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EXCERPTS FROM STATEMENTS BY REPRESENTATIVES IN THE
FIRST EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
CONTAINING REFERENCES TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

561st Meeting (1 November 1956 at 5 p.m.)

Mr. DULLES, United States (A/PV.561 at page 53): "...Despite that fact, there occurred under the auspices of the Secretary-General - to whom I should like to pay a tribute for his great contribution to the efforts at a just and peaceful solution of this problem - exchanges of views on how the six principles could be implemented. I do not think it is an exaggeration to say something which I am quite sure the Secretary-General would confirm - that is, that very considerable progress was made and that it seemed that a just and peaceful solution, acceptable to all, was near at hand."

562d Meeting (1 November 1956 at 9:50 p.m.)

Mr. ASHA, Syria (A/PV.562 at page 17): "...The Secretary-General of the United Nations, in his timely statement yesterday, has been the most eloquent interpreter of the general indignation which has reverberated in the heart of the United Nations and among people everywhere."

Mr. PEARSON, Canada (A/PV.562 at page 132): "...I therefore would have liked to see a provision in this resolution - and this has been mentioned by previous speakers - authorizing the Secretary-General to begin to make arrangements with Member Governments for a United Nations force large enough to keep these borders at peace while a political settlement is being worked out. I regret exceedingly that time has not been given to follow up this idea,

which was mentioned also by the representative of the United Kingdom in his first speech, and I hope that even now, when action on the resolution has been completed, it may not be too late to give consideration to this matter. My own Government would be glad to recommend Canadian participation in such a United Nations force, a truly international peace and police force."

563rd Meeting (3 November 1956 at 8 p.m.)

Mr. LALL, India (A/PV.563 paragraph 2 of the Indian draft resolution at page 51): "...2. Authorizes the Secretary-General immediately to arrange with the parties concerned for the implementation of the cease-fire and the halting of the movement of military forces and arms into the area and requests him to report compliance forthwith and, in any case, not later than twelve hours from the time of adoption of this resolution."

(at page 52): "...We give the Secretary-General only twelve hours to report to us. That is a short period of time. But, first, the situation is extremely grave; secondly, certain Powers took it upon themselves to give Egypt a twelve-hour ultimatum, and certainly, if twelve hours were given in those circumstances, twelve hours are enough to stop the situation created by the end of that ultimatum."

Mr. PEARSON, Canada (A/PV.563 at pages 53-55 and 56): "...But I do suggest that the Secretary-General be given another and supplementary - not conflicting, but supplementary - responsibility: to work out at once a plan for an international force to bring about and supervise the cease-fire visualized in the Assembly resolution which has already been passed.

For that purpose my delegation would like to submit to the Assembly a very short draft resolution which I venture to read at this time. It is as follows:

'The General Assembly, bearing in mind the urgent necessity of facilitating compliance with the resolution (A/3256) of 2 November, requests, as a matter of priority, the Secretary-General to submit to it within forty-eight hours a plan for the setting up, with the consent of the nations concerned, of an emergency international United Nations force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with the terms of the above resolution'.

I would assume that during this short period the Secretary-General would get into touch with, and endeavour to secure co-operation in the carrying out of the earlier resolution from, the parties immediately concerned - whose co-operation, I venture to repeat, is essential - as well as endeavouring to secure help and co-operation from any others whom he thinks might assist him in his vitally important task."

565th Meeting (4 November 1956 at 9:45 p.m.)

The SECRETARY-GENERAL (A/PV.565 at pages 3-5): "I have put before the Assembly three reports concerning the question under consideration at the first emergency special session.

One report, document A/3284, is the second report concerning the day-to-day developments relevant to the decisions covered by the resolution of the Assembly on 2 November. I do not believe that the Members of the Assembly will find anything in this report which requires immediate consideration.

A second report, document A/3287, deals with the cease-fire on which the Assembly urged the parties to agree. The report presents the state of affairs as of four o'clock this afternoon and indicates that communications received later will be circulated as documents. So far, no such communications have been received by me. However, at an earlier stage, I was approached by the Governments of France and the United Kingdom. One of the four Governments approached, the Government of Israel, has thus in no way reacted to me, to the démarche undertaken under the resolution of the General Assembly. We are now less than two hours from the time set for an agreed cease-fire. Without commitments from the three Governments which so far have not indicated their acceptance, this time is scarcely sufficient for the further contacts necessary if we are to meet the target. The Assembly may wish to consider this situation.

The third report, document A/3289, is my first report in reply to the request of the Assembly that, within forty-eight hours, the Secretary-General present a plan for the establishment of a United Nations force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities. In this report, I put before the Assembly certain preliminary proposals which I recommend for its serious consideration. I believe that the report is self-explanatory and therefore I do not wish to take up the time of the Assembly with any special comments."

Sir Pierson DIXON, United Kingdom (A/PV.565 at page 13): "As the Secretary-General has recalled, the Assembly early this morning adopted a draft resolution which had been submitted by nineteen delegations and which authorized Mr. Hammarskjöld immediately to arrange with the parties concerned for the implementation of the cease-fire called for

under the Assembly's earlier resolution, dated 2 November.

Mr. Hammarskjold has also mentioned that, in accordance with this authority, he addressed messages to the Governments of the United Kingdom, France, Israel and Egypt on the subject. These messages have now been circulated to us in document A/3287.

I thought that I should inform the Assembly that I am still awaiting the reply of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to the Secretary-General's message. Her Majesty's Government has throughout the day been giving most careful consideration to that message. I have, in fact, in the course of the day sent an interim reply to Mr. Hammarskjold from the United Kingdom Government (A/3282). There has, of course, been close consultation with the Government of France. When the Secretary-General's message was received, the Foreign Minister of France decided to fly to London for consultations with members of the United Kingdom Government. There are, however, considerable differences of time and geography involved, and, owing to those differences, it has not been possible for me to receive the reply of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in time for the opening of this evening's meeting. I hope - in fact, I expect - to be in a position in the course of tonight to inform the Assembly of the nature of the reply."

Mr. ENGEN, Norway (A/PV.565 at pages 18-20): "I wish to address myself to two documents which have been distributed to the representatives in this Assembly. I refer to the report submitted by the Secretary-General on the Canadian-sponsored resolution which the General Assembly adopted this morning. This report is contained in document A/3289. I wish

to speak also on the draft resolution, sponsored by the delegations of Canada, Colombia and Norway, which is now before the General Assembly. That resolution is contained in document A/3290.

....

As I have said, we have before us the first report of the Secretary-General. I am sure that I express the feeling of those who voted for the resolution this morning when I thank the Secretary-General for the speed with which he has taken action in response to the request of this Assembly. I am not going to say many words about this report, since the representatives will know what is in it.

....

My delegation, in company with the delegations of Canada and Colombia, has thought it appropriate to draft a resolution embodying the suggestions which the Secretary-General has made in his report. This draft resolution is before the Assembly. It aims at laying down clear directives for the establishment of such a force which the Assembly decided this morning should be established."

Mr. LALL, India (A/PV.565 at pages 21 and 22): "...It is a matter of regret that the Secretary-General has not been able to tell us that he has received equal acceptance, in fact any acceptance at all, by the other three Powers concerned. We hope that compliance will soon be forthcoming.

....

Then I should like to refer to the most important document A/3289, which the Secretary-General has placed before us. May I join the representative of Norway in congratulating and thanking the Secretary-General for his remarkable expedition in producing a report in less

than twenty-four hours of the adoption of our resolution which takes us as far as this document does. As the result of this report, we are able now to take some steps to set up a machinery which will make available forces in Egypt to supplant the aggressors who have entered the country, and which will restore peace and the status quo ante, the least that can be done for Egypt as an immediate measure. At this stage we have some slight reservations regarding paragraph 6. The Secretary-General has helped us considerably, however, by changing the word "directly" in the second line of this paragraph to "immediately". Nevertheless we feel that we cannot express our views on this paragraph until we see the final report which the Secretary-General has promised to us."

The SECRETARY-GENERAL (A/PV.565 at page 27): "I should like to take this opportunity to give a couple of clarifications which may be useful for the members of the Assembly.

As a matter of course, this report is based on the legal fact created by the vote taken this very morning by the Assembly.

As to the question of the conflict of the functions of the Chief of Staff, it is a matter of course that if the Assembly were to give this assignment to the Chief of Staff he would leave his post as Chief of Staff. He would change functions, and other arrangements would be made with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization.

Finally, the recruitment of officers for this group is something which corresponds to the functions which the Chief of Staff has already in relation to the Observer Corps."

Mr. RIFA'I, Jordan (A/PV.565 at pages 28-30): "...Aware of the short time Mr. Hammarskjold had available to fulfil his mandate under the nineteen-Power resolution of 3 November, we feel very grateful that he executed his task in a very prompt manner, which deserves our commendation. With the little time available to us to study the various reports, we can only bring to the attention of the delegations a few observations."

Mr. SUDJARWO, Indonesia (A/PV.565 at page 42): "...I am grateful to the Secretary-General for his report on the question of the formation of this international United Nations force, in document A/3289, the ideas in which find further expression in the draft resolution submitted by Canada, Colombia and Norway. In general, the outlines to be found there seem to my delegation helpful to facilitate and speed up the formation of the United Nations supervision force."

Mr. LODGE, United States (A/PV.565 at page 56): "...The Secretary-General has been asked to present to us by early Tuesday his full plan for setting up an emergency international force, as called for in the draft resolution which was submitted by Canada. We should do well to suspend our debate on this matter for the present and to adopt the draft resolution (A/3290) introduced by Canada, Colombia and Norway, which would establish a United Nations command, in accordance with the Canadian draft resolution (A/3276) adopted by the Assembly. We should take this step immediately to permit the Secretary-General and the Governments with which he is consulting to proceed at full speed in making plans for the emergency international force."

566th Meeting (7 November 1956 at 10:30 a.m.)

The SECRETARY-GENERAL (A/PV.566 at page 3): "I do not think that many words are needed in the introduction of my second and final report on the United Nations Force. I have put the main document before the Members. I only wish to express my warm hope that a decision in line with my proposals will be taken promptly so as to permit us to get going. There should not be left any uncertainty in the minds of people about the determination of the United Nations.

I would like to announce that last night I sent instructions to the Chief of the United Nations' Command, after agreement with the Egyptian Government, to proceed forthwith to Cairo for the first contacts. I have now received the first reply from the Chief of Command in which he informs me that Egyptian authorities agreed in principle to his flying to Cairo, but that detailed arrangements cannot be set up before today.

The Chief of Command has established direct radio contact with Allied Forces in Cyprus, which will be necessary for clearance and aircraft passage, and later for other purposes. Egyptian authorities agreed this morning also, in principle, to accept ten observers at once in Cairo. These observers will need jeeps and radios. Therefore the Chief of Command will try to send them by road down to Egypt. The Israel Government has been requested to allow passage.

That is the announcement I feel I should make as the first progress report on the setting up of the force in the area."

Mr. ESKELUND, Denmark (A/PV.566 at pages 12-15): "...We have before us, in document A/3302, the second and final report of the Secretary-General on the plan for an emergency international United Nations force.

We have all studied it with all the care that this historic document deserves and that the tremendous importance of its contents makes obligatory. May I add one word of deep appreciation to the man who is the author of this final report, our Secretary-General, who has once more shown his outstanding ability and all the other high qualities which have commanded in the past and will command in the future to a still higher degree our admiration and our complete confidence. I am sure that in this I can speak on behalf of everyone present."

Mr. PEARSON, Canada (A/PV.566 at page 16): "...We also wish to endorse the report of the Secretary-General, which is related to this resolution. In doing so, I should like to echo the words of gratitude and appreciation which have just been spoken by the representative of Denmark for the tireless and effective work done by the Secretary-General, without which we would not have this report before us today."

Mr. TRUJILLO, Ecuador (A/PV.566 at page 21): "...I shall also refer to the report presented by the Secretary-General in document A/3302. I believe that the Secretary-General has once again shown how skilful and effective a worker he is in presenting this report, which is a complete study of the situation."

Mr. GUNewardene, Ceylon (A/PV.566 at page 23): "...May I further note my Government's deep appreciation of the choice of the Secretary-General as chairman of this committee, for we all know the extremely heavy burden he is already carrying. His impartiality, sincerity and selfless devotion to duty is a shining example to all."

Mr. LODGE, United States (A/PV.566 at page 27): "...Nor can I leave this rostrum without once again expressing our deep admiration for the competence, the speed, the intelligence and the determination with which the Secretary-General is discharging the heavy responsibilities that we have laid upon him. Seldom in human history has a man had such responsibilities imposed upon him, and I believe that we in this Assembly should, for our part, act with the same speed and determination as we expect and know we shall receive from the Secretary-General."

Mr. RIFA'I, Jordan (A/PV.566 at pages 33-35 and 36): "...There is one other point which my delegation wishes to make clear. Paragraph 8 of the report of the Secretary-General mentioned that the assignment of the United Nations force should be determined by the needs arising out of the present conflict.

I wish to state that the scope of these needs, according to my delegation's view, does not extend beyond the present area of hostilities between Egypt and Israel, and that it also does not touch on other basic issues of the Palestine question. This is our understanding of the task of the United Nations emergency force and the field of its functions. It is in the light of this understanding that my delegation views the draft resolution of the seven Members, which was circulated at this meeting."

Mr. JARLING, Sweden (A/PV.566 at pages 37 and 38-40): "...It is our understanding that the tasks do not imply that the force should remain stationed in the area for an unlimited period or pending the solution of political problems affecting that area. This understanding would seem to be borne out by the Secretary-General's report, which, in paragraph 8, reads as follows:

'A closer analysis of the concept of the United Nations force, based on what the General Assembly has stated in its resolution on the matter, indicates that the Assembly intends that the force should be of a temporary nature, the length of its assignment being determined by the needs arising out of the present conflict.' (A/3302, page 4)

The Swedish Government concurs in the views of the Secretary-General expressed in paragraph 12 of the report about the functions of the force. Obviously this force should not be dispatched to the area in order to take over the tasks for which the British and French forces were sent there. Instead, the functions of the United Nations force, when the parties have approved of the resolutions, should be to enter Egyptian territory with the consent of the Egyptian Government in order to secure the cessation of hostilities."

Mr. SIKRANO, Philippines (A/PV.566 at pages 46, 47, 48-50 and 51):

"...Before proceeding to express briefly the views of my Government on the report of the Secretary-General and on the draft resolution before us, I must express first the profound appreciation of my delegation for the excellent work done by the Secretary-General. In an incredibly brief period of forty-eight hours, he was able to submit a thoroughly rounded report, a plan of organization including the principles which underlie it, a system of financing it, a plan for the recruitment of officers as well as an appraisal of the probable scope of the functions of the police force.

....

Paragraph 9 of the Secretary-General's report states that no part of the international police force should be stationed 'on the

territory of a given country without the consent of the Government of that country'. My attention, however, is called to the following sentence, which reads: 'This does not exclude the possibility that the Security Council could use such force within the wider margins provided under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.' The possibility envisaged in that sentence, if I am not mistaken, is that of collective action under Chapter VII, which this body employed in Korea.

While fundamentally I am not in disagreement with this statement, I must state, with due respect to the Secretary-General, that it might perhaps have been better if the sentence were not included in the report. Reference to the possible use of force for collective action, even by authority of the Security Council, might create serious misgivings on the part of countries that intend to offer forces to the international police force. There can be no doubt that under the resolution which authorizes the Assembly to establish an international police force, the fundamental aim is merely to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities. The possibility of the employment of a force for collective action under Chapter VII of the Charter was far from the mind of the Assembly when it approved the establishment of the international police force.

....

I would therefore call the attention of the advisory committee as well as that of the Secretary-General to the fact that in determining this international police force, the need should be emphasized of avoiding any preponderance of any group - not only of any particular country - which may make the international police force suspect before the eyes of the world. It is therefore important that the balanced

composition should not relate only to the size of the forces contributed by a country, but to the relative balance of the groups, taking into account the alignment of sympathies as far as this controversy is concerned."

Mr. ASHA, Syria (A/PV.566 at page 61): "...We wish to make it clear that we are not criticizing the Secretary-General's views, which may be sound in law, but we cannot accept any plan for a United Nations emergency international force which is not predicated on the prior fulfilment of the two basic objectives of the first resolution of this Assembly. If it is truly the desire of Britain, France and Israel to respect the decisions of this august body, then let them solemnly declare today that they are ready to withdraw their forces immediately, in order to facilitate the task of the United Nations force."

Mr. SUDJARWO, Indonesia (A/PV.566 at pages 68-70 and 71): "...With respect to the plan for an emergency international United Nations Force, document A/3302, I wish to express, first of all, the great appreciation of my delegation for the admirable and expeditious manner in which the Secretary-General has discharged the request made of him in the Assembly resolution of 4 November. In his report, the Secretary-General has touched upon many important and intricate questions which deserve our closest attention and study.

....

I fully support the Secretary-General's conclusion that:

'By the establishment of the force, therefore, the General Assembly has not taken a stand in relation to aims other than those clearly and fully indicated in its resolution of 2 November 1956.'

567th Meeting (7 November 1956 at 3 p.m.)

Mr. MICHALOWSKI, Poland (A/PV.567 at page 21): "...I have one more remark, which is somewhat legal in character. There is some doubt in our mind with regard to paragraph 9 of the draft resolution. It gives the Advisory Committee the power to request the convening of the General Assembly. First of all, I am at a loss to know what kind of session of the General Assembly is meant. A regular session? A special session? Or an emergency special session? Secondly, I have some doubts, not concerning the essences of the matter, but from a procedural point of view, as to the conformity of such a paragraph with Article 20 of the Charter and, consequently, with rules 8 and 9 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly. Perhaps those doubts could be clarified by the Secretariat or by the sponsors of the draft resolution. I only mention them because of my doubts with regard to this procedure."

Mr. BRILEJ, Yugoslavia (A/PV.567 at pages 23-25): "...Before concluding, I should like to associate my delegation with these other delegations which have paid a well-deserved tribute to our Secretary-General for the devotion and skill which he has shown once again in discharging his new task on behalf of the United Nations."

The SECRETARY-GENERAL (A/PV.567 at pages 57 and 58-60): "In the course of the debate certain requests or clarifications have been directed to me. I felt that at this stage of the discussion it might be useful if I gave a reply."

The representative of Syria has expressed the fear that in case of non-compliance by Israel with the request for the withdrawal of forces behind the Armistice Demarcation Lines, there would, on the

basis of the position taken in my report, arise a situation where Egypt will be presented with a fait accompli as the United Nations Force is at present not established with a view to enforce the withdrawal of forces. The representative of Syria said that he could not but feel the deepest misgivings concerning this situation.

My reply is simple. In case the unfortunate situation envisaged by the representative of Syria were to arise, I would consider it my duty to bring it at once to the attention of the General Assembly or to the Security Council for such measures as those two main organs of the United Nations might decide upon. Egypt will thus not be faced with a fait accompli but could resort to the means provided for in the Charter. My position as to the functions of the United Nations Force does in no way limit the right in these respects. I consider the definition of those functions in the report to be sound as a basis for this first stage in the setting up of the Force.

Another question which has been directed to me concerns the interpretation of the legal situation in respect of withdrawal of non-Egyptian forces other than the Israel forces. In my view, it does follow from the resolution of 2 November that all non-Egyptian forces - with the obvious exception of the United Nations force which will be there with the consent of the Egyptian Government - have to withdraw from Egyptian territory. It goes without saying that "Egyptian territory" in this context must be understood in the sense which follows from international law and the Armistice Agreement.

Still another question which I should like to clarify concerns the interpretation of my indication that the United Nations force will have to operate within a region extending from the Suez Canal to the Armistice Demarcation Line as established in the Egyptian-Israel

Armistice Agreement. What I intended to say with this phrase was entirely directed to the situation with which we are faced. The United Nations force will have to come in at what is at present the dividing line between the Egyptian and Israel forces. It is at whatever may come to be the dividing line that it will have to function. As the situation is, that means that United Nations activities will have to start close to the Suez Canal, but that after the expected compliance with the recommendations of the General Assembly they would end up at the Armistice Demarcation Line.

Other points have been raised on which I find it difficult to elaborate what I have said in the report, which to me seems to be self-explanatory. For example, I have been asked for an interpretation of what I have said about the length of the assignment of the Force as being determined by the need arising out of the present conflict. I am sure the Members will appreciate that in the still-unclear situation, it would be premature for me to say how the needs might develop after the end of the immediate crisis. However, the Force being under ultimate authority of the General Assembly, I think that this point need not give rise to worries. Likewise, I find that the interpretation of my statement concerning previous decisions, to the effect that there is no intent in the establishment of the Force to influence the military balance in the present conflict and thereby the political balance affecting efforts to settle the conflict, should be evident. However, this aspect too will certainly be followed closely by the General Assembly."

Mr. Krishna MENON, India (A/PV.567 at pages 68, 69-70 and 71):

"...Paragraph 8 says the following:

'It follows from its terms of reference that there is no intent in the establishment of the force to influence the military balance in the present conflict and, thereby, the political balance affecting efforts to settle the conflict. By the establishment of the force, therefore, the General Assembly has not taken a stand in relation to aims other than those clearly and fully indicated in its resolution of 2 November 1956.'

I confess I am a little perplexed by this statement. I do not know quite what its implications would be. If it means that this force is not intended to support the parties in the aggression or to intervene militarily, then I do understand it. But if the meaning of it were to go on to say that the occupation forces would remain where they are and therefore would not affect their military balance, then of course it is totally contrary to its purpose.

....

Then the Secretary-General has told us that this is a second and final report; but I suppose that that is only a procedural description because it goes on to say, in paragraph 11: 'However the general observations which are possible should at this stage be sufficient.' Therefore, my delegation wants to be assured that there is no finality about this report in the sense that it is a kind of army manual in regard to these forces."

The SECRETARY-GENERAL L (A/PV.567 at pages 76, 89-91 and 127): "I shall speak very briefly. The representative of India has raised a great number of points. On several he has attempted an interpretation of what I intended to say, and I think I can say that on all those points, to the extent that I could fully grasp what the representative said, I can confirm that his interpretation of my intentions is correct.

There were two points where direct questions were directed to me. The first one was concerning the character of the report which I have called final. It is final only in the sense that it is the last report I shall issue under the mandate decided upon on the morning of 4 November with a forty-eight hour margin. Of course, the Assembly may look forward to further reports on the development of this Force.

As to the question of what is the intent - as I expressed it, 'intent not to influence' - I wanted by that sentence to express only the view that the political basic decisions of this Assembly, of course, constitute the fundamental law of this whole operation."

"The matter raised by the representative of India is not one which I would like to put before the Assembly. The text to which he refers is a news release which is based on an official report from General Burns, but I think that the matter is better handled in regular diplomatic and administrative forms. I have received just this minute a further cable referring to the same matter which, to my satisfaction, clarifies the situation in one important respect, and with the President's permission I should like to refer briefly to what I find in this new report, as follows:

'The representative of the Israeli Government called and tendered apologies on behalf of the Government for the action taken in the forcible closing of the radio station at Gaza.

He stated that, through a misunderstanding of his instructions, the officer in Gaza had exceeded his authority and taken action which was not intended. The forcible closing of the radio station in Gaza was never the intention of the military authorities. He informed me that orders had been given by General Dayan that the radio transmitter will be replaced at once, and that the station can continue to be used."

"Before this meeting is adjourned, I should like to inform the Assembly that, despite the responsibilities which the Middle Eastern question has placed upon me and my staff, we are giving serious consideration to our responsibilities under the resolution on the question of Hungary adopted by the General Assembly on 4 November. That resolution has been formally called to the attention of the two Governments most directly concerned. I shall shortly be in a position to report on further steps that will be taken in implementation of the resolution. In the meantime, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is working with other welfare agencies to meet the need for food, medicine and other similar supplies."

EXCERPTS FROM STATEMENTS BY REPRESENTATIVES IN THE
ELEVENTH REGULAR SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
CONTAINING REFERENCES TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Item 66. Question considered by the first emergency special session
of the General Assembly from 1 to 10 November 1956

591st Meeting (23 November 1956 at 10:30 a.m.)

The SECRETARY-GENERAL (A/PV.591 at page 2): "The four reports I have put before the General Assembly cover the first phase of the United Nations efforts after the adoption of the General Assembly of its basic resolutions. Some progress in implementation is registered. Some new steps have to be taken. In my actions in implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly, I have, to the best of my understanding, neither added anything to the position of the General Assembly nor detracted anything from that position. I have been guided by the fact that the United Nations, in requesting a cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of foreign troops from Egypt, rejected the resort to force as a means to any of the proclaimed aims."

Mr. MAHQOUB, Sudan (A/PV.591 at page 6): "...The Secretary-General's report of 20 November 1956 (A/3375) and the aide-mémoire annexed to it demonstrate that the Egyptian Government responded to the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on 5 and 7 November 1956 and declared that:

'when exercising its sovereign rights on any matter concerning the presence and functioning of UNEF, it will be guided, in good faith, by its acceptance of the General Assembly resolution [A/RES/394] of 5 November 1956' (A/3375, annex, page 1).

Furthermore, in his report of 20 November 1956 (A/3376) on arrangements for clearing the Suez Canal, the Secretary-General reveals that the Government of Egypt has agreed, and in fact urged, that steps should be taken to reopen the Suez Canal, and that the Government of Egypt considers that the work should be started immediately upon the withdrawal of non-Egyptian forces from Port Said and the Canal area. The spirit shown by the Government of Egypt has encouraged the Secretary-General to address himself, for the purpose of carrying out the operation of clearing the Canal, to firms in countries not parties to the present conflict. His intention is to use experts now employed by the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration, who would be assisted by representatives of the firms that have been approached."

....

(at page 7): "It is to be noted that the Secretary-General's report of 21 November 1956 (A/3384) on compliance with the General Assembly resolutions of 2 and 7 November 1956 and the aide-mémoires annexed to that report reveal that no significant withdrawal has as yet taken place."

Mr. DAVID, Czechoslovakia (A/PV.591 at page 11): "...In the report of the Secretary-General, document A/3375, there is a direct statement to the effect that the withdrawal of armed forces, which the resolutions of the General Assembly call for, has not as yet been implemented."

....

(at page 17): "Although this Force was not set up in accord with the Charter, since the Government of Egypt has accepted the stationing of this Force on its territory, the Czechoslovak delegation gave a positive answer

to the request of 4 November addressed to it by the Secretary-General. In its cable of 6 November, the Czechoslovak Government indicated that it supported United Nations action for a cease-fire in Egypt and placed at the disposal of the United Nations one battalion of its own army. Further, on 12 November, it informed the Secretary-General that the Czechoslovak unit was ready to carry out its functions in the spirit of the resolution of the General Assembly and could be transported immediately to the staging area by Czechoslovak air transports.

....

Interesting facts are to be found in a memorandum of the Egyptian Government of 17 November addressed to the Secretary-General and contained in document A/3370. It is stated therein that, in spite of the resolution of the General Assembly and in spite of Egyptian and world public opinion, French and British forces, instead of withdrawing from Egyptian territory, have consolidated their positions."

....

(at page 21): "We also fully support the draft agreement between Egypt and the Secretary-General under which the stationing, functioning and time during which these forces will remain on Egyptian territory can only be decided on the basis of the agreement of the Egyptian Government."

Mr. URRUTIA, Colombia (A/PV.591 at pages 21 and 22): "...The Secretary-General has succeeded in finding solutions to the majority of the problems which confronted us last week. I feel that, if we enable him to continue along this course and to advance the negotiations which he has already initiated, satisfactory results will be obtained. If, on the contrary, we try to set specific principles at this stage or to curtail some of his freedom in conducting these negotiations, then we

will only complicate problems which are already more than sufficiently delicate. We must not overlook, moreover, that public opinion in the countries directly involved has become impassioned, that incautious debates in this General Assembly may well place these Governments in a difficult position and prevent the creation of an atmosphere sufficiently friendly to enable these Governments to accede to the suggestions of the Secretary-General and the General Assembly. That is why my delegation would appeal to all the Members of the General Assembly that without further debate, without further discussion, without further speeches, without further statements which may offend one or another country, we should vote speedily for this draft resolution and leave it to the Secretary-General to carry out negotiations and to meet the questions which have been outlined in reports which are well-known to all of you."

Mr. RIFA'I, Jordan (A/PV.591 at page 31): "The Jordan delegation was waiting for the report of the Secretary-General on compliance with the General Assembly resolutions of 2 and 7 November to come out. I wish to pay tribute to Mr. Hammarskjöld for his promptness."

....

(at page 32): "In the reply of the French Government to the questions of the Secretary-General, we read the following:

'Approximately one-third of the French forces which were deployed on 7 November has been withdrawn.'

The British reply states the following:

'Nevertheless the United Kingdom Government, as an indication of their intentions, have decided to withdraw at once an infantry battalion from Port Said.'

The Israel reply, which is mostly irrelevant to the specific item under discussion, states inter alia the following:

'There has been a withdrawal of Israel's forces for varying distances along the entire Egyptian front.'

....

(at page 33-35): "In their replies to the Secretary-General, the British and French Governments connect the withdrawal of their troops with the functions of the United Nations Emergency Force."

....

(at page 36): "In this connexion, I wish to bring to the attention of representatives the fact that on 7 November (A/PV.566) my delegation made a number of remarks regarding the functions of the United Nations Force and we requested certain clarification from the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General, in his answer to these remarks, said the following:

'...In my view, it does follow from the resolution of 2 November that all non-Egyptian forces - with the obvious exception of the United Nations Force which will be there with the consent of the Egyptian Government - have to withdraw from Egyptian territory. It goes without saying that "Egyptian territory" in this context must be understood in the sense which follows from international law and the Armistice Agreement.

Still another question which I should like to clarify concerns the interpretation of my indication that the United Nations Force will have to operate within a region extending from the Suez Canal to the Armistice Demarcation Line as established in the Egyptian-Israel Armistice Agreement. What I intended to say with this phrase was entirely directed to the situation with which we are faced. The

United Nations Force will have to come in at what is at present the dividing line between the Egyptian and Israel forces. It is at whatever may come to be the dividing line that it will have to function. As the situation is, that means that United Nations activities will have to start close to the Suez Canal, but that after the expected compliance with the recommendations of the General Assembly they would end up at the Armistice Demarcation Line.' (A/PV.567, pages 57-60)"

Mr. LLOYD, United Kingdom (A/PV.591 at page 41): "...In response to requests made on behalf of the Secretary-General, arrangements were made for a Norwegian-Danish company to enter Port Said. We have agreed that the main body of the Yugoslav contingent should disembark at Port Said and be assisted in transit. We have agreed to provide, if wanted, military transport for the Indian infantry battalion which will form part of the Force, and the necessary vehicles for the Norwegian medical company, and some medical supplies and food for the Force itself.

....

With regard to the tasks of the Force, we have noted the Secretary-General's report and, in particular, the annex to it. We understand this to mean that the Force will carry out all the tasks laid upon it in accordance with the resolutions of 2, 5 and 7 November. We have great confidence in the Secretary-General and we believe that he and the General Assembly will in good faith see that the Force is effective and competent to carry out those tasks. On that basis we have agreed to withdraw our forces."

....

(at page 43): "I shall remind you in passing of the note sent by the United Kingdom Government to the Secretary-General on 11 November (document A/3382). I do not want to dwell today on those actions or their relationship to international obligations. However, the task is to get the Canal cleared - and cleared without delay. The United Kingdom Government has formally expressed its full support for the efforts of the Secretary-General to organize a salvage team under the auspices of the United Nations. It has declared its willingness to release any salvage ships now under charter to the British Admiralty or to the British Government. We shall do everything in our power to help, and we welcome the assumption of United Nations responsibility."

Mr. ZAINEDDINE, Syria (A/PV.591 at page 46): "...The Secretary-General has asked the three allies some questions, and he has received evasive answers or half-answers."

Mr. OLIVIERI, Argentina (A/PV.591 at page 56): "...The offer of co-operation voiced just now by the Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom is of very great importance in our view. We believe that the Secretary-General and the General Assembly will have to attach great importance to that suggestions, and to ascertain whether it is possible to make use of such co-operation, since the United Kingdom has in the theatre of operations technical and other resources about which we all know.

With regard to compliance with the General Assembly resolutions of 2 and 7 November 1956, there are two paragraphs in the Secretary-General's report (A/3384) which call for some special comment, and I shall read them out:

'The Secretary-General has now received replies to his request to the Governments of France, Israel and the United Kingdom. The replies are circulated as annexes to this report (annexes 1-3).

At the present stage the Secretary-General does not wish to present any observations concerning the state of compliance reflected in the replies received. Nor does he find it to the purpose now to discuss the views expressed on the circumstances under which compliance was to be established.'

To be frank, our concern is that, in our view, those paragraphs embody a subtle reference to difficulties which have been encountered in having the recommendations of this Assembly complied with - and here I refer to the resolutions which related to the withdrawal of troops."

....

(at page 57): "The Secretary-General told us earlier that some progress had been noted and that new steps must be taken. To that end my delegation considers that the General Assembly has already adopted the resolutions necessary to ensure the taking of such steps. All that remains is for the parties directly concerned to allow those steps to be implemented. For all those reasons, the speedy co-ordination of movements between the United Nations Emergency Force and the French, British and Israel forces stationed in Egypt is of paramount importance."

592nd Meeting (23 November 1956 at 3 p.m.)

Mr. SHEPILOV, USSR (A/PV.592 at page 13-15): "...The impression is crystallizing that Britain, France and Israel have no intention at all to withdraw their troops from Egypt. What is the meaning of the

answers of the Governments of these three countries to Mr. Hammarskjold's letter? They merely contain foggy promises to carry out the partial withdrawal of some military units more or less as a goodwill gesture. Mr. Lloyd spoke about this today in rather hazy terms. He spoke in terms of one battalion to be withdrawn. At the same time a number of unacceptable conditions are set forth as if France, Britain and Israel were in Egypt in the full enjoyment and exercise of their rights and as if the United Nations were merely a petitioner."

....

(at page 18): "The Egyptian Government considers, as Mr. Hammarskjold reports, that Canal clearing work must begin immediately after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian armed forces from Port Said in the Canal area, and that the conclusion of contracts with salvage firms is within the purview and province of Egypt."

Mr. PEARSON, Canada (A/PV.592 at page 27): "...What are the functions of this United Nations Emergency Force? Those functions and the task - and it is a very difficult task indeed which confronts the Force - have been laid down by resolutions of the General Assembly, and they are found also in the Secretary-General's second and final report, which has been approved by the Assembly."

....

(at page 28-30): "Later, by resolution A/RES/395 of 7 November, the Assembly approved certain principles for the organization and functioning of the United Nations emergency Force and those principles were stated in certain paragraphs of the Secretary-General's report (A/3302) which was attached to the resolution."

....

(at page 31): "Having said that, however, I do agree that the Secretary-General should certainly consult with the Government of the country in which the Force is serving, on all matters of any importance that affect it ... As the Secretary-General has said in his report, its functions can be assumed to cover an area extending roughly from the Suez Canal to the armistice demarcation lines, and in that area to facilitate and aid the establishing and securing of peaceful conditions, as an indispensable prerequisite to a just and agreed political settlement."

....

(at page 32): "So I suggest that our immediate task, now that the process of withdrawal has begun, is to back up the Secretary-General in the terrific undertaking we have imposed on him. His industry and his intelligence deserve our full support. We have faith in him, as he has faith in the good faith of those he is dealing with. We hope, therefore, that we can help him with his work, that we can get ahead with that work in this Assembly instead of having to listen to long, distorted propaganda diatribes such as the one to which we have just had to listen - speeches we have already heard three or four times, which do not improve but, indeed, deteriorate with age."

Mr. AL-JAMALI, Iraq (A/PV.592 at page 42): "We have before us three reports of the Secretary-General. We wish to join other delegations in expressing our thanks and admiration to the Secretary-General for untiring work, for his sincerity, and for his devotion to the peace in the Middle East."

Mr. LUKANOV, Bulgaria (A/PV.592 at page 77): "...As is well known, the Secretary-General was constrained the other day to ask the Foreign Ministers of these three countries as to the progress they had made in the withdrawal of armed forces from Egypt and whether they intended to withdraw their armed forces from Egypt in accordance with the decisions of the General Assembly. These questions require a clear and unambiguous answer."

....

(at page 83): "Our delegation considers that the swift clearing of the Suez Canal and its reopening for normal navigation is an urgent task, and the anxiety of the Secretary-General in this regard is comprehensible. We note, however, that Mr. Hammarskjold's report (A/3376) on the clearing of the Canal would empower the Secretary-General to take over the necessary financial obligations. But it is not indicated what the sources for covering these obligations will be. We do not propose to have our country pay for the fact that somebody or other planned and carried out aggression and caused the closing of a canal which had previously been maintained by Egypt in perfect operating condition."

593rd Meeting (24 November 1956 at 10:30 a.m.)

Mr. SERRANO, Philippines (A/PV.593 at pages 7, 8-10, 11 and 12):

"...I must state at the outset, with all candour, that the Secretary-General's reports, while they indicate the great industry, conscientiousness and statesmanship which he has manifested in the discharge of his responsibilities, have up to this hour left a lot of essential things to be considered by this Assembly. We are in the dark.

I must, however, repeat my commendation and appreciation of the work of the Secretary-General within the limitations imposed upon him in the discharge of his responsibilities. In the first report (A/3375) we were informed that before he was able to bring into Egypt the first contingent of the United Nations Emergency Force certain questions were propounded to him by the President of Egypt as to the character and functions of that force. He also informed us that, by way of reply to those questions, he had given his interpretation of the resolutions, and that those interpretations were duly approved by the Advisory Committee. However, I must state that the report did not give us the nature, extent and scope of the interpretations he had given of the character and functions of the force. I must assume, for the moment, that most of his interpretations must be based on the functions of the force which he had commented on in his second and final report of 6 November, with which the Assembly concurred in its resolution of 7 November. Those interpretations, although rather general, were contained in paragraph 12 of his second and final report (A/3302) of 6 November on the question of the organization of the force.

However, as I said, the precise nature of those interpretations has not been dealt with in his present report to this Assembly. All that we know, as a result of his interpretations - and we are also not aware of whether President Nasser of Egypt had concurred in those interpretations - is that two points were agreed upon by him and the Secretary-General. Those two points were embodied in the aide-mémoire, which was related to his first report. The points are: first, Egypt declares that when exercising its sovereign rights on any matter concerning the presence and functioning of the Force,

it will be guided in good faith by its acceptance of General Assembly resolution 394 of 5 November. You will recall that this resolution of 5 November merely creates the Command of the Force, and makes mention that the Force has to assume the function of supervising the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of the previous resolution. We feel, therefore, that the President of Egypt has already made an assurance. Although the resolution referred to in his declaration to the Secretary-General relates basically only to the creation of the Command, he had agreed to take into account the fact that this Force was designed to supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with the previous resolution of 2 November, which relates to the cease-fire, the halting of the introduction of armed forces into the area and the withdrawal of the forces of the parties to the armistice lines, and finally the reopening of the Canal, making it secure again for navigation. As I recall, those are the basic contents of the resolution of 2 November, which are also referred to in resolution 394, which is mentioned in the statement of the President of Egypt.

On the other hand, the Secretary-General, with respect to the second point agreed upon, will also be guided, as far as the activities of the Force are concerned, by the task established for the Force in those resolutions. You will therefore see very clearly that these two basic points of agreement are too general to be of any value to this Assembly in guiding it through the difficulties that we see in the present situation.

It will be my purpose to propound certain questions about the present situation in relation to the present report of the Secretary-General.

In the second report of the Secretary-General, we are also informed that he has gratifyingly already commenced to explore the technical possibilities of engaging the services of private firms for assistance in the clearing operation. As a matter of fact, he asked - and I think with justification - that he be authorized to continue these negotiations with a view to immediately clearing the Canal. To this end, he asked authorization to arrange without delay for the necessary survey of conditions in the Canal and to employ the experts of the United Nations Technical Assistance Programme partly for this purpose; and finally to permit him to incur unavoidable expenditures in connexion with these suggestions of his which we are asked now to authorize. I understand that much of this request of the Secretary-General is now embodied in the six-Power resolution, which is before the Assembly.

For the moment, I am not prepared to make any comment on the third report of the Secretary-General, which refers to the administrative and financial arrangements for the Force. I understand that it suggests a tentative sum of \$10 million. Nor am I prepared now to make any comment on any portion of the report because I feel that any action that this body will have to take on it will have to include the consideration of the over-all question of the withdrawal of forces and compliance with the original resolutions on this matter. Unless we fix a time-limit and determine the probabilities of the success or failure of compliance with the previous resolutions, I do not know how this body can successfully consider this third report of the Secretary-General. I will consider this matter further in the latter part of my remarks.

Finally, we come to the most important part of the report. It is most important because it will be the basis for our determining what action we will propose in the premises. I refer to the report of the Secretary-General on the state of compliance with the General Assembly resolutions of 2 November and 7 November."

....

(at page 13-15): "I would therefore ask the following questions. If the questions appear to be addressed to the Secretary-General, I would like to make it clear that they may be answered by him now if he wants to do so. But if he feels that the answers to my questions may weaken, impair or in some way affect the progress of his present negotiations with any of the Governments concerned, and therefore impair the chances of success for a more workable arrangement with a view to securing compliance with the Assembly's resolutions, I shall not ask him to do so. He may answer my questions at any time in the future when he thinks it proper in the interests of peace and the successful conclusion of the matters we are now tackling."

(at page 16): "We were told that the Secretary-General has given his interpretations of the functions of the international force to President Nasser. My question is: are those interpretations those which are contained in paragraph 12 of his second and final report, or has he made some other interpretations which in his view are warranted by the General Assembly resolutions of 2 and 7 November? If so, what are those interpretations that he has given, and of which we should know?"

Secondly, on page 3 of the Secretary-General's report contained in document A/3376, there is the following statement:

'Although the work is not proposed to begin' - the reference here is to the operation of clearing the Canal - 'until after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian forces from the Port Said and the Canal area...' (A/3376, page 3)

May I know whether the Secretary-General has given an assurance to the President of Egypt that the clearing of the Canal will not commence until the non-Egyptian forces have been withdrawn? Has this been given by the Secretary-General as an assurance to the President of Egypt, that although he is taking preliminary steps for the survey of the Canal, the entry into contracts with private firms for this purpose, that as a matter of decision on his part the operations for the clearing of the Canal will not commence until the withdrawal of the non-Egyptian forces can be considered as a fait accompli? If so, has the Secretary-General given President Nasser this assurance?

I repeat, I do not ask the Secretary-General to answer me now. I will give him time to consider the time elements so far as his pending negotiations are concerned. The primary aim of my delegation is to secure a successful conclusion to all these negotiations, but this is an important matter about which the General Assembly has to know."

....

(at page 18): "That is one of the provisions, but the third important point is the opening of the Canal. No doubt, since the resolution speaks of the opening of the Canal, that is one of the functions to be assumed, if I understand correctly the interpretation of the Secretary-General, which I believe is a correct interpretation. Therefore, the Secretary-General has taken the initial steps to remove the obstructions,

at least in the form of exploring the technical possibilities and of exploring the propriety of entering into contracts with private firms. But the clearing of the Canal certainly is one of the functions to be performed by the Secretary-General acting through the forces."

....

(at page 21): "The last question I should like to ask is this: what does this Assembly propose to do in the light of the answer of Israel to the question of the Secretary-General? ... It reads as follows: (A/3384)

'Israel will willingly withdraw its forces from Egypt immediately upon the conclusion of satisfactory arrangements with the United Nations in connexion with the Emergency International Force. The "satisfactory arrangements", which Israel seeks are such as will ensure Israel's security against the recurrence of the threat or danger of attack, and against acts of belligerency by land or sea.'

....

(at page 22): "May I therefore ask the Governments concerned, and even the Secretary-General, to clarify all of those ambiguities which will place this body in the position of not being able to act logically and meeting the situation realistically."

....

(at pages 24-25 and 26): "Let us give the Secretary-General an opportunity to work out the pending negotiations and to remove the difficulties in his way and to find out from the parties concerned at what particular time they will be in a position to comply with these resolutions or whether they are willing to comply at all. Thus this body, at the opportune time, might be able to act with courage and

with candour, but I certainly think we are not being quite honest with ourselves if all we do is to receive reports from the Secretary-General when there is no compliance and merely reaffirm our previous resolutions, to be faced again, possibly, with another report of the Secretary-General that there is no compliance.

May I beg that we be realistic in meeting this situation. The way to meet this situation is as I have indicated. We can keep quiet for the time being on this report or, if we are to act at all, we merely have to request the Secretary-General or the parties concerned to co-operate with the Secretary-General in complying with these resolutions.

We would make it less difficult and strained as far as the actual situations are concerned. Mr. President, I must warn you and this Assembly that, if we act on the draft resolution presented by the twenty-one nations, in which we ask the parties, namely Israel, the United Kingdom and France, to comply forthwith with the resolutions, we are not pressuring in fact the parties themselves. The pressure is being put by this body upon the Secretary-General himself. The weight of the pressure, if one will realize the problems involved, is being made to bear upon the Secretary-General himself. We are not dealing with these countries directly.

Let us analyze the resolutions. We decide, but it is the Secretary-General who bears the weight of responsibility for interpreting and enforcing what we decide. The pressure, in effect, is being put upon the Secretary-General and not upon these parties, in the light of the replies. Would it be fair of us, at this time, considering that we have many things to read between the lines in the report of the Secretary-General, to press the Secretary-General, in effect, to tell these parties, 'You are asked to comply again'? Then the Secretary-General would come here, perhaps with a little embarrassment, and say:

'The parties have already replied. You have not given me the means. You told me your decision. I have already reported to you on how the parties feel about the situation and you are repeating your instructions to me again without giving me the means of enforcing your decision'."

....

(at page 27): "All we have to do is merely to authorize the Secretary-General to proceed with the pending negotiations, without of course closing the contracts."

Mr. PREOTHASA, Romania (A/PV.593 at page 31): "...The replies given to the Secretary-General by the British, French and Israeli Governments contain obvious efforts to temporize, to condition, the implementation of the General Assembly resolutions."

....

(at page 33-35): "We note from the reports of the Secretary-General that he mentions the question of the expenses involved in clearing the Suez Canal. It is the feeling of all of us that those who have caused the damage in Egypt should pay for the clearing of the Canal."

Mr. BOURGUIBA, Tunisia (A/PV.593 at page 37): "...We are told by the United Kingdom in paragraph 1 of its reply that no significant withdrawal has yet taken place, and we are told in another paragraph that the United Kingdom is prepared to withdraw its forces under certain conditions:

'If the Secretary-General can confirm that the Egyptian and Israeli Governments have accepted an unconditional cease-fire...'
(A/3384, Annex 3, page 1).

This condition may be regarded as a delaying manoeuvre because we shall see in a moment that Israel was going to set conditions and was not going to accept an unconditional cease-fire."

....

(at page 38-40): "These are the answers of the United Kingdom and France to the first question of the Secretary-General, whether any withdrawal of forces had taken place and, if so, to what extent."

....

(at page 42): "A third issue has been raised by the Secretary-General: he has asked Israel something which he did not ask of the United Kingdom and France. He has asked for the opportunity to send observers into the Gaza area in order to ensure and observe the cessation of hostilities."

Mr. LOEGL, United States (A/PV.593 at page 51): "The General Assembly has before it the report of the Secretary-General relating to the presence and functioning of the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt and his report on the clearing of the Suez Canal. We approve his statement and his reports."

The United States also believes that the Secretary-General's aide-mémoire (A/3375, Annex) relating to the United Nations Force should be approved by the General Assembly. The translation into specific terms of the general principles laid down by the General Assembly concerning the nature and functions of the United Nations Emergency Force is both delicate and urgent. The United States agrees that there should be continuing discussions on an urgent basis between the Secretary-General and the Governments directly concerned to settle these matters in accordance with the recommendations of the General Assembly. The Secretary-General enjoys our full confidence as he proceeds with those talks.

...The Secretary-General's arrangements for the clearing process can begin now. We believe that he will be able to make these arrangements under the relevant General Assembly resolutions without any delay in the clearing operation."

594th Meeting (24 November 1956 at 3 p.m.)

Mr. ZAHNEDDINE, Syria (A/PV.594 at page 36): "...I wonder whether the Secretary-General would be able to tell us in fact whether Israel has withdrawn two brigades from the Sinai Peninsula, and whether these two brigades, if they were withdrawn from the Sinai Peninsula, were withdrawn to the Syrian frontier, and whether they were demobilized in Israel."

Mr. Krishna MENON, India (A/PV.594 at page 48): "...Similarly, we have here a document which, I believe, came into our hands at about 3 o'clock and one which came in a little before that. What do they say? They say:

'The question has been asked whether these withdrawals' - that is, withdrawals of Israel forces - 'include any substantial movements of Israel forces out of Egyptian territory back to the Israel side of the Egypt-Israel frontier.' (A/3389)

Those are not the questions asked by the Secretary-General, and I make bold to say that without referring to the text, because the Secretary-General has to go by the decisions of the Assembly. The Assembly asked for the withdrawal behind the armistice lines."

....

(at page 51): "But the fact remains that this Assembly has been in session, the Secretary-General has been urging withdrawal, we have been

talking about withdrawal - and is there anyone here who does not say that that has been a factor in promoting this withdrawal?

The letter of 21 November from Mr. Lloyd to the Secretary-General said that there had been no substantial withdrawal - and that was written in the context of the decision to withdraw one battalion. Therefore, the United Kingdom Government admits that the withdrawal of one battalion is not a substantial withdrawal."

....

(at page 53): "I want to state categorically, here and now, that I desire the Secretary-General, on behalf of my Government, to be reminded of the statement made by my delegation when agreeing to participation in the Emergency Force, to which I shall refer when the main debate comes - the statement as to the conditions and the context in which these forces were being formed and being used."

595th Meeting (26 November 1956 at 10:30 a.m.)

Mr. PALAMARCHUK, Ukrainian SSR (A/PV.595 at page 11): "... Two weeks ago, at the end of the emergency special session of the General Assembly, the United Kingdom and France conditioned the withdrawal of their forces from Egyptian territory upon the creation of a United Nations force and upon their entry into Egyptian territory. Today, as the first units of the United Nations Emergency Force have entered Egypt, the United Kingdom and France are presenting further conditions for the withdrawal of their forces. In the aide mémoire to the Secretary-General of 21 November, document A/3384, the Government of France declared that it remained ready to withdraw its armed forces as soon as the International Force is in a position to discharge its functions. In its answer, the United Kingdom Government said that the Anglo-French forces would be withdrawn "as soon as Her Majesty's Government are satisfied that the UNEF is in a position to assume effectively the task assigned to it under the General Assembly resolutions."

(at page 12): "... The expenses connected with the clearing of the Suez Canal and the salvage work which is involved, as well as the damages caused to Egypt, must be paid by those who were guilty of aggression, that is, France, the United Kingdom and Israel. The Government of the Ukrainian SSR sees no reason whatever for assuming any part of the burden of expenditure which is outlined in the report of the Secretary-General."

Mr. DEJANY, Saudi Arabia (A/PV.595 at page 13-15): "Last week the General Assembly was again called upon to consider the problem of the aggression against Egypt. We received full reports from the Secretary-General on the different aspects of the situation, but the one which caused us the greatest concern was the Secretary-General's report on the compliance with the General Assembly resolutions of 2 and 7 November. Our concern was based more on what the Secretary-General did not say than on what he said in his report."

....

(at page 22): "... The applicability of the unconditional withdrawal of the foreign forces in the 2 November resolution to the invading forces of the United Kingdom and France was made very clear by the Secretary-General in the General Assembly on 7 November when, in reply to questions raised on this very point, he said the following :

'In my view, it does follow from the resolution of 2 November that all non-Egyptian forces -- with the obvious exception of the United Nations Force which will be there with the consent of the Egyptian Government -- have to withdraw from Egyptian territory. It goes without saying that 'Egyptian territory' in this context must be understood in the sense which follows from international law and the Armistice Agreement.'

(A/PV.567, pages 57, 58-60)

Mr. RIZK, Lebanon (A/PV.595 at page 31): "... However, to get the clear picture of the rebelliousness of this strange trio of aggressors against the world Organization and of how little they thought of its solemn decisions, one must revert to the report which the Secretary-General has submitted (A/3384) on compliance with the General Assembly resolutions of 2 and 7 November."

....

The French Government, for example, far from informing the Secretary-General of the immediate withdrawal of its forces, advises him, on the contrary, that the Anglo-French forces are settling down for a long occupation of the Suez Canal zone and that they are disposed in such a manner as to 'fulfil the task of defense, policing and repairs, which is incumbent' upon them (A/3384, annex 1)."

....

(at page 32): "We are studying plans for withdrawal," says the French Government in reply to Mr. Hammarskjold's query."

....

"As soon as Her Majesty's Government are satisfied that the UNEF is in a position to assume effectively the tasks assigned to it under the Assembly resolutions, the Anglo-French forces will be withdrawn", says the United Kingdom Government's reply to Mr. Hammarskjold's inquiry about withdrawal."

(at page 33): "In its reply to Mr. Hammarskjold, Israel says that it 'will willingly withdraw its forces from Egypt immediately upon the conclusion of satisfactory arrangements with the United Nations in connexion with the Emergency International Force'.

(A/3384, annex 2) The 'satisfactory arrangements' which Israel seeks are, according to the reply, 'such as will ensure Israel's security against the recurrence of the threat or danger of attack, and against acts of belligerency by land or sea'."

....

(at page 37): "There is no intent in the establishment of the Force", said Mr. Hammarskjold in his report of 6 November, "to influence the military balance in the present conflict and, thereby, the political balance affecting efforts to settle the conflict." This precise definition of the functions of the International Force rules out any peace conditions put by Israel for the withdrawal of its forces, as it rules out any question of the settlement of the Suez Canal problem as a condition for the withdrawal of the invading forces."

....

Mr. CASEY, Australia (A/PV.595 at page 46): "However, I would like to say something on matters raised by the Secretary-General's reports. First, I should like to congratulate the Secretary-General and General Burns on the progress that they have made towards the establishment and movement into position of the United Nations Emergency Force."

....

(at page 47): "It is common knowledge that the Secretary-General has encountered considerable difficulty in making arrangements for an effectively organized force to enter Egypt."

....

I have not heard of any action at all by the Egyptian Government to reopen the section of the Canal that is under its control, except to request the Secretary-General's assistance. But the Secretary-General's attempts to get some arrangements under way have been obstructed by Egypt's pretension that the Anglo-French force should complete its withdrawal before clearing operations begin -- a position which, so far as I can see, has no foundation in the resolution adopted by the Assembly on 2 November."

....

Mr. SHTYLLA, Albania (A/PV.595 at page 64-65): "As regards the reports of the Secretary-General on the clearing of the Suez Canal and the operations of the Emergency Force, the position of my delegation is the following : the Government of the People's Republic of Albania supported fully the legitimate right of Egypt to nationalize the Suez Canal Company.... The Suez Canal was closed only after the aggression of the United Kingdom, France and Israel against Egypt....

The complete responsibility for the situation must be placed upon the aggressor countries."

Mr. LOUW, Union of South Africa (A/PV.595 at page 67): "The South African delegation notes that the United Kingdom and French Governments have offered at their own expense to clear the canal under United Nations supervision. We suggest that this offer be accepted and that they be asked to get on with the job as soon as possible.

(at page 68-70): The Secretary-General's report, however, is far from clear as to whether this offer will be accepted. Indeed, the contrary seems to be suggested. The proposals of the Secretary-General may very well entail a very large expenditure. It is by no means clear who is to bear the costs involved — costs which some sources have estimated will be as high as \$40 million. Yet the Assembly has now authorized the Secretary-General :

'...to enter into the financial commitments that are unavoidable, although he is not now in a position to indicate the size of those initial commitments.' (A/3376, page 2)

Since the debate on Saturday, it has been brought to my notice that in giving the authorization the Assembly has, incidentally, completely ignored its rule of procedure 154 relating to estimates of expenditure. This authorization has also possibly committed the Organization to expenditure of the most questionable justification in the light of the offers made to clear the canal under United Nations supervision without any charge. One wonders how many of the delegations that voted for the resolution appreciated the probable commitments which they have undertaken."

Mrs. MEIR, Israel (A/PV.595 at page 71): "In order to leave no possibility of doubt in the minds of the members of this Assembly, the representative of Israel stated categorically that the equivalent of two infantry brigades had been withdrawn from Egypt to the Israel side of the line established in the Armistice Agreement of 24 February 1949. In spite of all this, sixty-three members of this Assembly voted for a resolution which contained the statement that no Israel forces had been withdrawn behind the demarcation lines.

Two explanations have been given. One is that the resolution adopted refers only to communications included in the Secretary-General's report of 21 November (A/3384), and as the two communications from my delegation bear the date of 24 November, they do not, therefore, fall within the compass of the resolution. This argument is, I regret to say, somewhat specious. The General Assembly does not deal with past history, but with current events. The information concerning the withdrawal of the two Israel brigades was, as I have already made clear, presented to the Assembly well before the vote and there was ample time to make an appropriate change in the text of the resolution."

....

(at page 72): "The second explanation, proffered from this rostrum by more than one representative, but perhaps more forcefully by the representative of India, is the most extraordinary of all. According to the representative of India, it was not clear that the two brigades have been withdrawn from Egypt according to the terms of the resolution of 2 November, that is to say, over the 1949 Armistice line.

The representative of India actually undertook to amend the text if Israel made it clear that the withdrawal was indeed over the 1949 Armistice lines. The representative of Israel lost no time in giving this assurance, but there was no response from the representative of India....
.... The delegation of Israel is prepared immediately, and has so again informed the Secretary-General officially, to enter into discussions with him or his designated representatives on the arrangements, which in our view must be made in order to implement the resolutions of the General Assembly in their entirety.

....

596th Meeting (26 November 1956 at 3 p.m.)

Mr. ALDUNATE, Chile (A/PV.596 at page 3): "Why should we evoke facts that are contained in the report of the Secretary-General of 21 November and say that two-thirds of these forces remain or that all such forces remain ? Who had the exact statistics ? Who had the latest figures ? How could we say it was two-thirds ? Perhaps it was two-thirds minus two."

....

Mr. KING, Liberia (A/PV.596 at page 6): "In the report of the Secretary-General, one of the conditions set out by President Nasser for the clearing of the Canal is the withdrawal of such invading troops. On page 2 of document A/3376, the Secretary-General pointed out that :

'In the course of the discussions between the Government of Egypt and the Secretary-General, the Government of Egypt expressed its wish to see the operation completed with the utmost speed. In view of the interest of the Government of Egypt, as well as of the interest of all the users of the Canal the Secretary-General feels that the most expeditious procedure to achieve the desired results should be followed in connexion with the matter'." (A/3376)

(at page 7): "On page 3 he summed up as follows:

'Although the work is not proposed to begin until after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian forces from the Port Said and the Canal area, the Secretary-General considers it possible to pursue negotiations and, in agreement with the Government of Egypt, to arrange for the necessary survey of the conditions in the Canal without delay.' (A/3376)

From my delegation's point of view, the complete and speedy withdrawal of the invading forces from Egyptian territory and the evacuation of the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula by Israeli forces to the demarcation lines established by the Armistice Agreement of 1949 would seem to be the prerequisite for operation to be commenced and undertaken for the clearing of the Canal. A partial or token withdrawal in our opinion would not effect the desired ends nor ease the very acute and grave situation."

Mr. de la COLINA, Mexico (A/PV.596 at page 9-10): "...I am quoting the second paragraph on page 2:

'At the present stage the Secretary-General is not prepared to indicate how the costs should be shared. He intends to revert to this question when the approximate costs have been estimated. He will at the proper stage of the negotiations request the necessary authority to conclude agreements concerning the operation.' (A/3376)

Then this document goes on in the next paragraph:

'That is why he suggests to the General Assembly to authorize him' - the Secretary-General - 'in consultation with the

Advisory Committee set up under the resolution of the General Assembly of 2 November 1956, to enter into the financial commitments that are unavoidable, although he is not now in a position to indicate the size of those initial commitments.' (Ibid.)

My delegation feels that it would be neither just nor convenient that we nations, who are completely guiltless with regard to the causes for the Canal's being closed up, should now be called upon to contribute funds for the clearance of the Canal. Therefore, may I point out right away, my country will neither directly nor indirectly permit any portion whatever of these expenses to be laid at the door of my Government."

Mr. Krishna MENON, India (A/PV.596 at page 18-20): "...The Assembly will recall that, as a result of the fact that Egypt's action in nationalizing the Suez Canal was challenged, conferences were held in London; negotiations took place; and, finally, the Governments of the United Kingdom and France brought the problem before the Security Council. Some time in October, agreements were reached on the basis for discussions. It was understood at that time by the world that the parties concerned were to talk directly to each other, using the good offices of the Secretary-General, and were to explore further the question of resolving the differences between Egypt and the two Western countries."

....

(at page 21): "So far as my Government is aware, the Secretary-General had suggested provisionally that on 29 October these discussions should continue informally - because they would have no other status - between

the representatives of the United Kingdom and France and the representative of Egypt, with his assistance and that they should be held in Geneva."

....

(at page 37): "I have not seen any document so far, coming from the Government of Israel, which categorically informs the Secretary-General that any appreciable part of its troops ... have been withdrawn."

....

(at page 41): "Now the composition of the United Nations forces and the conditions upon which they work, are, in our view, governed by various documents. One of these governing conditions is contained in paragraph 12 of the final report of the Secretary-General, contained in document A/3302. So far as we are concerned during the discussion of this report, my delegation asked for certain clarifications and also put forward our interpretations of certain points, which interpretations were accepted by the Secretary-General during the public meeting.

The Secretary-General has stated that matters raised by the representative of India are not ones which he wishes to place before the Assembly. The text of the speech to which I refer is as follows:

'I shall speak very briefly. The representative of India has raised a great number of points. On several he has attempted an interpretation of what I intended to say, and I think I can say that on all those points, to the extent that I could fully grasp what the representative said, I can confirm that his interpretation of my intentions is correct.' (A/PV.567, page 76)

....

The Secretary-General declared that it was his intention to negotiate with the Government of Egypt concerning the conditions of

operation by the United Nations forces, having regard to the agreed list and the balanced composition. At this time it would be possible to begin the transition of troops."

....

(at page 43): "The Secretary-General is adopting the resolution which my delegation had the honour to co-sponsor and, I want this clearly understood by the Assembly, this is not a final resolution - it is a resolution giving the Secretary-General authorization and power to undertake the necessary expenditures in order to carry out the proposals before the Assembly."

....

(at page 44-45): "I understand the Secretary-General has other arrangements in hand and we were very happy to note that the Secretary of State of the United Kingdom offered every co-operation, and we have every reason to believe that such co-operation would include the taking into account of these difficulties of personnel and so on. Therefore, the contributions would be of a character which do not impinge on the circumstances which prevail at the present time."

....

Now I think that is all my delegation desires to say but I hope that very soon it will be possible for the Secretary-General to advise this Assembly of the extent of damage to property and loss of life which is involved, and the need for relief required in Egypt."

....

(at page 46): "Therefore, we would suggest that the time has come for the Assembly to consider receiving a report from a highly creditable

authority - that is, the International Red Cross - and also to consider appointing a group of its own members to send their representatives into these areas, with the permission of the parties concerned, to apprise themselves of these conditions."

Mr. ARNALDO CATALAN, Guatemala (A/PV.596 at page 47): "...The delegation of Guatemala abstained when a separate vote was taken on the draft resolution submitted by Canada, Colombia, India, Norway, the United States and Yugoslavia (A/3386), concerning the clearing of the Suez Canal, since, according to the report of the Secretary-General (A/3376), the authorization given to the Secretary-General has certain financial implications and, in order to cope with these implications, it is not sufficient merely to consult the Committee set up by the resolution of 2 November."

....

(at page 51): "...the most important aspect of the statement made by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd is that part in which he said:

'We have great confidence in the Secretary-General and we believe that he and the General Assembly will in good faith see that the Force is effective and competent to carry out those tasks. On that basis we have agreed to withdraw our forces'. (A/PV.591, page 41)

That was stated by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd on 23 November this year. My delegation understands from this statement that the United Kingdom Government will accept the views and the criteria of the Secretary-General with regard to the competence and efficacy of the United Nations Emergency Force in fulfilling the task entrusted to it by the General Assembly, but I would add that these tasks do not include

that of substituting any invading forces in those functions. In other words, no warlike occupation is included in the functions or the motivations for the setting up of the Emergency Force."

Mr. KUZNETSOV, USSR (A/PV.596 at page 67): "...As regards the expenditure connected with clearing the Canal and repairing the damage there, the Secretary-General's report in essence predetermines the question, in the sense that it provides that the expenditure should be borne by the United Nations.

....

The aide-mémoire annexed to the Secretary-General's report does not deal directly with the financial implications of the presence and functioning of the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt. An annex to another report of the Secretary-General (A/3383), however, contains a draft resolution on the financial implications of the maintenance of the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt. This draft resolution prejudges the question, in the sense that it provides that the expenditure connected with the maintenance of the Emergency Force in Egypt should be borne by the United Nations."

The SECRETARY-GENERAL (A/PV.596 at pages 93-95, 96 and 97): "Members of the General Assembly will have received, this morning, in A/3383(Annex)Rev.1, a revised text of the draft resolution that was appended to my report of 21 November on Administrative and Financial Arrangements for the United Nations Emergency Force.

In order to assist the General Assembly in its consideration of the revised draft resolution, might I offer the following explanations and comments.

The resolution in the 'stripped-down' form in which it is now presented seeks to limit the action required to be taken at this stage

by the General Assembly in plenary session to some three or four basic matters on which decisions are urgently needed in order that the establishment and operations of the Force may proceed without interruption and delay.

I have accordingly considered it imperative to seek the concurrence of the General Assembly in the following matters: (1) the establishment of United Nations Emergency Force Special Account; (2) the establishment of this Account in an initial amount of \$10 million; (3) the authorization of advances from the Working Capital Fund for the purposes of interim financing of the Force; (4) authorization to establish necessary rules and procedures and to make necessary administrative arrangements for the purpose of ensuring effective financial administration and control of the Account so established.

Firstly, let me make it abundantly clear that the draft resolution I have offered, both in its original and in its revised form, relates solely and exclusively to arrangements regarding the Emergency Force, and in no way to other responsibilities which the United Nations may acquire in the area.

Secondly, I wish to make it equally clear that, while funds received and payments made with respect to the Force are to be considered as coming outside the regular budget of the Organization, the operation is essentially a United Nations responsibility and the Special Account to be established must, therefore, be construed as coming within the meaning of Article 17 of the Charter. It follows from this that the Secretary-General will be obligated to follow to a maximum degree the regular financial rules and regulations of the Organization, as well as the machinery and processes that have been laid down by the General Assembly for the purpose of financial review and control.

Having regard to the scope and complexity of the financial operations involved, it is indeed my intention to make special arrangements for a continuing independent audit to be carried out of all financial transactions concerning the Force.

Thirdly, it has been my assumption in processing the revised resolution that Member Governments, while recognizing the need for taking certain decisions without delay, will nevertheless wish to follow established procedures to the fullest extent practicable. Accordingly, I have felt it wise to suggest that such problems as allocation of costs among Member States should be deferred temporarily, pending an opportunity of their being properly and adequately considered and discussed in the appropriate Committee of the Assembly, that is, the Fifth Committee. Such action as the plenary may see fit to take here and now would therefore be without prejudice to subsequent decisions on other complementary and supplementary financial arrangements that need to be made. I would, however, hope that the Fifth Committee and, as necessary, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, would give these matters priority consideration."

597th Meeting (27 November 1956 at 10:30 a.m.)

Mr. FAWZI, Egypt (A/PV.597 at page 23-25): "...Another important precedent in relation to the clearing of the Canal of obstructions might be in the process of being set by the United Nations. I have already referred to this matter in my brief submission to the Assembly when I pointed out, as I am doing again today, that the failure of the invading Powers to withdraw from Egypt is holding up and delaying the clearing of the Canal, and that we could not possibly conceive of such a clearing taking place as long as those forces remain in Egypt, as long as clashes continue, and as long as there is still a possibility of the recurrence of hostilities.

The General Assembly has already been informed by the Secretary-General that during his recent visit to Cairo he discussed this matter with the Government of Egypt, which addressed to him a request for assistance from the United Nations on arrangements for this purpose as a matter of priority and that the Government of Egypt considers that the work should start immediately upon the withdrawal of non-Egyptian forces from Egypt.

In relation to this matter, two points require particular attention, the first being the type of relationship between the United Nations and Egypt in this respect. The Government of Egypt requested the assistance of the United Nations in clearing the Suez Canal of obstructions. The United Nations, in its resolution adopted on the 23rd of this month, authorized the Secretary-General to proceed with the exploration of practical arrangements and the negotiation of agreements in this regard. It follows from this that it will be the Egyptian Government which will assume the work of clearing the Canal of obstructions, with the assistance of the United Nations, in pursuance of the resolution of the General Assembly and of the agreements which would be concluded with the Government of Egypt.

The second point is that relating to the equities, the responsibilities and liabilities in regard to the destruction of installations and property, and to the paralyzing of traffic in the Canal which resulted from the aggression committed by Israel, France and the United Kingdom."

....

(at page 26): "The Secretary-General in his letter written yesterday to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel stated that he would not permit the conditions placed by Israel on the withdrawal of its armed forces to delay, in any way, the withdrawal of these forces in compliance with the unqualified and unconditional demand of the General Assembly."

....

(at page 31): "My delegation, therefore, requests that the Secretary-General make an immediate communication to the Government of France in order to put the mind of the General Assembly at rest in regard to this report because, if it is false, it is very necessary, in the interests of peaceful developments, that its circulation should be frustrated. I make this request and I leave it in your hands, Mr. President, for a few minutes to find out whether, without a formal motion, this can be done. We have no desire to prolong our proceedings in this matter, and if the Secretary-General would agree to make such a move on his own authority, it would not be necessary for the Assembly to proceed by way of a formal motion."

624th Meeting (18 December 1956 at 3 p.m.)

Mr. GISCARD D'ESTAING, France (A/PV.624 at page 51): "...Since 21 November, when we addressed an aide-mémoire to the Secretary-General, my delegation has been pointing out the arbitrary measures which have been taken in Egypt against French nationals. We referred to this again on 22 and 30 November last, and we wish to pay tribute to the Secretary-General for his efforts to reach an equitable solution, but no precise assurances have been made concerning safeguards. On the contrary, individual decisions have changed into a general attitude, and that is what has prompted us to place this matter before the General Assembly."

630th Meeting (21 December 1956 at 10:30 a.m.)

Mr. RIFA'I, Jordan (A/PV.630 at page 32): "...On 19 November, the Israeli representative, in a reply to the questions of the Secretary-General concerning the withdrawal of the Israel forces from Egyptian territory, repeated his Government's same equivocations. Although the resolutions of the first emergency special session called upon Israel, in a very clear and emphatic manner, to withdraw its forces immediately behind the armistice line, the Israel Government ignored such orders and informed the Secretary-General that it had withdrawn its forces only for varying distances along the Egyptian front."

....

(at pages 33 and 34-35): "I am conscious of the fact that my colleagues here might be waiting for a progress report by the Secretary-General so that they would act in the light of it. I am confident that the Secretary-General is in a position to give us such a report before the Assembly recesses. My delegation is anxious to hear from the Secretary-General, today if possible, a statement in which he would kindly clarify the situation in respect to the withdrawal of the Israel forces behind the armistice line and the withdrawal of the British and French troops from Egyptian territory. On the other hand, we should be grateful if he could give us information about the destruction which took place in Port Said and about the extent of the demolitions in Sinai. Other matters of particular importance to my delegation are the atrocities which are practised on the Arab population in the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip and the policy of Israel in this area.

I hope that my request to the Secretary-General will not be inconvenient to him."

632nd Meeting (21 December 1956 at 8:30 p.m.)

The SECRETARY-GENERAL (A/PV.632 at pages 3, 4, 5 and 6-7): "This morning the representative of Jordan directed to me certain questions. To the extent that I am in a position to reply to these questions I would like to use this opportunity to do so.

The first question put to me was concerned with the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces behind the armistice lines. The four resolutions of the General Assembly relating to withdrawal of forces from Egypt, as the Members of the General Assembly will remember, call for the withdrawal of Israeli forces behind the armistice lines. The last of these resolutions, adopted on 24 November, called for compliance 'forthwith' with the previous requests. As of today, the extent of Israeli withdrawal, and the further withdrawal in prospect, are as follows:

On 1 December the representative of Israel informed the Secretary-General by letter that on the morning of 3 December, Israeli forces would be removed from 'a wide belt of territory (about 50 kilometres) in proximity to the Suez Canal along its entire length...'. This withdrawal has been confirmed by General Burns, and elements of the United Nations Emergency Force immediately entered this area, although progress in it has been impeded because of minefields and destroyed roads.

On 11 December, the representative of Israel informed the Secretary-General 'that Israel was now ready to effect further withdrawals of Israeli troops in the Sinai Peninsula, in order to enable the United Nations Emergency Force to extend its occupation eastwards', and invited a meeting between the Commander of the United Nations Emergency Force and the Israeli General Staff to discuss arrangements to this effect.

General Burns met with General Dayan, the Israeli Commander, on the morning of 16 December. General Dayan informed General Burns that according to his instructions the Israeli forces were to be withdrawn from the Sinai Peninsula at the approximate rate of 25 kilometres per week during the 'next few weeks'. General Burns recalled to General Dayan that the Israelis were expected to withdraw behind the armistice lines as rapidly as possible. He felt sure that the rate mentioned would not be acceptable to the Secretary-General.

Specific arrangements presented at the same time provided for the withdrawal of Israeli forces on 18 December to Misfaq on the El Qantara - El Arish road, and to Bir Gafgafa on the Ismailia-El Auja road. The Israelis stated that on the road from Suez to Elath they had already withdrawn to Sudr el Heitan. In each such withdrawal, the United Nations Emergency Force contingents would advance to within five kilometres of the Israeli positions. In the Suez Gulf coast region, the Israeli forces were to withdraw from Sudr on the morning of 19 December, with a UNEF detachment moving promptly forward to take over the oil well installations at that place. The specific withdrawal arrangements for the 18th and 19th of December were accepted by General Burns.

Subject to further discussion and in addition to the above withdrawals, it was assumed as a tentative arrangement that within a week the United Nations Emergency Force would move forward approximately another 25 kilometres on roads eastward from the Canal, and also to Wadi Firham on the Suez Gulf coast. It was agreed that a 'reconnaissance party' of UNEF would proceed immediately to El-Arish to obtain information regarding the billeting and other requirements of UNEF preparatory to its entry there.

It was estimated by my military adviser, General Martola, and his military aides, that the pace and schedule for the Israeli withdrawal reported to General Burns by General Dayan on 16 December would mean that from four to six weeks might elapse before the withdrawal would bring Israeli forces 'behind the armistice lines', as required by the resolutions of the General Assembly.

The assumption by General Burns that the pace of withdrawal proposed by General Dayan would be unacceptable to me was confirmed to a member of the Israeli delegation on 17 December.

Specific Israeli proposals for withdrawals of their force beyond what was agreed upon on 19 December were presented the same day to General Burns. In substance, they provided for a further withdrawal of only some 20 kilometres along the main roads. General Burns informed General Dayan that these proposals were inadequate. On 20 December I informed the representative of Israel that this schedule of withdrawal, which had no completion date, was inconsistent with the intention of the resolutions of the General Assembly and unsatisfactory. The representative of Israel informed his Government to this effect.

Today the representative of Israel has presented a new withdrawal proposal which had been received from his Government and which superseded the proposal of 19 December. This envisages that the remaining Israeli withdrawal will take place in two phases. In the first phase, no Israeli forces would be 'west of El Arish' after the first week in January, although Israeli occupation of Sharm al Shaikh and Tirana would continue. The details of this phase of the withdrawal are to be worked out in another meeting between General Burns and General Dayan. The second phase would involve full Israeli withdrawal, understood to mean behind the Armistice Lines, at an unstated date.

Despite the difficulties encountered by the United Nations Emergency Force in its advance into the Sinai Peninsula, resulting from mine fields and destroyed roads some limitations in communications and transport and the nature of the terrain, the force is prepared to move forward at whatever pace may be required by a rapid Israeli withdrawal behind the armistice lines as envisaged by the General Assembly.

The second question put to me this morning was concerned with the withdrawal of French and British troops from Egyptian territory. The Anglo-French withdrawal from Port Said is in a very late phase, and I do not feel that it calls for any specific comments from my side.

The third question was regarding the destruction which took place in Port Said. So far, I have no specific information on that point.

Another question was to what extent there had been demolition in Sinai. On that point I wish only to refer to a letter from the Permanent Representative of Israel to me, which was circulated last week to delegations of the General Assembly, according to which the Israeli Government gave assurances that no demolition would take place in Sinai. As to the extent to which such demolition may have taken place, I am not in possession of any exact information.

Finally, the representative of Jordan referred to 'atrocities which had been practised on the Arab population in the Sinai Peninsula'. Again, I am not in a position to make any comments. He referred also to the Gaza Strip and the policy of Israel in that area. Shortly, the reports will be circulated on the present state of affairs of Gaza as well as the developments under UNRRA in Gaza.

As regards the policy of Israel in this area, I have no specific information to give to the General Assembly."

Mr. RIFA'I, Jordan (A/PV.632 at page 8): "I come to the rostrum only to express my deep gratitude to the Secretary-General for having been so kind as to give us this report. My delegation will give it full consideration."

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638th Meeting (17 January 1957 at 10:30 a.m.)

Mr. GUNewardene, Ceylon (A/PV.638 at pages 4 and 5-6): "...The resolutions adopted by the General Assembly are very specific in saying that they must go beyond the Armistice line. Not one word is mentioned about this in the communications, and the Secretary-General, in his report, says that this is a matter for further discussion.

May I submit, in all humility and with due respect, that this is not a subject for discussion. This is a mandate given by the Assembly, a mandate to the Secretary-General to see that it is enforced, carried out, and a mandate to Israel that the order should be complied with. So that I would not accept the position that this is a matter for further discussion. Certainly the Secretary-General and the Government of Israel may have talks, as many as they like, but I am sure that the General Assembly is not in a mood to vary its findings, which have been repeated so many times."

....

"The Secretary-General can certainly hold discussions with the Government of Israel, and the Government of Israel has the fullest liberty of holding any talks they like with the Secretary-General. But the mandate of the General Assembly is quite clear. The finding of the Assembly is that they must withdraw their troops from Egyptian territory. Surely Sharm Al-Sheikh is part of Egyptian territory. That is not contested, just as the islands on the opposite side constitute Egyptian territory."

Sir Percy SPENDER, Australia (A/PV.638 at pages 27 and 28): "...I should now like to refer briefly to the report of the Secretary-General in document A/3500. The Secretary-General's report is a factual and non-contentious account of his negotiations with the Government of Israel, and my Government finds itself largely in accord with the conclusions he has drawn. I observe with pleasure that the Secretary-General states, in paragraph 14, that:

'The international significance of the Gulf of Aqaba may be considered to justify the right of innocent passage through the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf in accordance with recognized rules of international law.'

I agree that this discussion of this question does not fall within the mandate of the Secretary-General, but I do wish to reiterate that the question is one which must be faced by the General Assembly. I am also happy to note that the Secretary-General considers that the basic function of the United Nations Emergency Force gives the Force great value as a background for efforts towards solving such pending problems to which the Secretary-General has referred, those of Gaza and the Gulf of Aqaba. Subject to the remarks which I have made in the course of my statement, I consider that the General Assembly should take note of and approve the report of the Secretary-General."

Mr. de FREITAS-VALLE, Brazil (A/PV.638 at page 29-30): "...Upon receiving the present report, the moment seems proper to reaffirm our confidence in the Secretary-General. I shall go further and say that the success of the long and difficult negotiations that must perforce

be undertaken will depend to a great extent on the freedom of action granted him (sic) by the 'Secretary-General'."

....

(at page 31): "We can be gratified, however, by the statement of 14 January made by the Israel Government according to which the Sinai Desert would be entirely evacuated by Israel forces by 22 January. The fact that an exception to this decision will be made in connexion with the strip on the Western coast of the Gulf of Aqaba detracts considerably from our expressed satisfaction. We also note with regret that no mention has been made of the future plans of the Israel Government concerning the region of Gaza.

The position of the United Nations in the face of this new development seems to us to be quite clear. The General Assembly can do no less than to abide unflinchingly by the terms of the resolution of 2 November, which calls for the prompt withdrawal of all forces behind the armistice line. As the Secretary-General very correctly points out in his report, both regions fall on the Egyptian side of the armistice demarcation line. The Israel Government does not contest this fact, to my knowledge."

....

(at page 32): "The physical presence of the United Nations in this disputed area might well prove to be the key to the solution of a most challenging international issue. As the Secretary-General remarked in his report, the basic function of the UNEF gives the Force great value as a background for efforts toward resolving such pending problems, although it is not in itself a means to that end....

The report of the Secretary-General states that the withdrawal is a preliminary - and I stress the word 'preliminary' - and essential phase in a development through which a stable basis may be laid for peaceful conditions in the area. This, if I am not mistaken, is exactly what the Government of Israel is striving for."

....

(at page 33): "Let us also hope that the Secretary-General will be entrusted with the necessary powers to go into the substance of the causes underlying the unfortunate state of affairs that still prevails in the Middle East. A final settlement of the problems confronting Israel and the Arab nations is the ultimate aim that should be relentlessly pursued."

Mrs. MAIR, Israel (A/PV.638 at pages 36 and 37): "...The Secretary-General, in his discussions with Israel representatives, had indicated that the clearing of the Suez Canal was the most urgent and immediate problem, after which one could deal with the general problem of withdrawal in the Sinai Desert and, finally, with the particular problem of the Sharm el-Sheikh area....

On 8 January 1957 Israeli forces withdrew to a more easterly line, leaving no Israeli forces west of El Arish. As a result of this action, the major part of the Sinai Desert was evacuated. Thus the undertaking of the Israel Government transmitted by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly on 24 December had been precisely fulfilled.

On 8 January, as soon as the previous phase of withdrawal had been completed, the Israel Government informed the Secretary-General of its decision to withdraw another twenty-five to thirty kilometres throughout the Sinai Desert except in the area of Sharm el-Sheikh. This action

enabled the entry of United Nations Emergency Force into El Arish and St. Catherine's Monastery.

On 14 January, one day before the previous phase of withdrawal was due for completion, the Israel Government communicated its decision to have the Sinai Desert entirely evacuated by Israel forces on 22 January, with the exception of the Sharm el-Sheikh area; that is the strip on the west coast of the Gulf of Aqaba which at present ensures freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran and in the Gulf of Aqaba. At the same time my Government informed the Secretary-General of its willingness to enter forthwith into conversations with him in connexion with the evacuation of this strip. At a meeting on 14 January the Israel representative also indicated the desire of my Government to begin discussions at an early date on the arrangements envisaged for the Gaza area."

....

(at page 39): "In our talks with the Secretary-General on withdrawal it was mutually understood at all times that the Sharm el-Sheikh and Gaza areas were reserved for discussions at a later stage in the withdrawal process."

....

(at page 42-45): "In his Note to the General Assembly the Secretary-General refers to 'the international significance of the Gulf of Aqaba' which justifies 'the right of innocent passage through the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf in accordance with rules of international law'."

....

(at page 49-50): "Because the problem of the Sharm el-Sheikh area raises such grave issues it has been reserved for discussion to this

late stage. It was no doubt for this reason that in conversations between the Israeli representative and the Secretary-General it was mutually understood that the very complication of the problems, and the international interest involved, implied a need for negotiation in order to safeguard that international interest, and that therefore this belonged to a later state of the general withdrawal."

....

(at page 51): "In his Note to the General Assembly the Secretary-General states that 'Further discussions with the representatives of Israel are required' on the question of the Gaza strip (A/3500, paragraph 9). On 14 January, Israel representatives stated that they were ready for such discussions at an early date. At this stage I wish only to describe the general background of our thinking on the Gaza question."

....

(at page 56): "The report submitted by the representative of the Secretary-General, Lieutenant-Colonel Nelson, who visited the Gaza Strip at the end of November, lies before the General Assembly as document A/3491." (quotes from the report)

....

(at page 58): "But we must not ignore the report of the representative of the Secretary-General, who states that:

'Removal of any effective authority from the area would cause an eruption, either by the refugees or local inhabitants in the form of looting or destruction of property.' (A/3491, page 3)

....

(at page 59-60): "I do not doubt that if the General Assembly leaves room for that consideration the progress already recorded in the Secretary-General's note can be crowned by arrangements which will eliminate the prospects of the renewal of belligerency by land and by sea. In the pursuit of such arrangements, my delegation will bend every resource of heart and mind in the days that lie ahead."

Mr. URRUTIA, Colombia (A/PV.638 at page 67): "...Yesterday we were told that a number of Asian and African countries would submit a proposal that set a deadline of five days for the withdrawal of the troops and contemplated the imposition of sanctions if this was not carried out. Now, after consultation, these countries have decided to limit their proposal to the text that has been distributed in document A/3501/Rev.1 which merely requests the Secretary-General to continue his efforts for securing the complete withdrawal of Israel in pursuance of the above-mentioned resolutions, and to report on such completion to the General Assembly, within five days."

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639th Meeting (17 January 1957 at 3 p.m.)

Mr. RIFA'I, Jordan (A/PV.639 at page 11): "...On 8 November Israel stated in document A/3320 its willingness to withdraw its forces from Egypt. In reading the Israeli communication included in the last report of the Secretary-General, dated 15 January, we find the following in paragraph 4: 'By 22 January the Sinai Desert will be entirely evacuated by Israel forces with the exception of the Sharm el-Shaikh area'. In paragraph 5 of this report the Secretary-General states:

'The intentions of the Government of Israel concerning compliance with the resolutions by withdrawal of Israel forces from the Gaza Strip have not been made known to the Secretary-General.' "

....

"The Secretary-General states in his last report: 'Under the terms of the General Assembly resolution, the forces should be withdrawn from these territories.' (paragraph 13) Then Mr. Hammarskjöld goes on to say the following with respect to the right of passage through the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba:

'The Secretary-General has not considered that a discussion of the various aspects of this matter, and its possible relation to the action requested in the General Assembly resolutions on the Middle East crisis, falls within the mandate established for him in the resolution of 4 November.' (paragraph 14)"

....

(at page 12): "The functions of this Force are known to representatives here and have been fully indicated in previous resolutions and reports. I should like to quote in this respect the explanation of the Secretary-

General concerning the establishment of the United Nations

Emergency Force:

'...It follows from its terms of reference that there is no intent in the establishment of the force to influence the military balance in the present conflict and, thereby, the political balance affecting efforts to settle the conflict...'

(A/3302, paragraph 8)"

....

(at page 13-15): "The draft resolution circulated in the Assembly (A/3501/Rev.1), co-sponsored by twenty-five Powers, is considered by my delegation as giving to Israel a last chance to complete its withdrawal behind the Armistice Demarcation Line of 1949. We trust that the Secretary-General will report such completion within five days."

Mr. LODGE, United States (A/PV.639 at pages 16 and 17): "...In his latest communication the Secretary-General reports that the Israel Government intends to evacuate its forces from Sinai by 22 January, with exception of the Sharm el-Shaikh area. The Secretary-General also reports that the intentions of the Government of Israel regarding withdrawal of its forces from the Gaza Strip have not yet been made known to him. He assumes that Israel wishes to make further observations on this question. This assumption is based on the oral statement of the representative of Israel

'that his Government is prepared "at an early stage" to discuss with the Secretary-General "proposals for arrangements for the Gaza Strip'. (A/3500/Add.1)"

....

"We have supported each of the resolutions of the General Assembly giving effect to this essential principle. We continue to hold this view and will vote for the draft resolution now before the Assembly. In taking this position we recognize the need for further consultations with General Burns and the Secretary-General in preparation for the withdrawal of the Israel forces from the positions they now occupy beyond the Armistice lines.

The draft resolution before us is a reiteration of the position already taken by the General Assembly. In the circumstances it is a reasonable and moderate draft resolution. It avoids condemnation and recriminations. It focuses on the immediate problem. As the Secretary-General has stated in his report (A/3500):

'...withdrawal is a preliminary and essential phase in a development through which a stable basis may be laid for peaceful conditions in the area.'

We agree with the Secretary-General that compliance with the General Assembly resolutions will enable all of us to turn to the many constructive tasks which must be completed if conditions in the area are to improve."

....

"We are encouraged to note from the report of the Secretary-General dated 15 January that considerable progress has been achieved in the withdrawal of Israel forces from Egyptian territory. We hope that the Secretary-General will be in a position promptly to announce further definite plans for the deployment of the United Nations Emergency Force along the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice line and in the area of the Straits of Tiran."

Mr. ZAIINEDDINE, Syria (A/PV.639 at page 22): "...Our able and indefatigable Secretary-General waited long for an answer from Israel in respect of Gaza. What did he get? He got silence. In paragraph 5 of his report (A/3500) he tells us this:

'The intentions of the Government of Israel concerning compliance with the resolutions by withdrawal of Israel forces from the Gaza Strip have not yet been made known to the Secretary-General'."

....

"Mrs. Meir, the lady representing Israel here, said on 2 December, 'Israel is negotiating with the United Nations about Gaza'. 'Negotiating': negotiating what? Negotiating about a resolution that decided upon withdrawal forthwith? What is there to negotiate about? How can the Secretary-General of the United Nations negotiate? He can in fact, as he did, simply to seek to implement the resolutions with the implementation of which he was entrusted. The report of the Secretary-General in fact belies the existence of such negotiations on Gaza, as he has spoken about the silence of Israel."

....

(at page 23-25): "And while resolutions were being accumulated, and while the Secretary-General was lending his best efforts to secure an implementation of those resolutions, what was Israel doing in Gaza?"

....

(at page 27): "As recently as last May, the Armistice Agreements were strengthened by assurances which Israel gave to the Secretary-General. In this connexion, the Secretary-General states in his report that these assurances:

'lent further legal solemnity to the relevant articles in the armistice agreements' (A/3500, paragraph 10)."

Mr. MAHGOUB, Sudan (A/PY.639 at pages 37, 38, 39-40 and 41): "...I am sure the Assembly will agree with me that no one person is better qualified to describe the failure of Israel to comply with the resolutions of the General Assembly and its dilatory attitude than the Secretary-General, the embodiment of neutrality in the highest world Organization, Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld. I will now let his reports speak.

On page 2 of document A/3500 dated 15 January 1957, the Secretary-General shows the reluctance of Israel to withdraw, not only from the Gaza Strip but also from the Sinai desert, to the degree that such withdrawal is measured inch by inch and mile by mile.

The representative of Israel conveyed to the Secretary-General on 14 January 1957 a communication concerning an intended further withdrawal. It is surprising to note that the said intended further withdrawal, even by 22 January 1957, will not cover the entire Sinai Desert, but an exception of the Sharm el-Sheikh area is explicitly made. Incidentally, the Sharm el-Sheikh area is a strip on the western coast of the Gulf of Aqaba, an integral part of Egyptian territory. The Government of Israel reserves the right to withdraw from that area after entering into conversations with the Secretary-General.

As to the Gaza Strip and the withdrawal behind the armistice line, the Secretary-General, in his report of 15 January 1957 (A/3500), states in paragraph 5:

'The intentions of the Government of Israel concerning compliance with the resolutions by withdrawal of Israel forces from the Gaza Strip have not yet been made known to the Secretary-General.'

It is true that the intentions of Israel concerning compliance with the resolutions by the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip were not made clear to the Secretary-General by Israel either in writing or by mere word of mouth. But the acts of Israel in the area reveal beyond any reasonable doubt its intention. Again, I will let the Secretary-General speak by reading paragraph 8 of his report of 10 January 1957:

'Some measures taken by Israel authorities as part of the general plan of administration of the Gaza area, especially in the economic, financial, postal and police fields, would seem to indicate a trend towards facilitating the permanency of the existing situation achieved through military action by Israel.' (A/3491, page 4)

This is the opinion of the Secretary-General through his agents in the area. This is an opinion which is completely neutral and which is expressed by a person who is above any shadow of doubt."

....

"...even in their communication of 14 January 1957 the Israeli authorities speak only of withdrawal behind the armistice demarcation line wherever it follows the north-eastern boundary of the Sinai Desert.

The Secretary-General is of the opinion that:

'This request makes it clear that the withdrawal of Israel forces must be behind the armistice line as it has been established

in the Egypt-Israel agreement. In this context it is to be noted, therefore, that the Israel communication is silent about withdrawal from the Gaza Strip which, according to this armistice agreement, falls on the Egyptian side of the armistice demarcation line.' (A/3500, page 3)

The Secretary-General rightly observed that the basic resolution of the General Assembly on the Middle East crisis, adopted on 2 November 1956, urged the prompt withdrawal of all the forces of the parties to the armistice agreement behind the armistice lines and that the resolution also covered other points of significance, chiefly that the parties were urged 'to desist from raids across the armistice lines into neighbouring territory, and to observe scrupulously the provisions of the armistice agreement'.

(Resolution 997 (S-I))

But the Secretary-General, being the independent and completely neutral person that he is, hastened, and rightly so, to add 'the three points in this operative paragraph, while existing simultaneously within the terms of the paragraph, were not linked together conditionally'. Israel, however, would certainly like to connect them together and to take the chance of imposing conditions and terms."

....

"The Secretary-General in his report of 15 January 1957 pointed out the letter and spirit of those resolutions in a nutshell. I shall quote paragraph 15 of his report, which reads:

'Like the cease-fire, withdrawal is a preliminary and essential phase in a development through which a stable basis may be laid for peaceful conditions in the area. When the

General Assembly, in its various resolutions concerning the recent crisis in the Middle East, gave high priority to the cease-fire and the withdrawal, the position of the Assembly reflected both basic principles of the Charter and essential political considerations.'

The attitude of Israel as gathered from the aforementioned report of the Secretary-General is not simply one of mere non-compliance but is one of implicit insistence on remaining in the Gaza Strip and Aqaba, both of which fall within the armistice line."

....

(at page 42): "Operative paragraph 2 is a request to the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to secure the complete withdrawal of Israel in pursuance of the previous resolutions recalled in the first paragraph of the preamble of this draft resolution."

Mr. SATO, Japan (A/PV.639 at page 43-45): "...I should like to offer my warm felicitations to the Secretary-General on his report, document A/3500, which was made available to the Assembly yesterday. The judicious assessment of the prevailing difficult situation testifies to the towering ability of the Secretary-General which, as always, commands our high respect. It also assures the great pains with which he is continuing his efforts towards the improvement of the situation by gradual stages. In paying a tribute to the remarkable accomplishments of the Secretary-General, my delegation earnestly hopes that his farther efforts in pursuit of peace in the Middle East will ultimately be crowned with success."

Sir Leslie MUNRO, New Zealand (A/PV.639 at pages 47 and 48-50): "...We have become increasingly dissatisfied with the role of the United Nations in the Palestine question. Despite vigorous efforts by the Secretary-General, the Chief of Staff and his corps of observers, tension has not been reduced. The protective veto of the Soviet Union in the Security Council, exercised always on one side, produced an inertia which was matched by an apparently equal indifference in the Assembly. Only by a large-scale conflict was the Assembly galvanized into action - and one wonders whether the effect of that shock has not almost worn off already."

....

"So far, the Assembly has to its credit one positive accomplishment, one advance on the situation which existed on 29 October last. That accomplishment, for which credit must go in the first place to an imaginative Canadian proposal and then to the unflagging efforts of the Secretary-General, was the creation of a United Nations Force."

Mr. QUIROGA-GALDO, Bolivia (A/PV.639 at page 56): "...We must also point to the fact that the occupation of the Gaza Strip by Israel, far from providing a possibility for reaching understanding, only renders more difficult the conciliatory work of the Secretary-General of our Organisation."

....

(at page 57): "...the delegation of Bolivia feels that if we are to maintain world peace, we must achieve the immediate evacuation of the Gaza Strip. It would be an incalculable disaster if, overnight, there should take place a voluntary exodus of the Gaza refugees to other parts of the globe. That would mean, on the one hand, the annexation

by Israel of a territory which, as the Secretary-General has said in his report of 15 January, is located on the Egyptian side of the Armistice demarcation line. It would also mean that hundreds of thousands of men and women would be the victims of disguised mass deportation."

Mr. KUZNETSOV, USSR (A/PV.639 at page 71): "The General Assembly has before it for consideration the report of the United Nations Secretary-General on compliance with Assembly resolutions calling for the withdrawal of the aggressors' troops from Egyptian territory. The report makes it quite clear that the troops of the Israel invaders still remain on Egyptian territory, and that these troops have occupied and continue to occupy parts of the Sinai peninsula and the Gaza area, as well as two islands in the Gulf of Aqaba area, in the Red Sea. The Secretary-General's report notes that Israel, a Member of the United Nations, has disregarded General Assembly decisions and continues to put forward artificial pretexts for prolonging the stay of Israel troops in Egyptian territory seized by Israel."

....

(at page 72): "These statements are self-explanatory; they are further confirmed by the Secretary-General's report of 10 January 1957 (A/3491), in which it is indicated that:

'Some measures taken by Israel authorities as part of the general plan of administration of the Gaza area, especially in the economic, financial, postal and police fields, would seem to indicate a trend towards facilitating the permanency of

the existing situation achieved through military action by Israel'. (A/3491, paragraph 8)"

640th Meeting (18 January 1957 at 10:30 a.m.)

Mr. SARASIN, Thailand (A/PV.640 at page 2): "...Such insistence (for full compliance by Israel) is essential if, as the Secretary-General's report again affirms, 'a stable basis may be laid for peaceful conditions in the area' and if 'both basic principles of the Charter and essential political considerations' are to be observed (A/3500, paragraph 15)."

Mr. ULLAICH, Czechoslovakia (A/PV.640 at page 6): "...The reports of the Secretary-General, the communications of the Governments of Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Syria contained in documents and the verbatim records of the General Assembly and the Security Council, the alarming daily reports on the events in the area of the Near and Middle East, and, last but not least, the premeditated plans and programmes of the United States of America, all testify to the fact that the situation in this area continues to be a source of danger and requires vigilance and energetic measures."

....

(at page 11): "The Secretary-General points out in his report (A/3500) on compliance with the resolutions endorsed by the General Assembly, that Israel has not yet withdrawn its armed forces behind the armistice line and that it has not yet showed any readiness to withdraw its troops from the whole of the territory occupied by it following its criminal attack. It is the more serious in view of the fact that, as the Secretary-General rightly stresses in his report, the complete

withdrawal of armed forces and the cessation of any aggressive acts is an essential prerequisite for the establishment of peaceful conditions."

....

(at page 13-15): "The Government of Israel, however, in complete disregard of the appeals by the General Assembly and repeated action on the part of the United Nations Secretary-General, has failed up to the present day to bring about the complete withdrawal of its troops behind the demarcation line as established in the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel."

....

"This intention of the Israeli authorities is further confirmed in the report given by a member of the UNEF Command in Egypt, Colonel K. R. Nelson, on his visit to this area. He concluded his report (A/3491) sent to the Secretary-General, by the following words:

'Some measures taken by Israel authorities as part of the general plan of administration of the Gaza area, especially in the economic, financial, postal and police fields, would seem to indicate a trend towards facilitating the permanency of the existing situation achieved through military action by Israel.' "

....

(at page 16): "Under the pretext of negotiating conditions - as the note of the Secretary-General clearly shows - Israel refuses even now, the third month after the treacherous attack against Egypt, to withdraw its troops. It is inadmissible to allow the aggressors to advance any conditions and it would be even less admissible to allow them to reap any advantage from their acts of aggression."

Mr. PICCIONI, Italy (A/PV.640 at page 17): "The Secretary-General has submitted his report on compliance with General Assembly resolutions calling for withdrawal of troops and other measures. I believe that his report is very encouraging."

....

"In connexion with the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces, the report of the Secretary-General notes substantial progress. On 21 December 1956 when Mr. Hammarskjold reported to us on the situation, the prospects in this field appeared uncertain and vague. Today we know that by 22 January, that is within five days, the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the Sinai desert will be practically completed."

....

"The report of the Secretary-General takes note of certain problems which still remain in abeyance. In this connexion, the delegation of Italy feels that no juridical question arises."

....

(at page 18-20): "The report of the Secretary-General emphasizes this necessity of taking up the constructive tasks which will follow from this problem. He has repeated this view many times, especially since the time the Security Council conferred upon him specific responsibility for the solution of this problem."

Mr. Hammarskjold therefore recalls in the first place that the General Assembly resolution of 2 November was not confined to addressing an invitation to the parties to withdraw their armed forces, but was also concerned with other questions having a direct impact on the improvement of the situation in the area. This resolution requested the parties 'to desist from raids across the armistice lines into

neighbouring territory and to observe scrupulously the provisions of the armistice agreements'. These are very important points, as we all well know, especially as they relate to the Gaza area.

Secondly, in connexion with the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba, the Secretary-General draws our attention to the international importance of these waterways."

....

(at page 21): "This draft resolution encourages the Secretary-General and calls upon him to continue his efforts and to report to us again on the results achieved within a period of five days. We are confident that the Secretary-General, through his efforts to achieve the full withdrawal of Israel armed forces, will be in a position, within the period of five days provided for in the draft resolution, to submit to the Assembly a satisfactory report on the results obtained. We fervently wish that in his new efforts it will prove possible for him to carry on along the same lines as he indicated in the report we are at present considering. It is on the basis of this report and the principles on which it seeks guidance that we intend to vote in favour of this draft resolution."

Mr. AEIZ, Afghanistan (A/PV.640 at page 23-25): "...I should like to take this opportunity to congratulate the Secretary-General on the tireless efforts he is exerting to find a solution to this very difficult problem."

Mr. ZABIGAILO, Ukrainian SSR (A/PV.640 at page 26): "...In his report, the Secretary-General draws the attention of the General Assembly to the fact that Israel has not, up to now, declared its readiness to

withdraw from the Gaza area. According to the New York Times of 16 January, a decision was taken, in the course of a meeting held by the political parties represented in the Israeli parliament, to the effect that the Gulf of Aqaba and the Gaza Strip should continue to be occupied by Israeli armed forces."

....

(at page 27): "In this connexion, it is interesting to note a letter from the permanent representative of Saudi Arabia addressed to the Secretary-General, document A/3499, in which reference is made to the constant violations by Israeli aircraft and naval units of the air boundaries and the territorial waters of this neighbouring State."

Mr. PEARSON, Canada (A/PV.640 at page 33-35): "I hope that the Secretary-General, in his efforts - which we support - to bring about compliance regarding withdrawal will in the further report which he is to make to us give consideration to ways and means of securing and stabilizing through United Nations action the situation after withdrawal has taken place and pending that political settlement which alone can establish real and lasting peace and security in the area."

....

(at pages 36 and 37): "The Secretary-General's report recognises this danger. It refers to the resolution (997 ES-I) of 2 November which states the obligations of the parties to withdraw, but which requires them also 'to desist from raids across the armistice lines' and 'to observe scrupulously the provisions of the armistice agreements'. The report refers also to the resolution (999 ES-I) of 4 November, which goes beyond mere withdrawal. And, furthermore, as the Secretary-General

states in his report, certain of those related aspects of withdrawal will assume added importance once a military withdrawal is effected. But even now, I suggest, we cannot ignore these related aspects in dealing with this question. Therefore, in asking the Secretary-General to report back to us it is my hope that he will report on these other matters, with suggestions to the Assembly on what can and should be done.

The Secretary-General has already indicated, in paragraph 11 of his report, that study might be given, for instance, to 'the question of the extent to which the (United Nations Emergency) Force might assume responsibilities so far carried by the Truce Supervision Organization'.

....

"The Secretary-General also notes in his report that the withdrawal of Israel forces has not yet extended to those forces in the Gaza Strip, where the situation, we recognize, regarding territorial sovereignty, density of population and refugees differs from that in the areas of Egypt from which withdrawal has taken place. Perhaps in his next report the Secretary-General might also indicate his views on how the United Nations might assist in stabilizing this area and in ensuring that it will not be used as a base for attacks and incidents, or as a target for retaliation. In that way also the United Nations action might help to prevent a recurrence of hostilities.

Then, in paragraph 14 of his report, the Secretary-General has raised the question of 'The international significance of the Gulf of Aqaba', which he thinks 'may be considered to justify the right of

innocent passage through the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf in accordance with recognized rules of international law'."

....

(at page 38): "In short, our view is that this Assembly, in its efforts to achieve complete withdrawal of Israel military forces behind the demarcation line as a matter of priority, has also an obligation to deal urgently and immediately with these other matters. The Secretary-General points out in his report that there is such an obligation. Perhaps I might read out paragraphs 16 and 17 of his report on that point...."

....

(at page 39-40): "The cease-fire that has been achieved and the withdrawal of forces which is being achieved will have opened the way to us for the attainment of these other indispensable objectives. Therefore, I hope that the Secretary-General, in his report next week, will give the Assembly his views on how we might take advantage here of the opportunity that is being afforded us."

Mr. JOJA, Romania (A/PV.640 at pages 41 and 42): "...The General Assembly has before it a report, dated 15 January 1957, by the Secretary-General on compliance with General Assembly resolutions calling for withdrawal of troops. In that report, we find statements by the representative of Israel to the effect that his Government 'is prepared to enter forthwith into conversations with the Secretary-General' concerning the Gaza strip (A/3500, paragraph 4). The report also informs us that the Israel Government is prepared to enter into conversations with the Secretary-General on the subject of the evacuation of the Sharm al-Shaikh area. But what kind of discussions

could be involved here? In four resolutions, the General Assembly has unconditionally, unequivocally and categorically demanded that Israel should withdraw its troops behind the armistice line and, hence, from the above-mentioned areas. These resolutions were adopted advisedly."

....

"If one compares the information contained in the most recent report by the Secretary-General with previous statements made by Israel officials, one finds a clear refusal to leave certain parts of Egyptian territory."

....

(at pages 46 and 47): "The General Assembly resolution relating to the United Nations Emergency Force were couched in very clear terms. In the report of the Secretary-General on the proposal to set up an emergency international United Nations force, document A/3302, it is stated:

'It follows from its terms of reference that there is no intent in the establishment of the Force to influence the military balance in the present conflict and, thereby, the political balance affecting efforts to settle the conflict.'

(A/3302, page 4)"

Mr. NOBLE, United Kingdom (A/PV.640 at page 48-50): "...At the proposal of the Canadian Government, it set up an Emergency Force of its own, and approved the role which the Secretary-General suggested should be given to it. It was because of that decision that we felt able to withdraw our forces from Egypt."

(at page 51): "The Secretary-General has made a most valuable suggestion on this point in paragraph 11 of his report. He suggests that further consideration might be given to the question of the extent to which the United Nations Force might assume responsibilities so far carried out by the Truce Supervision Organization. Part of these responsibilities of course involve the prevention of incursions and raids on both sides of the armistice lines. We share the hope of the United States representative that the Secretary-General, in his next report, will be able to elaborate on this idea of deploying the United Nations Force to act as a shield to separate the parties at sensitive points.

I also strongly support the recommendation of the Secretary-General in paragraph 12 of his report that the parties should formally re-confirm their undertakings to desist from raids and to take active steps to prevent incursions. There have been reports that incursions in the past have not always been organized by the Governments of the countries from which they took place. I am therefore in full agreement with the Secretary-General's further proposal that these reaffirmations should be made by all the parties to the various armistice agreements."

....

(at page 52): "We welcome the indications in the Secretary-General's report that he will be having further discussions with the representatives of Israel on proposals for arrangements for the Gaza strip....

The present view of my Government is that the Gaza strip might perhaps come under some form of international administration and control. I do not, however, wish to pursue this suggestion today, since the

Secretary-General will no doubt be reporting again after his further conversations on this subject."

....

(at page 53-55): "In conclusion, I now turn to the draft resolution before us which, as I understand it, requests the Secretary-General, in five days, to report to the Assembly on the result of his further efforts to ensure full compliance on the part of Israel. The attitude of Her Majesty's Government as regards the general intention behind this draft resolution has, I hope been made clear by what I have said in my speech."

Mr. HANIFAH, Indonesia (A/PV.640 at page 57): "...As the Secretary-General of the United Nations pointed out in paragraph 15 of his report of 15 January 1957 (A/3500):

'...withdrawal is a preliminary and essential phase in a development through which a stable basis may be laid for peaceful conditions in the area. When the General Assembly, in its various resolutions concerning the recent crisis in the Middle East, gave high priority to the cease-fire and the withdrawal, the position of the Assembly reflected both basic principles of the Charter and essential political considerations.'

It should also be noted that in this report the Secretary-General has properly linked the cease-fire and the withdrawal of all forces from Egyptian territory."

....

(at page 61): "The Secretary-General, moreover, is requested to report on such completion to the Assembly within five days. Certainly, after waiting already for more than two months for Israeli compliance,

the sponsors of this draft resolution cannot be accused of impatience, although, in this matter concerning world peace, patience may actually not be such a great value."

Mr. NASE, Albania (A/PV.640 at page 62): "...The report of the Secretary-General and the letter of 14 January 1957 from the representative of Saudi Arabia make it abundantly clear that one of the aggressors, Israel, which played the role of the provocative agent and dealt the first blow at the victim, continues to flout the decisions of the General Assembly...According to the letter of 14 January 1957 addressed to the Secretary-General, the Israel forces still have not withdrawn from an area on the western coast of the Gulf of Aqaba, and the Government of Israel contends that it will continue discussions with the Secretary-General regarding the evacuation of that area."

....

(at page 63-65): "Therefore, it is a matter of urgency to bring Israel to withdraw its forces behind the demarcation lines. The urgency is proven by the renewed aggression of Israel against its neighbour Saudi Arabia, as the representative of that country informed us in his letter to the Secretary-General."

641st Meeting (18 January 1957 at 3 p.m.)

Mr. DEJANY, Saudi Arabia (A/PV.641 at page 2): "On 17 January we received the Secretary-General's Note on compliance with United Nations resolutions calling for withdrawal of troops. He informed the General Assembly that withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces was completed, thus achieving full compliance. In regard to the withdrawal

of Israel forces, however, the Secretary-General has a frustrating and a tricky story to tell. He reports that he held extensive discussions with representatives of the Government of Israel aiming at full compliance with the withdrawal requirements by the earliest possible date and that these discussions have been taking place since 24 November 1956."

....

"As for the Gaza strip, the Secretary-General reports that the intentions of the Government of Israel concerning withdrawal from that area have not yet been made known to him."

....

(at page 3): "The Secretary-General, in accordance with the provisions of the resolutions and in the execution of his mandate, continued to insist on the unconditional and prompt withdrawal of military forces."

....

(at page 6): "Already there have been some provocative skirmishes initiated by Israel forces along the north-western Saudi Arabian coastline. My delegation has already brought this to the attention of the General Assembly in a communication addressed to the Secretary-General."

Mr. Krishna MENON, India (A/PV.641 at pages 21 and 22): "...But on 8 November - and the Assembly will remember that this document was circulated while the discussion was in progress - there was a communication sent to the Secretary-General by the Foreign Minister of Israel. I will read only one sentence:

'I have the honour on behalf of the Government of Israel to inform you that the Government of Israel will willingly withdraw

its forces from Egypt immediately upon the conclusion of satisfactory arrangements with the United Nations in connexion with the emergency international force.' (A/3320)"

....

"What did the Foreign Minister of Israel say on 8 November? The beginning of the second paragraph of this same communication states:

'At the same time, and without prejudice to this undertaking, I wish to state that while as a result of the Sinai operations we have succeeded in destroying...'.
The key words in this quotation are 'At the same time, and without

prejudice to this undertaking'. Therefore, if this is a document communicated by the Foreign Minister of Israel as a responsible statement to the Secretary-General, it means that irrespective of whatever other circumstances may prevail and irrespective of whatever may be the international character of the Gulf of Aqaba or anything else, the commitment has no conditions attached to it."

....

(at page 23): "We also have before us document A/3500, which is the report of the Secretary-General. It is remarkable for its extreme brevity. At the same time, one has to have an enormous amount of patience to understand exactly what is behind all this. The Secretary-General has been at pains not to say anything that will exacerbate feelings or make his further negotiations difficult. But my delegation wishes to make two observations. First of all, it wants to pay tribute to the Secretary-General and his colleagues for the patience with which they have continued the negotiations in spite of the fact that the undertaking of 8 November is up till now still unimplemented. Having said that much, we should like to express our view that - these resolutions were passed early in November and ,

now it is the middle of January and the withdrawals have not taken place - we are not debating how the withdrawal should take place but whether from some place withdrawals should take place at all.

For myself, I cannot accept the meaning of some words that follow later on in this document of the Secretary-General as flowing from the statement made by the Foreign Minister of Israel in this Assembly. These negotiations have gone on for two months, so it is the view of my delegation that in view of the slow progress made - not only the slow progress but also the unwillingness, that is, the non-compliance with their own statement that they would willingly withdraw - the Secretary-General, I think, should have reported to this Assembly much earlier.

The onus of calling attention to this matter and presenting a resolution on this item does not rest with Member States. This matter was placed, I think quite wisely, in the hands of the Secretary-General. The reason for his not so doing is that, I suppose, from day to day it was hoped that something would happen, which only adds force to the argument that there was unwillingness to withdraw. My delegation says all this because in the draft resolution now before the Assembly there is a request to the Secretary-General to continue these efforts. I am sure that he will do so even though any man with less patience would despair of doing it. But the draft resolution asks that within five days the Secretary-General should report on such completion."

....

(at page 26): "There are certain issues in this report which rather bother us. I shall deal with the first of these and that is in connexion with the statement made by the Foreign Minister of Israel, which was made on 14 January, one day before the previous phase of

withdrawal was due for completion, when the Israeli Government indicated its decision to have the Sinai Desert entirely evacuated by Israeli forces by 22 January with the exception of the Sharm al-Shaikh area - that is Egyptian territory, therefore the document of 8 November is not honoured in regard to that - that is the strip on the western coast of the Gulf of Aqaba which at present ensures freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran and in the Gulf. At the same time the Israeli Government notified the Secretary-General of its willingness to enter forthwith into conversations with the Secretary-General in connexion with the evacuation of this strip.

Now on page 4 of the Secretary-General's report (A/3500) he says, in paragraph 13:

'The communication of 14 January from the Government of Israel, in making an exception for the Sharm al-Shaikh area as "the strip on the western coast of the Gulf of Aqaba which at present ensures freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran and in the Gulf" indicates that the evacuation of the strip is anticipated,' - not contemplated but anticipated - 'although further conversations with the Secretary-General are suggested in connexion with this evacuation.'

We are all happy about the optimistic feelings entertained in this matter because otherwise it would be impossible to function, but I would respectfully suggest to the Secretary-General that this sentence 'the Government of Israel is prepared to enter forthwith into conversations with the Secretary-General' - not about the arrangements to be made for evacuation but 'in connexion with the evacuation' - does not seem to imply to us all that is said there unless it is followed by facts."

(at page 27): "That is one point to which we want to draw attention. The other is one with which my Government has been very much concerned from the very beginning. It comes in the Secretary-General's report and it also comes much more forcibly in the statement of the representative of Australia. The Secretary-General says:

'Further consideration may have to be given to the question of the extent to which the Force might assume responsibilities so far carried by the Truce Supervision Organization.' "

....

"If the Secretary-General's statement stood alone it would not worry us so much because of his great care and circumspection. All he has said is that further consideration and care should be given to this question. But when we go back to the reading by other delegations, we find that their understanding of the functions of the Emergency Force is something different."

....

(at pages 28 and 29-30): "So, while one does not become seriously perturbed by the idea expressed by the Secretary-General when he very carefully says 'further consideration would have to be given', which obviously means in the appropriate quarters, apparently this has already led to very serious misunderstanding on the part of responsible statesmen who seem to think that these United Nations Forces which have gone there, and which are not under very strict parliamentary control from anywhere, are to take on the function of an occupation force. My Government is very seriously concerned about this matter."

....

"My delegation is not prepared to discuss any other matter at this stage than the evacuation behind the armistice lines, because

we believe that unless the resolutions of the General Assembly on this matter are complied with there is no hope that Governments should now be enabled to turn to the constructive tasks to which the Secretary-General refers in paragraph 17 of his report. As everybody knows, this was the subject of the resolutions of 2, 4 and 7 November and later ones.

Now I refer again to the speech of the Foreign Minister of Israel. She made many references to what has been mutually agreed between the Secretary-General and the Israeli Government...The General Assembly will note that in each of these paragraphs of the Secretary-General's report great care has been taken to confine himself strictly within his mandate. For example, at the end of paragraph 14, the Secretary-General says:

'The Secretary-General has not considered that a discussion of the various aspects of this matter, and its possible relation to the action requested in the General Assembly resolutions on the Middle East crisis, falls within the mandate established for him in the resolution of 4 November.'

There is no doubt that as far as the Secretary-General is concerned, he is very aware of this situation, that is to say that it is not possible to enlarge either the scope of his function arising from this resolution or of any other instruments that have been set up. But when I read the statement of the Foreign Minister of Israel, which was presented to us very ably and with great clarity, I find that in many respects there has been mutual agreement between the Secretary-General and the Foreign Minister on this point or that point, which does not appear to be the position as implied here. But the most important question I would like to ask the Secretary-General to

throw some light upon at some time is what appears in the Foreign Minister's speech where she says:

'The acuteness of this question will be easily perceived if we recall that twelve weeks have elapsed since my Government addressed four questions to the Egyptian Government, through the Secretary-General, which have still not been answered:'
(reads the four questions listed at A/PV.638, page 39)"

....

(at page 31): "All these questions are of concern to the State of Israel; they have relevance to the world community; they have relevance to Egypt; and they certainly are of concern to the Secretary-General. But with great respect I want to ask Mr. Hammarakjold where these questions do arise from the consideration of the question proper. Because what is sought to be done is to open the whole question."

....

(at page 33): "These islands and coastal strips that are referred to are either Egyptian territory or, as the Secretary-General points out, territory which is legitimately under Egyptian control and occupation."

The SECRETARY-GENERAL (A/PV.641 at page 33): "The representative of India has addressed to me a direct question which referred to certain questions mentioned by the Foreign Minister of Israel. Those questions were first presented in the first reply of the Government of Israel to a request for a cease-fire. At that time they were circulated as a General Assembly document. They have not formed the basis for any kind of negotiation, the only basis for negotiation having been the General Assembly resolutions."

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Begum IKRAMULLAH, Pakistan (A/PV.641 at pages 33 and 34-35): "...My delegation appreciates the considerable progress achieved in this direction through the untiring efforts of the Secretary-General and requests that he continue his efforts and secure complete withdrawal by the Israeli forces within five days."

Mr. TARABANOV, Bulgaria (A/PV.641 at pages 39-40 and 41): "...It appears from the Secretary-General's oral report of 21 December 1956, as well as from his memorandum of 15 January 1957, that the fundamental concern of the Israel command is to create obstacles to the withdrawal of the Israel forces."

....

"On 14 January, the Israel Government informed the Secretary-General that it would be willing to withdraw its forces entirely from the Sinai Desert with the exception of the Sharm el-Sheikh region and the west coast of the Gulf of Aqaba.

As regards the Gaza Strip, it appears from the memorandum that the Israeli Government has not yet made its intentions known to the Secretary-General on the implementation of the resolution on the withdrawal of Israeli troops from this region....

Referring to the statement made on 8 November 1956 by the Government of Israel that it is prepared 'to withdraw its forces from Egyptian territory as soon as satisfactory arrangements can be made with the United Nations in connexion with the United Nations Emergency Force', the representative of Israel declared that, 'It is evident, therefore, that my Government cannot accept ... any criticism of Israel's action in carrying out its undertaking'. Further on in the statement, it is emphasized that, 'In our talks with the Secretary-General on withdrawal,

it was mutually understood at all times that the Sharm el-Sheikh and Gaza areas were reserved for discussions at a later stage in the withdrawal process'.

...It does not appear from the documents submitted by the Secretary-General that he has committed himself to the postponement of conversations on the Gaza Strip to a later date more convenient to the Israeli Government."

Mr. ENGEN, Norway (A/PV.641 at page 51): "My delegation has some observations to make on the report of the Secretary-General which is now before us. In our view the report is one of the most important documents which has come before the Assembly during the present crisis in the Middle East, and it deserves very careful study by everybody who wants to appreciate correctly the state of affairs with respect to the United Nations policy in this area.

In his report the Secretary-General gives an account of the compliance of the parties with respect to the General Assembly's demand for withdrawal of all foreign forces from Egypt and behind the armistice lines."

....

(at pages 52, 53-55 and 56): "As will be seen from the Secretary-General's report, great emphasis is laid on those parts of the General Assembly resolution of 2 November which the Secretary-General rightly calls the basic resolution in the crisis, dealing mainly with the situation which the General Assembly envisaged would arise after completion of the withdrawal behind the demarcation lines....

The Secretary-General, in his report, suggests that this demand by the General Assembly should be implemented by certain steps which, in our view, open quite hopeful prospectives with respect to the role the

United Nations can play in assisting the parties to establish a situation where they all may be able to enjoy greater security than at any time during the last ten years. It seems to us that the Secretary-General should very well proceed from the situation created by the armistice lines again becoming the dividing lines between the parties and solicit from all the parties concerned formal confirmations of the obligations under the Armistice Agreement to desist from raids and actively to prevent such raids and incursions across the armistice lines.

But the Secretary-General should go further. So far the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization has been the sole United Nations body entrusted with the task of securing the observance of the armistice. Within its terms of reference, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization has, I am sure, done its best. But we all know that it has not been an adequate and effective instrument for such a vast and complicated task. The Truce Supervision Organization has had no machinery for the prevention of raids and incursions. Its task has been to investigate and observe. It seems to us that there now exists an opportunity to remedy this shortcoming of the Truce Supervision Organization. The United Nations now has a second organization in this area, the United Nations Emergency Force.

....

My delegation notes with great interest the observations which the Secretary-General makes in paragraph 11 of his report (A/3500). His final remark in this paragraph seems to us to be completely appropriate, and I quote it:

'Further consideration may have to be given to the question of the extent to which the Force might assume responsibilities so far carried by the Truce Supervision Organization.'

As far as my delegation is concerned, we should like to encourage the Secretary-General to give such further consideration to this problem....

I hope that the Secretary-General will see his way to devote urgent attention to this particular problem and, in due course, enlighten us further on its prospects."

Mr. ESKELUND, Denmark (A/PV.641 at page 67): "...My delegation fully endorses the conclusion in the Secretary-General's report (A/3500) of 15 January 1957 that unconditional and complete compliance with the Assembly resolutions of 2, 4 and 7 November, concerning the withdrawal of Israel forces behind the armistice line, is essential."

Mr. MICHALOWSKI, Poland (A/PV.641 at page 68-70): "...The Secretary-General's report and all the other documents presented to us show that, during the talks with the United Nations, Israel has attempted to impose prior conditions for each stage of the withdrawal of its troops. It has been a process of continuous bidding, and we are now faced with the last stage in this process."

Mr. SHAHA, Nepal (A/PV.641 at pages 82 and 83-85): "Let me at the very outset associate myself with the tributes paid to the Secretary-General for producing his remarkable report which in itself is a proof of considerable tact and patience shown by him in negotiating with the Israeli authorities the withdrawal of their invading troops from Egyptian territory."

"The Secretary-General's report (A/3500) indicates that his efforts in securing the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the Sharm al-Shaikh area and the strip on the western coast of the Gulf of Aqaba have not so far yielded any concrete results. It is unfortunate that the communication of the representative of Israel conveyed to the Secretary-General, on behalf of his Government, about intended further withdrawal from the Sinai Desert by 22 January, does not include this area. Further, the Secretary-General's report states that 'the Israel communication is silent about withdrawal from the Gaza Strip which, according to this armistice agreement, falls on the Egyptian side of the armistice demarcation line'."

....

"With regard to the enforcement measures to be adopted by the United Nations for the observance of the armistice agreement by both sides, the Secretary-General's report suggests that 'further consideration may have to be given to the question of the extent to which the Force might assume responsibilities so far carried by the Truce Supervision Organization'....

Again, the Secretary-General suggests in paragraph 14 of his report that 'the international significance of the Gulf of Aqaba may be considered to justify the right of innocent passage through the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf in accordance with recognized rules of international law'.

In view of the Secretary-General's report and especially in consideration of the previous resolutions of the Assembly, which call upon Israel to withdraw its armed forces immediately behind the armistice lines, the Israeli authorities should, in all fairness, agree

to abide by the present resolution which my delegation has the honour of co-sponsoring along with other Asian and African Powers."

Mr. KISELEV, Byelorussian SSR (A/PV.641 at pages 83-85 and 86):

"The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR has carefully studied the Secretary-General's memorandum concerning compliance with General Assembly resolutions calling for the withdrawal of French, British and Israeli troops from Egyptian territory. The Secretary-General informs us that British and French troops have already withdrawn from Egyptian territory, whereas Israeli troops are only preparing to evacuate the Sinai Desert and are refusing to evacuate Sharm al-Sheikh, the area located on the western coast of the Gulf of Aqaba.

The Secretary-General does not yet know the intentions of the Israel Government concerning compliance with the resolutions calling for the withdrawal of Israel troops from the Gaza Strip. The Foreign Minister of Egypt, Mr. Fawzi, in his letter of 11 January 1957 to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, states that the Government of Israel is not complying with the General Assembly resolution calling for the withdrawal of its troops from all the territory of Egypt occupied by it after 29 October 1956....

The continued presence of Israel troops on Egyptian territory creates a tense situation in the area which can have extremely dangerous consequences. This is borne out by the letter of 14 January 1957 from the permanent representative of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General, in which it is stated that, as a result of a number of provocative acts of armed aggression committed by

Israel armed forces in the Gulf of Aqaba, tense situation has been created threatening the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia."

642nd Meeting (19 January 1957 at 10:30 a.m.)

U PE KIN, Burma (A/PV.642 at pages 2 and 3): "...Secondly, the Secretary-General in his report, document A/3500 dated 15 January 1957, has called our attention to 'the serious developments which have taken place'....

...Surely this Assembly, so persistently concerned with the Middle East crisis, must, in the words of the Secretary-General: 'turn to the constructive tasks' - I emphasize this phrase, 'constructive tasks' - 'to which the establishment and the maintenance of the cease-fire, a full withdrawal of forces behind the armistice lines, a desisting from raids and scrupulous observance of the armistice agreements, should open the way.' (A/3500, paragraph 17)

My delegation notes that this task includes the application of the rules of international law to what the Secretary-General also referred to as 'the right of innocent passage through the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf' of Aqaba."

Mr. SCHURMANN, Netherlands (A/PV.642 at page 4): "...When the Israel troops move out of the last parts of the area they are still holding, the United Nations Emergency Force will move in, and we trust that, as the representative of the United States said the other day:

'...the Secretary-General will be in a position promptly to announce further definite plans for the deployment of the

United Nations Emergency Force along the Egyptian-Israeli
Armistice line and in the area of the Straits of Tiran.'

(A/PV.639, page 17)

....

(at page 5): "That wise man, Sir Leslie Munro, whom we are fortunate to have in our midst, has enumerated seven points of what he considered should be United Nations policy in this matter. I am happy to state that my Government is in full accord with the aims which he outlined.

I trust that when the Secretary-General makes his next report the General Assembly will be able to take constructive action for the attainment of these aims."

Mr. CANAS, Costa Rica (A/PV.642 at page 6): "...The Secretary-General reports to us periodically with respect to the progress that is being achieved in the fulfilment of the objectives of resolution 997. But in no case has the Secretary-General told us that compliance has been stopped or suspended or that there has been any rebellion which makes it necessary for us to consider the progress achieved."

....

(at page 7): "The report of the Secretary-General (A/3500) states this quite clearly and there is no need for interpretation. It refers to the evacuation made on 3 December, the areas evacuated on 7 and 8 January and the withdrawal on 15 January, that is to say, four days ago. It speaks of withdrawals that have been carried out, some before and some after the statements in this Assembly that resolution 997 has not been complied with."

Mr. GEORGES-PICOT, France (A/PV.642 at page 13-15): "...The Secretary-General points out in his note that by that withdrawal full compliance was achieved with one aspect of the requirement defined in the four resolutions of the General Assembly relating to withdrawal of forces. No other requests were addressed to France and the United Kingdom. These countries, therefore, complied fully with the requests addressed to them by the General Assembly.

...The Secretary-General deals in paragraph 10 of his note with this part of the resolution of 2 November. He does not tell us whether these provisions have been respected or violated, and it would be interesting to have further precise information from him on this point."

....

(at page 16): "Can we be certain that the second part of the recommendation contained in paragraph 4 of the resolution of 2 November, that is the freedom and security of navigation, will be observed? Will the decision taken by the Security Council in 1951 finally be implemented? Disturbing statements have come from Cairo in this connexion.

On this point too we should like to have the necessary clarifications from the Secretary-General in an official document. Our apprehensions in this connexion are further increased by other events which have occurred after the cease-fire and up to recent days at a time when no military considerations could justify them."

....

"Israel has accepted the recommendations of the General Assembly. On 22 January, it will have evacuated practically all of the Sinai Peninsula. It is now requesting a study with the Secretary-General of ways and means for withdrawing its forces from the Gaza Strip and

Sharm el-Sheikh. Are these not very good and important results in the cause of peace? At the very time when the Secretary-General, with his patience and persevering action, is succeeding in obtaining these results, why should we attempt to precipitate at the risk of future complications a withdrawal on principles with which everyone is in agreement?"

....

(at page 19-20): "We believe also that it is not just to state that Israel has not complied with the resolutions of the General Assembly when we know, from the note of the Secretary-General, that the evacuation of Israeli forces is continuing and that, according to the assurances given by the representatives of Israel as noted in that report, these forces will have completely evacuated the Sinai desert, with the exception of Sharm el-Sheikh, by 22 January....

We think that the period of five days given to the Secretary-General is not realistic. The French delegation, on the contrary, would view with favour the undertaking by the Secretary-General of the necessary talks with the parties so as to ensure complete compliance with the resolution of 2 November. Mr. Hammarskjold possesses at least one effective means of ensuring respect for the resolution of 2 November, namely the United Nations Emergency Force...Many delegations have already made this suggestion. The French delegation, in its turn, appeals to the Secretary-General to undertake this new task. We know that the Organization can count on his experience and devotion in this matter."

Mr. MALIK, Lebanon (A/PV.642 at pages 22 and 23-25): "...Finally, the wording of the resolutions which we are now simply endeavouring to reaffirm does not in any shape or manner, explicitly or by implication, reveal any intention on the part of the General Assembly to make the withdrawal of the invading forces conditional upon the happenings of this or that event. This fact was brought out clearly by the Secretary-General in his report contained in document A/3500 and submitted to the General Assembly on 15 January 1957 in paragraph 6 of that report, we read as follows:

'Thus, in the same operative paragraph in which the request was made for a withdrawal of forces behind the armistice lines, the parties were urged "to desist from raids across the armistice lines into neighbouring territory and to observe scrupulously the provisions of the armistice agreements". The three points in this operative paragraph, while existing simultaneously within the terms of the paragraph, were not linked together conditionally.'

It is therefore quite obvious that neither in the General Assembly's nor in the Secretary-General's mind was there the slightest intention of making the withdrawal of Israeli forces contingent upon other questions mentioned in the resolutions calling for withdrawal."

Mr. van LANGENHOVE, Belgium (A/PV.642 at pages 27 and 28-30): "...First of all, may I refer to the opening paragraph of the Secretary-General's report (A/3500). After recalling that at the time of his report of 21 November only limited withdrawals had taken place, he adds:

'...on 22 December 1956, however, the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces was completed, thus achieving full compliance

with one aspect of the requirement defined in the four resolutions of the General Assembly relating to withdrawal of forces...'

This part of the Secretary-General's report is in striking contrast to his reports on the question of Hungary, in each of which the Secretary-General was compelled to note that the General Assembly resolutions were not followed by compliance, that he had no knowledge of any withdrawal of troops and that, in the absence of the co-operation of the States concerned, it was impossible for him to fulfil the mission entrusted to him."

....

"As has been pointed out by several representatives who have spoken this morning, if we were to interpret this as meaning that Israel has failed to comply with the General Assembly resolutions, that would be manifestly contrary to reality, as is stated by the Secretary-General in his last report. Here is what the Secretary-General says with respect to withdrawal behind the armistice lines:

'In consequence of the intended withdrawal announced in the latest communication to the Secretary-General from the Government of Israel on 14 January 1957, the United Nations Emergency Force on 22 January will reach the armistice demarcation line wherever it follows the north-eastern boundary of the "Sinai Desert"...' (A/3500, paragraph 8)

According to the Secretary-General's report, the only difficulties which so far prevent a complete withdrawal are in connexion with two particularly controversial strips of land, the coast of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Gaza Strip. As regards the first, the Secretary-General tells

us in his report that the Government of Israel has anticipated evacuation there and suggests new conversations on the subject. The issue involved is that of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba. In this respect the Secretary-General states the following in paragraph 14 of his report:

'The international significance of the Gulf of Aqaba may be considered to justify the rights of innocent passage through the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf in accordance with recognized rules of international law...' "

....

(at page 31): "The second difficulty relates to the Gaza strip, which, although it is not in Egyptian territory, is behind the demarcation line. According to the Secretary-General's Note, the Israel Government is prepared to enter forthwith into conversations with the Secretary-General on this subject....

...The resolution of 2 November, in addition to calling for the withdrawal of armed forces behind the demarcation line, urged the parties to desist from raids across the armistice lines into neighbouring territory and scrupulously to observe the provisions of the armistice agreements. In recalling these provisions of the resolution, the Secretary-General points out that they will take on new importance as the Israel forces withdraw to the demarcation line. In this respect, the Secretary-General points out that an appropriate liaison should be established between the Truce Supervision Organization and the United Nations Emergency Force, whose essential task it is to ensure the supervision and implementation of the cease-fire....

Generally speaking, I would say that it clearly follows from the Secretary-General's Note that further efforts are necessary to achieve a satisfactory solution of the difficulties which still lie in the way

of a complete implementation of the Assembly resolutions - and particularly in the way of a complete withdrawal. The Belgian delegation sees no objection to requesting the Secretary-General - as the present draft resolution does - to continue these efforts and to report in the near future to the Assembly, although, for our part, we think it would be preferable to leave the date of such a report to his discretion."

Mr. WALKER, Australia (A/PV.642 at page 37): "...With regard to the request to the Secretary-General to continue his efforts, we support that and we accept the interpretation given by several sponsors of the draft resolution that the second operative paragraph requests the Secretary-General to report within five days."

Mr. EBAN, Israel (A/PV.642 at pages 38-40 and 41): "...The second operative paragraph of the draft resolution addresses itself to the Secretary-General with a request to continue the efforts on which he has been engaged and to report to the General Assembly within five days. We shall, of course, be willing to see the Secretary-General resume the efforts which were interrupted by Egypt's convocation of this plenary debate.

I note, however, that the resolution gives the Secretary-General no clear guidance or mandate apart from what can be deduced in a study of the thoughtful discussion leading to its adoption."

....

(at page 53): "To sum up, then, the issue involves great national interests of Israel, great international interests and, above all, it embodies and symbolizes the whole problem of avoiding renewed belligerency and war. We shall carry forward our discussions with the

Secretary-General on this matter. In the centre of Israel's approach lies the necessity of implementing the 1951 resolution, the question of Egypt's reciprocal duties towards Israel and the problem of the precise definition of the functions of the United Nations Emergency Force."

Mr. GARIN, Portugal (A/PV.642 at page 67): "...As my delegation sees it, our Organization is only at the initial stage of its peace-building activities in this matter - as the Secretary-General put it when he mentioned the preliminary nature of the present phase of the withdrawal of troops....

That is the reason why my delegation has voted for the resolution which has just been adopted in order that the Secretary-General may report to this Assembly, within the period of time indicated, on the result of his further efforts to obtain the withdrawal of Israeli troops....

Furthermore, we hope that all the suggestions presented by the Secretary-General in his report, as well as others which have appeared during our debate relevant to our purpose, will receive the consideration of our Organization as soon as possible, in order that no undue delays should occur in our constructive efforts to bring about real peace, with justice, to the area."

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644th Meeting (28 January 1957 at 10:30 a.m.)

Mr. MAHGOUB, Sudan (A/PV.644 at page 3): "...My delegation wishes to pay a tribute to the Secretary-General for responding promptly to the General Assembly's request and reporting, on the expiration of the five-day time-limit set by the resolution, on Israel's position."

(pages 3 to 7 devoted to analysis of and extracts from report of the Secretary-General (A/3512))

....

(at page 7): "In his report which is now under review, the Secretary-General has many times referred to the Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel, dated 23 February 1949. I deem it necessary that a consideration should be made of the legal implications of this Armistice Agreement."

....

(at page 17): "A further point which was raised by Israel and is alluded to by the Secretary-General in his report under review, is the question of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran...It is, as is rightly pointed out by the Secretary-General, still a legal controversy."

Mr. GUNewardene, Ceylon (A/PV.644 at page 26): "...To make use of the picturesque words of the Secretary-General himself:

'The United Nations cannot condone a change of the status juris resulting from military action contrary to the provisions of the Charter. The Organization must, therefore, maintain that the status juris existing prior to such military action be re-established

by a withdrawal of troops, and by the relinquishment or nullification of rights asserted in territories covered by the military action and depending upon it.' (A/3512, page 2)"

....

(at page 31): "The Secretary-General, in his very clear report (A/3512) which he gave to the General Assembly, says the following in part II, paragraphs 10 and 11 thereof: (quotes)"

....

(at page 36): "I must congratulate the Secretary-General on the very clear document which he has placed before us in his report, which sets out most clearly the legal position on the question at issue. He has also presented us with some constructive views. I, for one, would like to endorse fully the objectives which the Secretary-General has in mind. I have not the slightest doubt that the United Nations will give him full authority, full sanction, to carry out the aims and objectives that he has envisaged in this report."

Mr. RIFA'I, Jordan (A/PV.644 at page 41): "...We meet today to discuss the Israel refusal to withdraw, in the light of the report (A/3512) of the Secretary-General, and the Israel aide-mémoire appearing in document A/3511. From these two documents, and from the statement which Mr. Ben-Gurion, the Israel Prime Minister, made before the Israel Knesset on 23 January, it becomes clear that Israel refuses definitely to evacuate the territories it occupied beyond the armistice demarcation line."

....

(at page 42): "The functions of the United Nations Emergency Force were clearly defined in the report (A/3302) of the Secretary-General of 6 November and in his present report (A/3512). They are limited in scope and temporary in nature, with a specific task to accomplish."

....

(at page 43-45): "It should also be noted that the Palestine area is governed by an armistice system which was dictated exclusively by military considerations. This fact keeps the political rights in the Palestine question recognized and safeguarded, and at the same time does not allow further military advantages. This point is thoroughly explained in Part Two of the Secretary-General's report (A/3512), in paragraph 13 of which he says:

'Thus, the United Nations cannot recognize a change of the de facto situation created under article VI of the Agreement unless the change is brought about through settlement between the parties; nor, of course, can it lend its assistance to the maintenance of a de facto situation contrary to the one created by the Armistice Agreement.'

The Secretary-General goes on to say:

'These considerations exclude the United Nations from accepting Israel control over the area, even if it were of a non-military character. They would also exclude the deployment of the UNEF necessary, in the absence of Israel troops, if such arrangements as those proposed by the Government of Israel were to be implemented.' "

Mr. SHAHA, Nepal (A/PV.644 at page 53-55): "...The report of the Secretary-General states that:

'The United Nations cannot condone a change of the status juris resulting from military action contrary to the provisions of the Charter. The Organization must, therefore, maintain that the status juris existing prior to such military action be re-established by a withdrawal of troops, and by the relinquishment or nullification of rights asserted in territories covered by the military action and depending upon it.' (A/3512, page 2)

It is, therefore, incomprehensible that the United Nations could possibly enter into any negotiations prior to the withdrawal of the Israel troops behind the Armistice line."

645th Meeting (28 January 1957 at 3 p.m.)

Mr. LODGE, United States (A/PV.645 at pages 2, 3-5 and 6): "...We have studied the Secretary-General's report with great care and we have concluded that the measures which he suggests are fair and practicable. They are, in fact, essential. The report is positive and constructive. It fully justifies our trust and confidence in the Secretary-General. The carrying out of his suggestions will mark the turning point in the unhappy history of this problem.

Without necessarily endorsing all the legal points contained in his report, the United States does endorse the basic premise on which the Secretary-General bases his recommendations. We believe that the United Nations Emergency Force should co-operate with UNTSO. We agree that strict observance by both Egypt and Israel of the provisions of the Armistice Agreement and the fullest respect for the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly are the keys to the restoration of peace and stability.

...The deployment of the United Nations Emergency Force must, as the Secretary-General recommends, be such as to assure that this separation is achieved. That is why the United States strongly supports the Secretary-General's recommendations concerning the deployment of the United Nations Emergency Force on both sides of the armistice lines, particularly with regard to the sensitive positions in the Gaza and El Auja sectors. We believe it is essential that units of the United Nations Emergency Force be stationed at the Straits of Tiran in order to achieve there the separation of Egyptian and Israeli land and sea forces. This separation is essential until it is clear that the non-exercise of any claim to belligerent rights has established in practice the peaceful conditions which must govern navigation in

waters having such an international interest. All of this, of course, would be without prejudice to any ultimate determination which may be made of any legal questions concerning the Gulf of Aqaba.

The United States hopes that the General Assembly will give decisive support to these and other recommendations set forth in the report. We believe the Secretary-General should be authorized to carry out these measures immediately upon the withdrawal of Israel forces."

Mr. EBAN, Israel (A/PV.645 at page 7): "...On 20 January 1957, the Secretary-General invited the Israel delegation to state to him its intentions on withdrawal and to formulate for the General Assembly its proposals on the arrangements which it had mentioned in relation to Sharm-al-Shaikh and Gaza. On 23 January 1957, I submitted Israel's proposals on each of these subjects in the form of an aide-mémoire which has been circulated as document A/3511."

....

(at page 8-10): "Before discussing Israel's proposals in detail, I wish to comment on the report submitted by the Secretary-General in pursuance of the General Assembly resolution of 19 January 1957."

(report analyzed pages 8-10 to 14-15)

....

(at page 16): "In making these observations on Israel's rights in the Suez Canal, I recall the report of the Secretary-General of 9 May 1956 (A/3596) in which it is emphasized, rightly, that the Security Council alone has the competence to interpret its resolutions. This was in reply to a request for action to help secure the implementation of the 1951 resolution."

....

(at page 18): "To sum up: We rise from a study of this part of the report firmly convinced that international organs should approach questions of navigation with the traditional emphasis on the international interest; on universality; on freedom of passage; on the absence of connexion between maritime freedom and external problems; and without undue deference to alleged rights of blockade.

The report deals in detail with the 1949 Armistice Agreement has 'deteriorated' (paragraph 15); that it has been 'undermined progressively by developments in recent years' (paragraph 15); 'that ever-widening non-compliance with it has developed' (paragraph 26); and, by implication, that it has ceased to be operative at all, to the extent that even after withdrawal behind the armistice lines, it could be considered as operative only in part, since non-compliance would still continue in other substantive clauses. That is the judgement in paragraph 27.

The Israel delegation has addressed the Security Council and the General Assembly many times on the events which led to the breakdown of the 1949 Armistice Agreement with Egypt. By the time we reached the point of explosion in October 1956, Israel was enjoying practically none of its rights under that agreement. We had no 'security and freedom from fear of attack'. We had no recognition by Egypt of the character of the agreement as a condition to permanent peace. The demarcation line offered us no protection against raids, assaults and fedayeen incursions. We had no freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba."

(at pages 22, 23 and 24): "In its commendable desire for realism, the report admits that a full restoration is impossible. It says:

'The Armistice regime may be considered as operative at least in part, provided forces are withdrawn behind the Armistice lines, even if non-compliance were to continue in relation to other substantive clauses of the Armistice Agreement.'

(A/3512, paragraph 27)

I repeat: 'even if non-compliance were to continue in relation to other substantive clauses of the Armistice Agreement'.

But on examination this thesis of the partial operativeness of the Agreement becomes difficult to sustain....

For these reasons we strongly doubt whether any system of relations can be established by rebuilding this collapsed structure on the basis of some of its less significant provisions, such as articles VII and VIII. But one truth does emerge from the central thinking of the report. The report admits that fresh agreements are required in any case between Egypt and Israel. Would it not, then, be wise to use such agreements for a serious and stable solution of outstanding security problems, rather than to revive an agreement which has collapsed beyond repair? Since the report admits that many provisions of the Armistice Agreements now have to be replaced or modified, surely efforts should be directed towards the establishment of a peaceful relationship between Israel and Egypt, rather than towards the restoration of a framework in which belligerency and hostility have flourished.

The report deals with the United Nations Emergency Force. The functions of the United Nations Emergency Force are cautiously and

restrictively interpreted. Indeed the activities of the Force are subordinated to Egypt's consent. I recall that the Secretary-General's second and final report on the Force (A/3302) did contain the seed of a different interpretation, expressed in the following paragraph, which perhaps should now be recalled to mind. The Secretary-General wrote:

'It is further clear that the General Assembly, in its resolution of 5 November 1956, by the reference to its resolution of 2 November, has wished to reserve for itself the full determination of the tasks of this emergency force, and of the legal basis on which it must function in fulfilment of its mission.' (A/3302, paragraph 8)"

....

(at page 27): "My delegation believes that the General Assembly can endow the United Nations Force with this capacity to solve that problem. Is not our position, by any objective standard, a position of moderation, of conciliation, of elementary prudence and of mature international responsibility? If the United Nations will simply decide to place its forces on this coast for the purpose of ensuring free navigation until a permanent agreement for freedom of navigation is reached, then the problem will have been solved."

....

(at page 34-35): In conclusion, I note that the Secretary-General in his report points out that the immediate issues at stake are practically all 'complicated and delicate'. By discussing them seriously and in a conciliatory spirit, without rancour or denunciation, the General Assembly can contribute effectively to their solution."

Mr. SERRANO, Philippines (A/PV.645 at page 36): "...We have before us the report of the Secretary-General of 24 January 1957 (A/3512) which makes reference to his previous report of 15 January 1957 (A/3500). In order to approach these reports of the Secretary-General intelligently and to determine possible positions available to this body or another appropriate organ of the United Nations, it seems to me necessary that we should keep distinctly in mind the following: first, the terms of the basic Assembly resolutions from 2 November 1956 to 19 January of this year; secondly, the position of the parties to the question - the position of Egypt and the position of Israel; thirdly, the position of the Secretary-General and of UNEF in the light of the terms of the Assembly resolutions, by which UNEF was created and organized and by which the Secretary-General was entrusted with certain specific responsibilities in connexion with the hostilities; and fourthly, what this Assembly can do and cannot do in the light of the present state of affairs. If we keep clearly in mind the juridical relation and the link among these four fundamental factors I have mentioned, I hope that we may be able to avoid the possibility of confusion and to view the situation with a degree of clarity." (pages 36 to 46 analysis of the Secretary-General's report)

....

(at page 46): "If I correctly interpret the views of the Secretary-General in the statement in which he speaks of obtaining the consent of Egypt for the assumption of functions by UNEF beyond what is expressly provided in the Armistice Agreement, as those which he has stated in his report of 6 January, I must say that there must be some point of disagreement in this respect. The question that arises,

therefore, in this connexion is the following: when UNEF has entered into the Gaza Strip soon after the withdrawal of the Israeli forces, can the Gaza Strip be regarded as Egyptian territory and will the further stay and deployment of UNEF there require the consent of Egypt? That is the question.

...If we are to interpret the words of the Secretary-General in his report: 'territory of a State', we must in this connexion recall the partition. Under the partition the Gaza Strip was a part of the Arab State and not of Israel. Necessarily it was also not a part of Egypt.

Therefore, if the legal and juridical link is to be established by the Secretary-General between this report and his previous report of 6 January, with reference to the consent of the State of a territory wherein these units may be stationed, the basis is erroneous. With respect to Egypt, Gaza is not its territory, and the consent of Egypt is not necessary for the continuance of UNEF in that area. In my view, neither is the consent of Israel necessary, because under the partition Gaza was a part of the Arab State and not a part of Israel or Egypt. In this respect, therefore, I am not quite in agreement with the conclusions arrived at by the Secretary-General."

....

(at page 47): "I would repeat that neither the consent of Israel nor the consent of Egypt, in my view, is necessary in the performance of the functions of UNEF in Gaza, so long as those functions are related to the terms of the resolution of 2 November, as reiterated in other resolutions of the General Assembly. Indeed, if such consent is necessary on the part of Egypt, I would say that such consent is already presumed by the fact that Egypt has voted in favour of these resolutions."

(at page 48): "But I daresay that if it is intended by this body to have UNEF in the Gaza Strip to prevent the possibility of the recurrence of conditions in which both parties accuse the other of military incursions, it would be essential for this body to ratify the functions of UNEF. I say that it could validly do so."

....

(at pages 51, 52, 53 and 54-55): "I therefore come to the following conclusion:

Firstly, in connexion with the present report of the Secretary-General, which unhappily is now the subject of criticism by the Government of Israel, I must state that the views expressed by the Secretary-General therein are limited to his assessment of his responsibilities and duties and those of the UNEF under the basic Assembly resolutions. He, therefore, cannot be expected to go beyond the responsibilities as defined for him and the UNEF by those resolutions which entrusted those responsibilities to him.

On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that the Secretary-General had functions assigned to him other than those arising from the Assembly resolutions. It should be recalled that the Secretary-General was brought into this picture as early as 1956. He submitted his report to the Security Council. When the Security Council discussed his report, it adopted a resolution on 4 June 1956, which in its operative paragraphs provided as follows:

'4. Endorses the Secretary-General's view that the re-establishment of full compliance with the Armistice Agreements represents a stage which has to be passed in order to make progress possible on the main issues between the parties....

7. Requests the Secretary-General to continue his good offices with the parties...and to report to the Security Council as appropriate.' (S/3605, page 2)

Therefore, as far as the Palestine question is concerned, the Secretary-General has two sources of obligations: the Assembly resolutions and the Security Council resolution of 4 June 1956. Therefore I come to the conclusion that, if the Secretary-General feels that he cannot do certain things, as indicated in the present report, I can also say that he might perhaps do those things under the authority given him by the Security Council resolution of 4 June 1956.

To illustrate this, I would point out that the Secretary-General's present report indicates his belief that there is a need or advisability for both parties to reaffirm the provisions of article I of the Armistice Agreement with respect to the guarantee of mutual abstention from attack by land, air or sea. As I view it, there is no need for the Secretary-General to recommend reaffirmation of that provision of the article, because under his terms of reference in the resolution of the Security Council he himself can require the parties to make such a reaffirmation in that respect if it will ease whatever misgivings Egypt and Israel entertain on the situation. I repeat that the sources of the functions of the Secretary-General are not only the Assembly resolutions but also the resolution of the Security Council in which he has been called upon to make use of his good offices for the securing of full compliance with the Armistice Agreement. Therefore, in that respect his functions may be deemed to be complementary as far as compliance with the Armistice Agreement is concerned.

Thirdly, what the Secretary-General cannot do under the Assembly resolutions and under the resolution of the Security Council, perhaps this Assembly or the Security Council can. It is essential to determine this in order that there may be no room for misapprehensions or misgivings. Surely the Secretary-General cannot do certain things under the Assembly resolution. Perhaps he cannot do certain things under the Security Council resolution. But what he cannot do, this Assembly or the Security Council alternatively may do, according to what might be appropriate in the circumstances.

Fourthly, Israel's proposal in regard to the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran, without regard to whether it is legitimate or illegitimate, valid or invalid, justified or unjustified, is a matter that in my view may be acted upon only by the Security Council, that is, in so far as navigation therein is concerned, leaving to this Assembly the matter of the withdrawal of Israel forces without any conditions whatsoever. The same is true with regard to the Gaza area. In so far as the armistice is to be observed in the Gaza area, and if there is need for maintaining the UNEF in the Gaza area for the purpose of avoiding a repetition of those cases of military incursions by both parties there, the Assembly can in my view redefine the functions of the UNEF so as to meet the situation.

Reaffirmation by the parties of article I of the Armistice Agreement, in so far as there is a mutual guarantee that neither of the two parties will attack each other, being essential to a condition for transition to a permanent peace in the area, can be done in my view by the Secretary-General, not under the present Assembly resolution but under his duties in connexion with the resolution of the Security Council.

Lastly, it is my hope - and this is to be done by the appropriate organ which is called upon to do so - and there is, in my view, a need for a revision of the Armistice Agreements in order to bring about greater stability and lesser misgivings on the part of the parties concerned. Revision of the Armistice Agreements is permissible and can be done under the machinery of the Armistice Agreement itself as provided in article VIII. Under article VIII of the Agreement there are three procedures for revision of the Agreement. The first is by mutual consent of the parties. The second is that, if mutual consent cannot be secured, one of the parties may call upon the Secretary-General, who in turn will call a conference of the representatives of both countries, and such a conference becomes obligatory upon both parties. Thirdly, if no agreement can be secured in that conference, the matter may be brought to the Security Council."

Mr. DEJANY, Saudi Arabia (A/PV.645 at page 58): "...The report of the Secretary-General is now before us. It states that at the expiration of the time limit, Israel had not fully complied. The word 'fully' seems to refer to the withdrawal which Israel had stated earlier that it would make by 22 January, and beyond which it will not go. The intention of the resolution was essentially intended to cover the Sharm al-Sheikh area and the Gaza Strip, the areas which Israel had refused to evacuate unconditionally. In effect, therefore, there was no modification in the position which Israel had maintained on 19 January, and which led to the adoption of that last resolution."

....

(at page 68): "My delegation is greatly disturbed by the attempts which are being pursued by some delegations to broaden the functions

of the United Nations Emergency Force. The Secretary-General, quoting from document A/3302, states in paragraph 7 of his report (A/3512):

'It follows from its (UNEF's) terms of reference that there is no intent in the establishment of the Force to influence the military balance in the present conflict and thereby the political balance affecting efforts to settle the conflict.'

We cannot accept any modification of that interpretation."

(at page 69): "Egypt made its position clear on the United Nations Emergency Force in the aide-mémoire which it forwarded to the Secretary-General

'Noting that the General Assembly in its resolution 395 approved the principle that it could not request the Force to be stationed or operate on the territory of a given country without the consent of the Government of that country'."

....

(at pages 71 and 72): "We adhere to the position maintained by the overwhelming majority of representatives and by the Secretary-General, that the withdrawal of Israel forces must be complete and unconditional."

30 January 1957

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646th Meeting (29 January 1957 at 10:30 a.m.)

Mr. JAMALI, Iraq (A/PV.646 at pages 11 and 12): "...We are grateful to the Secretary-General for the objective report which he has made to us after his hard labours with Israel. We certainly sympathize with him in the strain which he must have undergone in dealing with the Israel delegation. Reading the aide-mémoire of Israel and the report of the Secretary-General, we can very well appreciate the efforts of the Secretary-General. We feel that he deserves our gratitude for his relative impartiality, for his neutrality, for his objectivity. We may not agree with all that he proposes or with all his arguments. But we cannot help commending the fine spirit of impartiality and neutrality, the outlook, the peaceful objective which he has held before himself in preparing his report.

Of course, we are not surprised that the Secretary-General should be attacked and should be defied, that his report should be described as 'unconstructive' and 'unrealistic'. We are used to Israeli attacks on fair-minded people. We hope that our Secretary-General will be preserved to us, will be safe. Whenever I think of the integrity of the Secretary-General, I remember the late Count Bernadotte. He was another great Swede who worked for peace, and he wanted peace for the Middle East. But I hope that our Secretary-General will remain alive, will remain safe, will remain energetic and active in the field of international peace."

....

"This, of course, makes me think more and more that the Secretary-General's report should be given due weight. And I wish to express my agreement with the Secretary-General when he states his firm position

that nothing can be done before a complete withdrawal of the invading armies is achieved. I think the Secretary-General is absolutely right. Nothing can be done for the Middle East, nothing should be talked about - nothing can be talked about - before complete withdrawal of the Israel army behind the armistice lines is unconditionally effected.

We also agree with the Secretary-General that, pending a settlement, the truce and the armistice agreements must be faithfully observed by all parties.

Furthermore, we agree with the Secretary-General that the United Nations Emergency Force must be stationed in the demilitarized zone - and, if it is to be stationed on the armistice lines, we say it must be put astride, on both sides of the armistice lines.

We agree with the Secretary-General that the United Nations Emergency Force should never be turned into an occupying force. The United Nations did not go to the Middle East to occupy the territory of countries or States. It went to perform a very specific duty: to see to it that the withdrawal was effected peacefully, that the withdrawal of the invading armies was effected peacefully."

Mr. KUZNETSOV, USSR (A/PV.646 at page 27): "...The report by the Secretary-General submitted on 24 January regarding the results of his negotiations on the withdrawal of Israel troops from Egypt notes that Israel is continuing delaying tactics by putting forward new artificial pretexts and conditions in order to avoid carrying out the demands of the General Assembly in regard to the immediate withdrawal of Israel troops from Egyptian territory. The report notes:

'3. At the expiration of the time-limit set by the resolution for the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly, Israel has not fully complied with the requests of the General Assembly for withdrawal.' (A/3512)"

....

(at pages 33 and 34-35): "In the light of the above-mentioned attempts of the aggressive circles in Israel and in certain Western countries, I would like to also dwell for a moment on the Secretary-General's report which is now before us for discussion. The report notes that the claims of Israel to change the status of Gaza and to occupy Egyptian territory in the Aqaba area are quite unjustified and unlawful. The report justly points out that the United Nations cannot agree to the change in the juridical status even of a part of Egyptian territory, and that any attempts to change the juridical status of Egyptian territory would be a violation of the Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel and that it would also be contrary to the Charter of the United Nations. In this connexion the following appears in the report:

'The United Nations cannot condone a change of the status juris resulting from military action contrary to the provisions of the Charter. The Organisation must, therefore, maintain that the status juris existing prior to such military action be re-established by a withdrawal of troops, and by the relinquishment or nullification of rights asserted in territories covered by the military action and depending upon it.' (A/3512, paragraph 5)

Then the report goes on to say:

'Thus, the United Nations cannot recognize a change of the de facto situation created under article VI of the Agreement unless the change is brought about through settlement between the parties; nor, of course, can it lend its assistance to the maintenance of a de facto situation contrary to the one created by the Armistice Agreement. These considerations exclude the United Nations from accepting Israel control over the area, even if it were of a non-military character. They would also exclude the deployment of the UNEF necessary, in the absence of Israel troops, if such arrangements as those proposed by the Government of Israel were to be implemented.' (Ibid, paragraph 13)

The Secretary-General's report also recalls that the utilization of the United Nations armed forces for any purposes whatever can take place only with the agreement of the State on whose territory they will be active. However, I would like to point out that as regards that part of the report which deals with the proposal for a possible utilization of the United Nations Emergency Force for purposes other than those provided for in the 4 November resolutions, those proposals are formulated here in a somewhat unclear manner."

....

(at page 36): "The report of the Secretary-General once again confirms the undeniable fact that Israel has absolutely no reason to delay the withdrawal of its troops from Egyptian territory."

Mr. QUIROGA-GALDO, Bolivia (A/PV.646 at pages 37 and 38-40): "...The statements made by Mr. Ben-Gurion concerning the Gaza Strip and the Gulf of Aqaba now show a deplorable corollary: his attacks against the report presented by the Secretary-General in compliance with the tasks

entrusted to him by the General Assembly. We must say that such public attacks have no precedent in the ten years of the existence of the United Nations. Even during the most tense moments of the cold war, the role of the Secretary-General was always treated with the deference that his delicate mission warranted. He is, after all, defending the principles and purposes of the Charter and therefore is trying to uphold world peace.

The delegation of Bolivia believes that the Secretary-General's report is a clear summary of the background of the conflict. We feel that it is a scrupulously impartial and honest statement of juridical elements in the light of which the decision of the General Assembly to re-establish the situation before the aggression can be justified. Any other way of looking at this matter by the Secretary-General would have been overlooking the role that he is called upon to fulfil in our Organization, or else it would have been said of him that he had a blind spot.

...The Egyptian borders and territorial limits with Israel were determined by the 1949 Armistice Agreement. It was and it still is the intention and will of the General Assembly to eliminate the last vestige of the invasion committed by the three aggressor countries and to re-establish the status quo ante. This being the case, the report of the Secretary-General is a very wise reiteration of principles. Therefore, any attack on such a report by any of the parties concerned is unfounded. There can be no doubt whatever that the United Nations is called upon to solve all the difficult and complex problems facing the Near East. It would hardly be reasonable nor would there be any justification for the United Nations to blind itself to any of the elements that make this problem as complex as it is."

Mr. PEARSON, Canada (A/PV.646 at page 46): "...In our view the Secretary-General's report (A/3512), which we have before us and which we have been considering, shows the way out of this deadlock. The Secretary-General has given his views - sane and reasonable views - on the steps which should be taken after withdrawal, but which perhaps we can approve now. Those steps must be taken within the limits fixed by previous resolutions and decisions of the United Nations which until we alter them - if we have the power to alter them, as Assembly decisions - remain in effect. His report emphasizes, I think rightly, that actions through the recommendations of this Assembly, as contrasted with decisions of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter, require for their implementation the consent of the parties concerned.

The main argument of the Secretary-General's report is that we must return to the Armistice Agreement - to the full implementation of the Armistice Agreement - but that this should be joined with United Nations action to secure and supervise such implementation, something that had been absent in recent years, and that if we cannot take that kind of complementary action for implementation the mere injunction on the parties concerned to observe the armistice in its entirety may not prove to be very effective. The Secretary-General says in paragraph 15 of his report:

'There is universal recognition that the condition of affairs, of which this deterioration formed part, should not be permitted to return. Renewed full implementation of the clauses of the Armistice Agreement obviously presumes such an attitude on the part of the Governments concerned, and such supporting measures as would

guarantee a return to the state of affairs envisaged in the Armistice Agreement, and avoidance of the state of affairs into which conditions, due to a lack of compliance with the Agreement, progressively deteriorated.'

Compliance with the Armistice Agreement is, in our view, as important as compliance with recent resolutions on withdrawal, and other types of resolutions, although any effort to bring about this larger compliance should, I repeat, be subsequent to our decision on withdrawal. But that compliance, as I have said, should be with all the provisions of the Armistice Agreement - article I as well articles VI, VII and VIII."

....

(at page 47): "I think that the Secretary-General might be instructed, after consultation with the parties concerned, to make arrangements for the deployment of the United Nations Emergency Force on both sides of the armistice demarcation line and in the Gaza Strip in order that that Force, which is our own creation and which is functioning so effectively in the interest of peace and security already, might assume the supervisory duties of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and prevent incursions and raids across the demarcation line and maintain peaceful conditions along that line, and that Egypt and Israel, to assist in this essential work of the United Nations Force, should be requested to remove their military forces from or limit them in these areas of deployment which remain to be delimited."

....

(at page 48-50): "Then I think that the Secretary-General, on whom we seem to be placing great burdens or responsibility these days,

should be authorized to arrange for units, or a unit, of the United Nations Emergency Force, after the withdrawal of Israel forces, to be stationed at some spot in the Gulf to assist in the establishment and maintenance of peaceful conditions in that area."

Mr. BEN-ABOUD, Morocco (A/PV.646 at page 51): "...The Secretary-General's report states that 'Israel has not fully complied with the requests of the General Assembly for withdrawal' (A/3512, paragraph 3)."

14 February 1957

649th Meeting (1 February 1957 at 3 p.m.)

Mr. FAWZI, Egypt (A/PV.649 at page 7): "...The creation of UNEF has been a step in the right direction towards implementation of Article 43 of the Charter, and the consensus of opinion in the General Assembly is unmistakably in favour of helping this Force to prove its usefulness and to inspire full confidence. The General Assembly, in the formulation of its relevant resolutions, and in the statements made by many delegations, has been one with the Secretary-General in showing its full awareness of these essential considerations."

Mr. OTHMAN, Yemen (A/PV.649 at pages 7, 8-10 and 11): "The Secretary-General tells us in his report that he has endeavoured to clarify both the limits on the United Nations action, set by considerations of principle of involved, and the direction in which such action might be usefully developed."

In addition...we wish to emphasize the following passage in paragraph 13 as being particularly pertinent to our immediate deliberations:

'...Whatever arrangements the United Nations may now wish to make in order to further progress toward peaceful conditions, the Agreement must be fully respected by it. Thus, the United Nations cannot recognize a change of the de facto situation created under article VI of the Agreement unless the change is brought about through settlement between the parties; nor, of course, can it lend its assistance to the maintenance of a de facto situation contrary to the one created by the Armistice Agreement.'

(A/3512)

Stated in more concrete language, these limits on United Nations action mean that the General Assembly cannot take any action which may, directly or indirectly, support the Israel proposals regarding the Gaza Strip, or Sharm el-Sheikh, or the Strait of Tiran, or which in any way would accommodate Israel's conditions for the complete withdrawal of Israel forces behind the armistice lines. As to the direction which the Secretary-General's report suggests, the central point of emphasis in this direction is a reaffirmation of the Armistice Agreement.

The report leaves open only such matters as those relating to effective implementation of the agreement. But as a whole the report is a refutation of the argument that a return to conditions prior to the invasion of Egypt would be a return to the conditions which caused the aggression undertaken by the three Powers, Israel, the United Kingdom and France. This argument, by the way, is founded upon the erroneous assumption that the Armistice Agreement did not work because of certain inherent defects in it or because of border incidents as such....

The foremost and most serious question in the minds of the Arabs now is what the Secretary-General warns against, namely, whether the United Nations shall lend its assistance to the maintenance of what Israel has acquired as the result of the Israeli, United Kingdom and French invasion of Egypt."

Sir Percy SPENDER, Australia (A/PV.649 at page 23-25): "In paragraph 5 of his report (A/3512) the Secretary-General states the view that United Nations actions must be governed by principles and must be in accordance with international law and valid international agreements.

With this view - expressed, as it necessarily is, in these general terms - I am in complete accord. It is because I have not been at all certain what precise principle the United Nations has acted upon on some of its previous resolutions that I felt obliged to speak in the terms I did on the last occasion that the Assembly debated this subject."

....

"It follows that I agree with the proposition contained in paragraph 5 (a) of the Secretary-General's report, namely, that the United Nations cannot condone a change in what he terms the status juris - a term which, despite the comment of the representative of Israel, is known in international law - if such change results from military action contrary to the Charter."

....

(at page 26): "A critical consideration, which seems hitherto not to have received its proper attention by the Assembly - and my remarks are directed solely to Assembly action, since I agree fully with the Secretary-General when he says in his report that for his part he must act scrupulously in accordance with the decisions and recommendations of the Security Council, General Assembly and other principal United Nations organs - is that, prior to the incursion into Sinai by Israel, a 'state of war' was alleged by Egypt to exist between itself and Israel. Where has that critical factor hitherto received its proper attention by the Assembly?"

Another critical consideration - and to this the Secretary-General makes some reference in his report - is the conduct of both sides before the armed military action by Israel."

....

(at pages 27, 28-30, 31, 32, 33 and 34-35): "If the interdiction is not justified on the basis that such a state of war existed, then, bearing in mind the observations of the Secretary-General, we think that Egypt should give clear assurances that, upon compliance by Israel with the terms of the Assembly resolution calling for the withdrawal of its forces behind the armistice lines, Egypt will not attempt again to interdict the Straits at least until the issue of the Gulf has been determined by agreement, by this Assembly, by reference to the International Court of Justice, or by any other peaceful means....

This, surely, is not asking any more than the minimum in view of the fact that it is clear enough from the Secretary-General's report, read particularly with his report of 15 January, that any claim asserted by Egypt to control the Straits is, to say the very least, of exceedingly doubtful validity."

....

"It seems to me that paragraph 25 of the Secretary-General's latest report gives us a lead which the Assembly should follow. The Secretary-General says that, whatever rights there may be in relation to the Gulf and the Straits, such rights should be exercised with restraint on all sides."

...We cannot escape our responsibility by seeking to transfer it to the already overburdened shoulders of the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General poses the problem for us, and it is for us to decide how we should deal with it. What precisely do we propose to do to ensure that belligerent rights claimed by one State are not exercised pending a final determination of the issue - for example, through the

International Court of Justice? Or is it our intention - as I fear it may be - to leave this matter very much up in the air and so to poison further an atmosphere already unhappily charged with too much bad air as it is?

...we cannot disregard, no matter how much the representative of Israel may disagree with them, the observations of the Secretary-General on the concept of restrictions on the passage of international commercial shipping contained in the Security Council's resolution of 1 September 1951, as set out forcefully in paragraph 26 of the Secretary-General's report. I agree with the Secretary-General's remark that the general findings of the Security Council have a direct bearing on the question under consideration regarding the Gulf of Aqaba and that they remain valid and warrant corresponding conclusions as long as the assumptions defined by the Security Council remain correct....

In my view, these assumptions remain correct notwithstanding what the Secretary-General calls 'an ever-widening non-compliance with the Armistice Agreement' and notwithstanding the well presented arguments of the representative of Israel.

If we are to found our approach, as the Secretary-General properly states in paragraph 5 of his report, on 'valid international agreements', it follows clearly enough, in my view, that the interdiction by Egypt of the Strait of Tiran has been a continuing breach of the Armistice Agreement and should not be permitted to continue any further, any more than breaches of the agreement by Israel should be permitted to continue." (citations from paragraphs 24, 27 and 15 of the Secretary-General's report A/3512)

....

"I agree with the Secretary-General's interpretations of these matters. Surely in such circumstances, and in the events which have happened, it is not asking more than the bare minimum that firm assurances should be forthcoming from Egypt not to interfere meanwhile with the right of innocent passage through the Straits of Tiran. For again to borrow the words of the Secretary-General, there is universal recognition that the condition of affairs inherent in 'the deterioration' in the relationship between Israel and Egypt 'should not be permitted to return'."

....

"Let me now pass to other considerations. The present report of the Secretary-General - to which I desire to pay my sincere tribute as a masterly analysis of the situation and as presenting constructive suggestions for effective progress towards the creation of peaceful conditions in the area - deals with both the Strait of Tiran and Gaza.

The Secretary-General has, I believe, dealt with an exceedingly difficult matter with great objectivity. I pay my tribute to his labours although it happens that I take leave to differ with him in certain of the views he has advanced.

It would not be my purpose to examine the report with meticulous particularity. That would be neither profitable nor fair. I do, however, wish to place on record my views on a few of the propositions advanced by the Secretary-General in his report.

I would not find it possible to accept, in the wide and general terms in which it is expressed, the proposition advanced by the Secretary-General in the first sentence of paragraph 5 (b), namely that:

'The use of military force by the United Nations other than that under Chapter VII of the Charter requires the consent of the states in which the force is to operate.' "

....

"If the Secretary-General's proposition is of universal application - and if I have given it a wider meaning than the words of the Secretary-General would justify or than he intended - I shall be very happy to be corrected - then it would seem to me to follow that 'consent' is a continuing concept, and if that is so, consent may be discontinued or, consent having been given, may at any time be withdrawn unless the party concerned has by agreement otherwise precluded itself from so doing. Nor would the matter stop here. Consent must, so it would seem, if the Secretary-General's proposition is correct, cover every phase of the operation at every point of time. It would mean that no plans could be worked out for the discharge by the United Nations Force of its functions since it would reside solely within the power of the State concerned as to what specific area or areas such force should operate, when, for how long, and in what circumstances."

....

"It seems to me to follow from the proposition enunciated by the Secretary-General that unless agreement already given by Egypt to the operation of the United Nations Emergency Force preclude it, the Force presently operating within the borders of Egypt is entirely subject to Egypt's ultimate control. Egypt could, on that basis, at any time withdraw its consent wholly or in part or in relation to any area or operation. If this were the position, then we certainly would have a situation where, referring to the words of the Secretary-General, in

paragraph 5 (b) of his report, the United Nations Force should, it is true, not serve as a means to force settlement, in the interest of one party of political conflicts or legal issues recognized as controversial, but it could be used by Egypt to that end. I do not say that Egypt has any intention of interpreting the Secretary-General's statement in this way. I am merely dealing with the matter from the point of view of what I believe to be the logical consequence of the general proposition advanced by the Secretary-General, unless read subject to some qualifications.

If I may say so, with due deference to the view expressed by the Secretary-General, this is how, taken to its logical conclusion, his proposition could work out, and I am unable to accept it unless I am forced to do so by clear language of the Charter. I am not unaware of any such language."

....

(at pages 36 and 37): "Paragraph 12 of the Secretary-General's second and final report on the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force - with which the 7 November resolution concurred as regards the definition of the functions of the United Nations Emergency Force - states that those functions would be, 'when a cease-fire is being established, to enter Egyptian territory with the consent of the Egyptian Government, in order to help maintain quiet during and after' - and the word 'after' is a vitally important one - 'the withdrawal of non-Egyptian troops, and to secure compliance with the other terms established in the resolution of 2 November 1956' (A/3302, paragraph 12). What were those 'other terms' of the resolution of 2 November - a resolution which, by its terms, was directed to all parties involved in the hostilities. These terms were as follows: first, that there should

be an immediate cease-fire; second, that the movement of military forces and equipment, and so forth, into the area should be halted; third, that the parties to the Armistice Agreements should observe scrupulously the provisions of the Agreements; and, fourth, that, upon the cease-fire's becoming effective - and this event has now occurred - steps should be taken to reopen the Suez Canal and secure freedom of navigation. We think it is important to note that the functions of the United Nations Emergency Force are not directed solely to taking over territory as it is vacated by non-Egyptian forces; rather, the Force is to remain in positions occupied by it after the withdrawal, in order to secure compliance with the terms of the resolution here cited.

The latent question to which I have referred is this: Since the functions of the Emergency Force are, inter alia, designed to secure compliance with all the terms of the General Assembly resolution of 2 November - and the paragraph in question was accepted by Egypt, since it voted in favour of the relevant resolution - would it not now be open to Egypt, as the Secretary-General's proposition otherwise would seem to assume, to withdraw its consent either wholly or in part? I repeat that I am not saying that that is Egypt's intention, but I believe that that is the logical consequence of the Secretary-General's proposition and the latent question in the 2 November resolution to which I have referred. If not, then the functions of the Force are, clearly, to remain and discharge all the responsibilities that I have mentioned. While it is doing that, it must be subject only to the direction of the United Nations.

If, however, this is not the case, and 'consent' means continuing consent which may be determined by Egypt at its discretion, not only are important terms of the resolution stripped of much of their force, but Egypt is placed in a position where it can direct or limit or impede the operation of the United Nations Emergency Force, as 'a means to force settlement, in the interest of one party, of political conflicts or legal issues recognized as controversial' - to use again the words of the Secretary-General's present report (A/3512, paragraph 5 (b)). Should it ever arise, that would be an intolerable position....

For the reasons I have given, I am, I regret to say, unable to agree with the proposition propounded in the first sentence of paragraph 5 (b) of the Secretary-General's report. It follows that views expressed by the Secretary-General elsewhere in the report, to the extent to which those views depend upon the assumed validity of this proposition, cannot be supported by me."

....

(at page 41): "The Secretary-General's report says that we cannot act without the consent of both parties - since that would not be in accordance with a valid existing international agreement - in this case the Armistice Agreement. Each side therefore is entitled by international law to refuse its consent and if either side refuses its consent, would it be competent for the United Nations to take any further action to compel such consent? Apparently not. What then?"

The SECRETARY-GENERAL (A/PV.649 at pages 43, 44-45 and 46): "In his speech the representative of Australia raised one point on which he declared himself unable to agree with the proposition I had propounded in my report, and solicited a clarification. The proposition referred

to, is the one according to which the use of military forces by the United Nations, other than that under Chapter VII of the Charter, requires the consent of the State in which the force is to operate. I do not believe that this principle can be challenged as it is only under Chapter VII that the United Nations, in this case the Security Council, can take decisions which may infringe upon the sovereignty of Member nations.

Nor do I believe that the second part of the proposition, which requires complete impartiality in the activities of such a force - a condition fully stated already in the basic report on the Force - can be challenged.

However, I fully agree with the representative of Australia that if this were the whole story, the situation would have been most unsatisfactory. In practice, the consent obviously must be qualified in such a way as to provide a reasonable basis for the operations of the United Nations Force. That is exactly the reason why, in November, an arrangement was agreed upon with the Government of Egypt, according to which the Government of Egypt declared that, when exercising its sovereign rights on any matter concerning the presence and functioning of the United Nations Emergency Force, it would be guided in good faith by its acceptance of the General Assembly resolution of 5 November 1956.

The representative of Australia has rightly drawn attention to this, which, in the case under consideration, is the necessary supplement to the basic Charter principle. Under these circumstances, obviously, the situation facing the Assembly has to be judged in the light of the general principle I have stated - and which, in the report, I had no reason to state in anything but the most general terms - and the agreement

by which the Government of Egypt has given its consent, qualified so as to provide a basis for the operations of the Force.

This is the legal situation which is consistently reflected in the last report. To all the extent that movements of the United Nations Force are supposed to follow from the duties of the Force in relation to the cease-fire and the withdrawal, the matter, in the report, has been regarded as non-controversial as it is covered by Egypt's general consent while, on the other hand, as regards activities of the United Nations Force which would extend beyond what is covered by this consent, an additional consent has been considered as necessary.

I, thus, do not believe that there is any difference of views, as to this legal issue, between the representative of Australia and myself. The question which is not yet fully clarified, is how far in the practical cases under consideration the duties of the Force go, and how far, therefore, certain arrangements for the Force are covered or not by the consent given by Egypt as qualified by its assurance of good faith interpretation of the basic decisions of the General Assembly."

Mr. van LANGENHOVE, Belgium (A/PV.649 at page 47): "The report of the Secretary-General and the discussion to which it has already given rise confront us with a situation which could have been foreseen when two weeks ago we adopted the last resolution dealing with the Egyptian question. The withdrawal has made further progress, but it still remains incomplete. The objections which hinder it in the coastal region of Aqaba and the Gaza Strip have not been overcome. Hence two courses are open to us: repressive measures or constructive measures."

....

(at page 48): "During what the Secretary-General calls the first phases of the implementation of the Assembly's resolutions, no doubt it was right to give primary importance to the provisions which, after the ending of hostilities, dealt with the withdrawal of the armed forces. Now, when we are approaching the end of these first phases, more controversial questions are going to take up our attention. That is why the Secretary-General was certainly well advised in enumerating at the beginning of his report the principles which must govern his action at the same time as the action of the whole Organization.

...The Secretary-General emphasizes, on the contrary, in his further report the necessary respect for law and particularly for the Armistice Agreements, which derived their binding force from the consent of the parties.

In our view the principles involved can hardly give rise to controversy. They thus furnish a sound basis for the working out of possible measures which, as the Secretary-General says, will be made possible by the complete implementation of the resolutions of the Assembly."

....

(at page 49-50): "The resolution of 2 November called for the withdrawal of the armed forces behind the armistice demarcation lines, but it also called upon the parties to respect scrupulously the provisions of the Armistice Agreement. It is this which the Secretary-General recalls on two occasions in his last report."

....

(at page 51): "At the request of the Security Council, the Secretary-General devoted much effort to this scrupulous respect last year, and we understand that he therefore devoted an important part of his report to that point. We should not understand it if the Assembly were not to do likewise in its debates. The Secretary-General recalls that the first article of the Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel provides that both parties must refrain mutually and completely from belligerent acts....

In making this proposal, the Secretary-General draws the attention of the Assembly particularly to Articles VII and VIII of the Armistice Agreement, which provide for restrictions on the deployment of the military forces of the parties along both sides of the armistice demarcation line. He notes that these provisions 'have been undermined progressively by the developments in recent years, and, at the beginning of the crisis, were not being fulfilled.' He adds:

'There is universal recognition that the condition of affairs, of which this deterioration formed part, should not be permitted to return.' (A/3512, page 5)"

....

(at pages 52 and 53): "The Secretary-General was thus led to make proposals which would envisage an adequate deployment of the Emergency Force which would require a new decision on the part of the General Assembly....

...Moreover, the Secretary-General foresees that, when the Israel troops withdraw from the Gaza Strip and the coastal region of the Gulf of Aqaba, they will be followed by the Emergency Force in conformity with the functions which the Assembly entrusted to that Force and as, indeed, has occurred already in the other parts of the Sinai Peninsula."

....

"In his report of 15 January, the Secretary-General expressed this view:

'The international significance of the Gulf of Aqaba may be considered to justify the right of innocent passage through the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf in accordance with recognized rules of international law.' (A/3500, page 5)

As I said previously in discussion of this question, we consider this opinion as completely justified. It is not very important, in our view, whether or not the International Law Commission has postponed consideration of this question, because the authority for saying what the law is does not belong to that body. It is only the International Court of Justice that possesses that right.

Hindrances to the innocent passage of ships could not be justified either by the exercise of belligerent rights, since such exercise, as the Secretary-General noted, would be contrary to the Armistice Agreement."

Mr. HANIFAH, Indonesia (A/PV.649 at page 56): "...It is the basic principle to which the Secretary-General also refers in paragraph 5 (a) of his report of 24 January, when he states:

'The United Nations cannot condone a change of the status juris resulting from military action contrary to the provisions of the Charter. The Organization must, therefore, maintain that the status juris existing prior to such military action be re-established by a withdrawal of troops, and by the relinquishment or nullification of rights asserted in territories covered by the military action and depending upon it.' (A/3512)"

....

(at pages 57 and 58-60): "It is a cause of deep satisfaction to my delegation that, as stated in paragraph 22 of document A/3512, 'the Secretary-General has been informed of the desire of the Government of Egypt that all raids and incursions across the armistice line, in both directions, be brought to an end, and that United Nations auxiliary organs afford effective assistance to that effect.' Naturally, it is to be hoped that Israel will inform the Secretary-General of such a desire on its part."

....

(at page 62): "Furthermore, as pointed out in the report of the Secretary-General, such a new arrangement would only be workable with the consent of the two parties to the Armistice Agreement, namely, Egypt and Israel, since the Force would then have to enter the border regions of both these States. Needless to say, my Government would not be prepared to participate in any such arrangements without the prior consent of the Egyptian Government."

Mr. JERBI, Libya (A/PV.649 at pages 66 and 67): "...I wish first, on behalf of my Government, to pay a tribute to Mr. Hammarskjöld for the clear exposition and the excellent illustration of the legal aspects of the present situation, and particularly for his emphasis on the fact that United Nations action:

'In its effort to help toward solutions of the pending problems in the area...must be governed by principle and must be in accordance with international law and valid international agreements.' (A/3512, page 2)"

Mr. ESCUDERO, Ecuador (A/PV.649 at page 67): "The Secretary-General of the United Nations, in carrying out the tasks entrusted to him by the General Assembly in paragraph 2 of the operative part of the resolution of 19 January, within the time-limit set in this paragraph, has submitted a report contained in document A/3512, on the noble efforts he has made to bring about the complete withdrawal of the armed forces of Israel. That report was written with great objective spirit and great impartiality. The different and complex facets of the problem have been studied. This report reveals once again that our Secretary-General is worthy of the entire trust that the General Assembly has placed in him for the rigorous fulfilment of the tasks entrusted to him by our Assembly to re-establish peace and security in the conflict that began at the time of the invasion of Egyptian territory by the armed forces of Israel, which was a flagrant violation of the Armistice Agreement signed between Egypt and Israel on 24 February 1949."

....

(at page 71): "I do feel that it is extremely interesting that the Secretary-General, in paragraph 24 of his report, cites the comments of the International Law Commission on article 17 of the Articles of the Law of the Sea...."

....

(at page 72): "As the Secretary-General so wisely mentioned in his report, the first article of the Armistice Agreement gives that instrument the character of a non-aggression pact...."

Mr. JOJA, Romania (A/PV.649 at page 81): "...The Secretary-General has submitted his report to the General Assembly. The Secretary-General

confirms the fact that the Israel Government has not complied completely with the request for withdrawal made by the General Assembly. The Secretary-General has stated that the United Nations cannot agree that the status juris should be modified by action contrary to the Charter and that it must require that the status juris existing before the military action be re-established by means of a troop withdrawal and by the relinquishment or nullification of rights asserted in territories covered by the military action and depending upon it.

The report of the Secretary-General confirmed the fact that the principles of the Charter, of international law and of the provisions of the Armistice Agreement rule out any possibility of the United Nations agreeing that Israel should exercise authority over the region involved, even if that authority were of a non-military nature."

....

(at page 82-85): "With respect to the United Nations Emergency Force, it cannot be denied that this Force cannot be given any competence or role which, by its very nature, it cannot have. In this connexion the Secretary-General's report states:

'They would also exclude the deployment of the UNEF necessary, in the absence of Israel troops, if such arrangements as those proposed by the Government of Israel were to be implemented.'
(A/3512, paragraph 13)"

5 February 1957

650th Meeting (2 February 1957 at 10:30 a.m.)

Mr. KIZYA, Ukrainian SSR (A/PV.650 at page 3): "...The one who refuses to hear is deaf, and Israel refuses to listen to or to heed the demands of world public opinion. It refuses to state when the last Israel soldier will leave the territory of Egypt and go behind the armistice line. In the Secretary-General's report of 15 January (A/3500) it is stated that, 'Like the cease-fire, withdrawal is a preliminary and essential phase in a development through which a stable basis may be laid for peaceful conditions in the area.'

Some nine days later, during which one more resolution was adopted by the Assembly, calling upon Israel to withdraw its forces, the Secretary-General, in a report dated 24 January (A/3512), was obliged to state: '...Israel has not fully complied with the requests of the General Assembly for withdrawal' - no doubt the aggressor considered that it might in the future utilize the fruits of its criminal aggression."

....

"According to the aide-memoire included in the Secretary-General's report of 24 January (A/3511), the permanent representative of Israel to the United Nations makes use of such conditions for the withdrawal of Israel forces, which would, in effect, leave the Gaza Strip under the control of Israel."

....

(at page 4-5): 'The Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman called the Hammarskjöld report "negative and unconstructive" and in parts "a masterpiece of obscurity".' (Quotation from the New York Times of 28 January 1957)

....

"Therefore, the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR wishes to support the thesis advanced by the Secretary-General as follows:

'The United Nations cannot condone a change of the status juris resulting from military action contrary to the provisions of the Charter. The Organization must, therefore, maintain that the status juris existing prior to such military action be re-established by a withdrawal of troops, and by the relinquishment or nullification of rights asserted in territories covered by the military action and depending upon it.' (A/3512, paragraph 5 (a))"

Mr. ULLRICH, Czechoslovakia (A/PV.650 at page 12): "...At present, after three months of aggression Israel's troops still continue to occupy a part of Egyptian territory, and the Secretary-General, in his report of 24 January 1957 (A/3512) notifies us that Israel still refuses to comply with the request of the General Assembly to withdraw its troops from Egyptian territory.

...It emerges, however, from the report of the Secretary-General that the Israel Government still refuses to comply with this request and, instead of doing this, it is continuing its delaying tactics and always advancing new conditions which are contrary to the principles of the United Nations, to the norms of international law and to the existing Armistice Agreement of 1949."

....

(at page 13-15): "The General Assembly must now allow such a precedent to be established, a precedent which would undermine the very foundations of our Organization and the principles of the Charter based on

the prohibition of the use or threat of force. We see the meaning of this principle invoked in the report of the Secretary-General which states that...." (already cited by the Ukrainian SSR, paragraph 5 (a) of A/3512)

....

(at page 16): "Already the fact alone that measures which have nothing to do with the withdrawal of forces should be discussed in a situation created by aggression, represents an inadmissible pressure and is, in the terms used by the Secretary-General, 'an element influencing the solution'. Aggression is an international crime; its cessation and the removal of all its consequences cannot be made contingent upon any conditions."

....

(at page 17): "From the last version of these plans, submitted by the representative of Canada on 29 January, it follows that they would affect the administration of the Gaza area as well and would have a far-reaching effect both in the de jure and the de facto situation based on the Armistice Agreement of 1949. Such plans are in contradiction with the principles of the United Nations and international law as set forth in the Secretary-General's report as the basic considerations underlying any further measures. Thus on page 4 of the Secretary-General's report we can read the following:

'The United Nations cannot recognize a change of the de facto situation created under article VI of the Agreement unless the change is brought about through settlement between the parties; nor, of course, can it lend its assistance to the maintenance of a de facto situation contrary to the one created

by the Armistice Agreement. These considerations exclude the United Nations from accepting Israel control over the area, even if it were of a non-military character. They would also exclude the deployment of the UNEF necessary, in the absence of Israel troops, if such arrangements as those proposed by the Government of Israel were to be implemented.' (A/3512, paragraph 13)

There are also other passages of the Secretary-General's report which state quite unequivocally that the United Nations Emergency Force cannot in any case be used so as to affect in any way the future solution of political questions. It is therefore not possible to invoke the report of the Secretary-General as support for plans the substance of which is to misuse the United Nations Emergency Force."

....

(at page 21): "The Czechoslovak delegation fully agrees with the Secretary-General's position, as stated in document A/3512, that Israel should have, unconditionally and without delay, withdrawn all its armed forces behind the 1949 demarcation line, and that it cannot be condoned that the Israel Government should in any way use the aggression and its consequences as a means of pressure to influence the ultimate solution of the situation in Egypt."

Mr. LODGE, United States (A/PV.650 at page 22): "...We therefore join in proposing the second draft resolution (A/3518). This draft resolution deals with the measures set forth in the Secretary-General's report (A/3512)."

....

(at page 23): "The United Nations Emergency Force can best fulfill its mission and exercise such a restraining influence if, as proposed in the Secretary-General's report, it is deployed on both sides of the armistice line, particularly in the sensitive Gaza and El Auja sectors....

Again, with regard to Gaza the United States supports the Secretary-General's recommendation. The Secretary-General should, through a mission of his selection, supervise the withdrawal of the present civil administration in the Gaza Strip and take steps to ensure that incursions or raids across the armistice line in the Gaza area will not take place. The second draft resolution would provide for carrying out these measures."

Mr. MALIK, Lebanon (A/PV.650 at pages 26 and 27): "...Unfortunately, instead of reporting that Israel has completed the withdrawal of its forces behind the armistice line, Mr. Hammarskjold informed us that 'Israel has not fully complied with the requests of the General Assembly for withdrawal'. But Mr. Hammarskjold did not limit his report to mere information on the status of the compliance by Israel with the resolution. Acting as a principal organ of the United Nations - and that is what the Secretary-General is - the United Nations whose very essence, according to the Charter, is to maintain international peace and security, the Secretary-General has reiterated his firm views on the urgency of 'prompt conclusion of the first phases of the implementation of the General Assembly resolutions' (A/3512, page 10), that is, complete and unconditional withdrawal of Israel forces behind the armistice lines."

....

"That this is the true meaning of the Assembly's five resolutions (withdrawal of invaders) is clearly borne by the Secretary-General in the two reports he has submitted to this Assembly in documents A/3500 and A/3512, and for which I wish, in association with other delegations, to express our gratitude and appreciation to the Secretary-General. In his report of 24 January, the Secretary-General stated...." (quotes paragraph on status juris)

....

(at page 28-30): "This cardinal principle was one of the three enumerated by the Secretary-General in his report, principles which are 'generally recognized as non-controversial in the determination of the limits within which the activities of the United Nations can be properly developed' (A/3512, page 2). Applied to the case before us, what in effect does this principle so clearly enunciated by the Secretary-General mean? (amplifies)

Therefore, complete, unconditional and immediate withdrawal of Israel forces from Sharm el-Sheikh and the Gaza Strip is what the Secretary-General insists upon...."

....

(at page 31): "The issue is also not that of the United Nations Emergency Force, the present functions of which are clearly defined in the Secretary-General's report (A/3302) and sanctioned by the General Assembly in its resolution 1001 (ES-I)."

....

(at page 36): "In fact, the Secretary-General, after his three visits to the Near East in the spring and summer of last year, was well on the way to transforming the Truce Supervision Organization into an

effective machinery for peace when the Israelis dealt their blow on 29 October 1956.

Had Israel permitted the armistice machinery to function properly, had Israel given the Secretary-General a chance to render that machinery more effective, the raison d'être of Israel's grievances and complaints would have disappeared...."

Mr. BRILEJ, Yugoslavia (A/PV.650 at page 41): "...While insisting on the complete withdrawal of all the invading forces from all of the invaded territory as an essential precondition, as an absolute sine qua non of any further steps, the Assembly has always been keenly aware of the need for further measures designed to restore peaceful conditions in this troubled area. Such measures were in fact envisaged in the very first of the series of resolutions which the Assembly adopted at its first emergency session. This aspect of the matter has now been elaborated in the Secretary-General's report of 24 January, the importance and timeliness of which can hardly be overestimated.

...Their purpose, as the Secretary-General rightly points out, should be in the first place to restore and revitalize the armistice system. This is obviously, both from a political and from a legal point of view, the most realistic, indeed the only possible, course to take.

...In the words of the Secretary-General, what should be sought is:

'...a return to the state of affairs envisaged in the Armistice Agreement, and avoidance of the state of affairs into which conditions, due to a lack of compliance with the Agreement, progressively deteriorated.' (A/3512, paragraph 15)"

....

(at page 42): "A second essential point - and one which is closely related to the principle I have just mentioned - is that the United Nations Emergency Force cannot, to quote from the Secretary-General's report, 'serve as a means to force a settlement, in the interest of one party, of political conflicts or legal issues recognized as controversial' (A/3512, paragraph 5 (b))."

Mr. SATO, Japan (A/PV.650 at page 46): "...The report of the Secretary-General contained in document A/3512 has shown that the full implementation of the Armistice Agreement of 1949 would pave the way towards the stability of conditions conducive to a settlement ensuring the tranquility of the area in question."

Sir Leslie MUNRO, New Zealand (A/PV.650 at page 48-50): "...To guide us we have the report of the Secretary-General. Let us look at his position and take counsel from him, for in recent months we have cast upon him an enormous responsibility which he has worthily and most ably discharged. No single individual in the modern world, the servant of no one State, but of all States among us, has worked so unselfishly and so successfully for the good of us all. He is the head of a principal organ of the United Nations. As such, his reports to us are entitled to a peculiar respect.

Such measures as he has proposed in his latest report are ones which the second draft resolution before us asks us to adopt."

....

(at page 51): "Fourthly, I believe that the report of the Secretary-General, in whom we repose such confidence, affords a basis for the deployment of the United Nations Emergency Force in these areas - Gaza

and Sharm el-Sheikh - and along the Armistice Demarcation Line, pending a settlement of the problems involved."

....

(at pages 52 and 53-55): "We should have liked to see, as I have suggested earlier, a provision calling on the parties to refrain from any claim to exercise belligerent rights in accordance with paragraphs 27 and 28 of the Secretary-General's report. We believe, however, that this is implicit in paragraph 2.

In paragraph 3 we should have preferred to see more specific reference to the 'other measures' proposed by the Secretary-General, for example, the measures proposed in paragraph 29 of his report. However, it is perfectly clear from the terms of the draft resolution that among the 'other measures' - and I quote from paragraph 29:

'Israel troops, on their withdrawal from the Sharm-al-Shaikh area, would be followed by the United Nations Emergency Force in the same way as in other parts of Sinai.' (A/3512, paragraph 29)"

....

"Resolution II, however, holds out an opportunity and a challenge: first and foremost to this Assembly, to adopt it; secondly to the Secretary-General, with the aid of the United Nations Force, to implement it...."

Mr. NASE, Albania (A/PV.650 at page 56): "...The report of the Secretary-General, as well as the aide-mémoire on Israel's position, inform us that the Israel Government claims that it is rendering justice by annexing the Gaza Strip and by withdrawing its armed forces from Sharm el-Sheikh only under certain conditions."

651st Meeting (2 February 1957 at 3 p.m.)

Mr. GUNewardene, Ceylon (A/PV.651 at page 7): "...As far as the future of the people of Gaza is concerned, it is clearly indicated in the Secretary-General's report that some course of action has to be taken in consultation with the Egyptian Government, with whom, according to the Armistice Agreement, the control should vest."

Mr. SCHURMANN, Netherlands (A/PV.651 at pages 13-15 and 16): "...My delegation, however, voted for the resolution as a whole, because it had gained the impression from the comments of various speakers that the next step to be taken by the General Assembly would be the adoption of measures for a durable settlement of the conflicts in the Middle East. The well-balanced and thoughtful and constructive report of the Secretary-General gave further encouragement to this hope. In the view of the Netherlands Government, however, the second of the two draft resolutions that have now been submitted does not provide at this moment the reliable guarantees for the prevention of future disputes between the parties which the situation demands.

We have great faith in the abilities of the Secretary-General and we trust that he will be able to achieve the results that are most urgently needed, the results which are: complete cessation of all interference with shipping through the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba, and prevention of all belligerent acts along the Demarcation Line through a stationing of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Gaza area and in other places indicated in the report."

Mr. CARBAJAL-VICTORICA, Uruguay (A/PV.651 at page 26): "...And here I must refer to one part of the report of the Secretary-General. I share

the very high opinion of this Assembly that this distinguished civil servant honors us by his intelligence, his assiduity, his capacity and his impartiality. But this does not mean that I accept all the statements he made in his most recent report."

....

(at page 27): "In the report of the Secretary-General, in trying to show fully what the problems were, he has made some statements dealing with this Agreement which I should like to highlight."

....

(at page 31): "With reference to the Armistice Agreement, I should like to refute an argument which seems to appear in the report of the Secretary-General. I think that any man who reasons with such wisdom, with such logic, and who is so much above these actual deeds, cannot put this argument against the validity of the Armistice Agreement. It has been stated that if some of these provisions are not complied with, the Armistice Agreement will have lost all value."

Mr. TARABANOV, Bulgaria (A/PV.651 at page 37): "...Indeed, the Secretary-General's report of 24 January 1957 states that:

'At the expiration of the time-limit set by the resolution for the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly, Israel has not fully complied with the requests of the General Assembly for withdrawal'. (A/3512, paragraph 3)"

....

(at page 46): "In elaborating such conditions you have to take into account paragraph 24 of the last report of the Secretary-General (A/3512)...."

....

(at page 47): "Some have claimed that the report of the Secretary-General has led to this possible extension of the scope and functions of the Emergency Force. We note, as others have done, that some parts of the report lend themselves to ambiguous interpretation. For example, the following is stated in paragraph 29:

'...if it is recognized that there is a need for such an arrangement, it may be agreed that units of the Force (or special representatives in the nature of observers) would assist in maintaining quiet in the area beyond what follows from this general principle. In accordance with the general legal principles, recognized as decisive for the deployment of the United Nations Emergency Force, the Force should not be used so as to prejudice the solution of the controversial questions involved. The UNEF, thus, is not to be deployed in such a way as to protect any special position on these questions, although, at least transitionally, it may function in support of mutual restraint in accordance with the foregoing.' (A/3512, page 10)"

....

(at page 48-50): "Would not the presence of such a force jeopardize the proper solution of outstanding issues? And would its presence not run counter to the very principles that are enunciated at the outset of the Secretary-General's report? We consider that in drawing up the report the use of pressure was not taken into account as a way of arriving at the acceptance of a solution of problems arising from the outstanding issues."

....

(at page 51): "With regard to the Gaza area, as has been properly spelled out in the Secretary-General's report, we must reinstate the situation established by the Armistice Agreement....

We are also fully in agreement with the report of the Secretary-General when it states:

'The United Nations cannot condone a change of the status juris resulting from military action contrary to the provisions of the Charter. The Organization must, therefore, maintain that the status juris existing prior to such military action be re-established by a withdrawal of troops, and by the relinquishment or nullification of rights asserted in territories covered by the military action and depending upon it.' (A/3512, paragraph 5 (a))"

Mr. Krishna MENON, India (A/PV.651 at page 56): "...The Assembly will recall that after adopting the resolution of 19 January, we requested the Secretary-General to make an early report and we fixed the time-limit for it. We now have that report before us for our consideration. Having received and considered that report, the draft resolution states that the withdrawal by Israel must be followed by action which would assure progress towards the creation of peaceful conditions."

....

(at page 57): "On the other side, the Secretary-General reports that in the course of the discussions which have taken place since the circulation of his last report, he has been informed of the desire of the Government of Egypt that all raids and incursions across the Armistice Demarcation Line in both directions be brought to an end and that United Nations auxiliary organs afford effective assistance to

this effect. The last part of that statement requires the close attention of Members, namely 'that United Nations auxiliary organs afford effective assistance to that effect'."

....

(at page 58): "The whole of the procedures involved in this question are governed by the resolutions which we have adopted and which incorporate, as Members recall, paragraph 12 of that report of the Secretary-General from which the United Nations force emerged. My Government at that time laid down specific conditions in which we would participate in the United Nations force. But if we merely laid down those conditions, they would have little value except as being the view of one Government. Those conditions, however, were accepted. The Secretary-General accepted those conditions when we agreed to participate in that force. My delegation made reference to it again on 7 November when we were engaged in the last phase of obtaining the withdrawal of the British and French forces from Egyptian territory....

This is not the view of only one Government; indeed, it is not only something that was agreed to by resolution, but it is an international agreement between the Secretary-General and the Egyptian Government, which is set out in the aide-mémoire (A/3375, Annex), and the Secretary-General made reference to it yesterday...."

....

(at pages 61 and 62): "If that is not sufficient, the Secretary-General, in his report in document A/3512, has set out on page two, paragraph five, what must be regarded, in terms of this draft resolution, as the factors, the governing conditions, under which any recommendation, any suggestion, any proposal here can be considered...."

....

"It is true that UNEF is an organ of the United Nations. To that extent it takes its instructions, its orders, its guidance from the United Nations, but, as the Secretary-General pointed out on previous occasions, it is equally true that it has to function on sovereign territory; so that, if there is the law on the one side, there is the law on the other side that sovereignty has to be respected. Therefore, arrangements must be made, which is what the Secretary-General has done, with the Government of Egypt, and the Government of Egypt has responded in good faith."

....

"In placing them there, it is necessary that they should be placed on both sides of that line, and their function, as the Secretary-General pointed out, if all is agreed to, would be to assist the present observation corps in order to carry out what Egypt has said it desires and to which it has agreed, according to page 7 of this report which I read out a while ago, namely, that 'all raids and incursions across the armistice line, in both directions, be brought to an end'.

...Therefore, the entry of this force anywhere else at any time would be governed by the conditions under which the Secretary-General and the Egyptian Government have come to an agreement."

....

(at page 66): "Here therefore it is necessary to draw attention to that part of the Secretary-General's report on which we have been asked to express our opinion. This is what it says:

'In connexion with the question of Israel withdrawal from the Sharm-al-Shaikh area, attention has been directed to the situation in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran. This

matter is of longer duration and not directly related to the present crisis. The concern now evinced in it, however, calls for consideration of the legal aspects of the matter as a problem in its own right. It follows from principles guiding the United Nations that the Israel military action and its consequences should not be elements influencing the solution.' (A/3512, paragraph 23)"

....

(at page 67): "The Secretary-General himself having said that this problem is one of long duration, that it must be treated on its own and that there are legal problems, and when we have the authority of the International Law Commission that that Commission itself has not made up its mind on the matter, there can be no question that the resolution put before the Assembly seeks to resolve the question in that way."

....

(at page 68): "The paragraph continues:

'The duties of the Force in respect of the cease-fire and the withdrawal will determine its movements. However, if it is recognized that there is a need for such an arrangement, it may be agreed' - and the key word is the word 'agreed' - 'that units of the Force (or special representatives in the nature of observers) would assist in maintaining quiet in the area beyond what follows from this general principle.' (A/3512, paragraph 29)"

Mr. LODGE, United States (A/PV.651 at page 71): "...Let me make clear another point which appears to have caused some concern. The measures contained in the Secretary-General's report, which are referred to in

the second draft resolution before us, would not go into effect until Israel's withdrawals had been completed. We have previously taken note of and endorsed the Secretary-General's view that, and I quote from his report, 'withdrawal is a preliminary and essential phase in a development through which a stable basis may be laid for peaceful conditions in the area'. (A/3500, paragraph 15)

We believe that withdrawal is the first essential step. None of the constructive measures included in the second draft resolution are intended to go into effect until Israel has completed its withdrawal. Nor, let me add once again, will any of them be undertaken without the agreement of the affected party. It is for this reason that paragraph 4 asks the Secretary-General to consult with the affected parties."

Mr. MAHGOUB, Sudan (A/PV.651 at page 77): "...We were told that nobody can predict the consequences which will follow if Israel fails to withdraw, because when we introduced the draft resolution which asked for withdrawal within five days and requested the Secretary-General to report to us at the end of those five days, we were led to believe that Israel would not obey this resolution and that the result would be a resolution by the Assembly condemning Israel and inflicting penalties, such as withholding financial, military and economic assistance."

....

(at page 78-80): "The draft resolution went on to speak of the implementation of other measures proposed in the Secretary-General's report. Why did not the draft resolution say this also with regard to the deployment of the Emergency Force? In the Secretary-General's report it is made clear that the Emergency Force would be deployed on both sides of the armistice demarcation line. In fact it went on

to include the demilitarized area of El-Auja. The Secretary-General made it very clear that the deployment of such Forces should be subject to the consent of Egypt.

For this reason, this one measure of the Secretary-General was singled out very tactfully, intelligently and carefully, and phrased in such a way that it would be open to several interpretations."

652nd Meeting (2 February 1957 at 8:30 p.m.)

Mr. KUZNETSOV, USSR (A/PV.652 at page 4): "...In this second draft resolution it is proposed that the General Assembly take decisions on the deployment of the United Nations Emergency Force along the demarcation line established under the Armistice Agreement and on the implementation of other measures, set forth in the report by the Secretary-General contained in document A/3512, which ostensibly are necessary after the withdrawal of Israel forces. As seems clear from the report by the Secretary-General and the statements of some representatives, including the United States representative, other measures proposed are the deployment of United Nations forces in the Sharm el-Sheikh and Gaza areas and the simultaneous establishment in these areas of United Nations administration."

Mr. PEARSON, Canada (A/PV.652 at page 11): "...We agree with the view that there must be a full implementation of the Armistice Agreement of 1949, and that there must be a formal affirmation by the Governments concerned that they desist from raids and incursions across the demarcation line and take active measures to prevent these things happening. The Secretary-General, in his report, has called for these things. But they are not enough. The United Nations must take action

to achieve as well as merely to proclaim these objectives; to secure and supervise arrangements to this end."

....

"We must, therefore, in any draft resolution which we are considering, such as the one before us, be sure that we are giving the Secretary-General clear and definite authority so that, in the subsequent discussions and consultations which are required, he can make the United Nations and the United Nations Emergency Force effective for the purpose of bringing about action, following withdrawal of Israel forces."

....

(at page 12): "We are asking our Secretary-General to take on great and additional responsibilities. I hope that this second draft resolution - which is not a very long one - is not going to be the straw that will break this camel's back. But it is certainly our duty to give him as clear and precise a mandate as we can so that he can discharge these responsibilities with a minimum of confusion, controversy or delay.

I realize that it is the intention of the authors of this draft resolution to give the Secretary-General the authority necessary to discharge these new responsibilities and to perform this task that is of such vital importance to peace and the United Nations...."

....

"I realize, of course, that it would have been impracticable to have included in this draft resolution all the details of the actions which we wish the Secretary-General and the United Nations to take...I realize also that the Secretary-General must be given reasonable freedom of action, room to manoeuvre, in an operation of this kind, which is as delicate as it is complicated and important."

....

(at page 13-15): "My assumption on this point seems to me to be supported by the language of paragraphs 27 and 28 of the Secretary-General's report (A/3512), which refers to certain measures that should be carried out - and which, under paragraph 4 of this draft resolution, the Secretary-General is requested by this Assembly to carry out.

In regard to paragraph 3 of the second draft resolution, I take it that the word 'other' in the phrase 'the implementation of other measures' does not mean the exclusion of UNEF from these other measures by the fact that, under the preceding part of the paragraph, it is to be placed on the demarcation line. I also assume that the words 'in the area' at the end of this paragraph include the Sharm el-Sheikh and Gaza areas as well as the area of the demarcation line."

....

(at page 16): "I think it is especially necessary that there should be no doubt about the meaning of this resolution because if and when it is passed it becomes the Secretary-General's 'Bible' as he undertakes the duties based on it.

Our attitude to resolution II, then, has been conditioned by the interpretation I have given above and we think this is a reasonable and acceptable interpretation. The actual authority given the Secretary-General to carry out the provisions of this resolution is to be found in paragraph 4 where he is requested to take steps to carry out the measures which are in his report, which has been before us for some time. In other words, he is to implement his report on the basis of this resolution. It seems to me desirable therefore to recall the measures which are to be carried out by him, because they will be his responsibility."

....

"The Secretary-General recognizes that the deployment of the United Nations Emergency Force in Gaza on any wider basis than its deployment along the Armistice line in the Sinai Peninsula would require the consent of Egypt under the Armistice Agreement. He also points out, however, in his report - and I quote from that report - that 'the development of the situation in Gaza may require special attention and may impose added responsibilities on the United Nations' in particular in regard to refugees."

....

(at page 17): "The eighth and final measure which I have drawn from the report is that Israeli troops, on their withdrawal from the Sharm el-Sheikh area are to be followed by UNEF in the same way as in other parts of Sinai. The Force is not to be deployed there, as the Secretary-General points out, in such a way as to protect any special position on controversial questions, although, at least transitionally, it may function - or special United Nations observers may function - in support, and only in support, of mutual restraint and in maintaining quiet.

...I agree, for instance, with the representative of Australia that in accepting the Secretary-General's second report on the establishment of the Emergency Force we have already, and with the consent of the Government of Egypt, authorized the Force to help maintain quiet after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian troops and to secure compliance with the other terms of the resolution of 2 November 1956."

....

(at page 18): "In this connexion, the scope and the nature of Egypt's earlier consent was brought up yesterday by the representative of Australia and referred to by more than one speaker this afternoon. On that point the Secretary-General made, I think, an important clarification yesterday when he said: 'To all the extent that movements of the United Nations Force are supposed to follow from the duties of the Force in relation to the cease-fire and withdrawal, the matter...has been regarded as non-controversial as it is covered by Egypt's general consent while, on the other hand, as regards activities of the United Nations Force which would extend beyond what is covered by this consent, an additional consent has been considered necessary.' (A/PV.649, page 46)

The Secretary-General also said that whatever may be the legal situation under the Charter regarding consent, 'in practice, the consent must obviously be qualified in such a way as to provide a reasonable basis for the operation of the United Nations Force.' (Ibid., page 44-45)"

....

(at page 21): "Such a hope will only be realized, however, if, first, Israel forces are withdrawn and, secondly, if we back up the Secretary-General firmly and constructively in the task we are giving him, a task which I know he will undertake with the energy, sincerity and devotion he has already shown. If we do this, then we can be sure, I think, that the Secretary-General will use the authority we are now giving him and through the Force for peace which we have created ourselves, in a way which will bring about better conditions of security

in the area than have existed in the troublous and unhappy past, and thereby make an indispensable contribution to the peaceful and just political settlement which must come."

Mr. NOBLE, United Kingdom (A/PV.652 at page 22): "...I wish to join in the tribute which so many others have already paid to our Secretary-General for the earnestness and penetration which he has once again shown in drawing up a document of this importance in so short a time. He has set out in a masterly way the measures which can be taken at this time to establish and maintain peaceful conditions in the area of the recent conflict between Israel and Egypt."

....

(at page 23-25): "The second draft resolution which is before us today is expressed in general terms. But when I listened to Mr. Lodge this morning, it seemed to me that he explained very clearly what this resolution is intended to achieve and what it is expected that the Secretary-General shall do. His authoritative interpretation was very welcome to my delegation and will, I am sure, help us all greatly in deciding our attitude to the proposals before us.

...If the sponsors of a resolution interpret the meaning and the objects of the resolution in different ways, this cannot fail to place the Secretary-General in a position of some difficulty in carrying out the measures we hope he will take. In fact, it cannot but make his task more difficult, and this was emphasized by Mr. Pearson tonight."

Mr. PICCIONI, Italy (A/PV.652 at pages 27 and 28-30): "...In his report (A/3512) the Secretary-General has set forth the immediate problems of the hour and has made very useful suggestions with regard

to measures to be taken to solve those problems - notably problems relating to the Gaza Strip and Sharm el-Sheikh. In this connexion, we feel that the United Nations Force must be deployed in those areas so as to guarantee, as long as necessary, respect for all the obligations emanating from the armistice, whether it is a question of the end of the raids or the demilitarization of certain zones, or the obligation not to exercise belligerent rights."

Mr. de LLQUERICA, Spain (A/PV.652 at page 31): "...Thus, this draft resolution is based on the Secretary-General's very excellent report. In this connexion, I should like to extend my congratulations to the Secretary-General. Because the draft resolution is based on the Secretary-General's report, we are given complete assurances on an essential aspect of the problem - that is, the independence and sovereignty of the States which may be affected by future resolutions dealing with the Armistice Agreement rather than with the recent violation with which we are now concerned."

....

(at page 32): "In the Secretary-General's report, we find the following statement, which reassures us...." (quotes paragraphs 5 (b) and 5 (a) of A/3512)

....

(at page 33): "The proposals of the Secretary-General give us a good basis for a solution. These proposals are aimed at easing the tension in certain of these countries."

....

"...as regards the second draft resolution, we base our vote on the interpretation which we have given to the question of the independence

and sovereignty of States and on the scope given to these matters by the Secretary-General."

Mr. ENGEN, Norway (A/PV.652 at pages 36 and 37): "...The crucial point is then this: are there means for such action aimed at building a system of security in the area in which Egypt, Israel and the United Nations play their part, individually and jointly, in order to give us the largest possible amount of satisfaction that peaceful conditions will be safeguarded? In our view, there are such means available. They are outlined in the report of the Secretary-General, document A/3512, of 24 January. From this report can be extracted a distinct and quite simple series of measures which we, for our part, think should be implemented in order to bring the conditions in the area closer to peace than they have ever been since the end of the Second World War and, we hope, lay the groundwork for constructive peace efforts in that area.

As we see it, the General Assembly should authorize the Secretary-General to try to implement this programme through negotiations with the parties."

....

"There are other places also where the presence of the United Nations Emergency Force may be required for the same purpose. The Secretary-General has recognized this in paragraph 29 of his report. His submission is that units of the United Nations Emergency Force have certain duties with respect to the withdrawal and cease-fire in the Sharm el-Sheikh area."

....

(at page 41): "The Secretary-General, in paragraph 27 of his report, specifically mentions, as a measure to secure peaceful conditions, that the parties should be requested to give assurances that, on the basis of

full compliance with the Armistice Agreement, they will not assert any belligerent rights, including, of course, such rights in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran.

We support these measures and we appeal to the General Assembly to do the same. The non-exercise of belligerent rights, real or alleged, is, in our view, a requirement for the future maintenance of peace in that area.

Finally, there is the point of the administration of Gaza. Under draft resolution II, the Secretary-General will be authorized to negotiate with the government under whose jurisdiction Gaza belongs according to the Armistice Agreement. An arrangement in which the United Nations has a part is envisaged in paragraph 14 of the Secretary-General's report. By adopting the draft resolution, the General Assembly will authorize the Secretary-General to initiate such negotiations."

....

(at page 42): "As I have said before, draft resolution II is not a law; it is a recommendation and a mandate to the Secretary-General."

Mr. CHAVEZ ORTIZ, Bolivia (A/PV.652 at page 46): "...Therefore, my delegation cannot do otherwise than support both draft resolutions, with the understanding that the second draft resolution, appearing in document A/3518, gives to the Secretary-General sufficient flexibility to enable him to negotiate both with the Egyptian Government and with the Israel Government in such a manner that when these troops are placed on the armistice line in both territories these troops will not constitute an occupation of territory, because that would not be the function of the United Nations forces. We are sure that the Secretary-General will be able to do this successfully."

....

(at page 47): "If we are to implement this second draft resolution, the Secretary-General would have to negotiate with the Cairo Government. When this had been accepted by the Cairo Government, the movement of the United Nations forces would then be based upon an act of internal sovereignty on the part of Egypt...we understand that the Secretary-General will take the necessary steps to see that measures called for by the United Nations will not make the United Nations Force look like an occupation force."

Mr. KISELEV, Byelorussian SSR (A/PV.652 at page 52): "...The report of the Secretary-General points out that the proposals of Israel relating to the Gaza region are not acceptable inasmuch as they are contrary to the provisions of the Armistice Agreement. In the opinion of the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR, the United Nations cannot agree to the change in the status juris of the Gaza and Sharm el-Sheikh regions which result from military action. The United Nations should insist on the re-establishment of the status quo ante bellum by means of the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops.

...Mr. Pearson proposes to have the General Assembly instruct the Secretary-General to take the necessary measures to deploy the United Nations Emergency Force on both sides of the Armistice Demarcation Line with the purpose of having these troops assume the functions of observing the truce and maintaining peace and order along the Egyptian-Israel border. Mr. Pearson supported fully the statement of Mr. Lodge that units of the United Nations Emergency Force should be deployed in these regions so as to effect the physical separation of the land and sea forces of Egypt and Israel."

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659th Meeting (22 February 1957 at 3 p.m.)

Mr. SOBOLEV, USSR (A/PV.659 at page 16): "The Soviet delegation has already stated at the Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly that the decision to create the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt was taken in violation and in circumvention of the provisions of the United Nations Charter. According to the Charter, as is known, the right to create an international armed force of the United Nations for the support of international peace and security belongs exclusively to the Security Council and not to the General Assembly. On this basis the Soviet delegation does not find it possible to vote for approval of the Secretary-General's report on the status of the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt, and will abstain during the vote on the draft resolution in document A/3542 approving that report of the Secretary-General."

The SECRETARY-GENERAL (A/PV.659 at pages 16 and 17): "On 11 February I submitted the report (A/3527), in pursuance of the resolution of the General Assembly of 2 February (A/RES/461). Events since then have not called for a further report and I have presented none."

It is well-known, however, that discussions have been carried on outside this house in the continuing resolve to attain the goals defined in the several resolutions of the General Assembly. I have maintained close contact with these activities and have been kept well-informed on them. These serious efforts to break through the unfortunate impasse and to unlock the door to constructive endeavour are deserving of warm appreciation.

In so far as United Nations activities and positions are concerned, developments in the interim have given no reason to revise any of the substance of the previous report. However, in the light of some subsequent discussions in which I have engaged, I may make the following statement in the nature of a supplement to that report.

The Secretary-General states with confidence that it is the desire of the Government of Egypt that the take-over of Gaza from the military and civilian control of Israel - which, as has been the case, in the first instance would be exclusively by UNEF - will be orderly and safe, as it has been elsewhere. It may be added with equal confidence that the Government of Egypt, recognizing the present special problems and complexities of the Gaza area and the long-standing major responsibility of the United Nations there for the assistance of the Arab refugees, and having in mind also the objectives and obligations of the Armistice Agreement, has the willingness and readiness to make special and helpful arrangements with the United Nations and some of its auxiliary bodies, such as UNRWA and UNEF. For example, the arrangement for the use of the United Nations Emergency Force in the area should ensure its deployment on the Armistice line at the Gaza Strip and the effective interposition of the Force between the armed forces of Egypt and Israel. Similarly, the assistance of the United Nations and its appropriate auxiliary bodies would be enrolled toward putting a definite end to all incursions and raids across the border from either side. Furthermore, with reference to the period of transition, such other arrangements with the United Nations may be made as will contribute towards safeguarding life and property in the area by

providing efficient and effective police protection; as will guarantee good civilian administration; as will assure maximum assistance to the United Nations refugee programme; and as will protect and foster the economic development of the territory and its people."

660th Meeting (26 February 1957 at 10:30 a.m.)

Mr. PEARSON, Canada (A/PV.660 at page 23): "...The arrangements to follow withdrawal, which we should now agree on, are in essence, though not of course in detail, envisaged in the Secretary-General's reports of 24 January and 11 February, the former of which has already been endorsed by this Assembly."

....

"The second stage in this programme would be arrangements for the United Nations Emergency Force. In this regard, we think that the Secretary-General and the Commander of that Force should make arrangements with the Governments concerned for the deployment of the UNEF on the Armistice Demarcation Line."

....

(at page 26): "Israeli troops, on their withdrawal from the Sharm el-Sheikh area, should, as the Secretary-General puts it in his report of 24 January, 'be followed by UNEF in the same way as in other parts of Sinai', in order to assist in maintaining quiet in that area and in preventing conflict."

....

(at pages 27 and 28-30): "From the United Nations standpoint, a key issue also is how to provide security on both sides after Israel withdraws, on the basis of the Assembly's resolution of 2 November 1956, of later resolutions, as well as of the reports of the Secretary-General."

....

"Secondly, Israeli occupation of Gaza would only shift a little to the southwest the line between Israel and Egypt across which the raids might come. Since there will always be a line or frontier between Egypt and Israel, the only sure way to stop the raids across the Egyptian-Israeli line, wherever it may be, is by political action based on the sincere will of the Governments of Egypt and Israel, with United Nations assistance and supervision, to end such raids and incursions and to abide by the terms of the Armistice Agreement. Assurance of this intention, given by the Government of Egypt, has been repeated by the Secretary-General in his last two reports."

Mr. ZEINEDDINE, Syria (A/PV.660 at page 57): "...But what has the United Nations been doing during the last weeks while Israel has been defying its resolutions? And where do we stand today? Two methods, as we are aware, have been employed in attempting to bring about a withdrawal of Israel forces. One method was that followed by our Secretary-General. It consisted of trying to convince Israel of the advisability of withdrawing....

Our Secretary-General, on whom fell the main responsibility of implementing the United Nations resolutions, has utilized all possible arguments in order to convince Israel. He met with no results. His efforts with Egypt went on smoothly, followed finally by mutual comprehension. To get Israel's agreement to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula - a desert - constituted no issue, because Israel at no time wanted to keep the desert. The question was to get Israel's agreement to withdraw from the Sharm el-Sheikh area and the Gaza Strip. All the convincing arguments of our Secretary-General were unheeded.

He could well say that the resolutions were clear and emphatic, making withdrawal unconditional, complete and without delay. But Israel evaded the convincing efforts of the Secretary-General. In fact, it did not even listen to him because its mind was definitely set in another direction - that of expansion and holding to the results of expansion.

The efforts of the Secretary-General having failed, the United Nations was brought into a position of awaiting the answer of Israel."

661st Meeting (26 February 1957 at 3 p.m.)

Mr. ULLRICH, Czechoslovakia (A/PV.661 at page 2): "...The Report of the Secretary-General of 11 February 1957 (document A/3527) shows clearly that Israel not only consistently refuses to withdraw its forces from the Egyptian territory, but refuses also to discuss earnestly with the Secretary-General the implementation of the General Assembly's resolutions."

....

(at page 6): "In the letter of 5 February 1957 to the Secretary-General, the representative of Israel stated:

'On the clarification of these basic matters, a position would be created in which the other questions which you raised at yesterday's meeting could be considered in a more practical way.' (A/3527, Annex II, page 1)"

....

"The attitude of the Israel Government continues, as stated in the report of the Secretary-General, to be negative. Asked by the Secretary-General on the position of his Government on the Armistice Agreement, the representative of Israel stated that the Israel Government considers

the armistice as non-existent and referred to the declaration of the Prime Minister of Israel, Mr. Ben Gurion, to the effect that the Armistice Agreement 'has been broken and is beyond repair.' "

Mr. JAMALI, Iraq (A/PV.661 at page 13-15): "...Israel has made a mockery of this Organization. One resolution after another has been defied; one appeal after another has been rejected. The hard work done here by the Members, seventy-four of which voted for the unconditional withdrawal, has not been heeded. The fine and hard labours of the Secretary-General, with all his devotion and integrity, have not been heeded and have been of no avail. The efforts of that great man, the great leader of the free world, the President of the United States of America, were defied and made unfruitful."

....

(at page 23-25): "This Organization - including its Secretary-General - is not safe from Zionist propaganda and Zionist pressure.

I should like to deal with some lines of Israel propaganda which touch us here directly, and which affect our thinking."

Mr. DEJANY, Saudi Arabia (A/PV.661 at page 48-50): "...The Secretary-General, in his report of 24 January 1957, had emphasized the principle that the United Nations 'cannot condone a change of the status juris resulting from military action contrary to the provisions of the Charter'. The Secretary-General went on to say:

'The Organization must, therefore, maintain that the status juris existing prior to such military action be re-established by a withdrawal of troops, and by the relinquishment or nullification of rights asserted in territories covered by the military action and depending upon it.' (A/3512, paragraph 5 (a))

As is well known to all of us, and as the Secretary-General has reported both orally in our last meeting and in his latest report, Israel is adamant in its refusal to withdraw its forces unconditionally in compliance with the resolutions of the General Assembly."

....

(at page 57): "It is important to note in this connexion that the Secretary-General has orally informed the General Assembly, on 21 December, that General Burns and himself had informed Israel that a date falling between 13 and 27 January was considered unacceptable for the complete withdrawal of the Israel forces behind the armistice lines in accordance with the General Assembly resolutions."