

[3 CONFIDENTIAL]

UN ARCHIVES

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FILE	<u>4</u>
ACC.	<u>1998/0278</u>

UN RESTRICTED

To: D COS OPS

From: MILOB.500/SO3G2

05 Aug 95

SUBJECT: SHOOTING INCIDENT, KAMEMBE, 04 AUG

1. Attached please find sector 4 Milob report on subject incident.

2. Comment: There appears enough blame on both sides for the escalation, however it should be noted that:

a. with emotions stirred (the breaking of the roadblock and subsequent vehicle chase) the RPA were quite disposed to fire on unarmed UNAMIR troops when they had clearly surrendered themselves. It is surprising that only two people were wounded, possibly the deterrent of VP Kagame's warning against killing UNAMIR troops;

b. emotions are a consideration when dealing with RPA. When heightened, they are likely to be far more aggressive and irrational.

c. the unilateral escalation by Malawi coy (APCs & MGs) brings up the point of another potential problem over who has overall command of the Sector. It is recommended that, with formed troops essentially an "as tasked" unit, that the Milob Sector Commander, the one with the overall view and intelligence over the sector be the overall sector commander. This would also have the additional benefit of clearer reporting and non-duplication of effort.

② G3 Ops

Pls prepare a short fax to UNAMIR outlining the correct version of this incident.

[Signature]
Dcosops
5.8

④ UNAMIR Spokesman

1. Details contained herein.
2. Sitrep will have a UN RESTRICTED condensed version.
3. Pls return.

[Signature]
Dcosops
5.8

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UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

Force Commander's Memorandum

From: Maj Gen GC Tousignant

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'J. Tousignant', is written over a horizontal line.

To: DISTRIBUTION LIST

Date: 13 June 1995

Subject: CONSULTATIONS WITH GOVERNMENTS OF ZAIRE AND TANZANIA

Ref: UN Code Cable 1946 12 Jun 95 - Attached

1. GENERAL. The referenced cable announced the appointment of Mr Ajello as Special Envoy to the Secretary General for the conduct of consultations with the Governments of Zaire and Tanzania. The aim of this memorandum is to request your help in the planning and support of Mr Ajello's visit to Rwanda, Zaire and Tanzania.

2. ACCOMPANYING OFFICERS. I have designated Lieutenant-Colonel Richard V. Blanchette as the military senior officer to accompany Mr Ajello. Kindly designate a political officer who is fluent in both English and French to accompany, advise and assist Mr Ajello in preparing the report to the Council.

3. INFORMATION REQUEST CONCERNING MR AJELLO. The following information related to Mr Ajello is required:

- a. Arrival date and time in Kigali;
- b. Composition of travelling party (if not alone); and
- c. Biographical sketch.

4. BRIEF TO MR AJELLO. As requested at referenced cable, Mr Ajello will be briefed on the current situation in neighbouring countries. DCOS Ops has been tasked with the preparation of this briefing and will seek input

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from UNREO Executive Officer. Date and time of subject briefing are to be confirmed.

5. MISCELLANEOUS. The following points are brought to your attention:
- a. Security. The requirement for security elements to accompany the Special Envoy during the Consultations Phase will be determined after consultation with Mr Ian Douglas in Goma; and
 - b. Laissez-passer. Laissez-passer for Lt-Col Blanchette and the selected political officer are requested (same for security elements if they accompany the delegation).
6. Your cooperation is appreciated.

Distribution List

<u>Action</u>	<u>Information</u>
ED	UNHCR
Spec Asst to SRSG	
CAO	
DCOS Ops	
UNREO (Exec Offr)	
CSO	

CNR 163 P1/2

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: 95 KHAN/TOUSIGNANT, UNAMIR, KIGALI IMMEDIATE
 FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
 DATE: 12 June 1995
 NUMBER: 1946
 SUBJECT: Consultations with Governments of Zaire and Tanzania

UNAMIR
 JUN 12 P 4 40
 UNATIONS
 MILITARY OPERATIONS

1. Ref our discussion today in the context of para. 6 of resolution 997 (1995) of 9 June.

2. As already conveyed to you, the SecGen has designated Mr. Ajello to conduct these consultations. Mr. Ajello at present is in Maputo and should be reaching Kigali by the end of this week, so that he can be briefed by UNAMIR, before commencing the consultations. As discussed, kindly designate a qualified and experienced senior military officer (Col. or Lt. Col.) and a political officer to accompany and advise Mr. Ajello. The Officers should be fluent in both English and French. The political officer would assist Mr. Ajello in preparing the report to the Council.

3. As agreed, please ascertain from Ian Douglas whether he could extend his stay in Goma to brief and advise Mr. Ajello. This would require Douglas extending his stay for about two weeks. Once you confirm this, we would work out appropriate arrangements with UNHCR and FALD.

4. Kindly bring to Mr. Ajello's attention the notes on the Security Council's consultations on the renewal of UNAMIR's mandate which were sent to you last week. You should also prepare for him a brief with all relevant information available on the situation in the camps in Zaire and Tanzania. It would be essential to inform him, particularly in reference to the Goma area, of the configuration of the camps, specifically on the reported separation of camps housing RGF personnel from refugee camps, and the presence

SRSG (FC)

and activities of the militia in the latter. Please make available to him the reports received from Douglas and any other material (including maps of the border areas) that you judge would be helpful.

5. As you are aware, these consultations are being undertaken in the context of the reported intensification of arms deliveries to and training in "military" camps of ex-RGF personnel across from Rwanda's borders with Zaire and Tanzania, as well as the increase in the number of cross-border incursions into Rwanda which could destabilize the situation. You should discuss with Mr. Ajello the implications of all possible options for monitoring or controlling such activities. Certain questions arise. Would the stationing of international observers at airfields have a constructive effect, or would it make such observers liable to criticism as they would not be capable of verifying the final destination of arms shipments considered to be legitimate? Could their security be assured by personnel provided by Zaire/Tanzania or would this require deployment of additional international personnel? Would it at all be feasible to deploy observers in the suspect camps to ensure that arms do not come in and that incursions are not launched (it may not be possible to prohibit training)? How would the security of such observers be assured?

6. Your briefing to Mr. Ajello assumes special importance since he has not been briefed at Headquarters and may not be fully aware of operational necessities and difficulties. Please convey to him that he also should raise with the authorities, especially in Zaire, the feasibility of relocation of "military" camps to distance them both from genuine refugee camps and from the borders with Rwanda.

7. We shall be glad to receive your comments and provide any clarifications that could help in these consultations.

Thank you and best regards.

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UNAMIR
Force HQ
Kigali

3000.15 (Ops)

18 Apr 95

See Distribution

Subject: FRAGMENTATION ORDER NO 13

Reference:

A. SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS FOR OP RETOUR

SITUATION

1. The Government of Rwanda through the Ministry of Rehabilitation has expressed its intentions to commence camp closures in Sector 4A. The RPA has currently cordoned Kibeho camp with the intention of closing the camp commencing night fall 18 Apr 95. In an address by the local RPA Bde commander, the IDPs were informed that Kibeho is to be closed and those willing to go home will be provided transport. However, those who refuse to leave will not be allowed freedom to move in and out of the camp.

2. In order to ensure that the closure is undertaken in a peaceful manner and without bloodshed, UNAMIR presence and assistance is required during the operation.

3. Additionally, the RPA has indicated that the Rwanda/Burundi border would be closed to prevent criminals and IDPs wishing to move to Burundi from doing so.

4. ICRC has been informed to switch food aid to home communes and to cease food distribution in targeted camps prior to their closure by RPA.

MISSION

4. UNAMIR will assist in providing security in the IDPCs, en route and in the communes during the camp closures by RPA.

EXECUTION5. General Outline

a. UNAMIR and UNHRFO will monitor and provide security during camp closures, through mobile, foot and heli patrols

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of target Camps, routes, home communes and southern borders of Sectors 2, 4B, 4A and 4C.

b. UNAMIR, in conjunction with UNHCR and IOM, will also provide transport facilities to assist the aged, women and children willing to be evac to their home communes.

6. Grouping and Tasks

a. MILOB GP HQ.

(1) Grouping. No Change.

(2) Tasks

(a) Monitor RPA activities in all DP Camps in Sector 4A, especially Kibeho Camp forthwith.

(b) Conduct veh and aerial patrols of routes from Kibeho and other camps planned to be closed to home communes in Sectors 3A and 4B and to other camps in Sector 4A.

(c) Intensify patrols in southern borders of Sectors 2, 4A and 4B to monitor movement of DPs across the Rwanda/Burundi border.

b. TAC HQ.

(1) Grouping. No Change.

(2) Tasks.

(a) Coordinate UNAMIR/UNHCR/IOM tpt resources for voluntary repatriation of IDPs from camps under closure to their home communes as per OP RETOUR.

(b) Increase liaison with RPA to ensure security environment in home communes in the BUTARE Prefecture.

c. ZAMBATT

(1) Grouping. No change.

(2) Tasks

(a) Increase patrol activities in Kibeho and

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other DP Camps in Sector 4A.

(b) Conduct information campaign in IDPCs of RPA intentions to close Camps in Sector 4A.

(c) Monitor RPA activities and enhance UN troop presence in Kibeho Camp with effect from 20 Apr 95 and other Camps when targeted for closure by the RPA.

(d) Escort IDPs on foot/in vehicles from camps under closure to home communes.

(e) Provide security to all agencies during food, water and aid distribution in DP Camps.

(f) Conduct aerial patrols of DP Camps, routes to home communes and borders in Sector 4A.

(g) Deploy 8 TCVs to Tac HQ to facilitate voluntary repatriation of IDPs from Kibeho Camp and Camps targeted for immediate closure to Way stations/ORCs/Home Communes in other Sectors in coordination with TAC HQ/UNHCR with effect from 181800B APR 95.

(h) Provide troops of no less than pl str to monitor camps targeted for immediate closure.

(i) Stand-by an RRF of pl str to reinforce troops in targeted Camps during closures.

c. **SENBATT**

(1) **Grouping.** No Change.

(2) **Tasks.**

(a) Provide security in ORCs and Overnight Way Stations and home communes in Sector 4B.

(b) Increase UNAMIR presence in home communes with special emphasis on Mbazi, Maraba, Gishamvu, Huye and Runyinya, through 'Rotational deployment' and both foot and mobile patrols and in coordination with RPA and other UN Agencies.

(c) Conduct aerial patrols of routes to home communes and border areas in sector 4E.

(d) Escort returnees on foot to home communes/Way Stations/ORCs within Sector 4E.

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(e) Move returnees from Way Stations and ORCs in Sector 4B to their respective home communes.

(f) Monitor DP movements at border crossing points within your sector.

(g) Deploy 3 TCVs with drivers and co-drivers to Tac HQ for movement of IDPs with effect from 181800B Apr 95.

(h) Be prepared to support Zambatt to provide security during camp closure by RPA in Sector 4A on orders.

d. GHANBATT

(1) Grouping. No change.

(2) Tasks.

(a) Be prepared to provide an RRF of pl str to reinforce Zambatt troops in target camps on order. Tpt may be by TCV or heli depending on sit and aval.

(b) Deploy 5 TCVs with drivers and co-drivers to Tac HQ for movement of IDPs with effect from 181800B Apr 95.

e. Sector 3

(1) Grouping. No Change.

(2) Tasks.

(a) Provide security in ORCs/OWS/Home Communes in Sector 3A.

(b) Escort returnees on foot to Home Communes in Sector 3.

(c) Move returning IDPs from Way Stations/ORCs in Sector 3 to their respective Home Communes.

e. INDBATT

(1) Grouping. No change.

(2) Tasks.

(a) Deploy 10 TCVs to Tac HQ to facilitate

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voluntary repatriation of IDPs from Kibeho Camp on orders. In addition, vehs will be used in targeted camps for immediate closure to Way stations/ORCs/Home Communes in other Sectors in coordination with TAC HQ/UNHCR.

(b) Be prepared to undertake other tasks on order.

f. HAC.

(1) Liaise with UNHCR and IOM to provide tpt support for voluntary evac of IDPs from Kibeho starting 190700 Apr 95 and other camps under closure to ORCs/OWS/Home communes.

(2) Coordinate subsequent evac of IDPs with Tac HQ.

g. AIR OPS

(1) Provide heli sp for ptls, recce, liaison and AME.

(2) Be prepared to insert pl str RRF from Zambatt/Ghanbatt troops to Sector 4A.

h. AUSMED

(1) Establish cas clearing post at Kibeho Camp with effect from 190800B Apr and other target camps on order.

(2) Arrange treatment and evac of cas.

(3) Provide own security when deployed in DP camps.

i. PAFFO Ensure press coverage by international media of camp closures by RPA starting 19 Apr 95 at Kibeho DP camp.

7. Coord Instrs

a. Timings.

(1) Gradual closure of Kibeho camp will commence wef first light 19 Apr 95.

(2) Dates for closure of other camps to be communicated when available.

(3) Enhancement of security at Kibeho Camp to commence by 18 Apr 95.

(4) OWS and ORCs will be secured by 19 Apr 95.

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- b. Locations. ORCs, OWS and Home Communes as per Security Instrs for OP RETOUR. See Annex A for Trace.

ADMIN AND LOGISTICS

8. First Line Tpt. First line tpt to be provided by the following:

- a. Zambatt. 8 x TCVs.
- b. Indbatt. 10 x TCVs.
- c. Senbatt. 3 x TCVs
- d. Tunbatt. 3 x TCVs.
- e. Ghanbatt. 5 x TCVs.
- f. Nibatt. 3 x TCVs.

9. POL. TCVs involved in evac of IDPs to refuel at BUTARE (Senbatt HQ). G4 to ensure dumping of sufficient POL at location.


10. ACCN AND FEEDING. Drivers and co-drivers to carry own bedding and combat rations for a minimum of five days. SENBATT and ZAMBATT to provide accn to drivers and co-drivers when in their sector.

COMMAND AND SIGNAL

11. Command and control. UNAMIR HQ.

12. Coord. - TAC HQ.

13. Ack. Receipt to be ack on channel or via inmarsat telephone ASAP.


G. Tousignant
Maj Gen
Force Commander

Distribution:

Action:

List B Less RPA LO
List C
List D

Information:

List A

