

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

SECRET [5 CONFIDENTIAL]

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FILE 2
ACC. 1995/083

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UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

MILOB GP HQ

TO : All Milobs Sector Cdrs Date : 30 MAY 95
✓ INFO : DFC/CMO AND DCMO
FROM : SOO File : 232/ops/95
SUBJECT : REPORTING OF INCIDENTS.

1. There is a need to be careful in reporting of incidents and events. It is better to report an incident in its true perspective and if one is not sure to say that the report is as yet not confirmed. Exaggerated reporting often dilutes the value of Milobs reporting.

2. We as eyes and ears of the Force Cdr have a sacred duty to be performed. There have been instances in the past where the reports have not been upto the required standard. Some examples are :-

(a) The NGOs are likely to leave the sector soon. (A better reporting could include the specific agencies leaving and the exact dates)

(b) RPA is going to shoot down any helicopters flying in this sector

2. All Milob Sector Cdrs are requested to take necessary remedial measures and educate Milobs under their command about the importance of accurate reporting.

3. Best Regards.

8/20
Seen and well done
25/5
DFC/amu

(Signature)
(Mohd Ahsanullah)
Lt Col
SOO

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G-6
30/05/95

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TO: MA TO DFC/CMO, FHQ
COS , FHQ
DCOS (OPS) , FHQ
DCMO MILOBS GP HQ

FROM : HQ SECTOR 3, GITARAMA

SUBJECT: IMPENDING CHANGE OF COMMAND, RPA 301 BDE

DATE : 07 MAY 95

1. A CONFIRMED REPORT INDICATES THAT COL CHARLES NGOGA, CDR RPA 301 BDE (GITARAMA-KIBUYE) IS BEING POSTED TO BUTARE TO TAKE COMMAND OF THE RPA BDE AT THAT LOCATION WITH EFFECT 08 MAY 95. UNCONFIRMED SOURCES INDICATE THAT HIS PRESENT APPOINTMENT WILL BE TAKEN OVER BY LT COL CHARLES KAIONGA, CO RPA BN GISENYI, WITHOUT CHANGE IN RANK. IN THE LIGHT OF THE RECENT INCIDENTS IN KIBEHO, AN AREA CONTROLLED BY THE RPA BDE AT BUTARE, THIS CHANGE OF COMMAND APPEARS SIGNIFICANT. IT MAY THEREFORE BE USEFUL FOR ALL CONCERNED UNAMIR AGENCIES TO KNOW MORE ABOUT THE NEW RPA BDE CDR IN BUTARE.

DETAILED PERSONALITY SKETCH-COL CHARLES NGOGA

2. MY KNOWLEDGE OF COL CHARLES NGOGA IS BASED UPON AN APPROXIMATELY 6 MONTH LONG ASSOCIATION IN GITARAMA--AN ASSOCIATION WHICH HAS RESULTED IN, I HOPE, A LASTING FRIENDSHIP BASED ON MUTUAL RESPECT. TOGETHER WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO SOLVE SOME VERY TRICKY SITUATIONS WHICH TO HIS CREDIT, WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE WITHOUT HIS VERY COOPERATIVE ATTITUDE. HOWEVER, THIS SHOULD NOT MISLEAD ANYONE TO THINK THAT COL NGOGA'S ATTITUDE CAN BE TAKEN FOR GRANTED. HE HAS BEEN MOST INTRANSIGENT IN SOME SITUATIONS, SPECIALLY THOSE INVOLVING MILOBS AND HUMAN RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS OF ARRESTS AND OTHERS SUCH AS THE ENTRY OF HUTU CIVILIANS INTO THE HQ SECTOR 3 COMPLEX FOR PROTECTION.

3. COL NGOGA ADMITS THAT AT 34 HE IS VERY YOUNG TO BE IN COMMAND OF A BRIGADE. HE WAS EDUCATED IN UGANDA AND THUS SPEAKS FLUENT ENGLISH. HIS PERFORMANCE DURING THE WAR, AS CO 107 RPA BN IS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN EXEMPLARY AS WERE HIS ACHIEVEMENTS AS A YOUNG GUERRILLA COMMANDER IN THE BUSH WAR DURING THE RPA'S EARLIER CONFRONTATION WITH THE RGF. HE IS MARRIED AND HAS A 3 YEAR OLD DAUGHTER. THE FAMILY RESIDES AT KIGALI WITH HIS PARENTS. HIS FATHER IS AN EDUCATED AND SOPHISTICATED MAN BUT HIS EXACT POSITION AND PROFESSION IS NOT KNOWN. COL NGOGA'S SISTER RECENTLY GRADUATED IN POLITICAL SCIENCE FROM UGANDA. IT APPEARS THAT HIS FAMILY DID NOT SUFFER ANY LOSSES DURING THE WAR (THIS IS UNCONFIRMED).

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Kagame appropriate
file*

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*GB - misc - RPA
SB 9/5/95*

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4. DURING THE EARLY PART OF OUR ASSOCIATION I GAUGED COL NGOGA AS A MODERATE. HOWEVER WITH REPEATED MEETINGS AND REACTIONS TO SOME SITUATIONS, MORE SPECIFICALLY THE ISSUE OF OVERCROWDING IN GITARAMA PRISON, COL NGOGA APPEARED MORE AND MORE A HARDLINER. HE APPEARED TO BE DELIBERATELY AIRING HIS VIEWS TO BE SEEN TO BE A HARDLINER. HIS VIEWS SOMETIMES BORDERED ON THE BIZARRE. HE POINTEDLY EXPRESSED HIS ANNOYANCE ABOUT MY CONCERN FOR THE STATE OF THE PRISON AND FELT THAT IF HE WAS A PART OF THE TOP LEADERSHIP HE WOULD GAS ALL PRISONERS TO DEATH, AS THEY WERE GUILTY OF THE MOST HEINOUS CRIMES. MY VIEWS THAT RESPONSIBLE AND CIVILIZED COUNTRIES FOLLOWED A JUDICIAL SYSTEM FOR FAIR TRIALS AND THAT ALL PERSONS ARRESTED COULD NOT BE ASSUMED TO BE GUILTY OF GENOCIDE, WERE MET BY A TIRADE ON HOW I WAS NOT QUALIFIED TO SPEAK ON THIS SINCE I HAD NEVER WITNESSED THE KILLING OF MY FAMILY MEMBERS. SUCH DISCUSSIONS WERE USUALLY MADE IN THE PRESENCE OF MEMBERS OF OTHER UN AGENCIES. IT APPEARED TO ME THAT COL NGOGA WAS TRYING TO ESTABLISH HIMSELF AS ONE OF THOSE WHO SUFFERED THE GENOCIDE, OSTENSIBLY TO GIVE GREATER WEIGHTAGE TO HIS VIEWS AND TO BE SEEN AS A HARDLINER, WHICH I FEEL AT HEART HE IS NOT.

5. COL NGOGA APPEARS TO HAVE A DEEP RESPECT FOR MILITARY OBSERVERS, JUST ABOUT TOLERATES FORMED TROOPS (HE WAS NEVER TOO HAPPY WITH MALI COY) AND TOTALLY ABHORS HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS. IN THE LIGHT OF HIS NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARDS FRANCOPHONE COUNTRIES (MALI) HIS FUTURE DEALINGS WITH SENBATT TOO MAY BE COLOURED BY THIS ATTITUDE.

6. INTRESTINGLY, COL NGOGA WAS A FIRM SUPPORTER OF OP RETOUR AND DURING ITS DYING DAYS FELT THAT UNAMIR WAS DRAGGING ITS FEET. HE WAS ALL FOR THE FORCIBLE CLOSURE OF THE IDP CAMPS.

7. ON THE OTHER SIDE, COL NGOGA HAS A VERY FRIENDLY DISPOSITION. HE, HOWEVER, IS A FIRM BELIEVER IN FORM AND INSISTED UPON A SYSTEM OF APPOINTMENTS BEFORE MEETINGS. HE CARED LITTLE FOR OFFICERS BELOW RANK OF LT COL. IF HE SUSPECTED A PROBLEM RELATED TO UNAMIR HE MADE IT A POINT TO FIRST APPRISE ME AND DISCUSS THE ISSUE RATHER THAN TAKE UNILATERAL ACTION. HE HAS A TENDENCY TO TREAT HIS AOR AS HIS KINGDOM. IN GITARAMA EVEN THE PREFET WAS FORCED TO CONSULT HIM BEFORE EVEN THE SMALLEST DECISIONS WERE TAKEN. HE CARES LITTLE FOR WRITTEN DIRECTIONS OF GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES OTHER THAN THE DEFENCE MINISTRY. HE APPEARS TO BE CLOSE BOTH TO BE MINISTER OF INTEROR AND THE VICE PRSIDENT.

8. THE DECISION TO APPOINT COL NGOGA AS CDR OF THE BUTRE BDE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO DILUTE THE SITUATION IN SECTORS 4A AND 4B AND POSSIBLY BECAUSE HE IS SEEN TO BE MORE PRAGMATIC AND REASONABLE, NOTWITHSTANDING HIS EFFORTS TO SHOW THAT HE IS REALLY A HARDLINER. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT ALL UNAMIR CDRS DEALING WITH COL NGOGA SHOULD ADOPT AN ATTITUDE OF PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL

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RESPECT TOWARDS HIM WHILE DISPLAYING THEIR SYMPATHY FOR THE TUTSI CAUSE. AT THE SAME TIME THEY SHOULD ESTABLISH THEIR OWN PROFESSIONAL CREDENTIALS IN HIS EYES BECAUSE HE APPEARS TO RESPECT THIS. I HAD LONG DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM ON THE CONCEPTS OF LOW INTENSITY WARFARE AND THE TACTICS ADOPTED BY THE RPA DURING THE PERIOD OF THE BUSH WAR AND IMPRESSED MY VIEWS ON HIM BASED ON MY OWN EXPERIENCE OF COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN INDIA. HE ALWAYS SEEMED TO RELISH SUCH DISCUSSIONS WHICH WAS A MAJOR FACTOR IN BRINGING US CLOSER TOGETHER.

9. I WOULD FURTHER RECOMMEND THAT IN SITUATIONS WHERE RPA AND UNAMIR INTRESTS ARE AT VARIANCE IT WOULD BE BEST TO ATTEMPT CONVINCING COL NGOGA THROUGH INVOLVING HIM IN CONTINUOUS DISCUSSIONS. HE SOMETIMES APPEARS TO BE SLOW IN SEEING THE LIGHT BUT NORMALLY RELENTS AFTER SOME TIME. IT MAY ALSO PAY DIVIDENDS TO ENHANCE HIS EGO BY SEEKING HIS VIEWS ON SUBJECTS WHICH MAY BE SEEN TO BE INTELLECTUAL IN NATURE - RWANDESE CULTURE AND HISTORY, REASONS FOR SUCCESS OF THE RPA DURING THE BUSH WAR AND THE TACTICS ADOPTED BY THE RPA DURING THE LAST CIVIL WAR.

10. LASTLY, IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT COL NGOGA FEELS MUCH MORE COMFORTABLE IN THE COMPANY OF OFFICERS FROM ASIA AND AFRICA AND IS GENERALLY A LITTLE APPREHENSIVE IN HIS CONTACTS WITH LIGHT SKINNED PEOPLE.

11. A COPY OF THIS MEMO IS BEING ENDORSED TO SENIOR OFFICERS AT YOUR HQ FOR THEIR INFORMATION AND NECESSARY ACTION.


S A HASNAIN
COL
SECTOR CDR

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UNAMIR/NIBATT 2/7429.9/A

NIBATT 2
UNAMIR
BYUMBA CAMP
BYUMBA

See Distribution:

6 May 95

ALLEGED CARRIAGE OF DRUGS BY
UNAMIR VEHICLES

References:

- A. Our SITREP UNAMIR/NIBATT2/374 dated 4 May 95.
- B. Your FAX msg dated 6 May 95.
1. Our Reference A above stated that RPA and GENDAMARIE made such an allegation in a verbal discussion with own Ops Offr as to why UNAMIR vehicles were being searched by RPA.
2. The SITREP was therefore sent to alert UNAMIR on the allegation in order to avert embarrassing situations.
3. It did not therefore mean that the allegation was substantiated by RPA or anybody for that matter.
4. However, own Ops Offr who sent the SITREP has been warned to desist from sending messages which are based on mere verbal discussions.
5. Acknowledge.

*See Jw
09/5
DSC/own*
SA KATUNG
Lt Col
Cont Comd

Distribution:

External:
Action:

Force PM

Information:

DCOS OPS
DCOS SP

② DFC
COS

This is in response to our
query and our verbal objection
to UNAMIR RPA LO. FTI.

*DCOS OPS
6.6*

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8/5/95

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UNAMIR
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

FROM : A/OPS OFFR GHANBATT HQ (KIBUNGO)

GH2/121/G(OPS)

TO : UNAMIR HQ (KIGALI)

(ATTN) COS
GSO3 (OPS)

INFO : GHANCON HQ (KIGALI)

DATE : 23 MAR 95

SUBJECT : SHOOTING INCIDENT AT KABILIZI GR 5066

REFS:

A. INCREP NO. 42 G/127/OPS OF 211940B MAR 95.

B. INCREP NO. 43 G/128/OPS OF 221210B MAR 95.

C. SITREP NO. 121 GH2/121/G(OPS) OF 222015B MAR 95.

1. AT ABOUT 211400B MAR 95, TWO LOCAL MILITIA CHASED A LOCAL BY NAME SEBITUSI INTO PTL BASE AT KABILIZI GR 5066.

2. LOCAL MILITIAS ARMED WITH A GRENADE AND A RIFLE CLAIMED WERE TO ARREST SEBITUSI.

3. ONE MILITIA BY NAME PASCAL NENEYE WHO WAS ARMED WITH A GRENADE

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3. ONE MILITIA BY NAME PASCAL NENEYE WHO WAS ARMED WITH A GRENADE CHASED THE SUSPECT INTO THE PTL BASE. BOTH WERE DETAINED BY OWN TROOPS AND LOCAL MILITIA WAS DISARMED PENDING OFFICIAL HANDING OVER TO LOCAL AUTHORITY PER LAID DOWN PROCEDURE.
4. GHANBATT MIO, RPA LO, MILOBs AND HR TEAMS WERE DESPATCHED TO INVESTIGATE AND EFFECT HANDOVER.
5. AT ABOUT 211730B MAR 95, THE PTL BASE REPORTED OF RPA TROOPS AND LOCAL MILITIA SURROUNDING OWN CAMP DEMANDING THE RELEASE OF DETAINEES.
6. TENSION ROSE TO A HIGHER LEVEL WHEN ONE OF RPA SOLDIERS WAS ALLEGED TO HAVE FIRED A WNG SHOT. THIS WAS ALSO ALLEGED TO HAVE RESULTED IN OWN TROOPS FIRING A WNG SHOT AND TAKING FIRE POSITIONS. THIS HAPPENED WHEN OWN PL SGT WAS NEGOTIATING WITH RPA COMD.
7. OWN TROOPS CALLED FOR REINFORCEMENT WHICH ARRIVED SHORTLY AFTER MIO AND HIS TEAM. RPA COMD WAS SAID TO HAVE EXPLAINED LATER THAT THE WNG SHOT WAS AN ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGE FROM A YOUNG SOLDIER.
8. MIO AND HIS TEAM MANAGED TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE WITH LOCAL RPA COMD AND THE BOURGMESTRE OF MUGESERA AND AGREED TO HAND OVER DETAINEES ON 22 MAR 95 AT 0930 HRS AT MUGESERA COMMUNE OFFICE.
9. ON 220700B MAR 95, BASED ON EXISTING CORDIAL RELATIONS, THE PREFECT OF KIBUNGO AND CO 21ST BN OF RPA CALLED ON CO GHANBATT TO RESOLVE THE INCIDENT. A MEETING WAS CONSEQUENTLY ARRANGED BETWEEN CO GHANBATT, CO RPA 21ST BN AND BOURGMESTRE OF MUGESERA AT MUGESERA COMMUNE OFFICE TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE AND WITNESS THE HANDING OVER OF THE DETAINEES.
10. THE ISSUE WAS SUCCESSFULLY RESOLVED AMICABLY BY 221430B MAR 95

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
10. THE ISSUE WAS SUCCESSFULLY RESOLVED AMICABLY BY 221430B MAR 95 WITH A VIDEO COVERAGE. HOWEVER GHANBATT MP DET AND RPA INTELLIGENCE CELL WERE TASKED TO INVESTIGATE THE INCIDENT TO ASCERTAIN:

- A. THE CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO THE INCIDENT.
- B. WHETHER THERE WAS FIRING.
- C. WHO ACTUALLY FIRED.
- D. WHICH GROUP FIRED FIRST.
- E. WHETHER LOCAL MILITIA WAS MOLESTED.

11. THE RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE WAS REPORTED TO UNAMIR HQ PER REF 'C' PENDING A DETAILED REPORT TO FOLLOW SOON.

12. FURTHER MEETINGS HAVE BEEN PLANNED TO PUT IN PLACE MEASURES WHICH WILL ENSURE THAT SUCH AN INCIDENT DOES NOT OCCUR IN FUTURE.

13. ONE OTHER FEATURE WAS THAT THE NGOs WERE PREVENTED FROM WITNESSING THE HANDING OVER PROCESS.



MA AMOAH

CAPT

FOR COMMANDING OFFICER

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
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MILOB GP HQ
UNAMIR
Kigali
22 APR 95

Ref: A/01/k/95
DFC/CMO
UNAMIR HQ
AMAHORO HOTEL
REMER
Kigali

LETTER OF EXPLANATION.

1. I write to explain the circumstances which made me drive Mr Felli's car in the night of 20 Apr 95, after you instructed that it should be parked.
2. I sincerely wish to state that I never acted in defiance to your orders not to drive the car. From the Belgium village, I drove to the Ghanbatt Transit camp where the car should be parked. I did not even have the courage to send back your ADC and a driver was detailed. I remained in the transit camp (playing scrabble) till late in the night. Usually, the logistics officer sends me home but he decided that day that I should take his car home since he was tired and feeling sleepy. After a fruitless search for his keys, I knocked back and told him from his sleep that he should drop me since the only keys available were that of Mr Felli's car. I do not know if he was conscious of this at the time of answering your question on the whereabouts of the vehicle. Having failed to get him up, I drove home since I was to come on duty the following morning. This was the compulsion which he willingly or unwillingly did not explain to you.
3. The following morning, although I knew the car was to go to a workshop, I had no excuse to move it. I called for help and Maj Bob NYAKA drove me to work. I was in the office at the time I learnt you had asked for the car. I rushed up to explain and found you busy.
4. I solemnly swear that there is nothing I am hiding from you as far as the movement is concerned. I am seriously ashamed and sorry that this matter is seen as me, as a captain, had the guts to disobey your orders. I sincerely apologise for my actions and pledge that I shall not repeat such in future.


JOB KUSEH
Capt

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11/05/95