

UNAMIR

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ORGANISATION INTERNATIONALE POUR LES MIGRATIONS (OIM)  
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KIGALI - RWANDA

8 June 1995

**INVITATION**

**Jean-Victor Nkolo**, who was here as **Deputy Chief of Mission** from April this year, based in Maputo, Mozambique, will be leaving us for yet a new IOM mission in Liberia for which we wish him the best of luck and a safe journey.

We want to use this occasion to thank him for his commitment and contribution he made here in Rwanda and wish to invite you to join us

**on Monday 12 June 1995 from 3:00 pm to 5:00 pm**

at our Kigali office.

We are looking forward to seeing you!

With kind regards

Joost van der Aalst  
Chief of Mission



Address: Rue de Ntaruka 3  
Kiyovu  
(right accross the street from the Embassy of the Republic of Burundi)



UNITED NATIONS CENTRE FOR HUMAN SETTLEMENTS (Habitat)  
CENTRE DES NATIONS UNIES POUR LES ETABLISSEMENTS HUMAINS  
CENTRO DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS PARA LOS ASENTAMIENTOS HUMANOS



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**1st RBA-UNCHS (Habitat) Consultation for UNDP Resident Representatives from  
African countries in Crisis : Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire, (Tanzania, Uganda)**

Monday, 5 June 1995

- |                   |   |
|-------------------|---|
| -09h00            | Welcome Address by Dr. Wally N'Dow, ASG, UNCHS (Habitat)  |
| -09h15<br>(09h45) | "The Challenges of Rebuilding War-torn Rwanda"<br>H.E. Dr. Jacques Bihozagara, Minister for Rehabilitation and Social Integration   |
| -09h45<br>(10h15) | "Experiences of the UN mission (UNAMIR) to Rwanda"<br>Ambassador Khan, Special Representative of the Secretary General to Rwanda  |
| -10h15<br>(10h30) | Coffee break  |
| -10h30<br>(11h00) | "The Great Lakes Region and its significance for RBA's African countries in crisis approach"<br>RBA representative (to be determined)   |
| -11h00<br>(11h30) | UNDP's support to the Government's "Programme of National Reconciliation and Socio-Economic Rehabilitation and Recovery"<br>Mr. Sukehiro Hasegawa, UNDP Resident Representative, Kigali |
| -11.30<br>(12.00) | The need for a spatial approach in Rwanda's National Reconciliation Policy<br>Mr. Heinz Kull, Officer-in-Charge, Francophone Africa, Arab States & Europe, UNCHS (Habitat)              |
| -12.00<br>(14h00) | Lunch   |
| -14h00<br>(14h30) | "Political, Social and Economic Impacts of Rwandese Refugees on neighbouring countries"<br>Dr. Jinmi Adisa, IFRA Ibadan   |
| -14h30<br>(15h00) | "Environmental Impacts of the Rwandese Refugee Presence in border areas with Rwanda"<br>Mr. Stanislaus Nkwain, Resident Representative Adjoint, Kinshasa                                |



- 15h00  
(15h30) "Ngara and other Refugee Camps and their influence on Human Settlements pattern in border areas with Rwanda"  
Mr. Jose Victor Angelo, Resident Representative, Dar-Es-Salaam
- 15h30  
(15h45) Coffee break
- 15h45  
(16h15) "Security Issues and development in border areas with Rwanda"  
Mr. Andres Cavalho, Resident Representative a.i., Bujumbura
- 16h15  
(16h45) "After the departure of Rwandese refugees from Uganda, what has changed?"  
Prof. Babatunde Thomas, Resident Representative, Kampala
- 16h45  
(17h30) General discussion

Tuesday, 6 June 1995

- 09h00 Resumé of first day, outlook
- 9h15  
(10h15) Working Groups I and II  
(Urgent Issues to be addressed by UNDP and UNCHS (Habitat) in border areas of neighbouring countries with Rwanda)
- 10h15  
(10h45) Presentation of recommendations by working groups I and II
- 10h45  
(11h00) Coffee Break
- 11h00  
(11h30) "Anticipating Environmental Impacts of Refugees and Displaced Persons"  
Mr. Franklin Cardy, Dy. Asst. Executive Director, Environmental Management Division, UNEP
- 11h30  
(13h00) "Proposals for the reintegration of returnees in Rwanda"  
Habitat Working Group on Rwanda,  
Messrs. Alfons Gombé, Dr. Kibe Mugai, Heinz Kull
- 13h00  
(14h00) Lunch
- 14h00  
(15h00) Working Groups I and II  
(Critical analysis of Habitat's proposals for the reintegration of returnees in Rwanda)
- 15h00  
(15h30) Presentation of findings and recommendations by working groups I and II
- 15h30  
(15h45) Coffee break



- 15h45      General discussion  
(16h30)
- 16h30      Summary and outlook, future actions, funding considerations  
(17h00)      (presented by RBA and Habitat)
- 17h00      Closing remarks by Dr. Wally N'Dow

**Background Information :**

The dramatically deteriorating situation in Burundi is a visible sign that there is an urgent need for a comprehensive response by the international and particular by the UN community to the threats to the general stability of countries existing in the Great Lakes Region. As a first step by RBA and Habitat in view of the establishment of a common approach the present consultation will concentrate on the situation in Rwanda, where Habitat is presently executing the UNDP supported programme "RWA/94/010, Assistance d'Urgence à la Réhabilitation et la Reconstruction de la ville de Kigali et d'autres centres urbains<sup>1</sup>". Although modest in size and means this programme constitutes a major element in the Rwandese Government's policy of national reconciliation in which access to housing, urban land, infrastructure and commercial premises has become one of its centre pieces.

This emergency programme, designed in September 1994 almost immediately after the end of military hostilities in Rwanda, needs now a complementary programme that takes care of the question of how, where and when the two to three million Rwandese refugees presently living in neighbouring countries can be reintegrated into their home country. The question of their political, social and economic reintegration has been raised by the Government and many external observers at numerous occasions; it is the question of their spatial integration that will be the dominant feature of the foreseen 1st UNDP - Habitat consultation on Rwanda and which will be taken up in close cooperation with the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Social Integration of the Government of Rwanda.

A complementary feature to be addressed concerns the way RBA and UNCHS (Habitat) can assist Zaire, Burundi, Tanzania and Uganda in coping with the short and long term effects of the presence of millions of refugees in their respective border areas with Rwanda.

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<sup>1</sup>UNEP being associated agency

DRAFT PAPER BY THE SRSG  
1st RBA-UNCHS (Habitat) Consultation for UNDP Resident  
Representatives from African countries in Crisis

Mr. Chairman, delegates to this consultative body, distinguished ladies and gentlemen; I would like to give my profound appreciation to UNHABITAT and, in particular, the Executive Director, Dr. Wally N'dow for inviting me to share with you some of UNAMIR's experiences as a peace-keeping mission. I must confess that it is usually not easy to attempt a topic like this without importing some of my personal, even subjective experiences which would serve as a challenge and a guide in our deliberations. In such a case, a clear understanding of the background and immediate history surrounding the very existence of UNAMIR would enhance our understanding of the issues involved.

Following the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement on August 4, 1993 which called for a democratically elected government and provided for the establishment of a broad-based transitional government until the elections, in addition to the repatriation of refugees and the integration of the armies of the two sides, i. e. the former Rwandese government and the RPF, these two signatories called for a neutral international force to help implement this Arusha Agreement. This is the genesis of UNAMIR.

UNAMIR was established on October 5 by Security Council Resolution 872(1993) with provision for the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative who would lead UNAMIR in the field and exercise authority over all its elements. By the end of December 1993, there was an SRSG, A UNAMIR Force Commander with a battalion to establish Kigali as a weapons-secure area.

Even though the then MRND government and RPF expected UNAMIR to oversee and assist Rwanda during the transitional period of twenty-two months leading to democratic rule, circumstances prevailing at the time did not make it possible for democratization to take place as envisaged. Generally, the parties showed goodwill and cooperation in their contacts with each other and with the UN. The ceasefire was also respected. However, there were signs of mutual intransigence. In the course of January to March 1994, all attempts by the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, supported by a number of governments both within and outside the region, as well as the OAU Secretary-General and the observer states to the peace process to install the transitional institutions as provided for by the Arusha Peace Accords failed.

Despite the attendant political tensions which were marred by some violent incidents, assassinations and demonstrations, UNAMIR forces continued to play a stabilising role with the deployment of additional personnel and equipment. The authorised strength of 60 UNAMIR civilian police monitors with headquarters in Kigali was in place. In carrying out its mandate which was to assist in maintaining public security through the monitoring and verification of the activities of the gendarmerie and the communal police, CIVPOL worked closely with both sides in Kigali.

#### UNAMIR's Role by 30 March 1994

By the end of March 1994, the Secretary-General and all the members of the international community were convinced that UNAMIR should continue to support the dialogue of the parties to resolve the remaining differences relating to the formulation of transitional institutions. In fact, on 5 April 1994, the Security Council, by its Resolution 909(1994), expressed its "deep concern at the delay in the establishment of the broad-based transitional government and the Transitional National Assembly" and stated that it was "concerned at the deterioration of security in the country, particularly in Kigali".

#### April 6 1994

A plane carrying President Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Ntaryamira crashed at Kigali Airport killing all those on board. Then a civil war broke out which led to widespread killings and countrywide massacres of Tutsis and the Hutu opposition and intelligentsia and other supporters. Victims of the violence included Prime Minister Agatha Uwilingiyimana and 10 Belgian members of UNAMIR. Other gruesome details need no elaboration. The Secretary-General condemned the acts of violence and attacks on the members of UNAMIR in the strongest terms.

Following the murder of the Belgian soldiers and threats to Belgian nationals, the Government of Belgium decided to withdraw its battalion from UNAMIR. UNAMIR henceforth immediately found it impossible to carry on with its original mandate. Instead, UNAMIR concentrated on negotiating a truce with the two parties to permit the evacuation of expatriates, assisting in evacuations, rescue those trapped in the fighting; and providing humanitarian assistance to large groups of displaced persons under UNAMIR protection.

#### Experiences of UNAMIR

##### On the genocide:

According to the Secretary-General, the international community's delayed reaction to the genocide in Rwanda "demonstrated graphically its extreme inadequacy to respond with prompt and decisive action to humanitarian crises entwined with armed conflict. So, the entire UN system requires review to strengthen its relative capacity."

In the first place, up till August 1994, it was not easy for UNAMIR to get the authorised troop strength even though the Security Council had urged governments to respond urgently to the Secretary-General's request for resources in UNAMIR in Resolutions 925(1994) and 929(1994). Even where governments responded positively, the complicated efforts of matching troops from one country with equipment from another made early deployment of troops difficult. The fact that the UN itself has no standing army to deploy, as it were, in cases of extreme humanitarian and/or peace-keeping need further exacerbates the problem.

#### Double Accusation Against UNAMIR:

UNAMIR finds itself in an unenviable position; as former Rwandese authorities (now in exile) have found it convenient to blame UNAMIR for having lost the war to the then RPF; whilst some authorities of the present government continually accuse UNAMIR of providing shelter to members of the interahamwe. Quite to the contrary, UNAMIR has been playing the role of peace-keeper in a climate of mutual suspicions and antagonisms; facilitating the declared policy of the Rwandese government of national unity to repatriate the refugees mainly from Zaire, Tanzania and Burundi.

UNAMIR, in collaboration with the Agencies and NGOs, has adopted good sense and judgment by working side-by-side with the Rwandese government through the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Social Reintegration in what could be described as an otherwise successful programme for the safe and speedy return of the displaced persons in the diaspora.

#### HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE:

UNAMIR's presence in Rwanda is in many ways an important feature in the day-to-day life of the humanitarian community. UNAMIR's humanitarian unit and military component continue to provide essential services to UN agencies, bi-laterals, NGOs and even to the media ranging from security to logistics (transport of humanitarian commodities, fuel, communications, medical support, access to UNAMIR air services, etc.), information sharing and even the direct delivery of assistance.

I have also found it useful and necessary, in my capacity as the **designated UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator for Rwanda** and, as a matter of fact, the overall UN leader in Rwanda, to personally participate in weekly Inter-Agency (and regular NGO) co-ordination meetings which are held at the premises of the UNDP Resident Representative and Resident Coordinator. These meetings provide a forum for concerted action and joint strategic planning by the international community at large in the search for solutions to Rwanda's numerous post-war and post genocide problems and challenges. In addition, this also enhances our mutual understanding and, hence, working relationship, as members of one UN family in the country.

Working together as a team and co-ordinating our collective endeavours for the ultimate benefit of the Rwandese society, UNAMIR has continued to support and work with the Government of Rwanda, UN agencies and NGOs not only in the delivery of humanitarian assistance; but also in addressing key issues relating to recovery and rehabilitation. More specifically, we have found the adoption of the **Integrated Humanitarian Response (IHR)** strategy and the subsequent creation of the **Integrated Operations Centre (IOC)** with headquarters at the Rwandese Ministry of Rehabilitation and Social Reintegration as a sound pragmatic tool for addressing otherwise intractable humanitarian problems. The Integrated Humanitarian Response strategy is a network of partners comprising the Government, UN Agencies, NGOs and UNAMIR which, by definition, implies the pooling of resources i.e. human, financial and logistic; in order to solve outstanding



issues and/or satisfy desired objectives. UNAMIR's experience in this all-important area suggests that representatives of the government, Agencies and NGOs that engage in decision making should possess sufficient de jure and de facto authority for all practical purposes to translate their decisions for implementation into actions on the ground. In the case of Rwanda, it would appear that the security variable; and hence RPA interest should always be factored into the decision-making process.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished ladies and gentlemen, our most daunting challenge today, four days before the end of the current mandate of UNAMIR, is reflected in the general, or rather, overall assessment of what UNAMIR has been able to achieve so far.

Whereas the Rwandese authorities and the Security Council are generally agreed on the relative usefulness of UNAMIR vis-a-vis its mandate, the perception, utterances, and I dare say, reaction of the Rwandese populace in general suggest a less than wholesome appreciation of the role of UNAMIR as an assistance mission in Rwanda. Obviously, emotions tend to run very high following the events that afflicted the country in April to July, 1994.

One main reason for this rather negative image is UNAMIR's inability or unwillingness to-date to mount a public information campaign which would give the true picture of UNAMIR's role in Rwanda. Only then would everybody understand that, in addition to achieving its role as given by the mandate, UNAMIR's humanitarian support for Rwanda also covers the following:

**Transportation:**

Return of over 57,000 IDP's and thousands of refugees;  
Movement of thousands of orphans to orphanages;  
Movement of thousands of tons of foodstuff/seeds to ensure proper resettlement of returnees at home;  
Nationwide distribution of exam papers;  
Nationwide distribution of new Rwandese currency;  
Relocation of 2400 prisons to less crowded prisons;  
Evacuation of serious casualties to hospitals; and  
The gift of vehicles to the Rwandese government and local NGOs.

**Preventive Medical Services:**

Preventive medical clinics conducted in Kigali, Muyumba and other parts of Rwanda;  
Bacterial water analyses, waste disposal advice and vector control programmes for orphanages throughout Rwanda;  
Larvae and fly control, water analyses and waste disposal;  
Supervision of mass burials and disinfection of grave sites at Kibeho and Gisenyi IDP camps; and  
Over 6000 children immunised against measles.

**Medical Treatment:**

Over 260,000 Rwandese treated as outpatients;  
Over 2,500 Rwandese treated for dental problems;

As could be seen therefore, UNAMIR has also had some positive experiences in Rwanda; all calculated, in a modest way, to usher a climate of normalcy in a country torn by civil strife and senseless genocide recently. That all the other humanitarian players, and I dare say returnees, tend to flock around the casques blues is symptomatic of the critical humanitarian role of UNAMIR as a facilitator.

UNAMIR's experience in this arena is that unless the majority of the Rwandese refugees repatriate voluntarily; and until the trials of those accused of genocide commence in earnest either through the International or National Tribunal(s); thus cleansing the very ghost of genocide itself, our collective search for an enduring peace may be difficult to realize. Equally important is the overwhelming need for the international donor community to continue giving Rwanda much-needed development assistance to enable the society enjoy the much talked-about tolerance and reconciliation that the government and people of Rwanda are yearning for; and indeed so desperately need.

I thank you for your attention.

2,000 Rwandese treated as inpatients for diagnostic, surgical and intensive care needs;  
580 medical evacuations for Rwandese seriously injured by vehicle accidents, mine incidents and serious illness; and  
330 medical evacuations from Kibeho camp.

Medical Training:

Education of Rwandese medical/nursing staff in dressing, sterilization, surgical and resuscitation procedures, nursing systems and x-ray equipment operation;  
Course development for the training of 500 local nurse auxiliaries;

Demining:

Demining activities conducted in Kigali, Rwamagana and Ndera.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal:

Hundreds of EOD tasks completed rendering many schools, orphanages, churches, government buildings and ministerial residences safe from explosive, mine, mortar and rocket ordnance throughout Rwanda.

Bridges and Roads:

Bridges constructed at Busoro, Gatuna and Nyamata and repaired at Nyamata and Mata.

Maintenance and Recovery:

Recovery equipment and expertise provided extensively throughout Rwanda to clear wrecked vehicles; and  
The repair of essential Rwandese government and RPA vehicles.

Communications Support:

Repair, maintenance and re-establishing of RWANDATEL local lines, radio duplexers and VHF radio repeaters;  
Repair of Nyanza satellite equipment; and  
Provision of field cables in home communes and generators on loan to the Rwandese government.

Agricultural Activities:

UNAMIR troops have assisted farmers with the weeding, cultivating and harvesting of their crops.

Miscellaneous:

Restoration of water/electrical supplies in Kigali, Cyangugu, Byumba and Kibungu;  
Bulldozer taskings throughout Rwanda;  
Track construction and improvement at various sites;  
Reconnaissance of Nyanza, Kibuye, Gitarama, Gitagana and Nsinda prisons to determine how to improve conditions.



Ishami ry'Umuryango w'Abibumbye riharanira Amajyambere

To: All Heads of Agencies  
SRSG, UNAMIR  
Chief of Mission, IOM  
Country Delegate, ICRC

From: Sukehiro Hasegawa  
Resident Coordinator  
UNDP, Kigali

*S. Hasegawa*

Date: 29 May 1995

Subject: Special Meeting on Inter-Agency Coordination

Please find attached a discussion paper intended to facilitate discussion at the special meeting on inter-agency coordination which, as agreed at last week's heads of agencies meeting, will be held in the UNDP Conference Room, this Wednesday, 31 May at 15:00 hours.

Best Regards.



*DISCUSSION PAPER*

**INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION**

**Introduction**

The recent events in Kibeho camp and the subsequent report of the International Commission of Inquiry have highlighted the need for better coordination of UN agency activities in Rwanda. Donor countries are also demanding this, as evidenced by the remarks made by Minister Pronk of the Netherlands at the 19 May meeting of the Rwanda Operational Support Group. Although pledging important new assistance to Rwanda, specifically in the justice sector, Minister Pronk indicated his Government attached great importance to effective coordination within the UN system.

At the same time, Government officials seem increasingly skeptical of the utility of UN activity in Rwanda. Thus, on 20 May, Vice-President Paul Kagame, speaking on Radio Rwanda, said the Rwandese people had little to show for the large number of agencies and international relief personnel now present in their country.

Against this background, a thorough review of the role of the UN system in relation to relief, rehabilitation and development in Rwanda, is needed.

**I ISSUES**

**1) Improving the coordination of UN relief, rehabilitation and development activities in Rwanda**

This lack of coordination is manifested in several different ways:

- a failure to share information;
- a failure to coordinate programme development and implementation;
- an inability to develop common strategies (excessive time spent deciding what to do instead of acting);

Poor coordination impairs the overall effectiveness of UN agencies. It equally impairs our ability to anticipate problems and thereby to develop and implement proactive strategies.

What means can be employed to address these problems of coordination? The existing

heads of agencies meeting does not appear adequate for the task. Do we then need a new structure (or structures)? What would the decision-making procedures of such a structure be? Can we envision other mechanisms, in addition to or instead of a new structure, which would help improve coordination among the agencies?

## **2) The role of the IOC**

At present, the IOC neither makes UN system policy, nor does it report to any UN policy-making body. The Government has nevertheless claimed that, through interaction with the IOC, it consulted fully with the UN system and obtained its concurrence concerning the closure of the southern IDP camps, including Kibeho.

If the IOC is not a policy-making body, how successful has it been in implementing policy? The relief effort which followed the forcible closure of the southern IDP camps appeared quite successful. To what extent can the IOC take credit for this? What general lessons should be learned from Kibeho (before and after 22 April) insofar as the IOC is concerned?

What are the implications of current efforts to restructure the IOC?

Is an alternative institutional arrangement needed for the future implementation (and development) of UN agency policy?

## **3) Cooperation with the Government**

Clearly, the Government and UN agencies must work closely together, not simply in implementing particular programmes, but also in deciding how to programme resources. In fact, as the focus of UN agency activities in Rwanda shifts from relief to development, the Government has growing responsibility for decisions over the allocation of resources made available by international donors. Government officials, however, seem increasingly of the opinion that international agencies in Rwanda pay little attention to Government priorities or, for that matter, the needs of the Rwandese people. The UN agencies, more than ever before, need to listen attentively to what the Government and the Rwandese people are saying. A new, more responsive approach needs to be taken in the run-up to the Round Table Mid-Term Review (6-7 July).

This does not mean, however, that the agencies must abandon their independence. As representatives of the international community and the guardians of principles defined in that context, our views and priorities will often conflict with those of the Government.

In this way, a certain degree of friction between the agencies and the Government appears inevitable. The question then is how to maximize cooperation in general and defuse

or resolve conflicts over particular issues? What lessons should be learned in this respect from the events surrounding the closure of the southern IDP camps?

**4) Restoring international donor confidence in Rwanda**

International donor confidence in Rwanda was sorely shaken by the recent events in Kibeho. The report of the International Commission of Inquiry may facilitate the resumption and/or consolidation of aid programmes which were suspended in the wake of the Kibeho crisis. The 19 May meeting of the Rwanda Operational Support Group, in which donor countries pledged important contributions to support the work of the International Tribunal and the rehabilitation of the Rwandese justice system, constitutes some evidence of this.

Nevertheless, the somewhat improved climate in donor-Government relations, fostered by the Commission's report, seems to come, to some extent, at the expense of UN agencies, criticized by the Commission in the same report. The confidence of donors, not only in the Government, but also in the UN agencies has thus become a pressing issue.

**5) Current priorities**

What problems need to be addressed immediately through concerted inter-agency action? Prompt action in the justice sector is an obvious priority. What are the others?

## **II RECOMMENDATIONS**

**1) Inter-Agency Coordination Committee (ICC)**

In addition to the regular weekly meeting of the heads of agencies, it is proposed that a meeting of the Inter-Agency Coordination Committee (ICC) be convened, either regularly or as the need arises, for the purpose of discussing issues of common concern and taking decisions on any specific matter relating to relief, rehabilitation and development in Rwanda. The issues addressed by the heads of agencies or their representatives within the framework of the ICC would include the rehabilitation of the Rwandese justice system and the repatriation and reintegration of refugees and displaced persons. During ICC meetings, each agency would share information on programme strategy, areas of operation and policy decisions affecting UN agency activity in Rwanda. Decisions would ideally be reached by consensus or near consensus. Formal votes would be avoided wherever possible.

The primary function of the ICC would be to ensure the overall coherence of UN agency activity in Rwanda. It would do this by providing a forum for:

- (a) the sharing of information;
- (b) the coordination of UN agency programme development and implementation;
- (c) the development of common strategies.

The ICC would allow the heads of agencies to more easily surmount obstacles delaying programme implementation and otherwise hindering the work of the agencies. The ICC would also facilitate a more proactive approach to UN agency work. In ICC meetings, the heads of agencies would anticipate problems and address these through the development and implementation of proactive strategies.

Public information and relations with the media would be another concern of the ICC. Each agency would, of course, maintain its traditional reporting link to its headquarters and continue to disseminate information to the general public. Within the framework of the ICC, agencies would nevertheless be encouraged to ensure the accuracy of the information they release, as well as its conformity with general inter-agency policy where the heads of agencies consider it desirable to establish general or specific guidelines for this purpose.

The ICC, for its part, will keep regular records of its discussions and decisions for the benefit of all UN agencies, the ICRC, and IOM.

## **2) Integrated Operations Centre**

The IOC would continue to gather, synthesize and disseminate information and carry out assessment missions. Its operational activities would be limited to coordinating the delivery of emergency assistance. Its emergency handling capabilities would be strengthened and an early warning capacity developed. The IOC would continue to include Government representation. It would thus serve as a point of contact where convergence between UN agency and Government policy would be sought. The IOC would keep the ICC regularly informed of IOC activities and deliberations. It would be required to bring to the attention of the ICC any development which had implications for UN agency policy.



UNITED NATIONS  
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES  
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA


UNAMIR - MINUAR

**NOTE FOR THE FILE**

A meeting was convened by the Spokesman today with the information officers of the UN agencies operating in Rwanda with a view to devising a more integrated information strategy for the UN in Rwanda. Everyone agreed on the need for greater and better information-sharing. There was a recognition of the need for consistency so as to avoid mixed messages being sent regarding UN operations in Rwanda. It was agreed, therefore, that information officers of the agencies would meet with the UNAMIR Spokesman on a weekly basis to delineate priorities for the week, share information and otherwise coordinate information in the press area. We agreed that the UNAMIR Spokesman would continue to speak on policy matters with representatives of the agencies being called upon for details or clarifications when issues concerning their respective organizations were involved.

With regard specifically to the issue of IDPs and the recently-launched Operation Retour, everyone agreed that there was a need for inter-agency cooperation to ensure that a properly-coordinated information programme was launched to support this operation not only to inform world public opinion, but also to sensitise and encourage the IDPs themselves to return home. It was therefore agreed that the Integrated Operations Centre (IOC), working in close conjunction with the Spokesman, will develop an information strategy and programmes for Operation Retour, including programmes directed at IDPs and information to be made available to the media. It was suggested that in view of the need to keep the press informed of progress made, it would be advisable for the IOC and the Spokesman to meet daily or as often as warranted by events.

All the participants welcomed progress towards the launching of the UN Radio in Rwanda, and expressed readiness to cooperate in support of the radio in the editorial, programming and other domains. It was agreed that information officers of agencies will meet with the Spokesman at 4:00 p.m. on Monday, 19 December to work out concretely possible areas of cooperation and support for the Radio.

  
Sammy Kum Buo  
Political Adviser & Acting Spokesman  
17 December 1994