

SECRET

OUTGOING CODE

PRIORITY

To: Bunche New York

From: Linnér Léo

Date: 13 October 1961

No.: A- 2370

Reur 6976

1. We had never pressed for a reply since in Khiary's note of 14 August our request to use Matadi was coupled with posting of 500 to 600 UN troops in that area and with the withdrawal of the Tunisian contingent¹ as well as the requirements demanded by the Katanga situation, it was found impossible to effect such posting.

2. The question of replacing the Nigerian Policemen in Matadi was however taken up subsequently and following was sent to Adoula on 10 October: Quote

Me référant aux conversations que M. Dumontet, Chef des Opérations Civiles par intérim a eues avec votre Excellence les 8 et 9 Octobre, j'ai l'honneur de vous confirmer les arrangements qui ⁽¹⁾ont reçu votre approbation concernant:

- 1) l'utilisation temporaire et partielle de l'aéroport de Ndola de façon à décongestionner l'aéroport de Ndjili pour les raisons que vous savez;
- 2) le mouvement de relève des policiers nigériens à Matadi.

Concernant le premier point, il s'agit d'une dérivation du trafic aérien pour des avions de type moyen et, comme il a été porté à votre connaissance, d'une présence de troupes limitées à un peloton aux fins de sécurité.

Quant à la relève des policiers nigériens à Matadi, il s'agit de remplacer la centaine d'hommes composant le groupe de policiers nigériens actuellement en service par un groupe de policiers du même nombre, de la même nationalité, dans les mêmes conditions et ayant la même liberté de mouvement. Unquote

JP

.../...

3. With the ⁽²⁾ continued presence of Nigerian Policemen in Matadi Force Commander feels he needs not have any other military presence there in the event we can use Matadi for rotation of UN contingents.
4. A fresh approach to use Matadi's facilities for this purpose is therefore being made to Prime Minister.

Q

SECRET

OUTGOING CODE

MOST IMMEDIATE

ok
for

To: Bunche New York

From: Linnér Léo

Date: 13 October 1961

No. : A-2369

Further my A-2368 Khiary reported on telex at 1200Z today that

1. Point 2 of Protocole has finally been accepted.
2. On other hand Muke now proposes new point 3 that UN ~~plus~~ ^{AND} Katangese garrisons at Albertville, Nyunzu-Niamba ~~plus~~ ^{AND} Jadotville will be authorized to occupy their former position as established on 12 Sept. 61 with same strength and may freely carry out movements necessary to assure their mission.
3. Muke also wants to put one Gendarmerie company at E'ville airport. Khiary is proposing 50 Gendarmes plus 2 sections of Police which were as existing 12 Sept. Muke rejects this. Force Commander supported Khiary's proposal.
4. On para 2 above Force Commander told Khiary ⁽¹⁾ that he could not agree unless UN troops went back also to Kolwezi - Jadotville in number sufficient to ensure our own security.
5. Khiary considered Kolwezi in particular a new and indefensible demand sufficiently met by agreed powers of control commission under point 2. Nevertheless he indicated he would be doing his best at subsequent meeting scheduled for 1300Z.
6. We consider that nothing in a cease-fire requires return to status quo ante particularly where that would prejudice general security in the North.

cc: Force Commander

JP

OUTGOING CODE

[Signature]
PRIORITY

Not Immediate

TO : BUNCHE, NEW YORK
FROM : LINNER, LEOPOLDVILLE
DATE : 13 OCTOBER, 1961
No. : A-2368

[Signature]

1. Khiary in Elleo 25 of last night reports on negotiation of protocole text sent you in our A-2407 and 2410 as follows :

QUOTE TSHOMBE AYANT PERDU UN PARENT N'A PAS ETE VISIBLE DE LA MATINEE.

L'APRES MIDI IL A TENU UN CONSEIL DES MINISTRES POUR ARRETER LES INSTRUCTIONS A LA MISSION QU'IL COMPTE ENVOYER A LEO. J'AI EU UN CONTACT AVEC KIMBA SUR LE PROTOCOLE D'ACCORD QUE NOUS AVONS ELABORE A LEO. NOUS SOMMES D'ACCORD SUR LE PREAMBULE. LES CLAUSES 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 SONT ACCEPTEES PAR LES KATANGAIS AVEC LES LEGERES MODIFICATIONS SUIVANTES : CLAUSE 1, L'AERODROME DE LUENA, LIRE L'ANCIEN AERODROME D'AVILLE. CLAUSE 4, SUPPRIMER OU TOUTE AUTRE FORCE. LA CLAUSE 8 FERA L'OBJET D'UN ECHANGE DE LETTRES. LES KATANGAIS CONSIDERENT CE PROBLEME EN DEHORS DU CADRE DU CESSEZ-LE-FEU. CLAUSE 9, ILS SERAIENT D'ACCORD SUR LE CONTENU SI NOUS ACCEPTONS DE FAIRE PRECEDER CELA PAR LA REMISE DE LA RADIO A LA DISPOSITION DES AUTORITES KATANGAISES ET COMME CONSEQUENCE LES AUTORITES KATANGAISES ACCEPTENT LE POINT 9. J'AI PROMIS D'ETUDIER FAVORABLEMENT CE POINT. LA CLAUSE 2, LES KATANGAIS VOUDRAIENT Y APPORTER LES RESTRICTIONS SUIVANTES : (A) LES COMMISSIONS AURAIENT TOUTE LIBERTE DE SE RENDRE DANS TOUTES LES BASES OU LES AUTORITES KATANGAISES ET L'ONUC ONT DES FORCES¹²; OU (B) LES COMMISSIONS AURONT TOUTE LIBERTE DE SE RENDRE AVEC L'ACCORD DES AUTORITES CIVILES, KATANGAISES ET ONUSIENNES, ETC. J'AI LONGUEMENT EXPLIQUE QUE NI L'UNE NI L'AUTRE CLAUSE NE PEUT ETRE ACCEPTEE PAR LES NATIONS UNIES ET QUE LA REDACTION TELLE QU'ELLE EST LIBELLEE ACTUELLEMENT DU POINT DEUX EST UNE CONDITION SINE QUA NON POUR NOUS POUR ACCEPTER CE PROTOCOLE. DANS LA QUATRIEME PAGE DE L'ACCORD SOUS LE TITRE QUOTE

CLAUSES PROPOSEES PAR LES AUTORITES KATANGAISES UNQUOTE LES POINTS A, B, C ONT ETE REJETES; LE POINT D POURRAIT ETRE INCLUS SOUS LA REDACTION SUIVANTE : LES AUTORITES KATANGAISES AIDERAIENT A TROUVER DES LOCAUX ADEQUATS POUR LES TROUPES DE L'ONUC EN REMPLACEMENT DE CEUX QU'ELLES OCCUPENT ACTUELLEMENT. ⁹⁾ LE POINT E, KIMBA EST A LA RECHERCHE DE L'ACCORD TSHOMBE-HAMMARSKJOLD QU'IL VOUDRAIT INTEGRER DANS LE TEXTE. D'APRES MONSIEUR COX CET ACCORD N'A JAMAIS EXISTE ET IL NE SERA PAR CONSEQUENT PAS DIFFICILE D'ELIMINER L'INSERTION DE CETTE CLAUSE. LE POINT F, A ETE REJETE. LE POINT G AUQUEL LES KATANGAIS ATTACHENT BEAUCOUP D'IMPORTANCE VOUS EST SOUMIS POUR AVIS. DOIS-JE ACCEPTER SON INSERTION OU MAINTENIR SON REJET AU RISQUE D'UNE RUPTURE. JE PENSE QUE SON ACCEPTATION NE VOUS ENGAGE A RIEN. LISEZ BIEN LE TEXTE. J'AIMERAIS AVOIR VOTRE REPONSE AVANT VENDREDI NEUF HEURES DU MATIN DATE ET HEURE FIXEES POUR LA SIGNATURE DE L'ACCORD. AU CAS OU NOUS SIGNONS DEMAIN L'ACCORD IL FAUDRAIT QUE LE GENERAL MACEBOIN PRENNE LES DISPOSITIONS NECESSAIRES POUR NOUS ENVOYER AUX LIEUX OU SE TROUVENT LES PRISONNIERS KATANGAIS ENTRE NOS MAINS LE NOMBRE D'AVIONS SUFFISANTS POUR LEUR TRANSFERT A EVILLE. UNQUOTE

2. We immediately authorized Khiary to proceed subject to inclusion of same clause as in whole agreement that UN Headquarters must ratify. We made exception that prisoner exchange however should not repeat not be subject to prior approval. ¹³ As to Katangese point G we sought to avoid rupture by pointing out its impropriety but noting possibility of covering it in letter outside protocole as they do for resolutions.

3. For subsequent reference we use this cable to draw attention to practical difficulties under which Khiary negotiates. He sent this request for urgent instructions quote priority nations unquote. It was nevertheless six hours in transmission. He was actually meeting with Tshombe this morning when we were able to reach O'Brien on telex and have our reply sent by messenger to Khiary. On priority cables we often receive late in the morning his reports from the previous afternoon and must make a similar allowance to reply to him.

OUTGOING CODE

PRIORITY

To: BUNCHE, New York
From: LINNER, Leopoldville
Date: ¹²13 October 1961
No.: A-2367

Linner

SECRET

Your 7067.

A letter signed by the King of Sweden and the Minister of Defence to the Commander-in-Chief of the Swedish forces, dated July 28th, authorizes contracts to be signed for the Swedish troops from Gaza for service in the Congo up to the 1st of October 1961. In his request to the Swedish Foreign Office of July 22nd the Secretary-General requests the troops to be made available for the Congo for a period not to exceed two months, which implies 1st of October.^x Furthermore the Swedish Chief of Defence General Göransson during his latest visit here ^{agreed} ~~insisted~~ with the Force Commander on the troops having to be back in Gaza before October 10th. This date was then changed recently to October 12th as I mentioned in my cable to you.

However as it has now been decided that the Swedes should start being evacuated from here on 16 October the Force Commander and the Swedish Liaison Officer agree with me that the problem is solved satisfactorily.

cc. Col. Hakansson.

OUTGOING CODE

PRIORITY

OK
for.

To : BUNCHE, New York

From : LINNER, Leopoldville

Lin

Date : 13 October 1961

No.: : A-2365, A-2366

SECRET

Khiary, in a message of the 11th, now qualifies ideas he put up for your consideration as indicated in my A-2341-4, beginning para 7. Quote:

1. Une infiltration au Katanga du Nord même dans les conditions favorables actuelles ne peut se faire sans une préparation minutieuse et sérieuse. Je doute personnellement que toutes les précautions aient été prises du côté du Gouvernement Central pour entreprendre pareille opération. Ni vous ni eux ne pouvons nous permettre le luxe d'un échec dans cette affaire. Pour notre part, nous sommes dans l'impossibilité d'évaluer toute l'aide que nous pourrions apporter au Gouvernement Central avant de connaître les réactions du Siège sur la question. Le Gouvernement Central, s'il a réellement l'intention d'entreprendre une action pareille, doit d'abord s'entourer de toutes les garanties qui en conditionnent la réussite et ne pas juger à la légère la réaction des autorités katangaises et de leurs supporteurs.
2. Sans que nous ayons aucun droit de nous opposer à cette opération de police menée par le Gouvernement Central, nous devons insister auprès des mêmes autorités pour qu'elles coordonnent leurs actions afin de leur donner le maximum d'efficacité. Une préparation politique sur le plan international s'impose avant le déclenchement de l'opération.
3. Sur le plan militaire, il est prévisible que Tshombe utilise des moyens supérieurs en efficacité à ceux du Gouvernement Central. Il est donc nécessaire pour Adoula, avant de s'engager, de prendre toutes les précautions nécessaires, sinon il risquerait de mettre son Gouvernement et la République en danger. Les pressions qui sont exercées sur lui actuellement ne pourront justifier l'échec possible.

4. J'ai très peu de confiance dans les résultats des négociations qui pourraient avoir lieu entre le Gouvernement Central et Tshombe. Ce dernier, compte tenu des positions arrêtées d'avance par des intérêts étrangers, ne peut modeler sa position en cas de négociations sur des intérêts nationaux qui n'ont jamais existé dans son esprit. Les attermolements actuels permettent à ceux qui ont intérêt à créer l'état du Katanga de se préparer sur le double terrain politique et militaire. Qu'Adoula ne voie pas cela de notre part comme une politique tendant à l'empêcher d'agir librement et comme le désire son gouvernement, mais au contraire comme un souci réel ⁽³⁾ de notre part de voir toutes les actions du Gouvernement Central interposées après réflexion et auxquelles on aurait assuré d'avance toutes les chances de réussir.

5. Il est faux de croire que le temps ne profite qu'aux autorités katangaises. L'occupation du Nord Katanga n'est pas une fin en soi, mais uniquement un pas de la résorption de la sécession katangaise. Tshombe et ses acolytes mettront tous leurs moyens défensifs en jeu pour défendre le Nord. Quelles précautions ont été prises par le Gouvernement Central. Unquote.

~~6x~~ Subsequently the following has happened:

a) Adoula invited me for a meeting 11th late afternoon. Again he gave strong expression to his disappointment over the lack of positive news from Eville and said that, whilst realizing the need for caution and moderation, he nevertheless felt compelled to take action in North Katanga. Yesterday, he sent me a letter summing up his statements, from which I quote:

"Je vous ai rappelé le programme suivant, que le Gouvernement Central compte mettre à exécution, à partir du 15 octobre 1961, dans le Nord Katanga:

"1) Envoi d'un Commissaire général extraordinaire au Katanga, avec résidence dans une des localités du Nord (comme indiqué par ma lettre No 2058/61 en date du 4 octobre 1961);

"2) Envoi d'un corps de douaniers pour occuper tous les postes frontière;

"3) Envoi d'agents de la Sûreté; ¹⁴¹

"4) Envoi d'une police territoriale en vue d'assurer la reprise du trafic sur la ligne de chemin de fer Albertville/Kabalo.

"Vu l'approbation quasi-certaine par les Chambres de l'article 7 de la Loi fondamentale, le Nord Katanga pourrait être érigé en province autonome.

"J'espère que l'Organisation des Nations Unies mettra à la disposition du Gouvernement les moyens nécessaires au déroulement de ce programme."

OK for
A-2366 As regards article 7 of Loi fondamentale, I will cable comments separately. On thing Adoula told me but did not repeat in his letter was that he was going to import arms, since we had not been able to stop arms smuggling into Katanga, and the Central Government could not accept remaining passive on that score. He said he knew UN would not approve of this but that they would go ahead anyway.

Arguments I used against their plans of rushing into Katanga, North or South, were, amongst others :

1. Nothing has as yet been done by the Central Government to unify the military command. The idea of Lundula and Mobutu operating without coordination and, most likely, rather soon against each other, should fill us all with grave apprehension. Adoula answered that this problem was going to be solved in a matter of days.

(1)
2. The total inefficiency the Central Government has shown when it came to taking care of the Gendarmerie and Police refugees from Eville, now 950 including families, housed and fed and being given medical attention by us in one of our former camps. This in spite of the clear understanding, from the beginning, that once in Leo they would be wholly under the Government's responsibility, who would incorporate them in its forces. If Government were unable to cope with such a relatively small but psychologically most important problem, how could they envisage establishing a successful administration in North Katanga and how could they think of carrying out even more far-reaching and dangerous schemes.

3. I also drew to his ⁽²⁾attention the worrying signs of unrest and scheming in Stanleyville as reported to you in my A-2355, 6 and 7, stressing the need for stabilizing the relations between Stan and Leo further before launching into new adventures. I also marked my surprise at Gizenga's not having returned yesterday as he had committed himself to do and underlined the fact that Lubuma was back at his side very active indeed in a negative sense. Adoula was obviously embarrassed over this.

4. I also stated, as my personal conviction, that every day the cease-fire was maintained was in our favour. Adoula did not seem quite convinced about this.

Then, on the 11th, I had dinner with Adoula, the US Ambassador and Senator Gore on a short visit here with Senators Hart and Neuberger. Gore then mentioned that Tshombe, on September 27, had had a four-hour's talk with Walensky at Salisbury. Incidentally this, coming as complete news to me, is another embarrassing example of the inefficiency of our information service. According to what the American Consul-General at Salisbury ⁽³⁾had told Gore, Tshombe had asked for more assistance. Walensky had flatly discouraged him, making it clear that there was no other way out than some form of reconciliation with the Central Government. Gore who had also spent some time with leading political and financial circles in Brussels on his way down said he was definitely sure that time was working to our advantage.

Yesterday came Khiary's hope of an early signature as reported in my A-2360. All this together seems now to have convinced Adoula that he should be patient and not say or do anything that may jeopardize the reconciliation efforts. It should not be forgotten however that, as mentioned in para 4 of my A-2341, there are other elements involved who are continuing to exert great pressure for ^{some/}quick action on the part of Government in Katanga.

OUTGOING CODE

*OK
J. P. [unclear]*

ROUTINE

To: BUNCHE, New York
From: LINNER, Leopoldville
Date: 12 October 1961
No.: A-2364

Linner

SECRET

Your 7089.

Most grateful your understanding and support.

1. Dumontet is not happy about the wording "It would be ~~app~~ inappropriate for us to make any promise at this stage" and feels strongly that he must have some more definite assurance. < While he and I understand that it would be improper for you to promise what the Promotion Board will do, Dumontet does not seem unreasonable in suggesting that you could undertake to bring to its attention the high level of his Congo duties both in Eville where his post was taken over by a D-2, and in this newly proposed assignment. Such intimation from thirty-eighth floor would bear great weight and let Dumontet feel that he would receive some recognition for his willingness to take on responsibilities here which I would be the first to call onerous. >
2. Delighted over the prospect of getting FT back. Wish to confirm unhesitantly that he would certainly be employed as a straight political officer.
3. Gaviola left for Bukavu on 5 October to prepare himself for taking over from Cuperus, who is expected to leave the Congo on 26 October. Gaviola makes a good impression but as he has not been

acting on his own yet I would like to reserve judgment until later.³⁾

4. Agree the term information should be used instead of intelligence. ~~4)~~
May I once again stress the definite need for a first rate man, military or civilian. Incidentally, we have no means of coping with the wealth of documents captured from Munungo during the fighting in Eville. You may recall I raised the question in Stockholm whether there was any chance of your sending down someone even temporarily to go through them.

5. George Ivan-Smith will be of great help. Would Philip Dean, warmly recommended by my US Embassy friends here, be a possibility for a long-term assignment?

6. Fully share your concern expressed in para. 10. Have checked the name you propose with Sudanese Ambassador here who has worked with him in Paris and states he is "a very good man". Would be glad to get him here. Whether to be on my staff or as civilian officer could preferably be decided after we have had time to learn more about him here.

7. Had already given careful consideration to both Boscovic and Gavin, especially the former, but feel, and Dumontet confirms this, that it would be unwise to weaken Civops set-up further for at least some time to come.

ROUTINE

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

Handwritten signature/initials

TO : BUNCHE, NEW YORK
FROM : LINNER, LEOPOLDVILLE
DATE : 12 OCTOBER, 1961
NO : A- 2363

Handwritten signature/initials

1.- Among foreign nationals taken into UN custody in recent operations in Katanga are following six stateless persons who had been enlisted in Katangese gendarmerie : - Grabowski, Ochal, Swiderski, Jakiniuk, Wiltowski, Moos - all originally of Polish nationality. First three carry identity documents issued by Belgian authorities in Brussels under Convention on Statelessness (as was case in regard to Belina earlier).¹⁾ By arrangement with Belgian Liaison mission they were repatriated to Belgium yesterday. Fourth named person above was permanent resident of West Germany before entering Katanga and by arrangement with West Germany Embassy here was repatriated to Dusseldorf two days ago. Fifth named person though originally issued with residence permit for West Germany has now no valid documents permitting re-entry. West German authorities not repeat not prepared to send him to West Germany since he had been resident in France immediately prior to arrival in Katanga.²⁾ Last named person was resident in France before going to Katanga. His case is under discussion with French Embassy officials. You will be informed of final arrangements for repatriation of fifth and sixth named persons.

2.- Interrogation of above group has revealed that they had been recruited through "contacts in Paris" and "by Katangese delegation in Brussels" as late as May and July this year indicating that vigorous recruitment of foreign mercenaries

for military service in Katanga is still being conducted in Belgium and France by representatives of Katangese authorities enjoying official status. From reliable information in our possession, the "Permanent Delegation of Katanga" in Brussels has its headquarters at 30, rue Marie de Bourgogne, Brussels 4, and the "Permanent Mission of Katanga in France" is at 30, Avenue Georges Mandel, Paris 16. You may wish to make a strong protest to the two governments concerned for permitting officials of Katangese Government to³ carry out these functions openly in Brussels and Paris without any effort by the two governments concerned to restrict these activities.

3.- We wonder whether the above information should be brought officially to the notice of the Central Government in Léopoldville for any action it may wish to take in the diplomatic field. Your views will be appreciated.

Cc. Mr. Kanakantwe

SECRET

OK
for

OUTGOING CODE

ROUTINE

To : BUNCHE, New York
From: LINNER, Leopoldville
Date : 13 October 1961
No. : A-2362

Linner

Further to para C of my 2323 and with reference to para C of your 6981.

1. Cruise O'Brien now informs that original of document in question is not repeat not in UN possession. Also legal proof of authenticity is lacking although he says "We have no doubt of its authenticity". It will thus be difficult to justify acting under para A-2 to evacuate Pieters as political adviser in absence of more definite proof, especially bearing in mind public relations aspect of expelling a physician. Moreover, if challenged we would not be in a position to reveal precise nature or source of this evidence.
2. It may still be that the Commission of Investigation would wish to request Pieters to come for interrogation in view of his certification of Lumumba's death. Interrogation by Commission could conceivably produce material sufficient to justify action by us later under para A-2, but until then Pieters' coming would depend on his own willingness. Please advise.

cc. Mr. Kanakaratne.

OK
Hawley

OUTGOING CODE

ROUTINE

To: BUNCHE, New York

From: LINNER, Leopoldville

Linner

Date: 12 October 1961

No.: A-2361

SECRET

Reference my A-2346.

I am compelled to report that the Italian Ambassador ~~has~~ who has throughout shown an unflinching pro-UN attitude feels obliged to point out that he has reports from most reliable sources that Indian soldiers were indeed at the hospital and that shooting did in fact take place from there.

OUTGOING CODE

PRIORITY

To: BUNCHE, New York
From: LINNER, Leopoldville
Date: 12 October 1961
No.: A-2360

Lin

SECRET

Following from Khiari:

"Premièrement. Ai vu cet après-midi Tshombe et Kimba. *f*

La conversation a porté d'abord sur l'envoi d'une mission katangaise à Léopoldville. Le Président m'a remis la lettre que vous trouverez ci-dessous:

'Elisabethville, le 11 octobre 1961. J'ai bien reçu votre lettre du 6 courant, qui a retenu toute mon attention'. Je tiens à vous remercier vivement des garanties que les Nations Unies sont disposées à accorder quant à la sprite (garbled) et à la protection de la délégation katangaise qui doit se rendre à Léopoldville. J'ai le plaisir de vous informer que, grâce à ces assurances, ladite délégation quittera probablement Elisabethville fin de cette semaine. Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur, l'assurance de ma haute considération. Signée Moïse Tshombe, Président du Katanga.'

"Deuxièmement. Le projet du protocole est encore en étude et Tshombe m'a supplié de ne pas rentrer à Léopoldville avant la signature de ce protocole et l'exécution de ses principales clauses. On s'est fixé rendez-vous pour demain matin dix heures pour la mise au point définitive du protocole et peut-être la signature. Il est anxieux de nous présents (garbled) au moment de la mise en exécution des principales

clauses du protocole. Il aimerait également que j'accompagne moi-même les émissaires qui compte envoyer à Léopoldville en fin de semaine."

I have agreed with Adoula to keep the above strictly secret until we see how the situation develops.

cc. Mr. J. Poujoulat.

OUTGOING CODE

PRIORITY

max
JP

To : Bunche, New York
From : Linner, Léopoldville
Date : 12 October 1961
N° : A- 2359

Linner

SECRET

In his Elleo 17 Khiary reports: Quote

Tshombe m'a remis la lettre ci-dessous à laquelle je compte répondre dans le même sens que je l'ai fait à Ndola, une copie de cette lettre vous est adressée et une autre est adressée à Monsieur OBrien. Je pense faire signer à OBrien la même lettre que la mienne.

Elisabethville, le 11 octobre 1961. Monsieur le Représentant, par sa lettre du 20 septembre dernier, Monsieur Khiary, Chargé de Mission des Nations Unies pour le cessez-le-feu signé à NDola, m'avait donné l'assurance que les Nations Unies ne procéderaient pas à mon arrestation ni à celles des membres de mon gouvernement, suite au mandat émanant du Gouvernement de Léopoldville. Je viens d'apprendre avec surprise par notre émissaire de Léopoldville que, contrairement à ses promesses, l'Organisation des Nations Unies mettrait en exécution le mandat en question et procédera incessamment à mon arrestation. Je vous saurais gré en conséquence de me confirmer l'exactitude de cette information. Dans l'affirmative je tiens à vous faire remarquer qu'au moment même où je recherche une solution à la crise congolaise je ne comprends pas les mobiles des Nations Unies qui, en appliquant cette mesure, ne feraient qu'aggraver la situation actuelle. Espérant recevoir une réponse urgente à la présente, je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Représentant, l'expression de mes sentiments distingués. Signé : Moise Tshombe, Président du Katanga. Unquote.

OUTGOING CODE

PRIORITY

OK *[Handwritten signature]*

To: Bunche New York
From: Linnér Léo
Date: 12 Oct. 1961
No. : A- 2358


[Handwritten signature]


SECRET

Re para 3 your 7094 information I gave Adoula is as contained in our
FC 5737.

[Handwritten signature]
dP

OUTGOING CODE

OK 
ROUTINE

To : Bunche, New York
From : Linner, Léopoldville 
Date : 12 october 1961
N° : A- 2357

SECRET

In his 1189 Englund reports: Quote

As you know, the MNC is selling party membership cards here for 60 Francs. When travelling in province the party card is more useful as a laissez-passer than the official laissez-passer. Around town there are control posts manned by young party members checking the population. In the province, the ANC is charged with the control. We have further been told that the MNC intends to nominate party commissioners in every district with whom the government authorities will have to cooperate closely and who will be provided with far reaching authority. Unquote.


JP

OUTGOING CODE

ROUTINE

OK

SECRET

To: Bunche New York

From: Linnér Léo

Date: 12 October 1961

No. : A- 2356

In his 1184 Englund reports: Quote

1. Following an order from the ANC HQ the Congolese MP arrested some gendarmerie officers and soldiers during Saturday and Sunday for having left their camp without the necessary permission. Monday morning the gendarmerie surrounded the MP camp with full arms and hand grenades. They took the opportunity of beating up some MPs. I MP took refuge in our garage for some time. After intervention by Lundulla the gendarmes returned to their camp, where they had a meeting with Lundulla. Teshome and eye tried to get hold of Lundulla but as he stayed away we talked to his chief of Staff Loso who told us that the incident was settled. We will talk to Lundulla about the gendarmes as soon as we get hold of him.
2. Eye later met Manzikala who as well as most of the population is fed up with the gendarmes who are of no more than nuisance value. Their action yesterday shows once more that Lundulla has no control over them and that they apparently take orders only from Gizenga and his representatives.
3. Some days ago some gendarmes tried to stop a truck loaded with beer to take the ferry for the left river bank. As the driver refused, he was badly maltreated and stabbed in his legs with bayonets by the gendarmes. During Gbenye's latest visit here eye talked to him about the gendarmerie that is always the source of all the troubles here, but got no reaction from him. No further incidents between the MP and the gendarmerie are reported. Unquote
4. We have reported incident to Adoula.

JP

OUTGOING CODE

OK B
ROUTINE

To : Bunche, New York
From : Linner, Léopoldville *Linner*
Date : 12 October, 1961
N° : A- 2355

SECRET

In his 1188 Englund reports: Quote

Ambassadeur du Mali Monsieur Diakiti vient d'arriver a Stan par Air Congo aujourd'hui 10 octobre à quatorze heures. Le nombre de ses bagages indique qu'il a l'intention de rester ici bien longtemps. Avez-vous des informations concernant ses intentions à Stan. Nous sommes surpris de voir Ambassadeur du Mali à Stan particulièrement après avoir reçu la nouvelle qu'il n'a pas encore présenté ses lettres de créance au Gouvernement Central à Léo et qu'il avait quitté le Congo. J'ajoute que nous avons toujours l'impression que la présence de l'Ambassadeur du Mali au Congo n'était pas désirable après l'incident avec Monsieur Salumu à Stan. Dès l'arrivée l'Ambassadeur a été salué par Monsieur Ateto, Chef de Cabinet du Président Manzikala.

J'examine si la rencontre était intentionnelle et vous aviserai plus tard. Toutefois j'estime que la présence de l'Ambassadeur du Mali à Stan coïncidant avec le séjour de Monsieur Gizenga est de mauvaise augure. Unquote.

JP

OK
T. Mack

OUTGOING CODE

PRIORITY

To: Bunche New York
From: Linnér Léo
Date: 12 Oct. 1961
No. : A-2354

Linnér

SECRET

In his Elleo 18 O'Brien reports: Quote
Following message was sent to Tshombe on 10 Oct. : "Monsieur le Président,
Selon l'usage auquel nous nous sommes toujours conformés en ce qui concerne
l'arrivée de nouveaux contingents des forces de l'ONUC j'ai l'honneur de porter
à votre connaissance que le contingent Ghanéen doit quitter incessamment le Katanga
et sera remplacé par un nombre égal de troupes Onusiennes venant d'autres secteurs."
Khiary in circumstances considers it unnecessary bring matter especially to attention
cease fire commission. No repeat no reaction from Tshombe. We do not feel it
necessary or desirable to inform Tshombe of movements within Katanga not involving
reinforcements/. Unquote

JP

OUTGOING ~~CODE~~ CLEAR

1961 OCT 11 PM 6:07

O.N.U.C.

ROUTINE

LEOPOLDVILLE
11 October 1961

UNATIONS
NEW YORK

A-2353

Bunche from Linner.

Linner

Assume you have seen article on the Fuga in Paris-Match of
October 7 pages 78 to 81.

OUTGOING CODE

OK
7
PRIORITY

TO : BUNCHE, NEWYORK
FROM : LINNER, LEOPOLDOVILLE
DATE : 11 October 1961
NO. : A- 2352

Lin
SECR

1. Reur 6684 following information sought from Eville was delayed by transmission error Quote OBrien did inform members of consular corps that if civilian snipers fired on UN Force he would later in self defence reply to any such attack wherever it might come from. Raja gave same position speaking to Herckens. As regards firing from the Consulate it is a fact that for several days firing was kept up against the Post Office from the building in which the Belgian Consulate is in. UN forces were naturally obliged to reply upon the Belgian Consulate which occupies 2 floors of the building in question which was damaged. UN forces were instructed not repeat not to fire at the floors in question but in conditions of night firing it was not possible to avoid damage. The Belgian Consul has never denied the well-known fact that firing was maintained from the building in question against the Post Office. In his conversation of 27 September with Khiari he contented himself with denials that firing had taken place from the windows of the Consulate itself Unquote.
2. Our principal comment is that we fail to see in O'Brien's statement any contradiction of ONUC views or even of elementary rules of self-defence. Belgian implication that he said UN troops intended to shoot people on sight is inconsistent with the language they attribute to him. As those qui agissent en francs-tireurs could only be identified by act of firing, UN intent d'ouvrir le feu is minimum act of standard self-defence. O'Brien confirms this in para one above by reference to civilian shipers who fired on UN Force. To imply he meant civilians would be executed for possession of firearms is wholly unjustified by language they quote. Tombelaine has also confirmed Raja simply gave vent to blunt expression to show that return fire from soldiers sniped at would be effective.

OK *h*
PRIORITY

OUTGOING CODE

SECRET
WTC

TO : BUNCHE, NEW YORK
FROM : LINNER, LEOPOLDVILLE
DATE : 11 OCTOBER 1961
NO : A- 2351

- 1.- Reur 6980. Extensive file search negative. You did write Lumumba 20 August 1960 regretting and explaining how 15 Belgian military personnel were used by understandable error of local commander.
- 2.- Doubtful you wrote Van den Bosch since file contains copy of letter he wrote Congolese Foreign Ministry on 9 August announcing closure of Belgian Mission and his intention to leave that same day.
- 3.- Visits to 15 Belgians and arrangements for their evacuation were made by Dr d'Arenberg and Red Cross Representative Senn. No correspondence with French Embassy as protecting power found.

WWC/mc

OUTGOING CLEAR

LEOPOLDVILLE
11 October 1961

1961 OCT 11 AM 11:54 PRIORITY

O.N.U.C.

UNATIONS
NEW YORK

A- 2350

BUNCHE from LINNER

Linner

Reur 7046. Verbatim text furnished by UK Embassy confirms Welensky language you quoted, except that phrase was "and from there distributed".

OUTGOING CODE

okp
PRIORITY

To: BUNCHE, New York
From: LINNER, Leopoldville
Date: 11 October 1961
No.: A-2349

Linner
SECRET

Reference Force Commander's cable 5849 of 9 October.

From my talks in Stockholm with the Swedish Minister of Defence and other members of the Government I know that great importance indeed is attached by them to the date of 12 October being the latest one acceptable for the lift to commence from Leo to Gaza. I know the technical difficulties but I must stress that as far as I understand it would create a very bad impression indeed in Stockholm were we not fulfilling our commitments.

cc. Gen. MacEoin.

okp
ROUTINE

OUTGOING CODE

SECRET

TO : BUNCHE, MACFARQUHAR
FROM : LINNER, LEOPOLDVILLE
DATE : 11 OCTOBER 1961
NO : A- 2348

1.- FURTHER YOUR 6880 TO FOURNIER PARA 2 HE INDICATES THAT QUESTION OF MILITARY PROTECTION FOR FLIGHT IS NATURALLY OUTSIDE TERMS OF REFERENCE OF ACCIDENT ENQUIRY. ON OTHER HAND IT WOULD NOT BE CORRECT TO SAY ANTECEDENT CIRCUMSTANCES RELATING TO FLIGHT FELL OUTSIDE, AS SHOWN BY THEIR QUESTIONS TO ME. ANY OVERLAP BY ADDITIONAL ENQUIRY MIGHT CONFLICT WITH INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED BY ICAO REGULATIONS.

2.- FOR YOUR INFORMATION MY STATEMENT TO BOARD OF ENQUIRY ON 5 OCTOBER READS COLON
QUOTE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL DECIDED ON SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, THAT HE WOULD LEAVE, TOGETHER WITH HIS PARTY, FOR NDOLA THE FOLLOWING DAY. THE ONLY OTHER ALTERNATIVE THAT WERE SERIOUSLY DISCUSSED AS REGARDS THE MEETING PLACE WERE SALISBURY AND BANCROFT, BUT ONCE THOSE TWO PLACES WERE DISCARDED, FOR DIFFERENT REASONS, THERE WAS NO HESITATION WHATSOEVER IN HIS MIND CONCERNING NDOLA. MR. HAMMARSKJOLD CONSEQUENTLY REQUESTED THAT A PLANE STAND BY DURING SUNDAY. HE WAS TOLD THAT A DC-4 OR A C-46 WOULD BE AVAILABLE BUT THAT NEITHER TYPE OF PLANE WOULD BE VERY CONVENIENT WITH REFERENCE TO COMFORT OR SPEED. IT WAS THEREFORE SUGGESTED THAT THE FORCE COMMANDER'S PLANE BE BROUGHT BACK FROM ELISABETHVILLE AND PUT AT HIS DISPOSAL, TO WHICH HE AGREED.

SECRET

AS TO THE TIMING OF THE DEPARTURE, TWO FACTORS WERE RELEVANT IN MR. HAMMARSKJOLD'S MIND. FIRST OF ALL, HE WAS ANXIOUS TO ARRIVE AT NDOLA AS SOON AS EVER POSSIBLE SO AS TO AVOID THE POSSIBILITY OF MR. TSHOMBE LEAVING THE PLACE BEFORE HE ARRIVED. SECOND, IT HAD BEEN AGREED BETWEEN MR. HAMMARSKJOLD AND LORD LANDSDOWNE THAT THE LATTER WOULD ALSO PROCEED TO NDOLA ON SUNDAY BUT THAT HE WOULD CONTINUE SOONEST FOR SALISBURY AND DEFINITELY BEFORE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ARRIVED.

FOR REASONS I DO NOT KNOW, LORD LANDSDOWNE'S DEPARTURE FROM LEOPOLDVILLE WAS HOWEVER DELAYED UNTIL 4 p.m. AND CONSEQUENTLY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S DEPARTURE WAS ALSO DELAYED, UNTIL 4.55 p.m. ACCORDING TO MY WATCH.

I DID NOT AT ANY TIME HEAR ANYTHING ABOUT THE COURSE THE PLANE WAS SUPPOSED TO TAKE.

WHEN ACCOMPANYING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ABOARD THE PLANE I SHOOK HANDS WITH THE CREW AND NOTE FOR WHATEVER IT IS WORTH THAT THE CAPTAIN OBVIOUSLY WAS IN A CHEERFUL AND RELAXED MOOD.

THOSE ARE THE ONLY OBSERVATIONS I AM ABLE TO MAKE IN CONNECTION WITH THE DEPARTURE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HIS PARTY. UNQUOTE.

OUTGOING CODEOK *[initials]*

To : BUNCHE, NEW YORK
From : LINNER, MAC EOIN, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 11 October 1961
No. : A- 2347

*Lin***SECRET**

Reur 6984.

1. Note negative pregnant in Belgian denial their officers participated in attacks against ONUC. We never alleged they fired weapons or led assaults. Our A-2294, 2296, 2304 and 2322 did report evidence that named Belgian officers participated in sense of involvement in direction of overall operation. Language of your note verbale of 3 October quoted in 6858 BBB is perfectly consistent with this belief.

2. Serious comment seems unnecessary on charge that currently restricted capacity of ONUC to protect general population resulted from Gendarmerie withdrawals. We still assure protection those particular in areas. Incidents like Kipushi occur where Gendarmerie is active, while our troops are more or less immobilized by cease-fire in localities where Gendarmerie was incited to attack ONUC.

cc. Force Commander

INDICATE
PRIORITY

SVC Service	FFFF Routine	X	SSSS Priority	PRIORITE NATIONS
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N R

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Address(es)

FM ONUC LEO
TO UNATIONS NEW YORK
A- 2346

(TEXT & SIGNATURE)

insert prefix & / or number as required

USE DOUBLE SPACING.

BUNCHE FROM LINNEN

Following received from O'Brien:

Quote Italian consul has informed us that when he called on Tshombe last week to try to obtain release of Italian Doctor held as prisoner Tshombe proposed to agree provided Consul would sign declaration that Indian troops had used the Italian hospital as a standpoint from which they fired on gendarmerie and civilians Italian Consul naturally rejected this proposal. No repeat no Indian troops were in the Hospital at any time nor did any shooting take place from it. Tshombe's proposal is characteristic of the unscrupulous propaganda being waged by him and his friends against UN. Unquote

Comments follow separately.

Imp. Sarfatti 10085

T. O. R.

BY :

Drafted by : J. Poujoulet

Authorized : Dr. S. Linnér

Date : 11 October 1961

T. O. D.

ok pth

OUTGOING CODE

PRIORITY

To : Bunche, New York
From : Linner, Léopoldville
Date : 11 October, 1961
N° : A-2345

Linner

SECRET

We ^{did} ~~have~~ transmitted your 6892 to O'Brien whose comments, in his ELLEO 981, are as follows: Quote

Si nous cessons entièrement de donner des conférences de presse nous laissons le champ libre à Tshombe qui fait usage copieux habile et sans scrupules de ce moyen d'action répandant chaque jour des mensonges au sujet de nos actions et nos intentions. Si nous refusons tous les contacts avec la presse, nous acceptons par implication la vérité des accusations. C'est un avantage dont Tshombe ne manquera pas de tirer profit. Etant donné la rapidité des communications de presse et la lenteur relative des nôtres, la nécessité d'avoir votre autorité préalable pour chaque communiqué à la presse aurait pour effet d'abandonner presque totalement ce terrain vital à Tshombé. Dans ces circonstances notre position ici deviendra progressivement intenable à la suite de l'empoisonnement de l'opinion publique par Tshombe laissée entièrement sans antidote. Il faut vivre ici pour comprendre l'emploi et les malaises de cette propagande. Le journal local de ce matin raconte par exemple qu'un homme a été coupé en morceaux hier dans le camp des réfugiés tandis que les soldats suédois tout autour se contentaient de prendre des clichés de cette atrocité. Des faits divers de cette sorte sont acceptés à vue par la population européenne et par un certain nombre de journalistes. Seul le maintien d'un rapport plus ou moins constant avec les

SECRET

journalistes a jusqu'ici empêché les diffusions sur une plus vaste échelle de pareilles nouvelles mensongères et susceptibles d'empoisonner l'opinion publique.

Suivant votre paragraphe 5 de votre cable je m'abstiendrai pour le moment c'est-à-dire pendant la période des négociations d'un accord définitif sur le feu, d'avoir des contacts directs avec presse, mais je demanderai à Succar de rester en contact avec les journalistes afin de pouvoir au moins démontrer la fausseté des accusations qui continueront sûrement d'être diffusées. Unquote.

JP

OUTGOING CODE

PRIORITY

To: Bunche New York

From: Linnér Léo *Linnér*

Date: 10 October 1961

No. : A- 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344

SECRET

1. I have received the following letter from Adoula: Quote

a) Le Gouvernement Central désirerait être renseigné sur la situation exacte, au point de vue militaire, dans le Nord Katanga.

b) D'après les informations qui nous sont parvenues, cette région serait présentement libérée de l'occupation de la Gendarmerie Katangaise.

c) Le Gouvernement Central a l'intention d'instaurer rapidement l'autorité dans cette même région, en y installant une administration.

d) En effet, les populations du Nord Katanga ne doivent pas être livrées à elles-mêmes et doivent avoir une autorité légale, sur la base de la loi fondamentale.

e) Il entre aussi dans l'intention du Gouvernement Central de faire occuper cette région par des troupes de l'ANC. Ces dernières n'auraient donc aucune intention belliqueuse, mais seulement le devoir de maintenir l'ordre et de protéger les populations civiles.
Unquote. /

2. When subsequently meeting with Adoula I gave him the military information he had requested in paragraph a).

3. As to the other two points in his letter we had as usual an open and friendly exchange of views. I said I could well understand his position in theory but that I was afraid of the practical consequences if things were not planned with extreme caution and care. I mentioned that once ANC troops had been allowed to go to Luluabourg it seemed to me very doubtful that even Adoula would be able to prevent them from finally moving on towards and into Katanga. He not only agreed but even said that if too much time passed by without any tangible solution of the Katanga problem being in sight he would be absolutely unable to stop ANC from invading the Katanga. He was the first one to say that such an invasion would inevitably result in a wholesale massacre of civilians and military alike. Furthermore he had no doubt that the end result would be a clash between

.../...

Lundulla's and Mobutu's troops. He also volunteered the information that the troops selected for Luluabourg by Mobutu had been chosen amongst the weakest elements as Mobutu was sure his men would be beaten anyway either by Lundulla's men or by the Katangese or by both and therefore had preferred to save the better parts.

4. Adoula was anxious to point out that the pressure on him to move into Katanga was by no means coming from the Stanleyville group in the Government only but actually from all political parties.

5. I pleaded with him to avoid doing anything whatsoever in the near future that might jeopardize our reconciliation efforts in Elisabethville and I am convinced that he personally is as anxious as we are to exercise caution and restraint.

6. However, I think it is necessary for us to try and think ahead so as to be prepared for any situation that might arise. In this spirit I have asked Khiary to provide us with some facts and ideas which might be of some assistance when we are groping for a suitable policy. ✓

7. Khiary's assessment of the situation and recommendations are as follows: Quote

8. Au Katanga, sur une population de 1,650,000, 600,000 au moins sont Baluba, Tshokwe et autres, opposés au régime. Le reste, formé par les tribus Lunda, Bayeke, soutient en principe le Gouvernement Tshombe. Cependant, même parmi ces tribus une partie de la jeunesse est unitariste et désire le retour du Katanga au Congo. D'ailleurs, ce sentiment de l'unité est aussi développé chez la majorité des jeunes congolaises, même dans d'autres provinces partisans du fédéralisme ou confédéralisme, comme le Bas-Congo, le Sud Kasai et autres.

9. Lors des élections du mois de Mai 60, les soixante sièges du Katanga, élus au suffrage universel direct, se répartirent dans l'ensemble comme suit: environ une trentaine pour la Conakat et autres partisans de Tshombe, environ vingt-trois pour la Balubakat de Sendwe et ses partisans, les autres soit environ 7 sièges étant plus ou moins opposés au régime du Président Tshombe sans toutefois donner leur appui, au groupe de la Balubakat.

.../...

10. Les Baluba, dynamiques et évolués, occupent la majorité des fonctions administratives, forment la masse la plus importante des ouvriers qualifiés, des sociétés et compagnies étrangères installées dans le pays et sur eux repose la vie économique. Ils sont en outre dans la Gendarmerie, la police, sont combatifs et guerriers. Les Baluba forment la majorité absolue de la population du Nord Katanga, allant d'Albertville à Kamina et Kaniema en passant par Manono et Malemba Nkulu. Bien entendu, dans ce grand territoire quelques poches sont habitées par des non-Baluba dont quelques-uns sont, à l'heure actuelle, par la force des choses, fidèles au Gouvernement ou subissent son autorité.

11. Par une politique délibérée, les Belges ont renversé l'échelle des valeurs en contraignant les Baluba et autres tribus évoluées à subir la loi de ceux de leurs compatriotes encore à l'état primitif. Cette politique rendait nécessaire la contrainte d'une tutelle étrangère.

12. Dans la partie du Katanga fidèle à Tshombe, les grands centres industriels et miniers, la capitale même, sont habités par de fortes minorités Baluba agissantes. Ainsi à Elisabethville, Jadotville, Kolwezi, un peu moins de la moitié de la population est Baluba. Lors des derniers événements de Septembre environ 36,000 Baluba d'Elisabethville sur 70,000 se sont réfugiés sous la protection de l'ONU, entravant l'activité économique de la capitale.

Ceux-ci posent
13. ~~Ceci pose~~ aux Nations Unies des problèmes de plus en plus grands étant donné les conditions sanitaires déplorables qui règnent dans le "Camp". Ils sont de plus travaillés très fortement par des groupements de jeunesse qui les incitent à la révolte et qui, trompant la surveillance des troupes Onusiennes qui les gardent, réussissent de temps à autre, à s'infiltrer dans la ville où ils commettent des exactions sur les populations civiles. Toutes tentatives faites jusqu'à présent par l'ONU tant auprès des autorités Katangaises qu'auprès des grandes sociétés qui les emploient pour solutionner leurs problèmes, sont demeurées vaines. D'autres incidents ont eu lieu récemment, et notamment à Kipushi, le 29 Septembre, où, après une lutte acharnée contre la gendarmerie, les Baluba ont forcé celle-ci à battre en retraite et à déposer les armes. A la suite de cet incident, les autorités Katangaises ne

sont pas demeurées inactives et une expédition punitive menée par des renforts de la gendarmerie, aurait fait - d'après des renseignements non contrôlés - environ une centaine de morts parmi les Baluba.

14. Jusqu'au mois d'Août 1961, les Baluba du Kasai appuyaient la politique des Autorités Katangaises; après le ralliement de Kalonji, ils se sont mis en bloc du côté de l'opposition. Cette situation pose un grave problème aux autorités katangaises qui ont employé les moyens les plus féroces pour terroriser la population Baluba et la forcer à se soumettre ou à quitter le pays. A l'heure actuelle Tshombe propose de mettre des trains à la disposition des réfugiés et autres Baluba qui veulent quitter le Katanga. Il offre même une indemnité à ceux qui ont bradé leurs biens à vil prix.

15. Dans cet aperçu d'ensemble, la situation militaire se présente comme suit:

- a) Kabalo et sa région sont depuis toujours sous administration Baluba;
- b) Albertville, Nyembu, Manono, Nyunzu et leurs territoires sont sous contrôle des Nations Unies, la Gendarmerie est inexistante et a déposé ses armes. Cependant, une garnison importante de 1,200 hommes se trouve encore à Kongolo.

16. Les meilleurs éléments de la Gendarmerie sont Baluba et sont, à l'heure actuelle, suspectés par autorités katangaises et officiers blancs dans leur loyalisme et taxés de tiédeur vis-à-vis du régime. Bon nombre s'échappe et rejoint l'ANC ou se met sous la protection des Nations Unies. Un fait est certain, ils ne se battront pas contre les troupes du Gouvernement central. Tshombe le sait et écarte officiers et troupes Baluba des frontières, ce qui augmente leur appréhension et les force vers la désertion.

17. Lors des dernières hostilités, la majorité de la Gendarmerie n'a pas participé à la lutte.

18. Le 13 Septembre, la Gendarmerie était d'après des renseignements dignes de foi prête à se rendre. Elle fut empêchée par l'intervention rapide des officiers blancs rassemblés en toute hâte par Munongo, parmi les anciens officiers des forces katangaises, des colons, des employés des sociétés étrangères installées au Katanga. Ces mêmes officiers ont enlevé Tshombe. Ces officiers ont commenté les résolutions votées la veille par le Parlement de Léopoldville comme une volonté évidente du Gouvernement Central de désarmer la Gendarmerie et d'arrêter ses officiers. Par ce subterfuge ils ont obtenu un revirement de la part des forces Katangaises d'Elisabethville.

.../...

19. De l'application des résolutions du Conseil de sécurité et de l'Assemblée Générale:

a) Sur l'ensemble des territoires formés des 5 provinces sous contrôle du Gouvernement Central, la loi et l'ordre s'étendent progressivement. Les luttes inter-tribales cessent, la réconciliation s'étend, la vie économique reprend malgré les difficultés.

b) L'oasis de paix, tant vantée par Tshombé et malgré un semblant de fausse prospérité n'a cessé depuis un an d'être un foyer d'infection qui s'aggrave de jour en jour. Aux atrocités Baluba a répondu l'extermination décidée par Munongo: des villages brûlés, la population pourchassée jusqu'au fond des forêts les plus reculées; l'anarchie totale règne sur une moitié du Katanga et l'activité économique est paralysée sur ce territoire;

c) Le respect de l'intégrité territoriale est mis en échec par des agitateurs étrangers pour des considérations qui n'ont rien à voir avec les intérêts supérieurs du Congo et du peuple congolais:

20. Le Gouvernement Central dont l'équilibre et la stabilité sont encore frêles, risque de chuter contre l'écueil katangais et, dans ce cas, les conséquences les plus graves peuvent en résulter. Les Nations Unies supporteraient leur part de responsabilité.

21. Pour éviter d'en arriver à cette extrémité, tous les moyens pacifiques et de persuasion ont été employés mais les résultats obtenus sont maigres. Nous avons à faire face à des positions arrêtées d'avance et nous luttons contre un ennemi invisible qui tire sur nous en se cachant derrière ceux que nous voulons protéger. (2)

22. Le Gouvernement Central, quoique ne voulant en rien gêner l'action pacifique des Nations Unies, prend des mesures importantes pour pallier à la situation en cas d'aggravation.

23. Que cherchent les autorités katangaises:

- a) Gagner du temps;
- b) Laisser passer l'émotion causée par la mort du Secrétaire Général pour permettre à certains pays de modifier leur position en faveur du Katanga;
- c) Acquérir des moyens de lutte supérieurs à ceux du Gouvernement Central, blindés, avions, armes offensives, etc. Les renseignements de différentes sources confirment nos câbles précédents sur ce point. Tshombe, après avoir demandé le contrôle à

l'arrivée des avions des Nations Unies atterrissant sur les aérodromes katangais, a renoncé à ce contrôle lorsque j'ai demandé la réciprocité pour la surveillance des régions frontalières de Kolwezi, Jadotville, Kipushi, etc.

d) Semer la suspicion et la discorde entre les membres du Gouvernement central en essayant de les diviser sur des problèmes sensibles, comme la responsabilité de la mort de Lumumba. Tshombe a envoyé des émissaires à Léopoldville pour soudoyer certains responsables militaires et civils très versatiles pour obtenir leur défection. ~~Des détails vous seront fournis ultérieurement sur ce dernier point.~~

24. En essayant de juger ⁽³⁾ l'action probable des autorités katangaises dans les circonstances actuelles, il est nécessaire de tenir compte, à tout moment, de la politique rhodésienne. Il n'y a aucun doute que c'est à la frontière rhodésienne, surtout dans la région N'Dola-Kipushi, que s'organisent les activités militaires katangaises, recrutement des volontaires, importation d'armes et de munitions, etc. Kolwezi, la base militaire la plus importante du Katanga, se trouve également non loin de la frontière de Rhodésie.

25. Le Gouvernement Central au courant des préparatifs katangais n'attaquera pas avec ⁽⁴⁾ des moyens inférieurs. Que fera-t-il ? Achètera-t-il légalement des armes offensives que Tshombe obtient en contrebande ? Les Nations Unies, ne pouvant être l'instrument d'une politique nationale, n'apporteront sur le plan militaire évidemment aucune aide au Gouvernement. Il s'ensuit que la politique qui s'impose de notre côté et pour éviter un conflit ouvert, doit être une politique de prudence et de grande fermeté puisque ceux qui soutiennent Tshombe et à qui il doit "sa survivance" ne lui permettront pas de renouveler de son côté les hostilités.

26. Proposition. Pour sortir de cet imbroglio, et compte tenu de tout ce qui précède, nous proposons l'étude du plan suivant: Tout en continuant à appliquer strictement le cessez-le-feu, les Nations Unies ne s'opposeront pas à l'infiltration pacifique des troupes du Gouvernement Central dans les régions actuellement sous contrôle total des Nations Unies, ou déjà contrôlées par les éléments opposés au Gouvernement Katangais.

.../...

Cette infiltration doit être précédée par l'installation d'une administration civile qui fait défaut depuis certains mois, et qui contiendra l'ANC dans des limites valables à son arrivée. La liberté donnée au Gouvernement central dans cette région est légale, pacifique et unanime.

A-2344 27. Ouverture immédiate du chemin de fer de Kabalo pour la relance économique. Il est à remarquer que tous les postes, ou villes occupées par l'ANC, ne comprennent que de la population africaine, à l'exception d'Albertville et notre présence en force assurera la transition entre les deux règnes. Il est faux de croire actuellement que la population blanche se trouverait plus en danger avec l'ANC qu'avec une Gendarmerie qui ne contrôle plus rien ou qui demande pour elle-même la protection des Nations Unies contre les Baluba.

28. Cette opération légale réalisée dans le calme et s'accompagnant d'une relance de la vie économique et d'une campagne de politique de la main tendue et de réconciliation, doit immanquablement déclencher un mouvement de ralliement de la part des populations avoisinantes et des éléments Baluba de la Gendarmerie. Le plan de l'infiltration de l'ANC sera préparé par des techniciens qui éviteront toutes les difficultés prévisibles. (2)

29. Les risques de ce plan sont minimes. En effet, techniquement Tshombe ne peut réagir valablement par les moyens militaires habituels. S'il emploie la force, il y a de gros risques pour lui et la réaction de l'opinion publique mondiale lui sera défavorable et le Gouvernement central sera en mesure et en droit de s'opposer par les mêmes moyens en demandant aux Nations Unies d'arrêter le vol des avions pirates. (3)

30 Ce plan sera mis en exécution après une préparation minutieuse avec le Gouvernement Central qui déléguera le Vice-Premier Ministre Sendwe ou le Ministre de la Justice Mwamba Rémi avec plein pouvoir pour diriger les opérations civiles à partir de Kabalo ou d'Albertville. Sendwe et Mwamba jouissent de l'amitié et de l'estime des milieux européens dans le Nord Katanga et ont une grande influence sur le peuple Baluba dont ils disciplineront l'action.

(4)
31. Les forces des Nations Unies déchargées d'une grande partie des obligations qui leur sont imposées aujourd'hui, pourront mieux s'adonner à une tâche de paix, de réconciliation, de protection de toute la population blanche et noire.

32. La pénétration pacifique au Katanga Nord, l'instauration de l'ordre et la paix tranquilliseront la population blanche qui, rassurée, cessera sa lutte subversive actuelle qui est à l'origine de la cessation et autres difficultés du Congo. Dans le cadre de la nouvelle situation qui sera créée par la perte du Katanga du Nord et de certains appuis et conseillers, le renforcement de l'hostilité Baluba et des éléments africains rhodésiens, nous prévoyons que la frontière avec la Rhodésie deviendra moins perméable et Tshombe plus compréhensif. (5)

33. Il est à remarquer qu'en cas d'insuccès de nos démarches actuelles il sera difficile de maintenir l'ANC massée sur les frontières dans une inactivité démoralisante. Ces forces finiront donc par pénétrer au Katanga, et dans cette hypothèse, il est préférable qu'elles le fassent avec notre accord ~~en lui fixant ses objectifs et la manière de les atteindre~~, que de le faire contre notre volonté et les résultats dans ce cas seront surement négatifs. D'ailleurs les Nations Unies ne peuvent indéfiniment entraver l'action d'un Gouvernement légal pour rétablir par une opération de police l'ordre et la paix dans une partie de son territoire, cependant qu'elles tolèrent à des rebelles de pratiquer un génocide sur la moitié de la population. Ce plan pourrait être étudié mais on ne procédera à son opération qu'au cas où tous les moyens actuels s'avèreraient vains. En cas de négociations tout sera arrêté pour encourager les possibilités d'entente pacifique. Cela devrait être entendu au préalable avec le Gouvernement Central. Unquote

(7)
34. The above analysis was written before Khiary returned to E'ville and maybe subject to some modifications in the light of the results which he may be likely to achieve in his continued conversations with the Katangese authorities.

UNITED NATIONS — NATIONS UN

INDICATE
PRIORITY

SVC Service	FFFFF Routine	X	SSSSS Priority	PRIORITE NATIONS
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Priorité Nations traffic
is strictly limited.

CLEAR

N R

1961 OCT 10 PM 6:21

Address(es) FM ONUC LEO
TO UNATIONS NEW YORK
A- 2340

O.N.U.C.

(TEXT & SIGNATURE)

insert prefix & / or number as required

USE DOUBLE SPACING.

BUNCHE FROM LINNÉ

Reur 7025. We have never received either reports to which you make reference.

2. ICRC Representative in Leo, Mr. de Preux, who visited prisoners in Elisabethville and Jadotville, confirms he sent his reports directly to Geneva who must have subsequently transmitted copies to you.

3. De Preux is cabling Geneva for additional copies for our benefit.

Imp. Sarfati 10085

T. O. R.

BY :

T. O. D.

Drafted by : J. Poujoulat
Authorized : S. Linnér
Date : 10 Oct. 1961

UNITED NATIONS — NATIONS U NIS

INDICATE
PRIORITY

SVC Service	FFFFF Routine	SSSSS Priority	X	PRIORITE NATIONS
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Priorité Nations traffic
is strictly limited.

N R

CLEAR

1961 OCT 10 PM 3:21

Address(es)

FM ONUC LEO
TO UNATIONS NEW YORK
2339

O.N.U.C

(TEXT & SIGNATURE)

insert prefix & / or number as required

USE DOUBLE SPACING.

BUNCHE FROM LINNER Reur 6821 and 6982 reply to CICR delayed pending details
from E'ville sent Boissier today as follows: Quote Unquote

Imp. Sarfati 10085

T. O. R.

T. O. D.

BY :

Drafted by : M.W. Cox

Authorized : Dr. S. Linnér

Date : 10 October 1961

OUTGOING CODE

To : BUNCHE, NEW YORK
From : LINNER, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 10 October 1961
No. : A- 2338

Lin

*ok
for*

SECRET

Reference para (a) of your 6981 report containing information called for by Commission being pouched to-day in duplicate addressed to Schachter.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

*OK
J. Hawley*

*Sub
9/10*

To: Bunche

From: Linner, Mac Eoin

Linner

Date: 9 Oct 61

No: A-2337

Reur 7002. There is no basis for the Welensky charge. No ammunition of any kind has been taken into Eville or any other place in Katanga since the cease-fire.

cc: Gen Mac Eoin

OUTGOING CODE

OK
Shaw
ROUTINE

To: BUNCHE, New York
From: LINNER, Leopoldville
Date: 9 October 1961
No.: A-2336

Linner

I have got indications from various sources these last few days that considerable amounts of Tshombe money are being handed out to several people here in order to stir up the ever latent independence claims in Lower Congo. The aim is obvious: if, at this juncture, Tshombe can point to a vociferous independence movement in Kasavubu's own fief and under the very nose of the Central Government, he will certainly gain a propaganda point for his own secessionism. I have talked with Adoula about this. He confirms the above and views the situation with concern.

OUTGOING CODE

OK
Drauley
PRIORITY

To: MACFARQUHAR, New York

From: LINNER, Leopoldville

Date: 9 October 1961

No.: A-2335

Reur 6996. When I again raised the question of van der Oord's return it was because I had received a letter from him from which I quote:

"I doubt that ECAFE would care to refuse twice."

As things have developed however I reluctantly agree with you that we have to give up one of the best men we ever had down here and who has won the confidence and respect of the Congolese as few others have.

May I on a more general note ask to what degree pressure is applied on ECE to help us out with personnel. I cannot help feeling that they are quietly polishing old silver whilst we down here are trying to put a clay cup together.

OUTGOING CODE

PRIORITY

Handwritten signature: H. Charles

To : BUNCHE, NEW YORK
From : LINNER, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 9 October 1961
No. : A- 2334

Handwritten signature: Linner

Following from Khiari:

QUOTE

1. Ai rencontré Kimba qui assure l'intérim du Président. L'ai mis au courant réponse Adoula à message verbal de Tshombé. Il a marqué son accord sur cette réponse et a promis de la transmettre ce jour même à Tshombé, de la discuter ce soir avec Conseil Ministres. Il a confirmé décision Gouvernement envoyer émissaires à Léo. ✓

2. Contrôle du cessez-le-feu.

(a) Kimba se plaint que troupes Nations Unies aient procédé à Albertville au désarmement Gendarmerie katangaise revenue depuis deux jours dans ses cantonnements.

(b) Nations Unies auraient installé administration civile Baluba à Nyunzu.

(c) Arrêté et fouillé voiture Général Muke sur route Jadotville.

(d) Renforcé positions Nations Unies Poste, Lido, pont.

3. Raja consulté dément désarmement Gendarmerie d'Albertville. Quant à l'installation administration Baluba à Nyunzu est vrai mais ceci a été fait avec l'accord de l'ancien Commissaire de Tshombé resté sur place et devenu une sorte de conseiller de la nouvelle administration, ce que Kimba pensait également sans intervention aucune des Nations Unies.

4. Nous reprenons le travail de la commission demain matin et ai soumis projet d'accord dont vous avez copie et ai beaucoup insisté sur nécessité de conclure accord qui permettrait aux deux parties de voir le problème qui les sépare avec moins de méfiance, confirmant que si le protocole était signé demain nos troupes se retireraient immédiatement des positions qu'elles occupent actuellement et notamment Poste Lido et BCK.³ Lui ai fait remarquer également que l'interdiction faite à la sous-commission de visiter certaines régions déclencherait automatiquement de notre part des décisions de protection que l'autorité militaire ne tarderait pas à prendre. Sur ce point il a confirmé son accord personnel de voir une liberté totale accordée à la commission dans ses visites à toutes les régions du Katanga.

UNQUOTE

OUTGOING CABLE

~~SECRET~~

Cable

ROUTINE

To : BUNCHE

From : LINNER

Date : 7 October 1961

No. : A-2333

F 061725Z

FM BRUC STAN

TO UNIC LEO

BT

FOLLOWING FROM ENGLUND STAN YESTERDAY QUOTE

SECRET. 1178 LINNER FROM ENGLUND.

PARA 1. THE POLITICAL TEMPERATURE IN STAN HAS RISEN SOMEWHAT AFTER THE ARRIVAL OF GIZENGA

PARA 2. EYE HAD A TALK YESTERDAY WITH MANZIKALA WHO DID NOT SEEM TO BE ADVISED ABOUT GIZENGAS ARRIVAL AND ABOUT THE PURPOSE OF HIS VISIT. HE TOLD ME THAT HE WILL NOT VISIT GIZENGA. THE 2 GENTLEMEN ARE APPARENTLY NOT ON SPEAKING TERMS. MANZIKALA TOLD ME HE WAS WORRIED AND WANTED REINFORCEMENT OF UN TROOPS

PARA 3. LATER EYE HAD A DISCUSSION WITH LUNDULLA WHO SEEMINGLY THINKS OF NOTHING BUT KATANGA. LUNDULLA CRITICIZED THE CENTRAL GOVT FOR BEING TOO PASSIVE BECAUSE; AS HE SAID, THE LEO POEPLER, CONTRARY TO THE STAN PEOPLE, ARE NOT INTELLIGENT AND SOME PERSONS, SPECIALLY KASAVUBU AND MOBUTU, HAVE PRIVATE ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN KATANGA. LUNDULLA FURTHER HEARD THAT IF THE SECESSION OF KATANGA IS TOLERATED OTHER PROVINCES MIGHT TRY THE SAME

PARA 4. LUNDULLA JOINED IN KASONGOS COMPLAINTS AT THE CENTRAL GOVT FOR ASSIGNING FOREIGN OFFICERS WHO WERE SAID TO BE WORKING AGAINST THE GOVT, PURSUE ESPIONNAGE AND OCCUPY LUCRATIVE POSITIONS THAT COULD BE GIVEN TO CONGOLESE AS WELL. IN HIS RADIO SPEECH, KASONGO FURTHER CONCLUDED THAT THE CENTRAL GOVT IS FOUNDED ON THE FORCE OF THE STAN GROUP FIGHTING FOR UNITY. THERE WERE HOWEVER SOME POSSIBLE POINTS IN KASONGOS SPEECH. IN SPITE OF HIS COMPLAINTS, HE CALLED UPON THE POPULATION TO SUPPORT THE CENTRAL GOVT, TO WORK HARD AND TO COMBAT ANY

01/07/1

.....12

~~SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2 1 1

KIND OF FRAUDULENCE

PARA 5. GIZENGAS STAY IN STAN HAS GIVEN RISE TO MANY RUMOURS. EYE HAVE LEARNT FROM 2 INDEPENDENT SOURCES, THE RELIABILITY OF WHICH IS DIFFICULT TO ESTIMATE, THAT GIZENGA WILL NOT GO BACK. GIZENGA IS FURTHER SAID TO HAVE EXPRESSED AT A MEETING WITH HIS FRIENDS HIS GRATITUDE TO THE UN FOR HAVING SAVED HIS LIFE WHEN GOING TO LEO. THE LAST THEORY PRODUCED IS THAT HE WILL BE STAYING FOR 1 MONTH THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THERE IS A WIDESPREAD OPINION AMONG THE POPULATION HERE THAT GIZENGA WILL NOT GO BACK.

PARA 6. EYE FINALLY VISITED KASONGO YESTERDAY, WHO WAS ILL AND COULD NOT RETURN TO LEO TODAY. AMONG MEMBERS OF JEUNESSE PUNA THERE IS A SAYING GOING THAT KASONGO WANTS TO REPLACE KASAVUBU AS THE HEAD OF STATE.


PARA 7. EYE HAVE TRANSMITTED INFORMATION CONTAINED IN YOUR SV641 TO THE PROVINCIAL GOVT, WHO SEEMED TO BE REASSURED. EYE FURTHER LEARNED THAT MANZIKALA HAD A PHONE CONVERSATION WITH ADOULA WHO HAD TOLD HIM THE SAME.

PARA 8. EYE HAVE ONLY WANTED TO GIVE YOU THE ABOVE INFORMATION TO ILLUSTRATE TO SOME EXTENT THE LINE OF THINKING HERE.

PARA 9. THE MMN CONFERENCE WAS TERMINATED YESTERDAY AFTER 3 DAYS MEETINGS, THE SPEECHES OF KASONGO ABOVE-MENTIONED WERE DELIVERED AT THE CONFERENCE. SALUMU BERNARD STATED IN HIS LAST SPEECH THAT MNC, PSA AND BALUBAKAT ARE THE 3 PARTIES ON WHICH THE CONGO UNITY IS BASED. HE FURTHER STRESSED THE NECESSITY OF MERGING THE 3 PARTIES INTO 1. SALUMU CONCLUDED BY DEMANDING THE POPULATION TO OBEY THE ADOULA GOVT, BEING THE LEGAL SUCCESSOR OF THE LUMUMBA GOVT. THE REST OF THE CONFERENCE

CONCERNED WITH INTERNAL ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS AND SPECIALLY RELATING

OUTGOING CODE

OK 
PRIORITY

To: BUNCHE, New York
From: LINNER, Leopoldville
Date: 7 October 1961
No.: A-2332

A-2332B

SECRET

WTC
Approved in draft
by SL

1. As I mentioned when we met in Stockholm, ~~time has~~ now come for a considerable strengthening of the team of my office. For quite some time we were able to go ahead with a very small nucleus indeed and I do in fact believe that for instance for the period just before, during and immediately after the Lovanium session there was a definite advantage in working with a minimum of partners considering the extreme delicacy of the operations.
2. We now have ~~however~~ to adapt ourselves to conditions which whilst just possibly more normal will still tax our strength to the utmost. Perhaps it is not necessary or possible to go back to the kind of very extensive set-up we had during Dayal's time but some reinforcements seem to me absolutely vital.
3. With the loss of Fabry my office is reduced to a good English-language legal advisor and a vigorous Personal Assistant. As Kanakarathne is fully occupied with A-2 and internal legal questions, that means that if Poujoulat is out (as he is momentarily in hospital with a laceration ^(as he was) or on a field trip ~~as~~ recently to the Eville refugee camp) I would be utterly devoid of regular staff to carry on the many functions of my office. What is needed above all is an assistant with maturity, all-round competence, solid UN background and bilingual. He would be my main coordinator and should have the diplomatic skill to maintain the more delicate government contacts not handled by me personally. I consider that Dumontet has these qualities as well as excellent Congo experience. He would be willing to accept the

proposal if family arrangements were made and his promotion to D-1 which seems to have been long in process were definitive as against mere post allowance. (1) I would be grateful if you would give this suggestion positive consideration. Cox who has been performing much more of this internal executive function than legal work shares my view.

4. One intermediate level political officer for all-purpose bilingual written and personal contact work of the type made famous by Liu and Martin would also be needed and still leave the sixth floor staff far smaller than in Dayal's day. For nationality balance in relation to the Dumontet request I would think an FT Liu would be perfect if he could be persuaded. Of course his wife would be welcome to work with us too if that would in any way facilitate the arrangement. It would indeed be a wonderful thing to have him here and should it not go through I would appreciate it if you would kindly tell him how much I miss him, both professionally and personally.

A-2332-B → 5. Since Bill Cox' stay here is alas only temporary a legal adviser of high calibre and well tested in UN affairs is urgently needed to replace Fabry. As A-2 matters continue to claim attention I am reluctant to lose Kanakaratne and Ahmed too speaks highly of him. On the other hand Government contacts applying the agreements and working out other relationships will become more urgent and require a French-language legal Adviser preferably versed in continental law. Cox indicates the legal Counsel has been considering the possibility of exchanging Marcella in Gaza with Kanakaratne. The latter is quite agreeable though wishing only to settle his apartment and personal matters in New York en route. His nationality and political background would be excellent in the Middle East and Marcella's UNTSO and UNEF background valuable here.

6. Pagnanelli's assignment here terminates in December. Taff is disposing of the claims backlog and his greater skills in daily bread legal problems are unexploited as a mere Board Secretary. Ahmed, Cox and I think the legal

office would gain by using Taff for general internal legal advice as number two there.

7. I must remind you that we are still waiting anxiously for a man to take up the post of Chief Civilian Officer in Luluabourg. Tickner was definitely promised an assignment here as Field Coordinator and is badly needed as such regardless of the reinforcements suggested above. (1)

8. We are also waiting for a man to be Chief Civilian Officer in Coquilhatville. The present arrangement should be considered only as a temporary one faute de mieux.

9. De Ry Reynier has now left as you know. His job could be taken over by Dumontet. The rather unfortunate experience we had with him makes me feel that when strengthening my office definite preference should be given to regular UN staff members who have already proved their salt within our own Organization.

A- 10. Since Knecht has also left and Egge too I would suggest that apart from Egge's replacement, who is I believe a good man but not with the overall training and experience of Egge, we get a man attached to this office, preferably a civilian who is well-versed in intelligence activities. We are in fact dangerously weak on this score and one man even of the highest calibre would have more than a full-time job.

11. We need a first-rate Public Relations man. Apart from the unhappy situation in which we find ourselves in Elisabethville as regards press and radio our position here in Leopoldville is not satisfactory. True, the so to speak more mechanical side of providing the reporters with news is fairly well handled. But there is of course so much more to do in the nature of background information and orientation about our policy. As it is I am devoting much of my time to this and although in most cases it does pay off quite nicely I simply cannot afford the time. Is there any chance of getting George Ivan-Smith down here even if only for a month or two?

12. Reference Narasimhan memo PRU 61 of 2 October Packham looks very useful. We would welcome him soonest.

1961 OCT -7 PM 12:19
OUTGOING CLEAR
U.N.U.C.

ROUTINE

LEOPOLDVILLE
7 October 1961

UNATIONS NEW YORK

No.: A-2331

BUNCHE from LINNER



Re. the Fuga I am sure you have ^{noticed} ~~noted~~ article and photo in
Newsweek October 9 page 54.

Outgoing Code

oh ME
SECRET

To : Bunche and MacFarquhar
From : Linner *Linner*
Date : 7 Oct 61
No. : A-2330

As you are aware we are awaiting the recruitment of a qualified Officer to take charge of Public Works Units in Civilian Operations in replacement of Van der Oord. We have continued to hope however that Van der Oord could be reassigned as he had established extremely good relations with the Government authorities and had assisted in developing and supervising Public Works programme with outstanding competence. Since no one has yet been assigned to the post I would be grateful for your support in obtaining release of Van der Oord from ECAFE. You may wish to consider possibility of assignment of expert under recruitment for the post in ONUC to ECAFE as replacement for Van der Oord as this would enable us to maintain continuity of experience which is of paramount importance here both for the conduct of our work as well as in our relations with Government.

cc: Mr. G. Dumontet
Miss N. Osborne

OUTGOING CLEAR

1961 OCT -7 AM 11:12

O.N.U.C. ROUTINE

LEOPOLDVILLE
7 October 1961

UNATIONS NEW YORK

A-2329

BUNCHE from LINNER

Linier

Following received from O'Brien:

"The Katangese radio today carried the story that Sabena had complained to Kimba about a dozen civil aircrafts at Elisabethville airport alleged to have been put out of action by the UN. Local Sabena representatives called on me to express regret about the story which is a deliberate piece of fiction. They are protesting the Katangese authorities."

1961 OCT 7 AM 4:12

OUTGOING CLEAR

O. NOUNOU, C.

LEOPOLDVILLE
7 October 1961

ROUTINE

UNATIONS NEW YORK

Linner

A-2328

BUNCHE From LINNER

DOCTOR E. Beck Chief of the Civilian Swiss Medical Unit has sent me a letter from which I quote:

"Le dimanche 24.9.61 un agent de police congolais a trouvé en brousse dans les environs de la ville un nouveau-né abandonné par sa mère. Il l'a déposé à la maternité de notre hôpital. Selon la coutume du pays, la directrice de la maternité, une religieuse blanche, l'a prié de donner un nom à cet orphelin. Le policier a choisi Hammarskjold. C'est ainsi que le lundi 25.9.61 un jeune Congolais fut baptisé de ce nom illustre.

"Cette histoire a eu encore un épilogue qui mérite également d'être connu. Hier la religieuse en question qui travaille inlassablement depuis plus de 30 ans à la maternité m'a demandé d'où venait ce nom étrange. Cette ignorance illustre bien le dévouement complet de ces soeurs à leur religion et à leur travail."

OUTGOING CLEAR

LEOPOLDVILLE
6 October 1961

1961 OCT -6 PM 6:42

O.N.U.C.

UNATIONS
NEW YORK

A- 2327 BUNCHE FROM LINNER

REUR 6866 and 6895. Propose addendum as follows:

1. Following is an interim report on the implementation of the cease-fire agreement between ONUC and the Katangese authorities, signed at Ndola on 20 September 1961, previously reported on (S/4940 Add 7). The agreement became definitive, in accordance with its terms, upon its approval by United Nations Headquarters, which was communicated to Mr. Tshombe on 24 September 1961.
2. With this communication were formally transmitted the express conditions as understood during the negotiations with Mr. Tshombe, as follows:

"La conclusion de l'accord ne saurait constituer une modification quelconque des résolutions du Conseil de sécurité, y compris celle du 21 février 1961, et de l'Assemblée générale.

L'accord a un caractère strictement militaire et s'applique exclusivement à la force des Nations Unies au Katanga et aux forces armées au Katanga. Il ne comporte aucune intention ou fin politique.

L'accord ne s'applique pas en dehors du Katanga. "

Mr. Tshombe was likewise informed that his demand for indemnities for "war damages" was rejected by Headquarters.

3. In accordance with para 3 of the cease-fire agreement providing for a mixed commission with full powers to implement and supervise its application, Mr. Tshombe had on 21 September 1961 designated as the Katangese members Mr. Evariste Kimba, "Minister of Foreign Affairs", and General Muke.

ONUC on 23 September designated Mr. Mahmoud Khiary, who had negotiated the agreement at Ndola, and Col. Anders Kjellgren. An initial meeting took place in E'ville on 26 September 1961. The Katangese members called for the definitive withdrawal of ONUC troops from Katanga. This proposition was rejected and later withdrawn.

4. In the meeting of 27 September 1961 the ONUC representatives proposed that first priority be given to the exchange of prisoners pursuant to para 6 of the cease-fire agreement, to be followed by the organization of the surveillance functions of the mixed commission in accordance with para 3. The Katangese members presented a memorandum which contained a large number of proposals which the ONUC members considered so extreme as not to merit extensive discussion, as their main effect would have been to yield to Katangese control all aerodromes, regardless of their previous status or essential character for ONUC operations, restrict ONUC troops to their cantonments or to routes linking these to aerodromes, and like measures.

5. On the following day, 28 September 1961, there was established, in implementation of para 3 of the agreement, a mixed subcommission of three officers from each side to visit the garrisons and report to the commission.

6. Meanwhile discussions took up again on the highest level for continuing

by pacific procedures the application of para A.2 of the Secco resolution of 21 February 1961 for the immediate evacuation from Katanga of all foreign military or para-military personnel, political advisers and mercenaries.

7. The mixed sub-commission referred to in para 5 above began its first tour on 29 September 1961. This was designed in particular to correct erroneous information on ^{the} part of the Katangese authorities as to the military situation prevailing in the localities selected, namely, Kamina Base and Kamina town, Manono, Albertville, Niembo and Nyunzu. It was thus possible to establish that, contrary to erroneous statements given out, no portion of the ONUC base at Kamina was or had been under occupation by Katangese forces. Albertville, Niembo and Nyunzu were shown to be firmly held by the UN Force, the Gendarmerie being either isolated in their barracks or having fled into the bush. The situation was calm and no violation of the cease-fire terms by ONUC was alleged by any Katangese member of the sub-commission.

8. This tour took from 29 September to 1 October 1961, inclusive. When it was sought to continue the agreed itinerary to visit Jadotville, Kipushi and Kolwezi, (violations of the cease-fire having been reported in the last two, in the form of re-introduction of mercenaries and war material) difficulties were interposed by the Katangese authorities. Mr. Tshombe in a press conference on 2 October 1961 sought to justify this non-compliance with the formal understandings of the commission on the grounds that ONUC at Nyunzu ^{had} violated the agreement by taking prisoners after the cease-fire. ONUC representatives demonstrated that the Gendarmerie and police in this locality had fled into the bush before the cease-fire and had subsequently returned ^(asked to surrender in order) and requested to be placed under ONUC protection, ^{as they feared} ~~from~~ the local population.

9. It was agreed that the group would proceed to Jadotville. General Muke then stated that the sub-commission would be permitted only to see the ^{and other} Irish prisoners. When Col. Kjellgren called upon Mr. Kimba to protest ¹ he was informed that General Muke had been in error. The mixed sub-commission therefore departed for Jadotville on 5 October 1961. On their arrival the local Gendarmerie commander asserted that he had instructions from Mr. Tshombe that only the prisoners could be visited. No account was taken of the protests and explanations made by both elements of the mixed sub-commission. This was in clear violation of formal undertakings.

10. A new meeting was proposed by the Katangese at the commission level for 6 October 1961 to settle the question but at the same time was conditional on ONUC consent to withdraw from various points still the subject of negotiation in the commission and not related to the functioning of the sub-commission. Col. Kjellgren rejected the proposal of a meeting on such terms. ^A

formal protest by ONUC was transmitted on 6 October 1961 to Mr. Tshombe in view of this grave impediment to the effective application of the agreement.

11. Col. Kjellgren did, however, on 5 October 1961, inspect the prisoners at Jadotville. They are now 191 in number, some taken at Elisabethville having also been transferred there. He found them well treated, well fed and in good spirits. They are accommodated at the Hotel de l'Europe. The five wounded Irish soldiers have recovered.

12. On 2 October 1961 Mr. Khiary submitted to the Katangese authorities a proposal for a protocol in implementation of the cease-fire agreement which would fix a time for the exchange of prisoners without further delay. It would create three sub-commissions authorized to carry out inspections at any time and any place on request of either party, a complaint by either then being placed before the full mixed commission. ONUC would return specified positions to the Katangese, and both sides would guarantee their

neutrality. These would include the Post Office, subject to a guarantee of freedom of communications. The Katangese authorities would assure that civilians should not possess weapons. Both parties would undertake not to engage in hostile propaganda, boycotts or the rupture of public utility services. Application of the Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961 would of course proceed.

12. The Katangese members submitted counter-proposals which were unfortunately still in the vein of those mentioned in para 4 above. Mr. Khiary thereupon returned to ONUC Headquarters, Leopoldville, to report. He proposes to renew negotiations in Elisabethville for the protocol as from 7 October 1961.

cc. Mr. N. Ho.

OUTGOING CODE

ok 11/30
SECRET

TO : UNATIONS NEW YORK

NO / A- 2326

MACFARQUAR
BUNCHE FROM LINNER STOP BY ONUC 5700 MACFARQUAR WAS INFORMED THAT CHATTI HAD PUT OFF
FOR AN INDEFINITE TIME ACCEPTANCE POST SENIOR CONSULTANT PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION STOP
WE ARE NOW INFORMED THAT CHATTI HAS WITHDRAWN HIS CANDIDATURE ALTOGETHER STOP
IMPORTANCE AND EXTREME URGENCY OF HAVING CHATTI HERE WAS EXPLAINED BY KHIARY TO
MACFARQUAR IN CABLES 5183 AND 5287 STOP CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO SOLICIT
OUR AID TO ORGANIZE THEIR ADMINISTRATION AND DETERMINE ACTIVITIES AND POWERS NEW
MINISTRIES STOP LATEST APPEAL WAS MADE WITH GREAT INSISTANCE ON 25 SEPTEMBER BY
ADDOULA HIMSELF STOP UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES I RECOMMEND THAT MONGI SLIM BE
CONTACTED TO ASK HIS INTERVENTION IN THIS MATTER WITH VIEW OF CONVINCING TUNIS GOVERNMENT
TO DETAIL URGENTLY CHATTI STOP WE FEEL THAT IF CHATTI WOULD JOIN US WITHOUT DELAY FOR
SHORT PERIOD 2-3 MONTHS TASK REQUESTED BY CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED STOP
CHATTI WILL PERFORM DUTY THE MORE BECAUSE KHIARY ACQUAINTED HIM WITH PROBLEMS TO BE
DEALT WITH.

Lin
Drafted by : G. Dumontet

Date : 6.10.1961

Drafted by G. DUMONTET

OUTGOING CODE

PRIORITY

ohp

SECRET

To: Bunche New York

From: Linnér Léo *Linnér*

Date: 6 October 1961

No. : A-2325

Further to your 6912 following reply has been received from O'Brien: Quote

1. Offer was accepted in following way and form. Mr. Brie was brought to my office by Capt. Purfield, transport Officer of the Irish Battalion and reported verbally on lines transmitted in my 943. He then said that it would be relatively easy for him to go to Kolwezi and check on the accuracy of the story regarding the Fougas. I indicated we would be interested in any such information he might be in a position to give us. I made it quite clear that any risks he might run were his own and that we were neither commissioning him nor asking him to do anything on our behalf. What we engaged ourselves to do was to receive such information as he might be able to give us.

2. There is no repeat no written instrument.

3. He is not repeat not authorized in any way to say he represents or is acting on behalf of UN and he would be most unlikely to do so in present circumstances here.

4. Lacking a regular intelligence network and indeed since Egge's departure any intelligence officer, we do not feel we can afford to neglect such sources of information as this. Our position at present is that we are not going out of our way to seek out informants but neither are we declining to hear and consider such information as it is volunteered to us. The situation as regards collection and shifting of information is very unsatisfactory, and I have given Khiary a note on this. Unquote

JP

OUTGOING ~~CLERK~~ OCT -7 PM 12:19

O.N.U.C.

ROUTINE

LEOPOLDVILLE
7 October 1961

UNATIONS NEW YORK

No. A-2324

BUNCHE from LINNER



Your 6987.

Primo. Tshombe has in fact indicated that he is prepared to send one possibly two emissaries to Leopoldville any day now and that he might join them somewhat later. He has however made this conditional on obtaining guarantees of ~~x~~ the safety of the emissaries from the American, British and French Embassies here. The American and British Consuls have forwarded this request to their Embassies in Leopoldville whereas the French Consul claims he has not received such a request therefore the French Embassy feels unable to say or do anything about it. I have sent Tshombe ~~yesterday~~ a message in writing, repeating my assurances on behalf of ONUC and have provided the British and American Ambassadors with copies. They will let Tshombe know that he should avail himself of the security thus offered by ONUC. Furthermore Adoula made a public statement yesterday to the effect that any emissaries from Elisabethville would be guaranteed safe sojourn ⁱⁿ ~~and~~/return.

Secundo. This paragraph is missing in your cable.

Tertio. Adoula told me last night that Gizenga has left for Stanleyville and is expected back on Wednesday 11th.

OUTGOING CODE

SECRET

ole Mho

TO : BUNCHE, ~~NARASIMHAN~~, NEW YORK

FROM : LINNER, LEOPOLDVILLE

Linner

DATE : 6 October 1961

No. : A- 2323

Following matters relate to work of Commission of Investigation:

A. Reference your 5785 all possible information called for by Commission's decision at its 43rd meeting on August 11 has now been gathered and is ready for communication to Commission. Please cable whether this information should be pouched to you for transmission to Commission or whether it should be transmitted directly by us to Commission in Geneva.

B. At present under UN detention in Leopoldville is one Lt. Chalmers, British national, arrested at Manono on 28 August, while serving as a lieutenant in Katanga Gendarmerie. He claims to be the person who shot Lumumba and in the course of his interrogation has stated that he has in safe custody with a friend of his in Elisabethville the original "written order" signed by "three important people" whose names he would not disclose. He is prepared to be taken back to Katanga under escort to pick up his personal possessions including the order and to show the spot where the dead is supposed to have been committed. His detention was prolonged in view of the uncertainty of the Commission's movements. We have so far not informed the Commission about this individual but do not wish to repatriate him until we know whether or not the Commission is interested in questioning him. Your views will be greatly appreciated. You should ^{please} take into account that our interrogator not only detects flaws in plausibility of this new claimant's story but also has some reservations as to his mental balance. Story could well be a ruse to gain access to his belongings before expulsion.

SECRET

C. This morning Cruise O'Brien forwarded copy of a document supposed to have been written by Dr. Pieters who had signed Lumumba's death certificate. The authenticity of the document is still not properly established, but if proved would clearly establish role of Pieters as political adviser falling under para A-2 of Security Council resolution. He should thus be expelled. However in view of his possible interest to the Commission of Investigation we hesitate to repatriate him and thus expose ourselves once again to criticism by Commission for not informing them of such action before he is repatriated, as was our experience in the case of Huyghe. Here again your views as to whether Commission should be informed or not will ^{be} of great value.

D. Grateful for early views on all three matters raised above.