CHRONOLOGICAL FILE 14 DEC 1995 - 11 MAR 1996

[1 CONFIDENTIAL]

EL/WG APR 2009

1 Strictly Confidential

M.B. 21 Dec. 2011

UN ARCHIVES
SERIES S-1120
BOX 50
FILE 8
ACC. 1998/0278

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

Date: 14 December 1995

To: All Military and Civilian Personnel

From: Wilfrid de Souza
Executive Director

Subject: **Absence from mission area**

I will be out of the mission area from 15 December 1995 to 9 January 1996. During my absence, Mr. Ismaël DIALLO will act as Executive Director.

Please extend to him your usual cooperation.

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

UNAMIR-MINUAR

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

Bureau du Porte-parole

LE CONSEIL DE SECURITE RENOUVELLE LE MANDAT DE LA MINUAR JUSQU'AU 8 MARS 1996

Résolution 1029 (1995) adoptée à l'unanimité, le 12 décembre 1995

Texte de la résolution

Le Conseil de sécurité,

Rappelant toutes ses résolutions précédentes sur la situation au Rwanda, en particulier sa résolution 872 (1993) du 5 octobre 1993 par laquelle il a créé la Mission des Nations Unies pour l'assistance au Rwanda (MINUAR), ainsi que ses résolutions 912 (1994) du 21 avril 1994, 918 (1994) du 17 mai 1994, 925 (1994) du 8 juin 1994, 965 (1994) du 30 novembre 1994 et 997 (1995) du 9 juin 1995, qui définissent le mandat de la MINUAR,

Rappelant sa résolution 955 (1994) du 8 novembre 1994, portant création du Tribunal international pour le Rwanda, et sa résolution 978 (1995) du 27 février 1995, concernant la nécessité d'arrêter les personnes soupçonnées d'avoir participé au génocide au Rwanda,

Ayant examiné le rapport du Secrétaire général sur la MINUAR en date du 1er décembre 1995 (S/1995/1002),

Prenant note des lettres adressées au Secrétaire général par le Ministre des affaires étrangères du Rwanda les 13 août et 24 novembre 1995 (S/1995/1018, annexe I et S/1995/1018, annexe II),

Soulignant l'importance du rapatriement librement consenti des réfugiés rwandais, en toute sécurité, ainsi que celle d'une véritable réconciliation nationale,

Notant avec une vive préoccupation les informations selon lesquelles des éléments de l'ancien régime poursuivraient leurs préparatifs militaires et leurs incursions au Rwanda, soulignant la nécessité de prendre des mesures efficaces pour que les Rwandais se trouvant actuellement dans des pays voisins, y compris ceux qui sont dans des camps, n'entreprennent pas d'activités militaires visant à déstabiliser le Rwanda et ne reçoivent pas d'armements, étant donné que ces armements seraient très vraisemblablement destinés à être utilisés au Rwanda, et se félicitant à cet égard de la mise en place de la Commission internationale d'enquête créée en application de sa résolution 1013 (1995) du 7 septembre 1995,

.../

3. Prie le Secrétaire général de ramener à 1 200 personnes les effectifs de la MINUAR, afin d'exécuter le mandat énoncé au paragraphe 2 ci-dessus;

4. Prie le Secrétaire général de ramener à 200 le nombre des observateurs militaires et membres du personnel d'état-major et autre personnel militaire d'appui;

5. Prie le Secrétaire général de commencer à établir des plans en vue du retrait complet de la MINUAR, celui-ci devant se faire dans les six semaines suivant l'expiration du mandat actuel;

6. Prie le Secrétaire général de retirer la composante de police civile de la MINUAR;

7. Prie le Secrétaire général d'envisager, compte tenu des règlements existants de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, la possibilité de transférer, à mesure que des éléments de la MINUAR se retireront, du matériel non militaire de la MINUAR qui serait utilisé au Rwanda;

8. Prend note de la coopération existant entre la MINUAR et le Gouvernement rwandais aux fins de l'accomplissement du mandat de la Mission, et prie instamment le Gouvernement rwandais et la MINUAR de continuer à appliquer l'Accord sur le statut de la Mission en date du 5 novembre 1993, ainsi que tout nouvel accord qui pourrait être conclu en vue de faciliter l'exécution du nouveau mandat de la MINUAR;

9. Demande au Gouvernement rwandais de prendre toutes les dispositions requises pour que le retrait prévu de personnel et de matériel de la MINUAR puisse s'effectuer dans l'ordre et en toute sécurité;

10. Remercie les Etats, les organismes des Nations Unies et les organisations non gouvernementales qui ont fourni une aide humanitaire aux réfugiés et aux personnes déplacées dans le besoin, les engage à persévérer et demande au Gouvernement rwandais de continuer à faciliter l'acheminement et la distribution des secours;

11. Demande aux Etats et aux organismes donateurs d'honorer l'engagement qu'ils ont pris de soutenir les efforts de relèvement du Rwanda, d'accroître l'aide qu'ils apportent déjà à cette fin et, en particulier, de favoriser la mise en place à bref délai et le fonctionnement efficace du Tribunal international, ainsi que le rétablissement de l'appareil judiciaire rwandais;

12. Demande aussi aux Etats de coopérer pleinement avec la Commission d'enquête créée par sa résolution 1013 (1995);

13. Engage le Secrétaire général et son Représentant spécial à continuer de coordonner les activités des Nations Unies au Rwanda, y compris celles des organisations et institutions s'occupant d'aide humanitaire et de développement, ainsi que les activités des spécialistes des droits de l'homme;

14. Prie le Secrétaire général de lui faire rapport le 1er février 1996 au plus tard sur la façon dont la MINUAR s'acquitte de son mandat et sur l'état d'avancement du rapatriement des réfugiés;

15. Décide de rester activement saisi de la question.

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR-MINUAR

Office of the Spokesman

PRESS RELEASE

UNAMIR NR 95-49 **13 December 1995**

Mandate

The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Ambassador Shaharyar M. Khan welcomed the Security Council's decision to renew the mandate for a period of three months. The focus of UNAMIR's activities would be related to encouraging the voluntary return of refugees. Ambassador Khan noted that the 3-month mandate would be UNAMIR's last and that it had been agreed that, after concluding its mandate on March 8, UNAMIR would wind up in 6 weeks. Apart from providing good offices and logistic support for returning refugees, UNAMIR would assist the UNHCR and other International Agencies in encouraging the return of refugees. It would support the Government of Rwanda in promoting a climate of trust. UNAMIR would also protect the International Tribunal during this period. The CIVPOL element of UNAMIR would be withdrawn. Ambassador Khan noted that H.E. President Bizimungu had paid tribute to UNAMIR II's role.

Tribunal Indictments

SRSG referred to the indictments issued on 12th December by the International Tribunal in Arusha as a positive step forward in the process of bringing to justice persons accused of genocide and crimes against humanity. Ambassador Khan stated that although the people of Rwanda had waited over a year for the Tribunal to start functioning, Judge Goldstone, the Chief Prosecutor, had kept to his word that the first indictments would be made in 1995. Ambassador Shaharyar Khan added that this was the beginning of the process which would gather momentum. He expressed the hope that all member States would cooperate with the Tribunal. Ambassador Khan stated that he was encouraged by the response of regional member States at the Cairo Summit. Kenya had also indicated clearly to the Tribunal that it would cooperate with its decisions. Ambassador Khan expressed the hope that the national judicial system would be revived in the near future.

NGOs and arrests

SRSG expressed concern at the announcement that 38 NGOs had recently been ordered out of the country. Ambassador Khan stated that while it was Rwanda's sovereign right to decide on the activities of NGOs' operating in the country, he hoped that the appeals by the NGOs would be given due consideration by the Government.

Ambassador Khan also expressed concern at the arrest of Mr. Jean-Baptiste Barambirwa, President of CLADHO after he had made a speech on Sunday. Ambassador Khan stated that freedom of speech was a basic pillar of human rights. SRSG noted that Mr. Barambirwa would be presented before the Procurer today and he expressed the hope that Mr. Barambirwa would be treated with transparent justice.

.../

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

UNAMIR-MINUAR

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

Office of the Spokesman

SECURITY COUNCIL EXTENDS AND ADJUSTS MANDATE OF UNAMIR UNTIL 8 MARCH 1996

Resolution 1029 (1995) adopted unanimously on 12 December 1995

Text of the Resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on the situation in Rwanda, in particular its resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993 by which it established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), and its resolutions 912 (1994) of 21 April 1994, 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994, 925 (1994) of 8 June 1994, 965 (1994) of 30 November 1994 and 997 (1995) of 9 June 1995, which set out the mandate of UNAMIR,

Recalling its resolution 955 (1994) of 8 November 1994, establishing the International Tribunal for Rwanda, and its resolution 978 (1995) of 27 February 1995, concerning the necessity for the arrest of persons suspected of committing genocide in Rwanda,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on UNAMIR dated 1 December 1995 (S/1995/1002),

Noting the letters of the Foreign Minister of Rwanda to the Secretary-General of 13 August 1995 and 24 November 1995 (S/1995/1018, Annex I and S/1995/1018, Annex II),

Stressing the importance of the voluntary and safe repatriation of Rwanda refugees and of genuine national reconciliation,

Noting with great concern continuing reports of military preparations and incursions into Rwanda by elements of the former regime, underlining the need for effective measures to ensure that Rwandan nationals currently in neighbouring countries, including those in camps, do not undertake military activities aimed at destabilizing Rwanda or receive arms supplies, in view of the great likelihood that such arms are intended for use within Rwanda, and welcoming in this context

.../

3. Requests the Secretary-General to reduce the force level of UNAMIR to 1,200 troops to carry out the mandate set out in paragraph 2 above;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to reduce the number of military observers, headquarters and other military support staff to 200;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to initiate planning for the complete withdrawal of UNAMIR after the expiry of the present mandate, that withdrawal to take place within a period of six weeks after the expiry of the mandate;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to withdraw the Civilian Police component of UNAMIR;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to examine, in the context of existing United Nations regulations, the feasibility of transferring UNAMIR non-lethal equipment, as elements of UNAMIR withdraw, for use in Rwanda;

8. Takes note of the cooperation existing between the Government of Rwanda and UNAMIR in the implementation of its mandate and urges the Government of Rwanda and UNAMIR to continue to implement the Status of Mission Agreement of 5 November 1993 and any subsequent agreement to replace that Agreement in order to facilitate the implementation of the new mandate;

9. Calls upon the Government of Rwanda to take all necessary measures to ensure that UNAMIR personnel and equipment that are scheduled to withdraw can do so in an orderly and safe manner;

10. Commends the efforts of States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations which have provided humanitarian assistance to refugees and displaced persons in need, encourages them to continue such assistance, and calls upon the Government of Rwanda to continue to facilitate their delivery and distribution;

11. Calls upon States and donor agencies to fulfil their earlier commitments to give assistance for Rwanda's rehabilitation efforts, to increase such assistance, and in particular to support the early and effective functioning of the International Tribunal and the rehabilitation of the Rwandan justice system;

12. Also calls upon States to cooperate fully with the International Commission of Inquiry established pursuant to resolution 1013 (1995);

13. Encourages the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue to coordinate the activities of the United Nations in Rwanda, including those of the organizations and agencies active in the humanitarian and developmental field, and of the human rights officers;

14. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council by 1 February 1996 on the discharge by UNAMIR of its mandate and progress towards repatriation of refugees;

15. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

CHECKED FOR DISPATCH

uitter, A remplir par le redacteur | DATE: 28 December 1995 | ALLOTMENT / COMPTE | FILE / DOSSIER

ACTION	DEPT	ROOM / BUREAU	EXT / POSTE
OSO	PMSS/FALD/DPKO	S-2275	3-3744

12 PITCH 66/12 → | 12 PITCH - 85/12 →

DO NOT TYPE BEYOND THE MARGINS - SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE REVERSE SIDE

NE INSCRIVE RIEN DANS LES MARGES VOYEZ LES INSTRUCTIONS AU VERSO

UNAMIR

KIGALI

MATTHEW/AGUIRRE FROM DA COSTA

REFERENCE: UNAMIR FAX 6969 OF 21 DECEMBER 1995

SUBJECT: EXTENSION OF APPOINTMENT/ASSIGNMENT

IN VIEW OF APPROVAL EXTENSION UNAMIR MANDATE AND UPON YOUR RECOMMENDATION VIDE UNAMIR FAX 6727 OF 11 DECEMBER 1995, WISH CONFIRM EXTENSION OF APPOINTMENT/ASSIGNMENT OF STAFF MEMBERS THROUGH 31 MARCH 1996.

RELEVANT PERSONNEL ACTIONS/LETTER OF APPOINTMENTS OF MISSION APPOINTEES WILL FOLLOW SOONEST.

HAPPY NEW YEAR.

(BEISSEL/FIELDOPS) NNNN

CPO C/88 CPO

////

AUTHORIZED BY / AUTORISE PAR

SIGNATURE: DATE:

LUIZ CARLOS DA COSTA, CHIEF, PMSS/FALD/DPKO

NAME AND TITLE (PLEASE TYPE) / NOM ET QUALITE (A DACTYLOGRAPHIER)

Mr. Diallo's suggested responses - 4.12.95

QUESTIONNAIRE D'INTERVIEW AVEC L'AMBASSADEUR SHAHARYAR M. KHAN

RECEIVED
- 4 DEC 1995
OFFICE OF THE SRSG
UNAMIR

we should answer after mandate

Projet de réponses

1. ***De manière globale, quelle est la mission des casques bleus?***

"**De manière globale**" comme vous l'écrivez, la mission des casques bleus est de s'interposer entre deux parties belligérantes à la suite d'un arrêt des hostilités; et pour prévenir la reprise de ces hostilités.

2. ***Quelle est la mission de la MINUAR au Rwanda? (que signifie la MINUAR)? Concrètement, donnez-nous les éléments de détail.***

a) MINUAR signifie **Mission des Nations Unies pour l'Assistance au Rwanda**.

b) La mission de la MINUAR telle que définie dans la résolution 997 adoptée le 9 juin 1995 par le Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies, consiste à:

i) user de ses bons offices pour faciliter la réconciliation nationale dans le cadre de l'Accord de paix d'Arusha;

ii) aider le Gouvernement rwandais à faciliter le retour librement consenti des réfugiés, en toute sécurité, ainsi que leur réinsertion dans leur milieu d'origine, et, à cette fin, appuyer les efforts faits par le Gouvernement rwandais pour instaurer un climat de stabilité et de

confiance, grâce à des activités de surveillance menées dans l'ensemble du pays par des observateurs militaires et des observateurs de police;

iii) faciliter l'aide humanitaire, ainsi que la fourniture d'une assistance et de services spécialisés en matière de génie civil, de logistique, de santé publique et de déminage;

iv) aider à l'instruction d'une force de police nationale;

v) contribuer à assurer la sécurité, au Rwanda, du personnel et des locaux des organismes des Nations Unies, du Tribunal international pour le Rwanda, notamment en assurant en permanence la protection du Bureau du Procureur, ainsi que des spécialistes des droits de l'homme, et contribuer également, si besoin est, à assurer la sécurité des organismes humanitaires.

N.B

Veuillez trouver en annexe le texte complet de la résolution 997.

3. Vous avez poursuivi la mission de Booh Booh, y-a-t-il eu continuité dans vos mandats ou il y a eu une évolution. Précision : "entre la 1ère et la 2ème phase (la vôtre) quel bilan pouvez-vous faire?

Le 13 mai 1994, le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies a adressé un rapport au Conseil de Sécurité sur la MINUAR dans lequel il déclarait que la situation au Rwanda s'était

dégradée et continuait d'être hautement précaire,la violence s'étant installée et se progageant. Le Secrétaire général recommandait au Conseil de Sécurité de définir un nouveau mandat et d'établir une MINUAR II qui contribuera à créer des conditions de sécurité pour les personnes déplacées et à assister les organisations humanitaires.

Le 17 mai, le Conseil de Sécurité, par sa résolution 918 (1994), renouvelait le mandat de la MINUAR pour lui permettre de contribuer à la sécurité et à la protection des réfugiés et des personnes civiles à risque.

Quel bilan? Il pourrait suffire de dire que par sa simple présence à Kigali et à travers le pays, la MINUAR a contribué, largement, à rassurer beaucoup, nationaux comme expatriés, vivant au Rwanda. La MINUAR a contribué à asseoir une atmosphère de normalité dans la vie du pays. Elle a aussi apporté une assistance en matière de santé publique, de logistique, de travaux de réfection des infrastructures, d'ingénierie et ce, chaque jour. La présence de quelques milliers de "fonctionnaires" des Nations Unies, civils et militaires, a en outre contribué, aussi peu soit-il, à donner du travail à plusieurs dizaines de rwandais et à participer à la dynamique de l'économie nationale.

4. Etes-vous satisfait de votre mission?

Lorsque je compare l'état des lieux, du jour de mon arrivée à Kigali et à aujourd'hui, après avoir aussi parcouru le pays entier, oui, j'ai l'intime conviction que la MINUAR a convenablement rempli sa mission. Mais pensez-y, le Rwanda revient de très loin et beaucoup reste à faire; qui demande du temps, de la patience et davantage de moyens.

5. Est-ce-que vous pouvez nous donner quelques exemples de missions réussies?

Relisez les points i) à v) de la réponse à votre deuxième question: vous avez là des exemples de ce qui a été fait. Notez que tout ce qui est fait n'est pas forcément palpable mais a des effets tangibles sur la vie du pays. Par ailleurs, le Communiqué no.6 du 30 novembre 1995 ci-joint vous donne un aperçu de ce que la Force de la MINUAR a fait, en dehors et en sus de ses activités normales durant le mois de novembre.

6. Malgré les résultats atteints par la MINUAR, il subsiste, il a subsisté des incompréhensions, quant à la présence de la MINUAR. A quoi attribuez-vous ces incompréhensions?

Ces incompréhensions sont le fait, d'abord, de l'ignorance. Ignorance de ce qu'est la MINUAR et de son mandat. Que ce soit la MINUAR I ou II. Ignorance aussi de comment fonctionnent les Nations Unies et en particulier le Conseil de Sécurité. Alors beaucoup ont vite fait de juger et de condamner, sans connaître. Il y a aussi quelques-uns qui entretiennent ces incompréhensions par - excusez le peu - mauvaise foi; les Nations Unies étant souvent un bouc-émissaire facile pour se soustraire de ses responsabilités ou faire oublier ses propres manquements.

7. le doute qui existe quant au rôle des casques bleus est-il spécifique au Rwanda, ou s'est-il généralisé comme ce fut le cas pour la Somalie, la Bosnie?

Le doute provient de deux faits, au moins:

a) Le mandat des casques bleus est souvent très limitatif et lorsque sur le terrain la situation se dégrade, les casques bleus sont paralysés par les limites de leur mandat. Ils n'en peuvent mais;

b) Sur le terrain d'opération, les acteurs principaux - les belligérants - ne "jouent pas toujours le jeu". Ils enfreignent leurs propres décisions, ne respectent pas leurs engagements et contribuent, ainsi, à rendre plus aléatoire l'accomplissement du mandat des casques bleus.

A l'avenir, le Conseil de Sécurité devrait se pencher sérieusement sur ces deux aspects qui ternissent l'image des casques bleus et des Nations Unies. L'opinion publique devrait elle aussi être plus correctement informée.

8. Pour revenir au Rwanda, l'ancien commandant des forces de la MINUAR, le Général Roméo Dallaire, a déclaré dans une presse Belge "la MINUAR n'avait pas les moyens de sa mission. Avez-vous eu la possibilité de le constater?

le Général Dallaire se référait aux limites que lui imposait le mandat de la MINUAR tel qu'adopté par le Conseil de Sécurité. Il ne pouvait le transgresser pour répondre de manière adéquate à la situation qui prévalait au moment où il aurait tenu ces propos.

Heureusement la MINUAR II ne s'est pas trouvée devant le même dilemme.

9. Aujourd'hui, estimez-vous avoir eu ou simplement estimez-vous avoir les moyens de votre mission?

La MINUAR II a eu les moyens nécessaires à l'accomplissement de sa mission. Mais rappelez-vous ceci: il y a tant à faire; tout est à refaire au Rwanda.

10. Quelles difficultés avez-vous rencontrées,

- ***d'abord avec le commandement des forces?***
- ***les autorités gouvernementales?***
- ***la population? pour ces dernières, vous ont-elles facilité la tâche?***

Des difficultés avec le commandement de notre force? Aucune! Avec les autorités gouvernementales? Pas vraiment si l'on excepte , on l'a évoqué tantôt, l'incompréhension de certaines personnes sur le fonctionnement des Nations Unies et l'impatience, compréhensible, d'autres.

La population, elle, et dans sa majorité, n'est pas hostile à la MINUAR.

11. Y-a-t-il quelque chose que vous auriez souhaité faire et que vous n'avez pas fait?

J'aurais souhaité faire plus et plus vite, quoique tout ce qu'il était possible de faire a été fait.

12. On constate que la MINUAR travaille en collaboration avec le MINIREISO, est-ce à dire que la mission est devenue plus sociale que militaire?

La mission de la MINUAR a été dès le début de contribuer à préserver la société rwandaise; de ce fait elle a fait du social et s'est de plus en plus impliquée au fil des semaines.

13. Dans une allocution à l'Assemblée Nationale, le Président de la République avait souhaité que la mission s'oriente vers l'entraînement des forces armées, la réhabilitation des infrastructures etc.., est-ce que c'est ce que vous faites aujourd'hui?

C'est ce que nous faisons en sus de nos activités habituelles et chaque fois qu'on nous le demande.

14. Le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies lors de sa visite au Rwanda a déclaré à l'Assemblée Nationale:
"je serai l'homme le plus heureux si vous me disiez que demain la MINUAR devrait se retirer, alors aidez-moi à vous aider. Pensez-vous que l'heure est arrivée pour la MINUAR de se retirer?

Le Secrétaire général se référait au manque de ressources financières et à une certaine "**fatigue**" des donateurs. Quant au retrait de la MINUAR, c'est au Gouvernement rwandais d'apprécier et d'exprimer son avis, voire sa décision. Pour ma part, j'estime que le Rwanda a toujours et encore besoin du concours de la MINUAR ou d'un organe qui poursuivrait sa mission d'assistance.

15. Partirez-vous effectivement comme prévue en Décembre 1995?] question aujourd'hui caduque !

Attendons de voir.

16. Quelles sont les raisons objectives qui vous poussent aujourd'hui à partir?

Sinon quelles sont les raisons objectives qui vous permettent de maintenir la MINUAR.

Tout au long des réponses données plus haut, vous trouvez les raisons, objectives, comme vous les qualifiez justement qui militent en faveur de la poursuite de l'assistance des Nations Unies.

17. Serait-ce un départ total ou partiel?] caduque aussi !

La réponse à cette question sera contenue dans la résolution du Conseil de Sécurité sur la MINUAR d'ici le 8 décembre prochain.

18. Que fera cette "troisième mission"?

Avons-nous parlé de "troisième mission"? Vous anticipez!

19. Quels sont vos rapports personnels avec les autorités rwandaises?

Elles sont excellentes.

20. Que vous inspire la situation dans la sous-région?

Elle est volatile et appelle, d'urgence, des actes tangibles de sagesse. Les dirigeants et les faiseurs d'opinion doivent - enfin - s'atteler à la seule activité qui vaille la peine: travailler au retour de la paix civile, oeuvrer à l'instauration d'un climat de convergence, de coopération et de concorde entre les Etats. A l'intérieur de chaque Etat, en particulier au Burundi et au Rwanda, s'engager et entraîner toutes les couches sociales à faire renaître et entretenir un sentiment d'acceptation l'un de l'autre, de tolérance mais de justice, de convivialité.

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR COMMUNIQUE MINUAR
No.6
30 Nov 95

UNAMIR Military Activity Highlights: Month of November 1995

KIGALI, RWANDA -- Did you know that during the month of November 1995, in addition to normal duties, the following UNAMIR military activities were conducted under the command of Canadian Forces Major General Guy Tousignant to help assist the people of Rwanda?

CONSTRUCTION/ENGINEERING

a. provided an excavator cum digger to RPA for digging a canal in Gikongoro; a latrine at the Kigali Military Hospital and laying of pipes at a transit camp;

b. deployed a bulldozer for preparing the shifting of the transmitter site in Gikongoro; for a rehabilitation project in Kigali; for the building of a playground in Rwamagana; for work on Nakamera Transit Camp; to improve the Zindoro-Krama road; and, to improve the road approaching the Ramagana commune police training school;

c. completed work on building water supplies and on the electrification at the Butare Rehabilitation school;

d. repaired a hand pump for the Gashora administration offices;

e. recovered a minibus belonging to the RPA near Kanombe as well as a World Food Programme vehicle;

f. prepared for the launching of the bridge at Gashora and assisted in repairing the bridging at Gitarama;

g. deployed dumptrucks for transporting earth for the Nakamera Transit Camp in Gisenyi;

h. continued to conduct rehabilitation work on the 8 km Birenga road;

i. conducted lectures and demonstrations about mine awareness in Gitarama, Byumba, Butare and other communes throughout Rwanda;

j. the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team defused grenades, mortar bombs, anti-pers mines around Kigali; and,

k. activated local lines of Rwandatel.

MEDICAL

a. evacuated two RPA soldiers injured in a mine and vehicle accident to Kanombe Hospital;

b. medical personnel assisted in the national anti-polio vaccine campaign;

c. evacuated the bourgemestre of Rubavu and an RPA soldier to Kigali Hospital;

d. provided ambulance transport to injured locals to Kigeme Hospital as well as medical staff assistance to Kigeme Hospital;

e. delivered oral rehydration salts to health centres and orphanages in Byumba;

f. medical staff treated local Rwandese throughout the country; and,

g. medical staff treated orphans at various orphanages around Rwanda.

FIREFIGHTING

a. UNAMIR soldiers joined the Rwandan Fire Brigade to fight a fire at the Yamaha Spare Parts Centre in Kigali.

MILITARY OBSERVERS

a. assisted in the distribution of mine awareness campaign posters;

b. monitored the transfer of prisoners to the Nsinda Prison;

c. discovered live explosives and identified mines - local Rwandese made aware and Force Engineers defused the explosives safely;

d. monitored the safe return of refugees, hospital and prison conditions, schools and consulted with Prefects/Bourgemestres to assist in local communes; and,

e. advised human rights monitors of any possible human rights violations and investigated infiltrations, thefts, assaults, illegal arrests.

TRANSPORT ASSISTANCE

a. provided trucks to the Byumba Prefect to transport 10 tons of seeds and 20 tons of paddy seeds for the Ministry of Agriculture;

b. provided transport for returning refugees to their home communes and from

Nyamasheke to the Nyagatare Transit Camp;

c. provided trucks to the RPA for the transportation of more than 50 tons of food to RPA sub-units, for troop transportation, to transport laterite from to a firing range in Kigali, and to conduct RPA administration business;

d. provided trucks to the local (Rwandan) organization "ARDEC" to transport wood;

e. provided trucks for the transport of prisoners at Byumba and Kibungo to Nsinda and Rwamiko to ease the congested prison situation;

f. provided vehicles for use by RwandaTel;

g. provided trucks for the transportation of foodstuffs to: the ACEJ College Mushubati; Ponts et Chaussures to Gasarenda; to the Remera Parents School for Street Childen; to Rambura Girls Community School; and to Terres des Hommes for the transport of cereals;

h. provided trucks for the transport of new recruits to the Gendarmerie School in Rwamagana and to transport gendarmes to Kibungo;

i. provided trucks to assist in the transport and reburial of remains of genocide victims;

j. provided trucks for the transportation of construction materials to: SOS Children's Village; for a mosque in Kigali; to ARDEC for the construction of houses; to TROCAIRE for the transport of cement and bricks; to CONCERN for the transport of gravel at Nyarushishi Transit Camp; to IRC for construction materials to Buyeye; and, to CARE in Gikongoro;

k. transported 80 mattresses to Butare for the Groupe Scolaire;

l. transported seven tons of fertilizer to Gisenyi for Hungry International;

m. transported bridging material to Kayenzi for the Salvation Army; and,

n. transported tons of stationary and school materials to the Karago and Kirambo communes.

ORPHANAGES

a. medical teams visited orphanages throughout Rwanda to administer first aid and to recce any future medical/humanitarian requirements;

b. screened movies for ophans at Missionaries of Charity orphanage, Kibungo;

c. barbers from IndBatt and 95 CMSG donated part of their earnings to local orphanages;

d. transported 18 tonnes of firewood and furniture to the Cyeza orphanage;

e. donations provided to the MSF orphanage in Rubabu commune; and,

f. delivered tentage, cleaning supplies, sandals and blankets to various orphanages in Kigali.

Note to editors: For more information, please contact the UNAMIR Spokespersons, Mr Ismael Diallo at (212) 963-3582 or 963-9906, ext 11075 or Lt(N) Kent Page at ext 11124.

RENAISSANCE

Mensuel d'information

AVENUE DE LA PAIX Tel: 77587 s/c RWANDA MEDIA / PNUD B.P. 445 KIGALI RWANDA

RECEIVED
23 NOV 1995
OFFICE OF THE SRSG
UNAMIR

This is a good questionnaire. I would like to reply. SR 24.11

SP

QUESTIONNAIRE D'INTERVIEW AVEC L'AMBASSADEUR Shaharyar KHAN

1 De manière globale , quelle est la mission des casques bleus?

2 Quelle est la mission de la MINUAR au Rwanda? (que signifie la MINUAR)? Concrètement, donnez-nous les éléments de détail.

3 Vous avez poursuivi la mission de Booh Booh, y-a-t-il eu continuité dans vos mandats ou il y a eu une évolution. Précision : " entre la 1ère et la 2ème phase (la vôtre) quel bilan pouvez-vous faire ?

4 Etes-vous satisfait de votre mission ?

5 Est-ce-que vous pouvez nous donner quelques exemples de missions réussies

6 Malgré les résultats atteints par la MINUAR , il subsiste, il a subsisté des incompréhensions, quant à la présence de la MINUAR. A quoi attribuez-vous ces incompréhensions ?

7 Le doûte qui existe quant au rôle des casques bleus est-il spécifique au Rwanda, ou s'est-il généralisé comme ce fut le cas pour la Somalie, la Bosnie ?

8 Pour revenir au Rwanda, l'ancien comandant des forces de la MINUAR le Général Roméo Dallaire a déclaré dans une presse Belge " la MINUAR n'avait pas les moyens de sa mission. Avez-vous eu la possibilité de le constater ?

9 Aujourd'hui, estimez-vous avoir eu ou simplement estimez-vous avoir les moyens de votre mission ?

10 Quelles difficultés avez-vous rencontrées,

. d'abord avec le commandement des forces ?
. les autorités gouvernementales ?
. la population ? pour ces dernières, vous ont-elles facilité la tâche ?

11 Y- a t-il quelque chose que vous auriez souhaité faire et que vous n'avez pas fait ?

12 On constate que la MINUAR travaille en collaboration avec le MINIREISO, est-ce à dire que la mission est devenue plus sociale que militaire ?

13 Dans une allocution à l'Assemblée Nationale, le Président de la République avait souhaité que la mission s'oriente vers l'entraînement des forces armées, la réhabilitation des infrastructures etc..., est-ce que c'est ce que vous faites aujourd'hui ?

14 Le Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies lors de sa visite au Rwanda a déclaré à l'Assemblée Nationale :
" je serai l'homme le plus heureux si vous me disiez que demain la MINUAR devrait se retirer, alors aidez-moi à vous aider.
Pensez-vous que l'heure est arrivée pour la MINUAR de se retirer ?

15 Partirez-vous effectivement comme prévue en Décembre 1995 ?

16 Quelles sont les raisons objectives qui vous poussent aujourd'hui à partir ?
Sinon quelles sont les raisons objectives qui vous permettent de maintenir la MINUAR.

17 Serait-ce un départ total ou partiel ?

18 Que fera cette " troisième mission " ?

19 Quels sont vos rapports personnels avec les autorités rwandaises ?

20 Que vous inspire la situation dans la sous-région ?

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

UNAMIR-MINUAR

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

Mr. Diallo -
For Info.

RECEIVED
14 DEC 1995
OFFICE OF THE SRSG
UNAMIR

NOTE TO THE SRSG

Subject: **UNAMIR's mandate - Security Council Resolution 1029 (1995)**

I have asked VNHQ to inform me about their role. It seems legal in the context of refu. return. Geo. 20/12

1. By concentrating the new mandate on activities aimed at facilitating the voluntary return of the refugees, the Security Council has implicitly given UNAMIR a regional role. Under Security Council resolution 1029 (1995), UNAMIR is expected to "exercise its good offices to assist in achieving the voluntary and safe repatriation of Rwandan refugees within the frame of reference of the recommendations of the Bujumbura Conference and the Cairo Summit of the Heads of State of the Great Lakes Region, and in promoting genuine national reconciliation".

2. Such a role of good offices implies not only talking to the Rwandese Government but also discussing with the signatories of the recommendations of the above conference and summit. Furthermore, it calls for some initiatives that may help to persuade the refugees to return.

3. In this connection, unless we are authorized to cross the borders and speak directly to the refugees, Radio UNAMIR would continue to be our only channel of communication with those still in the camps. It is therefore essential that we make the best use of that important tool for the fulfilment of our new and last mandate.

I shall discuss the Radio 13 Sep separately. Geo. 20/12

4. To that end, some of the suggestions contained in my note of 11 August 1995 (copy attached), particularly those concerning the preparation, in cooperation with the Rwandese Government, of special and specific programmes for the camps, may be considered.

5. We may also seek clarification from Headquarters as to whether the exercise of our good offices, as recommended in resolution 1029 (1995), includes conducting rounds of consultations with the neighbouring countries to persuade them to implement the decisions of the Bujumbura Conference and the Cairo Summit.

WS

Wilfrid de Souza
14 December 1995

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR-MINUAR

RECEIVED
02 JAN
OFFICE OF THE SRSG
UNAMIR

Office of the Spokesman

Pl send this on as a model of an audience at possibly Pl be related to Rwanda also distribute
ED (2-1-96)

UNAMIR NEW Mandate

SRSG's Interview on Radio UNAMIR - Saturday 16 December 1995

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), Ambassador Shaharyar M. Khan gave a wide-ranging interview on Radio UNAMIR relating to the new UNAMIR mandate. The following are the salient features of the interview:

New Mandate's Focus

Question

On Tuesday, 12 December 1995 UNAMIR's mandate was extended by another 3 months. The world body will remain in Rwanda as a symbol of encouragement to those refugees considering returning from exile. I asked Ambassador Shaharyar M. Khan to explain the difference between the old mandate and the new one.

Answer

The difference is in the nature of responsibilities UNAMIR would now handle from 9 December 1995 up to 8 March 1996. Basically what the international community, if you like, the Security Council, has been stressing is that UNAMIR is still relevant in providing a beacon of confidence to the refugees who are across the lake in Zaire and in Tanzania. By that I want to specify that we are not actually engaged in any protection or security duties in our new mandate. But our very presence may help in the international effort which is being made by Rwanda, by the regional countries, by UN agencies and by the donor countries, to persuade the refugees to return home voluntarily. So, the next mandate underlines the good offices we can offer in persuading the refugees to return voluntarily. The mandate refers to the Cairo Summit as also to providing logistics to UNHCR and other agencies engaged in this exercise. So, our next mandate, I hope, will reflect what President Bizimungu said two days ago, namely, that UNAMIR II has been a successful operation. We feel that these remarks reflect the reality on the ground and we feel that this cooperation can continue.

Negotiations on the New Mandate

Question

The agreement to extend the mandate was taken after quite considerable negotiations. There seems to be three different inputs: the wishes of the Government of Rwanda, the wishes of the donor

.../

community and the wishes of the UN itself. How much did that affect the shape of this new mandate?

Answer

The differences were basically on two issues: one was the number of people required to defend the new mandate. As you know, we have 1800 formed troops and four hundred military observers and others, making a total of 2200. The Government of Rwanda was saying '**all right, if our friends in the international community feel that the presence of UNAMIR in Rwanda is going to help the refugees come back, we agree to their staying on, but we do not believe, that you need so many troops to be able to fulfil that mandate**'. On the other hand, the international community was of the view that the number of troops we had until 8 December was a bare minimum anyway and that to reduce further would make it difficult to fulfil the mandate. Anyway, there was discussion on this issue and we have now arrived at a suitable figure of 1400 and I am sure that we will be able to cooperate on this basis.

The second point of difference was that the Government of Rwanda insisted that, as a sovereign Government, it should have the authority to provide security protection to everyone, including diplomats and UN agencies. The Government of Rwanda felt that the sub-paragraph of our last mandate, in which we were required "**to contribute** " to security protection was no longer required. Now, the Security Council is very conscious of the need for international personnel to have security and protection and this issue was resolved when the Representative of Rwanda openly stated, in the Security Council, that the Government of Rwanda would provide complete protection to the UN community, to the Human Rights monitors and others. That left only the question of the Tribunal.

The Tribunal

Now, the Tribunal is a separate issue. The Tribunal insists that it must have its own security and protection. Judge Goldstone made a very plausible case that even in the Hague, they are not protected by the Dutch police or security forces. The Tribunal has its own protection force as is the case wherever they are operating, as for example in Croatia. In Arusha also the Tribunal will have its own protection force. So far, the Tribunal had been relying on UNAMIR to provide this protection. However, once it was agreed that the present mandate would end on 8 March, it was also agreed that from 8 March, the International Tribunal would be protected by an alternative international force. Once these two issues -- the number of military personnel required and the question of who is to protect the International Tribunal were decided -- there was no problem and the resolution went through. We can now look to the last three months of our stay here in a spirit of cooperation and in the hope that we will be helpful in persuading the refugees to return home voluntarily.

The Cairo Summit Declaration

Question

Recently, you have been accused by a refugee organization of being biased towards this Government. How do you react to such allegations?

.../

Answer

Well, I react favourably in the sense that if you are criticized by both sides, you know that you are doing your job in a manner that is unbiased. In the radio interview concerned, I had referred to the Cairo Conference decisions in which it had been acknowledged that there were people who were required to be apprehended as alleged criminals in the genocide and handed over to the International Tribunal. This was one of the agreements in the Cairo Declaration. Also, that there were camps in which there were "**intimidators** " - this word was used in the Cairo Declaration - that the intimidators had to be separated from the others in order that ordinary people exercise a free choice. There was also a clear reference to the suppressing of hate radios. Now, when you accept that there is hate radio, that there is need to separate the intimidators from the normal people, and that there are certain people who may be required for the Tribunal, naturally there is a responsibility with that concerned State to meet those obligations. My remarks were made in that context. I do feel very strongly that the commitments made in Cairo, in Bujumbura, in Nairobi, must be implemented, whether they are by the countries around Rwanda, like Tanzania or Zaire, or whether by Rwanda itself which has made many commitments on issues related to refugees' return. It is not enough to sign declarations. One has to see them implemented. And this also goes for the agencies and for the donor countries which have to support the process they have all agreed to. So my remarks were made in that context and were quoted, perhaps, a little out of context.

I have been myself to Tanzania and to Zaire, on more than one occasion. Both countries are insistent that refugees should go back. Both countries are looking for international support in order that the refugees return in safety and dignity. Now, what they are also saying is that they need international support to be able to pursue this objective. This international support is expected in the form of financing and of personnel that are required to perform the difficult task of separating camps, closing down **'hate Radio'** campaigns and separating the political elements from the common folk in the camps. So persuading them to return voluntarily is not going to be an easy task. Therefore, I do believe that the international community must support these programmes, support the implementation of Cairo and Bujumbura. There are people, I have to state, who see this process of voluntary refugee return as a political defeat for their objectives and they will criticize others because, if they see this tide of refugee return actually ebbing away from them and if large numbers begin to come back and are settled reasonably safely here, then they will lose a political prop on which they have based their whole philosophy. I am not surprised that when we see a major campaign regionally to persuade the refugees to return, and if success is written on the wall, that there will be a lot of criticism, not only of myself, but of all UN agencies and all the others who are part of this process of seeking voluntary refugees' return.

Future Deployment of UNAMIR

Question

To return to the psychological presence of UNAMIR, with your troops you are going to have to choose carefully how you deploy your men, where and for what reason will UNAMIR's blue helmets be deployed in Rwanda?

.../

Answer

At the moment we have, of the 1800 formed troops, roughly half in Kigali. They include the logistics, the engineers, the communications. The remaining 50% are in four locations: in Gisenyi, Cyangugu, Gikongoro and Kibungo. All four are opposite the likely entry points of the refugees: two opposite Zaire, and two opposite Burundi and the inlet from Tanzania. In the new mandate, with a reduced force strength, what we are planning is that the contingents in Kigali would remain, more or less, in the same shape, but instead of four, we would place two logistics cells opposite in Cyangugu and in Gisenyi, and withdraw the units from Gikongoro and Kibungo. We want to keep these logistic cells in these two areas because the very reason for UNAMIR's three-month mandate is that we should be helpful for the returning refugees and we cannot be seen to be five hours away by road from Cyangugu and three hours away from Gisenyi. We have to be available on the spot and we have to show ourselves. So, in the new deployment, I foresee that we will have logistic units which comprise a few soldiers, communications, engineers and also vehicles in these two places, so that we can be helpful, as we were when the 14000 forcibly returned came through in August from Zaire. That was an excellent operation which was carried out very smoothly and we hope that we can be of some use on the spot as refugees come in. I would add that if we begin to have a large number of refugees coming in from Tanzania, we will certainly be able to divert a logistic cell out in Kibungo to be able to help there as well. So there is an element of flexibility in the dispersal of our forces in the next months.

Civilian Police

Question

One of the most striking changes in this mandate compared to the previous one is the complete withdrawal of the civilian police. Now in the previous mandate, one of the most important functions of the UN, was to train a local police force; and for that reason CIVPOL was seen as an integral part of the force. Why has there been this change?

Answer

I remember even last time, when we were discussing the previous mandate, there was a strong feeling from the Government of Rwanda that CIVPOL should now phase out. The duties of CIVPOL can be divided into two sectors: the majority of about 85 are engaged in monitoring in the prefectures, in helping the local police and gendarmerie, which did not exist until earlier this year, to perform police functions on the ground. With the development of a skeleton gendarmerie and, hopefully, a communal police force which is being trained, the monitoring element of the police work is no longer required. I can fully understand that the Rwandan police and gendarmerie want to stand on their own feet and perform their own sovereign activities.

The second area is the one that is perhaps going to lead to a temporary vacuum. The second area was the training that we were providing to the Rwandan gendarmerie and the commune police in two institutions, one in Ruhengeri for the gendarmes and the other, for the commune police training centre in Gishari which is near Nsinda, where 750 young recruits have been inducted and only two weeks ago, the Vice-President inaugurated the course and made an excellent speech, in which he praised the cooperation between UNAMIR and Rwanda in starting up this programme. In

.../

this second area of cooperation, we had about 20 trainers from our CIVPOL in each of these institutes. It is entirely up to the Government of Rwanda to decide whether or not they need the trainers. We were told that Rwanda preferred, and we fully understand this, to have this training on a bilateral basis. So in fact this programme has closed down. Our trainers in our CIVPOL are now back at Headquarters. They will phase out within three to four weeks; already 30% will go within the coming week and the remainder will phase out. The CIVPOL programme has been a great success and it is now at an end. I personally feel rather sad that we cannot continue the training which was proceeding well but it is a decision by the Government of Rwanda and we respect it.

The Equipment Issue

Question

Ambassador Shaharyar Khan, there is a clause which invites the Security Council to consider UNAMIR leaving behind its non-lethal equipment for continued use in Rwanda once it has packed its bags and gone. Can you explain the reasoning behind this.

Answer

Yes I think it is important to understand the background to the equipment issue, because the man in the street does not really understand why the UN cannot leave behind the equipment that it has brought in. After all, it is much used, it is second hand; it costs a certain amount of money to take out of the country and if the UN does really want to help Rwanda, says the man on the street, why not leave this equipment behind? The answer to the question is that there are basic regulations of the UN General Assembly on this issue that apply to all peace-keeping operations, whether it is in Cambodia or Kuwait, Mozambique or Somalia. There are clear regulations as to how the equipment that has been used in a theatre of peace-keeping is to be disposed of. These regulations place equipment disposal in four categories as follows: the first category relates to equipment and material that belongs to other countries. You see a large number of vehicles, for instance, with white paint and UN markers on them, but a lot of them do not belong to the UN. They are working for the UN, but they belong to countries which have provided these vehicles, this material, to the UN operation. They could belong to, let's say, India, or Zambia or Nigeria or Chad, and at the end of the day, these countries have to decide whether they want the equipment back or not. In other words, this equipment does not belong to us and it belongs to the country which has sent it. It is for that country to decide what it wants to do with it. So we have no control over this first category.

The second category is equipment which is here and which is good enough to be used in another theatre of peace-keeping. The UN General Assembly has decided that if you have equipment that is usable in, let's say, Haiti today, or in Liberia, or in Angola, then just as we have received equipment from Somalia and Kuwait and Mozambique, similarly we are obliged to send our equipment to those countries because otherwise, new equipment would have to be bought. So the second category consists of equipment that we are obliged to send to other peace-keeping operations.

.../

The third priority is other UN agencies. The UN General Assembly rules state that if other agencies require this equipment they should have priority of use. For instance, I have requests from UNHCR for vehicles. I have requests from the Human Rights Organization here, I have requests from the Tribunal, from the Deputy Prosecutor's Office, I have requests from other agencies for equipment in order to perform their work which is essential for Rwanda. And the UN General Assembly would require UNAMIR to transfer the equipment to the agencies which need it.

It is only in the fourth category of what is left that is to be seen as available for the Government of Rwanda. Now, these are UN General Assembly regulations. Neither I, nor the Secretary-General, nor indeed the Security Council, can change these regulations. Only the General Assembly can override its own resolutions. Therefore, I think what you are seeing for the first time, is a very clear indication from the Security Council that the equipment that we have here and that we shall not obviously require after three months should be usable in Rwanda for the Rwandese Government, for the Rwandese people, for the rehabilitation, for use in Rwanda. So I hope people understand that much as though we would like to hand over all the equipment as we leave, we are constrained and limited to doing so because of these resolutions of the General Assembly, of which of course Rwanda is a party.

UN Future Presence in Rwanda

Question

What other than equipment will the UN leave behind? What would be the shape of a future UN presence in Rwanda following the March 8 draw-down.

Answer

This is, of course, a matter for Rwanda and the Security Council to decide. What is clear is that on 8 March, UNAMIR comes to an end. And six weeks from that point onwards, we shall no longer be here. I think this point needs to be emphasized because in my informal discussions, I get the impression from my friends in Rwanda that UNAMIR wanted to stay on and find all sorts of excuses for doing so. This is not the case. As the Secretary-General's report very clearly indicated, UNAMIR was ready to phase out even now. That is to say on 8 December 1995. What happened was that a laudable attempt by the regional States and by the international community to put together an attempted lift-off on the refugee issue was made at this point in time. It was felt that our presence here would be helpful. It would not be critical, but it would be helpful in trying to persuade the refugees to return. This is why Rwanda says: **'all right, if our friends say you [UNAMIR] should stay, we have no aversion to your staying'**. But the future of UNAMIR is very clear. Come 8 March and we shall phase out. Now, your question is what happens afterwards. Is a civilian, development-oriented presence, which lends itself to meeting Rwanda's genuine current needs going to replace UNAMIR? By that I mean repair of roads, bridges, repair of various other institutions - you know a lot of buildings are still not operative - repair of electricity, water and communications, getting agriculture back on its feet again by the distribution of seeds, etc., getting jobs going on a short-term basis. These are the immediate issues that Rwanda needs to have tackled and it feels that it needs a kind of peace corps, doctors, engineers and agronomists working

.../

here and reacting quickly to immediate situations. In other words, to address the sort of twilight zone between the end of civil strife, civil war, genocide as we have seen and the beginning of the normal development programmes through the World Bank and bilateral assistance through the Round Table. There is a twilight zone which needs to be addressed, between peacekeeping and normal development, perhaps peace-building.

The problem is -- and this again is something that is not easily understood -- the problem is that people say it should be easy. **'You are spending X number of dollars per day on your military presence over here, you have all these soldiers, this equipment, these vehicles, surely all that needs to be done is to replace them with a civilian presence'.** Unfortunately, the UN cannot make this transition automatically, because peace-keeping operations are funded by assessed contributions - that is, by obligatory contributions from member States. The funds for a civilian presence, a peace corps type of presence, an emergency peace building presence of doctors and engineers come from voluntary contributors. You cannot use money earmarked for a peace-keeping operation in civilian operations. Therefore, the money that is funding UNAMIR cannot automatically be diverted to a civilian operation. During the next three months, seeing the problems of the United Nations, its limitations, it constraints, the attitudes of the member countries, we should discuss how we can evolve a presence that meets Rwanda's needs, which is properly funded by voluntary contributions. It is important that people should understand that this is not an automatic diversion or flow of money from one operation to the other.

UNAMIR and Refugee Return

Question

Finally, Sir, how optimistic are you that the presence of UNAMIR will make any difference to the return of refugees?

Answer

I am very clear that the presence of UNAMIR is important, but not critical. Those people who argue that UNAMIR has been here for a year and a half and the refugees have not come back and therefore it proves that UNAMIR's presence does not affect the issue are, I believe, missing the point. The argument that they make is irrelevant. Never has it been asserted that the presence of UNAMIR itself is the magnet which will draw the refugees back. We may be an influential factor, we may be, at best, an important factor, but there are other factors, much more critical, which will have to be addressed for the refugees to return voluntarily. These factors are outlined in Bujumbura, in Cairo in Nairobi and if you allow me to summarize them, they are: that the refugees in camps must have psychologically the confidence to return and to believe that they will be treated fairly and with justice; that they will not be persecuted or be brow-beaten and that they will get their due share. This is a vital, critical factor which the refugees need to be convinced of in Tanzania and in Zaire. And this convincing has to be done essentially by the Government of Rwanda. The areas in which these assurances have to be given are known. They are that there should be no arbitrary arrest, that people who come back should be given their dues, that anyone who is suspected of any misdemeanor or a worse crime should be given transparent justice and that these are not

.../

statements and declarations made at conferences, but are declarations to be implemented on the ground.

I will add here, that the Rwandan Government's track record recently does indicate that the people who are coming back have been well treated. Look at the 14000 who were forced back from Zaire in August. Within three or four days, they were back in their communes, reasonably settled. Even when you look back to August last year when the French left and the Humanitarian Protection Zone became part of the whole, we saw roughly a million IDPs return to their homes over a period of three or four months. Some of them went out of the country, some of them went to Zaire, to Tanzania and to Burundi, others had difficulties settling back because they were accused of being part of a syndrome that was against the new Government. But, by and large, the majority of those people, of that million, went back safely. So the track record shows that there is an effort by the Government to settle these people, honourably and honestly. Of course, there will be occasions when people will take revenge, when people will go outside the transparent justice syndrome and where people may get treatment that is not correct. But, the psychological element of reassurance needs to be fortified by action on the ground.

The second critical element is that, in the camps as has been stated in Cairo, and in the tripartite discussions taking place currently, there is a need to stop hate campaigns, hate radio. There is need to stop intimidation, there is need to separate those who have been in the militia and the military from those ordinary people who went along with them, at the time of the trauma last year. And there is need to stop military training and infiltration across the borders. Now, once that stops, or is controlled, there are greater chances of the refugees coming back. In this whole syndrome, UNAMIR can play a positive role. Put another way, if we were to be seen going out at the very time when everyone is putting together these efforts to get the refugees back voluntarily, it would send wrong messages in camps. To answer your question, I feel that the next three months are important in trying to persuade the refugees to return. I feel our presence here is relevant, is important, but it is not critical. Whether, we are here or not, it is not going to critically affect the return of refugees. It is the other two elements that I have mentioned which are going to affect the return of refugees and I hope that we can all put our act together and that the two critical obstacles can be overcome so that we begin to see a return of refugees in large numbers taking place.

Question

We are still dealing in conditionals here; we are still working on "Plan A – **Refugees must return**". The refugees have voted with their feet out over the past 18 months not to return. Is it not time for the international community to think about **"Plan B"** -- moving the refugee camps away from the border so there is no infiltration, so that the refugees can be settled in some other places where they could become self-sufficient.

.../

Answer

I honestly believe that a very serious attempt must be made to implement the decisions that all the parties have taken in trying to get the refugees back voluntarily. By that I mean implementation of Bujumbura and Cairo Declarations. I do not believe implementation is taking place. I believe that if implementation does take place, only then will you be able to assess whether or not the refugees have exercised their voluntary desire to return. If, at that point, they still decide not to come back, then I reckon your **"Plan B"** needs to be looked at seriously. But, I reckon, that the whole syndrome, politically as well as in terms of refugees on the ground, we must make an effort to get those refugees back as part not only of a humanitarian process, not only to relieve the countries like Zaire, Tanzania and Burundi of the burden of carrying these refugees, but also as part of a political settlement, because until the refugees come back, one cannot really say that we are moving towards the kind of ethnic harmony that we all regard as essential for a political solution in this country. So long as the refugees stay out, there is a basic part of the jigsaw puzzle that is missing and without putting that part back into the whole, I feel a political resolution of the problems will be missing. Until this part is put back into the jigsaw puzzle, there will continue to be tension, especially around borders and I feel it will always breach against regional security in the region.

For more information, please contact the Office of the Spokesman in Kigali: phone: 84496, 84539, 84510 ext.: # 11075 or 11077.

DPKO-OUSG
INCOMING MAIL
* Action by: HA SYR
Info copy to:
* Please return originals to Central/other:
DATE: 22 December 19
REFERENCE:

United Nations Nations Unies

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

TO: Mr. Ismat Kittani
A: Under-Secretary-General
for Peace-keeping Operations

THROUGH:
S/C DE:

FROM: Hans Corell
DE: Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs
The Legal Counsel

SUBJECT:
OBJET: **UNAMIR contractors: imposition of taxes by the Government of Rwanda**

DPKO DEC 22 P 5:51
OUSG 8:35

Central
cc JH
MP
EL
LS
SR

1. I have received copies of several exchanges of communications between UNAMIR and DPKO with regard to the continued insistence on the part of the Government of Rwanda to tax goods and services imported into Rwanda for UNAMIR. In a related issue, I also understand that the Government has requested to review all contracts with UN contractors.

Background

2. The Government has addressed its requests for payment of taxes to individual UN contractors providing goods and services to UNAMIR. These requests for payment have been under the guise of enforcing Rwandan tax laws. This Office previously has addressed requests for payment of customs duties on goods imported into Rwanda by UN contractors for the official and exclusive use of UNAMIR (see memorandum dated 21 June 1995 from Mr. Zacklin to Mr. Annabi). In our 21 June 1995 memorandum, we indicated clearly that goods imported into Rwanda for UNAMIR are exempted from such taxes and, therefore, are not payable by UN contractors providing such goods to UNAMIR.

3. We also previously have advised on requests for payment of social security taxes which contractors should have collected from the emoluments of local employees. In our opinion dated 27 November 1995 from Mr. Ssekandi to Mr. Medili, we indicated that such taxes levied on nationals of Rwanda are payable.

The Present Issue

4. Most recently, the Government of Rwanda has attempted to impose various other taxes on contractors providing goods and services to UNAMIR which are ordinarily payable by corporations established and doing business in the country. In this regard, the Government has claimed tax payment for "droit de patente" and "impôt sur les bénéfices" which appear to be income or corporate taxes. We understand that in calculation of these taxes, the Government has used as the basis the cost of "importations" into

Rwanda, which in essence represents the value of the goods imported by the contractors for UNAMIR.

5. While it is difficult to determine the nature and validity of these taxes, it seems from the information received that these are the latest in a series of efforts of the Rwandan Government to tax goods and services imported into Rwanda for the exclusive and official use of UNAMIR.

Analysis

6. The position of the Government on the new taxes may have severe implications for the continuation of UNAMIR operations since the UN may be called upon by the contractors to pay this as part of the costs paid by the UN to the contractors for provision of the goods and services or face possible refusal by the contractors to provide the goods and services to UNAMIR.

7. These taxes raise similar issues to those addressed in our memorandum of 21 June 1995. Our advice in that memorandum was based on the relevant provisions of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (the Convention), to which Rwanda is a Party. The Convention is applicable to UNAMIR, as clearly indicated in the Status of Forces Agreement concluded on 5 November 1993 between the UN and Rwanda on the status of UNAMIR (SOFA).

8. Pursuant to Section 7(a) of Article II of the Convention, the United Nations, its assets, income and other property are exempt from all direct taxes. Article II of the Convention also provides that the United Nations, its assets, income and other property are exempt from customs duties and prohibitions and restrictions on goods imported by the United Nations for its official use (see Section 7(b) of Article II of the Convention).

9. The UN contractors are engaged following a competitive bidding process and most of the contracts for the UNAMIR contractors being taxed by the Government have been negotiated and concluded at Headquarters. In respect of foreign based contractors which do not have a permanent establishment in Rwanda but are located there for the exclusive purpose of providing goods and services to UNAMIR, we believe that such imposition of taxes on goods and services provided to UNAMIR, would be inconsistent with the status of the UN.

10. As to the current contracts concluded between the UN and the contractors, the contracts make specific reference to the exemption from taxes the UN enjoys under Section 7 of Article II of the Convention. The contractors have indicated that the prices quoted in their offers to the UN excluded the possibility of paying local income or corporate taxes imposed on companies established in Rwanda and doing business there. Such taxes were never expressly

addressed in the bidding documents or during negotiations between the parties on the contract price, although certain local taxes such as social security taxes, were addressed. Furthermore, we understand that such taxes have not been imposed in connection with other peace-keeping operations.

Conclusion

11. From the above, it appears that the Government of Rwanda is not entitled to impose taxes on goods and services provided to UNAMIR. This position has to be upheld by UNAMIR vis-à-vis the Rwandan authorities. Furthermore, the UN has not assumed any legal obligation under the relevant contracts to pay/reimburse the contractors for the various disputable taxes being imposed by the Government. However, in the event that these latter taxes are imposed, they could indeed be construed as unforeseen costs. We cannot, therefore, exclude the possibility that contractors would institute claims against the UN for reimbursement of such taxes. In such an event, the burden of paying such taxes could ultimately fall on the UN.

12. It seems to us that, at this stage, the matter must be dealt with at the highest political level, as the imposition by the Government of Rwanda of the aforementioned taxes on UN contractors would have significant implications for UNAMIR and seems to be an attempt to circumvent the exemption of the UN from taxes under the Convention and the SOFA.

Release of Contract Documents

13. As to the release of contracts and in so far as they constitute UN documents, they are inviolable by virtue of the provisions of section 4 of the Convention which provides as follows: "the archives of the United Nations, and in general all documents belonging to it or held by it, shall be inviolable wherever located." We would point out, however, that certain information could be released by the UN on a voluntary basis if it is in the interest of the Organization.

cc: Mr. I. Riza
Mr. H. Medili
Mr. R. Adams

UNITED NATIONS
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

UNAMIR-MINUAR

NATIONS UNIES
MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

TO: **Amb. Shaharyar M. Khan**
SRSG

DATE: 13 December 1995

FROM: **Ismaël A. Diallo**
Spokesman, UNAMIR

SUBJECT: **Practical Strategies for New Mandate**

A. Introduction

1. The opinions expressed in this note were conceived and drafted before December 8, 1995 when the Security Council formally met on Rwanda. UNAMIR's mandate has been since extended for a further period of three months in Resolution 1029 (1995) of 12 December, 1995.

2. The subsequent reading of that resolution has convinced me more of the imperative need for UNAMIR to take the direction outlined in the following proposals.

B. Background

3. If we accept that the mere presence of UNAMIR has contributed to the normalization of life in Rwanda, we cannot say as much with respect to the desired goal of mass repatriation of refugees in neighbouring countries.

4. We may add, as a corollary to the above, that such a presence for a further period of three months would not achieve much in terms of incentive for massive waves of returning refugees.

5. Undoubtedly, UNAMIR's confidence building role inside Rwanda has had a trickle effect in the camps without, however, registering the desired impact for solving the refugee problem and helping in a major way to achieve national reconciliation.

6. The new mandate, unlike the previous three under UNAMIR II, is totally focussed on the refugee repatriation exercise and calls, therefore, for creative initiatives and practical strategies in order to accomplish the new mission.

C. Proposals

1. Joint Teams

(a) It is imperative to establish joint teams consisting of Government officials from Ministries of Rehabilitation, Internal Affairs and Social Affairs, UNAMIR

officials, both civilian and military, Human Rights monitors, UNHCR officers and local representatives of the population in the communes.

(b) These teams would physically visit the refugee camps in Zaire, Burundi and Tanzania and talk to the refugees there in a bid to reassure them of safe repatriation. Host countries will, of course, be advised in advance.

(c) The teams would organize visits of refugee representatives to their respective communes so as to witness the security prevailing there and take back the message of positive information to the camps.

(d) The joint teams would also visit communes across the country, to get first-hand information on the situation there prior to convincing the refugees to return home and would subsequently continue to monitor the reintegration of the returnees.

(e) The members of these teams would be constantly on the move, spending over half their time in the communes and refugee camps during the three-month extension.

2. Radio UNAMIR

(a) A colleague's views

(i) A colleague in my office, who got close to the Radio Section during my two-month absence, has strong views about the parochial, sectionalist spirit of the Radio management, which is too wrapped into itself to value the great potential of inputs from other UNAMIR sections, especially within the OSRSG.

(ii) In that self-inflicted isolation, the Radio management does not set any programmes of work, not even weekly schedules, on the basis of which the colleagues in OSRSG can formulate contributions, in a collegial approach that is imperative if the Radio has to function as Radio UNAMIR and not simply as a section of UNAMIR.

(iii) At the same time, the Radio section remains fragmented within: heads of programmes hold daily meetings and proceed to give assignments to their journalists, who complain of being denied a chance to contribute ideas, as professionals, for the better running of programmes. In fact there are no programmes as such; there are only language units that are called programmes, which is a misnomer.

(iv) Heads of programmes are in constant touch with external news agencies, giving out information that is sometimes more interpretational than factual, which may lead to the phenomenon of "**uncoordinated troop movement**" with respect to the work of the Spokesman's Office.

(v) Other colleagues in OSRSG have aired strong criticism about the poor quality of Radio Rwanda News Summary, which is sent to the SRSG without any effort at editing and which reflects badly on the

professionalism within UNAMIR, among the many UN Offices that receive the daily summary.

Note: The above observations come from the Information Officer (UNV) in my office, who stands by every statement made above and requests a review of the whole matter.

(b) New approach

(i) Whatever the veracity of the above criticism, there is need to formulate a clear strategy for Radio programmes under the new mandate.

(ii) There is also need to associate more the colleagues in OSRSG in the policy-making exercise aimed at that reorientation.

(iii) In that connection, weekly or fortnightly plans of work for Radio programmes should be discussed at OSRSG meetings so that colleagues may add their inputs and help boost the impact of Radio UNAMIR.

(iv) Under the proposed reorientation, Radio UNAMIR should focus more on contacts with the population in the communes to bridge the information gap with the refugee camps.

(v) That would entail exchange of messages among relatives inside and outside the country (in refugee camps) for a more concrete effort at confidence building and fighting disinformation in refugee camps.

(vi) Such activities would be more effective than current trends devoted to news coverage of various seminars and visits of personalities, which coverage should be of secondary importance under the new mandate.

(vii) It would also help if Radio UNAMIR management could establish better working relations with Radio Rwanda, without of course having to compromise its objectivity, and set up structural collaboration with other UN agencies, IOM, ICRC and other major NGOs involved in assisting the refugees and interested in their repatriation.

3. Mandate Commission

(a) In anticipation of further negotiations expected to take place prior to the end of the new mandate on 8 March 1996, the ground-work could start immediately, with the setting up of a Government-UNAMIR Commission as soon as possible.

(b) The Commission would oversee the implementation of the new mandate and iron out differences that tend to undermine cooperation with the Government.

(c) This would help avoid last moment recriminations that have sprung up in discussions just before the end of previous mandates.

(d) More significantly, the Commission would study the nature and functions of the proposed body that will replace UNAMIR after 8 March 1996, with a consensus on the post-UNAMIR cooperation between the Government and the UN.

(e) That Commission should finalize its recommendations in the third week of January 1996, so that they may serve as guidelines for the Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council on 1 February 1996.

4. Inter-Agency Publication

(a) The concerted efforts of UN agencies in the repatriation exercise will require a special publication highlighting the operation, under UNAMIR coordination.

(b) To avoid fragmentation of those efforts, there should be a clear policy setting up a data centre for compilation and processing of information on repatriation and related activities.

(c) In case of financial limitations on the part of UNAMIR, whose budget for public information now stands at only US$ 10,000, the UN partners could pool together resources for a joint publication.

(d) The project would involve three issues - one by January 10, 1996, one on 15 February and the last before 8 March - to be produced in English, French and Kinyarwanda.

N.B.: The suggestions above have been intentionally made brief to avoid taking too much of your time. Similar views may have been already formulated by your Office. Whatever decisions are taken on what UNAMIR will do to accomplish its mandate during the coming three months, it is worth noting that this is the last opportunity for the Mission to win over its critics and leave Rwanda after 8 March 1996 with confidence and a clear conscience. This would at least avert the prospect of confirming Mr. Dusaidi's assertions that Rwanda has agreed upon the mandate renewal "not because [Rwanda] believes that actually UNAMIR can assist, as it has been here for a year and a half and no significant numbers of refugees have come back because of UNAMIR per se".

UNITED NATIONS
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

UNAMIR-MINUAR

NATIONS UNIES
MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

TO: **Amb. Shaharyar M. Khan**
SRSG

DATE: 18 December 1995

FROM: **Ismaël A. Diallo**
Spokesman, UNAMIR

SUBJECT: **Implementation of Practical Strategies for New Mandate**

I wish to refer to your annotations in the margin of my memorandum of 13 December 1995 concerning the meeting with UNHCR, HRFOR and UNDP to discuss the proposal on the joint teams.

The meeting could be convened for **Thursday 21 December** this week or after the holidays on **Wednesday 3 January 1996**. The time and venue of the meeting will be decided when you determine the date preferred.

3rd January please.

Such.

ED. 19/12

RECEIVED
18 DEC 1995
OFFICE OF THE SRSG
UNAMIR

Reçu le 18 DEC. 1995

UNITED NATIONS
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

UNAMIR-MINUAR

NATIONS UNIES
MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

TO: **Amb. Shaharyar M. Khan**
SRSG

DATE: 13 December 1995

FROM: **Ismaël A. Diallo**
Spokesman, UNAMIR

SUBJECT: **Practical Strategies for New Mandate**

A. Introduction

1. The opinions expressed in this note were conceived and drafted before December 8, 1995 when the Security Council formally met on Rwanda. UNAMIR's mandate has been since extended for a further period of three months in Resolution 1029 (1995) of 12 December, 1995.

2. The subsequent reading of that resolution has convinced me more of the imperative need for UNAMIR to take the direction outlined in the following proposals.

B. Background

3. If we accept that the mere presence of UNAMIR has contributed to the normalization of life in Rwanda, we cannot say as much with respect to the desired goal of mass repatriation of refugees in neighbouring countries.

4. We may add, as a corollary to the above, that such a presence for a further period of three months would not achieve much in terms of incentive for massive waves of returning refugees.

5. Undoubtedly, UNAMIR's confidence building role inside Rwanda has had a trickle effect in the camps without, however, registering the desired impact for solving the refugee problem and helping in a major way to achieve national reconciliation.

6. The new mandate, unlike the previous three under UNAMIR II, is totally focussed on the refugee repatriation exercise and calls, therefore, for creative initiatives and practical strategies in order to accomplish the new mission.

C. Proposals

1. Joint Teams

(a) It is imperative to establish joint teams consisting of Government officials from Ministries of Rehabilitation, Internal Affairs and Social Affairs, UNAMIR

officials, both civilian and military, Human Rights monitors, UNHCR officers and local representatives of the population in the communes.

(b) These teams would physically visit the refugee camps in Zaire, Burundi and Tanzania and talk to the refugees there in a bid to reassure them of safe repatriation. Host countries will, of course, be advised in advance.

(c) The teams would organize visits of refugee representatives to their respective communes so as to witness the security prevailing there and take back the message of positive information to the camps.

(d) The joint teams would also visit communes across the country, to get first-hand information on the situation there prior to convincing the refugees to return home and would subsequently continue to monitor the reintegration of the returnees.

(e) The members of these teams would be constantly on the move, spending over half their time in the communes and refugee camps during the three-month extension.

2. Radio UNAMIR

(a) A colleague's views

(i) A colleague in my office, who got close to the Radio Section during my two-month absence, has strong views about the parochial, sectionalist spirit of the Radio management, which is too wrapped into itself to value the great potential of inputs from other UNAMIR sections, especially within the OSRSG.

(ii) In that self-inflicted isolation, the Radio management does not set any programmes of work, not even weekly schedules, on the basis of which the colleagues in OSRSG can formulate contributions, in a collegial approach that is imperative if the Radio has to function as Radio UNAMIR and not simply as a section of UNAMIR.

(iii) At the same time, the Radio section remains fragmented within: heads of programmes hold daily meetings and proceed to give assignments to their journalists, who complain of being denied a chance to contribute ideas, as professionals, for the better running of programmes. In fact there are no programmes as such; there are only language units that are called programmes, which is a misnomer.

(iv) Heads of programmes are in constant touch with external news agencies, giving out information that is sometimes more interpretational than factual, which may lead to the phenomenon of "**uncoordinated troop movement**" with respect to the work of the Spokesman's Office.

(v) Other colleagues in OSRSG have aired strong criticism about the poor quality of Radio Rwanda News Summary, which is sent to the SRSG without any effort at editing and which reflects badly on the

professionalism within UNAMIR, among the many UN Offices that receive the daily summary.

Note: The above observations come from the Information Officer (UNV) in my office, who stands by every statement made above and requests a review of the whole matter.

(b) New approach

(i) Whatever the veracity of the above criticism, there is need to formulate a clear strategy for Radio programmes under the new mandate.

(ii) There is also need to associate more the colleagues in OSRSG in the policy-making exercise aimed at that reorientation.

(iii) In that connection, weekly or fortnightly plans of work for Radio programmes should be discussed at OSRSG meetings so that colleagues may add their inputs and help boost the impact of Radio UNAMIR.

(iv) Under the proposed reorientation, Radio UNAMIR should focus more on contacts with the population in the communes to bridge the information gap with the refugee camps.

(v) That would entail exchange of messages among relatives inside and outside the country (in refugee camps) for a more concrete effort at confidence building and fighting disinformation in refugee camps.

(vi) Such activities would be more effective than current trends devoted to news coverage of various seminars and visits of personalities, which coverage should be of secondary importance under the new mandate.

(vii) It would also help if Radio UNAMIR management could establish better working relations with Radio Rwanda, without of course having to compromise its objectivity, and set up structural collaboration with other UN agencies, IOM, ICRC and other major NGOs involved in assisting the refugees and interested in their repatriation.

3. Mandate Commission

(a) In anticipation of further negotiations expected to take place prior to the end of the new mandate on 8 March 1996, the ground-work could start immediately, with the setting up of a Government-UNAMIR Commission as soon as possible.

(b) The Commission would oversee the implementation of the new mandate and iron out differences that tend to undermine cooperation with the Government.

(c) This would help avoid last moment recriminations that have sprung up in discussions just before the end of previous mandates.

(d) More significantly, the Commission would study the nature and functions of the proposed body that will replace UNAMIR after 8 March 1996, with a consensus on the post-UNAMIR cooperation between the Government and the UN.

(e) That Commission should finalize its recommendations in the third week of January 1996, so that they may serve as guidelines for the Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council on 1 February 1996.

4. Inter-Agency Publication

(a) The concerted efforts of UN agencies in the repatriation exercise will require a special publication highlighting the operation, under UNAMIR coordination.

(b) To avoid fragmentation of those efforts, there should be a clear policy setting up a data centre for compilation and processing of information on repatriation and related activities.

(c) In case of financial limitations on the part of UNAMIR, whose budget for public information now stands at only US$ 10,000, the UN partners could pool together resources for a joint publication.

(d) The project would involve three issues - one by January 10, 1996, one on 15 February and the last before 8 March - to be produced in English, French and Kinyarwanda.

N.B.: **The suggestions above have been intentionally made brief to avoid taking too much of your time. Similar views may have been already formulated by your Office. Whatever decisions are taken on what UNAMIR will do to accomplish its mandate during the coming three months, it is worth noting that this is the last opportunity for the Mission to win over its critics and leave Rwanda after 8 March 1996 with confidence and a clear conscience. This would at least avert the prospect of confirming Mr. Dusaidi's assertions that Rwanda has agreed upon the mandate renewal "not because [Rwanda] believes that actually UNAMIR can assist, as it has been here for a year and a half and no significant numbers of refugees have come back because of UNAMIR per se".**

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

UNAMIR-MINUAR

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

NOTE TO THE SRSG

Subject: **UNAMIR's mandate - Security Council Resolution 1029 (1995)**

1. By concentrating the new mandate on activities aimed at facilitating the voluntary return of the refugees, the Security Council has implicitly given UNAMIR a regional role. Under Security Council resolution 1029 (1995), UNAMIR is expected to "exercise its good offices to assist in achieving the voluntary and safe repatriation of Rwandan refugees within the frame of reference of the recommendations of the Bujumbura Conference and the Cairo Summit of the Heads of State of the Great Lakes Region, and in promoting genuine national reconciliation".

2. Such a role of good offices implies not only talking to the Rwandese Government but also discussing with the signatories of the recommendations of the above conference and summit. Furthermore, it calls for some initiatives that may help to persuade the refugees to return.

3. In this connection, unless we are authorized to cross the borders and speak directly to the refugees, Radio UNAMIR would continue to be our only channel of communication with those still in the camps. It is therefore essential that we make the best use of that important tool for the fulfilment of our new and last mandate.

4. To that end, some of the suggestions contained in my note of 11 August 1995 (copy attached), particularly those concerning the preparation, in cooperation with the Rwandese Government, of special and specific programmes for the camps, may be considered.

5. We may also seek clarification from Headquarters as to whether the exercise of our good offices, as recommended in resolution 1029 (1995), includes conducting rounds of consultations with the neighbouring countries to persuade them to implement the decisions of the Bujumbura Conference and the Cairo Summit.

WS

Wilfrid de Souza
14 December 1995

ii) Un Volet actualité
Celui-ci serait consacré à la vie de tous les jours à l'ONU: compte-rendu de réunions, examen des décisions importantes des divers organes de l'ONU, interviews de personnalités sur des sujets d'actualité à l'ONU, interviews de membres du Conseil de Sécurité sur les débats concernant le Rwanda ou d'autres sujets (africains notamment) soumis à l'examen du Conseil. Cette émission pourrait se dénommer "ONU-ACTUALITES". Elle serait d'une durée de 30 à 45 minutes, diffusée 3 fois par semaine. Cette émission pourrait commencer avec l'examen par le Conseil de Sécurité du rapport du Secrétaire-Général sur le Rwanda.

III. CONSIDERATIONS D'ORDRE GENERAL ET TECHNIQUE

3. Il semble que les autorités Rwandaises aient maintenant donné leur accord pour le transfert au Mont REBERO de l'antenne principale actuellement au siège. Il faut donc accélérer le processus de ce transfert et installer le plus tôt possible les relais nécessaires devant permettre d'atteindre les camps de réfugiés à GOMA et BUKAVU.

4. Mettre au point un programme à l'intention des camps de réfugiés qui comprendrait, entre autres, des interviews avec des réfugiés et des hommes politiques, est une opération délicate dont le caractère éminemment politique n'échappe à personne. Il est donc recommandé de discuter d'abord l'approche et les grandes lignes du programme avec les autorités compétentes avant de commencer la diffusion. Cela demande aussi, une fois lancé le programme, une vigilance de tous les instants pour éviter les dérapages.

5. On ne gère pas un programme de cette nature sans une surveillance constante de la ligne politique suivie par les émissions. Il est donc proposé de doter notre radio d'un Conseil d'Administration dont le rôle serait, entre autres, de s'assurer que les moyens mis en oeuvre sont conformes aux objectifs politiques à atteindre, d'évaluer l'impact de nos programmes sur les populations-cibles et de prendre des décisions en ce qui concerne la gestion de la radio. Il est proposé que le Conseil d'Administration soit composé comme suit:

Le Représentant Spécial du Secr.-Gén.....Président
Le Directeur Exécutif.....VicePrésident
Le Conseiller Politique Spécial.....membre
Le Conseiller Juridique.....membre
Le Chef de l'Administration.....membre
Un représentant des Agences de l'ONU.....membre
Le Porte-Parole de la MINUAR.....membre ex officio
Le Chef de l'Unité Radio.....membre ex officio

Le Conseil devrait se réunir une fois par semaine en session ordinaire et, lorsque nécessaire, en session extraordinaire.

6. Il est proposé également que les horaires de diffusion soient réajustées et que la possibilité d'émettre également le matin soit examinée. La vie dans le pays ayant repris un cours quasi normal, peut-être faudrait-il envisager de commencer les émissions du soir à 17 ou 18 heures et en prolonger la durée jusqu'à 22 heures.

7. D'autre part, il paraît souhaitable d'éviter les longues diffusions de musique non-stop. Celle-ci ne devrait en principe pas constituer un programme en elle-même mais servir de lien entre les programmes. A ce sujet, il faudrait, autant que possible, donner la préférence à la musique africaine dans les émissions en langues locales.

8. Signalons enfin que les émissions prévues au paragraphe 2 alineas i) et ii) ci-dessus supposent une collaboration étroite avec le service radio et video du Département de l'information au siège à New York. Ce service que nous avons contacté nous a laissé entendre que son personnel est prêt à coopérer à ce sujet et qu'il en avait déjà fait l'offre à maintes reprises. On nous a assuré à ce sujet qu'il existe entre le siège et notre service radio les moyens techniques permettant de transmettre instantanément par téléphone enregistreur des interviews ou autres documents sonores de New York pour diffusion par notre radio à Kigali.

IV. CONCLUSION

9. Les suggestions ci-dessus ne sont que quelques idées qui pourraient servir de base de discussions. Elles sont donc loin d'avoir fait le tour de la question. Elles n'ont pas abordé, par exemple, la question des contraintes techniques éventuelles. Ce document ne traite pas non plus des moyens tant en personnel qu'en matériel à mettre en oeuvre pour la réalisation de ces idées. Mais nous avons pensé qu'en définissant d'abord les objectifs et les programmes correspondants, il serait plus facile d'évaluer les moyens de les réaliser.

WS

Wilfrid de Souza
11 Août 1995

c:\contribu

UNITED NATIONS
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

UNAMIR-MINUAR

NATIONS UNIES
MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

TO: **Amb. Shaharyar M. Khan**
SRSG

DATE: 13 December 1995

FROM: **Ismaël A. Diallo**
Spokesman, UNAMIR

RECEIVED
13 DEC 1995
OFFICE OF THE SRSG
UNAMIR

SUBJECT: **Practical Strategies for New Mandate**

A. Introduction

1. The opinions expressed in this note were conceived and drafted before December 8, 1995 when the Security Council formally met on Rwanda. UNAMIR's mandate has been since extended for a further period of three months in Resolution 1029 (1995) of 12 December, 1995.

2. The subsequent reading of that resolution has convinced me more of the imperative need for UNAMIR to take the direction outlined in the following proposals.

B. Background

3. If we accept that the mere presence of UNAMIR has contributed to the normalization of life in Rwanda, we cannot say as much with respect to the desired goal of mass repatriation of refugees in neighbouring countries.

4. We may add, as a corollary to the above, that such a presence for a further period of three months would not achieve much in terms of incentive for massive waves of returning refugees.

5. Undoubtedly, UNAMIR's confidence building role inside Rwanda has had a trickle effect in the camps without, however, registering the desired impact for solving the refugee problem and helping in a major way to achieve national reconciliation.

6. The new mandate, unlike the previous three under UNAMIR II, is totally focussed on the refugee repatriation exercise and calls, therefore, for creative initiatives and practical strategies in order to accomplish the new mission.

C. Proposals

1. Joint Teams

(a) It is imperative to establish joint teams consisting of Government officials from Ministries of Rehabilitation, Internal Affairs and Social Affairs, UNAMIR

I consider the proposal regarding joint-teams to be very valuable. In our new mandate we need to pursue it. I should like to call a meeting with UNHCR, UNDP (RR) to discuss this issue among ourselves first. My only doubt is that some may read against our presence.
Shah.
18/12
SD (H. Diallo)

officials, both civilian and military, Human Rights monitors, UNHCR officers and local representatives of the population in the communes.

(b) These teams would physically visit the refugee camps in Zaire, Burundi and Tanzania and talk to the refugees there in a bid to reassure them of safe repatriation. Host countries will, of course, be advised in advance.

(c) The teams would organize visits of refugee representatives to their respective communes so as to witness the security prevailing there and take back the message of positive information to the camps.

(d) The joint teams would also visit communes across the country, to get first-hand information on the situation there prior to convincing the refugees to return home and would subsequently continue to monitor the reintegration of the returnees.

(e) The members of these teams would be constantly on the move, spending over half their time in the communes and refugee camps during the three-month extension.

2. Radio UNAMIR

(a) A colleague's views

I shall deal separately with radio and improvement proposals. Despite shortcomings, Radio UNAMIR has done well. Sah.

(i) A colleague in my office, who got close to the Radio Section during my two-month absence, has strong views about the parochial, sectionalist spirit of the Radio management, which is too wrapped into itself to value the great potential of inputs from other UNAMIR sections, especially within the OSRSG.

(ii) In that self-inflicted isolation, the Radio management does not set any programmes of work, not even weekly schedules, on the basis of which the colleagues in OSRSG can formulate contributions, in a collegial approach that is imperative if the Radio has to function as Radio UNAMIR and not simply as a section of UNAMIR.

(iii) At the same time, the Radio section remains fragmented within: heads of programmes hold daily meetings and proceed to give assignments to their journalists, who complain of being denied a chance to contribute ideas, as professionals, for the better running of programmes. In fact there are no programmes as such; there are only language units that are called programmes, which is a misnomer.

(iv) Heads of programmes are in constant touch with external news agencies, giving out information that is sometimes more interpretational than factual, which may lead to the phenomenon of "**uncoordinated troop movement**" with respect to the work of the Spokesman's Office.

(v) Other colleagues in OSRSG have aired strong criticism about the poor quality of Radio Rwanda News Summary, which is sent to the SRSG without any effort at editing and which reflects badly on the

professionalism within UNAMIR, among the many UN Offices that receive the daily summary.

Note: The above observations come from the Information Officer (UNV) in my office, who stands by every statement made above and requests a review of the whole matter.

(b) New approach

(i) Whatever the veracity of the above criticism, there is need to formulate a clear strategy for Radio programmes under the new mandate.

(ii) There is also need to associate more the colleagues in OSRSG in the policy-making exercise aimed at that reorientation.

(iii) In that connection, weekly or fortnightly plans of work for Radio programmes should be discussed at OSRSG meetings so that colleagues may add their inputs and help boost the impact of Radio UNAMIR.

(iv) Under the proposed reorientation, Radio UNAMIR should focus more on contacts with the population in the communes to bridge the information gap with the refugee camps.

(v) That would entail exchange of messages among relatives inside and outside the country (in refugee camps) for a more concrete effort at confidence building and fighting disinformation in refugee camps.

(vi) Such activities would be more effective than current trends devoted to news coverage of various seminars and visits of personalities, which coverage should be of secondary importance under the new mandate.

(vii) It would also help if Radio UNAMIR management could establish better working relations with Radio Rwanda, without of course having to compromise its objectivity, and set up structural collaboration with other UN agencies, IOM, ICRC and other major NGOs involved in assisting the refugees and interested in their repatriation.

3. Mandate Commission

yes. we prepared. fax

(a) In anticipation of further negotiations expected to take place prior to the end of the new mandate on 8 March 1996, the ground-work could start immediately, with the setting up of a Government-UNAMIR Commission as soon as possible.

(b) The Commission would oversee the implementation of the new mandate and iron out differences that tend to undermine cooperation with the Government.

(c) This would help avoid last moment recriminations that have sprung up in discussions just before the end of previous mandates.

(d) More significantly, the Commission would study the nature and functions of the proposed body that will replace UNAMIR after 8 March 1996, with a consensus on the post-UNAMIR cooperation between the Government and the UN.

(e) That Commission should finalize its recommendations in the third week of January 1996, so that they may serve as guidelines for the Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council on 1 February 1996.

4. Inter-Agency Publication

Let's keep the Agencies out. They even have their own programmes. Let us so for as UNAMIR participation as discussed

(a) The concerted efforts of UN agencies in the repatriation exercise will require a special publication highlighting the operation, under UNAMIR coordination.

(b) To avoid fragmentation of those efforts, there should be a clear policy setting up a data centre for compilation and processing of information on repatriation and related activities.

(c) In case of financial limitations on the part of UNAMIR, whose budget for public information now stands at only US$ 10,000, the UN partners could pool together resources for a joint publication.

(d) The project would involve three issues - one by January 10, 1996, one on 15 February and the last before 8 March - to be produced in English, French and Kinyarwanda.

N.B.: The suggestions above have been intentionally made brief to avoid taking too much of your time. Similar views may have been already formulated by your Office. Whatever decisions are taken on what UNAMIR will do to accomplish its mandate during the coming three months, it is worth noting that this is the last opportunity for the Mission to win over its critics and leave Rwanda on after 8 March 1996 with confidence and a clear conscience. This would at least avert the prospect of confirming Mr. Dusaidi's assertions that Rwanda has agreed upon the mandate renewal "not because [Rwanda] believes that actually UNAMIR can assist, as it has been here for a year and a half and no significant numbers of refugees have come back because of UNAMIR per se".

La Déléguée du Président : S. COURTOUX

Mme. Sadako Ogata
Haut Commissaire
Haut Commissariat pour les
réfugiés - Nations Unies

Madame le Haut commissaire,

La presse fait actuellement écho à de très alarmantes déclarations émanant de personnalités rwandaises - dont l'ancien Premier ministre M. Faustin Twagiramungu - au sujet de massacres qui auraient été perpétrés au Rwanda par l'Armée Patriotique Rwandaise (APR). Ces massacres traduiraient une volonté de vengeance du Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR) à l'oeuvre depuis l'installation du gouvernement d'union nationale mis en place à Kigali en juillet 1994.

Monsieur Twagiramungu affirme (communiqué du 27 novembre dernier) détenir les *preuves irréfutables* du massacre de 250 000 personnes.

Plus récemment (communiqué du 8 décembre dernier), M. Sixbert Musangamfura, ancien Chef du Service Civil des renseignements auprès de M. Twagiramungu, a accusé le Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR) d'être responsable du massacre de 312 726 personnes entre avril 1994 et juillet 1995. M. Musangamfura affirme par ailleurs que certaines zones du pays, utilisées pour dissimuler des charniers, seraient interdites d'accès et de survol aux observateurs étrangers. Il accuse par ailleurs ces derniers de s'abstenir volontairement d'élever des protestations.

Nous nous étonnons, bien entendu, que la légitime publicité donnée à de telles allégation ne s'accompagne pas d'une vérification de leur exactitude. Mais nous nous étonnons surtout que des accusations d'une si extrême gravité ne déclenchent pas une mobilisation pour en confirmer ou infirmer la teneur. Pour d'aucuns, ce silence signifierait que les observateurs présents au Rwanda les considéreraient sans fondement au point d'estimer qu'elles ne méritent pas de commentaire. D'autres se demandent s'il ne s'agit pas d'un aveu. Pour notre part, nous ne pouvons pas nous contenter de supposer. La situation nous conduit à vous prier de bien vouloir nous faire savoir si vous tenez ou non ces accusations pour crédibles. Si elles reflètent la vérité, une action immédiate s'impose. Si elles sont fausses, il est également urgent de le faire savoir.

Le génocide en 1994 a laissé le Rwanda confronté à d'innombrables problèmes auxquels ses autorités doivent faire face. Alertés dès 1993 des menaces de génocide qui pesaient sur le pays, nous nous sommes efforcés de renforcer les avertissements de ceux qui ont révélé ces dangers. Aujourd'hui, nous ne sommes prêts ni a accepter qu'une campagne mensongère sape les efforts d'un gouvernement dont la tâche est déjà bien rude, ni à fermer les yeux sur des crimes s'il s'avère qu'ils ont été commis. Nous espérons bien vivement en vos éclaircissements.

Dans cette attente, je vous prie de recevoir, Madame le Haut commissaire, l'expression de ma haute considération.

Sharon COURTOUX

COORDONNE EN FRANCE LA CAMPAGNE INTERNATIONALE D'ACTION
DU NOBEL CONTRE LA FAIM ET POUR LE DÉVELOPPEMENT

UNITED NATIONS

ST

Secretariat

ST/IC/1996/12
6 February 1996

INFORMATION CIRCULAR

To: Members of the staff

From: The Secretary-General

Subject: IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY DECISIONS ON THE PROGRAMME BUDGET FOR THE BIENNIUM 1996-1997

1. My proposed programme budget for the biennium 1996-1997 1/ reflected determined efforts to initiate maximum efficiencies throughout the Secretariat. At the fiftieth session of the General Assembly, Member States welcomed both the timeliness and the new format of the proposed programme budget presentation and expressed support for my demonstrated commitment and that of senior management to do "more with less". They welcomed also the efficiency gains included in the proposed programme budget and my intention to pursue further efficiencies during the course of the 1996-1997 biennium.

2. The budget ultimately approved by the General Assembly in its resolution 50/215 A of 23 December 1995 requires me to make significant additional reductions. The Assembly decided on appropriations for 1996-1997 at the level of $2,608 million, including reductions of $50 million to be obtained through an increase in the budgeted vacancy rate to 6.4 per cent for staff in all categories, and a further reduction of $104 million to be achieved through additional savings.

3. Implementing budget reductions as decided in resolution 50/215 A will require a balanced approach in reducing both staff and non-staff costs. In this regard, it is planned that, to the extent possible, savings will be found in such non-staff expenditures as travel, consultants, equipment and furniture, buildings maintenance and alteration, and general operating expenses. Cutbacks in these areas are, however, expected to result in relatively modest savings, in that, as a whole, they represent a small portion of the regular budget. It is evident, therefore, that budgetary reductions of this magnitude cannot be effected without a significant reduction in the level of staff-related costs.

96-03084 (E) 090296 100296

/...

4. I have already asked programme managers to conduct a review of their programmes to identify ways to achieve further savings in their respective areas of responsibility. Programme managers have been requested to complete their reviews by 14 February. Over the next few weeks, I will be assessing the results of these reviews, and I will submit a progress report to the General Assembly on the implementation of resolution 50/215 A by 31 March. It is my responsibility to reduce expenditures to the level approved by the General Assembly. I am committed to doing so while, at the same time, minimizing the effect on programmes and continuing to improve the efficiency of the Organization. I am also committed to minimizing the impact on the staff. As I indicated to Member States, the international civil service must not be undermined.

5. I intend to keep staff fully informed of developments. Appropriate staff-management consultations will be conducted, in accordance with the requirements of Chapter VIII of the Staff Regulations and Rules. I would welcome suggestions from individual staff members, drawing on their experience and knowledge of the Organization, on possible means of achieving efficiencies and cost reductions.

6. Supervisors and managers will be given guidance in structural change, efficiency management and downsizing. Particular emphasis will be placed on ensuring that the process is conducted with full consideration of the implications for individual staff members. Assistance in responding to the new situation will be provided to individual staff members. Advisory outplacement support and counselling will be available for staff members who request them. I will request the support of Member States in assisting staff members and their families, where necessary, with regard to visa, employment and related issues.

7. I count on all staff members, including those serving in representational roles, to work supportively with programme managers to achieve the savings mandated by the General Assembly.

Notes

1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Fiftieth Session, Supplement No. 6 (A/50/6/Rev.1), vols. I and II.

-YING SLIP

FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA

(UNAMIR)

TO:

A: Mr. I. Diallo

FOR ACTION	☐	POUR SUITE A DONNER
FOR APPROVAL	☐	POUR APPROBATION
FOR SIGNATURE	☐	POUR SIGNATURE
FOR COMMENTS	☐	POUR OBSERVATIONS
YOUR ATTENTION	☐	VOTRE ATTENTION
AS DISCUSSED	☐	COMME CONVENU
AS REQUESTED	☐	SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE
NOTE AND RETURN	☐	NOTER ET RETOURNER
FOR INFORMATION	☒	POUR INFORMATION

For information only. Not for distribution.

Date:	FROM: DE:
27/02/96	Isel Rivero

Report of the Monthly [redacted] Conference Which Took Place in Kibungo on 21 February

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Effect of Reduced Strength

All MILOBs remarked that since December 1995 and due to the new mandate and force strength, the reduction of personnel has affected their ability to gather information and to carry out more extensive patrols.

Infiltration and Sabotage

As in the last conference, continued tension is prevalent in the sectors adjacent to Lake Kivu due to increased insurgent and sabotage activities and the concomitant retaliation by RPA. It was noted that local population in the three sectors are fearful and that the prison population has as a result of the above activities also increased. The RPA seems to feel that the local population is collaborating with the saboteurs.

Efforts at Reconciliation

All Sector Commanders remarked that the RPA is not winning the overall confidence of the population and that this coupled with the prison situation is a worrying sign. There also

seems to be a decline in the RPA rank and file discipline leading to arbitrary actions which in some cases has led to their taking the law in their own hands. These facts augur negatively for any progress on reconciliation.

Resettlement issues

The main problem for the resettlement of refugees continues to be housing facilities and the friction associated with invaded property. Mechanisms established by the Government to deal with the latter have not been effective.

UNAMIR Withdrawal

As in previous conferences, there is apprehension at the prospect of UNAMIR's withdrawal both within the NGO community and population at large. While relations with RPA and Gendarmerie officials have improved, this may be due to the fact that formed troops are no longer as prevalent as before in the rural areas.

Mass Killings/Retribution

I asked the Commanders whether they saw any truth in recent allegations made by the former Prime Minister that there have been massive killings inside Rwanda. All of them admitted that there are acts of reprisals, disappearances and even murder in some instances,

but that large scale killings could not have gone unnoticed by them or the population.

Others

Of particular interest in specific sectors, the presence of RPA soldiers who do not speak Kinyarwanda has been noticed in Sector 4, Cyangugu. UNAMIR continues to be denied access to the Akagera and Mugesera areas in Sector I, Kivungo. Curfews have been introduced in three communes in Sector 5, Gisenyi to prevent movement at night. This indicates a state of readiness by the RPA to curtail sabotage.

REPORT

SECTOR I

Security

The Sector Commander referred to the overall security situation and noted that the return of refugees from Burundi and Tanzania has considerably increased. There are 5 transit camps in this Sector able to accommodate 2,000 refugees each. Refugees overall seem to be well treated upon arrival though RPA presence in these camps is very prevalent. Two dead bodies were recovered from Lake Muhazi and there had been a theft at Sector

Headquarters of EDP and other electronic equipment. The Tanzanian Government had not been successful in separating the criminal elements from the rest of the refugee population. The RPA on the other hand was projecting itself as the force in control and not projecting an image of protection which is inherent in a national army. The Sector Commander remarked that access by UNAMIR to the Akagera and Mugesera areas was still forbidden by the RPA.

Refugees

Though there was lack of housing and other infrastructure, 11 areas have now been identified by the Government for resettlement of refugees. Each area could accommodate 5,00 each. Considerable work remains to be done one in order to make these sites viable.

Prisons

The situation in the Nsinda prison was satisfactory though the same could not be said of the communes cachots. There are 5,220 prisoners in Nsinda prison, 1,517 in Kibungo and over 1,500 in cachots.

Reconciliation

There have been positive signs as local authorities have made deliberate attempts with

the assistance of various international agencies to bring about a rapproachment among different groups. It is however, realized that reconciliation will be a long drawn-up process.

The Sector Commander recommended that UNAMIR obtain access by MILOBs to visit refugee camps in bordering countries. It should be noted that Sector I is the largest and include borders with Uganda, Tanzania and Burundi.

Sector 2

Security

The Sector Commander prefaced his comments by pointing out that his sector included two very tense spots, Kibuye and Gitarama. Sabotage activities by Interhamwe and former RGF had been carried out in the two prefectures which had prompted immediate reprisal actions by RPA. As a consequence men literally were in hiding and in fear which had a detrimental effect on economic activity. There are food shortages and banditry. Elements of the RPA seemed to lack discipline and acts of extortion have been noted.

Prisons

The Gitarama prison now held 6,360 prisoners including 219 women and the Kibuye

prison over 2,000 in appalling conditions. The commune cachots are overcrowded. It was obvious that arbitrary arrests are continuing. There had been over 1,000 arrests in Gitarama Prefecture over a period of 2 months. In the 17 communes of Gitarama there are 4,195 prisoners while in the 9 communes of Kibuye there are 1,200, the latter exclude the prisoners from the main prisons. The Sector Commander had approached several NGOs to provide food for the prisoners and CONCERN had responded positively.

Reconciliation

The RPA did no seem to be making any effort in gaining the confidence of the population. Not were any information campaigns by the Government of Rwanda reaching the communes.

Refugees

Returnees were faced with the problem that their property had been occupied by the RPA. No confirmation of any successful transfer of property had yet been received. UNHCR has reported the return of 299 to refugees to Gitarama and 6,800 to Kibuye. However, MILOBS have confirmed 176 and 360 respectively.

Attitude Towards UNAMIR

In spite of all of the above, hostility towards UNAMIR had decreased. MILOBS have a good working relationship with the RPA Brigade Commander as well as with local officials. This could be due to the curtailment of UNAMIR patrols due to the reduction of forces and of patrolling capability. The reporting by Radio UNAMIR on humanitarian activities carried out has helped and has acted as a check on contrary past reports on the part of the Government of Rwanda.

UNAMIR's Withdrawal

The population as well as some officials were apprehensive at UNAMIR's imminent withdrawal. The Sector Commander recommended that the RPA should be encouraged to enforce more discipline among its rank and file and that the situation in commune cachots be looked into.

SECTOR III

Security

This sector comprises the southern city of Butare. There had been a lull in acts of

robbery and intimidation, but recently these have again resurfaced. Relations between UNAMIR , Gendarmerie and RPA are good. However, relations between RPA and the local population was considered not normal, there were continued harassments, threats both written and verbal, as well as arbitrary arrests. These have affected local employees which worked for UNAMIR. To say that the situation was calm was misleading, the Sector Commander stated. In Gikongoro the situation was just stable.

The Virungwe Forest had been the scenario of Interhamwe activity. As a result RPA has increased patrolling of the area and this had had some restraining results.

Prisons

During the last two months, MILOBS had not been allowed to visit the commune cachots where the situation of inmates seem deplorable. However, through Human Rights Monitors and other sources it had been possible to estimate that 70% of the prisoners accused of genocide were either former IDPs or refugees.

The Butare Prefecture alone has 13,172 prisoners in various commune cachots and in two main prisons at Butare and Nyanza. In Gikongoro central prison there are 2,505 prisoners. It was clear that the judicial system was not working. There are no human or material resources, including transport, to establish any proper court system or greater

involvement in the police judiciary.

Refugees

There are resettlement differences between old and new case loads of returnees. In the Sector Commander's opinion, there is discrimination in dealing with new case loads. While in the past three months returnees consisted mostly of women and children, recently the arrival of younger males had been noticed. However, so far a total of 78,000 IDPs and 33,625 refugees have returned to their communes of origin.

Reconciliation

The Sector Commander believed that a long time would have to lapse before any meaningful reconciliation process is established.

SECTOR 4

Security

Security incidents had increased across the border and within the Sector. Acts of sabotage and infiltration were now better organized and executed. It is believed that the

local population was also collaborating. In turn, as in other Sectors, the RPA is retaliating. This vicious circle is obviously affecting refugee return. Security meetings were regularly organized for the NGO and UN agencies representatives in the Sector. The RPA is invited to participate. It has become clear that the RPA was not able to predict the situation.

Refugees

Those refugees who returned found their property occupied by the old case load. The Judicial system was not functioning and even the duties of Inspectors of the Police Judiciary had been usurped by RPA. Both prisons and cachots were overcrowded. There were 21 cachots in this Sector, one in each commune.

Reconciliation

Though officials participated in meetings with local officials, there were no activities which called upon the grass roots. As in Sector 2, there were no clear signs of reconciliation and the Government seemed to have abandoned their campaign at commune level to reach the population. Those lower level leaders who could exercise some influence in the communes are not acting because of fear of arrest.

The Sector Commander had noted that some elements of the RPA did not speak Kinyarwanda. In addition, the two Sous-Prefet of Cyangugu were originally from Burundi and Uganda. Therefore there was no homogeneity in the local government.

SECTOR 5

Security

Acts of banditry, arbitrary arrests and a sharp increase of insurgent activity has been recorded. It is believed that the local population was cooperating. The RPA has moved to eliminate informers and has introduced curfews in three communes bordering the Virunga Volcanoes and the Gishwati Forest where presence of FRGF has been noticeable. The Sector Commander believed that the FRGF could be undergoing better training since their effectiveness had increased. He pointed out that their activities had seemed to decrease after the Zairian forces had surrounded the camps. He would be monitoring the situation to ascertain if this assumption was correct.

The RPA considered all Hutu inhabitants as collaborators and has initiated night patrols with Hutu civilians. The RPA is also consistently showing their military control of the Sector by moving in numbers along the main roads and communal paths. They have also begun to train locals in mine awareness.

Attitude Towards UNAMIR

Relations with RPA have improved with close cooperation and frequent sharing of information. The MILOBs have introduced modalities to bring the RPA and UN agencies as well as NGOs together at weekly meetings for coordination purposes.

UNAMIR Withdrawal

There was widespread consternation at UNAMIR's withdrawal plans on 8 March. Even some officials had indicated their misgivings about this decision. NGOs and UN Agency Representatives are also concerned and some have indicated that they would be curtailing their activities once UNAMIR departed.

Prisons

The prison and commune cachot situation is similar to other sectors. The Gisenyi prison capacity is for 700 inmates. It presently houses 1,838 of which 27 are women and 41 children. There are a total of 12 commune cachots with an average population of 1,800-2,000. There is also a military detention centre with 208 inmates. These are believed to be former FRGF members. The MILOBs have tried to enlist the support of NGOs in the distribution of additional food and medicines especially for women and children.

As in other sectors the judicial system was non-existent. The Inspectors of the Police Judiciary were not functioning either. Meetings of the Triage Commissions have been suspended after the first three meetings.

Reconciliation

Regarding reconciliation, the Sector Commander pointed out that as far as his RPA Counterpart was concerned, the RPA would not forgive nor forget. Yet other officials are trying to assist in easing the returnees incorporation into society. He suggested that Radio Unamir should hold round table discussions with the participation of the RPA on this issue.

Refugees

The number of refugees had been relatively steady. In January 7,739 and in February 4,986 (so far) had been registered. The returnees are treated fairly by Rwandese authorities and it was apparent that sincere efforts for their rehabilitation were being made. There are problems with resettlement due to the housing shortage. UNHCR is playing a major role in the construction of temporary dwellings. The Government was also making efforts to resolve any property disputes but no figures have been provided on cases resolved.

UNITED NATIONS
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

NATIONS UNIES
MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

DATE: 27 February 1996

TO: A. UNIC/UNIS Directors
UN Representatives
UNDP Resident Representatives
PKO Information Officers

THROUGH: S/C DE: Mr. Graeme Warner, Chief
Information Centres Service, DPI

FROM: DE: Eugen Gheorghe, Officer-in-Charge
Dissemination & Communications Unit, ICS/DPI

SUBJECT: OBJET: Annual Survey on Electronic Dissemination

1. We kindly request that you fill out the enclosed two forms which are self-explanatory and fax them back to us as soon as possible. By doing so you will help us to serve your information needs better. You can change your preferences or suspend the transmissions at any time by notifying the Dissemination and Communications Unit in writing, but please do keep in mind that such changes entail a significant amount of additional work for the Unit.

2. Please note that we are unable to customize the categories any further due to limited staff resources.

3. Due to financial constraints we kindly ask that any request for fax/telex transmissions to locations with E-mail be accompanied by a written explanation of the reasons necessitating this request.

4. We look forward to receiving your replies. Thank you for your kind cooperation.

414

ANNUAL SURVEY BY DISSEMINATION UNIT, ICS/DPI ON TRANSMISSION OF INFORMATION MATERIALS MARCH 1996

OFFICE: _____
CITY: _____
COUNTRY: _____

I. Would you like to receive the following materials on a regular basis?

Categories of Materials	Language	
	ENG	FRE
1. Daily Press Briefing of the Spokesman for the SG		[redacted]
2. Daily Highlights		[redacted]
3. UN Journal (English/French combined) **e-mail only**		
4. All Press Releases (includes A & B) **e-mail only**		[redacted]
A. Secretary-General's Messages and Statements [1]		
B. Selected (Key) Press Releases [2]		[redacted]
7. DPI Background Notes (text of upcoming publications)		
8. DPI Programme Update **e-mail only**		[redacted]
9. Selected Briefings and Press Conferences held at HQ		[redacted]
10. Selected UN parliamentary documents, such as SG's reports & SC resolutions		

II. Occasionally, some materials (such as SG's messages or speeches, DPI background notes, etc.) are available in Spanish, Arabic and Russian, although usually with significant delays, compared to the English. Would you like to receive available materials in any of the following languages in addition to the English (or French) version?

Language	✓ for Yes
Spanish	
Arabic	
Russian	

III. A. If you have **Internet or Higgins e-mail**, do you have the capability of receiving binary files (e.g. accented characters, compressed files)? YES_____ NO_____

B. If you have **cc:Mail**, do you prefer Wordperfect 5.1 files (formatted) to ASCII (pure text)? YES_____ NO_____

---

[1] Including statements attributable to the Spokesman for the SG

[2] Security Council meeting summaries, including presidential statements and draft resolutions; General Assembly plenary meeting summaries, background and round-up releases on other meetings and conferences, and press releases covering issues and events of special importance

Copy ED Radio Spokesman SA/SRSG 26/2/96

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

MILOB GROUP HQ : OPS BRANCH

FROM : CMO

TO : Office of SRSG

INFO : MA to A F C
ADCOS(OPS)

RECEIVED
26 FEB 1996
OFFICE OF THE SRSG
UNAMIR

FILE : MILOB/CMO/OPS/46

DATE : 24 FEB 96

REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES DURING 95 / 96

1. Please refer to your memo of 23 Feb 96 on above subject.

2. **Details of Returnees .** Almost two million refugees left Rwanda during the Rwandan crisis in 1994 and settled in refugee camps in Burundi, Tanzania and Zaire. However, only limited number of them have returned to Rwanda. Their details are given below :

(a) For the Year 1995. A total of 240,388 refugees returned to Rwanda in 1995. Monthly figures are :

Month	Number of Returnees
Jan	34477
Feb	26421
Mar	30347
Apr	23051
May	23245
Jun	11199
Jul	10829

Aug	27044
Sep	20468
Oct	13022
Nov	6702
Dec	13583
Total	240,388

(c) For the Year 1996. During 1996 the following returnees came back to Rwnda :

Month	Number of Returnees	
Jan	13264	
Feb	25498	(up to 22 Feb)

3. **Assistance Provided By MILOBs / UNAMIR.** The MILOBs monitor the movement of returnees from the border up to their home communes. MILOB patrols visit the border posts regularly (almost everyday for the active border posts and at reasonable frequency for other border posts). Thereafter they visit the transit camps to check the figures as well as to assess the requirements of returnees.

4. UNHCR requests for transport whenever the number of returnees are large. UNAMIR has been frequently assisting them by providing transport for the movement of returnees from border posts to transit camps. UNAMIR uses both first line and second line transport for this purpose.

5. MILOB patrols visiting communes check on the resettlement of returnees. They also assess their needs and try to coordinate these with necessary NGOs who could support those needs. UNAMIR has also undertaken other important tasks like dozer works in transit camps and improvement on roads and bridges to assist refugee repatriation.

6. MILOBs have also tried to reunite the orphans with their parents.

7. MILOB visits to communes also act as a great source of confidence and inspiration

to the returnees who are otherwise very apprehensive.

CHARLES NELSON
Col
CMO

ZCZC KGMF5114 ACOM4545
SY BGD GUM KGM DAM NIC NAQ KOM MGS BEL ZAC-IRS
.NEWYORK (DPI) 11 0937Z
BT
CCM6238-03
OMNIPRESS/UNDEVPRO
PART 1 OF 1

UNAMIR - REGISTRY
Action to :
1
2
3
Initial
SPOKESMAN
UNAMIR
1 2
1996 MAR 11 P 6:23

SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTR.
GENERAL
S/RES/1050 (1996)
8 MARCH 1996

RESOLUTION 1050 (1996)
ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT ITS 3640TH MEETING, ON 8 MARCH 1996

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

RECALLING ITS PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS ON THE SITUATION IN RWANDA,

HAVING CONSIDERED THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA (UNAMIR) OF 29 FEBRUARY 1996 (S/1996/149),

WELCOMING THE LETTER OF 1 MARCH 1996 FROM THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND COOPERATION OF RWANDA TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (S/1996/176, ANNEX),

PAYING TRIBUTE TO THE WORK OF UNAMIR AND TO THE PERSONNEL WHO HAVE SERVED IN IT,

STRESSING THE CONTINUED IMPORTANCE OF THE VOLUNTARY AND SAFE REPATRIATION OF RWANDAN REFUGEES AND OF GENUINE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION,

EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE IT ATTACHES TO THE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA IN PROMOTING A CLIMATE OF CONFIDENCE, SECURITY AND TRUST AND THE SAFE RETURN OF RWANDAN REFUGEES,

EMPHASIZING ALSO THE IMPORTANCE IT ATTACHES TO STATES ACTING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE REGIONAL CONFERENCE ON ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES, RETURNEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS HELD IN BUJUMBURA IN FEBRUARY 1995, THE SUMMIT OF HEADS OF STATES OF THE GREAT LAKES REGION HELD IN CAIRO ON 28-29 NOVEMBER 1995, AND THE FOLLOW-UP CONFERENCE OF 29 FEBRUARY 1996 HELD IN ADDIS ABABA, AND THE IMPORTANCE IT ATTACHES TO THE CONTINUATION OF EFFORTS TO CONVENE A REGIONAL CONFERENCE FOR PEACE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION,

ENCOURAGING ALL STATES TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INQUIRY ESTABLISHED BY RESOLUTION 1013 (1995) OF 7 SEPTEMBER 1995,

RECOGNIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD OPERATION IN RWANDA IN CONTRIBUTING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CONFIDENCE IN THE COUNTRY, AND CONCERNED THAT IT MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN ITS PRESENCE THROUGHOUT RWANDA UNLESS SUFFICIENT FUNDS FOR THAT PURPOSE ARE SECURED IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE,

CONCERNED ALSO TO ENSURE THE EFFECTIVE OPERATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA ESTABLISHED BY RESOLUTION 955 (1994) OF 8 NOVEMBER 1994,

COMMENDING THE CONTINUING EFFORTS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA TO MAINTAIN PEACE AND SECURITY AS WELL AS TO RECONSTRUCT AND REHABILITATE THE COUNTRY,

STRESSING ITS CONCERN THAT THE UNITED NATIONS SHOULD

SPEC FL CAO Spokesman

CONTINUE TO PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN ASSISTING THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA IN PROMOTING THE RETURN OF REFUGEES, IN CONSOLIDATING A CLIMATE OF CONFIDENCE AND STABILITY AND IN PROMOTING THE REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OF RWANDA,

REITERATING THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA FOR THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF ALL UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL STAFF SERVING IN THE COUNTRY,

1. TAKES NOTE OF THE ARRANGEMENTS MADE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR THE WITHDRAWAL, STARTING ON 9 MARCH 1996, OF UNAMIR PURSUANT TO ITS RESOLUTION 1029 (1995) OF 12 DECEMBER 1995;

2. AUTHORIZES ELEMENTS OF UNAMIR REMAINING IN RWANDA PRIOR TO THEIR FINAL WITHDRAWAL TO CONTRIBUTE, WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA, TO THE PROTECTION OF THE PERSONNEL AND PREMISES OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA;

3. WELCOMES THE INTENTION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO SUBMIT RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY REGARDING UNAMIR NON-LETHAL EQUIPMENT THAT MAY BE RELEASED FOR USE IN RWANDA IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 7 OF ITS RESOLUTION 1029 (1995) AND CALLS UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA TO TAKE ALL NECESSARY STEPS TO ENSURE THAT UNAMIR PERSONNEL, AND EQUIPMENT WHICH IS NOT REMAINING IN RWANDA, CAN BE WITHDRAWN WITHOUT IMPEDIMENT AND IN AN ORDERLY AND SAFE MANNER;

4. ENCOURAGES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, IN AGREEMENT WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA, TO MAINTAIN IN RWANDA A UNITED NATIONS OFFICE, TO BE HEADED BY HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND TO INCLUDE THE PRESENT UNITED NATIONS COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM AND RADIO STATION, FOR THE PURPOSE OF SUPPORTING THE EFFORTS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA TO PROMOTE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, STRENGTHEN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM, FACILITATE THE RETURN OF REFUGEES AND REHABILITATE THE COUNTRY'S INFRASTRUCTURE, AND OF COORDINATING THE UNITED NATIONS EFFORTS TO THAT END;

5. COMMENDS THE EFFORTS OF STATES, INCLUDING NEIGHBOURING STATES, THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS AGENCIES, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS WHICH HAVE PROVIDED HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS, AND UNDERLINES THE IMPORTANCE IT ATTACHES TO CONTINUED EFFORTS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA, NEIGHBOURING STATES, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES TO FACILITATE THE EARLY, SAFE, VOLUNTARY AND ORGANIZED RETURN OF RWANDAN REFUGEES TO THEIR OWN COUNTRY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE BUJUMBURA CONFERENCE;

6. CALLS UPON STATES AND ORGANIZATIONS TO CONTINUE TO GIVE ASSISTANCE FOR THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RWANDA AND THE REHABILITATION OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF THE COUNTRY, INCLUDING THE RWANDAN JUSTICE SYSTEM, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS TRUST FUNDS FOR RWANDA, AND INVITES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONSIDER WHETHER THERE IS A NEED TO ADJUST THE SCOPE AND PURPOSES OF THOSE FUNDS TO BRING THEM INTO LINE WITH CURRENT REQUIREMENTS;

7. CALLS ALSO UPON STATES TO CONTRIBUTE URGENTLY TO THE COSTS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD OPERATION IN RWANDA, AND ENCOURAGES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONSIDER WHAT STEPS MIGHT BE TAKEN TO PLACE THE OPERATION ON A MORE SECURE FINANCIAL BASIS;

8. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE COUNCIL BY 5 APRIL 1996 ON WHAT ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN AGREED WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE PERSONNEL AND PREMISES OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA AFTER THE

WITHDRAWAL OF UNAMIR AND ON THE ARRANGEMENTS HE HAS MADE PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 4 ABOVE, AND TO KEEP THE COUNCIL CLOSELY INFORMED THEREAFTER OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SITUATION:

9. DECIDES TO REMAIN SEIZED OF THE MATTER.

END OF PART 1 OF 1
DISSEMINATION AND COMMUNICATION UNIT/DPI - NY HQ

=031196162ØGMT

NNNN

ZCZC KGMF5056 ACOM4364
SY BGD GUM KGM DAM NIC NAQ KOM MGS BEL ZAG JRS
.NEWYORK (DPI) 05 1136Z
BT
CCM6057-03
OMNIPRESS/UNDEVPRO
FILE :S1996149 - PART 1 OF 3
DOC_SYMBOL:S/1996/149

UNAMIR
1996 MAR -5 P 8:37

UNITED
NATIONS
SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTR.
GENERAL
S/1996/149
29 FEBRUARY 1996
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. THE PRESENT REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1029 (1995) OF 12 DECEMBER 1995, IN WHICH THE COUNCIL DECIDED TO ADJUST THE MANDATE OF THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA (UNAMIR) AND TO EXTEND IT FOR A FINAL PERIOD UNTIL 8 MARCH 1996. THE REPORT COVERS THE MAIN DEVELOPMENTS IN RWANDA SINCE MY REPORT OF 30 JANUARY 1996 (A/50/868-S/1996/61) AND OUTLINES POSSIBLE OPTIONS REGARDING THE UNITED NATIONS ROLE AFTER 8 MARCH 1996.

II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

2. SINCE MY LAST REPORT, RELATIVE CALM AND STABILITY HAVE CONTINUED TO PREVAIL THROUGHOUT RWANDA, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF AREAS BORDERING ZAIRE. IN THOSE AREAS THE SITUATION IS TENSE AS A RESULT OF AN INCREASE IN THE LEVEL OF INSURGENT ACTIVITIES BY ELEMENTS OF THE FORMER RWANDESE GOVERNMENT FORCES (RGF). THE IMPORTANT PROGRESS ACHIEVED BY RWANDA SINCE THE END OF THE CIVIL WAR AND GENOCIDE IN JULY 1994 IS APPARENT FROM THE FOLLOWING STATISTICS: AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION HAS REACHED 82 PER CENT OF PRE-WAR OUTPUT; CHILD IMMUNIZATION, SANITATION, URBAN WATER SUPPLY AND HEALTHCARE, 80 PER CENT; INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION, 75 PER CENT; WHILE PUBLIC TRANSPORT, PRIMARY SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITY EDUCATION ARE ABOVE 60 PER CENT.

3. HOWEVER, THERE REMAIN A NUMBER OF OUTSTANDING ISSUES THAT NEED TO BE ADDRESSED WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THESE INCLUDE THE RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT OF 1.7 MILLION REFUGEES, PROGRESS TOWARDS NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, THE REVIVAL OF THE NATIONAL JUDICIAL PROCESS, IMPROVEMENT OF PRISON CONDITIONS, EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO CURB DESTABILIZATION ACTIVITIES BY THE FORMER RGF AND THE EQUITABLE DISBURSEMENT OF AID. THE PROSPECT OF THE UNAMIR WITHDRAWAL AFTER 8 MARCH 1996 HAS ALSO CAUSED REPRESENTATIVES OF SOME INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN RWANDA TO EXPRESS CONCERN ABOUT THEIR SAFETY, IN PARTICULAR AFTER THE EXPULSION OF 38 NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND AN INCIDENT, ALBEIT ISOLATED AND IMMEDIATELY ACTED UPON BY THE GOVERNMENT, IN WHICH THREE MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL WERE ASSAULTED BY A RWANDA PATRIOTIC ARMY (RPA) GUARD UNIT.

4. DURING THE PAST TWO MONTHS, THERE HAS BEEN A MARKED INCREASE IN INSURGENT ACTIONS CARRIED OUT BY FORMER RGF

Sister G. CAO Secretariat

ELEMENTS, IN PARTICULAR IN THE NORTH-WESTERN PREFECTURE OF GISENYI. THE MOST IMPORTANT WAS THE SABOTAGE ON THE NIGHT OF 2 FEBRUARY 1996 OF THE ELECTRICITY POWER LINE AND WATER INTAKE TO THE LOCAL BREWERY IN GISENYI. ACCORDING TO THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA, A LARGE NUMBER OF INFILTRATORS HAVE BEEN SENT INTO RWANDA TO COORDINATE INSURGENT ACTIVITIES, AS A RESULT OF WHICH PATROLLING BY THE RPA HAS INCREASED IN THE BELT ADJACENT TO THE BORDER WITH ZAIRE.

5. DURING THE PERIOD UNDER REVIEW, THE FORMER HEADS OF STATE OF MALI AND THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA, GENERAL AMADOU TOUMANI TOURE AND MR. JULIUS NYERERE, FACILITATORS OF THE CAIRO SUMMIT OF HEADS OF STATE OF THE GREAT LAKES REGION IN NOVEMBER 1995 (SEE S/1995/1001), VISITED RWANDA AND OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION TO MONITOR STEPS BEING TAKEN IN PURSUANCE OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED AT THAT MEETING. THESE VISITS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO AN IMPROVEMENT IN RWANDA'S RELATIONS WITH ZAIRE AND THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA. ACCORDING TO THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF RWANDA, MAJOR-GENERAL PAUL KAGAME, THE RECENT EXCHANGES OF VISITS BETWEEN ZAIRE AND RWANDA HAVE PROMOTED THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS. THE HANDOVER BY ZAIRE ON 13 FEBRUARY OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT BELONGING TO RWANDA AND REMOVED BY THE FORMER RGF IS SEEN AS A STEP FORWARD IN THE IMPROVEMENT OF BILATERAL RELATIONS, AS RECOMMENDED AT THE CAIRO SUMMIT.

6. ONE OF THE FACTORS THAT DISCOURAGE REFUGEES FROM RETURNING TO RWANDA CONTINUES TO BE THE NON-FUNCTIONING OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM. ALTHOUGH SOME CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES HAVE BEEN INTRODUCED TO ALLOW FOR THE ADOPTION OF SPECIAL PROCEDURES TO DEAL WITH THE CASES OF THOSE SUSPECTED OF CRIMES RELATED TO THE GENOCIDE, NO TRIALS HAVE YET TAKEN PLACE. THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE HAS RECENTLY DECLARED THAT THE FIRST TRIALS WILL START IN APRIL. MEANWHILE, THE NUMBER OF DETAINEES HAS CONTINUED TO RISE, REACHING THE FIGURE OF 65,515 AT THE END OF JANUARY. DESPITE SERIOUS OVERCROWDING, CONDITIONS IN PRISONS HAVE SLIGHTLY IMPROVED THROUGH THE CONSTRUCTION OF NEW DETENTION CENTRES (SEE SECTS. III AND VI).

7. ON 19 FEBRUARY 1996, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA ANNOUNCED THE INDICTMENT OF TWO PERSONS, CURRENTLY IN THE CUSTODY OF THE ZAMBIAN AUTHORITIES, ON CHARGES OF GENOCIDE AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY. WARRANTS OF ARREST WERE SENT TO THE ZAMBIAN AUTHORITIES WITH A REQUEST TO HOLD THE ACCUSED UNTIL SUCH TIME AS DETENTION FACILITIES WERE AVAILABLE IN ARUSHA. TEMPORARY ARRANGEMENTS ARE NOW BEING MADE FOR THE DETENTION OF PERSONS AWAITING TRIAL PENDING THE CONSTRUCTION OF PERMANENT DETENTION FACILITIES. FOLLOWING THE TERMINATION OF THE UNAMIR MANDATE, SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR WILL NEED TO BE AGREED BETWEEN THE TRIBUNAL AND THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA.

8. AS REGARDS RELATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA AND UNAMIR, SEVERAL ISSUES REMAIN TO BE RESOLVED. IN PARAGRAPH 7 OF ITS RESOLUTION 1029 (1995), THE SECURITY COUNCIL REQUESTED ME TO EXAMINE, IN THE CONTEXT OF EXISTING UNITED NATIONS REGULATIONS, THE FEASIBILITY OF TRANSFERRING UNAMIR NON-LETHAL EQUIPMENT, AS ELEMENTS OF UNAMIR WITHDREW, FOR USE IN RWANDA. IN A LETTER DATED 13 FEBRUARY 1996, THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL ALSO ASKED ME TO EXERT FLEXIBILITY IN THE DISPOSITION OF UNAMIR EQUIPMENT (S/1996/103). ACCORDINGLY, I WILL SHORTLY SUBMIT RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY REGARDING UNAMIR EQUIPMENT THAT, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE LIQUIDATION PROCESS, CAN BE RELEASED FOR USE IN RWANDA. I TRUST THAT, IN

THE MEANTIME, THERE WILL BE NO OBSTACLES TO THE TRANSFER OF EQUIPMENT NEEDED IN OTHER PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS.

9. AS MENTIONED IN MY LAST PROGRESS REPORT, I DISPATCHED A TEAM OF EXPERTS TO KIGALI TO DISCUSS WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS OTHER ISSUES OF COMMON CONCERN TO THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA, SUCH AS LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE TAXES BY UNITED NATIONS CONTRACTORS OPERATING IN SUPPORT OF UNAMIR. THE UNITED NATIONS INSISTED THAT UNITED NATIONS CONTRACTORS AND THEIR EXPATRIATE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE EXEMPT FROM HOST COUNTRY TAXATION ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEY HAVE BEEN ENGAGED SOLELY TO PROVIDE LOGISTIC SUPPORT SERVICES, DISTRIBUTION OF RATIONS TO THE VARIOUS COMPONENTS OF THE MISSION AND AIR AND LAND TRANSPORTATION IN SUPPORT OF UNAMIR ACTIVITIES. IN THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSIONS, THE UNITED NATIONS DELEGATION RECEIVED ASSURANCES THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT INSIST ON IMPOSING TAXES WITH RESPECT TO UNAMIR CONTRACTORS. FOR ITS PART, THE UNITED NATIONS AGREED THAT SOCIAL SECURITY TAXES FOR LOCALLY RECRUITED EMPLOYEES OF CONTRACTORS WERE PAYABLE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA, IN ACCORDANCE WITH NATIONAL LEGISLATION. THE UNITED NATIONS ALSO INDICATED ITS WILLINGNESS TO PAY, AS APPROPRIATE, CHARGES FOR COMMUNICATION SERVICES USED BY UNAMIR AND OTHER UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES IN RWANDA, SINCE THESE WERE CHARGES FOR PUBLIC UTILITY SERVICES, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION ON THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

III. HUMAN RIGHTS

10. THE HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD OPERATION IN RWANDA (HRFOR) HAS ESTABLISHED A PRESENCE IN ALL BUT ONE OF RWANDA'S 11 PREFECTURES AND DEVELOPED RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE AUTHORITIES, INCLUDING THE SECURITY FORCES. THE HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICERS CONTRIBUTE TO THE PREVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND TO APPROPRIATE INVESTIGATION AND ACTION. THE FIELD OPERATION SYSTEMATICALLY PRESENTS INFORMATION REGARDING REPORTED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS TO THE COMPETENT MINISTRIES. THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE NATIONAL GENDARMERIE AS WELL AS FOR THE RPA, HAS ESTABLISHED FORMAL LIAISON CHANNELS WITH HRFOR AT THE NATIONAL AND LOCAL LEVELS. THE INFORMATION RESULTING FROM THE OPERATION'S OWN INVESTIGATIONS, TOGETHER WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA'S RESPONSE, IS REPORTED TO THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND MADE AVAILABLE TO THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON RWANDA.

11. CONDITIONS OF DETENTION ARE ONE OF THE MOST SERIOUS ASPECTS OF THE CURRENT HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION. THEY FORM AN IMPORTANT SUBJECT OF THE OVERALL MONITORING, DIALOGUE WITH THE AUTHORITIES AND REPORTING BY HRFOR. IN SEEKING TO REDRESS VIOLATIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF DETAINEES AND TO IMPROVE CONDITIONS OF DETENTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS, HRFOR COORDINATES ITS WORK WITH THAT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC). HRFOR PLANS TO GIVE HIGH PRIORITY, AS THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM BECOMES OPERATIONAL, TO PROMOTING A REDUCTION IN THE NUMBERS OF THOSE DETAINED WITHOUT CHARGE OR TRIAL.

12. HRFOR ASSESSES THE STATE OF READINESS OF HOME COMMUNES TO RECEIVE RETURNEES AND ASSISTS THOSE COMMUNES IN THE RESETTLEMENT PROCESS. THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR) HAS EXPRESSED ITS CONCERN THAT THE PRESENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD OFFICERS IN THE RECEIVING PREFECTURES AND COMMUNES SHOULD BE MAINTAINED AND STRENGTHENED SO THAT HRFOR CAN CONTINUE TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON THE STATE OF READINESS IN COMMUNES THAT MAY RECEIVE

RETURNEES AND ASSIST IN THEIR RESETTLEMENT AND REINTEGRATION.
13. FOLLOWING THE APPOINTMENT OF A NEW CHIEF OF HRFOR IN OCTOBER 1995, THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS HAS REVIEWED THE PRIORITIES OF THE OPERATION FOR 1996. THE CONCLUSIONS HAVE BEEN SHARED WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA AND WITH THOSE GOVERNMENTS WHICH HAVE PROVIDED VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TRUST FUND FOR HRFOR. THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA HAS MADE CLEAR ITS WISH TO HAVE THE PRESENCE OF HRFOR MAINTAINED AFTER THE MANDATE OF UNAMIR EXPIRES. I BELIEVE THAT HRFOR MUST CONTINUE TO CONSTITUTE AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE IN RWANDA BEYOND 8 MARCH 1996.
14. HOWEVER, THE HIGH COMMISSIONER HAS FACED GREAT DIFFICULTIES IN SECURING SUFFICIENT VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO FUND HRFOR. IN MID-NOVEMBER 1995, HE DREW THESE DIFFICULTIES, AND THEIR ADVERSE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF THE OPERATION, TO THE ATTENTION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. IN ITS RESOLUTION 50/58 L OF 22 DECEMBER 1995, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RECOGNIZED THE VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION THAT THE HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICERS HAVE MADE AND REQUESTED ME TO TAKE APPROPRIATE STEPS TO ENSURE ADEQUATE FINANCIAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR HRFOR.
15. THE REQUEST FOR REGULAR BUDGET FUNDING FOR HRFOR WAS NOT APPROVED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS LAST SESSION. THE HIGH COMMISSIONER WAS THEREFORE OBLIGED TO DONORS IN JANUARY 1996 FOR ADDITIONAL VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS. HE HAS SO FAR RECEIVED PLEDGES OF SOME $2.5 MILLION, AVAILABLE TO FUND HRFOR BEYOND ITS CURRENT FINANCIAL ALLOTMENT COVERING THE PERIOD TO 31 MARCH 1996. HOWEVER, THE HIGH COMMISSIONER IS COMMITTED TO REIMBURSING A $3 MILLION LOAN THAT HE RECEIVED FROM THE CENTRAL EMERGENCY REVOLVING FUND IN ORDER TO START OPERATIONS IN SEPTEMBER 1994 AND FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PERIOD FROM 1 APRIL TO 31 DECEMBER 1996 ARE ESTIMATED AT APPROXIMATELY $7 MILLION, BASED ON A STAFFING OF 120, OF WHOM 80 WOULD BE UNITED NATIONS VOLUNTEERS. ADDITIONAL FUNDING TO ENABLE HRFOR TO MEET ITS ADMINISTRATIVE, LOGISTICAL, COMMUNICATIONS AND SECURITY NEEDS WILL ALSO BE REQUIRED FOLLOWING THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNAMIR.
16. THE HIGH COMMISSIONER HAS ASXED ME TO DRAW THE ATTENTION
END OF PART 1 OF 3
DOC_SYMBOL:S/1996/149

DISSEMINATION AND COMMUNICATION UNIT/DPI - NY HQ

=0305961752GMT

NNNN

ZCZC KGMF5057 ACOM4365
RR BGD GUM KGM DAM NIC NAQ KOM MGS BEL ZAG JRS
.NEWYORK (DPI) 05 1136Z
BT
CCM6058-03
OMNIPRESS/UNDEVPRO
FILE :S1996149 - PART 2 OF 3
DOC_SYMBOL:S/1996/149

UNAMIR
1996 MAR -5 P 8:36

OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO THE FACT THAT, UNLESS SUFFICIENT VOLUNTARY FUNDS CAN BE SECURED IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE, HE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN A FIELD OPERATION WITH HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICERS DEPLOYED THROUGHOUT THE PREFECTURES OF RWANDA AND WILL HAVE TO CLOSE DOWN HRFOR. I SHARE HIS VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE MOST REGRETTABLE IF THIS CLOSURE HAS TO OCCUR BEFORE A MAJOR RETURN OF REFUGEES HAS TAKEN PLACE, THE RWANDAN JUSTICE SYSTEM IS FUNCTIONING ADEQUATELY AND NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ARE BETTER ABLE TO PROMOTE AND PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS.

IV. MILITARY AND SECURITY ASPECTS

17. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE CURRENT MANDATE, THE REDUCTION OF THE UNAMIR FORCE LEVEL TO 1,200 FORMED TROOPS AND 200 MILITARY OBSERVERS AND HEADQUARTERS STAFF WAS ACHIEVED BY EARLY FEBRUARY. SOME ADJUSTMENT HAD TO BE MADE TO THE ORIGINAL PROJECTIONS OF REDUCTION OF PERSONNEL AS A RESULT OF THE DECISION TAKEN BY CANADA TO WITHDRAW ITS CONTINGENT WITH EFFECT FROM 2 FEBRUARY 1996. THE REMOVAL OF THE FORCE LOGISTICS SUPPORT UNIT AT THIS LATE STAGE HAS PLACED SOME STRAIN ON THE MISSION, WITH THE RESULT THAT THE FUNCTIONS OF THAT UNIT HAVE HAD TO BE CONTRACTED OUT OR TERMINATED.

18. AS STATED IN MY LAST PROGRESS REPORT, TWO LOGISTIC ELEMENTS HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED AT NYUNDO, NEAR GISENYI, AND SHAGASHA, NEAR CYANGUGU, IN ORDER TO ALLOW UNAMIR TO ASSIST UNHCR IN THE REFUGEE REPATRIATION PROCESS. ALL OTHER FORMED TROOPS ARE DEPLOYED IN THE KIGALI AREA, ALTHOUGH SOME ELEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO ENSURE SECURITY AT THE COMMUNICATIONS SITE ON MOUNT KARONGI AND FOR THE PROTECTION OF MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL WORKING AT KIBUYE, IN WESTERN RWANDA. THE TROOPS STATIONED IN KIGALI CONTRIBUTE TO THE SECURITY OF THE TRIBUNAL, PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, PROTECT UNITED NATIONS PROPERTY AND ASSIST IN REHABILITATION AND THE REPAIR OF INFRASTRUCTURE. MILITARY OBSERVERS ARE DEPLOYED IN FIVE SECTORS, WITH THEIR REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS AT KIBUNGO, GITARAMA, BUTARE, CYANGUGU AND GISENYI RESPECTIVELY (SEE MAP).

19. UNAMIR HAS CONTINUED TO ASSIST THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA IN FACILITATING THE SAFE AND VOLUNTARY RETURN OF REFUGEES TO THEIR HOME COMMUNES. WHEN THE BURUNDI AUTHORITIES CLOSED THE CAMP OF NTAMBA IN THE FIRST WEEK OF FEBRUARY, UNAMIR TROOPS AND MILITARY OBSERVERS, WORKING IN SUPPORT OF UNHCR AND OTHER AGENCIES, PROVIDED ASSISTANCE TO RESETTLE THE RETURNEES. TASKS PERFORMED BY UNAMIR HAVE INCLUDED THE CONSTRUCTION AND IMPROVEMENT OF TRANSIT CAMPS, TRANSPORTATION ON BEHALF OF UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES AND OTHER PARTNERS, AND ENGINEERING WORK, INCLUDING ROAD AND BRIDGE REPAIR. UNAMIR ASSISTED THE RPA IN TRANSPORTING A NUMBER OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND MAJOR PIECES OF EQUIPMENT BELONGING TO RWANDA, WHICH WERE RETURNED BY ZAIRE ON 13 FEBRUARY. MILITARY OBSERVERS HAVE CONTINUED TO PATROL AND MONITOR THE SITUATION. HOWEVER, THE REDUCTION IN

SELECT FL OAD SHAUGHNAN

THE NUMBER OF MILITARY OBSERVERS HAS CURTAILED THE MISSION'S REPORTING AND INVESTIGATION CAPABILITIES.

20. PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 1029 (1995), WHICH REQUIRES THAT UNAMIR BE WITHDRAWN WITHIN SIX WEEKS OF THE END OF THE MANDATE, A LIQUIDATION PLAN HAS BEEN DRAWN UP. IT IS EXPECTED THAT THE LAST MILITARY ELEMENTS WILL HAVE WITHDRAWN BY MID-APRIL AND THAT STAFF OFFICERS WILL LEAVE SHORTLY THEREAFTER. AN ADEQUATE LEVEL OF SECURITY TROOPS WILL BE MAINTAINED UNTIL MID-APRIL, AT WHICH TIME ALL INSTALLATIONS WILL BE TURNED OVER TO OTHER UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES OR TO THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA.

V. HUMANITARIAN DEVELOPMENTS

21. THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN RWANDA CONTINUES TO WARRANT A CENTRALIZED COORDINATION STRUCTURE, GIVEN THE CHALLENGE TO BE CONFRONTED WITH THE RETURN AND ABSORPTION OF REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS. THE PRESENT AUTHORITY FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE RESTS WITH THE UNITED NATIONS HUMANITARIAN COORDINATOR/RESIDENT COORDINATOR, WHO IS SUPPORTED BY A SMALL DEPARTMENT OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS OFFICE. UNDER HIS AUTHORITY AN OVERALL CONTINGENCY PLAN IS BEING PREPARED, SHOULD MASS REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES FROM ZAIRE OCCUR. HOWEVER, FUNDING FOR THE OFFICE OF THE HUMANITARIAN COORDINATOR REMAINS A PROBLEM AND THIS MAY REQUIRE ADJUSTMENTS TO THE COORDINATION STRUCTURE IN THE FUTURE.

22. UNHCR, RWANDA AND THE COUNTRIES HOSTING SOME 1.7 MILLION RWANDAN REFUGEES, NAMELY, ZAIRE, BURUNDI AND THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA, HAVE MADE A CONCERTED EFFORT TO ACCELERATE THE VOLUNTARY RETURN OF REFUGEES. DURING THE PERIOD UNDER REVIEW, THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES RETURNING TO RWANDA ROSE CONSIDERABLY. FROM AN AVERAGE OF AROUND 5,000 A MONTH THROUGH MUCH OF 1995, JANUARY 1996 SAW THE NUMBER OF RETURNEES INCREASE TO MORE THAN 14,000. IN THE FIRST THREE WEEKS OF FEBRUARY ALONE, REFUGEE RETURNS TOPPED 20,000.

23. THE PACE OF RETURN FROM THE COUNTRIES OF ASYLUM, HOWEVER, HAS NOT BEEN UNIFORM. FOLLOWING INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS AMONG ZAIRE, RWANDA AND UNHCR TO IMPLEMENT DECISIONS TAKEN BY THE TRIPARTITE COMMISSION AT ITS MEETING IN DECEMBER 1995, WHICH INCLUDED A PROPOSAL FOR TARGETED VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION LEADING TO THE CLOSURE OF CAMPS, AN OPERATION LAUNCHED BY ZAIRE BEGAN ON 13 FEBRUARY. HOWEVER, THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES RETURNING FROM ZAIRE REMAINS VERY LOW.

24. ON THE OTHER HAND, REFUGEE RETURNS FROM BURUNDI HAVE INCREASED DRAMATICALLY IN FEBRUARY IN THE WAKE OF FIGHTING IN THE NORTHERN PART OF THE COUNTRY, WHICH EMPTIED TWO RWANDAN REFUGEE CAMPS. FOLLOWING THE ABANDONMENT OF THE NTAMBA CAMP IN BURUNDI BY SOME 14,000 REFUGEES FEARING THE SPREAD OF ETHNIC FIGHTING, ON 27 JANUARY A DELEGATION LED BY RWANDA'S MINISTER FOR REHABILITATION AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION VISITED NTAMBA TO URGE REFUGEES WHO HAD RETURNED TO THE CAMP TO GO BACK TO RWANDA. MEMBERS OF THE BURUNDI/RWANDA/UNHCR TRIPARTITE COMMISSION AND A SECOND DELEGATION FROM RWANDA ALSO MADE EFFORTS TO PERSUADE THOSE REMAINING TO REPATRIATE RATHER THAN FOLLOW THE BULK OF THE CAMP'S RESIDENTS INTO THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA. AS A RESULT, MORE THAN 4,400 RWANDANS DECIDED TO REPATRIATE DURING THE FIRST TWO DAYS OF FEBRUARY AND THE CAMP WAS SUBSEQUENTLY CLOSED.

25. DURING THE FOURTH MEETING, HELD AT BUJUMBURA ON 29 AND 30 JANUARY 1996, THE BURUNDI/RWANDA/UNHCR TRIPARTITE COMMISSION DECIDED TO HAVE THE REMAINING CAMPS IN BURUNDI PROGRESSIVELY

CLOSED, STARTING WITH THOSE NEAREST THE BORDER WITH RWANDA. THE COMMISSION EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT ALL REMAINING RWANDAN REFUGEES IN BURUNDI WOULD HAVE REPATRIATED BY JULY, AND ALL THE CAMPS CLOSED. THOSE REFUGEES WHO DECIDE NOT TO RETURN WILL BE TRANSFERRED FARTHER AWAY FROM THE BORDER AREAS INSIDE BURUNDI.

26. THE NUMBER OF RETURNEES FROM THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA ALSO SHOWED A SIGNIFICANT RISE IN FEBRUARY. A DELEGATION FROM RWANDA AND THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA LED BY THE RWANDAN PRIME MINISTER, MR. PIERRE RWIGEMA, HELD MEETINGS WITH RWANDAN REFUGEES IN THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA. AN ATTENTIVE AUDIENCE OF MORE THAN 10,000 PEOPLE IN THE BENACO CAMP LISTENED FOR THREE HOURS AS HE DISCUSSED THE SITUATION IN RWANDA AND ANSWERED QUESTIONS ON SECURITY AND PROPERTY. OVER 500 PEOPLE REPATRIATED DURING THE WEEK OF 12 TO 16 FEBRUARY, MORE THAN DURING THE PRECEDING MONTHS COMBINED.

27. AN ESTIMATED 1.1 MILLION RWANDAN REFUGEES REMAIN IN ZAIRE, 511,000 IN THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA AND 97,000 IN BURUNDI - TAKEN TOGETHER, ONE OF THE WORLD'S LARGEST REFUGEE POPULATIONS. UNHCR, RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR PROTECTION, ASSISTANCE AND REPATRIATION, IS FACING A SERIOUS FINANCIAL PROBLEM IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION. AMONG PROGRAMMES LIKELY TO BE AFFECTED BY THE OFFICE'S DIFFICULTIES IN GENERATING THE $288 MILLION IT NEEDS IN 1996 ARE REHABILITATION AND OTHER PROJECTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE REPATRIATION AND REINTEGRATION OF REFUGEES. THE CONSTRUCTION OF 30,000 SHELTERS, LATRINE BUILDINGS AND A SUPPLY OF POTABLE WATER, AS WELL AS THE DISTRIBUTION OF NON-FOOD ITEMS TO RETURNEES AND ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT BY NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION PARTNERS, MAY HAVE TO BE CURTAILED OR ABANDONED IF THE CURRENT TREND CONTINUES.

28. IN AN ATTEMPT TO LAUNCH A SERIES OF PROJECTS TO REPAIR DAMAGE TO THE ENVIRONMENT AND INFRASTRUCTURE IN COUNTRIES HOSTING RWANDAN REFUGEES, UNHCR AND THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNDP) PROPOSED A $70.5 MILLION PROGRAMME ON 24 JANUARY. THE PROJECTS, PRESENTED AT A DONORS MEETING AT GENEVA, ARE THE RESULT OF ONE OF THE DECISIONS TAKEN DURING THE CONFERENCE ON ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES, RETURNEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION, HELD IN FEBRUARY 1995 AT BUJUMBURA.

29. ON 6 DECEMBER 1995, 38 NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS WERE REQUESTED BY THE MINISTRY OF REHABILITATION AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION TO CEASE OPERATION (19 OF THEM HAD ALREADY LEFT THE COUNTRY), LEAVING BEHIND 114 NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS STILL OPERATING. IN A LETTER ADDRESSED TO THE NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION COMMUNITY, THE MINISTRY REGRETTED THE MISINTERPRETATION OF THE EXPULSION AS GENERAL HOSTILITY TO ALL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND STATED THAT THE REASONS FOR THIS ACTION INCLUDED THE INVOLVEMENT OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN ACTIVITIES INCOMPATIBLE WITH THEIR MANDATE, WHICH AFFECTED THE SECURITY OF THE COUNTRY, AND UNETHICAL BEHAVIOUR SUCH AS SELLING OF RELIEF GOODS. THE MINISTRY SAID IT FULLY APPRECIATED THE WORK OF THE REMAINING NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND ASSURED THEM OF THE GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT TO CONTINUE ITS CLOSE COLLABORATION WITH THEM.

30. THE PERCENTAGE OF PEOPLE RECEIVING FOOD AID THROUGH TARGETED DISTRIBUTIONS IN RWANDA REMAINED LOW DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD. THE EMPHASIS OF THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME

(WFP) IS NOW ON FOOD-FOR-WORK DIRECTED TOWARDS REHABILITATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES, REPRESENTING 62 PER CENT OF ALL FOOD AID DISTRIBUTED. IN ADDITION, WFP PROVIDED FOOD TO OVER 7,500 CHILDREN IN JANUARY.

31. THE UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND (UNICEF), THROUGH ITS TRAUMA RECOVERY PROGRAMME, BEGAN RECRUITING 11 NEW TRAUMA ADVISORS TO COLLABORATE WITH 11 OTHERS ALREADY WORKING IN THE PREFECTURES. IN 1996 TRAINING WILL FOCUS ON TEACHERS AND MEDICAL WORKERS AS THEY HAVE THE MOST DIRECT CONTACT WITH TRAUMATIZED CHILDREN.

VI. REHABILITATION, RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

32. ON THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE GENEVA ROUND-TABLE CONFERENCE, DISBURSEMENTS BY DONOR COUNTRIES REACHED $404 MILLION, REPRESENTING NEARLY 70 PER CENT OF PLEDGES MADE BY DONORS IN JANUARY 1995. DONORS' DISBURSEMENTS ACCELERATED OVER THE LAST QUARTER OF 1995, WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO A STABILIZATION OF THE EXCHANGE RATE, A LOWER RATE OF INFLATION AND A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES, BRINGING RWANDA'S CURRENT IMPORT COVERAGE TO 5.1 MONTHS. PREPARATIONS ARE UNDER WAY FOR THE 1996 ROUND TABLE, DUE TO BE HELD ON 2 AND 3 MAY AT GENEVA. THREE WORKING GROUPS HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED TO FOCUS ON THE GOVERNMENT'S PRIORITY AREAS: JUSTICE AND SECURITY, CAPACITY-BUILDING AND THE TRANSITION FROM HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOPMENT. DOCUMENTS OUTLINING THEIR STRATEGIES ON EACH OF THESE TOPICS ARE BEING PREPARED BY VARIOUS MINISTRIES, WITH THE SUPPORT OF UNDP, UNICEF AND WFP.

33. WITH REGARD TO THE JUSTICE SYSTEM, THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE HAS COMMUNICATED ITS REVISED PLAN FOR THE UNDP "REHABILITATION OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM" PROJECT. THE PLAN PROPOSES THE RECRUITMENT OF 10 LEGAL ADVISERS TO ASSIST IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF "SPECIAL CHAMBERS" TO HANDLE GENOCIDE CASES, WHICH MUST BE VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY THE CONFERENCE ON GENOCIDE HELD AT KIGALI IN NOVEMBER 1995. IT FURTHER CONTEMPLATES PROVIDING ENHANCED REMUNERATION FOR OVER 1,000 JUDICIAL PERSONNEL IN ORDER FOR THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE TO ATTRACT QUALIFIED STAFF. THE PROJECT WILL ALSO PROVIDE EQUIPMENT FOR THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE AND TRIBUNALS IN THE PREFECTURES.

34. AN EXTENSION TO CYANGUGU PRISON, A SITE EXPERIENCING ACUTE OVERCROWDING, WILL BE FINANCED THROUGH A PROJECT RECENTLY APPROVED BY THE GOVERNMENT AND UNDP. ICRC BEGAN INSTALLING WATER/SANITATION AND KITCHEN FACILITIES IN TWO WAREHOUSES IN BYUMBA AND KIBUNGO THAT WILL SERVE AS TEMPORARY DETENTION SITES. UNDP IS BUILDING SECURITY PERIMETERS AT THESE SITES AND CONSTRUCTION WORK CONTINUED ON THREE OTHERS IN

END OF PART 2 OF 3

DOC_SYMBOL:S/1996/149

DISSEMINATION AND COMMUNICATION UNIT/DPI - NY HQ

=0305961841GMT

NNNN

ZCZC KGMF5058 ACOM4366
SY BGD GUM KGM DAM NIC NAQ KOM MGS BEL ZAG JRS
.NEWYORK (DPI) 05 1137Z
BT
CCM6059-03
OMNIPRESS/UNDEVPRO
FILE :S1996149 - PART 3 OF 3
DOC_SYMBOL:S/1996/149

UNAMIR
1996 MAR -5 P 8:37

KIGALI AND BYUMBA. DESPITE THESE IMPROVEMENTS, OVERCROWDING IN SEVERAL PRISONS AND MOST OTHER PLACES OF DETENTION REMAINS A MATTER OF SERIOUS CONCERN.

35. CAPACITY-BUILDING ACTIVITIES HAVE CONTINUED DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD. PHASE II OF THE RWANDAN COMMUNAL POLICE TRAINING PROGRAMME SIGNED BY THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR AND UNDP ON 18 JANUARY 1996 WILL FUND TRAINING FOR A THIRD GROUP OF 750 CADETS AT THE TRAINING FACILITY IN GISHARI AND PROVIDE FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF LIVING QUARTERS FOR POLICE IN 100 COMMUNES. IN A JOINT PROGRAMME WITH UNDP, WFP IS PROVIDING FOOD FOR COMMUNAL POLICE TRAINEES AND CONTINUES TO ASSIST THE TRAINING CENTRE FOR GENDARMES IN RUHENGERI.

36. IN THE HEALTH SECTOR, VARIOUS EFFORTS WERE UNDERTAKEN BY WHO AND UNICEF TO PROVIDE EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES TO HOSPITALS AND TO REHABILITATE HEALTH CENTRES. WORK ON TWO HOSPITALS IN GIKONGORO AND CYANGUGU AND THREE HEALTH CENTRES IN BUTARE IS EXPECTED TO BEGIN IN EARLY MARCH. THESE EFFORTS CONCENTRATED ON TRAINING AND EDUCATION WITH REGARD TO PREVENTIVE MEASURES ON DISEASE AND NUTRITION. TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF TEACHING IN PRIMARY SCHOOLS, UNICEF HAS BEEN FINANCING THE IN-SERVICE TRAINING OF 5,600 UNDERQUALIFIED TEACHERS. THE PROGRAMME, WHICH ALSO INCLUDES INSTRUCTION IN LANDMINE AND CHOLERA AWARENESS, IS NOW IN ITS FINAL STAGES. UNICEF ALSO CONTINUES TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA IN ITS EFFORTS TO ASSIST CHILDREN IN ESPECIALLY DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES. THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, IN COLLABORATION WITH UNICEF, HAS DECIDED TO EXPAND THE "CHILDREN IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW" PROJECT TO INCLUDE LEGAL DEFENCE FOR CHILDREN CLAIMING PROPERTY LEFT BY THEIR DECEASED PARENTS. UNICEF AND THE UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION (UNESCO) ARE COLLABORATING WITH VARIOUS GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES IN THE ELABORATION OF STRATEGIES FOR REINTEGRATING CHILD DETAINEES INTO THE RWANDAN SCHOOL SYSTEM.

37. AS REPORTED IN DECEMBER (SEE S/1995/1002), AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN RWANDA IS RECOVERING BEYOND INITIAL ESTIMATES. ACCORDING TO THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS (FAO)/WFP CROP SURVEY FOR THE 1996-A SEASON AND THE FOOD NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT PUBLISHED IN JANUARY, THE AREA UNDER CULTIVATION IN RWANDA INCREASED BY 14 PER CENT OVER THE 1995-A SEASON. THE REPORT ESTIMATES THE AGGREGATE FOOD PRODUCTION FOR THE 1996-A SEASON AS 24 PER CENT HIGHER THAN THE 1995-A SEASON. THE LARGEST PROBLEM FACING FARMERS REMAINS THE LOW AVAILABILITY OF AGRICULTURAL INPUTS.

VII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

38. IN ITS RESOLUTION 50/211 OF 23 DECEMBER 1995, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY APPROPRIATED AN AMOUNT OF $32,324,500 GROSS FOR THE FINANCING OF THE ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR THE PERIOD FROM 1 JANUARY TO 8 MARCH 1996.

39. PURSUANT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S REQUEST TO INITIATE

SEE FR CAO Secretariat

PLANNING FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNAMIR WITHIN A PERIOD OF SIX WEEKS AFTER THE EXPIRY OF ITS MANDATE, I INTEND TO SEEK THE RESOURCES REQUIRED FOR THE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS FORTHCOMING RESUMED FIFTIETH SESSION. IN ADDITION, SHOULD THE COUNCIL CHOOSE ANY OF THE OPTIONS DESCRIBED IN THE PRESENT REPORT FOR A CONTINUING POLITICAL OR MILITARY PRESENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN RWANDA, I SHALL REQUEST THE ASSEMBLY AT ITS RESUMED SESSION TO PROVIDE THE RESOURCES REQUIRED FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION.

40. AS AT 15 FEBRUARY 1996, THE TOTAL OUTSTANDING CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNAMIR SPECIAL ACCOUNT FROM THE INCEPTION OF THE MISSION TO 8 MARCH 1996 AMOUNTED TO $84.5 MILLION AND THE TOTAL OUTSTANDING CONTRIBUTIONS FOR ALL PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS STOOD AT $1,891.6 MILLION.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS

41. WHEN RWANDA EMERGED FROM CIVIL WAR AND GENOCIDE WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY ON 19 JULY 1994, CONDITIONS IN THE COUNTRY WERE NOTHING SHORT OF DISASTROUS. THERE WAS NO ADMINISTRATION, NO FUNCTIONING ECONOMY, NO JUDICIAL OR EDUCATION SYSTEM, NO WATER OR ELECTRICITY SUPPLY AND NO TRANSPORT; THE POPULATION, MOREOVER, WAS STILL IN A STATE OF PROFOUND SHOCK.

42. TODAY, CONDITIONS IN RWANDA ARE RETURNING TO NORMAL, THOUGH A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF THE POPULATION ARE STILL REFUGEES OR DISPLACED PERSONS. THIS PROGRESS HAS BEEN ACHIEVED ESSENTIALLY THROUGH THE EFFORTS OF THE PEOPLE OF RWANDA. BUT UNAMIR, OTHER UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS HAVE WORKED WITH THE GOVERNMENT TO RESTORE BASIC INFRASTRUCTURES AND TO REHABILITATE VITAL SECTORS OF THE ECONOMY. UNAMIR ENGINEERS HAVE PARTICIPATED IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF TRANSIT CAMPS FOR RETURNING REFUGEES. ITS CIVILIAN POLICE UNIT HAS ASSISTED IN THE ESTABLISHMENT AND TRAINING OF A NEW GENDARMERIE AND COMMUNAL POLICE. ITS SPECIALIZED UNITS HAVE HELPED CLEAR MINES. IN COOPERATION WITH UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, UNAMIR HAS ASSISTED ORPHANS, MOVED TO REOPEN SCHOOLS AND CONTRIBUTED TO THE REHABILITATION OF HEALTH CARE AND SANITATION FACILITIES. IT HAS ALSO PROVIDED HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND HELPED TO EASE THE APPALLING PRISON SITUATION. UNAMIR BY ITS PRESENCE HAS PROVIDED A SENSE OF SECURITY AND CONFIDENCE TO THE REPRESENTATIVES OF UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES, INTERGOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS WHO, THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY AND SOMETIMES UNDER VERY DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES, HAVE WORKED FOR THE RECOVERY OF RWANDA.

43. IN MY REPORT OF 30 JANUARY 1996 (S/1996/61) I REPEATED THE VIEW THAT THE UNITED NATIONS WOULD STILL HAVE A USEFUL ROLE TO PLAY IN RWANDA AFTER THE EXPIRY OF THE MANDATE OF UNAMIR ON 8 MARCH 1996. ON 31 JANUARY, MY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE BRIEFED THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ABOUT VARIOUS OPTIONS FOR A POST-UNAMIR PRESENCE WHICH HE WOULD BE DISCUSSING WITH THE RWANDAN AUTHORITIES. HE MENTIONED THREE SUCH OPTIONS:

(A) THE RETENTION OF A SMALL POLITICAL OFFICE TO SUPPORT THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS TO PROMOTE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, STRENGTHEN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM, FACILITATE THE RETURN OF REFUGEES AND REHABILITATE THE COUNTRY'S INFRASTRUCTURE;

(B) THE RETENTION OF A POLITICAL OFFICE ON THE ABOVE LINES, PLUS A MILITARY COMPONENT CONSISTING OF MILITARY OBSERVERS TO

MONITOR THE RETURN OF REFUGEES, SPECIALIZED UNITS TO PROVIDE LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR THEIR RETURN AND FORMED TROOPS TO ENSURE SECURITY FOR THE LOGISTIC UNITS;

(C) THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A REGIONAL OFFICE WITH RESPONSIBILITIES FOR PROMOTING PEACE, STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION AS A WHOLE.

44. IN HER LETTER TO ME OF 13 FEBRUARY 1996 (S/1996/103), THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL SAID THAT THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL CONCURRED WITH MY OBSERVATION THAT THE UNITED NATIONS STILL HAD A USEFUL ROLE TO PLAY IN RWANDA AND ENCOURAGED ME TO UNDERTAKE CONSULTATIONS ON THE APPROPRIATE NATURE OF THAT ROLE AFTER 8 MARCH 1996. MY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE HAS SINCE EXPLORED THE ABOVE OPTIONS WITH THE RWANDAN AUTHORITIES. HOWEVER, THE LATTER HAVE NOT REQUESTED THAT ANY OF THE OPTIONS SHOULD BE RECOMMENDED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND HAVE CONTINUED TO EXPRESS STRONG RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE RETENTION OF UNITED NATIONS TROOPS IN RWANDA AFTER THE EXPIRY OF UNAMIR'S CURRENT MANDATE.

45. DESPITE THE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS TOWARDS NORMALCY IN RWANDA REPORTED ABOVE, THE RELATIVE PEACE NOW PREVAILING IN THAT COUNTRY WILL BE UNDER CONSTANT THREAT AS LONG AS MORE THAN 1.5 MILLION REFUGEES ARE CAMPED ALONG ITS BORDERS. THE PRESENCE AMONG THESE REFUGEES OF NUMEROUS ELEMENTS OF THE FORMER RWANDAN ARMY TOGETHER WITH ORGANIZED MILITIAS ADDS TO THIS THREAT. WHILE INTIMIDATION BY THESE ARMED ELEMENTS PLAYS AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN DISCOURAGING REPATRIATION, THE RELUCTANCE OF THE REFUGEES TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES IS MOTIVATED TO A HIGH DEGREE BY CONCERN ABOUT SECURITY CONDITIONS INSIDE RWANDA. IT IS MY BELIEF THAT IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THE DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED NATIONS MILITARY PERSONNEL, PARTICULARLY IN THOSE AREAS TO WHICH LARGE NUMBERS OF REFUGEES ARE EXPECTED TO RETURN, COULD SPEED UP THE PROCESS OF RETURN BOTH BY BUILDING CONFIDENCE AND BY PROVIDING MUCH-NEEDED LOGISTIC SUPPORT. I AM CONVINCED, THEREFORE, THAT RWANDA COULD BENEFIT GREATLY FROM A FURTHER PHASE OF UNITED NATIONS SUPPORT TO HELP CONSOLIDATE PEACE AND SECURITY.

46. HOWEVER, ANY OF THE THREE OPTIONS PRESENTED IN PARAGRAPH 43 ABOVE WOULD REQUIRE THE CONSENT OF THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT AND THAT CONSENT HAS NOT BEEN FORTHCOMING. I REGRET, THEREFORE, THAT THERE APPEARS TO BE NO ALTERNATIVE, IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, TO THE COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL THE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY COMPONENTS OF UNAMIR AFTER 8 MARCH, ON THE BASIS OF THE PLANS ALREADY PREPARED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 5 OF RESOLUTION 1029 (1995). NOTWITHSTANDING UNAMIR'S WITHDRAWAL, THE PROGRAMMES, FUNDS, OFFICES AND AGENCIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM, AS WELL AS THE HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICERS AND THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL, WILL REMAIN IN RWANDA TO CARRY OUT THEIR VARIOUS MANDATES, WITH COORDINATION BEING ASSURED THROUGH THE STANDARD UNITED NATIONS ARRANGEMENTS.

47. IN CONCLUDING THIS FINAL REPORT, I WISH TO RECORD MY WARM APPRECIATION TO MY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, MR. SHAHARYAR KHAN, TO THE LAST UNAMIR FORCE COMMANDER, MAJOR-GENERAL G. IOUSIGNANT, AND TO THE CURRENT ACTING FORCE COMMANDER BRIGADIER-GENERAL SHIVA KUMAR, ALL OF WHOM HAVE DEMONSTRATED THE HIGHEST QUALITIES OF LEADERSHIP. I AM ALSO DEEPLY GRATEFUL TO ALL THE MEN AND WOMEN, CIVILIAN AND MILITARY, INCLUDING STAFF OF UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES AND PROGRAMMES AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, WHO HAVE DEVOTED THEMSELVES TO TRANSLATING INTO REALITY THE COMMITMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS

TO THE PEOPLE OF RWANDA.

END OF PART 3 OF 3
DOC_SYMBOL:S/1996/149

DISSEMINATION AND COMMUNICATION UNIT/DPI - NY HQ

=0305961839GMT

NNNN

Reçu le 13 MARS 1996

WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME

THE FOOD AID ORGANISATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS

To: Ambassador S. Khan, Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General in Rwanda

From: Techeste Zergaber, Country Director, WFP Kigali

Subject: Radio UNAMIR

Date: 11 March 1996

Reference is made to your request to UN Agencies present in Rwanda, to share the running costs of a UN radio which will replace Radio UNAMIR.

I regret to inform you that WFP Headquarters have advised that such an activity is not within WFP's mandate and therefore are not in a position to fund the operations of a UN radio.

Best regards.

Mr Diallo
Mr Dossamelo
Ms Ladwin Rafii
13-3-96
WS

cc: Radio UNAMIR,
UNESCO Kigali,
UNDP Kigali,
UNHCR Kigali,
UNICEF Kigali,
WHO Kigali,
HRFOR Kigali,
World Bank

ZM / 12-Mar-96

WFP KIGALI, BP 1150, KIGALI, RWANDA

Reçu le 13 MARS 1996

Mr Diallo
Mr Dessouds'
Mr Ito
Ms Ladan Rafii
13-3-96
WS

Report on the Fifth Annual Peacekeeping Mission

November 3–11, 1995

Republic of Rwanda
Republic of Angola



UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION
of the United States of America

Mr. Kagamé told us that he had yet to understand why UNAMIR withdrew at the most critical time and allowed 3,500 people to be massacred within U.N. premises. He reiterated that the presence of U.N. troops and of U.N. agencies created a problem of credibility for the government of Rwanda. "More money should be spent on raising the institutional capacity of Rwanda," he said. "Even UNDP acts in parallel of us. They do not coordinate their activities with us. They hire our expatriates to work for them." Mr. Kagamé insisted that the new Rwandese Army had the capacity to contain infiltrators. That evening, as we arrived in Angola, the delegation learned that Rwanda had just launched a successful attack against militia bases on Iwawa Island on Lake Kivu at the Zaire-Rwanda border. The attack had resulted in 100-300 deaths, according to various accounts, and as we heard the news, we realized that the offensive was going on at the very time of our meeting with the Defense Minister.

Mr. Kagamé told us that he had yet to understand why UNAMIR withdrew at the most critical time and allowed 3,500 people to be massacred within U.N. premises.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

At the end of its visit, the Delegation generally supported the opinion that UNAMIR's mandate should not be renewed, with some members in favor of a scaled-down operation focused on a simplified mandate. The arguments ranged as follows:

- It appeared clear to all of us that 1,800 troops would be insufficient to stage a counter-attack or deter any real military threat. At the same time, such a force level is too high to accomplish other, clearly delineated and limited, security tasks, such as ensuring the protection of human rights observers and members of the International Tribunal. Some of us also believed that the presence of a battalion stationed along the Zaire-Rwanda border at the points of entry of returning refugees could have a confidence-building effect on future repatriation. Defenders of these views thought that a force of 850 troops would suffice to ensure the security of the International Tribunal and to help build confidence at the border.

- Others among us were not convinced that U.N. troops were the best vehicle to ensure the security of members of the International Tribunal given the loss of credibility that the U.N. force has had to endure since its withdrawal from Kigali in April 1994. Proponents of this view suggested that a private contractor would do a better job and cause less tension among Rwandese. Regarding the maintenance of a U.N. presence at the Zaire-Rwanda border, it was pointed out that effective confidence-building measures require the perception of a credible deterrent. Since the U.N. force did not muster such credibility

with 1,783 troops, it would obviously not gain more credibility with fewer soldiers. The rationale in favor of a battalion along the border therefore seemed weak. This group therefore favored a complete withdrawal of UNAMIR.

- Whether we supported a small military contingent or a complete withdrawal of UNAMIR's military elements, all of us noted--once again--the lack of a well-articulated and fully-integrated economic recovery plan in the mandate of the peacekeeping mission. Unlike in Haiti, the Resident Representative of the U.N. Development Program in Rwanda was not appointed Deputy SRSG, an innovation which we had applauded in our report on the U.N. mission in Haiti and had recommended for future missions.

- More generally, the U.N. mission in Rwanda appears as a textbook illustration of mismatch between the objectives and the means of multilateral intervention. The inadequacy of the force level and structure to enforce the wide-ranging mandate contained in Resolution 925 was compounded from the start by a blatant lack of will on the part of the international community to make troops available and, more and more in the past few months, by the reluctance of the Rwandese government to have UNAMIR's mandate renewed. Given the lack of consensus on the necessity of the mission--both on the part of potential troop-contributors and on the part of the host government--it is no surprise that UNAMIR never obtained the resources necessary to achieve its objectives effectively.

Finally, the fact that the latest renewal was obtained against the opinions of most observers on the ground seriously damages the credibility of U.N. action. When member states could have acted to stem the genocide, troop contributions to deploy a multilateral operation under U.N. command were not made available. A year and a half later, the vested interests of some U.N. agencies and troop contributors seem to provide the only explanation for another extension of the mandate.

UNAMIR-MINUAR

The Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General
P.O. Box 749
Kigali, Rwanda
Telephone: 212 - 963 - 3930
Fax: 212 - 963 - 3090

le 9 mars 1996

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai l'honneur de me référer à la résolution 1050 (1996) du Conseil de Sécurité en date du 8 mars 1996 encourageant le Secrétaire général à maintenir un bureau des Nations Unies au Rwanda après la fin du mandat de la Mission des Nations Unies pour l'assistance au Rwanda (MINUAR) le 8 mars 1996.

Comme vous le savez, le paragraphe 4 de cette résolution prévoit que ledit bureau comprendra une station de radio-diffusion. La Convention d'établissement et d'exploitation de Radio MINUAR signée entre le gouvernement rwandais et la MINUAR le 14 janvier 1995, dont copie est ci-jointe, pourrait également s'appliquer à la nouvelle radio si un certain nombre d'amendements étaient apportés à ce texte.

Outre le quatrième alinéa du préambule de ladite Convention qui comporte une référence au mandat de la MINUAR et qu'il faudrait remplacer par une référence au mandat du nouveau bureau des Nations Unies, l'intégralité de la convention se prête à la simple substitution du nom "Radio NATIONS UNIES" à celui de "Radio MINUAR".

Nous nous félicitons de cette nouvelle occasion qui nous est donnée de collaborer avec votre gouvernement pour la réalisation de ses objectifs prioritaires.

La présente lettre et votre consentement signifié par l'envoi par retour de la lettre ci-jointe dûment signée, constitueront un amendement à ladite Convention tel que prévu en son article 9.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Ministre, les assurances de ma haute considération.

Shaharyar M. Khan

Shaharyar M. Khan
Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire général au Rwanda

M. Jean Pierre Bizimana
Ministre de l'Information
Kigali

Monsieur le Représentant Spécial,

J'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception de votre lettre en date de 8 mars 1996 dont les termes sont ci-après:

"Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai l'honneur de me référer à la résolution 1050 (1996) du Conseil de Sécurité en date du 8 mars 1996 encourageant le Secrétaire général à maintenir un bureau des Nations Unies au Rwanda après la fin du mandat de la Mission des Nations Unies pour l'assistance au Rwanda (MINUAR) le 8 mars 1996.

Comme vous le savez, le paragraphe 4 de cette résolution prévoit que ledit bureau comprendra une station de radio-diffusion. La Convention d'établissement et d'exploitation de Radio MINUAR signée entre le gouvernement rwandais et la MINUAR le 14 janvier 1995, dont copie est ci-jointe, pourrait également s'appliquer à la nouvelle radio si un certain nombre d'amendements étaient apportés à ce texte.

Outre le quatrième alinéa du préambule de ladite Convention qui comporte une référence au mandat de la MINUAR et qu'il faudrait remplacer par une référence au mandat du nouveau bureau des Nations Unies, l'intégralité de la convention se prête à la simple substitution du nom "Radio NATIONS UNIES" à celui de "Radio MINUAR".

Nous nous félicitons de cette nouvelle occasion qui nous est donnée de collaborer avec votre gouvernement pour la réalisation de ses objectifs prioritaires.

La présente lettre et votre consentement signifié par l'envoi par retour de la lettre ci-jointe dûment signée, constitueront un amendement à ladite Convention tel que prévu en son article 9."

J'ai l'honneur de vous informer que les termes de votre lettre ci-dessus rencontre l'agrément de mon gouvernement et que cet échange de lettres constitue un amendement à la Convention d'établissement et d'exploitation de Radio MINUAR.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Représentant Spécial, les assurances de ma haute considération.

Son Excellence
Monsieur l'Ambassadeur Shaharyar M. Khan
Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire général
des Nations Unies
Kigali

Reçu le 12 MARS 1996

Copy

HC
ED
JIKOCA

12/3/96

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA
LIAISON OFFICE
KINSHASA-ZAIRE

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA
BUREAU DE LIAISON
KINSHASA/ZAIRE

UNAMIR - MINUAR

UNAMIR
96 MAR 11 P 3:10

RECEIVED
12 MAR 1996
OFFICE OF THE SRSG
UNAMIR

OUTGOING FAX NO. 021/96/OFF.

MIR NO. _____

MISC NO. _____

A : M. Shaharyar Khan Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire Général KIGALI, RWANDA FAX NO.: (1) (212) 963 3090	DE : Cheikh-Tidiane Gaye Directeur du Bureau de Liaison de la MINUAR KINSHASA, ZAIRE.
ATTN.:	DATE: 11 mars 1996
CC:	PHONE: 243 88 45 325 FAX NO: (212) 3769466
CC:	SECTION:
OBJET: Situation dans les camps encerclés.	

1. Depuis notre Fax 018/96/OFF du 27 février 1996, le nombre de soldats zaïrois encerclant les camps Kibumba et Nyangesi n'a cessé de diminuer.

2. A Kibumba, une vingtaine de soldats sont en faction pendant le jour et retournent à Goma pendant la nuit.

3. Avec l'absence des militaires, les réfugiés reprennent leurs activités pendant la nuit.

4. Deux réfugiés coupeurs de bois furent tués fin février 1996 par des gardes forestiers.

5. Par ailleurs, les fermes environnantes souffrent de plus en plus de la pénurie de la main d'oeuvre, et on craind des conséquences néfastes sur les prochaines récoltes.

Mr Diallo
Ms Rafii

/...

6. Il faut aussi noter que la station locale de la radio a intensifié la diffusion des mesures administratives arrêtées par le gouvernement:

   - Les réfugiés n'ont plus le droit de travailler dans les chantiers, entreprises et fermes de la région.

   - Les organisations humanitaires et les ONG doivent remplacer leurs employés rwandais par des zaïrois.

7. En dépit de toutes ces mesures, le rapatriement volontaire est dans une impasse, faute de candidat.

8. Enfin, les autorités zaïroises ont identifié 1011 réfugiés qui avaient quitté Kibumba pour se retrancher au camp de Kahindo. Des ordres ont été donnés pour que ces réfugiés ne bénéficient d'aucune assistance dans le camp de Kahindo.

Haute considération.

REFERRING TO A PRESS CONFERENCE HELD EARLIER IN THE DAY ON RWANDA, A CORRESPONDENT SAID THAT THE SPEAKERS SAID THAT WHEN THEY APPROACHED THE UNITED NATIONS FOR INFORMATION WHILE PREPARING THE REPORT, THEY WERE NOT GIVEN ANY INFORMATION.

MS. FOA RESPONDED, "I KNOW EXACTLY WHAT HAPPENED. WHEN WE RECEIVED THE FIRST DRAFT OF THE REPORT, WE REPLIED SAYING, 'THIS IS INACCURATE, THIS IS INACCURATE, THIS IS ACTUALLY WHAT HAPPENED'".

SHE SAID THAT ON THE QUESTION OF THE 11 JANUARY CABLES FROM AND TO THE FORCE COMMANDER, MAJOR-GENERAL ROMEO DALLAIRE, WHICH WAS THE MAIN POINT OF DISAGREEMENT, THE UNITED NATIONS TOLD THEM EXACTLY WHAT HAD BEEN DONE; THAT FOUR COMMUNICATIONS HAD GONE TO THE FIELD THAT DAY; THAT MAJOR-GENERAL DALLAIRE AND THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE HAD BEEN GIVEN VERY SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS OF WHAT
TO DO.

SHE SAID THE AUTHORS OF THE REPORT CAME BACK, RATHER RUDELY, AND SAID, "PROVE IT." THEY WANTED COPIES OF THOSE CABLES. FOR VARIOUS REASONS, IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS TO GIVE THEM THE CABLES AND THAT WAS EXPLAINED TO THEM. THE

END OF PART 1 OF 2
DISSEMINATION AND COMMUNICATION UNIT/DPI - NY HQ

=0313960129GMT

NNNN

ZCZC KGMF5134 ACOM4577
SY BGD BEL DAM JRS KGM LFP LUA GUM LYN MGS NAQ NIC KGM PAM DSH MRM
PHT ZAG
.NEWYORK (DPI) 12 0812Z
BT
CCM6270-03
OMNIPRESS/UNDEVPRO
PART 2 OF 2
DOC_SYMBOL:DB//1996/03/12

UNAMIR - REC'D
1 3 MAR 1996
- Action completed
- Acknowledge
Initial

UNITED NATIONS GAVE THEM THE CABLES ALMOST WORD FOR WORD.

MS. FOA EXPLAINED THAT THE PROBLEM WITH GIVING THEM THE CABLES, WHICH WERE CALLED CODED CABLES OR CLASSIFIED CABLES, WAS THAT PEOPLE WERE NAMED IN THEM, IN PARTICULAR PEOPLE WHO HAD GIVEN THE UNITED NATIONS INFORMATION AND WHO MIGHT BE IN DANGER. ALSO, DIFFERENT GOVERNMENTS WERE NAMED. THE UNITED NATIONS DID NOT FEEL THAT IT WAS APPROPRIATE TO HAND OUT THOSE CABLES. THE AUTHORS DID NOT SEEM TO TAKE THAT VERY WELL, BUT DID REVISE PARTS OF THEIR REPORT. ONE OF THE THINGS THEY HAD SAID IN THE INITIAL DRAFT WAS THAT MAJOR GENERAL DALLAIRE'S CABLE HAD BEEN PUT IN A BLACK FILE AND HIDDEN AWAY BECAUSE IT WAS SUCH A BOMBSHELL THAT THE UNITED NATIONS DID NOT WANT ANYBODY TO KNOW. "THEY UNDERSTOOD WHEN THEY SAW WHAT HAD BEEN DONE THAT THIS WAS NOT THE CASE."

ASKED HOW SHE WOULD CHARACTERIZE THE REPORT IN THE LIGHT OF HER STATEMENT THAT THE AUTHORS WERE RUDE IN NOT ACCEPTING THE UNITED NATIONS GOOD FAITH OFFER OF INFORMATION, MS. FOA REFERRED TO THE CONCEPT OF INNOCENCE UNTIL PROVEN GUILTY, BUT NOTED THAT "THE BASIC GIST OF WHAT THEY WERE SAYING TO US IS 'WE THINK THAT YOU DIDN'T DO A VERY GOOD JOB AND YOU HAVE TO PROVE THAT YOU DID DO A GOOD JOB'".

NOTE:THE "UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN RWANDA (UNOR)" REFERRED TO IN THE FIFTH PARAGRAPH OF PAGE 2 OF YESTERDAY'S BRIEFING NOTES SHOULD READ "UNITED NATIONS OFFICE IN RWANDA (UNOR)".

END OF PART 2 OF 2
DISSEMINATION AND COMMUNICATION UNIT/DPI - NY HQ

=0313960141GMT

NNNN

SRSG FC CMD

ZCZC KGMF5121 ACOM4562
RR BGD BEL DAM JRS KOM LFP LUA GUM LYN MGS NAQ NIC KGM PAM BSH MRM
PHT ZAG
.NEWYORK (DPI) 11 0738Z
BT
CCM6255-03
OMNIPRESS/UNDEVPRO
FILE :DB11MAR - PART 1 OF 2
DOC_SYMBOL:DB//1996/03/11

UNAMIR
1995 MAR 12 A 8:07

11 MARCH 1996
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING OF OFFICE OF SPOKESMAN FOR SECRETARY-GENERAL

SYLVANA FOA, SPOKESMAN FOR SECRETARY-GENERAL BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI, BEGAN TODAY'S NOON BRIEFING BY ANNOUNCING THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THIS MORNING MET WITH THE SENIOR ADVISORY GROUP FOR THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON HUMAN SETTLEMENTS (HABITAT II) (ISTANBUL, 1996). EARLY THIS AFTERNOON, HE WOULD BE MEETING WITH THREE NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS WHICH MADE A $38,100 CONTRIBUTION TO THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME (WFP) TO BUY FOOD FOR THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF KOREA. HE WOULD BE ACCEPTING THE CHECK IN THAT AMOUNT FROM THE THREE ORGANIZATIONS.

AT 3 P.M., THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WOULD ADDRESS THE HIGH-LEVEL WORKING GROUP ON THE STRENGTHENING OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM, SHE SAID.

TONIGHT, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WOULD LEAVE FOR THE SUMMIT OF PEACEMAKERS IN SHARM EL-SHEIK, MS. FOA SAID. HE FELT THAT IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT THAT LEADERS GET TOGETHER AND ACT BECAUSE TERRORISM HAD A GLOBAL DIMENSION, AND ONLY A GLOBAL APPROACH WOULD STOP IT IN ITS TRACKS.

"WHEN HE LEAVES EGYPT, HE WILL FLY ON TO GENEVA WHERE HE IS GOING TO MEET WITH THE TEAM WORKING ON A THE COMPREHENSIVE DISARMAMENT TALKS", MS. FOA SAID.

SHE SAID THAT ISMAT KITTANI, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S SPECIAL ADVISER, REPORTED OVER THE WEEKEND THAT HE HAD MET WITH THE LEADERSHIP OF THE UNITED TAJIK OPPOSITION. THE OPPOSITION HAD AGREED TO EXTEND THE EXISTING CEASE-FIRE UNCONDITIONALLY FOR ANOTHER THREE MONTHS. HOWEVER, THE OPPOSITION DECLINED TO ACCEPT THE GOVERNMENT'S INVITATION TO ATTEND THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE TAJIK PARLIAMENT, WHICH HAD BEEN SCHEDULED FOR TODAY, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT REACHED AT THE MOST RECENT ROUND OF INTER-TAJIK TALKS HELD IN ASHKHABAD. MR. KITTANI WAS CURRENTLY IN DUSHANBE. HE ADDRESSED THE PARLIAMENT'S SPECIAL SESSION THIS MORNING AND INFORMED IT OF THE OPPOSITION'S AGREEMENT TO EXTEND THE CEASE-FIRE. HE SAID THAT, GIVEN A SIMILAR STATEMENT MADE EARLIER BY THE PRESIDENT OF TAJIKISTAN, HE CONSIDERED THAT THE EXTENSION OF THE CEASE-FIRE HAD NOW BEEN AGREED TO BY BOTH SIDES. "SO LET'S KEEP OUR FINGERS CROSSED", MS. FOA SAID.

"WE'VE HAD SOME BAD NEWS FROM GEORGIA", MS. FOA SAID. A MEMBER OF THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION FROM BANGLADESH WAS KILLED WHEN HIS VEHICLE HIT A MINE ON SATURDAY. HE WAS KILLED INSTANTLY BY THE EXPLOSION, AND TWO OTHERS, A HUNGARIAN MILITARY OBSERVER AND AN INTERPRETER, WERE INJURED, BUT THEIR INJURIES WERE NOT CONSIDERED LIFE-THREATENING. THE UNITED NATIONS VEHICLE HIT THE MINE ON A ROAD NORTH OF THE VILLAGE OF RETCHKI IN THE GALI SECTOR.

"FIELD REPORTS FROM THE SUBURBS OF SARAJEVO ARE DISTRESSING

SRSG FC CAO Spokesman

TO SAY THE LEAST", SHE WENT ON. "THEY SAY THAT LAW AND ORDER HAS FURTHER DETERIORATED IN THE SUBURBS OF ILIDZA AND GRBAVICA OVER THE WEEKEND. THE VACUUM OF AUTHORITY CREATED BY THE RAPID DEPARTURE OF SERB POLICE AUTHORITIES WITHOUT THE EXISTENCE OF EFFECTIVE FEDERATION CONTROL HAS RESULTED IN LAWLESSNESS CHARACTERIZED BY ROBBERY, ARSON, INTIMIDATION AND, IN A COUPLE OF CASES, MURDER. THE TWO SUBURBS HAVE NO POLICE FORCE TO MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER. MOST OF THE SERB POLICE OFFICERS HAVE ALREADY BEEN EVACUATED, AND THE FEW REMAINING ARE UNWILLING OR INCAPABLE OF DISCHARGING POLICE FUNCTIONS. THE RESIDENTS WHO REMAIN THERE HAVE NO FIRE PROTECTION SINCE ALL THE FIRE-FIGHTING EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN WITHDRAWN."

SHE SAID THAT THE CONSEQUENT CONDITION OF TERROR WAS FORCING THE FEW SERBS WHO MIGHT WANT TO REMAIN TO JOIN THE EXODUS. THE HEADS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION FORCE (IFOR) CONTINGENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL POLICE TASK FORCE (IPTF) MET WITH ABOUT 100 MOSTLY ELDERLY ILIDZA RESIDENTS ON SATURDAY TRYING TO ALLAY THEIR FEARS AND TO PERSUADE THEM TO STAY. THE FRIGHTENED RESIDENTS TURNED THE MEETING INTO A FRANTIC APPEAL FOR INTERVENTION BY IFOR.

MS. FOA SAID THAT THE SITUATION WAS NOT GOOD, AND THAT BUILDINGS WERE BEING SET ABLAZE.

"IN THAT REGARD, I CAN TELL YOU THAT WE NOW HAVE 563 IPTF MONITORS DEPLOYED IN BOSNIA, AND 358 OF THEM ARE IN THE SARAJEVO REGION. WE HAVE ANOTHER 181 AWAITING DEPLOYMENT IN ZAGREB", SHE WENT ON.

ON RWANDA, MS. FOA SAID THAT SHAHRYAR KHAN WOULD REMAIN THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN THE POST-UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA (UNAMIR) OPERATION, WHICH WOULD BE CALLED THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN RWANDA (UNOR).

SHE INFORMED CORRESPONDENTS THAT THE WORLD CHRONICLE TELEVISION INTERVIEW WITH THOMAS JOHANSEN, DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME'S ENERGY AND ATMOSPHERE PROGRAMME, WOULD BE SHOWN ON IN-HOUSE CHANNELS 6, 23 AND 38 AT 2:30 P.M.

ON PRESS CONFERENCES, SHE SAID THAT TOMORROW AT 11 A.M., THERE WOULD BE A PRESENTATION BY THE DANISH MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE RWANDA EVALUATION REPORT. THAT REPORT WAS A STUDY THAT EVALUATED INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE 1994 GENOCIDE IN RWANDA. IT WAS PREPARED BY AN INTERNATIONAL TEAM UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE DANISH OFFICE HANDLING DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE. IT WAS GOING TO BE RELEASED WORLDWIDE TOMORROW. SHE BELIEVED THAT COPIES OF THE SYNTHESIS WERE AVAILABLE FOR CORRESPONDENTS AT THE DOCUMENTS COUNTER.

THE SPOKESMAN SAID THAT THE UNITED NATIONS WELCOMED ANY INITIATIVE TO IMPROVE THE CAPACITY TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE WHICH, OF COURSE, DEPENDED ON THE SUPPORT OF MEMBER STATES. "I AM SURE THAT THE VARIOUS PROPOSALS IN THIS REPORT WILL BE REVIEWED CAREFULLY BY THE AGENCIES CONCERNED."

REGARDING THE PRESS CONFERENCE, SHE RECALLED A QUESTION ASKED BY A CORRESPONDENT SEVERAL WEEKS AGO, WHICH, SHE SAID, HAD HAUNTED HER EVER SINCE. THAT CORRESPONDENT HAD ASKED IF THE SECRETARIAT DID NOT HAVE THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY TO UPHOLD THE CREDIBILITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND WHETHER IT WAS NOT ABROGATING THAT RESPONSIBILITY BY ALLOWING THE UNITED NATIONS TO TAKE BLAME, TO BE THE SCAPEGOAT ALL THE TIME. SHOULD NOT THE UNITED NATIONS STAND UP AND SAY "NO" WHEN IT WAS ASKED TO FULFIL A MANDATE WITHOUT THE NECESSARY RESOURCES? THE RWANDA REPORT, WHICH COST $1.7 MILLION, WITH FUNDING FROM

37 COUNTRIES, WAS SOMETHING THAT THE UNITED NATIONS HAD TO TAKE A STAND ABOUT -- IT CONTAINED SOME SERIOUS INACCURACIES THAT LENT AN ALMOST REVISIONIST FLAVOUR TO THE STUDY.

IN PARTICULAR, SHE SAID, IN STUDY NUMBER TWO ENTITLED "EARLY WARNING AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT", THE AUTHORS MADE SEVERAL BLITHE, MISGUIDED AND UNFOUNDED ASSERTIONS ABOUT THE ACTIONS, OR LACK THEREOF, OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE SECRETARIAT. THOSE ASSERTIONS DID NOT REFLECT REALITY. IT WAS A MATTER OF PUBLIC RECORD THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD APPEALED TIME AND TIME AGAIN TO MEMBER STATES TO INCREASE THE FORCE AND TO STRENGTHEN THE MANDATE OF THE UNITED NATIONS FORCE IN RWANDA. IT WAS IRONIC THAT, AT THE TIME THOSE ALLEGATIONS WERE COMING OUT, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS ONCE AGAIN URGING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO RESPOND TO THE SIGNALS AND MAKE CONTINGENCY PLANS TO AVOID A RECURRENCE OF SUCH A TRAGEDY IN BURUNDI.

"IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL TO GO THROUGH WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED ON RWANDA", SHE SAID. WHAT THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT WAS BASICALLY BEING ACCUSED OF WAS STANDING BY, NOT TAKING ANY ACTION, MISREADING THE CONFLICT AND LETTING THE WHOLE THING GO INTO A BLACK FILE WHICH WAS CIRCULATED VERY QUIETLY, AND NOT KEEPING THE SECURITY COUNCIL WELL ENOUGH INFORMED. SHE THEN GAVE THE FOLLOWING CHRONOLOGY OF THE EVENTS IN RWANDA:

ON 24 SEPTEMBER 1993, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL REPORTED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA ACCORD WHICH HAD BEEN SIGNED ON 4 AUGUST. HE RECOMMENDED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF UNAMIR AND ASKED FOR 2,500 TROOPS, INCLUDING TWO INFANTRY BATTALIONS OF 800 TROOPS EACH.

ON 5 OCTOBER, THE SECURITY COUNCIL PASSED RESOLUTION 872 ESTABLISHING UNAMIR FOR A PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS AND AUTHORIZING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO DEPLOY ONE BATTALION.

ON 30 DECEMBER, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WENT BACK TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND SAID, "IT DOESN'T LOOK GOOD. LET'S DEPLOY THE SECOND BATTALION". DESPITE THE COUNCIL'S REQUEST TO HIM IN AN EARLIER MESSAGE TO CONSIDER WAYS TO REDUCE THE MAXIMUM TROOP STRENGTH, HE ARGUED THAT, UNDER THE EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES, REDUCTION OF RESOURCES COULD JEOPARDIZE THE PEACE PROCESS.

ON 6 JANUARY 1994, THE SECURITY COUNCIL AGREED TO DEPLOYMENT OF THE SECOND BATTALION.

ON 11 JANUARY 1994, THERE WAS AN EXCHANGE OF CABLES. FOUR COMMUNICATIONS WERE EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE FORCE COMMANDER IN KIGALI AND THE DEPARTMENT OF PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS WHICH BASICALLY RESULTED IN THE FORCE COMMANDER BEING GIVEN PERMISSION ON AN AD HOC BASIS TO ASSIST THE GOVERNMENT IN SECURING AREAS SO THAT ILLEGAL ARMS COULD BE SEIZED. THIS RESPONDED TO THE PART OF THE REPORT WHICH SAID THAT HIS COMMUNICATIONS WERE IGNORED AND PUT IN A BLACK FILE.

ON 10 FEBRUARY, CHINMAYA GHAREKHAN, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S SENIOR POLITICAL ADVISER, BRIEFED THE SECURITY COUNCIL ABOUT THE TENSION AND THE DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION IN RWANDA. HE AGAIN BRIEFED THE COUNCIL ON 16 FEBRUARY ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

ON 30 MARCH, IN HIS SECOND REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL REGISTERED ALARM OVER THE DETERIORATION OF THE SECURITY SITUATION, THE RESURGENCE OF VIOLENCE, THE INSECURITY ENGENDERED BY THE POLITICAL IMPASSE, THE RAPID AND DRAMATIC DETERIORATION OF SECURITY IN KIGALI, THE DISTRIBUTION OF ARMS TO CIVILIANS AND THE INCREASE IN ETHNICALLY MOTIVATED CRIMES AND MURDERS.

ON 6 APRIL, THE PLANE CARRYING THE PRESIDENTS OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI CRASHED NEAR KIGALI AIRPORT KILLING ALL ON BOARD.

ON 7 APRIL, THE INTERIM PRIME MINISTER WAS EXECUTED, AND 10 BELGIAN SOLDIERS SERVING WITH UNAMIR WERE KILLED. ON THE SAME DAY, THERE WAS AN ORAL REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY MR. GHAREKHAN TALKING ABOUT THE SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CIVILIAN POPULATION.

IQBAL RIZA, THEN OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS, BRIEFED THE COUNCIL ON 9 APRIL, TALKING ABOUT WIDESPREAD FIGHTING AND DISORDER.

ON 11 APRIL, MR. RIZA AGAIN BRIEFED THE COUNCIL ON THE RAPIDLY DETERIORATING SITUATION THROUGHOUT RWANDA.

ON 12 APRIL, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL MET WITH THE BELGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER VERY LATE AT NIGHT IN BONN AND THEY DISCUSSED WITHDRAWAL OF CERTAIN CONTINGENTS. HE IMMEDIATELY, THE NEXT DAY, SENT A LETTER TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL SAYING, "WE NEED TO REINFORCE".

ON 20 APRIL, IN HIS THIRD REPORT TO THE COUNCIL, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL GAVE THE COUNCIL THREE OPTIONS. HE SAID THAT THE FIRST OPTION WAS THE ONE HE WANTED. THE SECOND OPTION WAS LESS DESIRABLE, AND THE THIRD, HE CONSIDERED OUT. THE FIRST OPTION WAS FOR AN IMMEDIATE AND MASSIVE REINFORCEMENT OF UNAMIR TROOPS TO STOP THE FIGHTING AND THE MASSACRES. THAT WOULD REQUIRE SEVERAL THOUSAND ADDITIONAL TROOPS AND WOULD ALSO REQUIRE THAT UNAMIR BE GIVEN ENFORCEMENT POWERS UNDER CHAPTER VII. OPTION B WAS THAT IT WOULD BE DOWNSIZED AND ONLY A SMALL CONTINGENT WOULD REMAIN THERE AS AN INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN THE POWERS. THE THIRD OPTION, WHICH HE SAID HE DID NOT RECOMMEND AT ALL, WAS THAT UNAMIR BE COMPLETELY WITHDRAWN.

ON 21 APRIL, THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADOPTED RESOLUTION 912 AUTHORIZING THE REDUCTION OF THE FORCE LEVEL TO 270 TROOPS.

ON 29 APRIL, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AGAIN WROTE A LETTER TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL SAYING THAT DOWNSIZING WAS NOT THE ANSWER AND THAT IT WAS GETTING WORSE. "WE MUST CONSIDER MORE FORCEFUL MEANS." HE SAID THAT THE SCALE OF HUMAN SUFFERING AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES LEFT THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITH NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO EXAMINE THAT POSSIBILITY.

ON 4 MAY, CONTRARY TO WHAT THE REPORT SAID, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WENT ON NIGHTLINE AND CALLED THE SITUATION GENOCIDE, AND SAID, "SOMETHING MUST BE DONE OR WE WILL ALL BE ACCUSED OF GENOCIDE".

"WELL, WE ARE ALL BEING ACCUSED OF COMPLICITY IN GENOCIDE BUT I DON'T THINK IT IS USEFUL FOR THE UNITED NATIONS TO TAKE it sitting down anymore", as FOA said.

END OF PART 1 OF 2

DOC_SYMBOL:DB//1996/03/11

DISSEMINATION AND COMMUNICATION UNIT/DPI - NY HQ

=0312960057GMT

NNNN

CURRENT PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

UNTSO — Since June 1948
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
Current strength: 183 — Fatalities: 38
Rough annual cost to the UN: $26.8 million

UNMOGIP — Since January 1949
United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
Current strength: 44 — Fatalities: 9
Rough annual cost to the UN: $6.6 million

UNFICYP — Since March 1964
United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus
Current strength: 1,199 — Fatalities: 167
Rough annual cost: $44.0 million
(UN assessment on Member States ($22 million) and voluntary contributions by Cyprus (1/3 of total cost) and Greece ($6.5 million))

UNDOF — Since June 1974
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
Current strength: 1,059 — Fatalities: 36
Rough annual cost to the UN: $32.1 million

UNIFIL — Since March 1978
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
Current strength: 4,627 — Fatalities: 209
Rough annual cost to the UN: $135.3 million

UNIKOM — Since April 1991
United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission
Current strength: 1,179 — Fatalities: 5
Rough annual cost to the UN: $62.2 million

MINURSO — Since April 1991
United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
Current strength: 367 — Fatalities: 7
Rough annual cost to the UN: $58.8 million

UNOMIG — Since August 1993
United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
Current strength: 130
Fatalities: 1
Rough annual cost to the UN: $16.0 million

UNOMIL — Since September 1993
United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
Current strength: 91
Rough annual cost to the UN: $17.6 million

UNMIH — Since September 1993
United Nations Mission in Haiti
Current strength: 4,398 — Fatalities: 6
Rough annual cost to the UN: $243.0 million

UNAMIR — October 1993 to 8 March 1996
United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
Current strength: 1,398 — Fatalities: 26
Rough annual cost to the UN: $198.6 million

UNMOT — Since December 1994
United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan
Current strength: 44 — Fatalities: 1
Rough annual cost to the UN: $7.3 million

UNAVEM III — Since February 1995
United Nations Angola Verification Mission III
Current strength: 6,552 — Fatalities: 8
Rough annual cost to the UN: $254.1 million

UNPREDEP — Since March 1995
United Nations Preventive Deployment Force
Current strength: 1,225
Projected cost (six months): $25.2 million

UNMIBH — Since December 1995
United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Current strength: 374 — (Incorporates IPTF)
Projected cost (six months): $52.7 million

UNTAES — Since January 1996
United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium
Current strength: 2,909
Projected cost (six months): $110.4 million

UNMOP — Since January 1996
United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka
Current strength: 28
Projected cost included in UNMIBH (see above)

NOTE: Figures for operational strength are valid 29 February 1996 and include military and civilian police personnel; figures may vary slightly from month to month due to rotation. Casualty figures are valid 31 January 1996 and include military (1,339), civilian police (36) and civilian international (40) and local staff (29). Cost figures represent annualized figures for 1995 valid 31 December 1995, unless otherwise indicated, and are rough annual costs to the United Nations. Costs to the United Nations of 15 of 17 current UN peacekeeping operations are financed from their own separate accounts on the basis of legally binding assessments on all Member States. UNTSO and UNMOGIP are funded from the United Nations regular budget. Since the mandates of most operations are renewed periodically starting from different dates, annual cost estimates for comparative purposes are approximate.

Prepared by the United Nations Department of Public Information in consultation with the Department of Peace-keeping Operations and the Peacekeeping Financing Division, Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts. DPI/1634/Rev.2 — March 1996

BACKGROUND NOTE: 1 MARCH 1996

UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS 1948 to 1 March 1996 41
Operations under way as at 1 March 1996* 17
(*including UNAMIR, whose mandate ends on 8 March 1996)



PERSONNEL (as at 29 February 1996)
Military and civilian police personnel served 1948 to 1996 ..... over 750,000
Military and civilian police personnel serving 29 February 1996 26,357
Fatalities 1948 to 31 January 1996 1,444
Countries contributing military and civilian police personnel at 29 February 1996 70

FINANCIAL ASPECTS (costs to the United Nations as at 31 December 1995)
Estimated total cost of all operations 1948 to 31 December 1995 ..... About $15.4 billion
Estimated annualized cost of operations in 1995 ..... About $3.0 billion
Projected cost of peace-keeping in 1996 ..... $1.4 billion to $1.5 billion
Outstanding contributions to peace-keeping as of 5 March 1996 ..... About $1.8 billion

United Nations

copy : AFC
ED
DIALLO
Rabia
Ladan
20/3/96

TUNIS DECLARATION ON THE GREAT LAKES REGION

March 18, 1996

Presidents Mobutu of Zaire, Museveni of Uganda, Bizimungu of Rwanda, Ntibantunganya of Burundi, and Mkapa of Tanzania met in Tunis, Tunisia from March 16-18, 1996 to carry forward their African initiative to promote peace, justice, reconciliation, stability, and development in the Great Lakes region. Former Presidents Carter of the United States, Nyerere of Tanzania, and Toure of Mali served as facilitators. The Heads of State reviewed the progress made toward the achievement of their commitments undertaken in Cairo, Egypt on November 29, 1995, decided on additional measures that must be taken to meet fully these commitments, and pledged themselves and their countries to undertake further actions to achieve their common goals for the region.

The Heads of State agreed that, while useful steps had been taken since Cairo, serious problems persist. These include intimidation in the refugee camps, concerns of some of the refugees about their security, cross-border raids into Rwanda and Burundi, inadequate judicial systems in Rwanda and Burundi, and continued violence in Burundi with little progress toward constructing a long-term government structure that will ensure protection of the rights and interests of all groups, including minority groups.

The Heads of State expressed their conviction that these problems can be addressed with the steps described below, which have been taken or will be taken. Together they will significantly reduce tension, hostility, insecurity, and distrust in the area, encourage the return of refugees, stimulate economic rehabilitation and development, and advance efforts to fashion long-term government structures acceptable to their citizens.

They also urged Rwanda and Burundi to enhance and strengthen further the process of confidence building through broad national consultative mechanisms to achieve long-term solutions and national reconciliation.

On a regional level:

1. The Heads of State reaffirmed their rejection of the ideology of genocide.

2. The Heads of State and their ministers have initiated a dynamic and sustained dialogue, involving frequent meetings with each other, to plan and undertake concerted endeavors in the region. This productive consultative relationship will continue at the Heads of State level.

3. The Heads of State expressed approval that, consistent with the Cairo Declaration, the Governments of Zaire and Rwanda had agreed in January

on the return to Rwanda of heavy military equipment taken into Zaire by ex-Armed Forces of Rwanda. Zaire, on February 13, 1996, returned the military equipment which it had been able to identify and possess and agreed to continue its search efforts as promised to find the other equipment and to return it as found to the Rwandan government.

4. Cross border incursions continue, and increasingly, the perpetrators kill civilians, particularly local officials, and lay land mines as they retreat. But some significant actions have been taken. There is now greater cooperation and information sharing among governments of the region. Tanzania has rounded up and confined 400 persons known to be involved in such activities. President Mkapa stressed that refugees in Tanzania received neither arms deliveries nor military training. Because of fighting in Burundi spilling across its border, Tanzania has increased its level of troops in the area as a deterrent.

--Additionally, the Heads of State pledge to:

--take more rigorous efforts to shut down arms flow and military training to rebel groups engaged in cross-border incursions, including urging the UN to station monitors at airports and border points.

--Heads of State will restrict the travel of leaders associated with cross border incursions and urge other countries to take similar action and freeze the financial assets these persons hold abroad; and

--Heads of State will permit the Commission of Inquiry established by UN Resolution 1013 to investigate reports of military training and arms transfer to former Rwanda government forces.

5. The Heads of State reiterated their hope that most of the refugees will return home in a relatively short period of time. They recognized, however, that many refugees would not likely repatriate in the near future because of their real or perceived association with the genocide in Rwanda. In the camps themselves, intimidation is continuing. They also note that some bureaucratic procedures pertaining to logistics and registration are playing into the hands of intimidators and endanger refugees intending to repatriate.

--It should be noted that Zaire has arrested a few intimidators who have been removed from the refugee camps. In addition, Zaire has banned political activities of the RDR in camps.

--Tanzania and Burundi have banned RDR political activity, and has tightened security control within the camps. Tanzania has identified the key intimidators in the camps and intends to separate them from the other refugees and house them in a camp in the interior. It is seeking financial assistance to carry through these plans.

--More needs to be done to separate the intimidators, including armed factions, from the other refugees in order to enable them to make a free choice about repatriation. Conscious of the need to avoid forced repatriation, the Heads of State challenge the International community to work with them and finance a major effort that would permit this choice. This effort would consist of the following components:

--preparing the home communes to receive the refugees, including the placement in the communes of an adequate number of human rights and other monitors to ensure security;

--taking measures involving camp administration and management that will guard against cases of insecurity in the border areas.

6. The Heads of State pledged full support to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and other jurisdictions in accordance with UN security resolution 955 (1994) of November 8, 1994. They promised to turn over to these jurisdictions indicted persons located in their countries and urged all other countries to do the same. President Mkapa said that the genocide suspects located in Tanzania are under surveillance and will be picked up if indicted by the Jurisdictions. The Heads of State further affirmed that they will cooperate fully in the investigations of the competent juridictions. They will similarly support the work of the International Commission of Inquiry for Burundi. The Heads of State of Rwanda and Burundi pledged to guarantee the security for personnel and witnesses relevant to the work of the International Tribunal and the Commission of Inquiry.

7. The Heads of States expressed continuing concern about the use of radio broadcasts and the print media to spread hate and fear in the region. The participants pledged to take action to curtail the illegal and inflammatory radio broadcasts from one country to another, and reaffirmed their requests for assistance. President Mkapa stressed that Tanzania would not permit hostile propaganda to be broadcast into neighboring countries. President Mobutu said he had asked for assistance to locate and halt inflammatory radio broadcasts despite questions of sovereignty.

President Carter agreed to continue his discussions with experts to ascertain how and whether technical assistance can be provided to locate and prevent such broadcasts.

Within Rwanda:

8. President Bizimungu expressed deep concern about the slow rate of refugee repatriation. Whereas 26,000 refugees from Burundi returned to Rwanda between December 1995 and February 1996, perceived insecurity within Burundi may have motivated some to repatriate. The refugee flows from Tanzania and Zaire during the same period amounted to 2000 and 20,000, respectively. President Bizimungu attributed these small flows to intimidation in the refugee camps.

9. Consistent with the principle of justice with reconciliation and to demonstrate to the refugees its strong desire for them to return, the Government of Rwanda reaffirms its obligation to ensure the safety of returnees, protect their legal rights, and recover their property. To this end, the Rwandan Government has:

--announced a decision to establish special procedures to expedite legal proceedings for the large number of persons held on charges relating to genocide. These mechanisms, which include specialized chambers within ordinary courts, will enable the judicial system to carry out an expeditious and systematic categorization of genocide perpetrators; release those for whom adequate evidence is lacking; permit plea agreements when appropriate; and conduct early trials of those charged. It has trained personnel in arrest procedures and is appointing prosecutors to authorize all arrests.

--in recognition that many refugees fear they will be arrested when they return, agreed to activate the review mechanism (Commission de Triage) to investigate cases (subject to judicial oversight) prior to arrests. It also accepts that defendants should have the opportunity to have the advice of legal counselors. It called upon the international community, particularly African states, to provide support for a mechanism to assist those who cannot afford legal counsel. The Government of Rwanda expects its genocide trials to begin in May 1996.

--trained 300 new magistrates, 90 new prosecutors, 250 new investigators, and has prepared files on thousands of individuals now ready for trial. The Government of Rwanda expressed

appreciation to other countries who have provided technical and other assistance for this training and hopes that future assistance, particularly in the legal area, will be extended when requested.

--attached special importance to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Rwanda and declared that it would welcome the strengthening of this office and the deployment of an expanded number of human rights monitors throughout the country. It is prepared to permit the number of such monitors to increase to an authorized level of 300, and called on the international community to provide the resources to finance the critical work of the human rights monitors.

--continue with programs to promote greater professionalism and discipline within the armed forces, gendarmerie, and the police force, including training in non-lethal riot control. It plans to build more barracks for the soldiers and move forward in collaboration with the World Bank to establish a commission on demobilization and reintegration and initiate its work as soon as possible. The government promotes, within the framework of demobilization, integration into the military of those members of the ex-FAR who were not involved in the genocide.

--pledged to encourage initiatives undertaken by indigenous NGOs to rebuild civil society; urged NGOs operating in camps to transfer progressively their services and personnel from countries of asylum to countries of origin; and emphasized the need for these organizations to focus more on rehabilitation and development and less on relief.

--pledged to work out quickly the modalities with international financial institutions and the donor community to permit the early allocation of existing and future pledges of assistance toward critical rehabilitation and development projects. At present only 40 percent of funds pledged have been disbursed.

--reiterated its determination to strengthen administrative procedures that ensure respect of property rights, including land, as well as enable expeditious return of properties to their legitimate owners immediately on demand. In accordance with the Arusha agreement, new sites have been identified to develop for resettling old refugees, and the Government of Rwanda requested international technical and financial assistance in preparing these

lands for settlement. The government will endeavor to provide special assistance for widows (including land owning rights), for orphans, and for communities that receive large numbers of returning refugees.

--encouraged refugee repatriation by actively promoting "look and see" cross-border visits by refugees, sent senior government officials into camps in Tanzania and Burundi to explain conditions inside Rwanda and urged refugees to come home, plans to make similar visits to camps in Zaire, and is encouraging international organizations and NGOs to intensify the campaign to provide objective information to the refugee camps on events and developments inside Rwanda. President Mobutu and President Bizimungu agreed that a high level Rwandan team would visit refugee camps in Zaire very soon.

--collaborated closely with UNHCR and the countries of Tanzania, Zaire, and Burundi in preparing for the refugee return and encouraging them to do so. Through this continuing collaboration, and with technical support and equipment, these governments and UNHCR should be able to ensure that processing and other re-entry requirements can be met with minimum delay to the returning refugees.

--agreed to take concrete steps to encourage dialogue, social healing, and integration among all Rwandese, including those refugees who were not involved in the genocide and who seek to rebuild Rwanda. The Government of Rwanda requested the facilitators of the Great Lakes Summit to make contact with influential personalities among the refugees to encourage them to come home and to assist in promoting repatriation of other refugees.

--demonstrating its commitment to transparency, agreed to make public a report on implementation of the recommendation of the Commission established to investigate the Kibeho incident, as well as the outcome of the Commission on Inquiry into the Kanama incident. *

Within Burundi:

10. The Head of State of Burundi and his delegation emphasized their commitment to bring to an end the climate of insecurity and impunity that

has paralyzed the country. They will move with speed and determination to launch a process leading to new institutional structures agreed upon and supported by all citizens that will ensure protection of the rights of all Burundians, and their participation within the political and economic life of the nation. To that end the Head of State and his delegation:

--welcomed that former Tanzanian President Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere accepted the mandate given to him by the international community, and endorsed by the Heads of State of the region, to assist the people of Burundi in finding means to achieve peace, stability, and reconciliation within Burundi as a basis for a lasting political settlement. This settlement must include the resolution of fundamental problems relating to the access, control, and management of power, so that either the ethnic or political minority is reassured. The Government of Burundi is committed to take concrete steps to fight exclusion, extermination and genocide which have been used by some to achieve and monopolize power. For the success of any such dialogue, there should be an end to killings within Burundi. All parties, internal and external, should take all possible steps to create the necessary environment for successful progress.

--declared that the National Debate on the major problems facing the country will be launched urgently. The debate will seek a consensus for constitutional structures as described above, which will promote peaceful coexistence among all Burundians. All parties and groups that seek these goals and renounce violence as a means to reach political ends could participate. These principles will be incorporated into the constitution.

--reported positively on the dialogue and growing collaboration among the government, different socio-political partners, and the security forces. They reaffirmed their intention and determination to continue their collaboration. The representatives of the political parties, Frodebu and Uprona, who participated in the Tunis summit, made it clear that they appreciate and support the efforts of the government to restore peace and security to the country.

--reaffirmed its commitment to repatriate the refugees and reintegrate the displaced and dispersed elements of the population, premised on reconciliation at the community level. Adequate security will be essential. International assistance will be required

initially for communities heavily impacted by returnees, and to promote self-sufficiency of all returnees.

--agreed to create the necessary conditions of security to facilitate the reintegration on campus and in hostels those students who have left them.

--reiterated their commitment to guarantee the security of personnel of the UN, OAU, and humanitarian agencies in order that they can fulfill their mandate, particularly concerning affected populations.

--reaffirmed their commitment to continue to intensify their comprehensive dialogue aimed at ensuring the security of all and restoring mutual confidence among all Burundian citizens. This debate should lead to the establishment of a National Pact of Peaceful Coexistence between the different components of the country and of a constitution adapted to universal democratic principles and to the specificities of Burundi in order to put in place the indispensable instrument for the organization of free and fair elections in 1998.

--declared their support for the deployment of UN Human Rights monitors based on the needs expressed by the government, stated strong hopes to see the current number substantially increased, and pledged to deploy these monitors to all sections of the country and ensure that they can safely carry out their functions.

--reaffirmed their determination to guarantee security for personnel and witnesses relevant to the work of the International Commission of Inquiry for Burundi.

--in order to begin the process by which the population will regain confidence in the security forces (as pledged in Cairo,) committed to undertake a comprehensive training program to enhance professionalism and discipline within the security forces. Such training would include how to uphold international human rights conventions while carrying out military responsibilities. The Government of Burundi also intends to redefine the respective structures and mission of the security and defense forces so that they will assume responsibility for the security of all elements of the population. The international community should be prepared to provide the necessary technical assistance.

--once again called upon the international community in general and neighboring countries in particular to prevent armed external attacks on Burundi and to dismantle the networks of arms flow across borders.

--condemned the ideology of exclusion and genocide and expressed a strong desire for the expeditious establishment by the countries of the region of an early warning mechanism to prevent destabilization and human rights violations, as well as dissemination of the ideology of ethnic hatred, exclusion, and genocide.

--agreed to develop a democratic media policy, including provisions for independent and autonomous media; guarantee wider access to information to journalists on all sides; and support initiatives that promote responsibility of the media. As expressed in Cairo, they reaffirmed their deep concern over the use of radio broadcasts to spread hate and fear in the region. The participants pledged to take all possible action to terminate the illegal and inflammatory radio broadcasts from one country into another. They called upon the international community to assist by providing technology to identify and demobilize mobile transmitters.

--pledged to guarantee neutrality and independence of the courts, and take concrete steps to improve the system of justice, including accelerating the trials of those accused of crimes against humanity; the training of lawyers, judges, and magistrates; and judicial assistance to defendants. They reiterated their request to the international community for assistance, including the use of foreign lawyers, to achieve these goals

--pledged their commitment to organize democratic elections in 1998.

Appeal to the International Community:

To enable the governments to fulfill the commitments made above, the Heads of State call upon the international community to assist in arranging and disbursing the necessary funding to achieve them. In Rwanda and Burundi, in addition to funding for rehabilitation, resettlement, and development, international assistance will be required for improving the systems of justice, development of democratic media policy, deployment of human rights monitors, and professionalization of the security forces. Member states of the UN are requested to respond generously to the appeals from UNHCR and UNHCHR. A greater proportion of funding should go to projects within the countries of origin.

Funding must also be obtained in order to conduct the National Debate in Burundi, restore the environment in countries of asylum, and continue the work of the International Tribunal for Rwanda and the Commission of Inquiry for Burundi. Zaire and Tanzania require financial, and in some cases technical, assistance for their efforts to separate intimidators from bonafide refugees. The facilitators agreed to work to obtain and expedite funding for these efforts.

In recognition of the close collaboration between governments in the region and the international and regional governmental organizations and donor governments, as well as local and international NGOs, the Heads of State declared their willingness to work closely with these groups, and particularly with the UN, OAU, and World Bank, in the future. The focus of this collaboration should be the accomplishment of concrete programs and projects on the ground that will promote justice, reconciliation, peace, stability, and development.

The Heads of State requested that former Presidents Carter, Nyerere, and Toure and Archbishop Tutu continue their efforts to facilitate contact and actions by their five governments, track comprehensively the achievements made at this meeting and in Cairo, and prepare recommendations for consideration by these governments at their next meeting. General Touré, who consulted extensively in the region since the Cairo Summit, suggested the following for future consideration: greater regional collaboration and economic and security matters; cooperation among African states in the areas of health, agriculture, and education; and a mechanism to accomplish these purposes. They also accepted the invitation by CNN to arrange for participation in person or by satellite of the five Heads of State and the facilitators at the internationally broadcast CNN World Report in early May at which time they will be able to share worldwide their assessment of the situation in the Great Lakes region and the efforts being undertaken to deal with the complex, interrelated problems of the area.

The Heads of State were pleased by the frank, open, and constructive discussions that characterized the Summit. They commended The Carter Center for arranging the meeting.

The Heads of State and their delegations expressed their profound appreciation to President Ben Ali and the Tunisian people for their support and hospitality for this historic meeting.

429 Signed:

430

431

432

433 Mobutu Sese Seko Yoweri Kaguta Museveni Pasteur Bizimungu

434

435

436

437

438 Sylvestre Ntibantunganya Benjamin William Mkapa

439

440

441

442

443 Mwalimu J. K. Nyerere (witness) Amadou T. Toure (witness)

444

445

446

447

448 Jimmy Carter (witness)