Cable File
Outstation - Kamina
Incoming

31/08/1960 - 09/02/1962

1/2

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

SC
CC

UN ARCHIVES
SERIES S-0736
BOX 36
FILE 6
ACC. DAG13/1.6.1.20

DECLASSIFIED

Kamma

O: DAYAL

DATE: 28 January 1961

NO. 682

Re your D-216

For the time being I think your alternative a.) that is to say, to wait for Belgian reaction to note of 21 January, is the one to be followed. Will however keep matter in view and revert to it if necessary.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : DAYAL

FROM : SECRETARY-GENERAL

DATE : 28 JANUARY 1961

NUMBER : 649

Reur D203, paragraph 4. As long as the United Nations custodianship of the bases is not cancelled by the Security Council, the bases cannot in any circumstances be surrended and, consequently, it will be mandatory to deploy troops at your disposal in such a way that, to the best of our ability, any unilateral action on the part of Mobutu or his ANC can be effectively prevented. In order to give emphasis to this position, I have decided to release early next week the letter which we addressed to the Belgian Government on the question of bases on 21 January 1961. I have so informed the Belgian mission, thereby giving them an opportunity to reply to this letter if they so wish. The publication whould force belgians to give proper instructions so as to avoid becoming a party to a possible conflict with ANC trying to override Security Council's authority.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : DAYAL

FROM : SECRETARY-GENERAL

DATE : 21 JANUARY 1961

NUMBER : 479 480

21 January 1961

To : Permanent representative of Belgium

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that certain information reaching me from my special Representative in the Congo tends to indicate that negotiations have been proceeding between representatives of your government and Colonel Mobutu and his regime, with the object of altering the present status of the former Belgian bases in the Congo now under the custodianship of the United Nations force, and also of movable property now stored at those bases. Since the United Nations force took the custodianship of the bases and the property in them not only on the request of your government but also as a provisional measure under article 40 of the Charter I feel sure that your government would have officially informed the United Nations, as an essential party to the negotiations, had any but the most preliminary and exploratory conversations taken place. Nevertheless, it may be useful if I recall the terms of the present mandate of the force regarding the bases and further clarify the policy it should follow regarding them and their contents.

It will be recalled that in the latter part of August your Governments troops evacuated the bases on the express condition that they would be occupied by United Nations troops, their final disposition being a matter for further negotiation. As stated in my report to the Security Council(S/4475). The force then occupied the bases as a provisional measure under article 40 of the Charter,

without prejudice to the rights and claims of the parties concerned.

I informed your government by a letter of 28 August 1960 or our views on the legal nature of United Nations custodianship of the bases. In particular, I said : " La durée de l'administration de l'organisation des Nations Unies devrait, naturellement, être déterminée sur la base des conditions qui ont rendu la prise en charge nécessaire et qui elles-mêmes découlent du mandat donné au Secrétair Général par le Conseil de Sécurité, dans ses resolutions des 14 et 22 Juillet et 9 Aout. Il doit donc être considéré comme entendu au'aussi longtemps que l'administration demeurera nécessaire pour remplir l'objet de ces résolutions, elle continuera d'être assurée sous réserve d'instructions contraires de la part du Conseil. En même temps, il est reconnu que l'organisation des Nations Unies, dans l'esprit de l'article 40, devra tenir pleinement compte des intérêts légitimes des parties, des accords intervenus entre elles et de la nécessité de négociations en temps voulu concernant le sort des bases. "

In accordance with the foregoing, it is incumbent upon the Secretary General to determine first whether the continued administration of the bases is necessary for the fulfillment of the purposes of the Security Council resolutions, and second whether their disposition and the disposition of equipment and material in them would prejudice the legal interests of the parties concerned . His decision on these questions are, of course, subject to instructions that he may receive from the Security Council.

With respect to the first of these points, it is my considered conclusion that at the present time the transfer of the bases to the "Armée Nationale Congolaise" would be contrary to the provisions of the Security Council resolutions and detrimental to achieving the purposes which the Council and the GeneralAssembly have adopted

These installations, I need hardly emphasize, are of considerable military value; they contain airfields, military repair shops, barracks and other facilities of direct military utility. In addition, of course, they include stores of arms and ammunition. By turning these over at this time, the UN force would obviously be taking ant action the compatibility of which with the Security Council resolutions, is open to serious question. In view of this, such action whould not be taken without authorization by the Security Council.

The policy against providing materials of war was reaffirmed , as you know, in paragraph 6 of the General Assembly resolution 1474 (ES-IV) of 20 september 1960 which reads as follows:

" without prejudice to the souvereign rights of the Republic of the Congo calls upon all states to refrain from the direct and indirect provision of arms and other materials of war and military personnel and other assistance for military purposes in the Congo during the temporary period of military assistance through the United Nations, except upon request of the United Nations through the Secretary General for carrying out the purposes of this resolution and of the resolutions of 14 and 22 July and 9 August 1960 of the Security Council."

It can hardly be doubted that this paragraph is applicable in the present case since the transfer of military installations and the bases to the ANC can only be regarded as the "Provision of arms and other materials of war" and "other assistance for military purpose in the Congo" I assume that the government of Belgium would take full account of this provision, and that it will not act contrary to the policy expressed therein . On its part, the UN force must be guided by this provision and regard it as a further specification of the objectives inherent in the Security Council resolutions. Accordingly, the force, unless otherwise instructed by the security council, can take no action in respect to the surrender and the

transfer of its administration of the bases and the material therein which would conflict with the foregoing policy.

It is also pertinent for me to mention the second condition of United Nations administration of the bases, namely the requirement that the action of the force should not prejudice the rights and interest of any of the parties. In the present circumstances, there is considerable doubt that this requirement would be satisfied by the surrender of United Nations custodianship and for this reason, too, I believe the transfer cannot take place without the prior authorisation of the Security Council.

The foregoing considerations apply to the bases themselves - that is, the immovable property and fixtures - as well as to the arms, and other materials of war stored there. However, there may be property of the Belgian government stored at the bases which does not constitute arms or materials of war and which has not, under principles of states succession, become the property of the republic of the Congo. The United Nations force which, in accordance with the assurance given in my letter of 28 August, is under an obligation to take full account of the legitimate interests of your government, would be glad to discuss with your government what property falls into this category, and to release such property for any disposal which your government may consider appropriate.

Sir, etc....

Dag hammarskjold

Secretary General

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : DAYAL

FROM : SECRETARY-GENERAL

DATE : 21 JANUARY 1961

NUMBER : 477 478

Reur D-123 to 125 and memos of 12 January covering Kasa Vubu's letters of 9 and 12 January it is my conclusion that ONUC must retain custodianship of Kamina and Kitona bases at present time and that such continued administration is legally justified in terms of conditions set forth in my letter of August 28 to Belgian representative. I am accordingly sending the following letter to the Belgian Representative here you may communicate the substance of our position to Kasa Vubu.

" Le 21 Janvier 1961

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

J'ai l'honneur de vous informer que certains renseignements qui me parviennent de mon représentant spécial au Congo tendent à démontrer que des négotiations se déroulent, en vue de modifier le statut actuel des anciennes bases belges au Congo, qui sont maintenant sous la sauvegarde de la force des Nations Unies, ainsi que des biens meubles actuellement entreposés dans ces bases. Etant donné que la force des Nations Unies assure la sauvegarde des bases et des biens qui s'y trouvent, non seulement à la demande de votre Gouvernement mais également à titre de mesure provisoire au sens de l'article 40 de la Charte, je suis persuadé que votre Gouvernement aurait officiellement informé l'organisation des Nations Unies, en tant que partie essentiellement intéressée aux négotiations, si des conversations autres que des échanges de vues très préliminaires et de simples prises de contact avaient été entamées. Toutefois, il n'est peut-être pas inutile de rappeler les termes du mandat actuel de la force touchant

les bases et de préciser d'avantage la politique qu'elle devra suivre en ce qui concerne les dites bases et les biens qui s'y trouvent.

Il convient de rappeler qu'a la fin du mois d'Aout les troupes de votre Gouvernement ont évacué les bases sous la condition expresse que celles-ci seraient occupées par des troupes des Nations Unies, leur sort définitif devant être réglé par des négociations ultérieures. Ainsi que je l'ai déclaré dans mon rapport au Conseil de Sécurité (S/4475), la force a alors occupé les bases à titre de mesure provisoire au sens de l'article 40 de la Charte, sans préjudice des droits ou prétentions des parties en cause.

Dans une lettre en date du 28 Aout 1960, j'ai fait connaitre à votre Gouvernement nos vues sur la nature juridique de la sauvegarde des bases par les Nations Unies. En particulier, j'ai précisé ce qui suit:

Son excellence Monsieur Walter Loridan

Représentant permanent de la Belgique auprès des Nations Unies,

50 Tockefeller Plaza New York,

" La durée de l'administration de l'organisation des Nations Unies devrait, naturellement, être déterminée sur la base des conditions qui ont rendu la prise en charge nécessaire et qui elles-mêmes découlent du mandat donné au Secrétaire-Général par le Conseil de Sécurité, dans ses résolutions des 14 et 22 Juillet et 9 Aout. Il doit donc être considére comme entendu qu'aussi longtemps que l'administration demeurera nécessaire pour remplir l'objet de ces résolutions, elle continuera d'être assurée sous réserve d'instructions contraires de la part du Conseil. En même temps, il est reconnu que L'Organisation des Nations Unies, dans l'esprit de l'article 40, devra tenir pleinement compte des intérêts légitimes des parties, des accords intervenus entre elles et de la nécessité de négociations en temps voulu concernant le sort des bases"

Conformément à ce qui précède, il appartient au Secrétaire Général de déterminer en premier lieu s'il est nécessaire de continuer d'administrer les bases pour atteindre les buts énoncés dans les résolutions du Conseil de Sécurité et en deuxieme lieu si leur cession et celle de l'équipement et du matériel qui s'y trouvent lèseraient les intérêts juridiques des parties en cause. Il va sans dire que les décisions du Secretaire Général en la matière dépendent des instructions qu'il pourrait recevoir du Conseil de Sécurité

En ce qui concerne le premier de ces points, je suis parvenu, après mûre réflexion, à la conclusion qu'à l'heure actuelle le transfert de ces bases a' l'Armée Nationale Congolaise dépasserait la compétence du Secrétaire Général établie par les dispositions des résolutions du Conseil de Sécurité et de l'Assemblée Générale. Ces installations, J'ai besoin de le souligner, ont une valeur militaire considérable; elles comprennent des terrains d'aviation, des ateliers de réparation militaires, des casernes et autres aménagements ayant une utilité militaire directe . En outre, elles contiennent naturellement des dépots d'armes et de munitions. En les cédant à l'heure actuelle, la force des Nations Unies prendrait manifestement une mesure dont la compatibilité avec les résolutions du Conseil de Sécurité est particulièrement sujette à caution. C'est pourquoi cette mesure ne devrait pas être prise sans l'autorisation du Conseil de Sécurité.

L'interdiction de fournir du matériel de guerre a été réaffirmée, comme vous le savez, au paragraphe 6 de la résolution 1474 (ES-IV) de l'Assemblée Générale, en date du 20 Septembre 1960, qui est concu en ces termes : "6. Sans prjudice des droits souverains de la république du Congo,(invite) tous les Etats à s'abstenir de fournir, directement ou indirectement, des armes ou autre matériel de guerre, du personnel militaire ou autre assistance à des fins militaires au Congo pendant la durée de l'assistance militaire accordée à titre temporaire par

l'intermédiaire des Nations Unies, sauf si les Nations Unies le demandent, par l'entreprise du Secrétaire Général, pour atteindre les objectifs de la présente résolution et des résolutions adoptées par le Conseil de Sécurité les 14 et 22 Juillet et le 9 Aout 1960".

Il n'est guère douteux que le transfer d'installations militaires et des bases à l'ANC peut être considère comme une "fourniture d'armes ou autre matériel de guerre" et " autre assistance à des fins militaires au Congo" Je pense que le gouvernement Belge tiendra duement compte de cette disposition et qu'il ne prendra aucune mesure incompatible avec la politique qu'elle définit. De son coté la force des Nations Unies doit s'en inspirer et elle la considère comme précisant d'avantage les objectifs inhérents aux résolutions du Conseil de Sécurité. En conséquence, sauf instructions contraires du Conseil de Sécurité, la force ne peut prendre aucune mesure contraire à la dite politique en ce qui concerne la cession et le transfert de ses pouvoirs d'administration sur les bases et le matériel qui s'y trouvent.

Je dois également mentionner la seconde condition de l'administration des bases par les Nations Unies, A savoir que l'action de la force ne doit léser les droits et intérêts d'aucune des parties. Dans les circonstances actuelles, il est tout a fait douteux que cette condition serait remplie dans l'hypothese ou les Nations Unies se dessaisiraient de leur sauvegarde et c'est pourquoi également je pense que le transfert ne peut pas avoir lieu sans une autorisation préalable du Conseil de Sécurité

Les considérations ci-dessus valent pour les bases elles-mêmes c'est-à-dire pour les biens immobiliers et installations fixes - ainsi que pour les armes et autre matériel de guerre qui s'y trouvent entreposés. Cependant il se peut que le gouvernement Belge possède, dansles bases, des biens qui ne constituent pas des armes ou du matériel de guerre et qui conformément aux principes des successions entre Etats, ne sont

pas devenus propriété de la République du Congo. Conformément aux assurances données dans ma lettre du 28 Aout, la force des Nations Unies a l'obligation de tenir pleinement compte des intérêts légitimes de votre Gouvernement et serait disposée à étudier avec votre gouvernement quels sont les biens rentrant dans cette catégorie et à se dessaisir des dits biens pour les fins que votre gouvernement jugera appropriées

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, les assurances de ma très haute considération.

Le Secrétaire Général

Dag Hammarskjold.

UNITED NATIONS - NATIONS UNIES

INDICATE PRIORITY	SVC Service	FFFFF Routine	SSSSS Priority	PRIORITE NATIONS

Priorité Nations traffic is strictly limited.

N R

OUTGOING CLEAR MOST IMMEDIATE

Address (es) UNATIONS NEW YORK

Urgent 16/1

(TEXT & SIGNATURE) insert prefix & / or number as required USE DOUBLE SPACING.

D-96 SECGEN FROM DAYAL

1. Swedish train escort in battle early morning 15 January with Baluba one kilometer South of Bukama. Three Swedish wounded who have been taken to Kamina.

2. Names and details follow:

Major Kurt Skoog 2286. Bullet through left lower femur with fracture between Condyle. Bullet through right knee with cartilage defect. Bullet through right thigh no fracture. Bullet through neck muscles. Condition good. Lennart Lundgren PTE 2335. Bullet wound through left shoulder. Good condition. Major Erik Bonde 2126 . Bullet through left arm. Good condition. Belgian civilian doctor Motul from Luena. Bullet through head with basis fractures severe brain injuries and shock. Condition extremely serious.

3. Fighting had broken out on morning of 15 January between Moroccans and Katanga Gendarmerie at Luena when, according to Moroccans, Katanga Gendarmerie opened fire first. At approximately same time Baluba attacked Luena hospital wounding one Belgian Doctor whose condition given paragraph 2. above. Situation in Luena tense.

4. ONUC Elisabethville reports Katanga government requested withdrawal of Moroccans and their replacement by other troops. Also reported from Elisabethville that Katanga Government no longer recognizes neutral zone and is still irritated about happenings at Manono.

Algo 5644 — 100.000 - 10/60

T. O. R.

BY :

T. O. D.

Drafted by : J. Kelly

Authorized : R. Dayal

Date : 15 Jan. 61

Kamina

YCD NY 66A 12 00012 ;

LTF

CRUC

LEO ;

21A DAYAL FROM BUNCHE FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF NOTE RECEIVED ON TENTH FROM BELGIAN MISSION ON WHICH YOUR COMMENTS ARE SOUGHT AND THOSE OF DIRIVE CMA ANMED AND ANY OTHERS HAVING TO DO WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS AFFECTING STORES AND EQUIPMENT IN THE BASES STOP NOTE READS COLON ;

P2/51 ;

QUOTE NEW YORK, LE "0 JANVIER 1961 LA MISSION PERMANENTE DE LA BELGIQUE PRESENTE SES COMPLIMENTS AU SECRETARIAT GENERAL DES NATIONS UNIES ETDUORDRE CHLDWQVZMZZVACLUHTNQZQ

. PG KV(7(

(SZTXM

P2/51 ;

QUOTE NEW YORK, LE 10 JANVIER 1961 LA MISSION PERMANENTE DE LA BELGIQUE PRESENTE SES COMPLIMENTS AU SECRETARCAT GENERAL DES NATIONSIUNIES ET DORDCD DE SON GOUVERNEMENT A LHONNEUR DATTIRER SON ATTENTION SUC LES DIFFICELTES SERIEUSES QUE PRESENTENT LES OPERATIONS DE LIQUIDATION DU MATERIAL,

P3 ;

SE TROUVANT DANS LES BA' 'I OCCUPEES PRECEDEMMENT PA' LES FORCES METROPOLITAINES BELGES AU CONGO PARA 1) A KAMINA DES NEGOCIATIONS, MENEES DANS UN EXCELLENT ESPRIT DE COLLABORATION ENTRE LA COMMISSION DES NATIONS UNIES PRESIDEE PAR LE GENERAL WHEELER ET CHARGEE DE LACQUISITION DE MAONCIEL ET DEQUIP-MENT ET UNE COMMISSION ;

P4 ;

DU MINISTERE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE BELGE AVOIENT ABOUTI A UN ACCORD DE PRINCIPE CONCRETISE DANS LE RAPPORT ETABLI EN DATE DU 5 OCTOBRE 1960. IL AVAIT ETE ESTIME QUE LA VALEUR TOTALE DU MATERIEL QUE LES NATIONS UNIES ETAIENT INTERESSEES A REPRENDRE SELEVAIT A ENVIRON 430 MILLIONS DE ;

P5 ;

FRANCS BELGES. LE PRINCIPE DU PAIEMENT IMMEDIAT DE 15 POUR CENT DU TOTAL DE LA VALEUR DE CE MATERIEL AVAIT ÉTÉ ACCEPTE, LORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES AURAIT DONC ETE AMENEE A VERSER, AU TRESOR BELG[illegible] AU 31 DECEMBRE [illegible] AU PLUS TARD.[illegible] MILLIONS D[illegible]

RECEIVED
1961 JAN 12 [illegible] 5:44
G.H.Q.H.Q.

P6 ;

LELCESPARA QUELQUES JOURS PLUS TARD LES AUTORITES LOCALES
DES NATIONS UNIES DECIDEHENT UNILATERALEMENT DE REJETER
40 POUR CENT DU MATERIEL FIGURANT SUR LA LISTE ORIGIN PARA
DANS CETTE EVENTUALITE, LE TRESOR BELGE ETAIT TOUJOURS EN
DROIT DATTENDRE DE LONU UN PAIEMENT DENVIRON 40 MILLIONS
DE FRANCS BELGES A LA

P7 ;

FIN DE LANNEE ECOULEE PARALA DECISION DES AUTORITES LOCALES
DES NATIONS UNIES AU CONGO DE REJETER UNE PROPORTION IMPORTANTE
DU MATERIEL QUELLES AVAIENT ENVISAGE DE REPRENDRE AU DEBUT
A COMPLIQUE SINGULIEREMENT LA TAVHE DU PERSONNEL BELGE.
IL ETAIT TECHNIQUEMENT IMPOSSIBLE DEXECUTER, AU 31 DECEMBRE
1960,BLES ;

P8 ;

OPERATIONS DEVACUATION OU DE VENTE SUR PLACE DE CE MATERIEL,
LESQUELLES DEVRONT VRAISEMBLABLEMENT SE POURSUIVRE JUSQUEU
31 JANVIER 1961. LE MINISTERE BELGE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE
A DONC ETE FORCE, CONTRE SA VOLONTE, DE RETENIR A CETTE FIN,
UN PERSONNEL TECHNIQUE A KAMINA, SOUS ;

P9 ;

PEINE DE VOIR LE MATERIEL APPARTENANT A LETAT BELGE LAISSE
A LABANDON PARA PAR AILLEURS IL SEMBLE QUE LES AUTORITES
LOCALES DE LONU MENVISAGERAIENT PLUS DUTILISER LA BASE AUX
FINS DE SON PROGRAMME DASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE ET DEMMAINTENIR
LA VIE ECONOMIQUE SEMICOLON LES INSTALLATIONS DE FORMATION
TECHNIQUE SERAIENT FERMEES ET ;

P10 ;

UNE PARTIE IMPORTANTE DE LA MAIN DOEUVRE CONGOLAISE SERAIT
LICENCIEEPARA LA MISSION PERMANENTE SOUHAITERAIT AVOIR DU
SECRETAIRE GENERAL LA CONFIRMATION OFFICIELLE DE CETTE
DECISION PARA

2D A LA BASE DE KITONA LES DIFFICULTES SURGISSENT ESSENTIELLE-
MENTDE LA DECISION DES AUTORITES MILITAIRES DE LONU DE
REFUSER MALGRE LES ASSURANCES QUI ;

P11 ;

ONT ETE DONNEES A MAL... REPRISES PAR LE SECRET... GENERAL A CETTE MISSION LEMBARQUEMENT ET LE RETOUR EN BELGIQUE DU MATERIEL DONT LORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES A DECLARE ELLE-MEME NE PAS AVOIR LUSAGE PARA 3) A LEOPOLDVILLE SE POSE LE PROBLEME DU SORT DU MATERIEL DE TELECOMMUNICATION QUI A ETE ;

P12 ;

REMIS AUX AUTORITES DE LONU, LORS DE LEVACUATION DES FORCES METROPOLITAINES DE LA BELGIQUE AU MOIS DE JUILLET 1960.
LA DELEGATION DU MINISTERE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE DE BELGIQUE AVAIT SUGGERE QUE CE MATERIEL, DONT LA VALEUR EST ESTIMEE A ENVIRON 12 MILLIONS DE FRANCS BELGES, ;

P13 ;

FUT REPRIS DANS LA LISTE DU MATERIEL DONT LACHAT AVAIT ETE RECOMMANDE AU SECRETAIRE GENERAL. DANS UN CABLE DU 3 OCTOBRE 1960, LE GENERAL RIKHYE DECLARAIT QUE CE MATERIEL NE POUVAIT ETRE RACHETE PAR LES NATIONS UNIES ET QUE LE LITIGE DEVRAIT ETRE REGLE ENTRE LES GOUVERNEMENTS BELGE ;

P14 ;

ET CONGOLAIS PARA CETTE SOLUTION NE POURRAIT ETRE RETENUE.
CEEN EFFET IL Y A LIEU DE REMARQUER QUE CET EQUIPEMENT NAI JAMAIS APPARTENU AU CONGO SEMICOLON IL EST LA PROPRIETE EXCLUSIVE DE LETAT BELGE. SI LORGANISM

SUITE PAGE 7 CI

NEST PAS DISPOSEE A

EXCLUSIVE DE LETAT BELGE. SI LORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES
NEOEST PAS DISPOSEE A LE REPRENDRE, SEULE SA ;
P15 ;
RESTITUTION A SON PROPRIETAIRE LGAL ET REEL, CEST-A-DIRE
LETAT BELGE PEUT ETRE ENVISAGEE PARA LES CONSIDERATIONS
EMISES PLUS HAUT INDIQUENT A SUFFISANCE LA NECESSITE URGENTE
POUR LE SECRETARIAT GENERAL DE DONNER DES DIRECTIVES PRECISES
A SES REPRESENTANTS AU CONGO, EN VUE DE LA SOLUTION DE CES
PROBLEMES TECHNIQUES. ;
P16 ;
ELLES INCITENT LE GOUVERNEMENT BELGE A RENOUVELER SA PROPOSI-
TION EXPRIMEE POUR LA PREMIERE FOIS, LE 10 NOVEMBRE 1960
ET TENDANT A LOUVERTURE A NEW YORK DE NEGOCIATIONS ENTRE LES
REPRESENTANTS QUALIFIES DU SECRETARIAT GENERAL ET DU GOUVERNE-
MENT BELGE, EN VUE DE METTRE UN POINT FINAL A CES OPERATIONS PARA ;
P17 ;
LA MISSION PERMANENTE . PERMET DERAPPELER QUE C..TE PROPOSITION
AVAIT ETE ACCEPTEE, EN PRINCIPE, PAR LE SECRETARIAT GENERAL
ET QUE LE 11 NOVEMBREPV. M. WIESCHHOFF AVAIT VERBALEMENT INFORME
CETTE MISSION QUE CES NEGOCIATIONS POURRAIENT VRAISEMBLABLEMENT
SOUVRIR DURANT LA PREMIERE SEMAINE DE DECEMBRE 1960.
QUELQUES JOURS ;
P18 ;
PLUS-TARD, M. WIESCHHOFF DECLARAIT QUE CES NEGOCIES,,
PAR SUITE DE RAISONS TECHNIQUES, NE POURRAIENT SE TENIR AVANT
LA MI-DECEMBRE, MAIS JUSQUA CE JOUR IL NA PAS ENCORE ETE
DONNE SUITE A LA SUGGESTION DU GOUVERNEMENT BELGE PARA
LA MISSION PERMANENTE DE LA BELGIQUE SAISIT CETTE OCCASION ;
P19/14 ;
POUR RENOUVELER AU SECRETARIAT GENERAL DES NATIOS LES ASSURANCES
DE SA HAUTE CONSIDERATION. UNQUOTE "

COL 214 10 1961 5 1960 430 15 31 1960 64.3 40 40 31 1960
31 1961 23 33 1960 12 3 1960 10 1960 1960 "

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To : Mr. Dayal
From : Cordier
Date : 3 January 1961
Number : 17

Reur ONUC 6 agree your suggestion to use Block as Base Administrator until new appointment toward end of January or early February. Guinea assignment not urgent . In meantime will continue survey field for another qualified candidate of different nationality for Kamina. Also pursuing effort to provide successor to De Angelis.

Action taken

TRANSMITTED
1960 DEC 29 PM 11:01
O.N.U.C.

RECEIVED
1960 DEC 29 PM 10:58
O.N.U.C.

C1

INCOMING TELEGRAM delivered to:

Spec. Repr. SG	✓	Chief Gen. Serv.		ILO	
Mil. Assist. SG		Publ. Info Off		UNESCO	
Chief Civ. Ops		Civil Aviation		Mil. Operat.	
Chief Adm. Off		WHO		Res. Officer	
Chief Fld. Adm		Accs & Travel		FAO Repr.	
Chief Pers Off		Logistics Serv.		ITU Repr.	
Chief Fin. Off.		UN Appeal Relief		WMO	
Chief Proc Off		Welfare Office		Ch. Comm. Off.	

MILITARY recipients: M:

YC39 S NY 51 29 22302 ;

ETAT PRIORITE

ONUC

LEOPOLDVILLE ;

4518 MOST IMMEDIATE

DAYAL FROM CORDIER IN EXHAUSTIVE SEARCH FOR SUCCESSOR TO AHMED AS BASE ADMINISTRATOR KAMINA WE HAVE CHECKED CURRICULUM VITAE AND REFERENCES OF LIAROMATIS WHO IS PRESENTLY ON STAFF AT BASE STOP HE SEEMS QUALIFIED ADMINISTRATIVELY COMMA LINGUISTICALLY AND OTHERWISE STOP WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR EVALUATION URGENTLY "

COL 4518 "

C1

INCOMING TELEGRAM delivered to:					
Sp[redacted]epr. SG	✓	Chief Gen. Serv.		ILO	
Mil. Assist. SG		Publ. Info Off		UNESCO	
Chief Civ. Ops		Civil Aviation		Mail Operat.	
Chief Adm. Off	✓	WHO			
Chief Fld Adm		Acco & Travel		FAO Repr.	
Chief Pers Off		Language Serv.		ITU Repr.	
Chief Fin. Off		UN Food Relief		WMO	
Chief Proc Off		Welfare Office		Ch. Comm. Off.	
MILITARY recipients:		M:	-		

RECEIVED
1960 DEC 29 6:25
O.N.U.C.

Ch Asst
C3
Presume I have opened?
AS 29/12

YC4 NY 53 28 23542 ;

LTF

ONUC

LEO ;

4502 OLVER YOUR 3466 PLAN GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE IF AGREEABLE TO DAYAL BUT CONCERNED HERE THAT KAMINA NOT HAVE PERIOD WITH NO BASE ADMINISTRATOR STOP PLEASE EXPLAIN WHAT QUOTE PROPER ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE MADE FOR KAMINA ADMINISTRATION DURING INTERIM PERIOD UNQUOTE UTOP REGRET PERSONNEL SELECTION NOT FIRMED BUT EXPECT MOMENTARILY ;

FIELDSERV "

COLC4502 3466 "

30/12

INCOMING CODE

To : Mr. Dayal.
From : Mr. Bunche.
Date : 23 Dec. 1960.
No. : 4439

Reference B-1730. We have carefully considered suggestion for custodial maintenance contract with commercial engineering firm and regretfully find it not feasible for a number of reasons. Will therefore undertake prompt recruitment of consulting engineer for short period as per your alternative.-

cc: Mr. Dayal only.

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, KETTANI, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : BUNCHE, NEWYORK

Date : 23 December 1960

No : 4438

Para 1 our 4309.

Approach to Italy to accept responsibility for providing all personnel to operate - repeat operate the C-119 squadron, requires information about additional Italian personnel that would be needed. Please itemize requirements. Indian and Norwegian crews now participating in C-119 operation are to be replaced now or at the time of the expiry of their tours of duty? Please adivse.

New subject. ONUC 3385.

According to your recommendation, Italy will be requested to provide aircraft spare parts depot personnel to replace Indian team. Based on previous experience, long delay occurs between our request and the provision of personnel. Indian Government inquiring again when Indian team will be repatriated. Hope at least that the eight personnel who wish to be repatriated immediately could be released before availability of Italian replacements. Please advise.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To : Mr. R. Dayal

From : Secretary General

Date : 18 December 1960

No. : 4309 -1408

1. Our 4226 accepted recommendations in your (III) A and B of B-1634 on C119s and reported that Italy has already been approached.

2. In existing circumstances and in view of considerations set forth in B-1634, agree with your conclusion that Kamina be put on aye custodial maintenance basis as soon as possible. Implementation of this conclusion will, of course, involve discharge of most of Congolese workers on base. In view of their numbers this will be a serious dislocation, which could be cushioned to some extent by liberal application of measures indicated in your numbered paragraph one of B-1635.

3. Concurrence on cancellation of current construction contracts as indicated your numbered paragraph two of B-1635 naturally follows, and some is true of numbered paragraphs three and four. A sharp check should be kept by us on the number of Belgians who, under the revised approach to Kamina, might be considered necessary to retain beyond 31 December.

INCOMING CODE

To : Dayal
From : Bunche
Date : 13 Dec. 1960.
No. : 4157.

Kamina base air personnel.

Italian Government unable to provide air personnel listed under letter EEE, paragraph three of our 3834. In view of new policy with regard to Kamina base operation proposed in B-1633 and B-1634, are the above - mentioned personnel still needed query if so, a revised and reduced list would be welcome because our acceptable sources seem to have reached maximum capability for provision of air personnel.

c.c. Mr. Dayal only.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: DAYAL

FROM: SECRETARY-GENERAL, NEW YORK

DATE: 9 DECEMBER 1960

NUMBER: 408:

Reference B-1634 - 1635.

1. Appreciate this thorough assessment of Kamina situation and policy, which clearly requires review in light of recent developments. Your recommendations and questions are being studied and our comments will be forthcoming in due time.

2. However, we immediately concur in your recommendations in III of B 1634 affecting C-119's and will explore possibility of implementation.

DEC 60

yc11 ny 50/49 7 2350z =

ltf

onuc

leo =

4022 mcdiarmid reference b-1576 stop immediate recruitment undertake of power and water engineers cma posts seven and eight of list cma but cannot give assurance that they will be on hand in quote two weeks or so unquote cma although every effort being exerted stop =

bunche +

col 4022 b-1576 +

To : Mr. Dayal

From : Mr. Bunche

Date : 30 November 1960

Number : 3834 , 3835

1 . For purpose of proceeding with immediate recruitment, we wish your confirmation of a final , consolidated list of personnes which must be recruited for Kamina , indicating clearly which are to be civilian and which military .

Following list , on which your final views are requested , is based on Ahmeds memo to you of 29 October on " Evacuation of Belgian personnel " ; Rikhyes memo to me of 7 November , commenting on Ahmed's memo ; and Ahmed's memo to me of 10 November on " Evacuation of Belgian personnel "

2 . You will fully understand our desire to limit recruitment to strictly essential posts . In this regard , your latest views on prospects for use of Kamina (B 1536 ; KA 68) will have important bearing .

3 . Consolidated list is following /:

a . Ahmed list number one . (1) post number one to be filled from among the seven administrative officers for the base separately requested , as indicated in Ahmed's memo of 10 November . Presumably these seven are to be military

(2) Recruitment no longer required for posts numbers six and fourteen , for maintenance of buildings and furniture and an electrician-mechanic since they are filled by ONUC military personnel .

(3) Having in mind Rickhye's reservation, I must still ask if it is not practical to fill some of the remaining positions on this list with military personnel, such as numbers two, ten, eleven and thirteen.

b. Ahmed's list number two. Still awaiting confirmation by Italy of request made to them on 10 October for a military medical team of "about 20" for Kamina base, in pursuance of Rickhye's B 1180. This is a lower figure than the one cited in Ahmed's list.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To : Mr. R. Dayal

From : Secretary General

No : 3835

Date : 30 November 1960

(Continuation of 3834)

C. Ahmed's list number 3. Are we correct in assuming that immediate needs in this category would be met by recruitment of civilians for posts numbers 43 (who would be a labour administration expert), 46 and 47, deferring for time being any action on posts 48 and 51 ?

D. Ahmed's list number 4. No recruitment needed, particularly in light of B-1536, paragraph B.

E. Ahmed's list number 5. Military recruitment proceeding. Awaiting replies from Italy and Brazil to requests made on 28 October 1960 in pursuance of Dayal/Von Horn's B-1508. Italy has requested to provide: 5 English/French-speaking airmen administrative clerks 4 English/French-speaking airmen typists 3 safety equipment technicians for parachute packing and survival gear handling 1 machinist-aircraft technician 1 sheet metal technician 1 welder-aircraft technician 1 carpenter-aircraft technician 2 painter-aircraft technicians 1 warrant officer 3 airmen supply technicians for aircraft spares. Brazil was requested to provide: 1 Lt. maintenance officer with workshop supervision experience 1 Lt. telecommunications officer 1 Lt. supply officer. These outstanding requests were confirmed by Group Captain Carr in his recent visit to U.N. Headquarters.

F. Ahmed's list number 6. Awaiting word on Fournier's suggestions.

G. Ahmed's list number 7. According to our records here, there is one Pakistani transport platoon located in Kamina base. Most desirable personnel for posts from 90 to 94 could be taken from Pakistani platoon. If this is not feasible, we should be provided with thorough breakdown as to functions and ranks so that a request can be put to a probable source.

H. Ahmed's list number 8. Will seek

a suitable civilian laundry machine operator.

I. Ahmed's list number 9.

1 radio transmitter technician. Is none available in military set-up ?

Your prompt comments will expedite action.

To / Dayal

From : Secretary-General

Date : 30 November 1960

Number :3832

Your B-#1536 Kamina .

Proposals arising from your guidelines will be awaited . Please associate Linner and Fournier with review of flying school requirements . There might be makings of regional special fund project here .

C O P Y INCOMING CODE CABLE

To: Rikhye, Von Horn, Linner

From, Secretary-General, New York

Date: 18 November 1960

No: 3538

Subject: Kamina Base

Since Wheeler mission certain factors have supervened which inevitably affect the policy decisions previously taken regarding purchase of stores and equipment at Kamina. In first place it now appears that base is unsuitable for use as civilian training centre. In second place there is an acute paucity of funds and so is difficult to find finance for even top priority projects for Congo operation. These considerations combined necessitate a drastic reduction in items for purchase for cars and maintenance of base. The list should accordingly be revised, keeping following among other considerations in mind:

(1) Any items not strictly required for maintenance at barest level of essential base installations should be excluded;

(2) Items which though available at a favourable price should not be included unless absolutely essential for maintenance purposes;

(3) Elborate equipment which may have been necessary when base was in full operation but which has little relevance to its present or future use should be eliminated;

(4) Equipment strictly required for purposes UN military operation, provided price and other factors are favourable, should be included;

(5) Requirements for UN purposes should be viewed from short term point of view in view budgetary situation.

Another consideration of basic nature relates to political necessity for earliest possible withdrawal of Belgian elements.

Above instructions do not of course apply to requirements for repair and maintenance UN aircraft or for flying school, in which cases recommendations should be based on needs.

Question of continued employment of as large a number of present Congolese staff either on base or elsewhere when useful work could be found for them should be kept in mind but this should not necessitate purchases of expensive equipment not otherwise required.

Please transmit above to Ahmed at Kamina as policy line. We would appreciate your comments and his on above line.

Dayal has been in on all of our discussions here regarding Kamina, Kitona and Banana and will take up matter with you upon his return.

Distribution Gen. Von Horn
Mr. Linner

File

INCOMING CODE MESSAGE

To : Rikhye

From : Cordier

Date : 17 NOV 1960

Number : 3506

Reference B-1442. Italian Government was requested to provide a Medical Team of 20 for Kamina Base on 10 October. No reply yet received. Follow up action was taken today with Italian Mission.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To: RIKHYE

From: SECGEN

Date: 13 November 1960

Number: 3403

Reference B-1416.

Headquarters fully aware acuteness aircraft spares situation. Every effort being exerted to meet your needs on emergency basis. Difficulty is in limited sources for aircraft and spares. Dayal indicates in general aircraft on delivery were quite run down.

2. As to Kamina, our understanding of UN authority is that set forth in B-1005, where in sub-para Z 3 of para 2, approved in 1929, authority to requisition is explicitly stated. As indicated in our 3397, since we cannot replace Belgian spares and tools by delivery at Brussels from US sources and cannot purchase on open market, we will reimburse Belgians for what we keep at Kamina.

File

INCOMING CODE

TO: Rikhye

FROM: Secgen

DATE: 10 November 1960

KA-57

NUMBER: 3285

The Belgians have informed me that they wish to conclude an agreement concerning the take-over by the UN of the equipment in the bases and wish also to arrange for the substitution of Belgian by the UN technical presonnel to serve in the bases. I have been informed by the Belgian representative here that general agreement has been reached between the Belgian officials and the UN representatives at Kamina. The Belgians desire that the preliminary agreement reached should be finally agreed by me and they wish for that purpose to send a Belgian official to New York. In order to assess the desirability of entering into discussions on this subject in New York, I wish to be urgently informed as to what arrangements have been discussed thus far both at Kamina and Kitona. Please cable details immediately.

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : SECGEN, NEWYORK

Date : 26 October 1960

No : 2917

May we have your comments as soon as possible on following letter dated 21 October received from Permanent Mission of Belgium:

"La Mission permanente de la Belgique se réfère à la correspondance qu'elle a eu l'honneur d'échanger avec le Secrétaire général au sujet de l'évacuation de la base de Kamina. Ainsi que Monsieur le Secrétaire général ne l'ignore pas, les autorités locales de l'ONU au Congo avaient préparé de concert avec une délégation du Ministère de la Défense nationale de Belgique à Kamina, un plan d'évacuation de cette base qui prévoyait notamment la mise à la disposition de l'ONU de 36 techniciens belges après le 1er décembre 1960. Or il résulte d'un message en date du 14 octobre 1960 que le Chef de la Délégation du Ministère de la Défense nationale vient d'adresser à son département à Bruxelles, qu'à présent les autorités de l'ONU souhaiteraient le maintien, après le 15 novembre, d'environ 200 techniciens belges et ce jusqu'à une date pouvant aller au-delà du 31 décembre 1960. Si le Gouvernement belge est en principe d'accord au sujet de cette demande, il souhaiterait obtenir de Monsieur le Secrétaire général la confirmation officielle de cette requête. Il serait entendu qu'au cas où la présence de ce plus grand nombre de techniciens belges serait désirée, les frais résultant de ce maintien soient supportés par l'ONU. La Mission permanente souhaiterait obtenir les vues de Monsieur le Secrétaire général sur ces deux points à sa plus prompte convenance et il saisit cette occasion de lui renouveler les assurances de sa plus haute considération."

Gen Rathgye

INCOMING CODE MESSAGE

KA-44

Bhuler Kitona

Dayal

To : Dayal

From : SecGen

Date : 11 OCT 1960

Number : 2571

Your B-1216 Kitona. Agree Leopo that naval craft should be retained. ~~But I~~ They are consider them part of the installations of the base. Therefore in accordance with arrangements with Belgians ~~by~~ of Leopo my cable 1336 we should not pre-judge rights of parties by purchase. We merely take over, maintain and use pending decision on title.

ONUC HQ In 0901 51
Serial Number 9
For Action : C 1 M
As Info : C 5
M 1

15

.YC14 NY 101 8 2313Z ;

LTF

ONUC

LEO ;

2520 DAYAL FROM BUNCHE FURTHER TO OUR 2292 RE SWEDISH ENGINEERS STOP OUR ENQUIRIES CONFIRM SWEDISH GOVERNMENT HAD RECEIVED EARLY IMPRESSION THAT ALL PERSONNEL COMMA WHETHER CIVILIAN OR MILITARY PAREN OTHER THAN TROOPS UNPAREN ENTITLED TO DOLLARS TWENTY PER DAY STOP MATTER BEING TAKEN UP WITH MISSION ; P2/51 ;

HERE AND POSITION EXPLAINED PAREN I.E. THAT ONLY CIVILIANS ENTITLED TO DOLLARS TWENTY WHILE ALL MILITARY RECEIVE DOLLARS ONE THIRTY CENTS UNPAREN AND ASKING GOVERNMENT URGENTLY TO CONSIDER UPWARD ADJUSTMENT IN ENGINEERS SALARY SO THEY WILL CONTINUE XXXXX ON STOP

XXXX TRUST ENGINEERS WILL AWAIT OUTCOME OUR APPROACH STOP TEXT OUR LETTER POUCHED "

COL 2520 2292 "

Jmcd 9/10

Bry Ritchie
JU 9/x

Y 9/10 02162Q

09/05002

INCOMING CODE MESSAGE

To : McDiarmid

From : Michelmore

Date : 8 OCT 1960

Number : 2506

Your 1198. Do we understand correctly that you need in Toto repeat Toto two managers, two bookkeepers, one warehouse manager and two store managers and that this incorporates and supersedes Olvers 1414 ?

INCOMING CODE MESSAGE

To : Olver

From : Fieldserv.

Date : 8 OCT 1960

Number : 2502

Re your 1172 regarding Cooks. Advise if Cooks and mess personel require fluency in french. Also for our guidance would appreciate a description of how your operation is going to function. Description should include the numbers of people to be fed, with a breakdown by types indicating numbers of civilians, military and local personnel involved.

Reply
File
Jmcd 7/10/60

INCOMING CODE

TO: Dayal

FROM: Secgen

DATE: 7 October 1960

NUMBER: 2454

Belgian representative advises that Kamina is the only troop-carrying vessel of Belgian Navy and that no other ship suitable for transport of personnel from Kitona and Banana is available in area. He is checking with Brussels but is positive that no different reply will be forthcoming. In circumstances, you may give authorisation requested. Observers should be stationed as you propose and you may wish to consider to whom at Banana and Leo advance notification might be given to avoid usual hysterical reaction to surprise.

INCOMING CABLE - CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : SECGEN, NEWYORK

Date : 4 October 1960

No : 2376

Following are texts of three Notes Verbales received to-day from Permanent Mission of Belgium:

A

La Mission Permanente de la Belgique a l'honneur de se réferer à la communication que Monsieur le Secrétaire général lui a adressée en date du 18 septembre 1960 et relative à la présence de militaires belges dans les bases de Kitona, Kamina et Banane.

La Mission permanente souhaite réaffirmer le désir du Gouvernement belge de réduire cette présence au strict minimum.

Le Ministère de la défense nationale de Belgique se propose de maintenir 40 hommes seulement pour l'entretien des bases de Kitona et de Banane. Pour fixer l'effectif qui devra être maintenu à la base de Kamina, les autorités belges attendent les spécifications de Monsieur le Secrétaire général. La Mission permanente lui serait donc reconnaissante de lui faire connaître ses vues sur ce point.

Dès le 15 octobre, ces techniciens, placés sous la protection des troupes internationales des Nations Unies, auront revêtu des vêtements civils.

Le Gouvernement belge serait disposé à envisager le maintien de spécialistes supplémentaires, pour autant que ceux-ci soient requis par l'Organisation des Nations Unies et pris en charge par celle-ci. A cet égard, il serait souhaitable que Monsieur le Secrétaire général fasse connaître d'urgence ses desiderata car le Gouvernement belge entend ne pas retarder le rapatriement du personnel militaire dont la présence n'est pas désirée.

En terminant, la Mission se permet d'attirer l'attention de Monsieur le Secrétaire général sur la nécessité de prévoir la définition du statut des spécialistes belges dont la présence sera maintenue.

La Mission permanente de la Belgique saisit cette occasion de réitérer à Monsieur le Secrétaire général les assurances de sa très haute considération.

B

La Mission permanente de la Belgique a l'honneur de se référer à la note qu'elle a adressée à Monsieur le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies en date du 28 septembre 1960.

Au troisième paragraphe de cette note il était dit: "Aucun officier belge n'a été autorisé à rejoindre les troupes de M. Kalonji" et la fin du même paragraphe: "A toutes fins utiles, le Gouvernement belge ouvre une enquête."

La Mission est autorisée à déclarer aujourd'hui qu'il résulte de cette enquête que plus aucun officier de l'Armée belge ne se trouve au Kasai.

En ce qui concerne le Katanga, la Mission est en mesure de confirmer que les six membres de l'Armée belge, c'est-à-dire le Lt. Col. Goidts et cinq militaires de rang subalterne, dont il était question à l'avant-dernier paragraphe de la note du 28 septembre, ont quitté le territoire du Katanga pour être rapatriés en Belgique.

La Mission permanente de la Belgique saisit cette occasion pour réitérer à Monsieur le Secrétaire général les assurances de sa très haute considération.

C

La Mission permanente de la Belgique présente ses compliments à Monsieur le Secrétaire général et d'ordre de son Gouvernement a l'honneur d'attirer sa bienveillante attention sur le problème suivant.

A la requête des autorités du Kasai et vu les graves désordres qui règnent dans la région, deux fonctionnaires belges ont été détachés de la mission technique d'Elisabethville pour se livrer à une enquête sur place. Il s'agit de M. De Wael, magistrat, qui est chargé d'étudier la question de la reprise d'un exercice normal de la justice et de M. De Wilde, un haut fonctionnaire, qui examinera le problème de la réorganisation éventuelle du cadre administratif.

En chargeant la Mission permanente de porter cette mesure à la connaissance de Monsieur le Secrétaire général, le Gouvernement belge la prie de préciser que la Belgique, en agissant de la sorte, a pour seul souci de favoriser le rétablissement de l'ordre dans le sud du Kasai.

Si Monsieur le Secrétaire général avait des objections au sujet de cette mission, il apparaîtrait indispensable d'envisager le remplacement de ces deux agents par des fonctionnaires des Nations Unies, sous peine de voir la situation chaotique existant déjà s'aggraver encore.

La Mission permanente de la Belgique saisit cette occasion de réitérer à Monsieur le Secrétaire général les assurances de sa très haute considération.

- - - - -

Air Commander → M 5

DV

ONUC HQ in 282246 Z

Dr NOL-108

For action: C M 9

As Info: C 1

M 1, 4

YC31 F NY 132 28 2139Z

ETAT

ONUC

LEOPOLDVILLE

2207 DAYAL VONHORN FROM BUNCHE STOP B-834 KAMINA 14 STOP INDIAN GOVERNMENT PREPARED TO MAKE AVAILABLE COL V.P. ROY TO KAMINA BASE COMMANLER STOP HIS PARTICULARS ARE COLON ARMY SERVICE CORPS OFFICER SEMICOLON BORN 1 MAY 1917 MOMMA COMMISSIONED 5 OCTOBER 1940 COMMA HAS HELD VARIOUS STAFF

MA to SC

I presume somebody will reply! I still think it stupid to have an air base commanded by an Army officer.

P2

AND COMMAND APPOINTMENTS IN ARMY SUPPLY CORPS SEMICOLON WAS ALSO ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL IN THE RANK OF FULL COLONEL IN AN ARMY HEADQUARTERS FOR THREE YEARS SEMICOLON AT PRESENT IS COMMANDANT OF ARMY SUPPLY CORPS SCHOOL STOP COL ROY IS READY FOR DEPARTURE AT SHORT NOTICE STOP HOPE HE MEETS

P3/32

YOUR REQUIREMENTS PLEASE ADVISE STOP FOR YOUR INFORMATION INDIA REPLIED TO INITIAL REQUEST THEIR INABILITY PROVIDE ENGINEER CORPS OFFICER AND SECRETARY GENERAL THEN INVITED THEM TO RECOMMEND BEST QUALIFIED OFFICER AVAILABLE STOP

Gle
Air Comd.
29 Sep.

COL 2207 B-834 14 1 1917 5 1940

Y 28/9-60. 21552

Kamina . X

INCOMING CODE

To : Dayal, Leopoldville

From : SecGen

Date : 28 September 1960

Number : 2193

Your B 1100 Kamina.

Regret delay in cabling instructions mentioned your one. We endorse your views expressed your B 1073 subject to two points. Firstly, currency of payments should be consistent with financial policies followed by civilian operation and ONUC administration. Secondly, purchase of private cars, radios and refrigerators will presumably be related to requirements for official car pool, and any common messing facilities you set up.

Your two. We shall cable later about senior Administrative Officer. Finance Officer Pokorny, P3 level, will be available very soon.

Your three. Agreed.

Your four. We must reserve judgement pending receipt of Wheeler report on quantities, qualities, prices of items recommended for purchase. Wheeler Clements advice will weigh heavily in our decisions.

INCOMING CODE MESSAGE

To : Dayal

From : SecGen

Date : 22 September 1960

Number : 2033

Received today following two Aides Memoires from Belgian Delegation: "Le Gouvernement Belge a ete informe d'une certaine tension qui regne dans la region de Manono au Katanga. Ce developpement compromet serieusement l'activite economique locale.

C'est ainsi que la societe geomines serait forcee denvisager le rapatriement en Belgique de son personnel. Une telle mesure aurait des consequences extremement serieuses pour l'economde de toute la region.

Le Gouvernement Belge espere donc que L'Organisation des Nations Unies voudra bien prendre durgence les mesures qui simposent en l'occurence. New York, le 21 Septembre 1960."

"Ainsi que Le Gouvernement Belge la deja declare a maintes reprises, el est; il est tout dispose a cever a L'Organisation des Nations Unies le materiel se trouvant a Kamina, qui est la propriete de l'etat Belge et dont les Nations Unies pourraient avoir besoin.

C'est dans cet esprit quun arrangement etait intervenu entre le General Wheeler et le Colonel Willems.

Il semble quun certain malentendu se soit produit a ce propos. Si le Gouvernement Belge est toujours dispose a ceder le materiel par voie de negociations, il ne pourrait

accepter d'etre prive de sa uuopriete par une action unilaterale.

Le Gouvernement Belge serait reconnaissant a L'Organisation des Nations Unies de vouloir bien rappeler sa position en la matiere au representant du Secretaire General dans la Republique du Congo. New York, le 21 September 1960."

INCOMING CODE

To : Dayal, Von Horn

From : SecGen

Date : 27 September 1960

Number : 2163

Your B 1087 Kamina materials.

If in your (a) judgment of necessity rests with Base Commander, there is no problem. Otherwise we stand on Cordiers B 845 that recognition of any right to remove material is unacceptable. He there asked for indication , items Belgium not prepared to sell under any conditions. Situation would be eased if you had such list as basis for discussion.

We have had no repeat no Belgian protest yet.

INCOMING CODE MESSAGE

To : Bayal

From : SecGen

Date : 26 SEP 1960

Number / 2138

Basic report on Kamina and Kitona has been recieved here and in view of urgency following memorandum, of which copies will be pouched tomorrow, is being cabled now.

"25 September 1960 Memorandum to: Special Representative

From : The Secretary General

Subject : Memorandum on the use of the military bases of Kamina and Kitona(including Banana) in The Republic of Congo.

The Secretary-General has recieved and considered the report of the study group appointed by him to make recommendations on alternativ use of the bases once their present military use has been terminated, to evaluate the financial implications of maintenance or conversion and to study means of assuring continued employment for the thousands of congolese presently dependent on the bases. Copies of the report in english (original) and french have been pouched to you. Instructions have been cabled on your immediate problems arising from the take-over.

It is now urgently necessary to transmit the report to the Congolese authorities, to consult them and, if possible to secure their formal decission on the future use of the bases (irrespective of a settlement of issues of title to, and payment for, the property which must lie some month ahead); on essential aspects of financial responsibil and on prepatory steps for the development of a training programme including a survey by ILO and UNESCO. The potentialities of the bases for the economic development of the country are such that a policy decisi now is imperative. The difficulties of identifying the authorities who can legally speak for the Republic are fully realised here, but it is hoped you will do whatever can be done to move forward on this as soon as conditions permit. To guide your discussions with these authorities

authorities/

the Secretary-General makes the following suggestions. Kamina. Immediately, some of the facilities will be required for the support of the United Nations Force; notably as an air maintenance unit; as a base for DC-3 s, light aircraft and helicopters; and as a source of materials. For these purposes you are authorised to establish a base commander and staff; air squadrons and maintenance units; engineer, medical, ordnance; signal and supply services; and lists of required materials, almost all of which will be available by 1 october. Where these arrangements deplete your force headquarters establishment below required strength, you will ask for replacements.

The evacuation of Belgian personnel(variously given as 759 in your cable and as 1105 in the basic report) must not suffer any delay. The Secretary-General cannot accept the argumentthat the language problem delays replacement: no non-congolese whose technical services are not essential should be retained. He suggests the following approach to the matter. Posts in lists A, D and E of annex VI to the report, already cabled to you, should be immediately screened for rigorous elimination of those no longer really necessary and for replacement of others by French-speaking members of ONUC civil and military establishments: the target date for completing this withdrawal is 15 October. For scrutiny of posts in lists B and C and of possibilities of promotion of Congolese to fill them, you may find it useful to send Messrs Gardiner and Fournyer to Kamina to determine with your technical officers what the requirements of non-Congolese personnel should be. These should be found from civilian sources as a step towards the long-term national use of the base. The speed of elimination of Belgians will depend on this.The Secretary-General hopes to be able to call on African and other states for self-contained teams in this stage and, subject to their availability, aims at completion of Belgian evacuation by 15 November; He is also recruiting immediately the two Administrative Officers, a Finance Officer and four secretaries requested by you. To accelerate the civilianization of the base, one of the Administrative Officers will be a very senior officer. The final stage of the operation of the base for the United Nations Force will look to the replacement of military services as the units' terms of duty come to an end, by civilian units, preferably Congolese.

Cabled authority has been given to you in connection with maintenance, supply and construction contracts and the continued employment of Congolese

...../..

technicians and teachers in the period of transition from Belgian military requirements to Congolese national objectives. During this time some expenditures will be on account of United Nations Force, including a fair share of such overheads as power and water, some debitable to the Government of Belgium for such items as custody and movement of their stores and support and evacuation of their personnel, and some to the Government of the Congo for maintenance of employment not required by United Nations activities. Careful accounting should be done to separate and identify debits attributable to each party. Ways and means may, however, be drawn from available cash resources irrespective of source until regular provision of funds can be arranged.

As to the ultimate national use of the base the Secretary-General would like to commend to the Government of the Republic of the Congo the proposal of the basic committee that the whole base be converted to a civilian training centre for technicians, craftsmen and clerical officers and should include a flying school which might soon become a regional aviation training centre and facilities for training women. If this were accepted, the Secretary-General would establish an inter-agency team shortly to prepare a detailed project and, in the meantime, even during United Nations military occupation of the base, would proceed immediately with civilianization and Africanisation of the base, with the extension and development of existing courses of study and with a programme of overseas studies for Congolese selected to fill senior posts at Kamina and elsewhere. An early expression of the Government's wishes is requested.

Kitona (including Banana) The two bases may have a permanent value in the national defence policy of the Republic of the Congo and, until that policy has been determined, the Secretary-General thinks that the military and naval facilities and installations should be preserved on a care and maintenance basis as a charge on the Congo budget. If this is acceptable, he is prepared to provide arrangements for this.

Concurrently, however, use should be made, in the Secretary-General's opinion, of the [redacted] training facilities of the bases. If the

Government agrees, he would make two proposals: (1) concentration at Kitona of the training of the Armee Nationale Congolaise, (2) continuation of the Petty Officers school at Banana with a development to encourage training of deck and engineer officers for the merchant marine, for which the United Nations already for other countries has used facilities made available by Denmark.

Miscellaneous. It has been suggested that there would be permanent value for future governments in making a record now of the history, rights, titles, customs and usages which existed or have developed in the bases. If such a record is wanted, the Secretary-General will make someone with the necessary skills available to prepare it."

Kamina.

INCOMING CODE MESSAGE

To : Dayal

From : Bunche

Date : 25 September 1960

Number : 2122, 2128, 2129 and 2130

1. Report by Study Group on Kamina discussed today. Being pouched immediately in English Text. French Text will follow as soon as translation completed.

2. In meantime, since this information may be of immediate utility to you, we transmit herewith annex VI of report on Belgian Personnel at Kamina Base. Annex reads: "Belgian Personnel at Kamina Base

Belgian Personnel at Kamina Base

	5	4	3	2	1
A. Managerial, Administrative and Professional					58
Managerial and Administrative				43	
Commanders and Directors			8		
General Staff		6			
Instruction and Transport Wing		1			
Other		1			
Senior Officers and Chiefs			22		
General Staff		8			
Purchasing	1				
Sound	1				
Works and Buildings	1				
Special Services	1				
Training and Intelligence	2				
Proc and Evacuation	2				
Health Services		2			
Head Quartermaster		1			
Air Procurement Platoon		1			
Training and Transport Wing		8			
Flying Group	1				
Technical School	1				
Engineering Officer	2				
Pilot Instruction	1				
Pilot Transport SQ	1				
Administrative Officer	1				
Equipment and Stores	1				
Training Centre		1			
Other		1			

	5	4	3	2	1
Other Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs			11		
Military Magistrate and Deputy			2		
Professional				15	
Works Engineer			1		
Electrical Engineer			2		
Meteorologist			1		
Librarian			1		
Professional Trainees			2		
Doctor of Internal Medicine and Dentist			1		
Surgeon			1		
Eye, Ear and Throat Specialist			1		
Anaesthetist			1		
Pharmacists			2		
Head of Pharmacy Laboratory			1		
Pharm Chemist			1		
B. Technical and Supervisory					293
Technical				55	
Phsiotechnician			1		
Ophtalmological Technician			1		
X-ray			3		
Laboratory (Chem)			1		
Pharmacy Assistant			1		
Nurses			11		
Physiologist			1		
Photographers			2		
Cartographer			1		
Translator			1		
Weather Forecaster			1		

	5	4	3	2	1
Radio Operators			5		
Radio Operators aboard Plane			17		
Balloon Specialist			1		
Parachute Specialists			8		
<u>Instructors</u>				109	
General			42		
Fencing		2			
Fire and Police Brigade		1			
NCO School		1			
Parachute		1			
Procurement (Air Supplies)		30			
Training and Instr Wing			67		
Pilot Instructors		57			
Chief	2				
Ground	7				
Flight Formation	1				
Techn School	2				
In Flight	9				
Unspec	24				
Training	9				
Link Trainers	3				
Navigation Training		7			
Education, Other		3			
Chaplain				1	
<u>Training and Instr Wing Techn Personnel</u> (Instructors)				102	
Junior Officers			37		
Navigation		3			
Fire Prevention		3			

	5	4	3	2	1
Telecommunications		2			
Equipment Officer		5			
Pilot Transport		1			
Pilots		4			
Rescue Squad	2				
Flight Chief	1				
Maintenance Squad	1				
Technical		11			
Telecomm Squad	3				
Techn School	2				
Control and Insp	1				
Maintenance	4				
Auto Transport	1				
Air Services Squad		1			
Unspec		7			
Pilots			56		
Rescue Squadron		12			
Regular Flight		24			
VVV		2			
Students		18			
Navigators			9		
<u>Supervisory Personnel</u>				26	
Transportation			4		
Wheeled Vehicle Maint Command		2			
Proc Officer Transport		1			
Head Transport Platoon		1			
Buildings and Barracks			7		
~~Intx~~ Chief of Service, Buildings and Barracks		1			

		5	4	3	2	1
	Chief of Service, Buildings and Barracks Works		1			
	Junior Building Officer		1			
	Junior Admin Officer Buildings and Barracks		1			
	Junior Directing Officer, Buildings and Barracks		2			
	Manager Military Buildings		1			
	Schools			4		
	Head, School Platoon		1			
	Head, Schools		3			
	Others			11		
	Chief of Service, Techn Services			1		
	Chief Warrant Officer			1		
	Company Commander, Admin Company			1		
	Deputy Chief Ordinance			1		
	Warehouse Commander			1		
	Chief, Non-Mobile Control Tower Team			2		
	Chief, Works Platoon			1		
	ADJRS			1		
	(SSS one in one word)			2		
	General Manageress, Health Services			1		
C.	Foreman, Artisans and Skilled Workers					365
	<u>Foreman</u>				15	
	Unspec, Land Engineering			6		
	Engineering			9		
	Chief, Eng Shop			1		
	Buildings and Works			2		
	Works			1		
	Buildings and Barracks			4		
	Technical Services			1		

	5	4	3	2	1
Fitters, Mechanics and other Metal Workers				265	
Fitters			123		
Technical Services, Land Eng		2			
Precision Instrument		8			
Aircraft		15			
Motor, Aircraft		82			
Gun Smith		13			
Engineering for Ordnance		1			
Iron Works		2			
Mechanics			114		
Precision Instruments		11			
Electrical, Aircraft		3			
On Board Aircraft		14			
Radio, Air Force		54			
Auto		20			
Telescript		1			
Electrical, Building and Barracks		3			
Engineering, Works		2			
Equipment, Works		1			
Woodworking Machinery		1			
Communication Lines and Cable		4			
Repairmen			14		
Radar HAWA		1			
Radio		2			
Carburetion and Elec, Auto		3			
Auto		5			
Arms		1			
Smallarms		1			
Refrigeration Equipment		1			

	5	4	3	2	1
Welders and Smiths			8		
Welder		3			
Aeronastical Welding		1			
Copper and Tinsmith		4			
Lathe Operators			6		
Metal Lathe		5			
Equipment and Metal		1			
Electricians				33	
Carpenters				3	
Plumber (Building Installation)				1	
Runway Control and Radio				3	
Air Traffic				3	
Parachute Folders and Repairmen				13	
Firemen				2	
Fuselage Coverer (Canvas)				2	
Service Occupations				28	
Truck Drivers and Chauffeurs			11		
Butchers			2		
Slaughterer		1			
Butcher		1			
Bakers, Mech			2		
Cooks			11		
Cook-Butcher		1			
Head Cook		1			
Assistant Cooks		9			
Launderer			1		
Boiler Operator			1		
D. Clerical Officers					192

	5	4	3	2	1
Secretaries			39		
Med Secretary		1			
Pharmacist Secretary		1			
Other Secretaries		35			
Typists		2			
Clerks			30		
NCO and Warrant Officers			27		
Technical Apparatus, Air Force		11			
Transport, Army		6			
Training and Instructing		4			
Other		6			
Storekeepers			6		
Procurement			61		
Headquarters		2			
Health Service		2			
Land Engineering		8			
Command	3				
Works	1				
Engineering Equip	4				
Logistics		3			
Quartermaster		6			
Ordnance		7			
Petrol, Oil and Lubricants		1			
Ammunition		1			
Food		3			
Bedding and Personal Effects		1			
MOC		4			
Other		9			

	5	4	3	2	1
Technical, Air Force		14			
Code Officers			6		
Health Officers			5		
Draughtsmen, Architectural and Techn			4		
Tribunal			5		
Registrars		4			
Court Secretary		1			
Instructors, NOS			2		
Cafeteria Keeper			1		
Other Personnel					197
Reinforcements, Army			184		
Quartermasters		27			
Officers	1				
Men	26				
Ordnance		80			
Officers	2				
Men	78				
Transport, Men		28			
Telecommunications		36			
Officers	1				
Men	35				
Military Tribunal		3			
Health Service - BAKA		10			
Unskilled, Cleaning			13		

- - - - -

INCOMING CODE MESSAGE

To : Dayal

From : SecGen

Date : 19 September 1960

Number : 1936

Following note verbale today handed to Belgian delegation: "Para. Le Secretaire General de L'organisation des Nations Unies presente ses compliments au representant permanent de La Belgique aupres des Nations Unies et a l'honneur d'attirer son attention sur ce qui suit.

Le Secretaire General vient de recevoire un rapport sur la situationxx aux bases de Kamina, Kitona et Banana. D'apres ce rapport, il reste encore a Kamina 759 militaires Belges, a Kitona 398, et a Banan 80.

Le representant du Secretaire General au Congo recommande que, prochainment, les Nations Unies assument la pleine direction des operations a Kamina. Ses representants soumettront sous peu un plan pour la substitution des techniciens Belges par des techniciens des Nations Unies.

A Kitona, une reduction rapide des Belges qui se trouvent encore a cette date avancee est indiquee, dautant plus que la majorite de ces Belges, dapres les renseignements recus, ne sont pas des techniciens mais des soldats des combat.

Les Belges qui restent a Banana d'oivent aussi etre retires sans delai.

Tout en donnant ces informations sur les vues et intentions de L'Organisation des Nations Unies, le Secretaire General estime necessaire de souligner l'importance desisive d'une execution rapide et integrale par le Gouvernement Belge du retrait de tous les elements militaires. Il note avec regret la situation qui regne encore, surtout a Kitona ou la presence continue dun assez grand nomlre de militaires a cette date justifie une protestation renouvelee quant a la maniere dont la

question du retrait a ete traitee du cote Belge.

Le Conseil du Securite ayant invoque les articles 25 et 49 de la charte, ses decisions sont de caractere obligatoire. Meme si le conseil na pas decide dappliquer des mesures de coercition prevues dans les articles 41 et 42, et; comme il est bien connu, na pas, dans le mandat donne au Secretaire General, autorise celui - ci a avoir recours a de telles mesures, le laissant ainsi sans pouvoir dimposer les decisions du conseil, le Secretaire General est convaincu que, conformement a l'esprit et a la lettre de ces deux articles, le Gouvernement Belge ne tardera pas, a cette date avancee, a donner plein effet a ces decisions."

INCOMING CODE MESSAGE

To : Dayal

From : Labouisse

Date : 8 September 1960

Number : 1651

Further your B - 846.

U.States advises that two USAF Aircraft will arrive Kamina September tenth and one such aircraft September eleventh to transport Belgians to Brussels."

Please inform Mr Linde

INCOMING CODE MESSAGE

To : Dayal, Cordier

From : Secretary General

Date : 8 SEP 1960

Number : 1623

Re your B-846. We are requesting United States to airlif 150 Belgians from Kamina on return trip of planes bringing in supply platoon.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: CORDIER, GALO PLAZA Rptd. BERENDSEN, Eville

FROM: N.Y.

Date: 6 SEPTEMBER 1960

NUMBER: 1596

With apologies for delay transmittal, following is text of letter dated 2 September 1960 received from Belgian delegation :x "(...as attached-reply to letter re S.G's precisions au sujet responsabilités de l'ONU concernant l'administration temporaire des bases de Kitona et de Kamina -...)

Monsieur le Secrétaire General,

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre du 28 Août 1960 parlaquelle vous avez bien voulu me donner des précisions au sujet de votre position touchant les responsabilités de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en ce qui concerne l'administration temporaire des bases de Kitona et de Kamina.

Mon gouvernement prend acte de ce que: 1. Le droit de propriété Belge sur les bases en question est expressément reservé; 2. Les techniciens Belges ainsi que leurs familles bénéficieront de la protection necessaire de la part des forces des Nations Unies; 3. L'Organisation des Nations Unies n'a "pas le droit de transférer les terrains, ni d'apporter des modifications importantes aux installations ", et, dans la détermination de la durée de son administration, elle "devra tenir pleinement compte des légitimes intêrets des partis, des accords intervenus entre elles et de la nécessité de négociations en temps voulu concernant le sort des bases".

Le gouvernement Belge note que l'Organisation des Nations Unies s'inspira pour l'administration des bases des principes genéraux du droit civil relatifs a la gestion provisoire d'affaires pour autrui.

Il comprend que les prestations pour l'entretien des bases sont à la charge de la Belgique et que les prestations fournies à l'Organisation des Nations Unies seront payées par celle-ci.

Je saisis cette occasion, Monsieur le Secrétaire Genéral, de vous renouveler l'assurance de ma très haute considération.

Walter Loridan,

Représentant Permanent de la Belgique aux Nations Unies.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: CORDIER

FROM: SECGEN

DATE: 6 September 1960

NUMBER: 1561

Your 789. I have informed Belgian Delegation here of content and have strongly urged that Colonel Vivario be removed soonest. It is totally intolerable to have, seven days after agreed withdrawal of Belgians from Congo, UN flag fly next to Belgian flag.

I do not agree however that our troops should not immediately be sent to Kitona and hope that planned action with regard to Kitona and Banana be taken as soon as possible.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: CORDIER, GALO PLAZA Rptd. BERENDSEN, Eville

FROM: N.Y.

Date: 6 SEPTEMBER 1960

NUMBER: 1596

With apologies for delay transmittal, following is text of letter dated 2 September 1960 received from Belgian delegation :x "(...as attached-reply to letter re S.G's precisions au sujet responsabilités de l'ONU concernant l'administration temporaire des bases de Kitona et de Kamina -...)

Monsieur le Secrétaire General,

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre du 28 Août 1960 parlaquelle vous avez bien voulu me donner des précisions au sujet de votre position touchant les responsabilités de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en ce qui concerne l'administration temporaire des bases de Kitona et de Kamina.

Mon gouvernement prend acte de ce que: 1. Le droit de propriété Belge sur les bases en question est expressément reservé; 2. Les techniciens Belges ainsi que leurs familles bénéficieront de la protection necessaire de la part des forces des Nations Unies; 3. L'Organisation des Nations Unies n'a "pas le droit de transférer les terrains, ni d'apporter des modifications importantes aux installations ", et, dans la détermination de la durée de son administration, elle "devra tenir pleinement compte des légitimes intêrets des partis, des accords intervenus entre elles et de la nécessité de négociations en temps voulu concernant le sort des bases".

Le gouvernement Belge note que l'Organisation des Nations Unies s'inspira pour l'administration des bases des principes genéraux du droit civil relatifs a la gestion provisoire d'affaires pour autrui.

Il comprend que les prestations pour l'entretien des bases sont à la charge de la Belgique et que les prestations fournies à l'Organisation des Nations Unies seront payées par celle-ci.

Je saisis cette occasion, Monsieur le Secrétaire Genéral, de vous renouveler l'assurance de ma très haute considération.

Walter Loridan,

Représentant Permanent de la Belgique aux Nations Unies.

INCOMING CODE MESSAGE

To : Secgen N.Y. Cordier

From: Plaza

Date: 6 SEP 1960

Number: 83.

Your 1519 reaching me 1040 LT on 5 September was first message I received from you since my arrival in Kamina on 30 August. Text our note verbale 2 September still not repeat not received.

I wish to reassure you that I acted at all times guided by your letters of 28 August and your 1340, and with acute awareness of uniliteral nature of take over according to article 40 of charter. Memorandum of understanding was only a man to man paper restating for Van Lierde my understanding of instructions hed had received from Brussels and which he had read to me in part. There was no point any idea or intent of negotiation, and memorandum was not meant to reflect agreement which would have been reached. It was not signed, but only initialled, and I admit that even that would have been unnecessary.

On specific points, paragraph 2 of my memorandum follows rather closely letters of 28 August and your 1340 which were checked back at time of drafting. Lack of adequate communications left me unaware of further developments which may have made me spell out in writing temporary nature of arrangements.That these arrangements were applying to immediate situation only,and in no way committed future,was however clearly stressed inour conversation.

On point 3 of my memo,this points to personnel difficulty for which no solution has yet been found.Hogan is not repeat not colonel,but major. Senior UN Officer on base,commanding battalion,is presently Adams,also major.There was intention to have Irish full colonel to come to Kamina in this post,but this was cancelled for reason unknown to me and without my being consulted. In absence od any other person of military rank or civilian status appropiate to place above Van Lierde, I had no choice

but to temporarily assume charge of Commandant of base for all legal and practical purpose, a situation which, of course, interferes with my mission on log term plans for base. I hope to see soon signs of action on my repeated calls for an immediate solution of this problem.

On point 4,I submit that it would be unwise for UN to attempt to take over immediately practical operation of routine police functions involving policing of town of I5000 congolese,about half Balubas and half Luluas. Adams is in charge of security,but he still has to rely heavily on base Congolese police and Belgians.With regard to disciplinary powers over Belgians,this will have to be clarified as part of status.

Your remark on point 5 noted.

Re point 6,legal situation in pursuance of article 40,in particular as affecting ownership rights of non movable property,is clear to me Question might arise,however,of rental of fixed equipment.

Re point 7,flying school personnel ready by priority on first available transport.

Repoint 8,I do not need assure you that I share your feelings regarding flag.I look forward to opportunity to tell you some time story of these days,which were by no means easy.

Meeting on which I shall report separately having been arranged for late morning 5 September with Van Lierde and commission arrived from Brussels preceding day, I seized opportunity to make UN position crystal clear to all in light of your comments, by expressly indicating (A) that memo had only been working paper from me to Van Lierde stating my understanding of his instructions as he had received them from Brussels; (B) that memorandum thus in no way reflected result of negotiations between us, and was not repeat not in nature of an agreement; (C) that it was because basis of situation could be found only in letter sent by Secretary General to Belgium Government, level at which all decisions were to be taken; (D) in particular, that these decisions may relate to replacement of Belgium personnel by others;(E)that Van Lierde was head of Belgian Technical Assistance Mission,

P.T.O.

taking instructions from me a situation which he had clearly understood and accepted from the time he had received his instructions.

Van Lierde acknowledged my statement on the nature of the memo,and fully concurred in my view that negotiations had not repeat not and could not repeat not have taken place between us.In view of this,I would be inclined to think that memo should be left as is for what it was meant to be,and not be revised for your approval.A formal memo can be prepared for your consideration,however,if you see need for such document.

Chairman of Commission referred in content of my ~~parx~~(C) above to exchange of letters,implying that you had received/belgian answer to yours of 28 August. I am not repeat not aware of any such reply.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: CORDIER, GALO PLAZA Rptd. BERENDSEN, Eville

FROM: N.Y.

Date: 6 SEPTEMBER 1960

NUMBER/ 1596

With apologies for delay transmittal, following is text of letter dated 2 September 1960 received from Belgian delegation re "(...as attached-reply to letter re S.G's precisions au sujet responsabilités de l'ONU concernant l'administration temporaire des bases de Kitona et de Kamina -...)

Monsieur le Secrétaire General,

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre du 28 Août 1960 parlaquelle vous avez bien voulu me donner des précisions au sujet de votre position touchant les responsabilités de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en ce qui concerne l'administration temporaire des bases de Kitona et de Kamina.

Mon gouvernement prend acte de ce que: 1. Le droit de propriété Belge sur les bases en question est expressément reservé; 2. Les techniciens Belges ainsi que leurs familles bénéficieront de la protection necessaire de la part des forces des Nations Unies; 3. L'Organisation des Nations Unies n'a "pas le droit de transférer les terrains, ni d'apporter des modifications importantes aux installations ", et, dans la détermination de la durée de son administration, elle "devra tenir pleinement compte des légitimes intérets des partis, des accords intervenus entre elles et de la nécessité de négociations en temps voulu concernant le sort des bases".

Le gouvernement Belge note que l'Organisation des Nations Unies s'inspira pour l'administration des bases des principes generaux du droit civil relatifs à la gestion provisoire d'affaires pour autrui.

Il comprend que les prestations pour l'entretien des bases sont à la charge de la Belgique et que les prestations fournies à l'Organisation des Nations Unies seront payées par celle-ci.

Je saisis cette occasion, Monsieur le Secrétaire Général, de vous renouveler l'assurance de ma très haute considération.

Walter Loridan,

Représentant Permanent de la Belgique aux Nations Unies.