MACHINE GUNS (GPMG). THESE COMPONENTS INCLUDED FEEDER PLATES AND RECEIVER COVERS. WE DID NOT OBSERVE ANY BARRELS OR OTHER GPMG PARTS THAT NORMALLY CARRY SERIAL NUMBERS. WE DID NOT FIND ENOUGH COMPONENTS TO ASSEMBLE A FULL WEAPON, WHICH LEADS US TO SUSPECT THAT THERE MAY BE MORE WEAPONS CACHES ON THE ISLAND. OTHER ITEMS FOUND AT THIS SITE INCLUDE:

- A. THIRTY ITALIAN TS-50 ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES;
- B. SEVERAL ANTI-TANK MINE FUSES;
- C. A CARRYING CASE FOR AN ANTI-TANK MINE;
- D. SEVERAL LARGE SACKS OF MILITARY TNT, (IN POOR CONDITION);
- E. A ROLL OF EXPLOSIVE DET CORD; AND
- F. ONE R-4 ASSAULT RIFLE.

15. (U) WE THEN TOURED THE NORTHERN MASS OF THE ISLAND. DURING THE TOUR OF THE NORTHERN PART OF IWAWA, WE OBSERVED APPROXIMATELY 15 BODIES OF DEAD MALES IN THEIR LATE TEENS AND TWENTIES. WE ALSO OBSERVED A SITE WHERE THE 75MM RECOILLESS RIFLE HAD BEEN FIRED SEVERAL TIMES. WE TOURED THE DEFENSIVE POSITION ON THE HIGH GROUND ON THE NORTHERN MASS. WE SAW SEVERAL BUNKERS AND TRENCHES, AN EMPTY CARRYING CASE FOR TS-50 ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES, AND A LARGE AMOUNT OF AMMUNITION. THE AREA WAS MINED AND BOOBY-TRAPPED, SO WE STAYED ON THE TRAILS AND DID NOT DISTURB ANYTHING. MOST OF THE DEAD WE SAW ON THE NORTHERN PART OF IWAWA WERE AT THIS SITE.

16. (U) WE THEN EMBARKED ON A TOUR OF THE SOUTHERN MASS OF THE ISLAND. WE SAW AT LEAST FIFTEEN DEAD ON THIS TOUR, TEN OF THEM SCATTERED ON A SMALL SPORTS FIELD. WE SAW THE LANDING SITES, WE EXAMINED ONE OF THE FISHING BOATS USED TO CARRY TROOPS, AND WE SAW A BUILDING WHERE BAGS OF BEANS WERE STOCKPILED. WE OBSERVED A LARGE NUMBER OF CAPTURED EX-FAR DOCUMENTS, MAPS, AND SKETCHES. WE FOUND SOME ANTI-RPF PROPAGANDA. WE THEN RETURNED TO THE VILLAGE AT THE ISTHMUS.

17. (U) AS WE APPROACHED THE VILLAGE, WE HEARD A SMALL EXPLOSION. A YOUNG RPA SOLDIER HAD STEPPED ON AN ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE LESS THAN A

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METRE FROM THE SITE ON THE BEACH WHERE SOME OF THE CAPTURED WEAPONS WERE DISPLAYED, AN AREA WHERE WE HAD SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME RECORDING SERIAL NUMBERS. THE SOLDIER WAS EVACUATED BY SPEED-BOAT TO HOSPITAL IN KIBUYE. WE RETURNED TO GISENYI SOON AFTER. ON FRIDAY, 10 NOVEMBER, THE ISLAND WAS VISITED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE FLOW OF ARMS. WHILE THEY WERE TOURING THE ISLAND, ONE OF THEIR RPA ESCORTS HAD A FOOT BLOWN OFF WHEN HE STEPPED ON AN ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE. BECAUSE OF THE DANGER POSED BY MINES, THE NATIONAL DE-MINING OFFICE IN KIGALI IS ASSISTING THE RPA IN CLEARING THE ISLAND.

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18. (U) WE BELIEVE THAT THE EX-FAR HAD BEEN OCCUPYING ISLE IWAWA AS A TRAINING AND STAGING BASE FOR INFILTRATIONS INTO KIBUYE PREFECTURE. ISLE IWAWA WAS A GOOD CHOICE, BECAUSE IT CUT 25 PERCENT OFF THE DISTANCE BETWEEN IJWE ISLAND AND THE COAST OF RWANDA. THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO CONDUCT TRAINING AND PREPARATIONS FOR OPERATIONS WITHOUT BEING OBSERVED BY ZAIRIAN AUTHORITIES OR ANYONE ELSE. IT ALSO GAVE THEM THE ABILITY TO TRUTHFULLY SAY THAT THEY WERE OCCUPYING SOME RWANDAN TERRITORY, WHICH MAY HAVE IMPORTANT MORALE CONSEQUENCES.

19. (U) WE FOUND NO REASON TO DISPUTE THE RPA CLAIM THAT THEY KILLED 171 EX-FAR ON THE ISLAND. WE DIRECTLY OBSERVED AT LEAST THIRTY BODIES, AND WE DID NOT STRAY OFF THE BEATEN PATHS BECAUSE OF THE DANGER OF MINES AND BOOBY-TRAPS. WE DID, AT TIMES, SMELL MORE DEAD BODIES, BUT THEY COULD NOT BE OBSERVED FROM THE TRAIL. THE BODIES SEEN IN THE SOUTHERN MASS OF THE ISLAND WERE AT A MORE ADVANCED STAGE OF DECOMPOSITION, INCLUDING BLOATING AND INSECT INFESTATION, THAN THE BODIES AT THE NORTHERN ISLAND MASS. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS AS REPORTED BY THE RPA. OF THE THIRTY BODIES WE OBSERVED, WE ONLY SAW THREE IN UNIFORM, BUT WE WOULD EXPECT THIS, AS THE EX-FAR IS AN INSURGENT ARMY. WE DID NOT SEE ANY WEAPONS WITH THE BODIES, BUT TO BE HONEST, WE WOULD HAVE BEEN SUSPICIOUS IF WE HAD. PART OF THE PROCESS OF SECURING THE BATTLEFIELD IS REMOVING ALL THE WEAPONS SO THAT ANY ENEMY THAT HAD MANAGED TO EVADE CAPTURE CANNOT USE THEM AGAINST YOUR OWN TROOPS. WE HAVE NO WAY OF ESTIMATING THE NUMBER THAT DIED TRYING TO SWIM TO IJWE ISLAND, BUT DO NOT EXPECT IT TO BE IN EXCESS OF ONE HUNDRED.

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20. (U) THIS ACTION, COUPLED WITH THE EXISTENCE OF NEW ARMED SPEEDBOATS ON LAC KIVU, SHOULD HAVE THE BENEFICIAL EFFECT OF REDUCING THE INCIDENTS OF INFILTRATION INTO KIBUYE PREFECTURE, WHICH SHOULD IN TURN REDUCE THE NUMBER OF MINES BEING LAID IN THAT AREA.

21. (U) AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULTS ARE AMONG THE MOST DIFFICULT AND DANGEROUS OF ALL MILITARY OPERATIONS. THE ONLY OPERATION MORE DIFFICULT OR DANGEROUS MIGHT BE THE WITHDRAWAL IN CONTACT, WHICH IS EXACTLY WHAT THE EX-FAR ENDED UP TRYING TO DO. THE RPA HAVE ACHIEVED A GREAT VICTORY HERE, AND THEY ARE VERY PROUD OF IT.

22. (U) THE LAYOUT OF THE DEFENCES ON ISLE IWAWA GIVES SOME CLUES INTO THE QUALITY OF THE EX-FAR TRAINING. THE GENERAL IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE EX-FAR KNEW WHAT THEY WANTED TO DO, BUT DIDN'T KNOW HOW TO DO IT. THE TRENCHES WERE POORLY CONSTRUCTED, AND ARRANGED IN A STRAIGHT LINE. THIS VIOLATES ONE OF THE PRINCIPLES OF DEFENCE - THAT IT MUST HAVE DEPTH. THE BUNKERS DID NOT HAVE REAR-WARD FACING FIRING PORTS, VIOLATING THE PRINCIPLE OF ALL-ROUND DEFENCE. THE TRENCHES AND BUNKERS WERE ISOLATED, AND DID NOT APPEAR TO HAVE INTERLOCKING ARCS OF FIRE. THE APPROACHES TO THE TRENCHES WERE FROM THE HILLSIDE BEHIND THEM. THE DAMAGE TO THE VEGETATION CREATED A VERY CLEAR TRAIL THAT EXPOSED THE LOCATION OF THE TRENCH AT THE END OF IT. FURTHERMORE, THE COMMANDER OF THE ISLAND GARRISON APPEARS TO HAVE FLED ON THE FIRST NIGHT OF THE FIGHTING, TAKING TWO HUNDRED OF HIS SOLDIERS WITH HIM.

23. (U) COMBAT IS A ZERO-SUM GAME. THE GREATER THE VICTORY FOR ONE SIDE, THE WORSE THE DEFEAT FOR THE OTHER. THIS DEFEAT OF THE EX-FAR MUST BE TREMENDOUSLY HUMILIATING FOR THEM. THE RPA HAS PROVEN AGAIN THAT THEY ARE A SUPERIOR FIGHTING FORCE. WE BELIEVE THAT THE EX-FAR WILL LIKELY FEEL COMPELLED TO DO SOMETHING TO RESPOND. AS THEY HAVE DEMONSTRATED THAT THEY LACK THE TRAINING FOR CONVENTIONAL MILITARY OPERATIONS, THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO INVADE RWANDA. THEY WILL PLAY TO THEIR STRENGTH, WHICH IS INSURGENT WARFARE. WE EXPECT THEM TO INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON CYANGUGU, GISENYI, AND RUHENGERI PREFECTURES. THEY WILL LIKELY DO THIS QUICKLY, TO TRY AND RESTORE THE CONFIDENCE OF THEIR OWN SOLDIERS AND THE REFUGEES LIVING IN THE CAMPS. THEY WILL ALSO WANT TO BLUNT THE INCREASE IN MORALE THAT THE RPA WILL GET AS A RESULT OF THIS VICTORY.

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24. (U) THIS ACTION HAS ALSO PROVIDED US WITH SOMETHING THAT HAS BEEN ELUDING US UNTIL NOW - HARD EVIDENCE OF WEAPONS BEING MADE AVAILABLE TO THE EX-FAR. WE HAVE RECEIVED INTELLIGENCE REPORTS ON THE SUBJECT, BUT INTELLIGENCE REPORTING IS NOT NORMALLY IN A FORM USABLE AS EVIDENCE. USING THE SERIAL NUMBERS WE OBTAINED, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO TRACE THE MANUFACTURE AND SALES RECORD OF SOME OF THE ARMS THAT WERE CAPTURED. TWO OF THE CAPTURED G3s WERE ONE WEAPON APART IN MANUFACTURING SEQUENCE. FURTHERMORE, THE WEAPONS COMPONENTS WE SAW WERE STILL IN THE MANUFACTURER'S ORIGINAL PACKING. THIS REMOVES ANY DOUBT THAT THE EX-FAR HAVE BEEN RECEIVING WEAPONS.

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GENERAL SITUATION

1. (U) THIS PAST WEEK IN RWANDA HAS BEEN DOMINATED BY A NUMBER OF TRAGIC MINE INCIDENTS. INCLUDING AN INCIDENT IN GOMA, THERE WERE SEVEN INCIDENTS REPORTED THROUGH UN CHANNELS, WITH A TOTAL OF FOUR PERSONS KILLED, AND THIRTEEN WOUNDED.

2. (U) ON SUNDAY, 29 OCT, AN AMERICAN RESCUE COMMITTEE VEHICLE CARRYING TWO INTERNATIONAL STAFF RAN OVER AN ANTI-TANK MINE THAT HAD BEEN PLACED IN A POTHOLE IN THE MIDDLE OF THE ROAD 3.5 KILOMETRES SOUTH OF KIBUMBA REFUGEE CAMP. THE DRIVER SUFFERED ONLY MINOR INJURIES, BUT HIS PASSENGER, A 48-YEAR-OLD AMERICAN WOMAN, SUSTAINED TERRIBLE HEAD AND LEG INJURIES. SHE LATER LOST BOTH LEGS ABOVE THE KNEES.

3. (U) ON MONDAY, 30 OCT, THREE SECONDARY SCHOOL CHILDREN WERE SERIOUSLY INJURED BY AN ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE 20 KILOMETRES SOUTH OF RUHENGERI. ONE OF THE STUDENTS LOST HIS LEG IN THE EXPLOSION.

4. (U) ON TUESDAY, 31 OCT, THERE WERE TWO MINE INCIDENTS IN KIBUYE PREFECTURE. AT 0700 HOURS A 20-YEAR-OLD MAN LOST A FOOT TO AN ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE ON A FOOTPATH. AT 1900 HOURS A 40-PASSENGER BUS TRAVELLING FROM CYANGUGU TO KIBUYE STRUCK AN ANTI-TANK MINE. THREE PERSONS WERE KILLED, AND FOUR WERE INJURED.

5. (U) ON WEDNESDAY, 1 NOV, IT WAS REPORTED THAT SOME LIVESTOCK HAD BEEN KILLED AFTER AN ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE WAS DETONATED NORTH-EAST OF BYUMBA, NEAR THE UGANDAN BORDER.

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6. (U) ON THURSDAY, 2 NOV, AN RPA VEHICLE STRUCK AN ANTI-TANK MINE 4 KILOMETRES SOUTH-EAST OF RUHENGERI. ONE SOLDIER DIED AT THE SCENE, AND THE OTHER THREE WOUNDED SOLDIERS WERE TAKEN TO RUHENGERI HOSPITAL.

7. (U) ON SATURDAY, 4 NOV, A GROUP OF CHILDREN FOUND AN ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE ON THE ROAD AT SHAGASHA, CYANGUGU PREFECTURE. FORTUNATELY, THEY DID NOT TOUCH IT, BUT REPORTED IT TO THE RPA, WHO NEUTRALIZED IT IN THE PRESENCE OF THE MALAWI COMPANY ENGINEER REPRESENTATIVE.

8. (U) UNAMIR G2 COMMENT. THESE INCIDENTS ARE BECOMING ALL TOO COMMON IN THE MISSION AREA. ALTHOUGH THE RPA HAVE REQUESTED MINE DETECTION EQUIPMENT, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD HELP. OF THE SIXTEEN DIFFERENT TYPES OF ANTI-TANK MINES BELIEVED TO BE IN THE AREA, ONLY HALF OF THEM HAVE ENOUGH METAL IN THEM TO BE DETECTED WITH ANY RELIABILITY. OF THE THIRTEEN DIFFERENT TYPES OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES ENCOUNTERED IN RWANDA, ONLY FOUR HAVE SIGNIFICANT QUANTITIES OF METAL IN THEM.

9. (U) IT IS BELIEVED THAT THERE ARE BETWEEN 40,000 AND 50,000 UNCLEARED LANDMINES IN RWANDA THAT WERE PLACED DURING THE CIVIL WAR. THIS SITUATION IS FURTHER COMPLICATED BY THE EX-FAR, WHO HAVE BEEN LAYING NEW MINES IN WESTERN RWANDA. OF THE MINE INCIDENTS IN THIS PAST WEEK, WE BELIEVE IT LIKELY THAT ONLY THE ONE NEAR BYUMBA WAS A RELIC FROM LAST YEARS' WAR. THIS PAST WEEK GRAPHICALLY ILLUSTRATES THE SAD TRUTH THAT THE MAIN VICTIMS OF MINE WARFARE ARE USUALLY CIVILIANS.

THREATS TO UNAMIR

10. (U) IT WAS REPORTED ON 2 NOV THAT THE FORCE ARMEE ZAIRE, OR FAZ, HAS COMPLAINED TO THE RPA ABOUT UN HELICOPTERS OVERFLYING ZAIRIAN AIRSPACE, AND HAVE THREATENED TO SHOOT THEM DOWN. UNAMIR G2 COMMENT. THE FAZ HAS A NUMBER OF 14.5MM, 37MM, AND 40MM ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS, AS WELL AS SA-7 SURFACE-TO-AIR-MISSILES. IT IS NOT

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KNOWN IF ANY OF THEM ARE DEPLOYED IN THE RELIEF SECTOR, BUT
CONSIDERING THE IMPORTANCE OF GOMA AIRPORT TO THEM, IT IS QUITE
LIKELY THAT THERE ARE SOME. WE BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO
TEST THEIR RESOLVE IN THIS MATTER.

DISTRIBUTION LIST

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CO GHANBATT	HUMAN RIGHTS

From: MILOB HQ Sector 4


To: MILOB GP HQ/SOO//
UNAMIR HQ/G3/HAC//

7 October 1995

SRSG REPORT - AUGUST 1995

Ref: UNAMIR/G2 - Reports and Returns

Enclosed please find the SRSG report for September 1995.


D.J.K. Akplor
Lieutenant-Colonel
MILOB Commander Sector 4

(2)

G2 Info

See and read
paras 27-31

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09/10

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UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

FROM: MILOB 4 CYANGUGU

DATE: 07 October 1995

TO: MILOB GP HQ/SOO//

INFO: UNAMIR HQ/G3/HAC//

SRSR REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 95

GENERAL

1. The general situation in MILOB Sector 4 AOR has been relatively calm. Incidents of banditry activities ranging from household robberies, stealing of livestock and farm products to indiscriminate killings, have taken place in the Bugarama Sub-Sector to the south of Sector 4, but with a reduction in the numbers of reported cases. The Nyamasheke Sub-Sector has also reported infiltrations from Ijwi island on at least three separate occasions in the Gatara commune and Birembo sector by the FRGF.

2. From 1-30 September, 25 incidents were reported of sabotage (2), A/Pers mines (2), grenade (2), robbery (6), shooting (5) and killing (8). In addition to the infiltrations and bandit activities, personalities in political authority are being targeted for assassination. The "Responsable" of Rasano cell in the Bweyeye sector was killed on 3 Sep 95.

3. In the Nyamasheke Sub-Sector, reports were received between 15-18 September about RPA seizing some 115 cows from local farmers in the Gatara commune (GR 1345) who live near or on the edge of Nyungwe Forest. These actions by RPA resulted in the arrestation of at least 15 people over a three day period, who complained about these practices. One of the arrestee was the counsellor of Karambi sector (GR 1644).

ADMINISTRATION AND ORGANIZATION

4. The Préfet of Cyangugu is Mr. Théobald Rutihunza, the former director of the Cimerwa cement factory in Bugarama. His administration is concentrating its efforts on rebuilding the Cyangugu Préfecture infrastructure (utilities, water) and providing minimal social services to the communes. Furthermore, farming and commercial activities have greatly increased. In the Cyangugu Préfecture a change of Bourgmestres is underway within the 11 communes with most of the present incumbents being replaced.

POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

5. The Préfet, communal and sector leaders regularly address the people and inform them

on current events. Security is becoming an increasingly political headache, as incidents in the Sub-Sectors reveal. The proximity of Ijwi island, the presence of 300,000 refugees in nearby Zaire and nightly incidents of robbery, killings and acts of intimidation tend to nurture a climate of insecurity and fear. Nonetheless, the security issue is improving in Sector 4.

JUDICIAL SYSTEM

6. The judicial system is still not fully functional. There is still a severe lack of infrastructure and a sound legal and justice system in place. The ability of the civil administration to operate independently is impeded by a continued lack of resources and a climate of uncertainty and anxiety about the future. At the Sector level, the "Tribunal de Première Instance" has begun to function with one president of the Court, four magistrates, two greffier and one clerk. This is for criminal and civil affairs but not on genocide cases since the Supreme Court in Kigali is not functioning. The following Canton (Communes) tribunals are functioning: Bugarama and Nyakabuye communes. For the other nine communes in the Préfecture, there is no judicial system in place but some "Inspecteurs de Police Judiciaire" are in place. At all levels (commune, sector and cell), there is a well established practice of mediation for minor affairs/disputes. Arrests by the RPA and Gendarmerie, the former especially, occur daily.

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE TRANSPORT

7. This is still a major headache for the Préfecture. There is a twice-weekly bus service going to Nyagatare and Kigali. Every day, there are three or four minibuses going to Kibuye and Kigali, but there is still no public Rwanda bus service deserving the Cyangugu Préfecture. The other communes lack public transport and people have to walk long distances to markets, "centres de santé" and hospitals. There are 8-9 "matatu" or taxis leaving Cyangugu every day and many private taxis filling the void left by the absence of public transport.

MEDICAL

8. The Préfecture has good medical facilities provided by ICRC, MSF, MDM, other NGOs and UN agencies, including German Emergency Doctors (GED) which will remain operational until the end of the mandate on 08 December 1995. There are three hospitals: Kibogora (Kirambo), Gihundwe (Cyangugu) and Bugarama. The Bugarama hospital does not perform any surgery and all patients requiring surgery are evacuated to the Gihundwe hospital. As well, 16 clinics are managed by NGOs. The major problems are the lack of qualified local staff, special drugs, mosquito nets, potable water and electricity. For example, in the Nyamasheke Sub-Sector, the Gatara commune has no electricity since August 94.

UNITED NATIONS / HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS

9. The Préfecture enjoys and benefits greatly from the many UN and NGOs present. UNHCR has responsibilities of coordinating some NGO support in cooperation with the préfet himself. The presence of the Malawi company and MILOBS has created the atmosphere of

security for UN agencies and NGOs in the Sector.

10. The NGO and UN projects are effective and some have been re-evaluated and improved. There is more emphasis being placed on schools, agriculture and the improvement of the economy. IRC and Save the Children are the agencies involved in schools; MDM run three of the four orphanages, and share the bulk of the medical clinic projects with MSF (Spain). ICRC, besides prisons, and other known tasks, share distribution efforts with Christian Reformed World Relief Committee for seeds, hoes and some food programs.

POPULATION

11. It is estimated that before the genocide the population was approximately 85-90 % Hutu and 10-15% Tutsi. The local population in the various communes has not openly rejected the returnees or harassed them in ways that would make them feel unwelcome. This atmosphere will remain as long as no housing and land redistribution disputes occur in the communes, sectors and cells or that returnees are not confronted with their former house or property occupied by someone else on their return. The housing problem is being exacerbated by the 1959 cases who occupy housing and land vacated by those who fled Rwanda during the 1994 war. The increasing population requires that priority be given to the use of scarce building materials towards the implementation of the Rwandese Government housing plan. A balanced housing and land redistribution plan must be promulgated.

12. Human rights estimate the number of persons killed in Cyangugu was approximately 68,000 with about 90% being Tutsi. In many areas of the Préfecture, only a handful of Tutsis remain and they are mainly women and children. The only official population figures are those before the war (15 August 1991 - 514,279) and those after the war (31 March 1995 - 394,600). A population survey is to be conducted in the Cyangugu Préfecture but no date has yet been announced, and will likely be reported after the refugee situation stabilizes.

PRISONS AND DETENTION CENTERS

13. The judicial system is still not fully functional. At the Sector level, the "Tribunal de Première instance" has begun to function with one President of the Court, four magistrates, two greffier and one clerk. This is for criminal and civil affairs but not dealing with genocide cases as the Supreme Court in Kigali is not functioning. The following Canton (Communes) tribunals are functioning: Bugarama and Nyakabuye communes. For the other nine communes in the Préfecture, there is no judicial system in place but some "Inspecteurs de Police Judiciaire" are in place. At all levels (commune, sector, cell), there is a well established practice of mediation for minor affairs/disputes.

Prisons and Detention Centers

14. In the Cyangugu Préfecture there are one central prison, four brigades, 11 communal cachots and at least 10 detention centers. The Préfecture has a considerable prison

population and this situation has not changed since the last report. There is overcrowding in the Cyangugu prison. By Human Rights account, the four brigades (Kamembe, Bugarama Cité, Bugarama Cimerwa and Gisuma brigades) in the Préfecture hold 353 prisoners of which 186 prisoners are presently held at the Kamembe brigade. There are also 2,054 prisoners (of which 400-500 are without a trace of a dossier) in the Cyangugu prison, which has a capacity of 500, and 802 prisoners in the 11 communal cachots in the Préfecture. In total for the Préfecture there are some 3,200 prisoners.

15. In the Kamembe brigade, prisoners are being detained without due process of law and many for periods of four to six months. Food in the prison is mainly provided by ICRC, food in the detention facilities is provided by families. The health situation is deteriorating due to overcrowding. Sanitation is generally acceptable, but there is a problem of sewage disposal. Due to the efforts of ICRC, the water plant is operating to the benefit of the prison. A list of facilities and populations is available separately from this report.

16. Of primary concern is the current arrestation process. The RPA remains the main arresting agent. The legal process at the Préfecture level is still being developed. Trial of those who participated in the genocide still has not begun and some prisoners are still dying in overcrowded prisons. It is recommended that steps be taken to assign a greater burden of the responsibilities to the Government of Rwanda for the tasks presently assigned to the ICRC and similar organizations, in the running of the prisons.

HUMANITARIAN MATTERS

17. Humanitarian matters cover repatriation and settlement of refugees in their former communes, logistic support and coordination with UN agencies/NGOs for orphanages (Kibogora, Nyamasheke, Kamembe and Rusayo), 17 "centers de santé"/clinics and hospitals (Kamembe, Bushenge, Bugarama). The humanitarian officer is a facilitator and a liaison officer with the civilian and military authorities on humanitarian matters. MILOBS also monitor human rights and report any abuses which occur, such as those in prisons or detention centers.

18. From January-August 1995, Sector 4 saw a total of 11,021 refugees and 1,292 IDPs for a total of 12,313 persons. Between 1-30 September, 1,546 returnees have arrived at the Sector 4 border areas. During the same period, there was a total of 1,351 arrivals and 2,554 departures from the Nyagatare transit camp with 447 going to the Cyangugu Préfecture. There were no returnees from Burundi in July and August but 306 came in September. Assistance in resettling the returnees is being provided by UNHCR, WFP and IRC. As of 30 September, there were 63 refugees left in the Nyagatare transit camp.

19. The most common complaints of returnees still include the lack of accommodation, theft and destruction of property. The most vulnerable returnees include women and unaccompanied children who have limited ability to easily acquire land. It is also difficult to repossess land and property without a male relative. Refugees arriving at Uvira, Zaire are generally in poorer health, some suffering from malaria and malnutrition, than those arriving at Rusizi I.

HEALTH SERVICES

20. Health services and medical services, are provided by Médecins du Monde, International rescue committee for the Red Cross, Medicos sin Fronteras (Spain), German Emergency Doctors, HELP (funding and material donations since end of June), World Vision and Norwegians Peoples Aid (NPA). Other health services such as nutrition, maternity, family services, dispensary and patient care are found at the hospitals and most clinics. The hospital in Kamembe sector, Gihundwe cell has complete services, including major surgery and some dental services. The hospital was renovated and provided with cost of its equipment by NPA, and this restoration and rehabilitation continues with the added assistance of MDM. Facilities at Bushenge and Nyamasheke include minor surgery capacity. There are no changes to the number of clinics and hospitals listed in the June 95 report.

SCHOOLS

21. During the aftermath of the genocide and war, Cyangugu was severely looted including the schools. The result is that most schools in the Préfecture are still in very bad condition, requiring urgent support from UN agencies and NGOs to function properly. Almost all schools were at least partially destroyed or damaged - loss of school material, desks, roofs, windows, doors, lighting, fixtures and even electrical fittings. The low priority and lack of supplies and repair expertise has compounded the problem. The lack of response in resolving this acute problem in the Cyangugu Préfecture needs to be seriously addressed by UNAMIR. IRC and Save the Children are the principal agency which is assisting in the rehabilitation of the buildings with the assistance from UNICEF based in Gikongoro.

22. Most schools are primary schools and many were constructed or maintained by church organizations. The ratio of teachers to students in the primary schools is 1:50 and worse in some cases. The state provides salaries for the teachers, normally between FR 10,000 to 30,000.

23. Most communes consist of approximately 10 sectors with each having an average of 5,000 students and only 100 teachers. Each sector normally had several structures used as schools with one teacher assigned to each. Female students appear to outnumber male students two to one. The great majority of primary schools in the Préfecture are now operational but require assistance to upgrade the pedagogic and physical infrastructures of the school system. All have been fitted with proper roofs. The only primary level institution not yet functional is the "C.E.R.A.I.".

24. Secondary schools have been reopening since 1 April 95. However some sectors, such as the Cyangugu Sub-Sector, Bugumira sector, have no secondary schools. The following secondary schools are not in operation: the Nyamasheke secondary college for men, le Groupe Scolaire APEEDUC, Tyazo secondary school and the Umubyeyi college (both in Kirambo commune and which are private schools). The two other non-functional schools are operated by religious groups: Groupe Scolaire Gihundwe and Groupe Scolaire Mururu.

25. In summary, it can be noted that not all sectors have schools that are usable and therefore

children must often travel long distances to attend school. Given the fact that there are limited structures and equipment, the added student load from other sectors compounds the structural problems. There is a critical shortage of secondary schools. Roofing and structural fixtures are in high demand throughout the Préfecture, let alone just for schools. There is an urgent requirement to coordinate and focus UN and NGO resources to the task of rebuilding the school infrastructure, knowing well that priorities are determined by the Government of Rwanda.

ORPHANAGES

26. Médecins du Monde (MDM) still administers three orphanages and GED, the Nyamasheke orphanage. There are many orphans from the genocide not in the organized orphanages, but are living with families. In some areas there are as many as 400 orphans spread throughout the commune. It is suspected that some of the female orphans are kept for labor. The total number of children organized into orphanages is about 750; predominantly Tutsi. The number of orphans in all the orphanages is slowly decreasing. The greatest needs of the orphanages still remain the rehabilitation of the structures, basic necessities such as beds, mattresses, cooking facilities and a steady supply of food and educational materials. The orphans moved to the Noviciat, Kamembe commune from the APEEDUC orphanage on Tuesday, 19 September. Listed below are the four orphanages in Sector 4, their respective commune and the number of orphans in each:

Rusayo	Gishoma	304
Noviciat	Kamembe	202
Kibogora	Kirambo	164
Nyamasheke	Kagano	118

SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS - SECTOR 4

27. The following significant developments occurred:

- a. 3 September. An investigation was conducted by Cyangugu Sub-Sector commander reference the mutilated body of a local named Gatéra. It was learnt that the deceased was arrested by the Gisuma gendarmerie on 31 August and died on 3 September of multiple injuries sustained during incarceration. He was accused by the locals of Karengera commune as having participated in the genocide. The autopsy report obtained by the "Inspecteur de Police Judiciaire" revealed that Gatéra died of multiple contusions with the right eye gouged out, a fracture at the back of the cranium and a fracture of the right superior jaw. The body was handed over to his father who buried him at Bushenge sector (GR 9031) on 08 September. The father learnt about the death of his son three days later. The human rights were informed of this incident and are investigating.
- b. 5 September. At 2315 hrs, a loud bang believed to be an explosion was heard from the general direction of Nyarushishi cell (Gr 845238) and reported morning

of 06 sep by Milobs and an officer from Malawi company. It was learned on Wed, 06 sep at 1025 hrs that one electric-power pylon (#448) was blown up by suspected Interahamwe elements GR 850228, Gisuma commune, Matare sector (GR 8622). Cyangugu Sub-Sector commander and UNCIVPOL proceeded to the site at 1045 hrs. On arrival, it was observed that pylon #448 was totally destroyed and a second pylon nearby was severely bent. The power cables as well as the high frequency telephone cables were severed. Some 15-20 RPA soldiers were seen conducting a sweep of the nearby area and conducting their own investigation. There were no casualties and no one to our knowledge has been arrested to date.

- c. 6 September. At 2359 hours, bandits, numbers unknown threw a grenade, type unknown through the window of the house of a local from Gishoma commune, Rukunguli sector (GR 8414). The motive for the attack is unknown. The name of the local is Hari Ndintwarijs, 26 years old. He heard them talking outside his house and immediately tried to flee through a side window. He received burns on his back as he was escaping.
- d. 10 September. At 2000 hrs, an RPA soldier shot to death a civilian named Mutokambari Nfoyingo of Tyazo sector (gr 0342), Kirambo commune. The shooting happened at a house GR 040438 frequented by locals and RPA soldiers. The motive for the killing appears to be jealousy since two boys, one of which is RPA, were going out with the same local girl who is a prostitute. No summon was given by the RPA soldier. The boy was shot through the chest and died instantly as he attempted to flee the house through a side window. When the other RPA soldiers heard the shot they came and arrested the occupants of the house: two girls and two men. They were arrested and were arraigned at the Kirambo cachot communal. Human rights have been apprised of this situation.
- e. 14 September. The bodies of four locals were found at Rwumba sector (GR 1535) near the Nyungwe forest. Their bodies were found in a hut in one of the farms. The perpetrators and the motive for the killing are suspected of being RPA soldiers frustrated by the uncooperative attitudes of the locals in apprehending FRGF/Interahamwe who infiltrated using 17 boats on 26 August at Rusizi cell, Gatare commune.
- f. 23 September. A 10 year old school boy, named Isidore Ntabuhungiro of Rwahi sector (GR 7930) in Kamembe commune found and brought home and old grenade. At 1430 hours while trying to break it open at his house, the grenade exploded. He sustained serious injuries. He died at the Gihundwe hospital later.
- g. 24 September. At 0230 hrs, an electrical pylon was blown in Cyimbogo commune, Cyete sector GR 771206. This was a clear act of sabotage with explosive charges placed on the four legs of the pylon. The pylon remains

functional and will be replaced as soon as possible.

VISITS

28. There were four visits to Sector 4 during the month of September:

- a. 8-9 September. DCMO visited MILOB HQ and Bugarama Sub-Sector.
- b. 11 September. Col Kattah, DCOS Ops visited MILOB HQ and was briefed on the general situation, security issues, humanitarian as well as logistic problems by the HQ + staff.
- c. 13 September. Force Commander visited MILOB HQ and Rusizi I. He was briefed on the general situation as well as security issues in Sector 4.
- d. 18 September. Visit by ADG (SD) Indian Army to Rusizi I.

RPA ACTIVITIES

29. Security is improving in the Préfecture because of more disciplined and better trained and equipped troops. In addition, joint local and RPA patrols conducted in the Bugarama Sub-Sector, communes of Bugarama and Nyakabuye as well as in the Nyamasheke Sub-Sector, communes of Kirambo and Gatare particularly. These patrols have reassured the locals and given them a great psychological boost. The RPA is also compelled to deal with increasing infiltrations, acts of sabotage and indiscriminate killings by FRGF/Interahamwe coming from Zaire, thereby undermining their overall effort and ability to guarantee the security of the population. There has been an increase in cordon and search operations in the Nyamasheke Sub-Sector as well as day and night patrolling to provide as much ground coverage as possible. In light of the new mandate, the RPA has taken responsibility for security, including that of UN agencies and NGOs, throughout Rwanda. The RPA has two battalions deployed in the Cyangugu Préfecture: 157 Battalion with its Headquarter at Gihundwe sector (Cyangugu) and 101 Battalion at Bugarama Cité.

CONCLUSION

30. The general situation in Sector 4 is unstable and tense along the border areas with Zaire, more particularly along the east coast of Lake Kivu and in the Bugarama Sub-Sector as well as the Nyamasheke Sub-Sector. Two incidents of A/Pers mines and the blowing up of two power electric pylon have also been reported in the Cyangugu Sub-Sector. The intent of the present government remains to create and project a situation in the country favorable to the departure of the UN on 8 Dec 95. The position of the FRGF is therefore to maintain the Rwanda situation high on the UN agenda until a political settlement can be imposed on the present Government of Rwanda. The campaign of political killings, the acts of sabotage and terrorism and other low level operations carried out in the Cyangugu Préfecture must be analyzed in this context and

within the scope of psychological warfare. Given the special circumstances of the Préfecture, the military remains in command and control of the operations and most administrative aspects within the Préfecture.

31. The FRGF uses the defended borders of Zaire and Burundi in their propaganda campaign and as a safe base for offensive operations. It is assessed that the current situation including ongoing acts of banditry and murder, non-procedural arrests, deaths in custody, and the non-functional but improving civil and judicial system will continue in the foreseeable future.

REGIONAL

KENYA:

ACCORDING TO PRESS:

ON WEDNESDAY, KENYA'S PRESIDENT DANIEL ARAP MOI SAID HE WOULD REJECT INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL SUMMONS FOR SUSPECTS IN LAST YEAR'S GENOCIDE AND THAT ANYONE WHO CAME TO THE COUNTRY TO PURSUE THOSE ACCUSED WOULD BE ARRESTED. RWANDA'S PRESIDENT WARNED THAT THIS COULD RESULT IN REGIONAL CHAOS, WHILE THE TRIBUNAL PROSECUTOR STATED THAT THIS DECISION CONTRAVENED INTERNATIONAL LAW. MOI IS STICKING TO HIS GUNS ON THIS ISSUE AND STATED THAT THE CAUSES OF LAST YEAR'S GENOCIDE ϕ HAD TO BE INVESTIGATED BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL SAT.

cc
the file
Don
bio

OFFICIALS

* COMMENT: MANY OF THE FORMER GOVERNMENT, TOOK REFUGE IN KENYA AND CAMEROON. CAMEROON SEEMS ESSENTIALLY THE REFUGE OF "OLD MONEY" HUTUS, WHILE KENYA HOUSES MOST OF THE OLD GOVERNMENT (FRG) APPARATUS. IT WAS PRIMARILY THESE WHO DRAINED THE COUNTRY'S COFFERS AND ESSENTIALLY ESTABLISHED A GOVERNMENT IN EXILE, BASED OUT OF NAIROBI. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOME OF THE PURLOINED MONEY MAY BE FINDING ITS WAY INTO THE PRESIDENT'S POCKET. WHAT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE IS THAT KENYA IS CURRENTLY ATTEMPTING TO CURRY INTERNATIONAL FAVOUR IN A BID TO GET VITAL NEW FINANCIAL AID FROM THE IMF. THE MAIN OBSTACLES TO THIS AID HAVE BEEN CHARGES OF KENYA'S HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND CORRUPTION.

UNAMIR DAILY INFOSUM
AS OF 05 0600B OCT 95

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REGIONAL

ZAIRE: ACCORDING TO THE GOVERNOR OF SOUTH KIVU PROVINCE, ZAIRE WILL EXPEL REFUGEES IF THE UN IS UNABLE TO COMPLETE THEIR REPATRIATION BY 31 DEC. THE GOVERNOR STATED QUOTE THE RWANDAN REFUGEES WILL BE WILLINGLY OR UNWILLINGLY MADE TO COMPLY WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S DECISION UNQUOTE. THE UNHCR HAS PROMISED TO ACCELERATE VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION PROGRAMMES BUT MANY REFUGEES STILL FEAR REPRISALS IF THEY RETURN. ZAIRE INTENDS TO INCREASE ITS TROOP PRESENCE IN THE CAMPS IN ORDER TO GIVE A PUSH TO THE STALLED UN REPATRIATION EFFORT.

COMMENT: IN AUG, ZAIRE FORCIBLY EXPELLED APPROXIMATELY 15,000 REFUGEES AND WOULD NOT BE RETICENT TO DO THE SAME IN THE FUTURE. HOWEVER, THE ZAIRANS STILL FACE THE SAME PROBLEMS. THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY ONE POINT THREE MILLION REFUGEES IN ZAIRE AND LESS THAN 5,000 ZAIRAN MILITARY AND PARA-MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE KIVU REGION. THESE ARE POORLY TRAINED AND EQUIPPED TROOPS WITH LIMITED LOGISTICAL SUPPORT. IN AUG, THE ZAIRANS RAN OUT OF GAS AND TRUCKS AND ENDED UP REQUESTING ASSISTANCE FROM THE UN.

THE FORMER RWANDAN GOVERNMENT FORCES WHO LIVE IN OR NEAR THE UN CAMPS NUMBER MORE THAN 30,000. IT HAS BEEN CONFIRMED THAT THE GOVERNOR OF THE KIVU REGION IS BEING PAID OFF BY FORMER GOVERNMENT INTERESTS. THE ZAIRAN GOVERNMENT ACTUALLY HAS LIMITED CONTROL OVER EASTERN ZAIRE, AND WITH ONLY ONE OPERATIONAL C-130 HERCULES AIRCRAFT CANNOT EASILY INFLUENCE THE SITUATION. THE BEST TROOPS IN KIVU ARE THE 1,500 MEN FROM THE DIVISION SPECIALE PRESIDENTIALE, WHO ARE PAID BY THE UN TO POLICE THEIR CAMPS. THESE TROOPS WERE NOT INVOLVED IN THE AUG REPATRIATION CAMPAIGN.

IF THE UN CANNOT GET THE VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION PROGRAMME RESTARTED AND MOVE AT LEAST 5,000 PEOPLE DAILY, OR IF IT DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE THE MONEY FLOWING INTO THE COUNTRY FOR THE REFUGEE CAMPS, THEN ZAIRE WILL CONDUCT ANOTHER FORCED REPATRIATION. HOWEVER, WITHOUT THE USE OF FORCE, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT ANY REPATRIATION EFFORT COULD BE SUSTAINED BEYOND THE LEVELS ACHIEVED LAST AUGUST.



Kigali 30 September 1995

TO : MajGen G.C. Tousignant
Force Commander

FROM : LtCol A. Chabir
MA to DFC

Alench

SUBJECT : Sitrep on NSINDA detention centre

1. On Friday 29 september, I have visited NSINDA detention centre accompanied by the PAffO, Lt. Kent Page and a UNMAMIR Radio representative.
2. It has been noticed that the following tasks are still undertaking:
 - a) construction of the watchtowers: 6 over 9 are completed;
 - b) installation of the external flash lights are not yet achieved;
 - c) the last rain showers have caused a heavy erosion putting in danger a large part of the wall of the site. An engineer team will visit the site next week to assess the required action.
3. UNAMIR contribution:
 - a) the 2 x 25 Kva generators, promised by UNAMIR, have been delivered Friday 29 September to the Director of the prison.
 - b) As soon as UNDP provides the required gravel, Force EngCoy will be requested to improve the track leading to the site and the parking area in front of the back gate.
4. In light of the above, it could be stated that the site could not be ready before mid October 1995.

cc: ED
CAO
CISS
CBMS

DFC
COS
[REDACTED]
DCOS/SP
G3 ENG
CO ENGCOY

Seen

*Seen
2/10*

*Seen
02/10*
[Signature]

95 CMSG BRIEFING PACKAGE

As at 18 Sep 95

HISTORICAL NOTES

1. Unlike most African states, Rwanda and its southern neighbour Burundi were not a creation of colonial rule. When it was absorbed by German East Africa in 1899 it had been an established kingdom for several centuries. The Tutsi, cattle breeders from the Horn of Africa, began arriving about 500 years ago. The Tutsi gradually subjugated the Hutu inhabitants. They established a monarchy headed by a Mwami (king) and a feudal caste of nobles. The Tutsi reduced the Hutu to serfdom through a contract known as 'Abuhake' whereby the Hutu farmers obligated their services to the Tutsi Lords, in return for cattle and the use of pastures and arable land.
2. In 1899 the court of the Mwami agreed to become a German Protectorate. Belgian troops from Zaire occupied Rwanda in 1916. From 1920, Rwanda formed part of Rwanda-Burundi, administered by Belgium under a League of Nations mandate and later as a UN Trust Territory. Reforms instituted by the Belgians in the 1950s encouraged the growth of democratic political institutions. Dissension between the majority Hutu and their former overlords, the Tutsi, led to a rebellion in 1959, resulting in an overthrow of the Tutsi Monarchy. During the 1959 revolt and its aftermath more than 160,000 Tutsi fled to neighbouring countries and an estimated 20,000 were killed. A UN supervised referendum brought victory to the Party of Hutu Emancipation Movement (PARMEHUTU) in 1961. As a result internal autonomy was granted by Belgium on 1 January 1962 and in June Belgian Trusteeship was terminated by the UN. Rwanda became independent on 1 July 1962.
3. From 1962 to 1973 the PARMEHUTU ruled with Gregoire Kayibanda as leader. As a result of inefficiency and corruption, the public became disaffected with the party. A bloodless coup was led by MGen Juvenal Habyarimana after which all political activity was abolished. A national referendum in December 1978 approved a new constitution, aimed at returning the country to normal government. In December 1983 Habyarimana was elected President, and re-elected in 1988.
4. Since 1982, cross-border refugee problems have affected Rwanda's relations with Uganda. In early July of 1990, after a sharp decline in political and economic conditions, Habyarimana conceded that political reform was necessary. In September of 1990 the Commission Nationale de Synthese was established, with a mandate to make recommendations for political renewal.
5. On 1 October 1990 an estimated force of 10,000 guerrillas representing the exiled Tutsi-dominated Front Patriotique Rwandais or Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF or Inkotanyi) crossed the border from Uganda into northeastern Rwanda. Numerically, the troops were dominated by Tutsi refugees, but there were also a number of disaffected elements of the Ugandan army. Belgian and French troops were dispatched in response to a request for assistance. They did not engage in combat as the small Rwandan Army, with help from Zaire, turned back the assault. The Rwandan Government declared victory in November; however, the RPF then adopted guerrilla tactics. Attacks occurred in border areas in the north and northwest, initiated from camps in Uganda. This raised accusations, which were denied, that Uganda was supporting the RPF.
6. The conflict continued through 1991 and 1992 with a ceasefire reported

in late March 1993. Under the truce, the rebel force gave up the territory it controlled so that displaced civilians could go home. A 19 km wide DMZ along the Ugandan border was then set up but the villagers did not return. On 4 August 1993 the Arusha Accord was signed, ending hostilities, and UNAMIR was created to oversee its implementation. Fighting resumed in April 1994 after the suspicious deaths of the presidents of both Rwanda and Burundi in an airplane crash near Kigali. This event prompted a new round of ethnic violence between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups. As the RPF swept south toward Kigali, the Hutus turned on the Tutsis and killed between 500,000 and a million of them. When the scale of the genocide became known, the Hutu then fled Rwanda, fearing Tutsi reprisals when the RPF took power. Eventually, 2.2 million refugees fled to the states surrounding Rwanda, with the bulk of them going to Zaire.

7. Although the situation has reached a state of relative stability, the UN forces must deal with the perceptions of partiality held by all Rwandans. UN forces are viewed by the Hutus as being pro-Tutsi, while the Tutsi believe that UNAMIR stood back and allowed the genocide to occur.

8. At the present time, the Former Rwandan Government Forces (FRGF) is estimated in size to be approximately 40,000. They appear to be conducting low-level banditry in the areas of sectors 4 and 5 closest to the border. Although rumours of invasion are common, it is assessed that an FRGF invasion of Rwanda is unlikely in the near future. The greatest threat to the safety and security of UN personnel continues to be from banditry and unsafe driving.

9. The current UN mandate was adopted by the United Nations Security Council on 9 June 1995. **Flip Chart #1** This resolution calls for the mandate to be extended until 8 December 1995, with concurrent troop reductions from 6,200 to 1,800 by October 1995. The current level of military observers and civilian police will be maintained. The planned UNAMIR drawdown plan is summarized on **Flip Chart #2**.

10. Under this mandate, UNAMIR will exercise its good offices to help achieve national reconciliation within the frame of reference of the Arusha Peace Agreement, assist the Government of Rwanda in facilitating the voluntary and safe return of refugees and their reintegration in their home communities, support the provision of humanitarian aid, and expertise in the areas of engineering, logistics, medical care and demining, assist in the training of a national police force, and contribute to the security in Rwanda of personnel, International Tribunal and Prosecutor's office and the humanitarian agencies in case of need. **Flip Chart #3**

95 COMPOSITE MISSION SUPPORT GROUP

INTRODUCTION

9. The Mission Support Group is a composite entity made up from 95 CMSG (a Canadian contingent of 85 persons) and elements of the UNAMIR civilian Transport, Movements, Logistic and General Services staffs. 95 CMSG operates out of Trafipro with elements at different locations in Kigali.

MISSION Flip Chart #4

10. The mission of 95 CMSG is to provide the Force Commander UNAMIR with:
- a. A force level logistics planning and coordination cell;
 - b. A force level operational information collation/distribution cell;
 - c. A medical/general health care advisory group; and
 - d. Limited second line service support, utilizing integral CCIR personnel and resources when/if authorized by the Contingent Commander.

ORGANIZATION

11. 95 CMSG is organized with a HQ, five functional platoons and a combined Admin/NSE organization. This organization is depicted on **Flip Chart #5**, and is broken down as follows:

a. HQ

- i) composition: a. command element - consisting of the Commanding Officer, Deputy Commanding Officer, Group Sergeant Major and Military Police. This element provides the Gp command structure under the authority of the Comd CCIR, Terms of Reference and CF orders and instructions, and
- b. ops element - consisting of Log Ops and the National Command and Control Information System (NCCIS), this element provides the Gp CP/Log Ops Centre providing the control and coordination function for all Gp operations and UNAMIR logistic support operations, provides the control stations for Gp radio comms, and provides rear link capability to Canada through INMARSAT.

b. Transportation:

- (1) Composition. An Ops and Tasking Cell, a Despatch Cell, and a Cargo Section. It has 14 persons and a fleet of 4x8T cargo, 2x 5,000l fuel tankers, and 2x 15T container movers
- (2) Functions:
 - provides second line tpt support to UNAMIR contingents by tasking both the Brown and Root fleet, the primary service contractor for UNAMIR, and its own vehs,
 - works with the Chief Integrated Transport and Maintenance Management (CITMM) in the Fleet Management role, by assisting in the issuing/receipting functions of vehs, as well as the overall coord of veh distr in UNAMIR, and
 - provides first line transport support to 95 CMSG.

c. Maintenance:

- (1) Composition. A Control and Production office, a Quality Assurance Section, a Recovery Section and an Ancillary Repair Section (welding, electrical, refrigerator). It has 17 persons with 2 x mobile repair vehicles, and 2 x heavy recovery vehicles
- (2) Functions:
 - provides quality assurance inspectors to the CITMM and Brown and Root organizations to assist in maintaining the extensive civilian vehicle fleet in UNAMIR, and
 - provides 1st and 2nd line inspections, repair and recovery to all 95 CMSG Equipment.

d. Supply:

- (1) Composition: Customer Services, Procurement and Supply Control, Property Control and Receipt and Inspection Sections. It has 14 people in the organization
- (2) Functions:
 - provides "one stop shopping" through its Customer Service Section and the Brown and Root Warehouse for certain commodities (general stores),
 - provides commodity management for all stores less fresh rations, cbt rations, bottled water, tentage, defence stores, ammunition, EOD, vehicles, helmets, body armour and night vision eqpt,
 - provides procurement and requisition tracking services to the customer,
 - provide a coordinated Supply/Property Control/R+I service, and
 - provides first line supply support to 95 CMSG.

e. Info Cell

- (1) Composition: Consists of a 5 person cell, working out of Trafipro and UNAMIR HQ.
- (2) Functions:
 - provide UNAMIR with a force level operational information collation/distribution cell.

f. Med:

- (1) Composition: Consists of a MO, a Nurse, a Preventive Medicine Tech, and four Med Assistants.
- (2) Functions:
 - provide a medical/general health care advisory group to UNAMIR,
 - provide a first line med support to 95 CMSG, and
 - provide assistance to NORMED when required.

g. Admin:

(1) Composition: Consisting of first line admin support personnel.

(2) Functions:

- financial services,
- orderly room,
- Non Public Funds support,
- postal service,
- cooks and ration accounting,
- welfare, and
- control of local staff.

12. This concludes my briefing on 95 CMSG. Are there any questions.

Flip Chart #1

Current UN Mandate: UN Resolution 997 (1995)

- adopted 9 June 1995
- mandate extended to 8 December 1995
- troop reductions
- maintain personnel levels for MILOBs and Civpol

Flip Chart #2

Current UNAMIR Contingent State

As at 3 Aug 95:

- Sector 1 - Indbatt - 596
- Force Engr Coy - 140
 - Force Sig Coy - 125
 - UNAMIR HQ - 58

Sector 2 - Ghanbatt - 800

Sector 3 - Malicoy - 198

Sector 4 - Malawicoy - 179

Sector 4A - Zambatt - 795

Sector 4B - Senbatt - 237

Sector 5 - Nicoy - 135

As at 9 Sep 95:

- Sector 1 - Indbatt - 596
- Force Engr Coy - 140
 - Force Sig Coy - 125
 - UNAMIR HQ - 46
 - Ghancoy 1 - 135

Sector 2 - Ghancoy 2 - 162

Sector 3 - Malicoy - 135

Sector 4 - Malawicoy - 135

Sector 5 - Nicoy - 135

As at 12 Aug 95:

- Sector 1 - Indbatt - 725
- UNAMIR HQ - 58

Sector 2 - Ghanbatt - 800

Sector 3 - Malicoy - 135

Sector 4 - Malawicoy - 135

Sector 5 - Nicoy - 135

Flip Chart #3

UNAMIR will:

- help achieve national reconciliation,
- assist safe return and reintegration of refugees,
- provision of humanitarian aid and trg in engineering, logistics, medical care and demining,
- trg of national police force, and
- contr to secur of pers, Internationa Tribunal and NGOs

Flip Chart #4

MISSION


The mission of 95 CMSG is to provide the Force Commander UNAMIR with:

- a. A force level logistics planning and coordination cell;
- b. A force level operational information collation/distribution cell;
- c. A medical/general health care advisory group; and
- d. Limited second line service support, utilizing integral CCIR personnel and resources when/if authorized by the Contingent Commander.

Flip Chart # 5

95 CMSG Organization

The breakdown of pers for 95 CMSG is as fols:



F.M. O.C. MALICOY

T.C. D.CDSO.P.S.

OBJET: ABOUT HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO LOCAL A.P.R. FORCES

NR 004/95/O.C. MALICOY II SEPT


FROM REQUEST OF LT-COL PATRICK NYAMVURBA COMBATT 1ST BAT A.P.R. GIKONGORO
 STOP TWO TRUCKS BENFORD NR 3831 AND 3827 HAD BEEN SENT FOR TRANSPORTING FOOD
 TO THEIR FORCES STOP SINCE 11.2200 THE TWO TRUCKS AREN'T BACK STOP MALIAN
 PERSONNEL ON BOARD AS FOLLOW STOP TWO DRIVERS STOP FIVE ESCORTMEN STOP./.

① 5802 Info

Be check with our
 RPA no here and
 brief

Ben
 12/9

O.C. MALICOY
 LT-COL MALI



[Signature]

② Passed to G2 Info
 12/9

[Signature]
 14/9

[Signature]
 14/9



File No 5000.10 (PLANS)

To: G3 OPS

From: G3 PLANS

Date: 7 Aug 94

Subject: HANDOVER OF RESPONSIBILITIES WITH G3 PLANS CLERK

1. The responsibilities for G3 Plans Clerk are to be assumed by the G3 Ops clerks on 14 Aug 95.

2. WO1 J. Arhin is required to conduct a handover with the outgoing G3 Med clerk and the G3 Ops clerks before 11 Aug 95. It is requested that you direct your senior clerk to commence a handover with WO1 J. Arhin NLT 8 Aug 95.

3. Your assistance is most appreciated.

① 202-INFO
② WO1 EDET
START HANDOVER/TAKEOVER
by 8 AUG
7/8

Thur
7/8



File No 5000.9 (PLANS)

To: DISTRIBUTION LIST

From: *for* G3 PLANS *[Signature]*

Date: 31 Jul 94

Subject: OPS SECTION BRIEFING OF CO MALAWICOY

Reference: A. 5000.9 (PLANS) dated 28 Jul 95

1. The Ops briefing of the new CO MALAWICOY scheduled for today, Reference A, must be postponed due to changes to the CO's arrival date.

[Handwritten mark] 2. The Ops briefing is now tentatively scheduled for Thursday 3 Aug 95 in the G3 Plans office in accordance with the following schedule:

- a. 1400 - 1445 hrs, G3 Ops;
- b. 1445 - 1455 hrs, G2 Info;
- c. 1455 - 1510 hrs, G3 Plans; and
- d. 1510 - 1525 hrs, SO Log.

3. The date will be confirmed as soon as possible.

Distribution List:Action:

G3 Ops
G2 Info
SO Log
OC MALAWICOY

May check back pointed to next week
4-8 *[Signature]* *Thunt*
4/8

UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA



UNAMIR - MINUAR

NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

File No 5000.9 (PLANS)

To: DISTRIBUTION LIST

From: *for* G3 PLANS *[Signature]*

Date: 4 Aug 94

Subject: OPS SECTION BRIEFING OF CO MALAWICOY

Reference: A. 5000.9 (PLANS) dated 3 Aug 95

1. The new CO MALAWICOY missed this mornings flight and is now scheduled to arrive in Rwanda on 5 Aug 95.
2. The Ops briefing will now be held next week at a date to be determined. Further information will be forwarded as soon as possible.

Distribution List:

Action:

~~G3 Ops~~
G2 Info
SO Log
OC MALAWICOY

⑨ MAJOR CHUNBU
4-8 *[Signature]*

[Signature]
5/8



File No 5000.9 (PLANS)

To: DISTRIBUTION LIST

From: *for* G3 PLANS *[Signature]* ①

Date: 3 Aug 94

Subject: OPS SECTION BRIEFING OF CO MALAWICOY

Reference: A. 5000.9 (PLANS) dated 31 Jul 95

1. The new CO MALAWICOY is now scheduled to arrive in Rwanda on 4 Aug 95.

2. The Ops briefing is now scheduled for Friday 4 Aug 95 in the G3 Plans office in accordance with the following schedule:

- a. 1400 - 1445 hrs, G3 Ops;
- b. 1445 - 1455 hrs, G2 Info;
- c. 1455 - 1510 hrs, G3 Plans; and
- d. 1510 - 1525 hrs, SO Log.

Distribution List:Action:

G3 Ops
G2 Info
SO Log
OC MALAWICOY

② 3.8 MAJ CHUMBU

Roger Sir.
[Signature] SO2 OPS
8/8

③ Don't forget also the brief for the UNV's on SATURDAY 5th

[Signature]



From: DCOS Ops

To: G3 Ops
G3 Plans
G2
G3 Engr
G3 Air
FSO
CLO

Info: DFC
COS
DCMO

Date: 7 Aug 95

Subject: HANDOVER NOTES FOR INCOMING DCOS OPS

1. Col Kattah from Ghana has been nominated as the new DCOS Ops. It appears that his current duties will preclude him from arriving prior to my departure, thereby hampering an effective, face-to-face handover. In order to minimize this shortfall, I intend to prepare an extensive brief outlining the various concerns and issues facing Operations Branch.
2. Accordingly, all action addressees are directed to provide a written brief in point-form format giving a broad overview of their responsibilities and outlining all current and outstanding issues, resources, and critical problem areas, and future staff action required. The briefs should be as succinct as possible and consist of no more than 1 to 1 1/2 pages.
3. Reports should be submitted to me no later than 9 August in both hard copy and computer disk format (WP 5.1 or 5.2). It is anticipated that once Col Kattah arrives all addressees will have an opportunity to deliver a complementary verbal briefing as directed and coordinated by the A/DCOS Ops.

UNV Orientation Day

Date: 5 August 1995
Time: 9am - 4pm
Location: Briefing Room Headquarters

09.00 Introduction by Ms. Veronique Zidi
* 09.30 Military Brief
10.30 * Coffee Break *
11.00 Political Briefing
11.30 Medical Briefing
12.00 Security
Chief of Security - Mr. Paul Ischlika
13.00 * Lunch Break *
* 14.00 / Military Police
15.00 / Civilian Police
15.30 Communications

* * *

Please could you confirm to the ^{UNV's} Programme Manager, Ms Veronique Zidi your participation, call sign Uniform Victor I (Telephone line could be out of order because our movement to Trofimo Rén W.E.

NAT CHURCH

Sog To brief them

27/7

[Signature]
Actioned
[Signature]
5/8

DCOS(Cops)

G3(Cops), FMO/rep and
fpm to brief.

for necessary action pl.

[Signature]
27/7



Office of the Spokesman

PRESS RELEASE**UNAMIR NR 95-43****5 August 1995****THE KAMEMBE SHOOTING INCIDENT BETWEEN RPA AND
MALAWI SOLDIERS**

On 4 August 1995, there was a shooting incident near Kamembe market in Cyangugu Prefecture, in which two UNAMIR Malawi soldiers were injured by RPA soldiers. Subsequently, high tension arose between the Malawi Company and the RPA in the area.

From the investigation carried out, the following facts emerged:

- A Malawi Company soldier committed a traffic offence near Kamembe market.
- After being stopped and ordered to report to the nearby Gendarmerie, the Malawi soldier sped away and further committed another offence by breaking through the road-block at the Kamembe check-point.
- Pursuit was given from the Kamembe market by the RPA and Gendarmerie personnel, who, after the Malawians stopped their run-away vehicle, shot at close range two Malawi soldiers. A pistol shot hit one of the soldiers on the hand, while an AK-47 shot hit another Malawian on the left thigh.
- The situation was escalated by the arrival of heavily armed Malawi reinforcements both on the scene of the incident and at the local Gendarmerie Headquarters.
- After several hours of rising tension, the Military Observers (MILOBs) in the area defused the situation by sending back the Malawi reinforcements to their base at Shagasha, while negotiating the release of the arrested Malawian and their vehicles. This was achieved and the injured soldiers were taken to Gihundwe Hospital where they underwent surgery to remove the bullets. They are in stable condition.

The incident is indeed regrettable. There is, on the one hand, unacceptable conduct by some UNAMIR personnel, and, on the other hand, excessive use of force by the RPA. However, this should not affect the positive co-operation between the RPA and UNAMIR, which are partners for peace in Rwanda.

For more information, please contact the Office of the Spokesman in Kigali: phone: 84266 ext.: # 11075 or 11124 or 11066.

**UNAMIR FORCE HQ
OUTGOING FACSIMILE**

ORIGINATING FAX NO: .

DATE: 04 AUG 95

TO: ANNAN UNITED NATIONS NEW YORK	FROM: DCOS OPS HQ UNAMIR KIGALI RWANDA
INFO: SITUATION CENTRE NEW YORK	
FAX: 001-212-963-9053	FAX: 1-121-963-3090
REFERENCE:	
SUBJECT : SPECIAL SITREP - INCIDENT BETWEEN RPA AND MALAWI SOLDIERS	
NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING THIS ONE: ONE	

1. TODAY AT ABOUT 1430B HRS AT KAMEMBE NEAR CYANGUGU AN INCIDENT HAPPENED BETWEEN RPA AND MALAWI SOLDIERS AFTER A NEAR (NOT ACTUAL) ACCIDENT IN MARKET AREA.
2. SUBSEQUENTLY TWO MALAWI SOLDIERS WERE SHOT ONE EACH IN THE ARM AND THE LEG. WOUNDS NOT SERIOUS. HAVE RECEIVED MED TREATMENT. REMAINDER OF SECTION PATROL OF 1 OFFR AND 7 MEN TAKEN TO CYANGUGU GENDARMERIE, TWO VEHICLES IMPOUNDED.
3. NEGOTIATIONS BY SECTOR COMD, MILOB GOING ON WITH LOCAL RPA AUTHORITIES. G3 RPA INFORMED AND WAS REQUESTED TO DEFUSE THE SITUATION.
4. FURTHER INFORMATION WILL BE FORWARDED TO YOU AS SOON AS AVAILABLE.
5. BEST REGARDS.

(1)

File: 1000 (G2)

Date: Jul 95

To: DCOS OPS

From: G2 INFO

Subject: REPORTING - DAILY SITREPS

1. This office is in the process of reviewing the Mission's Information Requirements and it occurred to us that perhaps the format of the Daily SITREP should also be reviewed to see if it meets the requirements of the new mandate.

2. Attached for your consideration is a revised SITREP format which we feel may better serve the needs of all concerned. It is by no means complete nor organised in the most appropriate manner. It does however show where improvements might be made.

3. If you feel that a change to the format maybe warranted, we suggest that:

a. a sample be sent to OPS, MILOB HQ and to Unit Commanders for their comment; and

b. that we schedule a meeting for the end of July to review the comments and decide whether to accept the new format or not.

② COS

1. Current sitrep instr is att.
2. Proposal is in greater detail although it generally follows same headings.
3. Your comments pls.

[Signature]
DCOS OPS
24.7

④ G2

1. Note mins.

2. See my minor revisions;

lets circ to
DCMO/500 Milobs,
Sect of Unit Comds
for input on this
suggestion/new
checklist.

[Signature]
DCOS OPS
25.7

③ DCOS (OPS)

1. Ref above
2. There is no need to incl international and future intentions.
3. The present format is okay. However, we may send the revised one after deletion of what ever portions that are not applicable to sector comms, for comments.

[Signature]
24.7

DRAFT

RECOMMENDED SITREP FORMAT

1. GENERAL: a overview of the situation within the AOR
2. OWN ACTIVITIES: what has been done including humanitarian assistance provided.
3. SECURITY:
 - a. INTERNAL: incidents which might effect national or individual security within the country:
 - (1) acts of violence or major criminal acts against citizens;
 - (2) activities of the RPA and any changes in their dispositions;
 - (3) activities of the Gendarmerie;
 - (4) illegal or irregular arrests;
 - (5) violations to the Status of Mission Agreement or acts against members of the International Community
 - b. EXTERNAL: incidents which originate outside Rwanda and which occurred in or will affect the national security of Rwanda.
 - (1) actions and activity by the FRGF;
 - (2) actions and activity by the Militia;
 - (3) actions or activity by the military forces of neighbouring nation military forces against the FRGF, Militia , Rwanda or Rwandan refugees.
4. POLITICAL AND CIVIL AFFAIRS: events within the AOR which may affect favourably or negatively the efforts of reconciliation or rehabilitation:
 - a. meetings held by local authorities and the theme;
 - b. demonstrations, strikes and gatherings;
 - c. visits of government representatives and the purpose;
 - d. relations between local authorities and members of the International Community;
 - e. the withdrawal of humanitarian support
6. REFUGEES AND RETURNEES:
 - a. numbers of refugees returning to or leaving Rwanda;
 - b. reports of conditions in the refugee camps;

c. situation of those who have returned;

d. numbers of returnees waiting in transit centres to be resettled;

7. INTERNATIONAL: information about events and conditions in neighbouring countries. (if applicable)

8. HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS: problems which require a quick response.

9. LOGISTICS AND PERSONNEL:

a. personnel state;

b. vehicle state;

c. urgent logistical or administrative needs or problems.

10. COMMANDER'S ASSESSMENT: an evaluation of ^{recent or} the day's events and how they relate to past incidents and possible future consequences.

11. FUTURE INTENTIONS: a summary of ^{significant} ~~what~~ activities the unit(s) will be undertaking within the next 48 hours. (if applicable)

UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA



UNAMIR - MINUAR

NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

File No 5000.9 (PLANS)

To: DISTRIBUTION LIST

From: G3 PLANS

Date: 28 Jul 94

Subject: OPS SECTION BRIEFING OF CO MALAWICOY

1. A operational briefing will be conducted for the new CO MALAWICOY Monday, 31 Jul 95 in the G3 Plans office in accordance with the following schedule:

- a. 1400 - 1445 hrs, G3 Ops;
- b. 1445 - 1455 hrs, G2 Info;
- c. 1455 - 1510 hrs, G3 Plans; and
- d. 1510 - 1525 hrs, SO Log.

2. Any questions may be directed to, Capt I. Denny, G3 Plans 4, at local 11162.

Distribution List:

Action:

G3 Ops
G2 Info
SO Log
OC MALAWICOY

Info:

DCOS Ops

[Handwritten signature]
28²⁷

[Handwritten signature]
H/B



File No 5000.9 (PLANS)

To: DISTRIBUTION LIST

From: G3 PLANS

Date: 28 Jul 94

Subject: OPS SECTION BRIEFING OF CO MALAWICOY

1. A operational briefing will be conducted for the new CO MALAWICOY Monday, 31 Jul 95 in the G3 Plans office in accordance with the following schedule:

- a. 1400 - 1445 hrs, G3 Ops;
- b. 1445 - 1455 hrs, G2 Info;
- c. 1455 - 1510 hrs, G3 Plans; and
- d. 1510 - 1525 hrs, SO Log.

2. Any questions may be directed to, Capt I. Denny, G3 Plans 4, at local 11162.

Distribution List:Action:

G3 Ops
G2 Info
SO Log
OC MALAWICOY

Info:

DCOS Ops

(9)

~~HAT LITRE~~

28/7

31/7

①

File: 1000 (G2)

Date: Jul 95

To: DCOS OPS

From: G2 INFO

Subject: REPORTING - DAILY SITREPS

1. This office is in the process of reviewing the Mission's Information Requirements and it occurred to us that perhaps the format of the Daily SITREP should also be reviewed to see if it meets the requirements of the new mandate.

2. Attached for your consideration is a revised SITREP format which we feel may better serve the needs of all concerned. It is by no means complete nor organised in the most appropriate manner. It does however show where improvements might be made.

3. If you feel that a change to the format maybe warranted, we suggest that:

a. a sample be sent to OPS, MILOB HQ and to Unit Commanders for their comment; and

b. that we schedule a meeting for the end of July to review the comments and decide whether to accept the new format or not.

② COS

1. Current sitrep instr is att.
2. Proposal is in greater detail although it generally follows same headings.
3. Your comments pls.

[Signature]
DCOS OPS
24.7

[Signature]
26.7

[Signature]
26/7

④ G2

1. Note mins.
2. See my minor revisions;

lets circ to
DCMO/SW Milobs,
Sect of Unit Comds
for input on this
suggestion/new
checklist.

[Signature]
DCOS OPS
25.7

③ DCOS (OPS)

1. Ref above
2. There is no need to list international and future intentions.
3. The present format is okay. However, we may send the revised one after deletion of what ever portions that are not applicable to sector comms, for comments.

⑤ cc: SW A copy sent to
COS SW 25/7

[Signature]
24.7

DRAFT

RECOMMENDED SITREP FORMAT

1. GENERAL: a overview of the situation within the AOR
2. OWN ACTIVITIES: what has been done including humanitarian assistance provided.
3. SECURITY:
 - a. INTERNAL: incidents which might effect national or individual security within the country:
 - (1) acts of violence or major criminal acts against citizens;
 - (2) activities of the RPA and any changes in their dispositions;
 - (3) activities of the Gendarmerie;
 - (4) illegal or irregular arrests;
 - (5) violations to the Status of Mission Agreement or acts against members of the International Community
 - b. EXTERNAL: incidents which originate outside Rwanda and which occurred in or will affect the national security of Rwanda.
 - (1) actions and activity by the FRGF;
 - (2) actions and activity by the Militia;
 - (3) actions or activity by the military forces of neighbouring nation military forces against the FRGF, Militia , Rwanda or Rwandan refugees.
4. POLITICAL AND CIVIL AFFAIRS: events within the AOR which may affect favourably or negatively the efforts of reconciliation or rehabilitation:
 - a. meetings held by local authorities and the theme;
 - b. demonstrations, strikes and gatherings;
 - c. visits of government representatives and the purpose;
 - d. relations between local authorities and members of the International Community;
 - e. the withdrawal of humanitarian support
6. REFUGEES AND RETURNEES:
 - a. numbers of refugees returning to or leaving Rwanda;
 - b. reports of conditions in the refugee camps;

c. situation of those who have returned;

d. numbers of returnees waiting in transit centres to be resettled;

7. INTERNATIONAL: information about events and conditions in neighbouring countries. (if applicable)

8. HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS: problems which require a quick response.

9. LOGISTICS AND PERSONNEL:

a. personnel state;

b. vehicle state;

c. urgent logistical or administrative needs or problems.

10. COMMANDER'S ASSESSMENT: an evaluation of ^{recent or} the day's events and how they relate to past incidents and possible future consequences.

11. FUTURE INTENTIONS: a summary of ^{significant} ~~what~~ activities the unit(s) will be undertaking within the next 48 hours. (if applicable)

To FC

Info: D COS OPS

From: SO3 G2

20 Jul 95

SUBJECT: FRGF "DEATH SQUADS" IN SECTOR 4C

References: A. G2 Int Briefing 16 Jul 95
B. G2 Collection Task 029 (attached)
C. Our conversation 19 2015B Jul, Canada House, Belgian Village

1. At Ref A we apprised you of the possibility that FRGF was targetting and executing individuals in the Bugerama area.

2. Investigation into the matter by Sector 4C has yielded some convincing indicators to support the allegations. I have attached his reponse to Ref B as a stand-alone document on the issue for your detailed information.

3. Since attending the UNAMIR G2 Intelligence Working Group (10-11 May) Major Bibeau has produced some first class intelligence products from his Sector. He has maintained a consistently high motivation and collection/reporting effort in what has been the busiest Sector in the AOR. He has already been commended (Annex C) for his superb work on the factional marine capabilities in Kivu area; a work which is now the definitive basic intelligence document in the intelligence community [none had existed prior]).

4. Although there can be no pride of authorship in intelligence, I take this opportunity to praise the consistently high effort, intellect and competence of Major Bibeau in Sector 4C. Major Bibeau would probably make an excellent PA for I believe him to be the type of person who would excels in whatever he does. As per Reference C, however, it is my fervent hope that it will be his current job in which he will continue to excel, at least until the FRGF window of opportunity has passed.

Attachments

ANNEX A - COLLECTION TASK #029, 16 JUL 95
ANNEX B - SECTOR 4C REPORT, BUGARAMA SUB SECTOR, 18 JUL 95
ANNEX C - COMMENDATION, MAJOR BIBEAU, 22 MAY 95

To: MILOBS

From: UNAMIR HQ/G2

Date: 16 JUL 95

SUBJECT: COLLECTION TASK #029

Reference: MILOB GP HQ SITREP, 15 JUL 95, PARA 2.B.(3)

1. This is an information collection task. Please answer all questions or conduct investigations to the best of your capabilities. Partial answers submitted on time are more useful than complete answers late. For clarification or other matters, contact G2 Information at UNAMIR HQ at 11254 (UNAMIR SWITCHBOARD NETWORK).

2. The following information is required by UNAMIR HQ/G2 no later than (AS DISCOVERED):

What indicators are available to indicate a campaign of terror to kill designated people by FRGF/militia (as opposed to simple robbery or killings by the RPA)?

- a. were the victims also robbed?
- b. what arms were the victims killed with?
- c. what were the political sympathies of the victims (eg: pro-RPA/pro-FRG?);
- d. etc



From: MILOB HQ Sector 4/Ops O//

To: UNAMIR HQ/G2

Info: MILOB GP HQ/SOO//

/8 July 1995

COLLECTION TASK - BUGARAMA SUB SECTOR

- Refs: A. Sitrep No. 014 131800-141800 hrs July 95, para 2c
B. Sitrep No. 015 141800-151800 hrs July 95, para 2c
C. Sitrep No. 013 121800-131800 hrs July 95, para 4b
D. Sitrep No. 012 111800-121800 hrs July 95, para 2c

1. The following information is provided in reply to UNAMIR/G2 collection task of 16 July 95:

- a. Q1. What indicators are available to indicate a campaign of terror to kill designated people by FRGF/Militia, as opposed to simple robbery or killing by RPA (and genuine bandits)?

A1. First indication of a campaign to kill people with responsibilities are the last two incidents in Muhehwe (GR 8608) and Mubombo (GR 9199). Further information from the Bugarama bourgmestre reveals that the bandits responsible for the incident in Muhehwe were arrested the same night by RPA. During interrogation, they revealed that individuals in positions of responsibilities were targeted in order to cause terror, instability and chaos in the Bugarama commune (GR 8907). The aim of the campaign is not only to terrorize the population and its leaders but to discredit the RPA and gendarmes in the eyes of the population, as unable to provide for their security and safety.

Furthermore, the Bugarama bourgmestre is afraid for his own life and

has requested transportation from MILOBS in Bugarama Sub Sector in the afternoon from the communal bureau to his residence. The bourgmestre has a motorcycle but it is unserviceable at the moment. The MILOBS have begun transporting the bourgmestre since Friday, 14 July. The bourgmestre presently walks to the communal bureau in the morning. MILOBS have been instructed to persuade him to accept transport in the morning for fear the bandits change their modus operandi as they become aware of his movements.

NOTE: The assistance offered the bourgmestre may be perceived as going against the new mandate which specifies that the UN is no longer responsible for "the security and protection of civilian at risks in Rwanda". This assistance is temporary until the motorcycle is repaired. The cause of the UN in Rwanda will not be strengthened if he is assassinated because MILOBS refused him transportation. The risks to MILOBS is minimal, no more than in normal circumstances.

The other two communes, namely Gishoma (GR 8211) and Nyakabuye (GR 9016), have formed so-called unarmed "watch groups" in villages (sectors) and their efforts are closely coordinated with RPA elements. This arrangement has resulted in a marked decrease in banditry activities in these two communes.

b. Q2. With what weapons/arms were the victims killed?

A2. The weapons used by the bandits in both incidents (Muhehwe and Mubombo), reported at references A and B, were light weapons, namely AK 47 and other small arms such as SLR. But an anti-personnel mine killed a man in Ruhoko sector (GR 8304), as reported at reference C, and bandits have been known to use guns and grenades, such as the incident at reference D.

c. Q3. Were the victims also robbed (and if so, of what items)?

A3. **In the first incident** involving the killing of the "Conseiller" (sector level) of Muhehwe (GR 8608), all household goods and clothes were

stolen. In the second incident, involving the killing of the "Responsable" (cell level) of Mubombo (GR 9199), his wife and two children, there was no stealing reported. The killing of the family can be interpreted as a warning to all those who associate or openly support the present Government.

d. Q4. What were the political sympathies of the victims i.e. RPA/FRGF/Interahamwe...?

A4. As far as can be determined, the communal appointments were assigned because the "Conseiller" and the "Responsable" were supporters of the present Government of Rwanda and its policies of reconciliation. It is not possible to confirm, due to the unavailability of the Bugarama bourgmestre, if both leaders were moderate Hutus, or if family members in the Mubombo incident were Tutsis. This will be confirmed in the following daily sitreps.

VICTIMS WERE ALL "HUTUS" (4C Sitrep # 019, 18-19 Jul)

e. Q5. Other pertinent information?

A5. The Bugarama commune (GR 8907) also has unarmed "watch groups" but these operate in villages (cells), independently of RPA which patrol only the main routes. If there is an incident in the villages, the RPA is alerted, as was done in the last incident in Muganza (GR 9005) reported at reference D, but by the time the RPA arrive, the bandits have fled. Cooperation and coordination of efforts would have prevented the incident in Muganza, in which one member of the "watch group" was killed and three others wounded. The combined efforts act as a deterrence.

It also appears that the FRGF stationed in Zaire are desperate for support and have resorted to a terror campaign of violence and intimidation in order to draw the support of the local population in the Bugarama commune. Furthermore, the former Government is also witnessing a return to normalcy in the Cyangugu Préfecture, sub-Préfectures of Rwesero and Bugumya, as well as in daily communal life. Their efforts are therefore channelled to create and sustain a climate of instability, insecurity and fear. The present trend also

shows that the focus of the terror campaign has switched from Nyamasheke Sub Sector to the Bugarama Sub Sector, mainly the Bugarama commune, because of its proximity to the Zaire and Burundi borders. The former Government cannot afford to lose the support of sympathizers and relatives to their cause, as people are slowly drawn into a sense of normalcy and every day preoccupations, such as commercial and farming activities. No overt support to the present Government of Rwanda will be tolerated.

NOTE: There have been no incidents of violence reported in the Nyamasheke Sub Sector since the beginning of July 95.

2. This completes the collection task assigned to MILOB Sector 4. If any further information comes up on this subject, you will be advised through daily sitreps or letter.



J.A. Bibeau

Major

Acting Sector commander

MILOB Sector 4

FROM: UNMAIR HQ/G2//

TO: MILOB SECTOR 4C/OPS O//

INFO: MILOB GP HQ/SOO/DFC//

22 May 1995

COLLECTION TASK 020

Ref: Your Collection Report 020, 20 May 95

1. Major Biebeau, this fax is to commend your work at Ref.
 2. What you have provided at Ref is a very good, very useable (a key word for us) piece of intelligence work. It is short, sharp and to the point. It is apparent that you are applying the principles of intelligence in your work within the sector. Your collection report will be used as our basic intelligence primary document for the foreseeable future. We maintain an interest, so remember the principle of continuous review.
 3. Sector 4C is certainly a busy sector for matters of intelligence. I must admit a certain trepidation with the loss of the energetic Capt Isberg. Your work to date has been of an even higher standard. Sector 4C promises to remain an area of significant interest. Keep up the good work, but do remember to pace yourself and train others, I would hate to lose you.
 4. Again, Well done!
-

TO: MILOB SECTOR 1/S2
INDBATT/S2
GHANBATT/S2
MILOB SECTOR 2/S2
SECTOR 3 HQ/S2
ZAMBATT/S2
MILOB SECTOR 4A/S2
SENBATT/S2
MILOB SECTOR 4B/S2
ETHIOBATT/S2
MILOB SECTOR 4C/S2
MILOB SECTOR 5/S2
NICOY/S2
AUSMED/S2
95 FLSG/OPS
FORCE ENGINEERING/OPS
MILOB SECTOR 6/S2

INFO: D/COS OPS
MILOB GP HQ/DCMO

FROM: UNAMIR HQ/G2 INFO

17 JUL 95

SUBJECT: BIWEEKLY INTELLIGENCE FORECAST (BWIF) # 004

REFERENCES: A. BWIF #001, 02 JUN 95
B. UNAMIR HQ/G2, SECTOR ROUTINE INFORMATION REPORTS,
12 MAY 95

OUTLOOK

1.(U) THE GENERAL SITUATION APPEARS STABLE THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. THE RPA MAINTAIN THEIR SECURITY MEASURES ALONG THE RWANDA/ZAIRE BORDER.

2.(U) ADDRESSING THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE EXPECTED RWANDA TO BRING ABOUT MOST OF THE CHANGE REQUIRED BY ITSELF. HE ALSO INTIMATED THAT IT WAS UNLIKELY THE ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST RWANDA WOULD BE LIFTED IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

ASSESSMENT

RPA

3. TROOP MOVEMENT AND REINFORCEMENT OCCURRED IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE COUNTRY, BUT IT APPEARS TO BE ROUTINE IN NATURE AS THERE HAS BEEN NO NOTICEABLE CHANGE IN THE RPA'S LEVEL OF READINESS SINCE THE INTIAL REINFORCEMENTS TO POSSIBLE APPROACHES IN LATE MAY. RPA TROOPS IN SECTOR 4C APPEAR INCREASINGLY MORE SUCCESSFUL IN INTERDICTING BANDIT RAIDS FROM IJWE WHILE THE INSTITUTION OF WHAT AMOUNTS TO "NEIGHBOURHOOD WATCHES" (CIVILIANS RESPONSIBLE FOR REPORTING SUSPICIOUS EVENTS WITHIN GIVEN AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY) SEEMS TO BE ENGENDERING A CLOSER COOPERATION AND

TRUST BETWEEN LOCALS AND RPA IN BUGERAMA AREA AND PARTS OF SECTOR 5. **COMMENT:** SINCE REINFORCING THEIR FORCES SECTOR 4C AND 5 IN MAY/JUN, THE RPA DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE AS CONCERNED ABOUT RUMOURS OF AN IMPENDING FRGF ATTACK. PROSPECTS FOR AN FRGF MILITARY SUCCESS (BWIF 001, 02 JUN) WERE WEAK AT BEST. WITH THE REDEPLOYMENT OF RPA TO COVER LIKELY APPROACHES, FRGF PROSPECTS FOR ANYTHING BEYOND THE CURRENT SMALL SCALE OPERATIONS ARE QUITE POOR. THOSE PRESSURES FACED BY THE FRG (BWIF 001, 15 MAY) CONTINUE TO GROW. RECENTLY A ZAIRAN OFFICIAL OPENLY CONDEMNED THE OPERATION OF AN INDEPENDENT NATION ON ZAIRAN SOIL AS BEING AGAINST THE CONSTITUTION OF ZAIRE. REFUGEE CAMPS ARE CONTINUING TO DEPOPULATE. DONOR COUNTRIES ARE BECOMING IMPATIENT WITH CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR THE CAMPS. THE FRG NEED SOMETHING TO FORCE A PLACE IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT. THEIR FEW SUCCESSFUL ACTS OF SABOTAGE DO NOT SEEM INCENTIVE ENOUGH FOR KIGALI TO DO SO. IF THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT CAN WIN THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF THE PEOPLE OF RWANDA, OR AT LEAST PREVENT MOTIVATING THEM FROM RISING UP AGAINST THEM, THE FRG WILL LIKELY CONTINUE TO LOSE INFLUENCE.

4. ON 12 JUL, OVER APPROXIMATELY A SIX HOUR PERIOD, FIRE WAS EXCHANGED ACROSS THE RWANDA/ZAIRE BORDER IN THE AREA OF THE FRGF CAMP AT PANZI. THIS INCIDENT CREATED INTEREST BECAUSE IT IS THE FIRST REPORT OF CROSS BORDER SHOOTING FOR SOME TIME AND GENERATED EMBARRASSMENT FOR UNAMIR AS IT WAS CIVILIAN AGENCIES WHO BROUGHT THE MATTER TO THE FORCE COMMANDER'S ATTENTION. UNFORTUNATELY, THE CIVILIAN AGENCY WAS IRRESPONSIBLY INACCURATE IN THEIR REPORTING AND THE MATTER COULD HAVE SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZED AID TO RWANDA. THE SITUATION WAS CALMED WITH THE IMMEDIATE INVESTIGATION BY AN INDEPENDENT AGENCY. **COMMENT:** FUTURE INCIDENTS WHICH COULD HAVE SIGNIFICANT REPERCUSSIONS (SUCH AS THE VIOLATION OF BORDERS) MUST BE REPORTED IMMEDIATELY IN AN INFORMATION REPORT (REFERENCE B, PARA 1.C.) AND FOLLOWED UP BY INVESTIGATION.

GENDARMERIE

5. THE NEWEST GRADUATES OF THE GENDARMERIE TRAINING SCHOOL HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED TO THE PREFECTURES. ALTHOUGH THEY ARE BETTER TRAINED THAN THEIR PREDECESSORS, THEY LACK EQUIPMENT WITH WHICH TO FUNCTION. A FURTHER 200 RECRUITS HAVE COMMENCED TRAINING BUT WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. **COMMENT:** THE PASSAGE OF CIVIL POWER TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES FROM THE ARMY IS AN IMPORTANT STEP IN THE LEGITIMACY OF THIS NEW GOVERNMENT. ALL SECTORS SHOULD PAY SPECIAL ATTENTION AS TO HOW LOCAL RPA RELINQUISH POLICE POWERS (ARREST/INVESTIGATIONS) TO THE GENDARMERIE.

FRGF/MILITIA

6. INCURSIONS CONTINUE WITH NO SIGNIFICANT INCREASE. ON 2 JUL, ELEMENTS ATTEMPTED TO SABOTAGE THE WATER TREATMENT PLANT IN GISENYI. THEY KNIVED TWO GUARDS AND PLANTED EXPLOSIVES WHICH DAMAGED A PUMP MOTOR. FURTHERMORE IT IS REPORTED THAT INFILTRATION ELEMENTS MAYBE OPERATING OUT OF THE GISHWATI FOREST GR 3000, INSTEAD OF RETURNING TO ZAIRE IMMEDIATELY. **COMMENT:** FRGF ARE UNLIKELY TO BE SUCCESSFUL IN SIEZING A PIECE OF TERRAIN

- TO FORCE A POSITION IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT. SABOTAGE AND TERRORISM/MILITARY ACTIVITIES ARE OPTIONS WHICH, IF EXPENSIVE ENOUGH FOR RWANDA, MIGHT FORCE THAT SEAT. WE MUST WATCH FOR AND REPORT ANY ACTS OF SABOTAGE OR MILITARY ACTION, WHETHER SUCCESSFUL OR PRE-EMPTED.

INTERNATIONAL

7. BURUNDI: FIGHTING STILL CONTINUES AROUND BUJUMBURA AND TO THE NORTH AND WEST. HUTU MILITIA HAVE OPENLY ATTACKED ISOLATED ARMY POSITIONS AND CONVOYS AS WELL AS INNOCENT CIVILIANS.

COMMENT TO UNIT/SECTOR S2 S

8. IN THE DOWNSIZED STRUCTURE OF UNAMIR, WE HAVE FEWER EYES ON THE GROUND. SLICK REPORTING PROCEDURES AND INVESTIGATIONS ARE REQUIRED IN EACH SECTOR. YOU ARE LIMITED ONLY BY YOUR OWN MIND AS TO WHAT/WHO IS A SOURCE OF INFORMATION. RECALL YOUR PRINCIPLES OF INTELLIGENCE, KEEPING TIMELINESS AND ACCURACY TWO OF THE POWERFUL ONES. YOUR NEXT BWIF IS DUE 30 JUL 95.

ATTACHMENTS

ANNEX A - UNAMIR HQ/G2, SECTOR ROUTINE INFORMATION REPORTS,
12 MAY 95

12 MAY 95

**SECTOR ROUTINE
INFORMATION REPORTS**

REFERENCE: INFORMATION OFFICERS' WORKING GROUP, 10/11 MAY

1. AS DISCUSSED AT YESTERDAY'S WORKING GROUP (REF) THIS MESSAGE IS HARD COPY OF THE SCHEDULE OF REPORTING EXPECTED FROM EACH UNIT/SECTOR MILOB INFORMATION OFFICER:

A. 15/30 OF EACH MONTH: INFORMATION SUMMARY (INFOSUM). THIS IS TO BE A QUICK OVERVIEW OF SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS IN YOUR SECTOR DURING THE PAST TWO WEEKS. BREVITY AND ACCURACY ARE EXPECTED. YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION, BASED UPON AVAILABLE INFORMATION, WILL BE HIGHLY VALUED. SPECULATION OR "GUT FEELING" IS USEFUL, BUT REMEMBER TO IDENTIFY IT AS SUCH. IF MORE THAN ONE POSSIBILITY EXIST, LIST EACH, IN ORDER OF PROBABILITY, USING WORDS SUCH AS "PROBABLE", "POSSIBLE", "UNLIKELY", ETC.

B. EVERY DAY: DAILY UNIT/SECTOR SITUATION REPORT (SITREP). TRY TO INCORPORATE ANY ANSWERS TO THE FORCE COMMANDER'S PIR/IRS YOU MAY HAVE DISCOVERED OR ASSESSED.

C. IMMEDIATELY UPON LEARNING OF A SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT. INFORMATION REPORT (INFOREP). AS DISCUSSED AT REFERENCE, THIS IS THE IMMEDIATE "HEADS UP" TO UNAMIR HQ TO LET US KNOW THAT SOMETHING SIGNIFICANT MAY BE GOING ON. THE REPORT SHOULD TRY TO ANSWER THE "5WH" QUESTIONS (WHO, WHAT, WHERE, WHEN, WHY AND HOW) ALTHOUGH TIMELINESS IS MORE IMPORTANT IN THIS REPORT THAN COMPLETENESS. WHEN FURTHER DETAILS AND ANSWERS ARE LEARNED, TRANSMIT THOSE THROUGH A SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION REPORT. PLEASE USE A CONTROL NUMBER FOR EACH REPORT TO AVOID CONFUSION BETWEEN DIFFERENT OR SIMILAR EVENTS.

D. UPON LEARNING MORE ABOUT A SPECIFIC INCIDENT. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION REPORT. THIS REPORT WILL FOLLOW YOUR INFOREP WITH GREATER DETAIL AND AN ASSESSMENT, IF POSSIBLE. YOU MAY SUBMIT ANY NUMBER OF SUPINFOREPS FOR A GIVEN INFOREP. REMEMBER TO BALANCE TIMELINESS WITH COMPLETENESS.

E. ON ORDER. INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE. THERE WAS SOME CONFUSION AS TO PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE PRODUCTION. THE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE IS A PLANNING TOOL FOR YOUR UNIT/SECTOR USE AS THE FIRST STEP IN DIRECTION. YOU ARE

CURRENTLY REQUIRED TO PRODUCE ONLY THE ONE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE DISCUSSED AT REF FOR DISTRIBUTION TO UNAMIR HQ/G2. THEREAFTER, IT IS YOUR RESPONSIBILITY TO CONTINUOUSLY REVIEW (FIRST PRINCIPLES).

2. THIS BRANCH WILL PROVIDE YOU WITH THE FOLLOWING ROUTINE REPORTS:

A. DAILY INFOSUM: WHICH IS INCORPORATED IN THE DAILY UNAMIR HQ INFOSUM, DISTRIBUTED TO ALL UNITS AND MILOBS ON A DAILY BASIS (PROBLEMS WITH MILOB DISTRIBUTION DISCUSSED AT REF WILL BE REMEDIATED);

B. BI-WEEKLY INFOSUM: 17 AND 02 OF EACH MONTH AND WILL BE BASED UPON ALL UNIT/SECTOR INFOSUMS.

C. INTREP/SUPINTREP: AS SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OF INFORMATION VALUE ARE IDENTIFIED. DISTRIBUTION MIGHT BE RESTRICTED TO THOSE UNITS AFFECTED/NEED TO KNOW.

D. COLLECTION TASKS: ALTHOUGH NOT REALLY A REPORT, THESE TASKS WILL BE INFORMATION REQUIREMENT DIRECTION TO YOUR UNIT/SECTOR. THE TIME INFORMATION IS REQUIRED BY IS A BALANCE BETWEEN OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND THE NEED TO GIVE YOU ENOUGH TIME TO COLLECT THE INFORMATION. YOUR REPORTS MUST ARRIVE AT UNAMIR HQ/G2 NO LATER THAN THE TIME/DATE SPECIFIED. IT IS MORE ACCEPTABLE THAT YOU SUBMIT AN INCOMPLETE REPORT ON TIME THAN A COMPLETE REPORT LATE.

FROM : Y DEMETRIOS, SAO UNAMIR NAIROBI	TO : CHAIM OUZIEL, CAO UNAMIR KIGALI
TEL : 254 - 2 - 622668	DATE : 24 JUN 95
ATTN : DFC, COS, DSOS(SP), DCMO WELFARE OFFR, FMO, SMPO	ORIGINATOR : MAJOR S PRATAP FORCE COORD TEAM, NAIROBI
FAX : 254 - 2 - 622668	FAX 3- 3090

SUBJECT : FORCE COORDINATION TEAM WEEKLY REPORT AS ON 24 JUN95.

1. please find attached weekly report for your information and necessary direction.

2. Regards.

UNAMIR - REGISTRY	Action to
	1 A COS
	2
	3
	27 JUN 1995
	Completed
	Acknowledge
	Initial

FC. 020-2

Sean
A/COS
28.6

Thant
28/6

CAO DFC (COS) DSOS(SP) DCMO
welfare off. FMO SMPO

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

FORCE COORDINATING TEAM WEEKLY REPORT
AS ON 24 Jun 95

1. General. The FCT performed its duties as enunciated in the charter of duties. There was no official movement between KIGALI and NAROB

2. RECEPTION & TRANSPORTATION. There was no official movement during this week, however member from FCT was at the the airport at the time of arrival and departure of UN flight to ensure that transients have smooth movement.

3. Hospitalisation & Patient Movement. There has been no hospitalisation and patient movement during this week. As per our information no patients are admitted in any of the hospitals in NAROB

4. Pouch & Registry. No change from previous report.

5. Expenditure from Petty Cash . No amount is presently held with team.

7. Misc.

(a) The office of the FCT has been shifted to UNOSOM building this week. The same may be informed to all concerned. We will intimate you the new telephone no shortly.

UNAMIR/UNV Programme

To: Brig.Gen. Shiva Kumar
Chief of Staff
UNAMIR

From: Liz Hughes
UNV Programme Manager



12 June 1995

Subject: Orientation Day

On 17 June I am intending to hold an Orientation Day for the newly arrived UNVs. I hope we can impose upon you again to provide a briefing on the role of the military and a representative from the medical section to talk on health issues. I attach the programme for your information. To confirm attendance please call ext. 15125 or 15102.

Many thanks for your continued support.

Dcos (ops)

1. Rep att.
2. For necessary action pl

② G3 Ops
FMO
FPM

A
12/6

Pls arrange for briefings
as req on 17 Jun 95
and confirm attendance with
UNV Coordinator.

ALW
13.6

Actioned
18/6

UNV Orientation Day

Date: 17 June

Time: 9am - 4pm

Location: Briefing Room Headquarters

09.00hrs Introduction
Mr. Kimso Nilsvang
Chief of Civilian Personnel

09.30hrs Military Brief *63 (ops) and FMO or rep.*

10.30hrs Coffee

11.00hrs Political Briefing

12.00hrs Security
Chief of Security - Mr. Paul Ischlika

13.00hrs Lunch

14.00hrs Military Police *FPM*

15.00hrs Civilian Police

15.30hrs Communications

Sent
4/6

Thurst
05/6

UNAMIR HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT ACTIVITIES IN RWANDA

INTRODUCTION

1. In addition to their military duties, participating contingents of UNAMIR have undertaken several humanitarian activities to assist the Rwandese people and Government in their normalisation effort.

ENGR TASKS UNDERTAKEN BY UNAMIR

2. Demining. Demining was carried out at the following places:-

- a. Islamic Cultural Centre, Kigali.
- b. Communal Police Training School, Rwamagana.
- c. Overnight Way Station at Ndera.
- d. Residence of Dr Rusanganwa, Kigali.

3. EOD. A variety of places were rendered safe of mines/unexploded ordnance including approx 20 schools, 10 churches/orphanages and important buildings including residences of several ministers. A total of 255 EOD tasks were undertaken in Kigali itself besides those done by various contingents in their respective sectors.

4. Roads and Bridges.

- a. Bridges. Bridges were constructed at Gatuna, Busoro, Nyamata, near Gako Camp, and repairs were done to bridges at Nyamata and Mata.
- b. Roads. Repairs were carried out to roads from Butare to Kibeho, in Kigali, and Cyangugu. In addition, a road leading to commune which is being promoted by Mrs Kagame was repaired.

5. Miscellaneous.

- a. Water and Electricity supply was restored in several schools/ orphanages in Kigali. Similar tasks were also undertaken by contingents in Cyangugu, Byumba and Kibungo.
- b. Dozer effort was provided at several locations including UNICEF Wksp, Belgium Village, Hotel Rebero at Mt Horizon for mass reburial ceremony, Centre De Jeunne in Kigali, Rwamagana prison, digging of pits at reception centre at Gisenyi.
- c. Construction of sentry post and earthen bund at Presidential Hanger.

6. Tasks To Be Undertaken in the Near Future.

- a. Track Construction at Rwinkwavu Rehabilitation Centre.
- b. Improvement of tracks for Belgian Red Cross.
- c. Improvement of tracks for ARAMET near Gashora.
- d. Reconnaissance of several prisons has been carried out with a view to improve situation in the prisons at Nyanza, Kibuye, Gitarama, Gitagana and Nsinda.

MEDICAL

7. **General**. UNAMIR Health Services have provided extensive level 1, 2 and 3 health care and preventive medicine support to Rwanda. This support ranges from primary health care at clinics established by contingent medical staff, through evacuation and resuscitative care to emergency surgery and life saving intervention at the Military Wing of CHK. Preventive Medicine assistance has focussed on the areas of vector, rodent and pest control, water analysis and advice on waste disposal. Health support in the "Peace Building Role" will be considered under the headings of Treatment, Evacuation, Preventive Medicine Programs, Training and Liaison with Non Government Organisations (NGOs).

8. TREATMENT.

a. A major contribution has been made to the people of Rwanda in the provision of primary health care and hospitalisation.

b. UNAMIR health services have treated 260,000 Rwandans as outpatients since the beginning of Sep 94.

c. More than 2000 Rwandans have been treated as inpatients in the same time period. Inpatient treatment has included diagnostic, dental, surgical and intensive care services.

d. Medical teams have been established in the field to support IDP camps and health clinics in major towns, particularly in the south west of Rwanda. In the latter part of 1994 medical teams spent more than two months providing a health clinic in the town of Butare and more recently medical teams assisted with the treatment and evacuation of casualties from Kibeho where a total of 330 patients were treated.

e. Dental assistance to the local community has been extensive with a dental team dedicated full time to humanitarian tasking over the period Aug 94 - Mar 95. Since Mar 95 humanitarian dental support has focussed on local orphanages. More than 2,500 Rwandans have received dental treatment.

9. **EVACUATION**. Assistance has been provided on numerous occasions to evacuate local Rwandans by road ambulance and aero medical transport following motor vehicle accidents, mine incidents and serious illness. This has been a critical function

in the absence of an ambulance service in the country. During the Kibeho camp closure, UNAMIR health services coordinated and assisted with the evacuation of 580 wounded and seriously ill IDPs.

10. **PREVENTIVE MEDICINE PROGRAMS.** The Environmental Health Services of UNAMIR have provided preventive medicine support to district health clinics, orphanages and IDP camps throughout Rwanda. This has also been a vital function in the absence of a district hygiene capability.

a. Support to health clinics has included bacterial water analysis, advice on waste disposal and provision of incinerators. Clinics at Rilima, Muyumba, Kilibra and Kilgali have been assisted in this regard.

b. Orphanages at Butare, Mutura, Nyundo, Kigungo, Kigali, Shyogwe, Byimana, Gitarama, Ruli and Cyeza have been assisted with vector control programs, water analysis and waste disposal advice.

c. IDP camps at Gisenyi and Kibeho have been assisted through the provision of advice on fly and larvae control, water analysis, waste disposal, supervision of mass burials and disinfection of grave sites.

d. Over 800 children were immunised against measles at the transit camp in Butare on 3 May 95.

e. Over 6000 children were immunised against meningitis in Nov 94.

11. **TRAINING.** A significant contribution is being made to the people of Rwanda in the provision of technical training assistance. A train the trainer approach has been adopted so that the expertise will be retained in the country when UNAMIR finally departs.

a. UNAMIR health services staff are heavily involved in educating the medical and nursing staff of CHK in a variety of fields including, dressings, sterilisation procedures, nursing systems, resuscitation and surgical techniques. Assistance is also provided with instruction and technical advice on the operation of medical equipment.

b. A course is being developed in conjunction with CHK to train 500 Nurse Auxiliaries to work in district health centres.

12. **LIAISON.** Liaison and coordination with NGO agencies is maintained on a regular basis to ensure that sponsorship and medical support of camps, communes and orphanages continues. In this regard, a representative from Medical Branch HQ UNAMIR attends the weekly coordination meeting at the IOC.

13. **CONCLUSION.** UNAMIR health services have undoubtedly saved very many lives and improved the quality of life to a substantial part of the population of Rwanda. Health services support could

have been greater but has been restrained at government direction over concerns of sustainability post UNAMIR and the government's desire to be seen to be in control of the delivery of health services in Rwanda.

TRANSPORTATION

14. The capability to use UNAMIR vehicles in support of the government or army of RWANDA or in support of humanitarian activities has done much to aid the nation in its return to normality. Transport has been used for:

- a. The Ministry of Rehabilitation in the return of over 57,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) to their Home Communes.
- b. The movement of many thousands of refugees from the border crossing points either to the Open Relief Centres(ORCs) or direct to their Home Communes.
- c. The movement of thousands of Orphans into new centres or closer to their original homes.
- d. The movement of over 1000 vehicle loads of foodstuffs and seeds to ensure the proper settlement of returnees into their Home Communes.
- e. The Ministry of Education in the collection from the airport, nationwide distribution and gathering of exam papers. The distribution of, and sometimes provision of essential school supplies.
- f. Distribution of the new currency by the intensive use, over the exchange period, of UN helicopter and road transport.
- g. The Ministry of Justice to move hundreds of prisoners from communal prisons into major prisons and then agreement to provide transport to re-allocate some 2,400 prisoners. The use of the sewage truck (honey wagon) to empty prison latrines.
- h. Other UN agencies or Non Government Agencies(NGOs) through the use of specialist container handling equipment, the use of fuel or water tankers, the deployment of the sewage truck.
- i. The use of many scores of vehicles for the transportation of building material for roads and essential structures, RPA stores throughout Rwanda. The transportation of wood for the communes and the prisons.
- j. The movement of church stores and materiel to help sustain the increase in religious activity.
- k. The provision of essential ambulances for the movement of serious casualties to hospitals.

- l. Regular support to the Gendarmerie schools, support to team building sports competitions.
- m. The delivery of coffins during the ceremonies to mark the anniversary of the genocide.
- n. The gift of over 10 vehicles to the Government.
- o. The loan of vehicles to the Prefects of Butare and Kibuye, and to the Prosecutor at Gitarama.
- p. Helicopter support to senior ministers and officials each week on a frequent basis.

15. **TRAINING**

- a. Civpol has so far trained 402 gendarmes (102 in Kigali and 300 in Ruhengeri). The Training school was renovated at the cost of \$30,000.
- b. Ausmed provided training of local staff in such fields as dressings, sterilisation procedures, and nursing systems. Also extends invitations to CHK doctors to attend RESUS, theatre, and lectures to encourage a two way flow of information.
- c. TUNBATT Med personnel trained staff of Gisenyi Hospital to use X-Ray equipment at the hospital.
- d. GHANBATT training RPA NCOs in drill and military music.

16. **SOCIAL AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES OF UNAMIR**

- a. **Orphanages**. Provided security at orphanages. Currently sponsoring 13 orphanages. Provided aid, food, transport, water, electricity, clothing, shoes, toys, playground equipment and monetary and donations. Conducted pest control and provided transport assistance to orphanages.
- b. **Prisoner Identification**. Conducting an ID card project to register all prisoners.

17. **COMMUNICATION SUPPORT**

- a. **RwandaTel Local Lines**. Provided support in terms of manpower and transport to assist in repair, maintenance and re-establishing RwandaTel local telephone lines in Kigali.
- b. **VHF Radio Repeater**. A VHF radio repeater has been provided to RwandaTel with complete ancillaries to meet mobile communication requirements of RwandaTel.
- c. **Assistance in Repair, Maintenance and Programming Radio Equipment**. Assistance in terms of repair, maintenance and programming Radio Duplexers has been regularly sought and always provided to RwandaTel.
- d. **Provision of Field Cable**. Requests for field cables

for communications in communes have been received through Military Observers and provided.

e. Repair of Satellite Equipment. Repair of Satellite equipment at Nyanza was carried out in Nov 94.

f. Provision of Generators on Loan to Rwanda Government. 16 Generators have been installed on request and are providing power supply at locations such as Kigali Airport, FM Radio Station Kanonbe, Earth Station Nyanza, Water Sub Station Kimihura, Rwanda TV Station Kigali. Besides, power supply has been provisioned to a number of civil locations from existing UN generators. Assistance in terms of repairs and maintenance to civilian generators has also been frequently provided.

18. MAINTENANCE AND RECOVERY

a. Repair, recovery facilities and specialist heavy recovery have been used extensively throughout Rwanda in the clearance of vehicles wrecked in the war or more recently in accidents.

b. Recovery of vehicles from the RPA, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, other UN agencies and various NGOs.

c. Maintenance of generators in key locations.

d. Repair of essential government and RPA vehicles.

19. AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES. UN troops assisting farmers in sector 4C to cultivate their farms. 350 Ethiobatt troops involved in weeding and harvesting of coffee in their AOR.

20. PUBLIC RELATIONS

a. Video Coverage. Provided video coverage at social and National functions in sectors such as;

(1) Welcome functions for returnees to their various communes. At Wedding ceremonies of Rwandese nationals including RPA Officials.

(2) At orphanages during promotional activities organized by the Ministry of Family and Women's Affairs

(3) Support for International Women's Day Ceremonies.

b. Band Entertainment. Provided Band entertainment at various functions including state visits, weddings and during celebrations such as Women's Day, etc.

c. Public Address System. Provided Public Address Systems to local authorities during mass activities like reburial ceremonies of the genocide victims.

d. Friendly Sports Competitions. UNAMIR troops have

organized and participated in sports competitions such as Football, volleyball etc with the locals as well as RPA throughout the country. Also provided logistic support in terms of transport, food and medical during such events in sectors.

The Health Minister's son incident

The following questions need to be answered:

1. When Bizimungu and his guard sought "protection" (or was it asylum?) with Zambatt, was it known that they were fugitives being sought by RPA and hence "alleged criminals"?
2. If so, why was not the normal procedure followed ^{is} a) report to ICRC, b) interview with Human Rights Monitors, c) hand-over to civilian prosecutor?
3. Who initiated the idea of the two fugitives being brought before the Inquiry Commission [The Commission only waited ^{for} witnesses who volunteered]. Did the two fugitives demand to go before the commission or was it suggested to them?
4. Once they had volunteered, did the Commission ask that they be brought to Kigali? Or was this initiative taken by UNAMIR?
5. Were the fugitives brought in UNAMIR uniforms? How were they brought? Where did they stay?
6. Was information regarding their presence ^{with UNAMIR} conveyed to the government at any stage?
7. After their evidence to the Commission, why were they taken to Mutura? Why were they transported in helicopter. By now, it must have been evident that they were "criminals" on the run, was it not realized that taking them to Mutura (instead of Gikongoro where they reported or even Kigali) and setting them free was tantamount to helping them escape?

FC

COS

— O.DCOS(COPS)

Please check with all concerned and attempt answer above seven questions.

Acting
20/5

F/658

Sans.
19/5

UNAMIR
195 MAY 18 1995

GIKONGORO RWANDA

ROUTINE/PRIORITY/IMMEDIATE/MOST IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED/RESTRICTED/CONFIDENTIAL ONLY/CRYPTO

FAX OUT NO:

PAGE 01 OF 03 PAGES

TO : G2 UNAMIR HQ KIGALI	FROM: LT O CHAPULA INFORMATION OFFICER SECTOR 4A/ZAMBATT
PREFIX NO.	DATE: 18 MAY 1995
ATTN:	FAX NO. 11243 TEL : 11244/11246/11245
FAXNO.	FILE NO: ZAMBATT/OPS 12
SUBJECT: RPA DEPLYMENT IN SECTOR 4A/ZAMBATT AOR	

1. Find attached the deployment of RPA in Sector 4A/ZAMBATT AOR.
2. Forwarded for your retention.

② CC
Copy to
G2
Thunt 8020PS

③ Treated
20-5

RPA DEPLOYMENT AS AT 18 MAY 1995

SER	AREA DEPLOYED	GRID REF	DESIGNATION	COMMANDERS	REMARKS
01.	GIKONGORO	527278	INF BN STR	LT COL PATRIC NYAMVUMBA-CO	AOR LOG COY
02.	KIBEHO	5007	COMPANY	CAPT ROBERT OC	AOR C COY
03.	KARAMA	5631	SECTION		AOR D COY
04.	MUSANGE	5347	2COYS STR PLU		AOR D COY
05.	RUKONDO	5538	PLATOON		AOR D COY
06.	MUSEBEYA	3932	PLATOON	2LT JOHN RUNYANJE	AOR D COY
07.	MUKO	3841	PLATOON	2LT KAREMELA	AOR D COY
08.	KADUHA	4643	COY STR	CAPT NTARE	AOR D COY
09.	KIBEHO	504071	PLATOON	2LT MUMBARAKI-PL COMD	AOR C COY
10.	KIBEHO	506074	PLATOON	2LT KARUANGA-PL COMD	AOR C COY
11.	REMERA	416924	COY HQ + A PL	CAPT EMMANUEL RUVUSHA-OC 2LT JOHN BOSKON PL COMD	AOR A COY
12.	MASIGA	449892	PLATOON	LT ALOJASI-PL COMD	AOR A COY
13.	NSHILI	393963	COY HQ + A PL	2LT ALI-OC SGT FRANCIS PL COMD	AOR A COY
14.	CYHINDA	553981	COY HQ	CAPT SAM	AOR A COY
15.	KIVU	403047	PLATOON	JAMES KALEMA	AOR A COY

18/05 '95 09:53

011225

UNARMED RADIO FM

0002

16.	MUTOVU	418057			AOR A COY
17.	NYAKIZU	578968			AOR A COY
18.	MUNINI	475998	PLATOON	JONAS KANSHIZHYA	AOR A COY
19.	KABUGA	554396	COY STR		AOR D COY
20.	KIGEME	4727	PLATOON		AOR B COY

10/00 00 00 00 00 00

011225

UNAMIR RADIO RM

0003

To: Information officers - all sectors

Info: DCOS /OPS

From: SQ2 (MILOBS HQ) G2 EP

Date: 06 May 95

Sam
1325

See
H
18/5

Subject: **Identification of sources**

1. A huge pool of potentially valuable sources of information exists both inside and outside Rwanda.
2. Information officers must keep low profile and by no means reveal the real nature of their mission when collecting information on the ground.
3. Sources have to be handled with maximum care and caution so that they are not put at risk. This is particularly important in Rwanda which has had a very long history of ethnic hatred and interrelated suspiciousness and mistrust as well as a long tradition of ruthless rule without any respect for the law.
4. Information sources in Rwanda include not only the UN military and civilian personnel, RPA, local administration and population and but also personnel employed by non-governmental and international organizations, aid programs run by specific countries and missionaries. Information officer should however keep in mind that while UN personnel are aware of the necessity of information collecting for the very understandable reason of their own security, then this is not always the case of other potential sources. In particular:
 - RPA: maximum cautiousness has to be exercised when talking to RPA personnel. If your interlocutor is talkative - let him or her talk and absorb whatever you reckon to be a valuable piece of information. Clarification may be requested on the ground of misunderstanding (distorted pronunciation, for example) if some topics sound interesting but straight questions must be avoided. Middle ranks seem to be the best source but again an info officer must not be too inquisitive. Personal contacts with higher ranks are encouraged (this observation particularly refers to African officers).
 - Administrative personnel in prefectures and communes: it is definitely easier to have a friendly chat with commune offices' personnel and they should be specifically targeted by information officers. Both in prefectures and in communes the education offices' staff seem to be the most accessible sources, quite often speaking effusively about everything. Some bourgomaistres can also be approached for information needs but in this case proceeding depend on personal contacts and individual

characteristics of a person. Meeting administrative personnel on a private basis (e.c. info offr having meals at the restaurant which is frequented by the local administrative and military personnel).

- NCOs and international organizations: info officer should be on friendly terms with all NCOs and other international and national organizations. A friendly get-together is the best chance to obtain and crosscheck any information. Quite often, the NCOs and other organizations, operating in the field and employing a great number of local workers, have an almost unlimited access to informations which are not available for military observers or formed units during their routine patrols and visits. The same refers to national aid programs run by respective countries. Valuable sources of information proved to be: MSF(Holland), IOM, Austrian Relief Program, Croix Rouge Belgique (Belgium), Gesellschaft fuer technische Zusammenarbeit (Germany), Netherlands Development Organization, Norwegian People's Aid, Refugee Trust Ireland, Care (australia), Oxfam UK (Great Britain), Help (Germany), Solidarites (France), Mines Advisory Group, Medicos en Catastrofe (Spain, Latin America), Medicus Mundi (Spain), Mediciens du Monde (France), Association Francaise des Volontaires (France), Swiss Disaster Relief, Action Technique de Developement Communale (France), Association Volontaires pour Developement Integre (France). World Food Program, UNHCR, UNESCO, UNDP and other UN agencies should be considered as very reliable source of information of political and military value.

- Missionaries may become a very valuable source as many of them have spent years in Rwanda and are familiar with the country, the people, the language and political realities. Even if an information officer is a non-believer it is advisable for him to maintain contacts with missionaries. Info officers who are christians may easily approach catholic or protestant missionaries and other clergymen; muslims may easily find their way into the islamic community.

- Information officer should rely on sources speaking his language so that misunderstandings and mistakes are excluded. Assistance by local interpreters in contacts with the population should be avoided; if it turns out to be necessary then maximum restraint should be practiced in asking sensitive questions.

4. Too frequent contacts with well placed local sources are discouraged as they prove a special kind of relationship between the info offr and his source. The best method of handling a source is an incidental visit/meeting or an official excuse (again official meetings, religious ceremonies etc.).

5. Info offr may request his interlocutor(s) to confirm rumours and himself may create them just to check the reaction.


6. Information from all sources - and particularly from local ones - has to be crosschecked and verified as it is a national tendency in Rwanda to exaggerate and misinterpret.

To: Information Officers
All Sectors - MilObs and Formed Units

From: UNAMIR Force HQ Ops Branch G2

Date: 18 April 1995

Subject: Information collecting plan



1. UNAMIR Force HQ Operations Branch G2 Section will process all information from both military observers in the field and formed units in sectors.

2. Information and operations officers in all sector Headquarters are therefore requested to provide timely updates on situation in their AOR to this HQ Ops Branch G2 Section. Urgent and sensitive information should be briefly mentioned in sitreps with a classified detailed report to follow up separately. Absolute priority should be attached to all threat related informations.

3. It is therefore suggested that information and operations officers develop and maintain their own network of information sources in their AOR. It should not be the case that sensitive information is passed in a gossip and rumour form without any evaluation and estimation. Info officers should bother to crosscheck whatever information they obtain.

4. Apart from timely updates on subjects and topics listed below information officers are requested to prepare weekly summaries of developments in their AOR as well as weekly/fortnightly forecasts based on information from all available sources. Info officers may be specifically tasked by this HQ to provide information or estimates on subjects of urgent interest. This HQ will in turn supply information feedback as well as analytic synopsis and estimates to sector/formed unit commanders and information officers.

5. Information officers should identify, select and handle their sources properly, i.e. without putting them at risk. Presumable sources of information are not only local authorities and/or RPA, gendarmerie etc. but also non-governmental and international organizations like ICRC, MSF, French and Belgian relief programs, medical personnel in the field, expatriates settled in Rwanda, including missionaries who have profound knowledge of the country, its language and its people.

6. Topics and subjects to be covered by information officers in the field are prioritized as follows:

- all information related to the political structure of Rwanda (people in power, people behind the scene, extremists and moderates, personnel changes, internal divisions, frictions, predictions of abrupt changes, profiles, update on personnel manning chief administrative positions); **Attn: Top priority is attached by UNAMIR HQ to this information.**
 - anti-UNAMIR campaign by the Rwandan government (people behind it, intended actions like disinformation, demonstrations, protests, violence, incidents, provocations, targets etc.);
 - Rwandan government's policies, intentions and attitude toward UNAMIR as well as attitude expressed by local authorities and population;
 - relations between RPA/government and population (cases of intimidation, harassment, arrests, retribution, executions, abuse of power, situation in prisons, discrimination, surveillance, measures against intellectuals, particularly of Hutu origin, identity cards etc.);
 - RPA strength (manpower, deployment, equipment, weaponry);
 - situation in IDP camps and policies toward camp population (RPA actions, government's plans and intentions etc.);
 - situation in refugee camps in Zaire, Tanzania and Burundi with focus on military activities there;
 - FRGF strength (structure, organization, deployment, leaders and commanders, weaponry, equipment, training system, intentions, plans, strongholds and support in Rwanda etc.).
 - situation in Burundi (this is particularly applicable to Sector 4) as an element interrelated with internal and external policies of Rwanda.
-

①

Sam
11/5

TO-SEE DISTRIBUTION

DATE-09/05/95

A REPORT PREPARED FOR THE INFORMATION OFFICERS CONFERENCE TO BE HELD ON 10-11 MAY/95.AIM

IT IS JUST TO INFORM YOU OUR REQUEST FOR NECESSARY MATERIALS FOR COLLECTING INFORMATION TO FIT THE DEMAND OF UNAMIR HQ/G₂/ THOUGH WE HAVE ASSUMED OUR TASK IN THE AOR TO BE ABLE TO CONTROL THE SECURITY SITUATION OF OUR SECTOR. OUR BATTALION BELIEVES THAT AN ADQUATE INFORMATION GATHERING MOVEMENT HAS TO BE DONE.

FOR LACK OF BASIC INFORMATION GATHERING METHODS AND SOURCES OF INFORMATION WE HAVE NOT COLLECTED ENOUGH INFORMATIONS.

THEREFORE TO HAVE EXECUTE OUR MISSION SUCCESSFULLY, WE REQUEST YOU TO PROVIDE US WITH THE FOLLOWING.

1. TO CONDUCT A DAY AND NIGHT PATROLS AND RECC/THE WHOLE AREA OF THE RESPONSIBILITY WE REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL ALLOCATION OF VEHICLES. /How many?
2. TO GATHER INFORMATION ABOUT THE SECURITY SITUATION OF OUR SECTOR AND TO HAVE COLLABORATOR FROM THE LOCAL WE NEED TO HAVE SOME AMOUNT OF MONEY FOR THIS PURPOSE TO BE ALLOCATED EVERY MONTH.
3. BINOCULARS, INFORMATION PRESSES, RECEIVER RADIOS AND TRANSLATOR.
4. A MOTOR BOAT TRAINING FOR SOME OF OUR PERSONNEL.
5. ISSUANCE OF MONTHLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY OF THE WHOLE SECTOR.

COMMENT

I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS THAT IF WE ARE TO BE PROVIDED WITH THE ABOVE MENTIONED FACILITIES, WE WILL BE ABLE TO THE GATHER INFORMATION SUCCESSFULLY.

BEST REGARDS.

DISTRIBUTION

ACTIONINFOG₂

DFC
COS
DCOS OPS

Thur
12/5

COL. ALEMESHAET DEGEFIE
CO ETHIOBATT-2

② G2

Pls prep a consolidated list
of all Sects.

11.5

Copy sent to
G2 11/5



File No 5000.9 (PLANS)

To: DISTRIBUTION LIST

From: G3 PLANS

Date: 9 MAY 95

Subject: OPS SECTION BRIEFING OF GHANBATT

1. Please note that an operational briefing will be conducted for the incoming CO & Bn Comd Gp GHANBATT Friday, 12 May 95 in the Ops briefing room in accordance with the following schedule:

- a. 0930 - 0935 hrs, DCOS Ops,
- b. 0935 - 1020 hrs, G3 Ops,
- c. 1020 - 1035 hrs, G2 Info,
- d. 1035 - 1050 hrs, G3 Plans,
- e. 1050 - 1110 hrs, SO Log, and
- f. 1110 - 1130 hrs, Force Legal O.

2. A helicopter will pick up the Comd Gp in Kibungo at 0840 hrs 12 May 95 and depart Kigali at 1215 hrs 12 May. Please forward names and UNID of all personnel to attend to G3 Plans, info G3 Air, end of work day 10 May.

3. Any questions may be directed to, Capt I. Denny, G3 Plans 4, at local 11162.

Distribution List:

CO GHANBATT
DCOS Ops
G3 Ops
G2 Info
G4 SO Log
AUSMED (Force Legal O)
G3 Air

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

TO: D COS OPS

①

Date: Kigali, 29/4/1995

FROM: CIVPOL COMMISSIONER

Ref: CIVPOL/MEMO/366/95

Y. C. M. A. L. C. L. T. awi

Subject: Information Officer's Conference

Reference your letter dated 22 Apr. 95 on the above - mentioned subject, the under - listed officer is to represent CIVPOL HQ at the conference.

Supt. Ofosu-Mensah Gyeabour.

Regards.

② G2

FNA.

DCOS Ops
30.4

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②

cc
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02/5



To: See Distribution

Date : 28 April 1995

From: CIVPOL Commissioner

Ref : CIVPOL/Memo/363/95

Subject: Familiarization Training Program for
Newly arrived CIVPOL

1. Attached is a program for orientation of newly-arrived CIVPOL to UNAMIR.
2. Venue of program shall be CIVPOL HQ KIMIHURURA KIGALI.
3. Program is to start on 3 May 1995. Those involved shall be informed in advance if there are any changes.
4. Participants are required to adhere to the program.
5. C. LOGO CIVPOL HQ is to organize transport to be used by the CIVPOL Observers during their training.

AT
02/5
Noted

Seen
AT
2/5

FAMILIARIZATION TRAINING PROGRAM FOR NEWLY ARRIVED CIVPOL

SRL	DATE	FROM	TO	SUBJECT	PRESENTED
3/5/95		8.30 HRS	8.55 HRS	Welcome address	CPC CIVPOL HQ
		9.00 HRS	9.50HRS	Political and Historical Background UNAMIR Formation and Mandate	SD02 (FHQ) Major Pitre
		10.00HRS	10.50HRS	Medical Brief	Ausmed LT. Colonel B.Curren
		11.00HRS	11.50HRS	Organization of Milobs GP-HQ and Sectors	SD02 MIlobs HQ Major Ratnaparkhi
		12.00HRS	14.00HRS	Lunch	
		14.00HRS	14.50HRS	Administratio n-Personnel Conduct-Leave/CTO and entitlement	CPOO CIVPOL
		15.00HRS	15.50HRS	Organisation of UNAMIR	C/PLANS
		16.00HRS	16.50HRS	UNAMIR Logistics System and Procedure	C LOGO CIVPOL HQ

4/5/95		8.00HRS	8.50HRS	Care and maintenance of vehicles	CTO
		9.00HRS	9.50HRS	Driving test	CTO
		10.00HRS	10.50HRS	Boards of inquiry Investigation	CPIO CIVPOL HQ
		11.00HRS	11.50HRS	Human Rights and General Convention	H.R. Branch
		12.00HRS	14.00HRS	Lunch	
		14.00HRS	14.50HRS	Humanitarian Operations	HAC
		15.00HRS	15.50HRS	Organization of FHQ	CMPO Maj. Kunsiya
		8.00HRS	8.50HRS	General Background information of UN CIVPOL Missions.	CPTO CIVPOL HQ LT COL SANGARE
		9.00HRS	9.50HRS	UN CIVPOL Behaviour and Discipline.	CPOO CIVPOL HQ
		10.00HRS	11.50HRS	UN CIVPOL/UNAMIR specific information on the CIVPOL Missions in Rwanda	CPTO CIVPOL HQ LT COL SANGARE
		12.00HRS	14.00HRS	Lunch	
		14.00HRS	15.50HRS	CIVPOL-UNAMIR Operations	CPOO CIVPOL HQ
		16.00HRS	16.30HRS	Posting instructions	

5/5/95		8.00 hrs	8.50 hrs	Introduction care and Maintenance of communication equipments	CPOO CIVPOL HQ
		9.00 hrs	9.50 hrs	Voice, Procedure and comm. sec.	CPOO CIVPOL
		10.00hrs	10.50hrs	Patrolling, monitoring,	CPOO CIVPOL HQ
		11.00hrs	11.30hrs	Closing address	CPC CIVPOL HQ

Distribution Internal - CIVPOL HQ

External Action.

- SDO2/OPS (FHQ)
- Ausmed
- MILOBS HQ
- C/Plans
- CTO
- HAC
- CMPO
- Human Rights



①

To: SRSB

File Reference:

From: DFC

Info: COS
G3 Ops

Date: 29th April 1995

Subject: SPECIAL SITREP FOR UN HQ

Reference: UNNY Code Cable 1425 dated 28 April 1995

1. As you are aware, we submit our daily sitrep, covering all relevant events of the previous day, to UNNY every morning. This is signed by DCOS Ops prior to 1100 hrs and transmitted shortly thereafter. Over the last month or so, a significant portion of that sitrep, namely the political paragraph(s) have not been included since your office has not been submitting them.
2. Accordingly from the military perspective, the daily sitrep should suffice the request for information requested in the Reference with the exception of the political paragraph and an additional update on military events that have occurred between midnight and noon of the "current" day. It is our intention to ask all units to send an incremental sitrep covering the period 0001-1200 hrs to Force HQ by 1300 hrs for onward transmission to your office by 1400 hrs. The suggested timing of preparing a fax by 1000 hrs daily would do little to add to our daily sitrep routine other than unnecessarily increase the work load on the staff. However if there are specific issues you would like us to address, we are more than prepared to contribute. As specific situations develop, we will send SPECIAL SITREPS which you will definitely be made aware of.
3. I hope that the aforementioned suggestion meets with your concurrence and satisfies the UNNY requirement.

② cc

Pse fwd to
DCOS OPS.

29/4

③ G3Ops

1. Ack
2. Pls action with your staff accordingly.

1.5

④

Sew

2/5-

UNAMIR/UNV Programme

①

To: Chief of Staff
UNAMIR

From: Ms. Liz Hughes *Liz Hughes*
UNV Programme Manager

27 April 1995

Subject: Orientation Day

A second orientation day for United Nations Volunteers who have arrived in country since the 8 April, which was the date of the first orientation day, will be held on 6 May.

I must thank you for your cooperation during the first seminar and request your assistance once more. Attached is the programme for your information.

We were all very enlightened by the brief we received from your officers on the military and medical components of the mission. I sincerely hope you can spare us these officers again to brief the new arrivals on 6 May.

Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

② For confirmation please
contact Liz ext. 15125
2 Harriette ext 15102

SO2 OPS 2

For your rec
action

29/4

*Adt
Behar
29/4*

③ G3 Ops

Pls take for action and present
"history" brief and cfm with UNV PM.

FMO

Pls make arrangements for an
appropriate briefing by your staff
and cfm with UNV PM.

*DCOS OPS
28.4*

UNAMIR

UNV Programme

Orientation Seminar

Date: 6 May

Location: Briefing room, UNAMIR HQ.

Participants: Newly arrived UNVs

- | | |
|---------------|---|
| 9.00-9.30 | Introductory session
Mr. A.H. Golo
Chief Administrative Officer
UNAMIR |
| 9.30-10.00 | Military Briefing
Force Commander or his
designate |
| 10.00-10.30 | Political brief
Senior Political Advisor |
| | 10.30-11.00 Coffee |
| 11.30-12.00 | Medical Brief
Chief Medical Officer |
| 12.00-13.00 | Security
Chief of Security |
| | 13.00 -14.00 Lunch |
| 14.00-14.30 | Role of Military Police
Chief of Military Police or his designate |
| 14.30-15.00 | Role of Civilian Police
Chief of Civpol or his designate |
| 15.00 -15.30 | Communications
Chief of Communications or his designate |
| 15.30 -16.30 | Role of other UN agencies
Mr. Hasagawa, UNDP Resident Representative |
| 16.30 - 17.00 | Welfare and Recreation
Mrs. McNeill, UNAMIR Welfare Officer |

3000.⁹~~11~~ (OPS)

FROM: DCOS OPS

TO: SECTOR 1
SECTOR 2
SECTOR 3A
SECTOR 3B
SECTOR 4A
SECTOR 4B
SECTOR 4C
SECTIR 5
SECTOR 6
MILOB GP HQ

DATE: 29 APR 95

SUBJECT: SPECIAL DAILY SITREP TO UN SECURITY COUNCIL

1. In addition to the daily SITREPs submitted to UN HQ NY, the Security Council has directed that a daily update of significant incidents within the UNAMIR AOR covering the period 2359-1200B be submitted until the situation stabilizes.
2. In view of the above, all Sectors are requested to submit a daily interim SITREP of significant incidents covering the mentioned period with effect from 29 APR 95.
3. The special SITREP is to reach this HQ not later than 1300hrs daily.
4. For compliance until further notice.

UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

INFORMATION CIRCULAR

TO: All UNAMIR Military and Civilian Personnel

FROM: Sammy Kum Buo
Officer-in-charge
Office of the SRSG

DATE: 26 April 1995

SUBJECT: Contacts with the Media

As you are aware, the United Nations, through its public information service, attaches great importance to keeping the general public aware of its activities throughout the world. However, such information must be reliable and accurate in order for the Organization to maintain its credibility with the media and the public as a whole. This can only be made possible if each operation or office speaks with one voice and presents a single factual and objective account of the information to be conveyed.

At UNAMIR, the SRSG, as the Secretary-General's representative and head of the mission, presents the official position of the United Nations in Rwanda. Besides his official Spokesman, he can also designate other senior officials at UNAMIR to address the public and the media. This is the official channel for disseminating information on UNAMIR. It is important that this procedure of speaking to the public through an organized channel be respected by all UNAMIR staff, both civilian and military, especially in moments of crisis, so as to avoid the reporting of conflicting accounts in the media. Additionally, all requests for press interviews should be directed through the Spokesman in order to ensure unity and coherence in the presentation of public information. With regard to press releases, these must be approved in advance by the Special Representative before they are issued.

I would like to take this opportunity to remind you of the need to exercise good judgment at all times in the handling of information, especially in view of the special circumstances characterizing a peace-keeping operation.

Your cooperation with regard to the above would be greatly appreciated.

cc: SRSG
FC

Sam
27/4

AK
26/4

Cover Sheet Classification
UNCLAS
Enclosure Classification
UNCLAS

Sam
27/f

Department of Defence
ASC UNAMIR II
Headquarters Australian Medical Support Force
FACSIMILE COVER SHEET


Page 1 of 2

File Number: 611-1-1	Senders Name:
Precedence: ROUTINE	DTG Sent:
Facsimile Destination	Facsimile Originator
OPS BR HQ UNAMIR	HQ AS MSF Kigali
Unclas Fax No: 00612-3601524	Unclas Fax No: 250 10000
Discon Fax No:	Discon Fax No:
Telephone No: 00612-3393009	Telephone No: 250 10000
Subject Title: KIBEHO IDP CAMP BRIEF	

Instructions/Comments

1. Enclosed is a brief summarising the sequence of events in Kibeho IDP Camp over the period 21 - 25 Apr 95.

③ COS
Pls note that this may
fuel further cas figures discussions
Desops
26.4
④ ces ap'd
27.4
② cc
Pse Copy to Desops
26/f
③ Done
26.4
26.4
27/h

Releasing Officer's Name	Signature	Rank / Appointment	Date
SPIERS		CAPT/SO3 Ops-A	25Apr95

THIS FAX COVER SHEET AND CLOSURE ARE TO BE TRANSMITTED IAW THE REQUIREMENTS OF
THE HIGHEST ENCLOSURE SECURITY CLASSIFICATION CONTAINED HEREIN

Cover Sheet Classification
UNCLAS
Enclosure Classification
UNCLAS

BRIEF FOR HQ UNAMIR
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IN KIBEHO
INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS CAMP 21 - 25 APR 95

1. Background. At about 18 0530B Apr 95, approximately three battalions of RPA surrounded Kibeho Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) Camp and began to close in on the population. The camp population fled in a mass panic to the two ZAMBATT positions within the camp. Amongst the chaos, a woman was shot in the hip and ten people were trampled to death. The RPA announced that the camp was being closed and that transport would be provided for persons wishing to return to their home communes. As at 20 Apr 95, approximately 5 000 people had been transported out of Kibeho and numerous reports of deaths and injuries to the IDP population had been reported.
2. 21 Apr 95. The IDP population became agitated on the night of 21 Apr 95 due to a combination of overcrowding, lack of food, water and sanitation, widespread fear of RPA intentions and agitation from within the ranks of the IDPs. It was reported that IDPs were attacking other IDPs with machettes.
3. 22 Apr 95. The IDP population made two attempts to break through the RPA cordon:
 - a. The first attempt occurred between 1100 and 1500 hr and resulted in 130 IDPs dead and a further 100 IDPs breaking the cordon. It is believed that the attempt coincided with a thunderstorm.
 - b. A second attempt commenced at 1710 hr. Initially up to 5 000 IDPs attempted to break-out of the cordon. Firing was reported from both RPA and IDP sides. RPA used heavy machine guns, rocket propelled grenades and small arms in their attempts to reconstitute the cordon. Initial reports of mortar fire directed against IDPs have not been confirmed.
4. 23 Apr 95. At first light, it was apparent that the RPA cordon had been broken en masse. The IDP population remaining in the camp was estimated to be as low as 1 000. AUSMED elements arrived in the camp at 0630 hr and were tasked to satisfy a HQ UNAMIR priority task of estimating the dead and wounded. Their report as at 0745 hr was a count of 4050 dead and 650 wounded. This count was restricted to the immediate area around the old cordon area with AUSMED elements being denied access to the camp's wider areas. Each death was confirmed by a Medical Assistant. Accompanying Infantry used pace counters to record each confirmed fatality. An intensive medical effort was performed by the two AUSMED CCPs believed to be the only medical assets within the Kibeho vicinity.
5. 24 Apr 95. Upon arrival at Kibeho, AUSMED elements reported that a stand-off had developed between the 500 remaining IDPs and the RPA who had adopted an aggressive stance surrounding the compound. ZAMBATT and AUSMED elements negotiated with RPA and gained a stay-of-action from the RPA. This enabled over 200 IDPs to leave the compound under UN escort. At last light, over 200 IDPs remained in the compound surrounded by an RPA cordon.
6. 25 Apr 95. AUSMED elements arriving at 0800 hr reported the situation in the camp was unchanged from the previous night.

Prepared By: CAPT I. Spiers SO3 Ops-A

Apr 95

Cleared By: LTCOL D.S.M. Roche CO

Apr 95

Consultation: HQ UNAMIR G2 Sect, Ops Sect, Int Sect, Deployed AUSMED Elements



Government
of Canada

Gouvernement
du Canada

ACTION
REQUEST

FICHE DE
SERVICE

To - À	Date
G2	26.4.95
	Time - Heure

From - De
DCOS Ops

Language spoken - Langue utilisée	Telephone No. - N° de téléphone	Extension Poste
<input type="checkbox"/> English Anglais	<input type="checkbox"/> French Français	
<input type="checkbox"/> Please call Prière d'appeler	<input type="checkbox"/> Returned your call Vous a rappelé	<input type="checkbox"/> Will call again Vous rapellera
<input type="checkbox"/> Action Donner suite	<input type="checkbox"/> Approval Approbation	<input type="checkbox"/> Note and return Noter et retourner
<input type="checkbox"/> Comments Commentaires	<input type="checkbox"/> Draft reply Projet de réponse	<input type="checkbox"/> Note and forward Noter et faire suivre
<input type="checkbox"/> As requested Comme demandé	<input type="checkbox"/> Signature	<input type="checkbox"/> Note and file Noter et classer
File No. - N° de dossier	Message taken by - Message reçu par	

Pls see me re your
threat analysis briefing
to B&R recently. *st*

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

SS 12.15 00 00

F 1295

Deu

24/4

UNITED NATIONS RWANDA EMERGENCY OFFICE
BUREAU D'URGENCE DES NATIONS UNIES POUR LE RWANDA
(UNREO)

FACSIMILE MESSAGE

To: DHA Geneva Debbie Saidy Maria Keating DHA New York Peter Hansen Kaz Kuroda Minister of Information, Kigali UNAMIR HQ, Kigali SRSG FC Spokesman Ops. P. Aff. O. Radio UNAMIR	Date: 23 April 1995 File: Total Pages: 4
From: Integrated Operations Centre, Kigali, Rwanda	
Subject: IDP SPECIAL UPDATE	

PLEASE FIND IDP SPECIAL REPORT.

Regards

AA
24/4

INTEGRATED OPERATIONS CENTRE (IOC)

IDP SPECIAL UPDATE

APRIL 22, 1995 -- 2100 HRS.

The following update is a compilation of reports from representatives of the IOC: the Government of Rwanda, NGOs, IOs, UNAMIR and U.N. agencies. This document is a summary of events that have been corroborated as of 2100 hrs on April 22, 1995.

SITUATION IN THE CAMPS

--Camp closures

Reports claim that Ndago camp appears to be empty of former camp residents. Ruramba and Buhoro IDP camps were also reported to be vacant of IDPs.

--Security

Much shooting was reported overnight (April 21/22) in Kibeho camp. Initial reports gave the resulting number of dead between 50 and 60, with many wounded.

Kibeho camp experienced much firing the morning of April 22 which resulted in many deaths. Initial reports state the RPA fired on IDPs (weapons included rocket-propelled grenades) in order to control an attempted break-out from the RPA cordon. There are initial reports that armed IDPs were in the camp, and that some firing came from IDPs. The situation was partially controlled by 1400 hrs., however renewed firing was reported at 1700 hrs. Some firing continued into the night. Casualties are estimated at around 1,000 dead and hundreds wounded, but these figures should be treated as very preliminary.

--Unaccompanied Children

By nightfall about 200 unaccompanied children were in the UNAMIR compound at Kibeho, many under 3 years of age, all in urgent need of evacuation.

--Medical

A medical team of the Australian Medical Battalion (Ausmed) and ICRC, MSF and Caritas have been operating in Kibeho. All personnel withdrew, however, when the security situation made medical assistance impossible. Ausmed is presently located at the UNAMIR position in Rwamiko. Medical NGOs and Ausmed are prepared to return to the camp as soon as the security situation is clear.

Efforts are being undertaken to increase the medical facilities at Butare and Gikongoro and possibly to re-establish the MSF hospital in Kibeho camp. Contingency planning for possible mass casualty evacuation to Kigali will require increased capacity at King Faisal Hospital. For this, Ausmed is seeking approval from the Government and assistance from U.N. agencies and NGOs.

Cases of cholera are increasing (5 cases confirmed) and dysentery is becoming more widespread in the camps and amongst those populations moving from the camps to the home communes. The medical NGOs are coordinating their activities from Butare and are planning to fortify medical surveillance in the home communes.

(over)

--Water/Sanitation

Water for drinking is being provided in all of the RPA-controlled camps in limited quantities. Sanitation facilities are less than adequate.

--Transport

IOM/ Butare is coordinating transport in the field. Presently the highest priority is being given to the evacuation of casualties. Currently 39 trucks and 30 buses have been made available by IOM and UNHCR. UNAMIR is providing 28 trucks and is attempting to have additional vehicles made available.

--Foot convoys

A large number of IDPs, estimated between 7-10,000, reportedly entered Nyakizu commune today. Runyinya also received foot convoys which early reports estimate at 4-5,000. Attacks on foot convoys by bandits have been reported.

--Access to camps

Many humanitarian relief organizations continue to find their aid restricted and work limited by intermittent denial of access to the camps by the RPA.

SITUATION IN COMMUNES RECEIVING RETURNING IDPS**--Open Relief Centers**

Open Relief Centers (ORCs) operated by Feed the Children/Europe have been opened/re-established in the following communes: Runyinya, Nyakizu, Gishamvu, and Huye. Basic shelter, water and biscuits are being provided. Reports state the arriving population is using local buildings for shelter as well as plastic sheeting.


IOC COORDINATION**--Coordination meetings**

On April 22 a Heads of Agency meeting was held at the IOC in Kigali to review the current situation.

--IOC/Butare office strengthened

On April 23 coordination meetings will be held at UNAMIR Technical Headquarters in Butare at 0730 hrs. and 1700 hrs.

IOC SITREP 22.4.95



MAIN POINTS

KIBEHO CAMP:

RPA firing into camp population leaving at least one thousand dead and hundreds more wounded.

Hundreds of unaccompanied children are left at Kibeho camp

An uncertain number of foot convoys left Kibeho for Runyinya
One foot convoy was attacked.

NDAGO CAMP:

It was reported that Ndago camp is closed and the population, estimated at 40,000, was marched towards Nyakizu commune

RURAMBA CAMP:

Abandoned. Population was estimated at 15,500.

BUHORO CAMP:

Abandoned. Population was estimated at 7,300



SD/CS Ops
FYI
& Disposal

20 Apr 95

SD362
22 Apr 95

- ⑦
1. Ref remarks by SO3 G2.
 2. The matter has been checked up again and these figures are not of various UN Agencies. The figures quoted by them are even more inflated.
 3. In any case due to the closure of IDPs these figures have lost its relevance. However, these can be taken as a reference for data base as to how many persons were there in camps a day before the camps started closing.
 4. These figures may be considered as fairly accurate considering the fact that the strength was monitored by milobs regularly.

Seen
22/4

Seen
22/4

Harish
(H.S. Ratnaparkhi)
Maj
22 Apr 95
for SOO

①

1 UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA
UNAMIR - MINUAR
MILOB GP HQ

UPDATE ON CAMPS IN SECTOR 4A

The latest strength of IDPs are as follows :-

1. Nyamagina	4500	
2. Buhoro	746	
3. Ruramba	12000	
4. Rwamiko	22000	
5. Kibeho	135707	
6. Ndago	65000	
7. Munini	17000	
8. Kamana	35000	
9. Gisunzu	6275	
10. Kigeme	2250	
11. Murambi	1287	(Tutsi camp)

Harish

(H S Ratnaparkhi)

Maj

18 Apr 95

② DCOS OPS

For your planning purposes.
Maj Ratnaparkhi is projects
officer, basic intelligence. Information
is current as of 17 Apr. He forecast
your possible requirement.

50362

19 Apr 95

③ Harish

DCOS ops is skeptical
about the figures. Suggests
you link up w/ 2+(N) Page
to view a video he
shot of the camp
yesterday. DCOS ops is
of the opinion these figures
are inflated for food
distribution purposes. Please
speak with me.

capt

50362

19 Apr 95



PRESS RELEASE

12 April 1995

**THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
SECRETARY-GENERAL ANNOUNCES THE FORTHCOMING
ARRIVAL OF JUDGES FOR RWANDA COURTS**

The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Ambassador Shaharyar M. Khan, held today his weekly press briefing, in which he spoke on the current commemoration of the genocide anniversary, the expansion of prisons and restoration of the national judicial system as well as the assistance for the reopening of secondary schools.

Having observed that the ceremonies marking the unleashing of last year's tragedy had revived great anguish among the Rwandese people and deep sorrow in the international community, the Special Representative deplored the fact that some officials had added their voices to yesterday's demonstration, held at UNAMIR's Headquarters, to protest against the UN Assistance Mission. "The speeches made by Rwanda's President and Vice-President should remain the guidelines for the country's normalization process," said Ambassador Khan.

On the issue of overcrowded prisons and poor state of the judicial system, the Special Representative pointed out that UNAMIR has just launched, in cooperation with the Government authorities, an operation to help ease congestion in certain prisons and to improve conditions in some others. This entails the transfer of prisoners from overcrowded prisons to ease congested jails and plans to expand some of the prisons.

Ambassador Khan also said that the first trial having been opened, it is important that courts start functioning even though the judicial system is not yet fully operational. He further indicated that expatriate judges are expected to start arriving in Kigali by mid-May to supplement the efforts of the Rwandese judiciary. The majority of those judges will come from African countries.

Concerning the assistance to secondary schools, the Special Representative showed that UNAMIR had helped in the reopening of some schools, adding that a lot of work remained to be done, especially with regard to repair of school buildings, installation of electricity and food supply to students, who are almost exclusively school boarders.

In answer to a question from one journalist, Ambassador Khan stressed that the reconciliation to be genuine and durable, it must permeate through the whole Rwandese society and, especially, at grassroot level.

For more information, please contact the Office of the Spokesman in Kigali: Ext.: # 11075 or 11066.