SUBJECT FILE
KATANGA CAMPAIGN
OPERATION ORDERS AND REPORTS

27/07/1961 - 06/11/1961

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

SC
CC

UN ARCHIVES
SERIES S-0788
BOX 4
FILE 5
ACC. DAC13/1.6.5.0.1

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

MIL INFO 2/A/3
6 Nov 61

Force Commander

ANC Invasion - KATANGA

Military Moves

1. Concentration. The ANC-LEO concentrated their forces as follows:

Dates?

a. LUISA - 8th Battalion 2 2 each

b. LUPUTA - 3rd Battalion
13th Battalion 2 2 each

c. LULUABOURG - 9th Battalion

2. Action. The selected area for invasion of KATANGA was KANIAMA - KAPANGA sector.

a. KANIAMA - 13 Battalion

(1) One company 13 Battalion captured road bridge located at the interprovincial border and advanced to KITENGO with another company followed by battalion headquarters, supporting arms and administrative elements; When?

(2) Two other companies proceeded along the LUBILASH River up to KABANZE; "

(3) On the main road LUPUTA - KANIAMA, the following action took place: "

(a) Limited close combat was experienced up to KITENGO; however, the troops were subjected to air bombardment by Katangese Air Force. Repeated

.../2

SECRET

Conf Brew rubbetts

2a(3)(a)(continued)

air attacks were carried out along the main axis in KATANGA territory and bombing was followed by parachutist landing between the interprovincial bridge and rear of ANC-LEO forward position. A ground attack was launched by the Katangese troops located in the KANIAMA area simultaneously with the airborne operation thus forcing the ANC troops to disperse and make their own way to LUPUTA area.

(b) In the meantime, the interprovincial bridge was destroyed, presumably by Katangese, and it prevented ANC transport and heavy weapons to return to KASAI. Road or rail When

(4) The two companies along the LUBILASH River lost contact with the main body and were also subjected to air bombardment. The troops dispersed and returned to LUPUTA by their own means. When

b. KAPANGA - 8 Battalion

(1) This battalion had concentrated at LUISA and moved to KASAI/KATANGA border. It appears that they never advanced into KATANGA and presumed to be intact. 2 Coy's Kasenko

c. Follow-Up Forces - 3 Battalion

(1) This battalion proceeded along the KAMUTAMBAI River towards TSHITAZU to follow-up success on either flank;

(2) NO information is available on the whereabouts of this unit.

d. Reserve - 9 Battalion. This battalion remained at LULUABOURG.

KATANGESE AERIAL ACTIVITY

3. Repeated air bombardments took place along the axis of advance LUPUTA - KANIAMA. The air bombardment coupled with the employment of parachutists by Katangese forces resulted in the withdrawal of ANC-LEO to KASAI. The psychological effects of Katangese air attacks on ANC troops have been the decisive factor in their withdrawal.

4. The Central Government troops were NOT provided with air support.

MERCENARY PARTICIPATION

5. Katangese troops were led by mercenaries and all parachutists so reported were believed to be non-Africans. It is estimated that the airborne troops consisted of a reinforced platoon. Undoubtedly all pilots responsible for air bombardment were mercenaries.

6. The Headquarters 1st Groupement was informed that four Belgians had been dispatched from ELISABETHVILLE to LULUABOURG for an unknown mission. This being known to the local population and ANC, it resulted in excitement and eventual search for these Belgians, thus causing unfortunate incidents already reported. It has been confirmed that four Belgians had made reservations at the Palace Hotel from ELISABETHVILLE.

REINFORCEMENT

7. The COQUILHATVILLE Battalion was alerted and two companies have been dispatched to LULUABOURG by air. The remaining troops are expected to follow.

ANC - STAN

8. The ANC-STAN concentrated 54 officers and 1880 men at KINDU as of 6 Nov 61. These personnel were selected from the 5, 16, and 19 Battalions.

.../4

9. An advanced party arrived at LODJA and it is expected that 157 men with their families will follow.

10. Officers have arrived at BUKAVU from STAN to carry out a reconnaissance on approaches to NORTH KATANGA via FIZI. The Provincial President Mr MIRUHO fears that the presence of ANC-STAN at KINDU has a political motive directed against his government.

11. Approximately 500 troops are preparing to move to KASONGO from KINDU.

12. The ANC-STAN has progressed very slowly, and it appears that there is little coordinated effort with ANC-LEO.

13. This Branch considers the temporary failure of this operation has been caused by the following:

a. Complete lack of air support by the troops of the Central Government while the Katangese had their airpower functioning;

b. Administrative deficiencies such as inadequacy of transport and supplies;

c. Inexperience and lack of training in handling supporting arms;

d. Inadequacy of operational training of officers and men in general for such a campaign;

e. NO coordinated effort with ANC-STAN, thus enabling Katangese troops to be concentrated in the threatened sector KANIAMA - KAPANGA;

f. The employment of foreign mercenaries and experienced advisers by KATANGA was an important factor in their superior handling of troops. The airborne landing of mercenary parachutists behind the ANC-LEO troops with the destruction of the interprovincial bridge caused the final rout.

(N Borchgrevink)
Lt-Col
Chief Military Information

1 Coy 13'. Kusuku de Kiuru 2 2 oct.
Kusuku à Katuda

~~Cutaway~~ Bronelin river 27 oct 1830 hrs

28 oct 0600 armes tombées & rencontre de l'ennemi
9 morts & 1 mort. arrivé à Kisumbo

29 oct Reece & advance vers Kiuru gare on
clash day a display in 2 Coy ~~on~~ attaqué
l'ennemi s'enfuit. 1 Coy mort.

30 oct 1 Coy advance vers Kisumbo Kusuku
and remain until 2. nov.

2 NOV ~~Retrait~~ ~~Concentration~~ 08 others

4 NOV 1000 enemy attack - (Refoulé)
1400 Reece air
1420 another attack & bombardment
1500 attaque terrestre - withdrew to river

5 NOV Move to Kaputa

UNITED NATIONS — NATIONS UNIES

INDICATE PRIORITY	SVC Service	FFFFF Routine	SSSSS Priority	PRIORITE NATIONS

Priorité Nations traffic is strictly limited.

— CODE —

N R

Address(es)

UNATIONS

~~NEW YORK~~

(TEXT & SIGNATURE) insert prefix & / or number as required USE DOUBLE SPACING.

A-2552-3 BUNCHE FROM LINNER

1. Reur most immediate of 5 November ~~I trust~~ you ~~will~~ may find some of the following useful in drafting proposed Addendum 13 for possible circulation to Secco:

2. ~~At the onset I must stress that~~ The military operation undertaken by ~~General~~ Mobutu in Katanga from bases located in Kasai was carried out without our ever having been informed. Although we knew of fairly large ANC troop movements towards the end of September, and although we knew that such troops were being centred in the Lulu and Luputa areas, we ~~had never been~~ were not informed of the actual intentions nor did we know with any precision the date on which the ANC entered into Katanga territory.

3. Because we had no UN persons on the scene of operations it was very seldom possible to confirm reports issued either by ~~General~~ Mobutu, the Central Government ~~authorities~~ or ~~by~~ the Katanga provincial authorities, regarding the various military actions. ~~which took place~~.

4. Although we sent on two or three occasions UN observers they ~~were~~ never ~~able to~~ crossed into Katangese territory, and we have never been able to establish how far ANC troops ~~had~~ penetrated into that territory.

5. Similarly, and in spite of various statements reporting numerous aerial bombardments carried out by Katangese aircraft, we are not able to confirm positively that all these attacks did occur. Only on one occasion did ~~UN~~ ONUC witness incursion into Kasai ~~territory~~ of Katangese aircraft and ~~saw~~ see the actual bombing.

6. As regards the role of mercenaries in this particular operation, none were actually seen by ~~UN~~ ONUC observers. It can be assumed however with near certainty that the Katangese aircraft were manned by non-Congolese personnel.

T. O. R.

T. O. D.

BY :

JP/mm

Drafted by :

Authorized : J. Pougoulat

Date : S. Linner

7 November 1961

Imp. Sarfati 10085

Address(es)

UNATIONS

NEW YORK

(TEXT & SIGNATURE) insert prefix & / or number as required USE DOUBLE SPACING.

7. The Office of the Force Commander has collected the following information:

a) Military Moves

(1) Mobutu's forces. Mobutu moved two battalions the 3rd and 13th by air, from Thysville and Leo respectively, to Lulu. This airlift commenced on 21 September and was completed on 1 October. These two battalions were joined by 8th ANC battalion already stationed at Lulu for the attacks from the North West, the 8th Battalion being allotted the Lulu-Luiza-Kapanga axis and the other two battalions the Lulu-Mwene Ditu-Kaniama axis.

(11) Kapanga axis. 8th Battalion completed road move to Luiza by 13 October. On 20 October ~~General~~ Mobutu confirmed radio and press reports of clash between the leading elements of this force and gendarmerie inside the Katanga border on the Kapanga road. On 31 October ANC HQ reported this force to be 30 kms inside Katanga. On 6 November ~~General~~ Mobutu explained that this force did not move into Katanga and is still intact.

(111) Kaniama axis. On 13 October this force of two battalions commenced move by rail from Lulu to Luputa near Katanga border. ANC HQ reported the move complete by 15 October. On 25 October Brig. Goulson, UN Commander at Lulu reported that he was convinced that some probing attacks by both sides had taken place and that in verification of this some ANC wounded had been evacuated to Lulu. On 31 October ANC HQ reported that this group was 60 kms inside Katanga. This now appears to have been an exaggeration as the verified air attacks which appear to have driven this force back on 2 November took place in general area of Tshisamba about 10 ~~kms~~ Kms inside Katanga.

(1V) Lundula's forces. It was reliably reported that a group consisting of ~~the best soldiers in the Stanleyville area were to make up a new unit for this att~~

T. O. R.

T. O. D.

BY : JP/mm

Drafted by :

Authorized : J. Poujoulat

Date : S. Linner

7 November 19

Imp. Sarfati 10085

UNITED NATIONS — NATIONS UNIES

INDICATE PRIORITY	SVC Service		FFFFF Routine		SSSSS Priority		PRIORITE NATIONS	

Priorité Nations traffic is strictly limited.

N R ~~CLEAR~~ 3.

Address(es)

UNATIONS

NEW YORK

(TEXT & SIGNATURE) insert prefix & / or number as required USE DOUBLE SPACING.

from the North. First element, airlifted by chartered Air Congo planes, landed in Kindu on 24 October. By 4 November this force had grown to 54 officers and 1887 others. On same date it was confirmed by the Malayans at Kindu that the move by rail and road to Kasongo near the Katanga border had commenced. On 6 November ~~Mayalans~~ Malayans reported only 905 ANC now remaining in Kindu.

As can be seen from the above Lundula's forces have never been engaged in the military operations, which took place along the Katanga-Kasai border, and have therefore been completely foreign in this operation. Because, however, the ANC forces from Orientale Province continue to be moving towards the north-eastern part of North Katanga there is ~~however~~ reason to believe that they are preparing an attack from that sector against Katangese forces whose strongest garrison is at present located in Kongolo.

A-2553

b) Katanga Aerial Activity

Several air attacks are reported to have taken place in the area of operations, and those which have been actually witnessed by ~~UN~~ ONUC have been already reported in paragraph 6 of Addendum 12.

Other attacks by Katangese aircraft were reported by the ANC to have taken place on 22, 27, 28 and 31 October but we were unable to confirm them.

Again on 2 November the ANC Commander at Lulu, Colonel Ndjoku, reported that a Katangese airplane which had come from the direction of Kaniama had dropped approximately 42 small bombs on an ANC column at Tshisamba on the border but inside Katangese territory. An attempt to verify this by the UN Commander in the Kasai Province resulted in the following cable he sent us on 3 November: QUOTE I visited Luputa today by helicopter. I was unable to get further today because the Central Government troops at Tshisamba withdrew to the Kasai side of the frontier. There are now no Central Government troops on the Katanga side of the frontier. Information

Imp. Sarfati 10085

T. O. R.

T. O. D.

BY :

Drafted by :

Authorized :

Date :

UNITED NATIONS — NATIONS UNIES

INDICATE PRIORITY	SVC Service		FFFFF Routine		SSSSS Priority		PRIORITE NATIONS	

Priorité Nations traffic is strictly limited.

N R ~~CLEAR~~ 4.

Address(es)

UNITIONS
NEW YORK

(TEXT & SIGNATURE) insert prefix & / or number as required USE DOUBLE SPACING.

on air attack is confused. It appears to have been carried out by 2 DC3 and 2 lighter type aircraft. They dropped some 40 small bombs. This attack was followed up by air drop of parachutists with many white soldiers using 2 DC4. The 7th Company of 13th Battalion ANC is completely dispersed and all contacts are lost. UNQUOTE

8. Stanleyville situation

Since his return from the Belgrade Conference, Vice Prime Minister Gizenga kept on requesting authority from the Council of Ministers to return to Stanleyville in order, he alleged, to close down his house there. He therefore left Leo for Stan on 4 October 1961 and although he had been granted a week's leave of absence in order to settle his domestic problems, and in spite of ~~numerous~~ repeated orders from the Central Government for him to return, Mr. Gizenga is still in Stanleyville at the time of writing this report.

9. Gizenga's stay in Stanleyville seems to have been the signal for a resumption of troubles and incidents. Thus, a week after his arrival Congolese military police arrested some Gendarmerie officers and soldiers over the weekend, alleging they had left their camp without necessary authorization. This was promptly followed by the Gendarmerie surrounding the MP camp and beating up some MP's.

10. In a public rally of the MNC members which was held at the Lumumba Stadium, Gizenga made a moderate speech pleading for support to the Central Government, also announcing the merging of all existing political parties into the Panalumumba Party.

11. On 19 October the Provincial Assembly, which had been meeting to elect its new government, adopted a vote of censure against President Manzikala, ~~who~~ and elected in his place Losala Simon. Other changes in the Provincial Government consisted ~~of Agaya Honoré, who was elected Vice President, Baya Jacques as Minister of Agricultur~~

T. O. R.

T. O. D.

BY :

Drafted by :

Authorized :

Date :

Imp. Sarfati 10085

UNITED NATIONS — NATIONS UNIES

INDICATE PRIORITY	SVC Service	FFFFF Routine	SSSSS Priority	PRIORITE NATIONS

Priorité Nations traffic is strictly limited.

N R ~~CLEAR~~ 5.

Address(es)

UNATIONS
NEW YORK

(TEXT & SIGNATURE) insert prefix & / or number as required USE DOUBLE SPACING.

and Grenfell Georges, Minister of Public Health. All other Ministers of Manzikala's previous government remained in office.

12. Subsequently, the former President, Manzikala, who had been placed under house arrest by the Gendarmerie sought and was granted UN protection. On 30 October more troubles broke out in the city, which were reported to have been spurred on by members of Jeunesse MNC. ~~UN~~ ONUC protection was given to the American Consul who was assaulted in his hotel by members of the same Jeunesse. Law and order was restored on the personal intervention of General Lundula and the American Consul was also able to return to his home.

13. Nevertheless, the Central Government sent Minister of Interior Gbenye to Stanleyville, where he spent three days beginning 31 October. Gbenye had many consultations with the newly elected Provincial President, who assured him of his obedience to the Central Government of Leo, and of his desire and determination to restore law and order in the Province.

cc. Force Commander

14. The above report is, I very much regret to say, not of the quality desired due to the fact that - for reasons you well know - our information from the field is extremely meagre and vague.

Imp. Sarfati 10085

T. O. R.

T. O. D.

BY :

Drafted by :

Authorized :

Date :

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

IMMEDIATE.

To : Mr. Linner,
Gen. MacEoin, Leopoldville.
From : Mr. Bunche, New York.
Date : 13 November 1961.
No. : 7892

(1)

SECRET

Reference our 7885.
Delegations pressing for information on details of recent ANC-Katanga gendarmerie fighting. Rikhye has some information but states that Goulson had reported more fully on it. With Mobutu back in Leo and possibility that new information can be obtained from him, would appreciate if additional material on ANC "action" in Katanga can be sent to us earliest for inclusion in addendum 13 should it be circulated.

(2)
ANC Lo Please take action.
ORM
13/11/61

cc. Mr. Linner.
Gen. MacEoin.

1 Bunche Yacob

Rem 7892 and OMR 6579

Katanga Company

~~DRAFT~~

The following additional information was obtained from General Mobutu on 16 Nov regarding the action of the ANC during the recent fighting which took place in the KATANGA/KASAI border. The only factual information which could be obtained relates to the actions of the 13th Bn on the Kaniama Axis and very little is known of the action taken by the two other battalions ~~of the ANC~~ concerned. It is our impression that General Mobutu himself is not fully aware of what took place during the alleged invasion. We therefore regret the following disappointing contribution to the story.

1 General Mobutu stated that he had been directed by the Prime Minister to visit his troops at the KASAI/KATANGA border and to ensure that no ANC troops move to Katanga. He arrived at Luputa on 25 Oct and immediately afterwards his troops were subjected to what he termed 'repeated heavy air bombardment and mortar fire. After having protested that this was a violation of the Katanga cease-fire, and after having requested UN air support, which did not effectively materialize, he had no option but to give the order to begin the invasion. This of course was done after having notified the Prime Minister on 26 Oct.

2 (a) Kaniama Axis. The 13th Bn moved from Lulabourg to Lusuku on the 13th Oct and from Lusuku to Katanda on the 23rd. They crossed the Lubilash River, the provincial frontier, at 1830 hours 27 Oct and the heavy weapons followed on the 28th. The first encounter with the enemy occurred on the same day (10 kilometres from the border) near Kisamba (TSHISAMBA), after which the enemy withdrew and ANC captured Kisamba.

A recce, followed by an advance, was made to Kisamba Station, a few kilometres past Kisamba on the 29th. The enemy again withdrew and Kisamba Station was secured by the ANC on 30 Oct. The Bn advanced and captured Kisamba Mission and remained there until 2 Nov, when, after the initial enemy attack was repulsed, an air bombardment of some 40 small bombs, combined with a ground attack, forced the ANC to withdraw to the Lubilash River and subsequently to Luputa.

../..

Although it was previously reported that vehicles had crossed the inter-provincial road bridge at the border, General Mobutu now states that the bridge had been blown many months ago and that no vehicles had crossed the border into Katanga. He also stated that the Katanga radio reports, to the effect that the ANC had lost many vehicles and other equipment, had been grossly exaggerated. ~~He contended that most of the most of the equipment claimed by Katanga to have been captured from the ANC were trucks and equipment previously captured by the ANC.~~

(b) Kapanga Axis. The 8th Bn completed their road move to Luisa on 13 Oct and a few days later to the Border area. ~~Kasombo~~. Only a recce element reached a few kilometres into Katanga, after which instructions were given for them to withdraw to the border. They are presumed to be located now on the Kasai side of the Border at ~~Kasombo~~.

(c) Follow-up Forces. There is still no information as to the actions taken by the 3rd Bn but it is confirmed that they proceeded along the Kamukambai River towards Tshitazu. This Bn did not seem to have achieved much success and nothing is known of its whereabouts.

* Attention must be drawn to the difficulty of accurate reporting on events not seen by UN personnel. No UN personnel were present at the actual ~~grand~~ GROUND clashes when these occurred. As far as air attacks are concerned only those on one day, 29 Oct, can be confirmed by UN personnel. All the major moves and build up of troops were confirmed by reports from UN units at Leo, Lulu Stanleyville and Kindu.

DRAFT

1. INTRODUCTION. Congolese Forces organised two main groupings for their attack on Katanga, Mobutu forces moving on two axes attempted to enter Katanga from the North West, and Lundula's forces are STILL grouping for an attempt from the North. ×

2. MILITARY MOVES.

a. Mobutu's forces Mobutu moved two battalions the 3rd and 13th by air, from Thysville and Leo, respectively, to LULU. This airlift commenced on 21 Sep and was completed on 1 Oct. These two battalions were joined by 8th ANC battalion already at LULU for the attacks from the North West, the 8th Battalion being allotted the LULU-LUIZA-KAPANGA axis and the other two battalions the LULU-MWENE DITU-KANIAMA axis.

b. Kapanga axis. 8th Battalion completed road move to LUIZA by 13 Oct. On 20 Oct General Mobutu confirmed radio and press reports of clash between the leading elements of this force and gendarmerie inside the Katanga border on the KAPANGA road. On 31 Oct ANC HQ reported this force to be 30 kms inside Katanga. On 6 Nov General Mobutu explained that this force did not move into Katanga and is still intact. ×

× This was either because the force left the area or else the original reports were in error.

c. Kaniama axis. On 13 Oct this force of two battalions commenced move by rail from LULU to LUPUTA near Katanga border. ANC HQ reported the move complete by 15 Oct. On 25 Oct Brig GOULSON, UN Commander at LULU reported that he was convinced that some probing attacks by both sides had taken place and that in verification of this some ANC wounded had been evacuated to LULU. On 31st Oct ANC HQ reported that this grou was 60 kms inside Katanga. This now appears to have been an exageratio as the verified air attacks which appear to have driven this force back on 2 Nov took place in general area of TSHISAMBA about 10 kms insid Katanga.

d. Lundula's forces. It was reliably reported that a group consistin of the best soldiers in the Stanleyville area were to make up a new unit for this attack from the North. First element airlifted by chartered Air Congo planes landed in Kindu on 24 Oct. By 4 Nov this force had grown to 54 officers and 1887 others. On same date it was confirmed

./..2

by the Malayans at Kindu that the move by rail and road to Kasango near the Katanga border had commenced. On 6 Nov Malayans reported only 905 ANC now remaining in Kindu.

3. KATANGESE AERIAL ACTIVITY

a. The pilot of UN DC4 aircraft on a return flight to Leo from Eville on 29 Oct observed and reported as follows: A small twin-engined aircraft dropped bombs on the railway tracks near the area of village KABWE KATANDA which is inside Kasai border about 45 kms NW of Kaniama. The aircraft was flying at a low height of about 200 ft and was heading SE. At least four bombs were seen actually dropped - white and black smoke was seen coming from the points of explosion. Captain of UN DC4 commenced following the unknown aircraft. The pilot of that aircraft, after presumably noticing the DC4 started taking evasive actions. It flew under low clouds and tried by other ways to dodge the DC4. DC4 followed the aircraft up to Kaniama airport, where it landed. DC4 kept circling round and nearabout Kaniama airfield for one hour and 50 minutes, keeping a watch on any further developments. At the Kaniama airfield, near the parking ramp, another aircraft was noticed. As DC4 was circling at same height, minor particulars of this aircraft could not be noted. It was believed to be single engined Dornier 27 or possibly two-engined Dornier 28. While UN DC4 was circling over Kaniama, this second aircraft (Dornier?) took off and tried to reach DC4. It was feared that it may machine gun the UN plane and therefore the DC4 climbed away and entered a rainshower and reversed the course. When DC4 came back later to the Kaniama airfield, Capt Beff, UN pilot, observed that both the aircraft were on the ground. The twin-engined DOVE appeared to be in a ready position on the airfield to take off while the UN aircraft was circling over. DC4 eventually left for Leo at 1540Z.

./.. 3

On the way back our aircrew noticed a village, probably Kasandji, 30 kms NW of Kaniama, on fire. About 50 huts were seen destroyed by fire. A large building, like a warehouse or a churc , was also on fire. The fire was caused most probably as a result of aerial bombing.

b. This attack was also confirmed by a UN officer who had accompanied two UN helicopters to the LUPUTA area. The helicopters landed first on the airstrip at LUPUTA but were warned by the ANC to move to a field some thousand yards away because they were expecting an attack by Katangese aircraft. Shortly after the helicopters landed in the field a black two engined aircraft flew from the direction of Kaniama at about 1000 ft and dropped one bomb which landed about 100 yards from the helicopters killing two civilians and wounding several others. The UN helicopters must have been clearly visible to the pilot of the Katangese plane.

c. Colonel ~~Joko~~ NDJOKO ANC commander ~~at~~ AT Luluabourg ~~has~~ reported on 2 Nov that a Katanga airforce plane coming from the direction of Kaniama had dropped about 42 bombs (small bombs and hand grenades) on an ANC column at Tshiamba just inside Katanga on the main road.

An attempt to verify this by Brig Goulson on 3 Oct resulted in following cable from him: QUOTE: I visited LUPUTA today by helicopter. I was unable to get further today because the Central Government troops at TSHISAMBA withdrew to the KASAI side of the frontier. There are now no Central Government troops on the Katanga side of the frontier. Information on air attack is confused. It appears to have been carried out by 2 DC3 and 2 lighter type aircraft. They dropped some 40 small bombs. This attack was followed up by air drop of parachutists with many white soldiers using 2 DC4. The 7th Company of 13th Battalion ANC is completely dispersed and all contacts are lost. UNQUOTE.

We give you this LATTER information although not confirmed by us because it is obvious that some such attacks did occur and

caused
the rout of the ANC and a mutiny in its ranks.

d. Other attacks by Katanga aircraft reported by ANC but unconfirmed by us were reported also on 22, 27, 28, 31 October.

4. MERCENARY PARTICIPATION. Undoubtedly Katangese aircraft were used and were undoubtedly piloted by mercenaries. We hav no other information confirmed by UN or other reliable source. We have only the ANC reports that the gendarmerie were led by mercenaries and that parachutists, if used at all, were mercenaries.

5. ROLE OF LUNDULA'S TROOPS. It was almost one month after commencement of the air move of Mobutu's forces that air move of Lundula's forces got under way. This resulted in the arrival of Mobutu's forces on the Katanga border about 18 Oct whereas Lundula's forces have not yet reached there. This raises the question of the role of Lundula's force. IF IT was to work in coordination with Mobutu's force the delay has been a disadvantage to Mobutu against whose force the Katangese WERE free to concentrate and has resulted in the temporary collapse of his effort.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

To: LINNER, LEO
From: BUNCHE, NEW YORK
Date: 6 November 1961
No. 7738.

Further to my 7737.

Exact wording of request for Secco meeting is " ...to consider the situation prevailing in the Province of Katanga, Republic of Congo (Leopoldville), caused by the lawless acts of mercenaries. " Please note emphasis on mercenaries which should be kept in mind in preparation of addendum 13.

Extract from cable
addressed to Dr Linner.

2. Would be very helpful to have available here, not later than Tuesday, a report on all confirmed information concerning the ill-fated ANC invasion of Katanga, including actual military moves, Katangese aerial activity, including all mercenary participation, fighting, role of Lundulla's troops and information since addendum 12 on Bizenga and Stanleyville situation. Report now requested would be circulated as addendum 13 when needed, depending on date set for SECCO meeting.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

Kat

MIL INFO 5/B

27 Oct 61

Force Commander

ANC Threat - KATANGA

1. Your attention is invited to our MIL INFO 5/E dated 23 Sep 61 and overlay showing grouping and axis of advance of ANC-LEO and ANC-STAN.

2. ANC-STAN troops have started moving southward and ten officers and 317 men reached KINDU.

3. The aim of this move appears to be twofold:

a. To concentrate troops for possible invasion of KATANGA;

b. To concentrate troops for possible deployment in the area NORTH of SANKURU river where the GIZENGA regime seems to be losing ground.

4. The above deductions have been reached in the light of the following information:

a. Movement of troops (6 officers, 159 men) by air on 25 Oct STAN-KINDU;

b. Proposed movement of remaining troops by rail and barge in the near future;

c. A public parade was held recently at STANLEYVILLE to raise their morale before being despatched to KATANGA;

d. Troops earmarked for movement were given a one month pay advance;

e. Troops were issued with field service marching order;

f. Normal infantry weapons including 60mm mortars were carried by troops;

g. Troops moving to LODJA have been reported. Their arrival at LODJA has NOT been confirmed yet;

.../2

SECRET

4 (continued)

h. The 19 Battalion ANC-STAN is the likely battalion being moved to KINDU. It is also probable that the best elements of the 5, 16, and 19 battalions have been selected for this operation. This force is commanded by Major MALONJY.

(N Borchgrevink)
Lt-Col
Chief of Military Information

Distribution:

Chief of Staff

Chief of Military Operations

Ethiopian Brigade Headquarters STANLEYVILLE

NSF Brigade Headquarters BUKAVU

KATANGA Command E'VILLE

Nigerian Brigade Headquarters LULUABOURG

SECRET

DR. Lumier

3/11

SUMMARY OF MAJOR EVENTS

3/4 Oct 61

LEOPOLDVILLE PROVINCE

1. Approx 60,000 lbs of stores, 7 jeeps and 32 personnel of 8 Ethiopian Bn left STAN and arrived LEO.

EQUATEUR PROVINCE

2. N T R

ORIENTALE PROVINCE

3. N T R

KIVU PROVINCE

4. Miruho's arrival in BUKAVU has been celebrated on a grand scale. He toured BUKAVU late in the day on 3 Oct. The local VIP of GOMA demanded an ONUC aircraft to fly to BUKAVU to witness the celebrations of Miruho's arrival. Lack of an ONUC aircraft was explained and VIP was advised to go by road. About 155 men of 11 Bn RUMANGABO, including the regimental band arrived in BUKAVU in chartered civilian buses to join in the celebrations. Miruho will address the public on 4 Oct. Two days holiday will be observed by the public and a march past of local forces, police and school children will also take place on 4 Oct.

5. The KIVU Provincial Assembly held its session on 2 Oct. UN troops provided necessary security cover for the session. The Assembly observed one minute silence in ~~the~~ memory of the late Secretary General.

KASAI PROVINCE

6. (a) Luluabourg

Col BOBODJO, Comd 4 Bde ANC THYSVILLE is visiting LULUABOURG on 3 Oct. The aim of his visit is not clear. He will stay there till Gen Mobutu who is due this week, arrives to review the troops.

SECRET

On whose authority were these civilians taken into custody ? Do they figure on your list of persons clearly established as falling within A-2 category of political advisers ? Certainly nothing in ordinary functions of local district officials justifies evacuation unless other evidence is in hand. Any arbitrary apprehension of such persons greatly damages reputation and authority of UN Force and Katanga Command.

Therefore send urgently statement of evidence or agreement on which these actions were based Meanwhile once again insist on rigorous control of transshipment to Leo of any civilians. A-2 classification or clear evidence of violating cease-fire must repeat must first be established, evidence transmitted to us, and advance notice given of arrival times.

KASAI PROVINCE

6. (b) The ANC LO reported that 30 jeeps and 20 loaded lorries arrived in LULU on 30 Sep. The details of loads are not yet available.

(c) Comd 3 Nigerian Bde visited MUSHENGE and was well received by the Chief.

KATANGA PROVINCE

7. (a) E'VILLE

(i) About 200 Gend vehicles were seen passing near Post Office?

(ii) 3 Senior Police Officers have sought UN protection and were despatched to LEO along with 11 more policemen.

(iii) The military observer group which was due to visit JADOTVILLE on 2 Oct could not proceed as planned because Col NWIMBI Senior Gend member stated that he was very busy. Later Mr KHIARI took up the matter with KIMBA and it was decided that the Group will visit JADOTVILLE on 3 Oct. The visit to JADOTVILLE was again stopped on account of refusal by Mr TSHOMBE. Mr TSHOMBE accused UN of violation of cease-fire agreement as prisoners were taken at NYUNZU after the cease-fire. In fact they had surrendered themselves and asked for UN protection on returning from the bush. The question of the visit to JADOTVILLE is being taken up again.

(iv) It has been confirmed that:

(1) Union Miniere is trying to convert Bulldozers into tanks.

(2) Foreigners are being concentrated at KIPUSHI to be used as a striking force.

(3) DC3 and DC4 aircraft can land at KIPUSHI.

KATANGA PROVINCE

7. (a) (iv) (4) The Belgians in JADOTVILLE and E'VILLE are rumoured to have declared that they will adopt a scorched earth policy in the event of an attack.

(5) The local traders still do not sell goods to UN personnel.

(6) 5 shots were fired at the Post Office between 2400 hrs 2 Oct and 0500 hrs 3 Oct. The source remains unknown.

(7) More refugees are pouring in.

(8) Reports from reliable sources indicate that the Gend are making an airfield in the bush near E'VILLE. This airfield remains camouflaged during the day. It is likely that this airfield is near MOKAMBO south of E'VILLE on the RHODESIAN border.

(9) An Irish officer who has returned ex from KITWE on 2 Oct reports that considerable anti UN propaganda is being made in RHODESIA. Funds are being collected publicly and posters are on display. The locals in KITWE have the impression that the UN suffered a heavy defeat in E'VILLE.

(b) A'VILLE

(i) Three civilian Belgians (with families) - Advisers to the local district officials were taken into UN custody on 2 Oct. Two of them with families were sent to LEO while the third will be sent later as he is to hand over cash and papers.

(ii) Mr DEVOUS, A Belgian Senior Advisor to the Commission who was missing on 2 Oct was found and taken into UN custody and will be despatched along with others to LEO for repatriation.

(c) MANONO - It is reported that the local police are harassing civilians. Own patrols commenced in town to ensure law and order and prevent police access to the locals. The situation is calm but tense.

(d) NYUNZU - The Observers Group visited Nyunzu and Niemba on 1 Oct. The Senior Gend officer of the group advised the Gend and the police to remain calm. The observer gp left for E'VILLE on 1 Oct.

(e) KABALO - The dead body of the Ethiopian soldier was buried on 1 Oct.

(f) KAMINA BASE - Two truck loads of Gends moved into No.2 Base at 0845 hrs on 3 Oct but later went away. DC was contacted and seemed to be genuinely surprised and amazed that Gends had entered the Base. A meeting with the Commissioner has been arranged.

Maj

(BP BHALLA)
Chief of Military Operations

Distribution

O I/C UNOC
Force Comdr
Chief of Staff
Chief Admin Offr
Mil Info
Chief Mil Ops
Mil Ops

28 September 1961

To: Maj-Gen Iyassu, Deputy Force Commander
Col J.J. Quinn, Chief of Staff

From: Force Commander

I should be grateful if, during your forthcoming visit to Eville, you would examine the following matters in addition to any other matters you may consider it necessary to investigate:

1. Condition of the troops.
2. The command and staff structure in Eville.
3. The intelligence service at HQ KATANGA.
4. Control and administration at Eville airport.
5. The situation at the post office Eville.
6. Allegations concerning pillage at airport and damage to mail at post office.
7. The tasks assigned to the different military units.
8. In the event of reinforcement, what is necessary to send to Eville.
9. Transport situation in Eville.

(Sean Mac Eoin) Lt-Gen

Comdt Bassett.

OPS 206 SECRET COPY NO 17

MAPS. KATANGA 1:1000000
EVILLE 1:20000

HQ SECTOR B
EVILLE
26 SEPT 61

ESTIMATE OF SITUATION AND OPERATIONAL PLAN - SECTOR B.

MISSION

1. UN Forces in SECTOR B will ensure maintenance of the peace in its Sector, by constant and effective patrolling discourage lawless elements and restore confidence amongst the population. Render whatever assistance is possible within their means and scope to bring about conditions of normalcy and relieve suffering among the people.

2. Specific tasks in order of priority.

a. Ensure security of EVILLE airport at all costs.

b. Ensure the security of vital UN installations in EVILLE.

c. Seize and hold other installations as the sit demands.

d. Carry out internal security operations in EVILLE in the event of disturbances.

Deductions from Statement of Mission.

EVILLE airport MUST be secured at all costs.

3. Internal security operations can in the light of recent events be stated as follows.

a. Assist police in preserving law and order particularly in preventing common looting, robberies, murders etc.

b. Assist police in preventing and if necessary putting an end to tribal, political and racial conflicts e.g. Baluba versus other tribes, Jeunesse versus everybody; protection of whites against Africans.

c. Prevent by immediate arrest and if necessary put an end to agitation by mercenary officers and advisers.

d. Protect whites from Africans and advise and assist if necessary in their evacuation from their homes to places of safety during disturbances.

e. Ensure the security of people under UN protection with particular reference to Refugee Camps.

f. Assist police in the restoration of normal conditions in day to day living.

g. Assist in the relief of suffering amongst the people by ensuring adequate food, medical attention and hygienic and sanitary conditions.

h. Continue to hold the following vital installations:

(1) Post Office

(2) Radio Transmitter

(3) Railway Tunnel

j. Be prepared to seize and hold or restore other important installations or places as the situation requires.

k. Constant patrolling is a sine qua non.

l. Ensure security of UN depots, establishments, camps, hospitals, stores and lines of communication.

Other forces

4. Gendarmerie

a. Str. See latest Int Report.

b. Locs. " " " " .

c. Disposns. Since Cease Fire Gend have been regrouping in EVILLE area. Where exactly regrouping is taking place is NOT fully known except that CAMP MASSART is the loc of greatest Gend conc - one coy approx loc in RUASHI, and re-occupation of Base Sup Depot (NOT confirmed) - Loc of paracommanders of unknown str in BRIQUEVILLE area.

d. Rfts

(1) It is generally accepted that the largest conc of Gend in a posn to reinforce Gend in EVILLE was in the area KOLWEZI - JADOT - SHINKOLOBWE up to cease fire. Their exact present loc is not known. Most recent reports give Gend forces in JADOT area as approx 2.300. Taking the worst case this force can reinforce in EVILLE area with one bn, say in SEVEN SOURCES area in 3 HOURS by day or during the hours of darkness in one night. Move of a large force would entail a big tpt and adm problem and would not likely go undetected by our recce. Such a move would take at least two days to complete.

(2) Rumours and reports give EVILLE Gend a rft capability from Rhodesia especially in the form of arms and equipment and qualified military leaders. We have no exact info of such rfts. Rfts from Rhodesia can reinforce EVILLE in a shorter time than from JADOT area.

(3) Gend have a capability of reinforcing EVILLE from other areas in SOUTH KATANGA but do not present a threat as serious as those mentioned in (1) + (2) above.

(4) Reinforcement may be carried out by infiltration. In the present sit this is more likely than large scale tp mov, especially from RHODESIA.

(5) Gend can also be reinforced by tribes (not Lunda) from RHODESIA and other areas i.e. tribes fabouring MUNONGO. It is difficult to assess this rft militarily

e. Morale. The losses by Gend in recent fighting could have the following effects.

(1) A lowering of morale and discipline and less will to continue the fight.

(2) A more confused impression of UN MISSION which may divide Gend ORs into two categories.

(a) Hardening towards ONU.

(b) A Pro-ONU influence where the policy of UN towards white influence is understood.

(c) It is likely that morale of units in Jadotville where Gendarmerie had a succes is higher than in Eville area where their losses have been greater.

(3) It is significant that a number of officers who were trained in Belgium are not in favour of continued Gend resistance.

(4) There are reports also that Gend ORs are NOT acting in a disciplinary fashion much drinking Simba missconduct is the order.

f. Fighting ability and training.

(1) The average Gend soldier is NOT a good fighter and soon gets tired under pressure.

(2) In recent fighting Gend made no attack by aslt and at no time even attempted to close with UN in combat.

(3) Attacks were made by fire alone and even then fire effect was negligable. The Gend are inherently afraid to attack at night.

(4) Gend standard of training is NOT good.

(5) In the absence of sufficient white leaders coord of Gend in offensive action is NOT likely. To arrest white officers now again in Gendarmerie is essential.

(6) Even with addition of new leaders it would not be possible for

them to produce a coord military force in a short time.
(7) During recent fighting white Gend leaders had difficulty in "bribing" native soldiers into action.

g. Equipment. With the exception of some few armd cars anti-tank guns and medium mortars the Gend is in the main equipped with small arms. Armd cars and anti-tank guns were handled effectively during the recent fighting by white personnel. Gend mortars even though used did NOT have any great effect.

h. Air. The two Fouga aircraft created more damage to UN than any other weapon. Our movement was restricted, our reconnaissance was curtailed and our installations, such as the airport were endangered.

5. Police.

a. Policy at the commencement of Operation MORTHOR was to seek police coop with UN. During the actual fighting police actions were simply passive.

b. Since Cease Fire police have made serious efforts to cooperate with UN with particular reference to the refugee problem and in efforts to allow natives to return to normal living, such as, protection of workers between Communes and places of employment in the city.

c. Even though police are assisting in refugee work at the same time their presence is resented by the refugees. Police/UN patrolling is regarded by refugees as an indication of UN untrustworthiness. However, there is less trouble with the Jeunesse now since police moved in.

Our Forces

6. Str. Four bns, Swed, Irish, Gurkha and Dogra. The Swed Bn consists only of HQ Coy and two coys. The Irish Bn is minus one coy (plus) (prisoners at Jadotville and other places) leaving HQ coy and two coys (minus approx one pl). One coy of Gurkhas is still at Manono leaving HQ coy and three coys. The Dogra bn is complete (HQ coy and four coys)

7. Locs and Disposns

a. Swed Bn

(1) Staff coy and two coys - Swedish Refugee Camp

(2) Commitments entail three pls whole time minimum force for security of Refugee Camp. This leaves approx two pls to provide patrols, guards, escorts etc. The most the Swedish Bn could produce for a special task would be about one coy plus three APCs and sp by RCLs.

b. Irish Bn

(1) HQ coy and two coys (minus one pl) - One coy is permanently committed at the Tunnel. This leaves HQ coy and approx two pls to protect Refugee Camp and lines and provide for normal patrols, guards etc. The most that Irish Bn could produce for a special task would be about one pl plus six Armd Cars supported by six 81 mm Mortars and RCLs.

c. Dogra Bn. Its HQ at HILL FARM and its four coys disposed between JADOT Junc and AIRPORT. This bn must be prepared to produce a a strong bn res. Five Malayan Armd Cars are in support. Until rfts arrive this bn MUST be responsible for "JADOT JUNC" task.

d. Gurkha Bn.

(1) POST OFFICE. Two coys (less one coy HQ and one pl)

(2) KAT HQ area. One coy HQ plus one pl.

(3) TRANSMITTER. One coy HQ plus two pls.

(4) OTHER DUTIES. One pl
e.g. GDS

(5) This bn has a pl (4) of 3" Mortars with (sec) two at Transmitter.

(6) The most that Gurkhas can produce as res under present commitments is one pl, one sec 3" Mortars and possibly one det RCL.

8. Rfts.

a. During cease fire none permitted.

b. In the event of renewal of hostilities UN have the capability of reinforcing as follows.

c. One JAT Bn from LEO - by air - This bn would take about three days at least to complete move from time of departure.

d. Only one bn could be landed at EVILLE at a time.

e. If a second bn could be made available it would take at least a further three days - Ethiopian Bn has been mentioned.

f. Rft . Capability

(1) One Bn str less tpt and by eqpt, in 3 days.

(2) Two Bns less tpt and by eqpt in 7 days.

(3) The availabilty of aircraft for tpt is a factor which cannot be reliably considered.

(4) Elements of both bns will fly-in simultaneously in order to speed up settling-in (according to LEO policy)

g. Armd Cars.

(1) Five armd cars reported to be available from Sweden could be available in EVILLE within one day of resumption of hostilities, if aircraft are available.

(2) The complete squadron of Malayan Armd Cars could also be made available within one day of resumption of hostilities, if aircraft are available.

h. 7 B Aircraft. These could be made available within one day of resumption of hostilities when the necessary permission is granted. Four Ethiopian ftrs, four Swede ftrs and six Indian Canberra bombers with ACT att are promised on resumption of hostilities.

9. Morale and Discipline. Morale and discipline can be rated high. Recent activity has if anything increased efficiency and has made for greater coordination and cooperation.

10. Security, concentration etc. Since Cease Fire, efforts to tidy-up and concentrate units from an operational and administrative point of view have placed UN forces in a more stable posn than heretofore when units were more dispersed and coord was NOT so good. However, operation MORTHOR has left us with new security problems, such as, holding of POST OFFICE, TRANSMITTER and TUNNEL.

11. Comd and Control.

a. Even before RUMPUNCH there was the problem of Comd and Control. The Sector B staff was far too small to organise operational and intelligence work, particularly the latter which was more of an espionage nature than normal military combat intelligence. The bde staff could be likened to a tac HQ staff with the task of running a conglommerate bde, but with the responsibilities of command i.e. SOUTH KATANGA.

b. With the arrival of HQ KAT in EVILLE the set did NOT improve. The responsibility of the newly appointed Sector B HQ did not differ very much from that of HQ S KAT.

c. The reinforcement of the bde (Sector B) by Dogra and Gurkha bns increased the task of Sector B staff.

d. As in all sits where two HQ are located in the one area there is certain to be duplication of efforts and uncertainty in regard to command status. Under the latest system Comd are responsible for logistics whereas Sector B is purely operational with only a log staff for immediate op liaison and planning. Until all units and sub-units are aware of the new system confusion will prevail and coord will NOT exist. A clear understanding of policy in regard to comd and control is essential.

12. Courses

a. Enemy.

A. Resumption of harassing attacks on lines similar to recent fighting but with a little more coordination, fire sp determination and str. Resumption also of pschological warfare and sanctions.

B. Organised guerilla warfare carried out by white led Gend groups coord or uncoord with tribal attacks and white supporters for the purpose of wearing down and prolonging anti-UN ops. Objs of guerillas to incl raids on supplies, HQs and other installations also sabotage and sanctions.

C. Coord attacks with main effort to seize airport and secondary attacks to seize such objs as POST OFFICE, TUNNEL and CASTLE.

D. A, B or C supported by air attacks.

b. Own Courses.

A. Concentration of forces at present available in EVILLE to form a tight perimeter defence of the airport await reinforcements and build up supplies and tpt.

B. Hold present posns as firm bases from which quick raids would be made on Gend and other installations by mobile striking forces. Objs to be seized but not necessarily held. This course to be undertaken either with or without reinforcements.

C. Seizure and holding of all other important installations NOT already in hands of UN in EVILLE e.g. CAMP MASSART and other barracks, Rly Station. The limit to UN forces operations will be dictated by the str of reinforcements and operations may be undertaken in other areas in SECTOR B e.g. JADOTVILLE. The purpose of the course is to eventually destroy Gend resistance.

13. Analysis and comparison of Courses.

a) Course A is a last resort course. It however would be a suitable course if UN was forced by enemy action, such as, Enemy Course C to concentrate, await lifts and sups before resuming the offensive. In view of our shortage of transport it reduces the need for mobility. A sudden break Cease Fire by KATANGA. An unlikely course of action under present conditions and more unlikely still if reinforcements arrive.

b) Course B as the sit exist at present this seems the most reasonable course of action. It has the advantage of holding our relatively strong posns against even the worst case, that is, enemy adoption of his Course C. At the same time it includes an aggressiveness which is necessary to maintain our military dominance of the situation.

c) We are NOT in a position at present to undertake ops of the nature stated in our Course C. With the availability of the promised reinforcements Course C is a feasible Course of action and would place UN forces EVILLE in a position to deal with the enemy no matter what course he adopts.

14. Decision. That UN forces SECTOR B put into effect Course B whether the Cease Fire is broken by KATANGESE or UN. That when reinforcements as promised are made available and the situation demands it that Course C be put into effect.

15. Comd org.

a. The arrival of one or two new battalions will require consideration from the Comd and C & L aspect. There are a number of possible solutions. Battalions expected are Jats and Ethiopians.

The following Comd organisations may be considered.

b. ORG A

(1) Dogra and/or Gurkha bns under unified Comd for immediate def of airport under comd HQ KAT.

(2) Swede, Irish plus new bn/s as strong bde striking force capable of dealing with disturbances, refugees etc. within the Sector and under ~~Comd KAT COMD~~. SECTOR B.

c. ORG B Two bdes i.e.

(1) Complete Indian bde (3 bns)

(2) Remaining bns under Sector B

(3) HQ KAT to remain as COMD HQ

d. ORG C. HQ Sector B or Indian Bde HQ expanded and provided with the capability of commanding and controlling all bns in EVILLE area. KAT COMD HQ to remain attached.

Advantages and Disagvantages of Suggested Orgs.

16. ORG A

PRO

a. Does NOT require the establishment of a new HQ.

b. Command and control facilitated.

c. Clear-cut division of responsibilities with particular emphasis on airport defence.

CON

Difficulties in the operation of two HQ in such

a. Restricted area and possibility of duplication of effort particularly in regard to administration and logistics.

NOTE: The setting up of DOGRA BN alone as an independent airport garrison directly under comd HQ KAT is preferred to having two bns in the airport garrison.

17. ORG B

a. As for A above except that responsibility is divided in an organisational basis rather than in relation to specific tasks.

b. Better org than A from organisation point of view but not as good from division of responsibility.

c. Bde HQs already in existence.

18. ORG C

PRO

a. No change from present organisation.

b. Does NOT require setting up a new HQ.

CON

a. Has all the disadvantages of present org already referred to.

b. Would entail expansion of Bde HQ Staff.

c. A very large force for one HQ to command and control.

d. Does NOT cater for independent comd and ctl of airport.

19. Other Requirements.

Recce unit. Recent events highlighted the importance of having a recce unit preferably one with armd cars as the main equipment. Employment and equipment of this unit should be as follows

a. Reconnaissance of approaches to city

b. Nucleus of task forces e.g. mobile reserve and airport defence.

c. Provide escorts for evacuation of wounded.

d. This unit should be equipped with armd cars mounting a suitable anti-tank gun as main armament e.g. French PANHARD, British DAIMLER or SALADIN. It would be ideal but NOT enlikely necessary that some APCs be included in the Recce unit organisation.

e. In preference to decentralising Recce sub-units it is strongly recommended that the complete unit should be centralised at the highest level under the immediate control of HQ Sector B.

f. Swedish APCs are expected - these together with Malayan and Irish Armd Cars can provide a Recce unit almost immediately.

20. Mortars - infantry support weapons.

Recent fighting highlighted the advantages of mortars particularly their morale and harassing effect without having to commit troops and their case of handling. Infantry support weapons e.g. as armoured self-propelled guns would also have a similar effect.

Deployment of new bns.

21. ONE bn only as rft

a. If only one bn is sent to EVILLE as Rft it is suggested that it be located in the ROUSSEAU FARM - WHITE PIERS CROSS RDS area. The advantages are as follows:

1) Gives us control of CHARLIE ROUTE which ensures an alternative route between airport and Eville.

2) Strengthens the airport defs

3) Most control as a loc for reserves for employment in either airport or city.

4) Denies enemy close-in observation on attack positions relative to the airport.

5) Controls enemy movement from RUASHI towards city and airport.

6) In keeping with own policy of concentration.

b. An alternative suggestion is to locate one new battalion in the LIDO area. The advantage of holding this area will be given in a later paragraph. However, it is felt that the advantages of occupying the ROUSSEAU FARM area outweigh those for occupying LIDO.

22. TWO bns as rft

a. One bn to ROUSSEAU FARM - WHITE PIERS CROSS RDS AREA - advantages given above.

b. Second bn to either
(1) LIDO area or
(2) SABENA GUEST HO - OLD AIRFIELD area.

c. The advantages of having a bn in the LIDO area are as follows:

(1) It assists in the control of enemy movement particularly from the direction of RHODESIA.
(2) It could tie in with the CASTLE area which is somewhat isolated at present.
(3) A strong position in the event of further disturbances in the City giving UN control over a part of the City which at present is more or less outside our immediate control.
(4) Helps to complete a UN cordon of the entire white City.

d. The main disadvantage of occupying the LIDO is that it disperses our forces, but with six bns this dispersion could be accepted.

e. The advantages of having a bn in the SABENA GUEST HO - OLD AIRFIELD area are as follows

(1) Secures against a threat to AIRPORT or City from JADOT direction.
(2) Controls main airport road.
(3) Thickens up airport defences.
(4) On the side of concentration.
(5) Readily available for action in the City.

f. The main disadvantages are that it leaves us with nothing on the SOUTH side of the City and gives enemy freedom of movement in that direction with particular reference to movement from RHODESIA.

23. CONCLUSIONS

a. One bn is best located in the ROUSSEAU FARM - WHITE PIERS CROSS RDS area and given tasks as follows:

(1) Prepared to support DOGRA Bn
(2) Secure JADOT junction with a minimum of one Coy Group.
(3) Control area SOUTH of airport and CHARLIE Route.
(4) Provide main bde res.

b. The second bn is best located in the LIDO area and given tasks as follows:
(1) Prevent enemy movement from SOUTH
(2) Prepared to move approximately one coy group as a reserve task force any place in City area.

MAJOR
(S ROSÉN)
COS SECTOR B.

COL
(JONAS WAERN)
OC SECTOR B.

DISTRIBUTION	COPY NO
SWEDISH BN	1 - 2
IRISH BN	3 - 4
DOGRA BN	5 - 6
GURKHA BN	7 - 8
KATANGA COMMAND	9 -10
HQ ONUC LEO	11-12
SECTOR A	13
SECTOR C	14
FILE	15-16

PLAN FOR OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES.

OUTLINE PLAN

1. SWED BN

a) Secure Refugee Camp and lines and other security duties.	-	3 pls
b) Task force.	-	One Coy supported by three APCs and available RCLs.

2. IRISH BN

a) Secure Tunnel area	-	One Coy
b) Secure Refugee Camp and lines and other security duties.	-	One pl (plus)
c) Task force.	-	One pl, sp by six Armd Cars, one pl 81 mm Mors and RCLs

3. GURKHA BN

a. Post Office	-	Two Coys (less one Coy HQ and one pl)
b) Kat HQ	-	One Coy HQ (plus)
c) Transmitter	-	One Coy HQ plus two pls
d) Other Duties	-	One pl
e) Task force	-	Reinforced pl, sp by one sec 3 Mors and one RCL det

4. DOGRA BN — Bn HQ and four Coys

a) Airport def and initially until Rfts arrive "JADOT JUNC" task

b) Prepared to create a bde Res of at least half coy supported by Malayan armd cars when bde Res is committed. This emergency Res should be prepared to sp or reinforce task forces, Refugee camp or the Airport grn.

5. CONSIDERATIONS

In order to secure the Airport, Post Office, Tunnel, Hospital, Kat HQ, Transmitter and in addition secure Refugee Camp the bulk of our forces in Eville area would NOT be available for any form of offensive action.

An assessment of bn tasks reveals tha the most all bns can provide would be

a) Swede Bn - One Coy group, supported by three APCs and one det of RCLs.

b) Irish Bn - One strong pl group supported by five armd cars, one pl of 81 m m mortars (4) and one det RCL

c) Gurkha Bn - One strong pl group supported by one sec 3 in mors, one RCL det (mounted on an APC)

Note: In order to support the operations of these groups sectors will be allotted to each group within which they can draw on immediate support of own elements in static posns in the sector concerned.

6. Until Rfts arrive it is evident that our offensive capability is limited to three simultaneous tasks for three coy/pl seized groups.

7. With a further outbreak of hostilities the Jeunesse element are most likely to capitalise on the disturbed situation and reduced security guards. This calls for extra vigilance ofsecurity guards.

8. The incl of the JADOT JUNC task to DOGRA BN should be ONLY temporary until the arrival of Rfts.

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES
AU CONGO

UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION
IN THE CONGO

BOITE POSTALE 7248
LEOPOLDVILLE
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
CABLE : ONUC LEOPOLDVILLE

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL

26 September 1961

NOTE FOR THE FORCE COMMANDER

1. In view of the last experience in Katanga and in order to exploit to the maximum the capabilities of each contingent in the future, I suggest that the following redeployment of troops be considered:

   i. The whole Indian Independent Brigade in Elisabethville and surrounding area.

   ii. Swedish, Irish, Ghanaian and Ethiopian Battalions in North Katanga with a Brigade Headquarters in Alberville.

   iii. An adequate reserve should be kept in Elisabethville in order to give to the Commander the necessary flexibility to face any situation.

2. The above suggested redeployment of troops in Katanga has the following advantages and disadvantages.

   Advantages

   (a) Enables the Command to have an adequate strength in Elisabethville.

   (b) Enhances the capabilities of the Indian Independent Brigade used as a homogenous self-supporting unit in the most critical area, which is Elisabethville at this time.

   (c) Command and control problems will be alleviated to a certain extent at least in Elisabethville.

   (d) Logistical support in each area will be easier.

Disadvantages

(a) The use of Indian troops only in Elisabethville might create some sort of uneasiness among Europeans as well as Katangese civilian inhabitants.

(b) To carry out the above-mentioned redeployment of troops might create transport problems.

3. Conclusion

Considering the seriousness of our problem in Katanga at the present, I feel that the above-mentioned disadvantages are minor and thus the execution of the suggested plan should be considered.

Maj. Gen. IYASSU MENGESHA
Deputy Force Commander

ST TE NON-CONGOLESE OFFICERS AS ON 9 SEPT. 61

Srl No.	Details	Repatriated	Awaiting repatr.	Missing	Total
1	Belgian Regulars MINEF	150 (a)	52(b)	5	207
2	Belgian Volunteers	85	45	95(c)	225
3	French	3	7	11	21
4	British	-	2	4	6
5	Poles	2	7	1	10
6	Hungarians	1	1	2	4
7	Apatrides (Stateless)	1	2	-	3
8	Danish	-	-	1(d)	1
9	Portugese	-	-	2	2
10	Spaniards	1	-	-	1
11	German	2	-	-	2
12	Switzerland (Swiss)	1	-	1	2
13	Italian	1	1	8(e)	10
14	South African	-	2	2(f)	4
15	Grand Ducale (Luxemb.)	1	-	-	1
16	Netherland (Dutch)	2	-	3(g)	5
17	Greek	-	-	5	5
18	Rhodesian	-	2	-	2
	Total:	250	121	140	511

Remarks

(a) Incl 14 on leave in Belgian

(b) (i) 13 tech requested for by TSHOMBE

(ii) 11 Special cases

(iii) 4 in Kamina (iv) 12 consulate

(v) 4 will depart by train on 16 Sep 61

(c) Incl 2 disappeared from Kamina

(d) Possesses air ticket to return to Amsterdam

(e) Two with consulate going to Johannesburg

(f) 1 ticket for N Rodesia

(g) 1 has a ticket to Brussels

1 has a ticket to Cape town

Pouch No. 201

16. IX - 61

25 Sept. 1961

To: Mr. C.V. Narasimhan, Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs New York

From: Sture Linnér, Officer-in-Charge, United Nations Mission in the Congo, Léo

With further reference to my A-2144 of 14 September 1961, I have now received from our representative in E'ville a statement as of 9 September 1961 regarding the position of non-Congolese officers as shown on the attached table.

Encl.

OUTGOING CLEAR

MOST IMMEDIATE

To: HUNCHE New York

From: LINCER Leopoldville

Date: 20 September 1961

No: A-2231

Have just received following from Khiari at 17.00 Z :

Quote Have just signed with Pres Tshombe at 1745 local the following provisional agreement for a ceasefire,. Have transmitted to Force Commander, Mr. O'Brien, and others for immediate execution:

Projet d'accord provisoire

Considering it necessary and desirable to end immediately the hostilities between the UN and the Katangan Gendarmerie insisting that all efforts must be made to avoid further loss of life the delegations have discussed the provisional agreement to normalize relations between the UN and the Katangese. and in force 21 Sept 0000 hours. It is understood that this agreement is not definite until after approval by the Secretariat General.

1. Order immediate cease fire.

2. Cease fire effective 21 Sept 0000 hours throughout Katanga.

3. A mixed commission of four members having full power will be immediately established to control the clauses of this agreement and find the means permitting the restablishment of relations between the UN and Katangan authorities on a basis of mutual coordination.

4. No troop movements to reinforce troop positions or garrisons will be permitted. This limitation applies to all LUTTC arms, munitions and other implements.

5. The two parties will maintain their freedom for resupply of their troops under normal conditions.

6. Exchange of prisoners will be a responsibility of the commission named by article 3.

7. Agreement will be publicly announced simultaneously by UN and the Government of Katanga.

8. Signed by TSHOMBE AND KHIARI. Unquote.

CONFIDENTIAL

20 September 1

Dr Sture Linner, Officer in Charge
Force Commander

At Elisabethville yesterday, 19 Sep, a Gendarmerie officer prisoner was brought to the UN HQ. We briefly questioned him and then instructed that a detailed interrogation be conducted by three selected officers.

In the course of his replies to questions, he stated that the present Gendarmerie operations in Katanga were being planned and conducted from the Belgian Consulate by Belgians in civilian attire. In addition, he stated that no planning or direction of military operations as such were now being conducted from the Gendarmerie HQ proper.

This officer has undergone training in Belgium and he stated that while in general Congolese officers were not consulted on planning or operational matters, officers of his category who had undergone training in Belgium in particular were denied access to information concerning Gendarmerie operations. The name of this officer is 2/Lt KAVBO LENGH (or MINGH).

(Seán Mac Eoin) Lt-Gen

S E C R E T

MEMORANDUM

MIL INFO 5/B

23 Sep 61

Force Commander

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE OF POSSIBLE ANC THREAT OF INVASION OF KATANGA

1. POSSIBLE STRENGTH. Ten battalions could be made available for this operation: five belonging to the MOBUTU group and five to the LUNDULA group. Dispositions are shown on trace attached. The strength of each battalion varies and an average estimate is 600.

2. ARMAMENT AND MOBILITY. These two factors are that of a normal infantry battalion. However, the shortage of petrol in ORIENTALE and KIVU provinces will restrict mobility. General rate of advance is considered to be 15 miles per day by road.

3. LIKELY OBJECTIVE AND AXES OF ADVANCE. See trace attached. It is estimated that the final objective will be the triangle EVILLE-KAMINA-KOLWEZI which is considered to be the "heartland" of KATANGA.

4. ATTITUDE OF VARIOUS TRIBES THROUGH WHICH TROOPS MIGHT PASS. It is difficult to assess this factor before a more detailed study of tribal situation is carried out. It is neither believed that KALONJI troops will oppose MOBUTU's advance nor that BALUBAS in NORTH KATANGA will oppose STAN advance. In the KATANGESE territory MOBUTU troops may even be more acceptable than STAN troops. A possibility therefore exists that KATANGESE will choose the "lesser evil".

5. LOGISTICAL SUPPORT PROBLEMS. The basic problem is one of petrol and maintenance. Troops can live off the land for considerable length of time. Limited capability of supply by air exists.

6. It is considered that logistical factors will limit the length of time the troops can stay in the field.

.../2

S E C R E T

7. LEADERSHIP QUALITIES. MOBUTU's forces have more ex-FORCE PUBLIQUE personnel; however, he is NOT advised by professional officers. STAN forces have fewer trained military personnel but LUNDULA is advised by outside advisors. Therefore, higher leadership may appear to be better in STAN group while unit leadership should be better in the MOBUTU group.

8. SINGULAR OR COMBINED EFFORT. The moves of the two groups will be co-ordinated politically by the Central Government, but tactical co-ordination is unlikely for two reasons:

a. Lack of staff capability and co-ordination;

b. Professional and political rivalry.

For these reasons it is considered likely that both advances will go in the direction of the "heartland" rather than aiming at a position of consolidation in the NORTH-WESTERN part of KATANGA.

(N Borchgrevink)
Lt-Col
Chief of Military Information

Distribution:

For Information:

Acting Chief of Staff
Chief Military Operations
Chief Air Operations
Chief Logistics

SECRET

ANC THREAT TO KATANGA





ORM

SEP -61

COLOUR CODE

BLUE ——MOBUTU
RED ——LUNDULA

SECRET

19 September 1961

1030/1914

Subject: Information Officer

Special Rep - UN Congo

Sir,

On account of the operations in Katanga, I would ask you kindly to attach an ANC officer to the UN Contingent.

This is a matter of priority.

Thanking you in advance etc.

PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER
OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

C. ADOULA

ROUTING SLIP

TO

Force Commander

	APPROVAL		NOTE AND RETURN
	SEE ME, PLEASE		YOUR COMMENTS
	YOUR SIGNATURE		YOUR INFORMATION
	NOTE AND FILE		FOR ACTION

What are your views on this please.

DATE	FROM
27 IX	

REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO

CABINET DU

MINISTRE DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE

Léopoldville, le 19 septembre 1961.

N° 1030/1914

Pour le 25.IX.

Objet:

Officier de renseignement

A Monsieur le Représentant de
l' Organisation des Nations Unies au
Congo
Léopoldville

Monsieur le Représentant,

Dans le cadre des opérations au Katanga, je vous demanderais de bien vouloir attacher un officier de l'A.N.C. au contingent de l'O.N.U.-

Vous voudrez donc bien réserver à la présente le bénéfice de la priorité.

En vous remerciant à l'avance, je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Représentant, l'assurance de ma haute considération.-

LE PREMIER MINISTRE & MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE

REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
CABINET DU
PREMIER MINISTRE

C. ADOULA

CALC & EO

SECRET

Copy No. 13
HQ Sec B
Kat Comd
12 Sept 61

Operation Order No 6 - Operation Morthor

Map Ref: Katanga 1:1.000.000
Eville 1:20.000

SITUATION

1. Congolese Force:

a. Gendarmerie. Discipline is not too good. They are apprehensive of UN but are NOT acquainted with or clear on UN mission. They are loyal to TSHOMBE as President and can be induced to co-operate with UN.
If assured of TSHOMBE's continued status they will follow him and a clash with UN can be avoided.

b. Police Forces. At present Police under SAPWE are cooperating. SAPWE, however, is an obedient servant of MUNONGO. He is religious and honest but not very clever. The real Chief of Police is probably Mr. SEGGERS. SEGGERS main interest probably is the protection of whites. If MUNONGO is arrested SAPWE and SEGGERS may be willing to cooperate.

c. African Population, are very susceptible to propaganda. They respect TSHOMBE and will probably follow him. If TSHOMBE should be unable to speak to or be seen by local population there is the danger of rumours spreading regarding his safety, which might lead to disturbances.

d. UN Refugees. These people have sought UN protection against the lawless arrest orders recently issued by MUNONGO and implemented by SURETÉ personnel. In some cases police have been ordered to make arrests. Refugees are opposed to KATANGESE authorities. In the event of disturbances in EVILLE or if NOT properly guarded tribal fighting might take place. Political leaders amongst refugees might induce refugees to take part in disturbances against KATANGESE.

e. Simultaneous with the military operation outlined in this order the following will take place.

a. TSHOMBE will be informed of the UN mission and requested to cooperate.

b. SAPWE and SEGGERS will be requested to cooperate and will be informed of the arrest of MUNONGO.

c. Col MUKE will be informed that UN action is against MUNONGO, SURETÉ etc and NOT against TSHOMBE, Gendarmerie and Police.

MISSION

2. UN forces in the EVILLE area will maintain law and order in the EVILLE area by seizing, holding and controlling Radio Installations and Post Office and by taking into UN custody personnel who are responsible for disturbances of the peace in KATANGA.

EXECUTION

3. General Outline. Under cover of darkness the following actions will take place and continue if necessary into daylight.

a. Seizing of Radio installations and Post Office.

b. Arrest of Minister of Interior MUNONGO.

c. Arrest of Minister for Information, Mr SAMELENGE and white Conseillers in the Ministry.

d. Arrest of Minister for Finance, Mr KIBWE.

e. Arrest of Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr KIMBA.

f. Arrest of African Chiefs of SURETÉ (Two) and all whites working there.

g. Arrest of any whites who resist.

4. 12 SWED BATTALION GROUP

a. Troops. Swed Battalion less guards on refugee camp and other installations and with under command two Irish Armoured Cars.

b. Tasks.

(1) Seize, hold and control Radio transmitter on Route de le KILOBELOBE.

(2) Take into UN custody Minister of Interior Mr. MUNONGO.

(3) Seize officers of Sureté, take over files and take into cutody the African chiefs (two) and all whites working there.

5 35 IRISH BATTALION GROUP.

a. Troops. Two Rifle Companies
HQ Coy
Three Armoured Cars

b. Tasks

(1) Seize, hold and control Radio station at College St FRANCOIS.

(2) Take into UN custody Minister for Finance, Mr KIBWE. Initial effort at his residence at Ave DROOGMANS 835. Minister's Bureau is at Corner of Ave KAMBOVE and WANGERMÉE 1492.

(3) Seize, hold and be prepared to block Railway Tunnel.

(4) Send one Section of MMGs to Italian Hospital.

(5) Retain at least one platoon as reserve in area ALBERT PARK as part brigade reserve prepared to take into UN custody Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr KIMBA (Minister's residence is at Ave DELVIN No 4) or perform any other brigade task.

(6) Secure Refugee Camps at FACTORY and own lines.

(7) Arrange for the local security of VERFAILLES' garage.

6. DOGRA BATTALION GROUP

a. Troops. Battalion(less one company at AIRPORT)and with under command three Irish Armoured Cars and one Swedish APC.

b. Tasks.

(1) Seize, hold and control EVILLE Post Office and Radio installations in its vicinity.

(2) Seize, hold and control Radio KATANGA studios.

(3) Be prepared to take into UN custody Minister for Information Mr SAMELENGE (Ave Des CHUTES 918) on orders.

c. Commander. As appointed by OC Dogra Battalion.

7. AIRPORT GROUP

a. Troops. One company Dogra Battalion
One company Gurkha Battalion

b. Tasks.

(1) Secure EVILLE airport.

(2) Secure the landing and departure of UN aircraft.

(3) Provide personnel and accomodation at SABENA VILLAS for the custody of arrested personnel.

(4) Provide escorts to airport from SABENA VILLAS as required.

c. Commander. OC Dogra Battalion.

8. Refugee Camp Group.

a. Troops. Swedish troops as arranged by OC Swedish Battalion.
One Gurkha Company less one platoon.

b. Tasks. Secure Swedish Refugee Camp.

c. Commander. Major Forslund.

9. GURKHA BATTALION.

a. Troops. Less one company at AIRPORT and company (minus) at Refugee Camp (Swedish).

b. Tasks.

(1) One platoon to defence KATANGA Command HQ at CASTLE.

(2) One section of MMGs to defence of Indian Supply Depot.

(3) Brigade Reserve at LIDO.

10. Other units. As per Operation RUMPUNCH and as outlined in previous paragraphs.

11. Coordinating Instructions.

a. All units concerned will arrange transportation to SABENA VILLAS of persons taken into UN custody.

b. Lt Col EGGE will initially act as Liaison Officer to Gendarmerie and will later take charge of arrested persons at the AIRPORT.

c. Lt von Bayer will contact Mr SAPWE by telephone and inform him of the situation and make the necessary reassurances at H-2.

d. Interpreters alloted as follows:

(1) Swedish Battalion - own interpreters.

(2) Irish Battalion - own civilian interpreter and one Swedish OR.

(3) Dogra Battalion Lt Gisle
Lt Danckert
WO Thurdin

(4) Gurkha Battalion - own interpreters

Interpreters will report to units by 1600 hrs 12 Sept

e. Hhr. 0400 hrs 13 Sept 61

f. Signal Technicians. As arranged

g. On completion of initial tasks Swedish, Irish and Dogra batallions will rally transport and personnel not required at ALBERT PARK.

h. Security. All reconnaissance, planning, communications etc prior to Hhr will be carried out with the utmost security.

ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

12. Transport For allotment and priority see ANNX A.

13. Armoured Cars.

IRISH - Three to Irish Batallion
Three to Dogra Batallion
Two to Swedish Batallion

SWEDISH - One to OC Sed B
One to Swedish Batallion
One to Dogra Batallion

14. Rations and Feeding. Unit arrangements.

15. Ammunition. 1st line will be carried and replenished by units.

16. Medical. As for PLAN B (attached)

17. Wire and Road block material. Requirements to be drawn from Swedish Batallion.

COMMUNICATIONS

18. HQ SECTOR B. SABENA VILLAS. Opens at 0330 hrs 13 Sept.

19. Tactical HQ (mobile). ALBERT PARK initially.

20. Signals. See ANNX B attached. Wrls silence on brigade net only up to 0355 hrs 13 Sept

ACKNOWLEDGE

AUTHENTICATION

COL
(J WABRN)
OC SEC B
KAT COMD

MAJOR
(S ROSÉN)
COS SEC B KAT COMD

ANNXS.

ANNX A - TRANSPORT
ANNX B - SIGNALS
ANNX C - OPS SKETCH
PLAN B - MEDICAL

DISTRIBUTION:	Copy No
O/C IRISH BN	1
O/C SWED BN	2
O/C DOGRA BN	3
O/C GURKHA BN	4
O/C ITALIAN HOSP	5
O/C INDIAN SIGNALS	6
O/C INDIAN SUPPLY	7
O/C SECT B KAT	8
O/C SECT A KAT	9
O/C SECT C KAT	10
O/C KAT COMMAND	11
ONUC REPR EVILLE	12
HQ ONUC LEO	13
FILE	14-15
SPARES	16-20

ANNX A

Transport Plan for Operation ORDER No 6

OPERATION MORTHOR

1. Means of transport will be supplied by batallions from own resources with the following exceptions:

   a. Swed Bn to be reinforced by one truck 3 ton ex Italian Hospital. Vehicle to report at Swed Bn HQ at 1700 hrs.

   b. Irish Bn to be reinforced by one truck 3 ton ex Ind Supply Depot. Vehicle to report at Irish Bn HQ /Farm Leopold/ at 1600 hrs.

   c. Dogra Bn to be reinforced by one truck 3 ton ex Ind Supply Depot and two jeeps 1/2 ton and one pick up ex Irish Bn. Vehicles to report at the farm west of the landingground at 1630 hrs.

   d. Gurkha Bn is already supplied with two trucks 5 ton ex Brigade reserve.

2. Irish and Swed armoured cars to be disposed of according to special orders.

3. After initial operation has been completed unrequired transport should as soon as possible move to Albert Park and report to Brigade Tactical HQ.

OPERATION MORTHOR

BRIGADE NET

ANNX F TO OPER[illegible]

ORDER NO 6

Kanaler
Ra 120 52 (57)
Ra 105 39,3 (39,8)

Frekv
Ra 200 6560 (6360)



Kan[illegible] 38,5 (49,6)

Appendix 2 to Annex A and B to OPERATION INSTRUCTION N° 1

Medical Capabilities and Plan

Medical resources of UN Forces Sector B, Kat Comd

1. The medical resources of UN Forces Sec B KAT COMD are:-

   a. The Italian hospital - 9 doctors and 50 beds, capable of being expanded to 80 beds.

   b. An emergency hospital can be established in the Swedish Camp on order. (In the Swedish Camp there is a depot of 20 beds and drugs, and in the Italian Camp there is equipment for an operating theatre. Three Italian doctors can be transferred to the emergency hospital when required.)

   c. The sick-bay at present in the Swedish Camp can take 5 patients.

   d. The doctors of Irish and Swedish Bn with equipment and medical orderlies are capable of erecting four Regimental Aid Posts - three in Irish and one in Swedish Bn.

   e. The Dutch Hygiene Team - two very competent medical WOs.

   f. Senior Medical Staff Officer of HQ KAT with one medical service officer.

Medical Plan A

2. On receipt of codewords for "EMERGENCY - PLAN A":

   a. Italian hospital will act according to ANNEX A TO OPERATION INSTR N° 1, point 9. As a principle the hospital should not be moved (see defence plan of Italian hosp).

   b. Sick-bay in Swedish Camp without doctor will be organised to receive casualties. Dutch hygiene team will assist.

   c. Regimental Aid Posts - in accordance with bn medical plans.

   d. Contact will be established between COS, HQ Sector B and Medical Staff Sector B.

3. Anticipated losses

UNIT	Losses in wounded per day	To be evacuated
35 Irish bn (631 all ranks)	5%	4%
12 Swedish bn (471 all ranks)	5%	4%

The requirements for medical treatment should be well covered (see medical resources)

4. Transport

a. The chief problem will be transport of casualties.

b. Means of transport

(i) from the lines to aid posts: stretchers, cars, armoured cars, ambulance jeeps.

(ii) From aid posts to hospitals: ambulance, cars, armoured cars, helicopters and airplanes.

c. Means of transport depend upon tactical situation, which can vary between
(1) minor incidents with the roads free and
(2) complete isolation of units with no opportunity of evacuating casualties by road.
The aid posts may have to hold patients until the roads can be used for evacuation. The position of the aid posts should therefore be given great consideration. Helicopter transport can be operated from aid posts, especially from the airport, and to the Italian Hospital. From the airport it is also possible to evacuate patients to Kamina Base Hospital. Such evacuation will take two hours. Request for helicopter or air transport will be arranged by COS, HQ Sector B.

Medical Plan B

5. On receipt of codewords for "EMERGENCY - PLAN B":
Action will be as for Medical Plan A, points 2 a-d.

6. Anticipated losses

As for Medical Plan A, point 3, and in addition civilian casualties, whites and Congolese.

7. Transport

a. For Medical Plan B the chief problem will also be transport - not only of UN casualties, but also of local white and Congolese population. As far as possible UN will take care of all civilian casualties that seek or are brought to UN aid stations. In addition contact will be made with the white population in E-ville for planning and cooperation purposes.

b. Means of transport : stretchers, ambulances, cars, armoured cars.

c. The choice of transport depends on the tactical situation, which can vary between a local riot with streets open for transport, and regular street-fighting with no opportunity for transport to get through. The aid posts may thus be forced to keep casualties for some time, and their positions therefore must be chosen with care. A well-equipped aid post will be established by Irish bn in the neighbourhood of Institute Marie-José.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : DR. LINNER, GEN. MACEOIN

FROM : SECGEN

DATE : 12 Sept 61

NO : 6300 (ETATPRIORITE)

Reference ONUC 5122 and our 6269. Relatively, Katanga remains most important area. Therefore, consideration should be given to earmarking reserves that can be moved there urgently. With move of Gurkas out of North Katanga question of further withdrawals from there no longer arises Furthermore, on basis of reasons given we agree that Malayans should be left in Kivu for the present. This would reduce the choice of reserves for Katanga to the 3rd Battalion in Orientale. Incidentally, it is understood that withdrawal of an Ethiopian battalion is not likely to take place before first week of November.

With Gizenga in Leo only Lundulas future remains unresolved. Chances of gun running are considerably less now in Orientale whereas they continue to remain alive in South Katanga particularly in Kolwezi area. It would therefore be more appropriate to locate troops in South Katanga in preference to Eastern Orientale.

During my visit to Leo we should take up the future of the Belgian bases with the Congolese government. We do realise that once combat troops return to Matadi, and we agree they should be Nigerians, there will be insufficient troops available for Kitona as well. We should therefore negotiate reduction of UN commitments that should preferably not be beyond minimal custodian responsibilities. In this connection, employment of a small Nigerian police detachment should be examined.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : DR. LINNER, GEN. MACEOIN

FROM : S COHEN

DATE : 12 Sept 61

NO : 6300 (STATPRIORITY)

Reference ONUC 5122 and our 6269. Relatively, Katanga remains most important area. Therefore, consideration should be given to earmarking reserves that can be moved there urgently. With move of Gurkas out of North Katanga question of further withdrawals from there no longer arises. Furthermore, on basis of reasons given we agree that Malayans should be left in Kivu for the present. This would reduce the choice of reserves for Katanga to the 3rd Battalion in Orientale. Incidentally, it is understood that withdrawal of an Ethiopian battalion is not likely to take place before first week of November.

With Gizenga in Leo only Lundulas future remains unresolved. Chances of gun running are considerably less now in Orientale whereas they continue to remain alive in South Katanga particularly in Kolwezi area. It would therefore be more appropriate to locate troops in South Katanga in preference to Eastern Orientale.

During my visit to Leo we should take up the future of the Belgian bases with the Congolese government. We do realize that once combat troops return to Matadi, and we agree they should be Nigerians, there will be insufficient troops available for Kitona as well. We should therefore negotiate reduction of UN commitments that should preferably not be beyond minimal custodian responsibilities. In this connection, employment of a small Nigerian police detachment should be examined.

PRIORITY

1961 SEP 11 AM 8:32
O.N.U.C.

CUG 003

SSS CUA

DE CUG 003/011

FM 1 GHANA

TO HQ ONUC LEO

INFO ZEN/ HQ SECTOR

BT

4547

UNCLAS 1055/G FOR GEN MACOEIN FROM ANKRAH. YOUR 11009 OF 102335B FULLY APPRECIATED . IMPLEMENTATION OF PLAN WILL MAKE MY PASNS VERY DANGEROUS AND VUNERABLE. STRENGTHS AT LOCATIONS WILL BE LESS THEN GEN-DARM AND POLICE. MY PROBLEMS NEED STUDY ON SPOT. RETURN OF CI-VILIAN POPULATION COMPLICATES ISSUE. REGRET CANNOTNCOMPLY UNTPU I HAVE YEEN YOU

BT

CFN 1055 11009 102335

011/0810Z SEP CUG

ONUC HQ In

Serial Number

For Action : C

As Info : C

M 4 6

M/C

NNNN

DRAFT

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: SECGEN
FROM: LINNER MACEOIN
DATE: 8 SEPTEMBER 1961
NO: ONUC

Referencr your 6210.

1. It is the intention if necessary to move the Gurkha Battalion to Elisabethville. This would allow us to move some Swedish or Irish to Jadotville or Kolwezi, but it must be kept in mind that Elisabethville is the key centre and therefore must be held in strength. The Swedish group at present in Kitona is 182 strong and any reduction in this strength would be an unacceptable risk. It would be much better to evacuate Kitona and hand it over to the Congolese. The establishment of a garrison in Bunia which has taken place within the last few days is necessary to prevent any attempt to fly in arms via the airfield there. When we did not have troops in Bunia there were constant reports of such traffic and by reason of the fact that we had no troops on the ground there we were not in a position to verify or disclaim such reports. The same argument holds good for Paulis. Therefore, we consider that a battalion is essential in this North Orientale area for some time. Any reduction in the strength in North Katanga as suggested by you again is unacceptable at this stage as there is always the possibility of Stanleyville infiltration into North Katanga. The only alternative to reinforcing Elisabethville with Indian troops is to use the Ethiopian Battalion from Kabalo for this purpose. We considere, however, that the effect of moving the Gurkhas to Elisabethville will in the end achieve our objective in respect of any political propaganda drawbacks there might be.

DRAFT

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: SECGEN

FROM: LINNER MACEOIN

DATE: 8 SEPTEMBER 1961

NO: ONUC

Referencr your 6210.

1. ~~It is the intention if necessary to move~~ We are now moving the Gurkha Battalion to Elisabethville on 9th. This would allow us to move some Swedish or Irish to Jadotville or Kolwezi if necessary but it must be kept in mind that Elisabethville is the key centre and therefore must be held in strength. The Swedish group at present in Kitona is 182 strong and any reduction in this strength would be an unacceptable risk. It would be much better to evacuate Kitona and hand it over to the Congolese. The establishment of a garrison in Bunia which has taken place within the last few days is necessary to prevent any attempt to fly in arms via the airfield there. When we did not have troops in Bunia there were constant reports of such traffic and by reason of the fact that we had no troops on the ground there we were not in a position to verify or disclaim such reports. The same argument holds good for Paulis. Therefore, we consider that a battalion is essential in this North Orientale area for some time. Any reduction in the strength in North Katanga as suggested by you again is unacceptable ~~xxxx~~ at this stage as there is always the possibility of Stanleyville infiltration into North Katanga. The only alternative to reinforcing Elisabethville with Indian troops is to use the Ethiopian Battalion from Kabalo for this purpose. We considera, however, that the effect of moving the Gurkhas to reinforce Elisabethville when necessary will in the end achieve our objective irrespective ~~in respect~~ of any political propaganda drawbacks there might be.

which of course will require to be replaced by Indian or other troops.

X going home

XX contribution

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : DR. LINNER, GEN. MACEOIN
FROM : SECGEN
DATE : 7 Sept 61
NO : 6210

Further to our 6181. Would additional battalion in Eville and something of approximate size in Jadotville and Kolwezi be useful back-stop? If so it is for you to decide on how troops would best be redeployed. Situation in Leo may perhaps now permit reduction of garrison in Kitona to a company and in Leo to 2 Battalions. If so consideration might be given to moving Swedish unit to Kolwezi and Jadotville with a company of Nigerians relieving them in Kitona. How important is it to maintain garrison in Bunia? Is it feasible to remove a battalion from Orientale? Might a battalion also be withdrawn from North Katanga at this time?

Psychological reaction to a reinforcement in South Katanga could be important. In our view reinforcements for Eville should be neither European nor Indian. Malayans would be very suitable although we realise they would have to be relieved first. endit.

cc. Linner, Maceoin

PRIORITY

MOST IMMEDIATE

To : Linner
From : SecGen New York.
Date : 7 Sept. 1961.
No. 6189

SECRET

For your information and, use in proper context, I give you key argument as used to delegations yesterday.

Theoritically we face four alternative developments .

1. Tshombe accepts invitation and cooperates with central government, with the implication that whatever special status may be achieved for Katanga would be established with in the constitutional framework and as a result of negotiations in constitutional form of the problem on new loi fondamentale; This would save Tshombe personally, although perhaps not all of his collaborators, and it would give Katanga the greatest degree of freedom that in the long run could be politically viable.

2. UN has to resort to "drastic measures", which increasingly would lead us to a kind of take-over of controls in various respects in Katanga, entirely against our wishes and with obvious objections in viewof UN principles as we wish to maintain them; I is only because of the inacceptability of alternatives 3 and 4, that we, in case of lack of positive developments under alternative one, would have to assume responsibility for such aye policy.

3. In view of general political significance of Katanga , as evidenced in last year's developments, the central government willhave to bow to pressures from the more extreme nationalists and try ANC operation against Katanga. Although in strict legal sense not a civil war action, it would in practice mean civil war with all the consequences in direction of spreading of conflict, sufferings for the people and sharp drop in prestige of UN in all directions.

4. The conservative elements resist nationalist efforts according to alternative 3, and this leads to a breakdown of the constitutional government of the character, although not in the form, of last year's break-up of the central government. Paras 3 and 4 are alternatives which must be squarely rejected,the only development which the UN can envisage is along the lines of 1 and 2 with the organisation being pushed further and further in direction of 2, if no evolution according to 1 takes place, and 3 and 4 represent a realistic threat.

./.

contd from 6189.

My conclusions were that the governments approached will have a major interest in strongly supporting a development to 1, but should anticipate developments according to 2, and for that reason assume the responsibilities for what we have to do if they did not help in direction of 1.

The analysis was recognised as realistic, and it is of special importance that British Ambassador did not raise any objection. For the British, who of course have to take into account the Katanga lobby in parliament, the essential thing seems to be that we act in a way which does not deprive Tshombe of his legitimate legal status and, to all possible extent, makes it easier for him to act on constitutional assumptions and within constitutional framework. They are emphatic in not recognising secession contrary to the constitution on Tshombe as chief of an independent stae with a position as such which it is our duty to respect. -

OUTGOING CODE

PRIORITY

Kal

To: O'Brien E'ville
From: Linnér Léopoldville
Date: 6 Sept. 1961
No. : EV- 418

1. In his 6149 SecGen advises us:
Quote Belgian mission here expresses view that it would be most helpful in present situation if we could delay departure of Belgian doctors and chaplains in Katanga Gendarmerie. I feel that good case can be made for doctors, as probably quick replacement from our side in their case is difficult. Chaplains may by some be considered a luxury and also from other viewpoints case has weaknesses, but I feel that matter should be considered on individual basis. In both cases we must leave decision to you in light of your greater knowledge but taking into account views transmitted by Belgians.
2. Re Katanga we note todays ticker news re assembly and demonstration. Neither development seems very impressive as result of certainly very strong background pressures. Main thing seems to be to be to keep Gendarmerie out of politics which should be possible with proper treatment. My feeling is that this is a moment in the Katanga revolution where best policy is to remain strong but to sit tight and let the medicine do its work without, if possible, new injections. Unquote

XX Your early comments appreciated.
3. Obviously para 2 above was sent before receipt by SecGen of our A-2081 2082 given by hand to Force Commander today for delivery through Raja, to you.

JP
cc: Force Commander

S E C R E T

Copy No.
HQ Sector B
Katanga Command
27 AUG 1961

OPERATION ORDER NO. 3.

MAP REFERENCE: KATANGA 1:1.000.000
EVILLE 1:20.000

OPERATION HUM PUNCH

SITUATION

1. Operation HUM PUNCH will take place simultaneously in all sectors of KATANGA Command.

2. Simultaneous with the military operation outlined in this order the following will take place:

   a. President Tshombe will be informed of UN Mission

   b. Mr. Sapwe, Police Commissioner will be asked to co-operate and if he desists he will be informed of the consequences.

   c. O/C Gendarmerie will be informed of UN Mission to arrest and expel white officers and mercenaries from KATANGA but will be told that there is no intention of disarming the gendarmerie. He will be asked to co-operate with UN in the maintenance of peace.

3. Location of Gendarmerie and Police Camps. As per verbal briefing.

MISSION

4. UN forces in the EVILLE area will implement the security council Resolution of 21st Feb 1961 by taking into custody and expelling white officers and mercenaries of the Gendarmerie.

EXECUTION

5. General Outline Plan B as already issued plus modifications outlined below.

6. Gendarmerie HQ Group - motorized

   a. Troops: A Coy 35 IRISH BN
   3 APC's SWEDISH BN
   2 ARMOURED CARS IRISH BN

   b. Col Waern O/C SECTOR B will accompany this group.

c. Tasks:

(1) Seize and hold gendarmerie HQ, disarm and take into custody white officers and mercenaries.

(2) Arrange documentation and transport to AIRPORT

d. Commander: Comdt. P. Quinlan.

7. 12 SWEDISH BN Group - motorised.

a. Troops: 1 COY SWED BN
3 COY SWED BN
HQ COY SWED BN

b. Tasks: As per Plan B and in addition seize, hold and control radio installation (transmitter) on Route de la KILOBELOBE.

c. Commander: Major Mide.

8. Group McNamee (Part motorised).

a. Troops: C Coy IRISH BN
HQ Coy IRISH BN
Five Armoured Cars IRISH BN

b. Tasks:

(1) Cordon off area of New Hospital and take into custody white officers living there.

(2) Arrange documentation and transport to AIRFIELD.

(3) Be prepared to move to JADOTVILLE JUNCTION and prevent if necessary any gendarmerie movement from that direction.

c. Commander: Lt. Col. McNamee.

9. AIRPORT GROUP

a. Troops: B Coy IRISH BN
A Coy DOGRA BN
One Section ARMOURED CARS - IRISH BN

b. Tasks: Secure ELVILLE AIRPORT in accordance with PLAN A for AIRPORT and SABENA VILLAS companies.

c. Commander: Comdt. T.A. McMahon.

10. DOGRA BATTALION (less one coy)

a. Tasks:

(1) One coy seize hold and control ELVILLE POST OFFICE.

(2) One coy seize and hold RADIO KATANGA INSTALLATIONS except Radio Transmitter at Route de la KILOBELOBE

b. Commander: Major SUKHDIAL SINGH.

11. Indian Signals Detachment - As for PLAN B.

12. Canadian Signals Detachment - As for PLAN B.

13. Indian Supply Detachment - As for PLAN B.

14. Italian Hospital - As for PLAN B.

15. Co-ordinating Instructions

a. D DAY - 28th AUGUST

b. H HOUR - 05.00

c. Security of Headquarters. Unit responsibility.

d. Guides. Guides from Swedish Bn will report to Dogra Bn at 2359 hrs on 27 AUG

ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

16. a. Rations and feeding arrangements: By unit arrangements.

b. Transport - See ANNX A attached.

c. Ammunition - 1st Line will be carried and replenishment by unit arrangement.

d. MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS: As for PLAN B.

COMMUNICATIONS

17. SECTOR B HQ - SABENA VILLAS

18. SIGNALS - See ANNX B attached.

Ack.

AUTHENTICATION

_____ MAJOR
(S. ROSEN)
COS SEC B

_____ COL
(J. SAERN)
OC SEC B

SECRET

OUTGOING CODE

PRIORITY

To: SecGen New York
From: Khiary, McKeis-Leopoldville
Date: 22 Aug. 1961
No. : A- 1981 1982

Votre 5650.

1. Nous avons jusqu'à maintenant essayé de résoudre le problème katangais, y compris le retrait de la Gendarmerie katangaise du nord de la province, en encourageant Tshombé à faire lui-même les gestes nécessaires qui lui auraient permis de normaliser sa situation avec le Gouvernement Central sans perdre la face: (mes télégrammes A-1934 et A-1954). Malheureusement, Tshombé a laissé toujours échapper les occasions qui lui étaient offertes. Apparemment, il interprète le relâchement temporaire comme un signe de manque de détermination de notre part, et a raffermi ses positions en devenant plus intraitable. Son voyage dans les régions des Baluba en est une nouvelle preuve. Cela peut porter un préjudice grave à la position des éléments modérés dans le Gouvernement Adoula et jouer en faveur des extrémistes. Ces raisons, ainsi que notre intérêt de libérer aussitôt que possible nos troupes qui se trouvent immobilisées au Katanga, appellent une action urgente et énergique de notre part, suivant les instructions dans votre 5650.

2. Adoula a soulevé la question du Katanga dès son retour de Stanleyville. Lui-même ne veut pas d'effusion de sang et favorise une solution pacifique avec l'assistance de l'ONUC, mais le groupe de Stanleyville insiste pour une action militaire. Adoula est tout à fait d'accord avec moi qu'une telle action par des troupes mal disciplinées et peu entraînées pourrait être désastreuse pour le prestige du Gouvernement, et nous continuerons au cours de discussions officieuses et confidentielles d'étouffer toute intention d'un recours à la force. Mais aux Katangais il faudrait, pour

.../...

des raisons psychologiques, donner l'impression que nous sommes prêts à appuyer le Gouvernement central et que la seule façon pour eux de se tirer d'affaire sera d'obtenir un compromis avec le Gouvernement central. A mon avis, il faut absolument que nous présentions une façade dure et ferme si nous voulons éviter le développement d'une situation où le recours à la force deviendra la seule possibilité.

3. Aujourd'hui, après une réunion du Conseil des Ministres, Adoula m'a envoyé la lettre suivante: " Monsieur le Chargé de Mission,

J'ai l'honneur de me référer à l'échange de lettres qui a eu lieu entre le Secrétaire Général et moi-même les 10 et 13 Août courant, par lequel j'ai demandé - et le Secrétaire Général a confirmé - que toute aide et tout appui que les Nations Unies sont en mesure d'apporter au Congo dans les limites de leur mandat, seraient fournis exclusivement au Gouvernement Central de la République que j'ai l'honneur de présider. J'ai plus particulièrement en vue l'assistance que les Nations Unies pourraient donner à mon Gouvernement pour assurer le maintien de la paix et de l'ordre public sur toute l'étendue du territoire de la République du Congo.

Dans ce domaine, le problème qui se pose avec la plus grande urgence est celui de mettre fin aux activités agressives de la Gendarmerie katangaise dans le nord de cette Province. Ces activités qui causent non seulement d'incessantes souffrances aux populations de cette région mais empêchent également tout redressement économique du pays, sont le seul fait d'officiers étrangers qui commandent les unités de cette gendarmerie, et des autres mercenaires. C'est pourquoi mon Gouvernement, se référant au paragraphe A-2 de la Résolution du Conseil de Sécurité du 21 Février 1961, serait très désireux que les Nations Unies prennent le plus rapidement possible des dispositions pour assurer l'évacuation de ces officiers étrangers et mercenaires qui se trouvent encore parmi les forces armées opérant au Katanga, et notamment parmi les groupes mobiles de la Gendarmerie qui sont actuellement déployés dans le nord du Katanga et qui continuent à se livrer à des actes agressifs contre les habitants de cette région.

.../...

Afin que la paix et la sécurité reviennent dans cette partie du pays, il serait utile que les Nations Unies prennent également toutes les mesures qui s'imposent pour obtenir le retrait graduel mais général des forces de la Gendarmerie qui ont été envoyées, depuis le début de cette année, dans les secteurs d'Albertville, de Kongolo, de Manono et de Kamina.

Dans le cadre des pouvoirs constitutionnels qui attribuent au seul Gouvernement de la République du Congo le contrôle des relations extérieures, de l'émigration et de l'immigration, ainsi que celui des douanes, mon Gouvernement se propose en outre de rétablir ce contrôle dès que possible sur toutes les frontières de la République. Comme vous n'êtes pas sans l'ignorer, des personnes et des quantités importantes de produits de toutes sortes entrent et sortent du pays sans que le Gouvernement Central puisse les contrôler ni percevoir les droits usuels.

L'établissement des postes de douane aux passages de frontière par où ces biens et personnes franchissent actuellement sans contrôle par le Gouvernement Central, est en ce moment à l'étude par les services compétents de mon Gouvernement, et fera l'objet d'une demande séparée d'aide auprès des Nations Unies dans un proche avenir, afin que les autorités légales de la République du Congo puissent assurer le libre et plein exercice de leurs droits souverains et de leurs responsabilités sur toute l'étendue du pays.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Chargé de Mission, l'assurance de ma haute considération".

4. Je me propose de répondre que nous sommes prêts à demander l'évacuation immédiate du personnel étranger des groupements mobiles katangais et à faire surveiller cette évacuation par nos forces, ainsi que d'assurer dans les limites de notre mandat, l'exécution des autres demandes qui nous ont été adressées par le Gouvernement.

5. Dès son retour à Elisabethville, O'Brien accompagné par Raja et Egge, fera une démarche très catégorique auprès de M. Tshombé, lui demandant le retrait immédiat de tous les mercenaires servant dans les groupements mobiles de la Gendarmerie katangaise et l'évacuation des autres cadres non congolais dans les délais visés par le plan Egge, ainsi que la cessation

.../...

de toute action opérationnelle de la Gendarmerie dans le nord du Katanga en attendant son retrait ou sa démobilisation. En même temps, Egge prendra les mesures nécessaires pour faire savoir aux officiers non congolais qu'ils seront tenus pour responsables de tout incident qui pourrait s'ensuivre.

6. Raja prendra immédiatement les mesures nécessaires pour s'assurer que, dans les quatre endroits où se trouvent maintenant des groupements mobiles, nos troupes aient une supériorité militaire qui leur permettra d'empêcher la liberté d'action des groupements mobiles et de prêter main-forte en cas d'opposition contre le plan prévu pour l'évacuation des cadres, le contrôle des armes offensives et le démembrement des groupements mobiles en tant qu'unités opérationnelles.

7. Egge est en train de préparer un plan détaillé pour le fonctionnement d'une commission mixte à Elisabethville, semblable à celle qui s'est occupée de l'évacuation des conseillers politiques, ayant pour tâche d'arrêter les modalités de l'évacuation du personnel militaire. Nous espérons, après avoir persuadé Tshombé de notre détermination, que nous n'aurons pas de difficulté à mettre sur pied cette commission et de pousser son travail avec toute la rapidité voulue.

8. Nous espérons que vos démarches à Bruxelles aboutiront à des ordres donnés par le Gouvernement belge pour le départ de tous les ressortissants belges qui sont maintenant au service de la gendarmerie katangaise dans les délais demandés par les Nations Unies et fixés par la Commission mixte mentionnée au para 7.

9. Toutes ces actions seront naturellement coordonnées suivant la situation politique et exécutées en consultation avec le Gouvernement Central. Si Tshombé se montrait prêt à se soumettre au Gouvernement central, les mesures pourront être exécutées avec moins de rigueur. D'autre part, si Tshombé continue de s'y opposer, nous renforcerions les pressions de notre part.

cc: Force Commander

RÉPUBLIQUE DU CONGO

Ministère des Affaires Etrangères
et du Commerce Extérieur

Léopoldville, le 22 août 1961.

N° 12/4270/61.

Réf. n° :

Annexe :

Objet :

Monsieur le Chargé de Mission,

J'ai l'honneur de me référer aux résolutions du Conseil de Sécurité autorisant le Secrétaire Général à prendre toutes mesures nécessaires en vue de fournir au Gouvernement de la République du Congo l'assistance dont il pourrait avoir besoin, ainsi qu'à la résolution de l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies demandant au Secrétaire Général de prendre des mesures effectives pour empêcher toute introduction au Congo d'armes de matériel et fournitures militaires.

D'après nos renseignements, des avions immatriculés à l'étranger, dont le survol du territoire congolais et l'atterrissage au Congo ne sont pas autorisés par le Gouvernement Central, font des escales sur divers aérodromes du Congo pour y débarquer du matériel militaire. Nos renseignements indiquent également que ces vols seraient utilisés pour des exportations illégales.

En vertu de l'article 19 de la Loi Fondamentale, les voies aériennes y compris les aéroports et la protection aérienne, sont de la compétence exclusive du pouvoir central. L'autorisation d'utiliser ces voies aériennes ne peut donc être donnée que par le Gouvernement Central de la République du Congo.

Je vous serais reconnaissant, Monsieur le Chargé de Mission, de bien vouloir donner des instructions aux forces des Nations Unies de saisir tout avion en provenance de l'étranger qui atterrirait au Congo sans avoir reçu l'autorisation préalable du Gouvernement Central. Je vous demanderais également de me faire parvenir immédiatement un rapport contenant tous renseignements utiles en cas d'une telle saisie, de même que tout autre renseignement que vous pourriez obtenir lors de l'inspection de la cargaison ou se rapportant à l'interrogatoire du personnel d'un tel avion.

Je suggère que les premiers interrogatoires soient menés par une commission mixte comprenant, outre des membres de la Force des Nations Unies, des représentants spéciaux des autorités congolaises.

REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO

Ministère des Affaires Etrangères
et du Commerce Extérieur

Réf. n° :

Annexe :

Objet :

, le

N°

En ce qui concerne les aéroports où les troupes des Nations Unies ne sont pas stationnées, j'apprécierais votre coopération pour que des survols périodiques de tels aéroports soient effectués par vos avions, et pour que je sois tenu au courant de toute activité suspecte qui pourrait être observée.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Chargé de Mission, l'assurance de ma haute considération.

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères,

Justin BOMBOKO.-

Rom Punch.

OUTGOING CODE

To : SecGen New York PRIORITY

From: Khiary, McEoin-Leopoldville

Date: 22 Aug. 1961

N°: A- 1981 1982

Your 5650

1. Up to the present we have been endeavouring to solve the Katanga problem, including the withdrawal of the Katanga gendarmerie from the North of the province, by encouraging Tshombe himself to make the necessary gestures that would have allowed him to normalize his situation with the Central Government without loss of face: (my telegrams A-1934 and A-1954). Unfortunately, Tshombe has always failed to grasp the opportunities that were offered to him. Apparently he interprets the present temporary relaxation as a sign of lack of determination on our side and has hardened his position by becoming more intractable. His trip to the region of the Balubas is additional proof of this. This may seriously prejudice the position of the moderate elements in the Adoula government and may act in favour of the extremists. These reasons, as well as our interest in freeing our troops immobilized in Katanga as soon as possible, call for urgent and energetic action on our part, in accordance with instructions contained in your 5650.

2. Adoula raised the problem of Katanga on his return from Stanleyville. He personally does not desire bloodshed and favours a peaceful solution with the assistance of ONUC, but the Stanleyville group insists on military action. Adoula is in full agreement with me that such action by poorly disciplined and inadequately trained troops could be disastrous to the prestige of the Government, and in the course of unofficial and confidential discussions

we shall continue to suppress any desire to have recourse to force. However, for psychological reasons, it would be well to give the Katangans the impression that we are prepared to support the Central Government and that the only way for them to extricate themselves from the situation would be to arrive at a compromise with the Central Government. In my opinion, it is absolutely necessary for us to present a firm and inflexible front if we want to avoid the development of a situation in which recourse to force will be the only possibility.

3. Today, following a meeting of the Cabinet, Adoula sent me the following letter:

"Sir,

I have the honour to refer to the exchange of letters that took place between the Secretary General and myself on 10 and 13 August 1961, in which I requested, and the Secretary General confirmed, that all aid and support that the United Nations is in a position to give the Congo within the terms of its mandate would be given exclusively to the Central Government of the Republic over which I have the honour to preside. More particularly, I have in mind the assistance that the United Nations could furnish to my government to ensure the maintenance of peace and public order over the entire extent of the territory of the Republic of the Congo.

In this field, the most urgent problem is to put an end to the aggressive activities of the Katanga gendarmerie in the north of this province. These activities, which not only cause incessant suffering to the inhabitants of this region but also prevent any economic recovery of the country, are attributable exclusively to the foreign officers commanding the units of this gendarmerie, and to other mercenaries. That is why my Government, referring to paragraph A-2 of the Security Council Resolution of 21 February 1961, would be very desirous that the United Nations, as quickly as possible, take

steps to ensure the evacuation of these foreign officers and mercenaries who are still among the armed forces operating in Katanga, particularly among the mobile groups of the gendarmerie; these are at present deployed in the North of Katanga and continue to indulge in acts of aggression against the inhabitants of this region.

In order that peace and security may return to this part of the country, it would be useful if the United Nations would also take all necessary measures to bring about the gradual but general withdrawal of the gendarmerie forces which, since the beginning of this year, have been sent to the Albertville, Kongolo, Mamono and Kamina sectors.

Within the framework of the constitutional powers which give the Government of the Republic of the Congo exclusive control of foreign relations, emigration, and immigration, as well as of Customs, my Government furthermore proposes to re-establish this control as soon as possible at all the frontiers of the Republic. As you are well aware, persons and considerable quantities of products of all sorts are entering and leaving the country without the Central Government being able to inspect them or to collect the usual dues.

The establishment of Customs-houses at the frontier crossings through which these goods and persons now pass unchecked by the Central Government, is now being studied by the competent departments of my Government and will be the subject of a separate request for United Nations assistance in the near future, in order that the legal authorities of the Republic of the Congo may have full and free exercise of their sovereign rights and responsibilities throughout the country.

Accept, etc..... "

4. I propose to reply that we are ready to require the immediate evacuation of the foreign personnel of the Katanga mobile groups and to have this evacuation supervised by our forces as well as to ensure, within the terms of our mandate, the execution of the other requests made to us by the Government.

5. Immediately upon his return to Elisabethville, O'Brien, accompanied by Raja and Egge, will approach Mr. Tshombe in very cateogrial terms, asking for the immediate withdrawal of all mercenaries service in the mobile groups of the Katanga gendarmerie and the evacuation of the other non-Congolese officers in the time-limits envisaged by the Egge Plan, and the cessation of all operations of the gendarmerie in the North of Katanga pending its withdrawal or domobilization. At the same time Egge will take the necessary steps to inform the non-Congolese officers that they will be held responsible for any incident that might occur.

6. Raja will immediately take the necessary steps to make certain that the four places where there are no mobile groups, our troops will have a military superiority that will permit them to deny freedom of action to mobile groups and to give armed assistance in the case of opposition against the plan envisaged for the evacuation of the officers, control of weapons of offence and the breaking up of mobile groups as operational units.

7. Egge is preparing a detailed work plan for a mixed commission at Elisabethville, similar to the commission that dealt with the evacuation of the political advisers, with the duty of drawing up procedure for the evacuation of military personnel. We hope, that after having persuaded Tshombe of our determination, we shall have no difficulty in setting up this

commission and urging its work forward with all desired speed.

8. We hope that the steps you take in Brussels will result in the Belgian Government's giving orders for the departure of all Belgian nationals now in service in the Katanga gendarmerie in the time limits required by the United Nations and determined by the mixed commission mentioned in paragraph 7.

9. All these actions will naturally be co-ordinated in the light of the political situation and carried out in consultation with the Central Government. If Tshombe showed his readiness to submit to the Central Government, the measures could be carried out with less severity. On the other hand, if Tshombe continued to oppose it, we should increase our pressure.

cc: Force Commander

ROUTING SLIP

TO

Gen. MacEoin

	APPROVAL		NOTE AND RETURN
	SEE ME, PLEASE		YOUR COMMENTS
	YOUR SIGNATURE		YOUR INFORMATION
	NOTE AND FILE		FOR ACTION

Report from the CFL on alleged agreements reached with Brigadier Raja.

DATE	FROM
11/8	RR

TRANSLATION

RAILWAY COMPANY OF THE HIGH CONGO TO THE GREAT AFRICAN LAKES

Brussels, 27 July 61

No SE/62636

Service: EXPLOITATION

Transportation on CFL
Southern region of theRailway

FEDERATION OF THE PROVINCIAL
ASSOCIATION OF FIRMS IN THE CONGO
6, Avenue Renkin (BP 84 - Leo I)
LEOPOLDVILLE

Sirs,

Ref: Your letter 450/671 D of 5 July to the President FEC,Brussels
Your Letter No 726/D.45203 of 19 july 61 to CFL, Brussels

With reference to the above mentioned letters, we have the honour to let you know the following:

As a result of the many discussions held in Albertville at the beginning of July between the ONU and Mr. MARISSIAUX, the Officer-in-charge of our Mission, it was decided on 5 July by General RAJA that according to the general fundamental agreement given by General Mac Eoin on the preceding eve, that the rail would be re-opened to traffic between NYUNZU and KABALO, thus resuming the commercial liaison ALBERTVILLE - KABALO; The CFL/reparation train was due to leave under ONU escort within the next 48 hours.

The said train did in fact leave on 7 July and thanks particularly to the propaganda that was made and a few gifts that were distributed to the population , it did reached KABALO the following evening, without any attacks whatsoever taking place in the areas known as "rebels" and any arrow thrown nor one gunshot.

It was a success.

./...2

In the morning of the 9th in KABALO the train was formed ready to return with a third engine and a load of 1000 tons. But the ONU gave the order to stop its departure.

However, during the course of the afternoon the train was authorised to leave following the protestations we made to the ONU but without all the cargo waggons nor the supplementary engine that had been attached.

What happened?

Mr. O'BRIEN of the ONU civilian operations had arrived to Albertville from Elisab thville and had cancelled the military authorities' decision; and moreover, the ONU had urgently transported Mr. Sendwe by UN plane to KABALO where he refused for the rail traffic to be resumed.

At a meeting held in General RAJA's residence in Albertville in the evening of the 9th, we had insisted on the necessity for the ONU to abide by the promises it had distinctly given and we had again requested that the rail be neutralized and that the questions concerning transportation be left out of political questions. General RAJA had then considered a solution consisting in allowing free circulation of any cargo other than coton or pewter coming from such areas where the eventual Baluba state could claim any rights; this transactional solution which, seemingly, from what the General thought, satisfied Mr. Sendwe, met with our acceptance.

But following a second contact between the ONU authorities and Mr. Sendwe in Kabalo, we believe on the following day, this very transactional solution was rejected by Mr. O'BRIEN.

The reparation train, safely back in Albertville on the evening of the 10th, inspite of having demonstrated clearly shown that the line was restored to a sufficient good condition and that the country was accepting the circulation of the trains was not followed by one single other departure towards Kabalo.

./...3

Perhaps you will deem it useful, knowing all these facts and especially how serious the matter is for the economy of our country and for our Company, to contact the ONU authorities in Leopoldville.

Indeed, the position taken by the ONU in Albertville does not seem to fit with those taken by the ONU in Leopoldville, such as they were stated in your formentioned letters;

In your letter of the 5 July you notified us that the ONU expected to find a solution to the question of the Kabalo knot problem. As regards this matter, we believe we should bring to your notice that the opposition that arose in Kabalo on 9 July was not provocated by the Ethiopian section of the ONU, who on the contrary seem to have followed General RAJA's instructions, but in fact by Mr.O'Briens directives and by the oppostion of Mr. Sendwe who was brought to Kabalo by the UN.

By your letter of 19 July, you are telling us that during the course of a meeting with ONU it was decided to raise the question of the Kabalo knot to Mr. Jason Sendwe and to make him realize how illogical his attitude was and how contrary it was to the general interest.

That it was decided after to use transportation in the direction West-East to send out ONU goods and equipment towards Albertville.

These two points give rise to the following remarks on our part:

It is not sufficient to convince Mr. Sendwe, but also Mr. O'Brien who seems to be even more than the former at the origin at the failure of the reopening of the traffic; perhaps will it be possible and we hope so, if certain high officials at the ONU have really at heart the general interest and if they can uphold the thesis of the neutralization of the rail in view to the traffic being resumed.

As for the second point, we think that there is a mistake in the wording in your letter and that we should read that the ONU wishes to utilize transportation in the direction East-West and not West-East.

Indeed, the ONU receives a heavy load of goods via Dar-es-Salaam but she evacuates the majority of it by plane towards Albertville,

.../4

Kabalo-Kamina; Our deleguate has learnt that the ONU Leopoldville had remarked upon the heavy expenses occasioned by these air trips and we have been asked to contact "Belbase" concerning rail transportation between Dar-es-Salaam and Kigoma and also on the subject of introducing such ONU officials amongst the leaders of the "Belbase" at Dar-es-Salaam.

This makes us suppose that the sense of the transportation in question is indeed from Dar-es-Salaam towards Albertville - Kabalo Kamina and that certain ONU services would indeed be interested from the point of view of efficacity and on economical grounds to the resumption of the railway traffice. It would appear, unfortunately, that this consideration has no weight on the negative decisions made by the ONU civilian personalities mentioned here above.Maybe that a certain insistance on this point in Leopoldville would not be useless.

Finally, we believe we should bring the following to your notice:

At a meeting held at Albertville on 5 July, presided by General Raja and which the Kissi District Commissioner and our representative assisted, the proposal was made that a reparation train with the object of repairing the line would leave Kabalo under the UN escort; that the reparation train that had left Kabongo under Katangese escort would stopp at Kitenge which it would have reached on the same day. The proposal was accepted by the Katangese authorities, but the train that was expected to leave Kabalo never did go. Yet we think that this proposal was a good one. The fact that the train that left Albertville was able to effectuate in the Baluba area the 125 kms separating Nyunzu from Kabalo without one gunshot proves the hope one can put in a ~~paei~~ peaceful penetration being used for communications to be restablished.

Please believe us, Sirs,

Very sincerely yours

A. MARISSIAUX
~~Administrator-Director~~
Manager-Director

F. TRICOT
~~Administrator~~
General Manager Director

M. Detroux
Rep. de Comitra

COMPAGNIE DES CHEMINS DE FER DU CONGO SUPERIEUR

AUX GRANDS LACS AFRICAINS

N° SE/62636

Service : EXPLOITATION

BRUXELLES 3, le 27 Juillet 1961

Transports sur C.F.L.
partie sud du réseau.

FEDERATION DES ASSOCIATION PROVINCIALES
DES ENTREPRISES AU CONGO

6, avenue Renkin (B.P. 84 - Léo I)
LEOPOLDVILLE.- (République du Congo)

Messieurs,

Réf. : Votre lettre 450/671 D du 5 juillet au Président F.E.C./Bruxelles.
Votre lettre n° 726/D.45203 du 19 juillet 1961 à C.F.L./Bruxelles.

Faisant suite à vos lettres précitées, nous avons l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance ce qui suit.

Après de nombreux entretiens tenus à Albertville avec l'O.N.U. au début juillet, par notre chargé de mission, M. Marissiaux, il avait été décidé le 5 juillet par M. le Général RAJA, en suite à l'accord de principe donné l'avant-veille par M. le Général MAC KEOWN, que le rail serait rouvert au trafic entre Nyunzu et Kabalo, rétablissant ainsi la liaison commerciale Albertville - Kabalo ; dans les 48 heures, le train de travaux C.F.L. devait partir sous escorte O.N.U.

Le dit train est en effet parti le 7 juillet et grâce notamment à la propagande faite et à la distribution de certains cadeaux aux populations, il arrivait à Kabalo le lendemain soir, sans qu'aucune attaque quelconque n'ait eu lieu dans les régions dites "rebelles" et sans qu'une flèche n'ait été lancée ou un coup de fusil tiré.

C'était un succès.

Le 9, dans la matinée, le train, à Kabalo, était formé pour le retour, avec une troisième locomotive et une charge de 1.000 tonnes.

.../...

.../...

Mais l'ordre fut donné par l'O.N.U. de suspendre le départ du train.

Dans l'après-midi cependant le train fut autorisé à partir, après protestations de notre part auprès de l'O.N.U., mais tous wagons de cargo et la locomotive de complément ayant été détachés.

Que s'était-il passé ?

M. O'BRIEN, des services civils de l'O.N.U., était arrivé à Albertville, venant Elisabethville et avait annulé les décisions des autorités militaires ; de plus, l'O.N.U. avait transporté d'urgence par un de ces avions M. Sendwe à Kabalo où il s'était opposé à la reprise du trafic.

Au cours d'une réunion tenue chez le Général RAJA à Albertville, le 9 au soir, nous avions insisté sur la nécessité pour l'O.N.U. de tenir ses promesses formelles et avions demandé à nouveau que le rail soit neutralisé et que les questions de transport soient laissées en dehors des questions politiques. M. le Général RAJA avait alors envisagé une solution consistant à laisser circuler tout le cargo autre que le coton et l'étain produits dans telle région où l'éventuel Etat Baluba pourrait revendiquer des droits ; nous nous étions ralliés à cette solution transactionnelle qui paraissait, d'après le Général, satisfaire M. Sendwe.

Mais à la suite d'un second contact des autorités O.N.U. avec M. Sendwe à Kabalo, le lendemain croyons-nous, cette solution transactionnelle était elle-même rejetée par M. O'BRIEN.

Le train de travaux, rentré à Albertville le 10 au soir, en ayant démontré que la voie était remise en état suffisant et que le pays acceptait la circulation des trains, ne fut plus depuis suivi d'aucun autre départ vers Kabalo.

Peut-être estimez-vous utile, suite à la connaissance de ces faits, spécialement grave pour l'économie du pays et pour notre Compagnie, de prendre contact avec les autorités de l'O.N.U. à Léopoldville.

En effet, la position prise par l'O.N.U. à Albertville ne paraît pas cadrer avec les positions prises par l'O.N.U. à Léopoldville, telles qu'exposées en vos lettres précitées.

Par votre lettre du 5 juillet, vous nous signaliez que l'O.N.U. comptait trouver une solution à la question du noeud de Kabalo. A ce sujet, nous croyons utile de vous signaler que l'opposition née à Kabalo le 9 juillet n'a pas été provoquée par la section éthiopienne de l'O.N.U. qui semble au contraire s'être aux instructions du Général RAJA,

.../...

.../...

mais bien par les directives de M. O'BRIEN et par l'opposition de M. Sendwe amené à Kabalo par l'O.N.U.

Par votre lettre du 19 juillet, vous nous dites qu'il a été décidé, au cours d'une réunion avec O.N.U., d'évoquer la questi question du noeud de Kabalo avec M. Jason Sendwe et de lui faire remarquer l'illogisme de son attitude, qui est contraire à l'intérêt général.

Qu'il a été décidé, ensuite, d'utiliser la capacité de transport dans la direction "Oest - Est" pour l'acheminement des marchandises et matériel O.N.U. vers Albertville.

Ces deux points suscitent de notre part les remarques suivantes

Il ne suffirait pas de convaincre M. Sendwe, mais aussi M. O'BRIEN qui paraît plus encore que le premier cité, à l'origine de l'échec de la réouverture du trafic ; peut-être, et nous l'espérons, cela sera-t-il possible si certains fonctionnaires supérieurs de l'O.N.U. sont réellement sensibles à l'intérêt général et peuvent soutenir la thèse de la neutralisation du rail en vue de reprise du trafic.

Quant au second point, nous pensons que votre lettre comporte une erreur de rédaction et qu'il faut lire que l'O.N.U. désire utiliser la capacité de transport dans le sens Est-Ouest et non OuestoEst.

En effet, l'O.N.U. reçoit de fortes quantités de marchandises via Dar-es-Salaam mais évacue la plus forte part de celle-ci par avion, vers Albertville, Kabalo et Kamina ; notre délégué a appris que l'O.N.U. Léopoldville avait fait des observations concernant l'importance des dépenses occasionnées par ces voyages avion et il nous a été demandé de prendre contacts avec la Belbase au sujet de transports par rail entre Dar-es-Salaam et Kigoma et aussi d'introduire tel fonctionnaire de l'O.N.U. auprès des dirigeants de la Belbase à Dar-es-Salaam.

Ceci nous fait supposer que le courant de transport envisagé est bien ex Dar-es-Salaam vers Albertville - Kabalo - Kamina et que certains services de l'O.N.U.C. seraient tout de même intéressés, pour des raisons d'économies et d'efficacité, à la reprise du trafic ferroviaire. Il ne semble malheureusement pas que cette considération pèse d'un grand poids sur les décisions négatives des personnalités civiles onusiennes citées plus haut. Peut-être une certaine insistance sur ce point, à Léopoldville, ne serait-elle pas inefficace?

.../...

.../...

Nous croyons enfin devoir vous signaler ce qui suit :

Au cours d'une réunion tenue à Albertville le 5 juillet sous la présidence de M. le Général RAJA, en présence du Commissaire de District Kissi et de notre représentant, il avait été proposé qu'un train de travaux, pour la remise en état du rail, parte de Kabalo sous escorte O.N.U. ; que le train de travaux, parti de Kabongo sous escorte katangaise stoppe à Kitenge où il était arrivé ce même jour. La proposition a été acceptée par les autorités katangaises, mais le train prévu au départ de Kabalo n'est jamais patti ; ilnous paraît cependant que cette proposition était heureuse ; le fait que le train parti d'Albertville avait pu effectuer, en zone Baluba les 125 km séparant Nyunzu de Kabalo sans aucun coup de feu, montre l'espoir que l'on peut mettre dans une pénétration pacifique, pour le rétablissement des communications.

Veuillez agréer, Messieurs, nos salutations distinguées.

A. MARISSIAUX.
Administrateur -directeur.

F. TRICOT.
Administrateur-directeur Général.