

[ 2 CONFIDENTIAL ]

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES 5-1120

BOX 9

FILE 1.

ACC. 1998/0278

OUT FAX 690  
UNOMUR  
CNR 218  
(RELAY VIA NYK)



FC. CUN 11  
MONUOR

UNAMIR

United Nations Observer Mission Uganda/Rwanda  
La Mission d'observation des Nations Unies Ouganda/Rwanda

13 MAY -9 13 35

NYK PLS RELAY TKS

PAGE 1 OF 5

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Info & Kalia  
09 MAY 1994

CODE CABLE

TO: MAJ GEN R. DALLAIRE, FC UNAMIR KIGALI	FROM: COL ASHLEY A/CMO, UNOMUR KABALE
FAX NO: (07) 84288	FAX NO: 258 498-23816
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE OF NRA FOR RPF.	

1. IN INVITING ATTENTION TO YOUR DIRECTIVE FOR AN ASSESSMENT ON THE SUBJECT, WE WOULD LIKE TO OFFER THE FOLLOWING FACTS/INCIDENTS:
  - A. BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF CURRENT HOSTILITIES BETWEEN RPF AND RGF, UNOMUR USED TO RESTRICT ITS MONITORING ACTIVITIES BETWEEN LUBIRIZI (SQ2263), ON THE EAST AND NKURUNGURO (8551) ON THE WEST.
  - B. BEYOND LUBIRIZI PATROLLING WAS NOT DONE DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF RGF ALONG THE BORDER.
  - C. WITH THE DEPLOYMENT OF RPF ALONG THE BORDER FROM LUBIRIZI TO MERAMA HILLS (SQ5183) AND FROM LUGENDABARE (SQ7648) TO MOUNT SABINIO AT THE ZAIRIAN BORDER, THE NECESSITY FOR UNOMUR TO MONITOR THE EXTENDED PORTION WAS FELT (REFERENCE OUR FAX NO. 556/WEEKLY SITREP DATED 25 APRIL 1994).
  - D. WE PLANNED TO SEND OUR PATROL TO MERAMA HILL AND ACCORDINGLY THE CHIEF LIAISON OFFICER WAS INFORMED (LETTER ATTACHED AS ANNEX "A").

CUN 11 (CNR 218)  
PAGE 2 OF 5

## CODE CABLE

- E. CLO INFORMED THAT HE NEEDED CLEARANCE FROM DEFENCE MINISTER BEFORE WE START MONITORING THE EXTENDED AREAS, AND ACCORDINGLY ASKED PERMISSION FROM DEFENCE MINISTER (LETTER AS ANNEX "B").
  - F. OUR PATROL ON 26 APRIL 1994 WAS STOPPED BY NRA 5KM SHORT (SQ 4787) OF MERAMA HILLS AND REFUSED ACCESS FURTHER TO THE SOUTH.
  - G. INTERESTINGLY, NRA DID NOT RESTRICTED OUR MOVEMENT NORTHEAST OF LUBIRIZI ALONG THE BORDER (REFERENCE CODE CABLE NO. 675 DATED 05 MAY 1994) AND IN AREAS WEST OF NKURUNGURO.
  - H. KAKITUMBA CROSSINGPOINT AT MERAMA HILLS IS LINKED UP BY A GOOD METAL ROAD TO MBARARA AND NTUNGAMO ON THE NORTH OF UGANDA.
  - I. IT MAY BE NOTED THAT RPF USED THIS AXIS MBARARA - KAKITUMBA - RWANDA \* DURING OCTOBER 1990 INVASION.
  - J. A/CMO MET THE ARMY COMMANDER, NRA ON 2ND MAY 84 AND EXPLAINED THE NECESSITY TO MONITOR MERAMA HILLS AREA AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A CP/OP AT KAKITUMBA FOR CHANNELIZING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE CONVOYS. THE ARMY COMMANDER ASSURED THE CLEARANCE BE GIVEN (WITHIN 2/3 DAYS (REFER TO CODE CABLE NO. 695 DATED 3 MAY 1994).
  - K. A/CMO ALSO MET THE NRA DIV COMMANDER AT MBARARA ON 06 MAY AND RAISED THE SUBJECT TO HIM.
  - L. WITH THE INDUCTION OF HELICOPTERS AND ENHANCEMENT OF OUR PATROLLING ACTIVITIES IN LAST ONE MONTH, NRA IS FINDING DIFFICULTIES IN MAKING EFFORT TO EXTEND ANY TANGIBLE SUPPORT TO RPF THROUGH BORDERS MONITORED BY UNOMUR. *Promote this?*
2. IN THE LIGHT OF FOREGOING, WE WOULD LIKE TO DEDUCE THE FOLLOWING ASSESSMENT:

CUN 11 (CNR 218)  
PAGE 3 OF 5

## CODE CABLE

- A. RPF HAS BEEN FIGHTING A WAR WITH RCF AND DEFINITELY THERE IS A  
31 REQUIREMENT OF HAVING RECEIVED OF ARMS/AMMO ETC
- B. SUCH MATERIAL ASSISTANCE HAS TO COME FROM OUTSIDE AND IN THIS CASE  
THE PREFERRED CHOICE IS EITHER FROM/THROUGH UGANDA OR ZAIRE.
- C. THE AREAS THAT WE ARE MONITORING ALONG RWANDA-UGANDA BORDER ARE  
RELATIVELY CALM AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITIES  
(REFERENCE TO OUR FAX NO. 590 DATED 2 MAY 1994).
- D. NRA'S RELUCTANCE/"DILLY DALLYING" IN GIVING A CLEARANCE TO MONITOR THE  
ROAD MBARARA/TUNGAMO - MERAMA HILLS HAS OBVIOUSLY CAUSED SUSPICION.
- E. DESPITE OUR LETTER DATED 26 APRIL, A/CMO'S MEETINGS WITH ARMY  
COMMANDER ON 02 MAY AND DIV COMMANDER ON 06, MAY, THE  
REPLY/CLEARANCE HAS NOT BEEN OBTAINED. SUCH MANIFESTATION FOR NO  
VALID/JUSTIFIABLE REASON, GIVE US THE IMPRESSION OF NRA'S INTEREST IN  
DENYING OUR ACCESS TO KAKITUMBA.
- F. WE ASSUME THAT NRA IS BUYING TIME WITH THE PRETEXT OF GETTING  
CLEARANCE FROM THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE. MEANWHILE, THEY ARE PUSHING  
OUT AS MUCH MILITARY ASSISTANCE OF ARMS/AMMO TO RPF WHICH THE  
LATTER NEEDS VERY BADLY.

3. BEST REGARDS.

*may be*

**UNITED NATIONS**  
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM



**(UNOMUR)**

(CNR 218) EUN 11 Page 4 of 5  
**NATIONS UNIES**  
MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

Annex 'A'

**TO:** Maj Robert Zakye  
Chief LO, NRA

**FROM:** Col Asrar  
Acting CMO, UNOMUR

**SUBJECT:** UNOMUR Monitoring Activities

**DATE:** 28 April 1994

**REF:** CMO/001/94

1. In inviting attention to our discussion on 25 April 1994, you are aware that the situation along the Uganda/Rwanda border has recently changed considerably. RPF has taken over the control of the Rwandese border between Lubirizi/Kamwezi and Merama Hills since the RPF has withdrawn from the border belt.
2. According to the UNOMUR mandate this mission is responsible for observing and monitoring the Uganda/Rwanda border. Due to the changed deployment of RPF along the border, I have received instructions to extend our activities to the border area between Lubirizi/Kamwezi and Merama Hills (up to and included Merama Hills' border crossing).
3. While appreciating our charter of duties, may I humbly request you to kindly inform NRA troops along the above mentioned border lines about UNOMUR's extended area of monitoring activities.
4. Best regards.

Information:

◆ DCOO

(CNR 218)

CUN11 Page 5 of 6

# NATIONAL RESISTANCE ARMY

Annex 'B'

TO: The MSO

DATE: 28 April 1994

REF: OPS/4/94

FROM: Maj R. Zakys  
OLO, NRA

*[Handwritten signature]*

SUBJECT: UNOMUR Monitoring Activities

Refer to our telephone conversation of 25 April 1994 about the above subject. The CMO has written to me requesting permission to put a 24 hour patrol at Mirama Hills. I have attached his communication to me for your management Sir.

FC

SRS4

CNR 179 P1/4

UNAMIR

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

94 APR 30 04 19

IMMEDIATE

TO: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KISALI  
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
DATE: 29 April 1994  
NUMBER: UNAMIR: 1365  
SUBJECT: Secretary-General's letter to the Council

... Please find attached, for your information, copy of the letter addressed today by the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council. Regards.

(2) Duka hite  
D/C

Then is critical.  
I did not know  
of the SC's initiative  
in this document.  
Phase 2 (core-fir) structure  
must be objective in regards  
to the loan and order aspect.  
we need to push our Swiss team  
out - on the route needs today  
and tomorrow in order to see  
how far we can get and as  
soon as we can needs for  
phase 2.

30/4



THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

ACTION:

RECEIVED  
OASG/DPKO

CNR 179 P2/4

bcc: Mr. Annan  
Mr. Gharekhan  
Mr. Kittani  
Mr. de Soto  
Mr. Aimé  
Mr. Riza  
SG's Office (2)

MIG  
WdS  
HO  
VS  
YM  
EW

FO:

29 April 1994

Dear Mr. President,

I regret to have to inform you that the Force Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) has reported a further deterioration of the situation in Kigali and other parts of Rwanda.

The capital city is effectively divided into sectors controlled by the Rwanda Government Forces (RGP) and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) respectively, with frequent exchanges of artillery and mortar fire between the two sides. UNAMIR reports strong evidence of preparations for further massacres of civilians in the city and there are several large concentrations of civilians who fear for their lives but enjoy little effective protection. Massacres continue on a large scale in the countryside, especially in the south.

A new complication is that in recent days both sides have begun to express lack of confidence in UNAMIR's impartiality and this is affecting their cooperation with my Special Representative and the Force Commander.

His Excellency  
Mr. Colin R. Keating  
President of the Security Council  
United Nations  
New York



CNR 179 P3/4

- 2 -

These developments raise serious questions about the viability of the revised mandate which the Security Council gave to UNAMIR by resolution 912 on 21 April 1994. In particular, it has become clear that that mandate does not give UNAMIR the power to take effective action to halt the continuing massacres. At best it can provide limited protection to small groups of threatened persons in the city of Kigali and it would be unable to save them if a new wave of massacres were to start. According to some estimates, as many as 200,000 people may have died during the last three weeks. This humanitarian catastrophe is rightly a matter of growing anguish in Africa and the rest of the world and demands urgent action by the international community.

In considering what action should be taken, it has to be recognized that the disastrous incident of 6 April which caused the deaths of the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi has had two consequences which require different responses from the international community. First, that incident sparked a resumption of fighting between the Rwanda Government Forces (RGF) and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF). Secondly, it reawakened deep-rooted ethnic hatreds, which have plagued Rwanda in the past and which have again led to massacres of innocent civilians on a massive scale.

The revised mandate which the Security Council gave to UNAMIR in resolution 912 on 21 April is an adequate response to the first of these consequences. My Special Representative and the Force Commander have been making strenuous efforts to help the parties agree to a ceasefire and a return to implementation of the Arusha Accord. Those efforts have not yet succeeded but the present mandate and strength of UNAMIR are sufficient for them to continue.

The events of the last few days have confirmed, however, that UNAMIR's revised mandate is not one which enables it to bring the massacres under control. Some of these have been the work of uncontrolled military personnel but most of them have been perpetrated by armed groups of civilians taking advantage of the complete breakdown of law and order

CNR 179 P4/4

- 3 -

in Kigali and many other parts of Rwanda. It has become clear that the horrors for which they are responsible can be ended only if law and order is restored, a task which is far beyond UNAMIR's present capacity.

In these circumstances, I urge the Security Council to reexamine the decisions which it took in resolution 912 and to consider again what action, including forceful action, it could take, or could authorize Member States to take, in order to restore law and order and end the massacres. In making this recommendation, I am of course aware that such action would require a commitment of human and material resources on a scale which Member States have so far proved reluctant to contemplate. But I am convinced that the scale of human suffering in Rwanda and its implications for the stability of neighbouring countries leave the Security Council with no alternative but to examine this possibility.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

*Boutros Boutros-Ghali*

Boutros Boutros-Ghali

1994-04-30

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PAGE = 01