

PdeC

SECRETARY - GENERAL'S TRIPS - TRIP TO SOUTHEAST ASIA

15 NOV 1984 - 19 JAN 1985

**PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER**

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL (CODE CABLE - 1 ITEM)

CONFIDENTIAL (2 ITEMS / DECLASSIFIED)

CODE CABLES (3 ITEMS / DECLASSIFIED)

EL/WG JULY 2006

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Mainland Southeast Asia



505685 (A01867) 10-83

ITINERARY

THE COMPOSITION OF PARTY

VIETNAM

CONTACT NUMBERS

SINGAPORE PROGRAMME

TIME DIFFERENCES
FROM NEW YORK

ITINERARY

COMPOSITION OF PARTY

CONTACT NUMBERS

PROGRAMME

TIME DIFFERENCES

Final before departure from New York

JH/JPK/lc

19 January 1985

ITINERARY FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

<u>Date</u>	<u>Itinerary</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Hours From GMT</u>	<u>Airline +Flgt Number</u>	<u>Equipmt.</u>	<u>Stops</u>
Sun 20 Jan	LV: New York (JFK)	1000	-5	PA100	747	0
Sun 20 Jan	ARR: London (LHR) (Brown's Hotel)	2140	0			
Mon 21 Jan	London					
Tues 22 Jan	LV: London (LHR)	1110	0	BA4752	757	0
	ARR: Edinburgh (Hotel Caledonian)	1220	0			
Wed 23 Jan	LV: Edinburgh	0910	0	BA4733	VA11	0
	ARR: London (Brown's Hotel)	1020	0			
Thur 24 Jan	LV: London (LHR)	1415	0	KL122	DC9	0
Thur 24 Jan	ARR: Amsterdam	1610	+1			
Thur 24 Jan	LV: Amsterdam	1730	+1	SQ23	747	0
	ARR: Cairo	2250	+2			
Fri 25 Jan	LV: Cairo	0005	+2	SQ23	747	0
	ARR: Bangkok (Hotel Oriental)	1315	+7			
Sat 26 Jan	Bangkok					
Sun 27 Jan	Bangkok					
Mon 28 Jan	LV: Bangkok	1030	+7	QV421	AN4	0
	ARR: Vientiane	1200				
	LUNCH					
Mon 28 Jan	LV: Vientiane	1600		QV311	AN4	0
	ARR: Hanoi (Government Guest House)	1700	+7			
Tues 29 Jan	Hanoi					
Wed 30 Jan	LV: Hanoi	1340	+7	TH501	737	0
Wed 30 Jan	ARR: Bangkok (Hotel Oriental)	1520	+7			

Thur 31 Jan	LV: Bangkok	P.M.	+7	BY SPECIAL AIRCRAFT		
	ARR: Chiang Mai			Flight time 30 mins		
	Overnight Government House					
Fri 1 Feb	LV: Chiang Mai	A.M.		BY SPEICAL AIRCRAFT		
	ARR: Bangkok		+7	Flight time 30 mins		
	LV: Bangkok	1700	+7	MH/TG83 AB3 0		
Fri 1 Feb	ARR: Kuala Lumpur	1955	+8			
	Hotel Hilton					
Sat 2 Feb	Kuala Lumpur					
Sun 3 Feb	LV: Kuala Lumpur	1330	+8	SQ107	AB3	0
	ARR: Singapore	1420	+8			
	LV: Singapore	1530	+8	SQ206	AB3	0
Sun 3 Feb	ARR: Jakarta	1600	+7			
	Government Guest House Wisma Negara					
Mon 4 Feb	Jakarta					
Tues 5 Feb	LV: Jakarta	1000	+7	Government Aircraft		
	ARR: Jogjakarta/	1100	+7			
	Borobudur					
	LV: Jogjakarta	1505	+7	Government Aircraft		
	ARR: Bali	1525	+7			
	Nusadua - Beach Hotel					
Thur 7 Feb	LV: Bali	1230	+7	GA663 (provided by		
	ARR: Jakarata	1400	+7	Government)		
	LV: Jakarata	1500	+7	GA966	AB3	0
	ARR: Singapore	1730	+8			
	Dinner at Government Guest House					
Thur 7 Feb	LV: Singapore	2110	+8	QF2	747	0
Fri 8 Feb	ARR: Sydney	0740	+10.5			
	(Government Guest House					
Sat 9 Feb	LV: Sydney	1000	+10.5	QF43	747	0
Sat 9 Feb	ARR: Auckland	1450	+12			
	South Pacific Hotel)					
Sun 10 Feb	LV: Auckland	1000	+12	By Car		
	ARR: Ngaruawahia	1130	+12			
	Lunch					
	LV: Ngaruawahia	1430	+12	By Car		
	ARR: Hamilton	1600				
	LV: Hamilton	1615		Government Aircraft		
Sun 10 Feb	ARR: Wellington	1735	+12			
	(Park-Royal Hotel)					

Mon 11 Feb	Wellington					
Tues 12 Feb	LV: Wellington	1550	+12	QF48	747	0
	ARR: Sydney	1705	+10.5			
	LV: Sydney		+10.5	Government aircraft		
	ARR: Canberra		+10.5			
	Lakeside Hotel					
Wed 13 Feb	Canberra					
Thur 14 Feb	LV: Canberra	P.M.	+10.5	Government Aircraft		
	ARR: Sydney		+10.5			
	overnight, Government Guest House					
Fri 15 Feb	LV: Sydney	1500	+10.5	PA816	747	0
Fri 15 Feb	ARR: Los Angeles	0925	-8			
	The Beverly Hills Hotel					
Sat 16 Feb	LV: Los Angeles	1100	-8	PA90	747	0
	ARR: New York (JFK)	1905	-5			

TH COMPOSITION OF PARTY

CONTACT NUMBERS

PROGRAMME

TIME DIFFERENCES
FROM NEW YORK

Friday, 25 January

Bangkok

00.05	depart Cairo	SQ 23
13.15	arrive Bangkok welcomed by Prime Minister, military honours transfer to Hotel Oriental	
18.00	short briefing by Mr. Kunugi and Walzer (UNHCR) followed by	
18.30	* informal dinner hosted by Mr. Kunugi at Hotel Oriental, with ladies	
20.30	retire for the evening	

* guests will include the Secretary-General's party as well as Kibria, Prattley, Anvar, Walzer and wives.

Saturday, 26 January

Bangkok

10.00	*	Working session with Foreign Minister at the Ministry
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12.00 Working lunch hosted by Foreign Minister
(very brief, off-the-cuff remarks)

15.00	**	Courtesy call on Prime Minister at Government House, exchange of gifts
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The Secretary-General and Foreign Minister sign a supplementary lease agreement between the Government of Thailand and the United Nations (ESCAP); t.b.c.

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16.40      return to hotel
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19.05 depart hotel

20.00 Reception in honour of SG and Madam hosted by Prime Minister General Prem Tinsulanonda at Government House followed by Banquet hosted by Prime Minister, same location (toast, entire party, dark lounge suit, ladies' evening dress)

* On the Thai side, up to 10 persons will accompany the Foreign Minister.

While not intending to engage in any substantive discussion, the Prime Minister would like the Secretary-General to outline his general thinking on global and some regional developments. Also the Secretary-General might indicate which issues will arise in the Security Council in 1985.

NB Separate programme for Madam. Hosts envisage the following:

11.15- Sightseeing, accompanied by wife of Foreign
16.30 Minister or Deputy Foreign Minister. Lunch hosted
by Foreign Minister's wife followed by visit to
National Museum.

Sunday, 27 January

Bangkok

07.30 depart hotel
08.30 depart Bangkok by Government aircraft
09.00 * Visit Khao-I-Dang Holding Center
 (with Madam)

* The Thai side has been requested to reschedule
 this visit to Friday, 1 February.

Monday, 28 January

Bangkok/Vientiane/Hanoi

09.45	depart hotel	
10.30	depart Bangkok	QV 421
12.00	arrive Vientiane	
	received by Vice-Foreign Minister	
	call on Prime Minister	
	lunch in Vientiane City hosted by Foreign Minister	
16.00	depart Vientiane	QV311
17.00	arrive Hanoi	
	welcome by Protocol Department,	
	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	
	transfer to State Guest House	
18.30	official welcome at State Guest House	
	by Foreign Minister	
later	official dinner hosted by Foreign Minister	

Tuesday, 29 January

Hanoi

t e n t a t i v e

morning	discussions with Foreign Minister followed by press conference
afternoon	meetings with government leaders
evening	possible reception for government, diplomatic corps and UN personnel hosted by Resident Representative

NB

Attire: lounge suit throughout visit to Vietnam

Wednesday, 30 January

Hanoi/Bangkok

t e n t a t i v e

morning	continuation of discussions possible visit of UNDP/FAO project
13.40	depart Hanoi
15.20	arrive Bangkok
	transfer to Hotel Oriental
17.30	depart hotel
18.30 to	reception at ESCAP in honour of Secretary-General and Madam
20.00	Working dinner hosted by H.E. the Acting Foreign Minister at Peninsula Hotel (brief toast, Secretary-General accompanied by 6, maximum, dark lounge suit)
NB: 18.30	Perm. Sec. Arsa meets with Messrs. Ahmed and Kunugi +1 at Peninsula Hotel

Thursday, 31 January

Bangkok/Chiang Mai

09.30	depart from Hotel
10.00	arrive at UN Building, briefing by senior officials
10.30	Secretary-General addresses UN staff
11.15	visit to Exhibition of ESCAP Publications
11.25	meeting with Staff Council
11.45	pre-lunch drinks with senior officials
12.30	viewing of scale model of new ESCAP Conference complex
12.45	Lunch hosted by Mr. Kibria
14.00	depart ESCAP for Hotel
afternoon	travel to Chiang Mai in Northern Thailand (government aircraft, 30 mins. flight))
evening	private audience with their Majesties the King and the Queen (SG and Madam alone, no formal remarks)
	* dinner hosted by their Majesties (SG and Madam to be accompanied by six, maximum, no toast, dark lounge suit, long dress)
	overnight in Chiang Mai at Government House
	* Separate arrangements in Chiang Mai for remainder of SG's party.
<u>NB</u>	morning free for Madam

Friday, 1 February

Bangkok/Kuala Lumpur

morning return to Bangkok Government aircraft

possible visit to Khao I Dang camp

luncheon

16.15 Press conference at airport

17.00 depart Bangkok MH/TG 83

19.55 arrive Kuala Lumpur
welcome by Foreign Minister
transfer to Kuala Lumpur Hilton

evening private

Saturday, 2 February

Kuala Lumpur

10.00 Minister of Foreign Affairs
calls on Secretary-General at Kuala Lumpur Hilton

10.30 depart Hotel for office of Prime Minister
(accompanied by Minister of Foreign Affairs)

10.45 call on Prime Minister
followed by discussions (+ 3)

12.30 luncheon hosted by Minister of Foreign Affairs
14.00 at Hilton Hotel
(working, no toast, entire party)

15.00 - visit to National Museum
16.00 (Madam and entire party)

16.15 - visit to Karyanika (Art and Craft Centre)
17.15

20.30 dinner hosted by Prime Minister
at official residence Sri Perdana (toast)
(lounge suit)

Separate programme for Madam

10.00 call on Dato Seri Datin Paduka Dr. Siti Hamsah
(wife of Prime Minister)

followed by morning coffee with BAKTI members
(Association of Wives of Ministers)

followed by lunch hosted by Tengku Nooraini
(wife of Foreign Minister)

Sunday, 3 February

K.L./Singapore/Jakarta

10.00 meet UNDP staff at Kuala Lumpur Hilton
11.00 Press conference at Kuala Lumpur Hilton
12.00
12.45 Prime Minister arrives at Kuala Lumpur Hotel
to bid farewell to Secretary-General
13.00 depart for airport
(accompanied by Foreign Minister)
13.30 depart for Singapore SQ107
14.20 arrive Singapore
15.30 depart Singapore SQ206
16.00 arrive Jakarta
welcomed by Vice-President Umar and Madam
transfer to government guest house
Wisma Negara
19.00 call on Vice-President Umar
19.30 private dinner

Separate programme for Madam in Kuala Lumpur

10.00 visit of pewter show room with demonstrations
11.00 lunch with Datin Maria Musa
(wife of Deputy Prime Minister)

Monday, 4 February

Jakarta

08.40 depart Hotel
09.00 laying of wreath at Kalibata National
Hero Cemetery
09.20 return to Wisma Negara

09.40 depart for Merdeka Palace
10.00 - Secretary-General and Madam (+ 3)
10.15 call on President and Mrs. Soeharto
at Merdeka Palace

11.20 depart for Department of Foreign Affairs
11.30 - talks with Foreign Minister Mochtar
13.00 at Foreign Ministry (RA, SK, plus 1)

13.00 working luncheon hosted by Foreign Minister
and Mrs. Mochtar Kusumaatmadja at
"Pancasila Room" at Department of Foreign Affairs
(toast)

14.35 depart for UN Office
14.55 arrive at UN office

15.45 depart for Wisma Negara

16.30 - press conference at Wisma Negara
17.30

20.00 banquet hosted by Vice President
and Mrs. Umar Wirahadikusumah (toast)

Separate programme for Madam, following
courtesy call on President and Mrs. Soeharto

10.35 visit to Puri Bhakti Renatama Museum
at Merdeka Palace, accompanied by Mrs. Soeharto

11.35 - visit to Children's Rehabilitation Centre
12.35

14.45 - visit to Iwan Tirta Boutique
15.45

NB

Attire in Jakarta: dark suit (no black tie/long dress)

Tuesday, 5 February

Jakarta/Yogyakarta

08.40	depart for residence of Vice President	
09.00	farewell call on Vice President and Mrs. Umar Wirahadikusumah	
09.20	depart for airport	
10.00	depart for Yogyakarta	government aircraft
11.00	arrive Yogyakarta airport	
11.10 - 12.00	visit to Borobudur Temple	
	Lunch	
13.15 - 13.35	visit to Multi Media Training Centre	
14.15	depart for Yogyakarta airport	
15.05	depart for Bali	government aircraft
15.55	arrive Bali	
	transfer to Nusa Dua Beach Hotel	

NB

1. The Foreign Minister and Mrs. Mochtar
will accompany the Secretary-General in Yogyakarta
and in Bali.

2. Attire: informal

Wednesday, 6 February

Yogyakarta/Bali

08.40 - visit to various art/cultural centres
15.40

luncheon at Tampaksiring Palace

15.40 return to Hotel

18.00 Kecak dance performance at Nusa Dua Hotel

20.00 dinner hosted by Governor of Bali and
Mrs. Mantra at the City Hall

reside at the Nusadua Beach Hotel

NB

1. The Foreign Minister and Mrs. Mochtar
will accompany the Secretary-General and Madam in
Bali and Yogyakarta.

2. Attire: informal

Bali/Jak./Singapore

12.30	depart Bali	GA663 (provided by
14.00	arrive Jakarta	government)
15.00	depart Jakarta	GA966
17.30	arrive Singapore	
	transfer to Government Guest House	

21.10	depart Singapore for Sydney	QF2
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* The remainder of the Secretary-General's party will be entertained by the Director of the International Organizations Department of the Foreign Ministry at the airport.

THIENHABO

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COMPOSITION OF PARTY

VIETNAM

CONTACT NUMBERS

TIME DIFFERENCES
FROM NEW YORK

COMPOSITION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PARTY
FOR HIS VISIT TO THE UK, SOUTH-EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
20 January - 16 February 1985

The Secretary-General

Mrs. Pérez de Cuéllar

* Mr. Rafeeuddin Ahmed, Under-Secretary-General and Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs in South-East Asia

** Mr. Brian E. Urquhart, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs

*** Mr. S.A.M.S. Kibria, Executive Secretary, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP)

**** Mr. Tatsuro Kunugi, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Co-ordination of Kampuchean Humanitarian Assistance Programmes

Mr. Francois Giuliani, Spokesman for the Secretary-General

*** Mr. Hédi Annabi, Principal Officer

Mr. J. Paul Kavanagh, Second Officer, Executive Office of the Secretary-General

Ms. Yanick Saint Victor, Secretary to the Secretary-General

Mr. John Hrusovsky, Chief Operations Officer

Mr. Gerard Levtchenko, Operations Officer

* will join the party at the conclusion of the Secretary-General's stay in the UK

** only in the UK

*** only in SE Asia

**** only in Thailand, Laos and Viet Nam

NB see the attached

NB

The Secretary-General decided that the following Resident Coordinators/UNIC Directors will accompany his party in their countries of accreditation:

United Kingdom

Mr. Erik Jensen
Director, UNIC London

Thailand

Mr. Winston Prattley
UNDP Resident Representative

Mr. Jamshid Anvar, Deputy
Special Representative of the
Secretary-General for Co-ordination
of Kampuchean Humanitarian Assistance
Programmes

Laos

Mr. Per Janvid
UN Resident Coordinator

Vietnam

Mr. Karl Englund
UN Resident Coordinator

Malaysia and Singapore

Mr. Y.Y. Kim
UN Resident Coordinator

Indonesia

Mr. Gamil Hamdy
UN Resident Coordinator

Australia/New Zealand

Mr. Paul Ignatieff
Director, UNIC Sydney

ITINERARY

THAILAND
LAOS
ARVN
VIETNAM

CONTACT NUMBERS

SIAM
SIA

TIME DIFFERENCES
FROM NEW YORK

THAILAND

(Country code: 66; Bangkok city code: 2)

ESCAP: Tel. 2829161, 2829171
 Telex 788 2392
 Cable ESCAP, BANGKOK (THAILAND)

Mr. S.A.M.S. Kibria, Executive Secretary
Tel. home

UNDP+ Tel. 2829613
 Telex TH 82392
 Cable UNDEVPRO, BANGKOK (THAILAND)

Mr. Winston Prattley, Regional Representative

UNIC: Tel. 2829607 direct line
 2829161-200 Ext. 1866
 Cable ESCAP, BANGKOK (THAILAND)
 Telex 82392 ESCAP TH
 82315 ESCAP.TH

Mr. Shih-ching Hsu, Chief
Tel. office 2829607
Tel. home 279-5431

Mr. Francisco M. Rosales, Information Officer
Tel. home 2793685, Ext. 39

Mr. Kunugi
Tel. home 270-1691

Mr. Anvar
Tel. home 270-1688

Oriental Hotel
Tel. (2) 234.8621

Chiang Mai

LAOS

UNDP: Tel. 2342, 2501, 3899
 Telex 306 ONU VTE LS
 Cable UNDEVPRO, VIENTIANE (LAOS)

Mr. P. Janvid, Resident Representative, a.i.
 Tel. home

VIET NAM

UNDP: Tel. 5-7495, 5-7318, 5-7304
 Telex 217 UNDEVPRO VT
 Cable UNDEVPRO, HANOI (VIET NAM)

Mr. Karl Englund, Resident Representative
Tel. home

Government Guest House
Tel.

MALAYSIA .

(Country code: 60; Kuala Lumpur city code: 3)

UNDP: Tel. 942555, 942687, 942717,
 942840, 942905, 942369
 Telex: MA 30270
 Cable: UNDEVPRO, KUALA LUMPUR (MALAYSIA)

Mr. Yoon Yul Kim, Regional Representative
Tel. home

Hilton Hotel (Kuala Lumpur) (3) 422.122

SINGAPORE

Country Code (65)

UNHCR

Tel.
Telex
Cable

UNHCR SINGAPORE

Mr. Van Aardenne

INDONESIA.

UNDP: Tel. 321308
 Telex: 44178 UNDEVPROIA
 Cable: UNDEVPRO, JAKARTA (INDONESIA)

Mr. Gamil Hamdy, Resident Representative
Tel. home 794.759

Yogyakarta

Wisma Negara Government Guest House
Tel. 361.4701

Bali

Nusadua Beach Hotel
Tel.

THAILAND

LAOS

VIETNAM

MALAYSIA

SINGAPORE
ESTIA

TIME DIFFERENCES
FROM NEW YORK

TIME DIFFERENCES

* UK is 5 hrs ahead of New York

Thailand 12

Laos 12

Vietnam 12

Malaysia 13

Indonesia 12

Singapore 13

Australia 15.5

New Zeal. 17

THAILAND
LAOS
VIETNAM

MALAYSIA
SINGAPORE
ESIA

TIME DIFFERENCES
FROM NEW YORK

THAILAND

NB

Please see also the following sections
of this brief;

- Kampuchea

- ESCAP

Recent cable traffic with UN, Bangkok

2020 BKK1030

SS NYK

.BANGKOK 9UNNY> 15 1041

84 AHMED RUFFUM DAYAL AND HELKE FROM ANUAR.

AAA. UNHCR FIELD OFFICER IN KID HOUSSEIN KHAN HAS BEEN INFORMED BY COLONEL PRANET COMMANDER OF TASK FORCE 88. THAT IT HAS BEEN DECIDED TO TRANSFER TO KID THE POPULATION OF NONG SAMET NUMBERING 62,000 PRESENTLY ON EVACUATION SITE CALLED RED HILL INSIDE THAILAND. PRANET HAS APPARENTLY INDICATED THAT THE POPULATION WOULD BE KEPT SEPERATE FROM PRESENT REFUGEE POPULATION NUMBERING SOME 30,000 UNDER UNHCR CARE. ALSO UNBRO WOULD BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR CARE AND MAINTENANCE. THE MOVE IS EXPECTED TO TAKE PLACE QUOTE SOON UNQUOTE AND IS TO BE COMPLETED QUOTE WITHIN FIVE DAYS UNQUOTE.

BBB. IN RESPONSE TO INQUIRIES MADE DURING LAST 24 HOURS WITH THE AUTHORITIES IN BANGKOK TO OBTAIN FURTHER CLARIFICATION REGARDING THE DECISION WE HAVE BEEN ASSURED THAT CONSULTATIONS ARE TAKING PLACE AMONG VARIOUS OFFICIALS CONCERNED AND WE WOULD BE ADVISED IN DUE COURSE.

COL 84 CKD

NNNN

CODE CABLE

To: Kibria, ESCAP, Bangkok (Thailand)

From: de Olivares

Date: * 17 January 1985

FYI AAA in the light of recent developments and on instruction from the Secretary-General, we have conveyed to Thai Permanent Mission in New York a clear preference for visit to Khao I Dang to be rescheduled from 27 Jan to Friday 1 February after return from Chiang Mai.

BBB Also we are conveying to Thai Mission preference for press conference to be scheduled to airport.

CCC Shall keep you advised on developments regarding the above.

DDD Please note that Mr. Anvar will also join the SecGen's party in Thailand.

PK

TLX-030

SS NYK

.BANGKOK (ESCAP) 18 1143

CKY-004 PHASE QXQXQ

CODE CABLE

TO: OLIVARES.

FROM: KIBRIA

DATE: 18 JANUARY, 1985.

NUMBER: CKY-004.

CONFIDENTIAL/NO DISTRIBUTION. ON THE QUESTION OF VISIT TO KHAO I-DANG
REFUGEE CAMP THAI FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS SEEM TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT
T

SUGGESTED CHANGE OF DATE. IN FACT DIRECTOR-GENERAL INTERNATIONAL
RELATION IN THE MINISTRY EXPRESSED DOUBT WHETHER VISIT TO KHAO I-DANG

CAN BE ARRANGED WITHIN AVAILABLE TIME ON 1 FEBRUARY. HE ALSO POINTED
OUT THAT AUDIENCE WITH KING AT CHAINGMAI ON 31 JANUARY EVENING HAS
ALREADY BEEN FINALIZED. HE FURTHER SAID THAT IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY
INCONVENIENT IN THE MIDST OF DEPARTURE CEREMONY AT AIRPORT TO ARRANGE
PRESS CONFERENCE AT AIRPORT. I THOUGHT I SHOULD DRAW YOUR ATTENTION
THESE POINTS. THAI PERMANENT MISSION IS ALSO LIKELY TO TAKE UP
THESE POINTS WITH YOU. (ESCAP)

COL CKY-004 1 31 QWQWQ

NNNN

OUTGOING COMED CABLE

TO: KIBRIA ESCAP
FROM: DAYAL
DATE: 18 JANUARY 1985
NO/ CYK 004-01

13.
E65 JAN 18 PM 6 05

RE YOUR CKY 004. YOU MAY WISH TO KNOW THAT FOREIGN MINISTRY
UNFORTUNATELY REACTED TO YOU BEFORE IT HAD RECEIVED THAI
PERMREP'S CABLE ADVISING OF OUR DEMARCHE.

SECGEN HAS REITERATED HIS CLEAR PREFERENCE THAT VISIT TO
KID SHOULD TAKE PLACE AFTER HE RETURNS FROM HANOI AND THAT
PRESS CONFERENCE SHOULD BE AT AIRPORT. THIS HAS BEEN CONVEYED
ON HIS BEHALF TO THE THAI PERMREP, AND SECGEN WILL PERSONALLY
MENTION THIS TO PERMREP AT DINNER TONIGHT.

TO: DEMONTAGNAC FOR DAYAL
FROM: KUNUGI
DATE: 18 JANUARY, 1985
NUMBER: CKY-005

THANKS YOUR CKY-01.

AAA. AS INDICATED MY CKY003, MEETING TOOK PLACE TODAY 18 JAN AT MFA WITH PARTICIPATION OF NSC (NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL), SUPREME COMMAND, UNPRO, UNHCR AND ICRD.

BBB. DURING THE DISCUSSION IT BECAME QUITE CLEAR THAT DECISION TO MOVE RED HILL POPULATION TO KID HAD BEEN TAKEN BY SUPREME COMMAND WITHOUT CONCURRENCE OR KNOWLEDGE OF MFA OR NSC. REPRESENTATIVE OF NSC WENT AS FAR AS STATING THAT THE DECISION DOES NOT COINCIDE WITH THE PRESENT POLICY OF RTG.

CCC. AFTER SUPREME COMMAND AND NSC GAVE CLARIFICATIONS, NITYA WHO CHAIR THE MEETING SUMMARIZED THE POSITION OF RTG AS FOLLOWS: FIRST. TRANSFER OF RED HILL POPULATION TO KID IS A TEMPORARY MEASURE BASED ON HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS FOR SAFETY OF THE POPULATION. STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AND REQUIREMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES IN THE BORDER ARE OTHER IMPORTANT FACTORS. SECOND. CHOICE OF KID IS INCIDENTAL. IT IS BEING USED AS ANOTHER EVACUATION SITE BECAUSE NECESSARY FACILITIES ALREADY EXIST TO ACCOMMODATE THE POPULATION. IN FACT A DIFFERENT NAME MAY BE USED FOR THE TEMPORARY SITE. THIRD. AS THE MOVE IS TEMPORARY AND IS NOT EXPECTED TO LAST MORE THAN 60 DAYS, NO POLICY OR LEGAL IMPLICATIONS NEED TO BE CONSIDERED. THE EVACUEES WILL NOT HAVE STATUS SIMILAR TO REFUGEES ALREADY IN KID UNDER UNHCR CARE AND MAINTENANCE, AND CONSEQUENTLY AT THE TIME OF THEIR RETURN TO THE BORDER, QUESTION OF VOLUNTARY NATURE OF THEIR RELOCATION OR REPATRIATION WILL NOT ARISE.

DDD. NITYA THEN PROPOSED THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS ADOPT A COMMON POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE PRESS AND EMBASSIES ON THE BASIS OF CCC ABOVE. WHILE WE NOTED WITH APPRECIATION THE EXPLANATIONS PROVIDED BY THE RTG AND ASSURED OUR FULL CO-OPERATION, WE POLITELY DECLINED TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH INTERPRETATION OF THE POLICY AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS REGARDING THE STATUS OF THE GROUP WHEN ACCOMMODATED IN KID. I ASSURED NITYA THAT AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE RTG BY THE UNITED NATIONS AND APPROPRIATE CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN VARIOUS AGENCIES INVOLVED, WE WOULD REVERT TO THE QUESTION OF POLICY AND LONG TERM IMPLICATIONS AS FAR AS IT CONCERNS THE UNITED NATIONS.

/...

EEE. EYE TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO REITERATE FOLLOWING VIEWS EARLIER CONVEYED TO NITYA ON ANOTHER OCCASION IN JUNE 1984: FIRST. UNITED NATIONS KAMPUCHEAN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IS ESSENTIALLY A MULTILATERAL INTERNATIONAL OPERATION AND NOT A COLLECTIVITY OF BILATERAL ASSISTANCE. SECOND. WHILE CONSENT AND CO-OPERATION OF HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES ARE ESSENTIAL, WE WOULD APPRECIATE PRIOR CONSULTATIONS ON MAJOR CHANGES IN OPERATION HAVING POLICY IMPLICATIONS SO THAT THE DONOR COMMUNITY COULD BE ADVISED OF PROPOSED CHANGES AS NECESSARY. THIRD. FOR PURPOSE OF SUCH CONSULTATIONS AND RELEVANT NOTIFICATIONS, WE HOPE MFA WILL CONTINUE TO SERVE AS OFFICIAL CHANNEL TO AVOID CONFUSING SIGNALS FROM DIFFERENT AUTHORITIES.

FFF. ALTHOUGH THE INDICATIONS PRIOR TO THE MEETING WAS IT WAS GOING TO BE A PRO FORMA EXERCISE, THE FRANK EXCHANGE OF VIEW MAY HAVE SET THE STAGE FOR A BETTER COORDINATION OF OUR FUTURE ACTIVITIES WITH REGARD TO THE BORDER. REGARDS.

THAILAND

1. Background

Area : 513,115 square kilometers.

Population : Mid-1983 estimates : 49,585,000
Composed of a Thai majority, with Chinese (14 per cent) and Malay (4 per cent) minorities, and indigenous hill peoples.

Religion : More than 90 per cent profess Theravada Buddhism, 4 per cent are Muslim, the remainder being Chinese Confucians and Christians.

Government : A Constitutional monarchy functioning through a strong Prime Minister. The King exercises little direct power but is a symbol of national unity and identity.

Head of State : H.M. King Bhumibol Adulyadej
Acceded to the throne in June 1946.

Prime Minister and Minister of Defence :
General Prem Tinsulanonda, first appointed Prime Minister in March 1980. Subsequently survived a coup attempt by army colonels in April 1981. Re-appointed following elections in April 1983. The longest-serving Prime Minister in the recent past, General Prem enjoys the support of the royal family and of the army.

Minister of Foreign Affairs : Siddhi Savetsila
(Air Chief Marshall)

2. Economic and Social profile

Economy, based on agriculture, which in 1982 contributed 20 per cent of the GDP, as did the manufacturing sector. Agriculture provided employment for 72 per cent of the work force in 1981. The principal products are : rice, cassava products, maize; sugar cane; kenaf.

The manufacturing sector comprises textiles, sugar, cement, and petroleum refining. Tourism was the major source of foreign exchange in 1982. The GNP per-capita was \$ US 670 in 1980.

3. Development Assistance

There has been a noticeable downward trend in the total value of technical assistance provided to Thailand by official donors over the past five years, particularly if the figures are discounted for inflation.

The major multilateral sources of technical assistance continue to be the United Nations System and the EEC. In addition to UNDP, important assistance was given by the United Nations Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF). Other UN agencies and organizations active in Thailand during the year included the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), World Health Organization (WHO), UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The major bilateral donors of technical assistance continue to be Japan, USA, and the Federal Republic of Germany. FRG continues to provide most of its assistance in this form to support programmes for Thai people affected by the influx of refugees from Indochina.

Other major donors are Australia, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Canada, Belgium and the Netherlands.

4. The UNDP Country Programme

The total UNDP resources (IPF) available for programming during the period 1982-86 are \$24.7 million.

The current Thai Country Programme was formulated, taking into account the priorities contained in the Government's Fifth Plan, and stresses the following themes: Management of the Development Process, Rural Development and Poverty Alleviation, Economic Diversification, and Energy.

5. Additional Relevant Facts and Considerations

Due to Thailand's central location and the presence of ESCAP, numerous regional programmes and projects are located in Bangkok. The office of Regional Representative/Resident Coordinator therefore plays a major role in coordinating and monitoring/evaluating the UNDP-supported regional activities located there. In addition, the Regional Representative has taken a progressive approach in introducing government-executed projects in Thailand which may provide a means for examining this concept as well as a model for developing this type of project elsewhere.

6. Additional suggestions by the UNDP for the Secretary-General

Special Issues relating to UN Operations in Thailand

The UNDP Resident Representative/Resident Co-ordinator in Bangkok, Mr. Winston Prattley, is also Director of UN Border Relief Operations, a role that he carries out under the aegis of the Secretary-General's Office, and the Office of the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Co-ordination of Kampuchean Humanitarian Assistance Programmes.

The recent intensive activity at the border, the security ramifications therein with special respect to international and voluntary personnel, and the relationship between the roles of Mr. Kunugi and Mr. Prattley, may come up in the course of the Secretary-General's visit.

THAILAND

Nationals of Thailand on geographical and non-geographical posts with the United Nations and some other UN organs

1. There were 33 nationals of Thailand on geographical posts at the United Nations Secretariat as of 30 November 1984, as compared with a desirable range for the country of 4-15. Thailand is therefore over its desirable range.
2. In addition there were, as of 30 November 1984, 662 Thailand nationals on non-geographical posts at the UN Secretariat, plus 88 employed by UNDP*, 76 by UNICEF, 1 by ICSC, 72 by UNCHR, and 2 on Special Leave without pay. The above-mentioned organizations therefore equals 934.
3. Attached is a table containing statistical data on Thailand's representation in the United Nations Secretariat for the last 10 years, as of 30 June of each year, which is the end of the year for the purpose of reporting to the General Assembly. This table also indicates the most recent data available for 30 June 1984. Attached as well is a list of 934 nationals of this Member State within the UN Secretariat and other organizations. This list shows the names, level of posts encumbered, functional title and office and duty station where the staff members were employed as of 30 November 1984.

*The current information on the local staff of UNDP is unavailable at this time due to technical reasons and as a result, the data provided for some local staff members might be out of date. The data on the international staff, however, is reasonably up to date.

Division for Policy Co-ordination
Office of Personnel Services

STAFF MEMBERS WHO ARE NATIONALS OF
THAILAND
IN POSTS SUBJECT TO GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION
1975-1984*

	<u>USG</u>	<u>ASG</u>	<u>D-2</u>	<u>D-1</u>	<u>P-5</u>	<u>P-4</u>	<u>P-3</u>	<u>P-2</u>	<u>P-1</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Desi- rable range</u>	<u>Contri- bution</u>	<u>Weighted range</u>	<u>Weighted Staff Position</u>
1975	-	-	-	1	-	3	4	7	5	20	3-8	0.11	79-181	357.0
1976	-	-	-	1	-	4	6	7	3	21	3-8	0.11	78-182	397
1977	-	-	-	1	1	3	6	8	3	22	4-9	0.10	114-263	510
1978	-	-	-	-	1	2	5	10	4	22	4-9	0.10	114-264	465
1979	-	-	-	-	1	4	4	10	4	23	4-9	0.10	114-264	501
1980	-	-	-	-	1	5	8	6	2	22	4-9	0.10	115-265	522
1981	-	-	-	-	1	5	8	10	1	25	4-15	0.10	153-592	744
1982	-	-	-	1	-	5	14	10	6	36	4-15	0.10	152-591	1025
1983	-	-	-	1	-	5	14	9	6	35	4-15	0.08	136-575	1001
1984	-	-	-	-	-	5	13	14	1	33	4-15	0.08	136-576	945

	<u>Staff at beginning of year</u>	<u>A P P O I N T M E N T S</u>			<u>S E P A R A T I O N S</u>			<u>Adjust- ments</u>		<u>Staff at end of year</u>
		<u>Career</u>	<u>Non- career</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Career</u>	<u>Non- career</u>	<u>Total</u>			
1975	22	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-1	20
1976	20	-	1	1	1	-	1	+1	-	21
1977	21	-	-	-	-	-	-	+1	-	22
1978	22	1	-	1	1	1	2	+2	-1	22
1979	22	-	-	-	-	-	-	+1	-	23
1980	23	-	-	-	1	1	2	+1	-	22
1981	22	-	-	-	-	-	-	+3	-	25
1982	25	-	4	4	1	-	1	+8	-	36
1983	36	-	-	-	1	-	1	+1	-1	35
1984	35	-	-	-	-	3	3	+1	-	33

*As of 30 June 1984

THAILAND
STATUS OF ASSESSED AND VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS
AS OF 10 JANUARY 1985
(in US dollars)

Name of Fund	1984		1985	
	Assessment or Pledge	Payment	Assessment or Pledge	Payment
A. ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS - Rate of Assessment	0.08%		0.08%	
Regular Budget	519,749	519,749	526,515	-
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) up to 31/5/85	5,528	5,528	2,816	-
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) up to 18/4/85	<u>22,236</u>	<u>22,236</u>	<u>11,112</u>	-
SUB-TOTAL	<u>547,513</u>	<u>547,513</u>	<u>540,443</u>	-
B. VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS				
Voluntary Fund for the United Nations Decade for Women	3,000	3,000	-	-
Trust Fund for Special Economic Assistance Programmes	10,000	10,000	-	-
Special Account for Assistance to Mozambique	1,000	1,000	-	-
Special Account for Assistance to Botswana	1,000	1,000	-	-
Trust Fund for the Institute for Namibia	1,000	1,000	-	-
Trust Fund for Social Defence (UNSDRI)	1,000	1,000	1,000	-
International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women	-	-	3,000	-
Trust Fund for 2nd International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA II)	<u>10,000</u>	<u>10,000</u>	-	-
SUB-TOTAL	<u>27,000</u>	<u>27,000</u>	<u>4,000</u>	-
TOTAL	<u>574,513</u>	<u>574,513</u>	<u>544,443</u>	-

Position of Thailand on Disarmament Issues

General: Although SEATO itself is no longer a functioning alliance, Thailand's membership of this quasi politico-military grouping continues to be reflected in its position on disarmament and related matters. On issues like the concept of a nuclear-freeze and nuclear non-proliferation, Thailand's attitude is more akin to that of Australia and New Zealand rather than that of the non-aligned countries. This comes out quite clearly in the explanations of its votes on issues like prevention of nuclear war, and militarization of outer space where Thailand stresses the need for verification and complinace as against the more general non-aligned support for unilateral initiatives by one or other major military powers.

Nuclear arms race and related matters: Thailand attaches great value to a comprehensive test-ban treaty, covering nuclear tests for all times and in all environments. It urges an urgent resolution of issues related to compliance and verification of such a treaty. At the 39th session of the General Assembly, it supported universal acceptance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Thailand sees a connexion between the pace of progress in the efforts at cessation of nuclear tests and a universal acceptance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Chemical and biological weapons: Thailand opposes the development, manufacture, stockpiling and use, in any circumstances, of chemical and biological weapons. At the 39th session of the General Assembly, it expressed the view that the 1925 Geneva Protocol is insufficient to eliminate the danger of the possible use of chemical and biological weapons. Therefore, only a complete ban, with adequate verification, could guarantee that a country at war or in conflict would not in desperation turn to these weapons at its disposal.

Establishment of zones of peace and nuclear weapon-free zones: As a member of the ASEAN, Thailand participated in the meeting of Foreign Ministers of ASEAN held in July 1984. This meeting endorsed the proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South East Asia. Like other members of the Non-Aligned Movement, Thailand also regrets the delay in convening the International Conference on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

ITINERARY

COMPOSITION

LAOS

VIETNAM

MALAYSIA

SINGAPORE

TIME DIFFERENCES
FROM NEW YORK

LAOS

1. Background

- Area : 236,800 square kilometers.
- Population : The last census was held in 1952. Population estimates at 1984 range between 3,900,000 and 4,129,000. A census will be held with United Nations assistance in 1985. The population is about 60 per cent ethnic Lao, 35 per cent belong to various hill tribes including the Meo (Hmong), and the remainder Vietnamese (there are about 50,000 troops in Laos) and Chinese. Vientiane is the only large town, with some 200,000 inhabitants.
- Religion: The principal religion is Buddhism and there are some Christians and animists.
- Government : Head of State Prince Souphanouvong., President of the Lao People's Democratic Republic since its establishment in December 1975
- Prime Minister and Chairman of the Council of Ministers: Kaysone Phomvihane.
- Minister of Foreign Affairs: Phoune Sipaseuth

2. Economic and Social profile

Laos is considered to be potentially the richest of the Indochinese countries, given its abundant agricultural, forest and mineral reserves, and its hydro-electric potential. Development has been hindered by both political turmoil and natural disasters. Soviet and Vietnamese aid for infrastructure and communication development is very important, and many thousands of Laotians are being trained in Vietnam. Thailand is however very important to the foreign trade of Laos. In 1982, imports from Thailand amounted to US\$. 42.1 million, out of a total of US\$ 90 million. Exports were US\$ 46 million, of which US\$ 26 million went to Thailand in the form of hydro-electricity. Other major exports are wood, coffee, tin and agricultural products. Officially, remittances in hard currency from abroad are put at US\$ 1 million, while the unofficial figure ranges from US\$ 5 million to 25 million. The GNP per capita which has been declining over the past couple of years, was estimated in 1982 to be approximately US\$ 90. Laos is a land locked and least developed country.

3. Development Assistance

Laos receives over \$100 million of external assistance per year in the form of commodity and project aid, technical assistance and cash grants from a variety of donors. The USSR and Viet Nam have provided about 60 percent of all aid in the past with the multi-lateral agencies such as the IDA, ADB, OPEC, UNDP and other members of the UN group making up the balance. However, more recently, bilateral assistance from Sweden, the Netherlands, Japan and Australia has become significant amounting to about \$16 million annually.

In general the planning and administration of aid and aid programmes by the Government has been a problem, though there is recent evidence that something is being done to try to eliminate some of the more aggravating obstacles to project implementation (clearance of experts and equipment, visa requirements, travel restrictions, lack of counterparts etc.).

4. The UNDP Programme

UNDP assistance from 1982 to 1986 amounting to \$28 million is directed mainly at increasing food production with emphasis on irrigation, flood control and livestock development. The Government has indicated to UNDP its wish to concentrate the programme in future on development of human resources in a broader range of sectors to remove one of the most serious constraints to efficient execution of development plans - the shortage of skilled, trained, technical and managerial personnel. Currently delivery of UNDP technical assistance to Laos is running at only \$3 to \$4 million per year which is 50 per cent of what it could be, were the constraints mentioned above removed.

LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Nationals of Lao People's Democratic Rep. on geographical and non-geographical posts with the United Nations and some other UN organs

1. There were 2 nationals of Lao People's Democratic Republic on geographical posts at the United Nations Secretariat as of 30 November 1984, as compared with a desirable range for the country of 2-14. Lao People's Democratic Republic is therefore within its desirable range.

2. In addition there were, as of 30 November 1984, 3 Lao People's Democratic Republic nationals on non-geographic posts at the UN Secretariat, plus 23 employed by UNDP*, 17 by UNICEF, and 14 by UNCHR. The above-mentioned organizations therefore equals 59.

3. Attached is a table containing statistical data on Lao People's Democratic Republic's representation in the United Nations Secretariat for the last 10 years, as of 30 June of each year, which is the end of the year for the purpose of reporting to the General Assembly. This table also indicates the most recent data available for 30 June 1984. Attached as well is a list of 59 nationals of this Member State within the UN Secretariat and other organizations. This list shows the names, level of posts encumbered, functional title and office and duty station where the staff members were employed as of 30 November 1984.

*The current information on the local staff of UNDP is unavailable at this time due to technical reasons and as a result, the data provided for some local staff members might be out of date. The data on the international staff, however, is reasonably up to date.

Division for Policy Co-ordination
Office of Personnel Services

STAFF MEMBERS WHO ARE NATIONALS OF
LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
IN POSTS SUBJECT TO GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION
1975-1984*

	<u>USG</u>	<u>ASG</u>	<u>D-2</u>	<u>D-1</u>	<u>P-5</u>	<u>P-4</u>	<u>P-3</u>	<u>P-2</u>	<u>P-1</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Desi- rable range</u>	<u>Contri- bution</u>	<u>Weighted range</u>	<u>Weighted Staff Position</u>
1975	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	2	1-6	0.02	34-152	35.5
1976	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	2	-	3	1-6	0.02	35-152	56
1977	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	3	2-7	0.02	71-220	73
1978	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	-	-	3	2-7	0.01	65-215	78
1979	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	-	-	3	2-7	0.01	65-214	78
1980	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	2	2-7	0.01	65-215	54
1981	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	2	2-14	0.01	84-523	76
1982	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	2	2-14	0.01	84-523	76
1983	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	2	2-14	0.01	84-523	76
1984	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	2	2-14	0.01	84-523	87

	<u>Staff at beginning of year</u>	<u>A P P O I N T M E N T S</u>			<u>S E P A R A T I O N S</u>			<u>Adjust- ments</u>		<u>Staff at end of year</u>
		<u>Career</u>	<u>Non- career</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Career</u>	<u>Non- career</u>	<u>Total</u>			
1975	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
1976	2	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	3
1977	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
1978	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
1979	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
1980	3	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	2
1981	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
1982	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
1983	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
1984	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2

*As of 30 June 1984

LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
STATUS OF ASSESSED AND VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS
AS OF 10 JANUARY 1985
(in US dollars)

Name of Fund	Outstanding Contributions for 1983 and prior years	1984		1985	
		Assessment or Pledge	Payment	Assessment or Pledge	Payment
A. ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS - Rate of Assessment		0.01%		0.01%	
Regular Budget	58,834	64,969	-	65,814	-
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) up to 31/5/85	2,132	346	-	176	-
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) up to 18/4/85	7,663	1,390	-	695	-
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination	<u>785</u>	<u>782</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
SUB-TOTAL	<u>69,414</u>	<u>67,487</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>66,685</u>	<u>-</u>
B. VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS					
Voluntary Fund for the United Nations Decade for Women	-	-	-	1,500	-
Trust Fund for the World Disarmament Campaign	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>500</u>	<u>-</u>
SUB-TOTAL	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>2,000</u>	<u>-</u>
TOTAL	<u>69,414</u>	<u>67,487</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>68,685</u>	<u>-</u>

Position of Lao People's Democratic Republic on Disarmament Issues

General: Partly due to bilateral problems with its neighbours and also because of its political affinity to the Socialist countries, the Lao People's Democratic Republic is not generally associated with independent initiatives on disarmament related matter. Most recently issues like prevention of militarization of outer space, use of chemical weapons and relationship between disarmament and security have figured prominently in Laotian statements in the General Assembly.

Nuclear arms race and related issues: The Lao People's Democratic Republic seeks the elimination of nuclear weapons as a priority goal and supports the concept of a freeze on nuclear weapons. At the 39th session of the General Assembly, it criticized the Strategic Defence Initiative, also described as "Starwars" scenarios, as an expression of intentions of gaining military superiority and emphasized the inherent dangers in doctrinal notions like "first nuclear strike", "admissibility of nuclear war" and "possibilities of winning a limited or prolonged nuclear war".

Chemical and biological weapons: Describing itself as a victim of the use of chemical weapons during the Viet Nam war, the Lao People's Democratic Republic has repeatedly stressed the dangers of the use of such weapons. It is opposed to the idea of fact-finding mechanism on ascertaining the use of chemical weapons. At the 39th session of the General Assembly Lao People's Democratic Republic voted against resolution 39/65 E which took note of the report of consultant experts nominated by the Secretary-General to devise procedures for the investigation of information concerning activities that may constitute a violation of the Geneva Protocol. Its position on this matter is taken on the grounds that the so-called fact-finding mechanism was not drawn up by all the parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol as stipulated by international law.

Establishment of zones of peace and nuclear-weapon-free zones: Lao People's Democratic Republic regards external intervention as an aggravating factor in promoting regional tensions and an obstacle to the establishment of zones of peace in various parts of the world.

ITINERARY

COMPOSITION OF

VIETNAM

MALAYSIA

SINGAPORE

ESIA

TIME DIFFERENCES
FROM NEW YORK

VIETNAM

1. Background

Area : 329,566 square kilometers.

Population : 57,200,000, mostly Vietnamese, the remainder being Tai, Meo, Montagnards and Chinese. While Ho Chi Minh City is the largest city (3.5 million inhabitants), Hanoi is the capital, with a population of 2,570,905.

Religion : Although religion is not officially encouraged, a majority of the Vietnamese are nominally Buddhists and Taoists, with a significant Roman Catholic minority in the South.

Government : The Council of State is the collective Presidency of Viet Nam, comprises 12 members, and is accountable to the National Assembly.

President : Truong Chinh

Secretary-General of the Communist Party:
Le Duan.

Chairman of the Council of Ministers :
Premier Pham Van Dong

Minister for Foreign Affairs : Nguyen Co Thach, who is also an Alternate Member of the Politburo of the Communist Party, which comprises 13 members and 2 alternates.

2. Economic and Social Profile

Economy is mainly agricultural, the chief products are: rice, maize, rubber, sugar cane, tobacco, tea, coffee, timber. Industry based in the North, comprises cement, food processing, metallurgy, textiles, paper and engineering. Coal is Viet Nam's main export, together with seafood and rice. Total exports in 1982 were US\$ 188 million. It is dependent on the USSR for 100 per cent of its fuel oil needs, 90 per cent of its fertilizer and 80 per cent of its metallurgical products. Total imports in 1982 were US\$ 637 million. The GNP per capita was US \$170 in 1978 (latest available figures), making it among the ten poorest countries in the world.

3. Development Assistance

Foreign aid to Viet Nam is decreasing for political reasons, mainly related to the intervention in Kampuchea. Sweden is still the largest non-socialist donor but its aid budget for Viet Nam has been reduced from \$45 million to \$37 million for fiscal year 1985. Denmark is winding up its assistance; Norway and the Netherlands have already done so. Finland has a small programme; French assistance is frozen pending agreement on rescheduling Viet Nam's debt to France. The USSR is by far the largest of all donors; its civilian aid is estimated to be equivalent to \$1 billion per year.

The United Nations system is an important source of multi-lateral assistance to Viet Nam. Neither the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, IFAD nor the EEC have active programmes in the country. UNICEF, UNHCR, WHO and FAO all have missions in Hanoi in addition to UNDP. In dollar terms the United Nations system as a whole shares second place as a donor with Sweden. Under the chairmanship of the Resident Representative/Coordinator regular meetings of United Nations heads of missions are held at which both programme and administrative matters are discussed.

4 The UNDP Programme

The UNDP has made available \$48 million of grant technical assistance to Viet Nam since the initiation of the programme in 1978. A further \$65 million is available for 1985-1986 making UNDP the largest of the UN donors. UNDP's programme in Viet Nam has been characterized by high technology, high equipment projects mainly directed at traditional technical cooperation sectors such as agriculture, forestry, fisheries, water management, quality control in manufacturing and regular industrial/technical training programmes. More recently the Vietnamese authorities have realized that they do not, in fact, have a sufficient quantity of high calibre, technically qualified counterpart personnel to absorb and manage such a technologically advanced and complex programme. They have accepted the need for UNDP funds to be directed more to traditional human resource development programmes with emphasis on education and training.

5. Additional suggestion from UNDP for the Secretary-General

Special Issues relating the UNDP's operations in Viet Nam

The Secretary-General should be aware that the UNDP Resident Representative and UN Coordinator in Viet Nam, Mr. Karl Englund (Sweden) is about to complete seven years of service in Viet Nam. Mr. Englund opened UNDP's office in Hanoi in 1978. The UNDP Administrator has extended Mr. Englund's contract by one month to enable him to be present for the Secretary-General's visit. He will leave Hanoi the day after the Secretary-General and will be replaced in mid-February by Mr. Anders Rojkaer (Denmark) currently UNDP Resident Representative in Nigeria.

The Secretary-General may also wish to know that the Government of Viet Nam has expressed concern at what it considers to be the slow pace of recent UNDP approvals of new projects of the Viet Nam programme. Indeed new projects have been subject to an extensive and rigorous appraisal process by UNDP which has inevitably entailed some delay in approval authority being given to the Resident Representative. This careful approach has been necessitated by the close scrutiny the programme has received from major donor Governments which have, in recent Governing Councils, expressed certain reservations at the high technology, high equipment component of the UNDP programme for Viet Nam.

6. Additional Note for the Secretary-General

Special Matter relating to Viet Nam and Laos

The Secretary-General may wish to note that Australia has recently selected UNDP as a multi-lateral vehicle for implementing an English Language Training programme in Viet Nam and Laos. The Australian Development Assistance Bureau is making available A\$700,000 (US\$600,000) with a promise of equivalent amounts for 1986 and 1987 if the project progresses well. The money will finance language-training activities for the two countries by the Canberra College of Advanced Education operating under sub-contract to UNDP. This arrangement in addition to being a unique example of multi-bilateral co-operation for Indo-China will help alleviate one of the most persistent obstacles to technical co-operation programmes in the two countries - namely the lack of qualified, english-speaking counterparts.

Extract from the Secretary-General's meeting
with Mr. Poul Hartling, UNHCR,
in New York on 15 November 1984

E. Vietnam

The Commissioner recalled his visit to Vietnam in September when he had met with Messrs. Pham Van Dong and Co Thach. The Orderly Departure Programme (ODP), inaugurated in 1979, seemed to be working well. Certainly the overall movement was in the right direction. In 1979, less than 2,000 people left Vietnam by air in the ODP, while over 200,000 left by sea. The corresponding figures for 1984 would be 25,000 and 22,000. He mentioned without elaborating that he had discussed the question of sea piracy with the government of Thailand. He was careful to underline UNHCR's non-involvement with the Khmer people on the Thai-Kampuchean border who are currently in the care of UNBRO.

J.P. Kavanagh
15 November 1984

VIET NAM

Nationals of Viet Nam on geographical and non-geographical posts with the United Nations and some other UN organs

1. There were 6 nationals of Viet Nam on geographical posts at the United Nations Secretariat as of 30 November 1984, as compared with a desirable range for the country of 2-14. Viet Nam is therefore within its desirable range.
2. In addition there were, as of 30 November 1984, 12 Viet Nam nationals on non-geographic posts at the UN Secretariat, plus 4 employed by UNDP*, 2 by UNICEF, and 1 by UNHCR. The above-mentioned organizations therefore equals 25.
3. Attached is a table containing statistical data on Viet Nam's representation in the United Nations Secretariat for the last 10 years, as of 30 June of each year, which is the end of the year for the purpose of reporting to the General Assembly. This table also indicates the most recent data available for 30 June 1984. Attached as well is a list of 25 nationals of this Member State within the UN Secretariat and other organizations. This list shows the names, level of posts encumbered, functional title and office and duty station where the staff members were employed as of 30 November 1984.

*The current information on the local staff of UNDP is unavailable at this time due to technical reasons and as a result, the data provided for some local staff members might be out of date. The data on the international staff, however, is reasonably up to date.

Division for Policy Co-ordination
Office of Personnel Services

STAFF MEMBERS WHO ARE NATIONALS OF
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
IN POSTS SUBJECT TO GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION
1975-1984*

	<u>USG</u>	<u>ASG</u>	<u>D-2</u>	<u>D-1</u>	<u>P-5</u>	<u>P-4</u>	<u>P-3</u>	<u>P-2</u>	<u>P-1</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Desi- rable range</u>	<u>Contri- bution</u>	<u>Weighted range</u>	<u>Weighte Staff Positio</u>
1975	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	-	1	4	-	-	-	-
1976	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	1	3	-	-	-	-
1977	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	2	-	-	-	-
1978	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	2	2-7	0.03	60-209	49
1979	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	2	-	3	3-8	0.03	76-226	68
1980	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	2	-	3	3-8	0.03	76-226	76
1981	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	2	-	3	3-14	0.03	99-539	97
1982	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	3	-	4	3-14	0.03	99-538	121
1983	-	-	-	-	1	-	2	1	-	4	2-14	0.02	91-531	134
1984	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	3	-	5	2-14	0.02	91-531	152

	<u>Staff at beginning of year</u>	<u>A P P O I N T M E N T S</u>			<u>S E P A R A T I O N S</u>			<u>Adjust- ments</u>		<u>Staff at end of year</u>
		<u>Career</u>	<u>Non- career</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Career</u>	<u>Non- career</u>	<u>Total</u>			
1975	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	+1	-	4
1976	4	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	3
1977	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-1	2
1978	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
1979	2	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	3
1980	3	-	1	1	-	1	1	-	-	3
1981	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
1982	3	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	4
1983	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
1984	4	-	2	2	1	-	1	-	-	5

*As of 30 June 1984

VIET NAM
STATUS OF ASSESSED AND VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS
AS OF 10 JANUARY 1985
(in US dollars)

Name of Fund	Outstanding Contributions for 1983 and prior years	1984		1985	
		Assessment or Pledge	Payment	Assessment or Pledge	Payment
A. ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS - Rate of Assessment		0.02%		0.02%	
Regular Budget	117,670	129,937	10,000	131,629	-
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) up to 31/5/85	17,432	1,384	-	704	-
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) up to 18/4/85	45,635	5,558	-	2,778	-
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination	<u>1,056</u>	<u>839</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
SUB-TOTAL	<u>181,793</u>	<u>137,718</u>	<u>10,000</u>	<u>135,111</u>	<u>-</u>
B. VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS					
Trust Fund for the World Disarmament Campaign	<u>-</u>	<u>4,188</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
SUB-TOTAL	<u>-</u>	<u>4,188</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
TOTAL	<u>181,793</u>	<u>141,906</u>	<u>10,000</u>	<u>135,111</u>	<u>-</u>

Position of Viet Nam on Disarmament Issues

General: Unresolved bilateral problems with its immediate neighbours on the peninsula and differences with the People's Republic of China on the strategic environment in South East Asia constitute significant factors in Viet Nam's position on issues of regional disarmament. On East-West issues it is a strong supporter of Soviet positions on concepts like nuclear-freeze and approaches like blanket measures of demilitarization of outer space. On its own, Viet Nam has recently co-sponsored resolutions on the use of chemical weapons where its position, like that of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, is in favour of a strict adherence to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and of serious reservations on international investigations over the actual use of such weapons in Indochina.

Nuclear arms race and related matters: Viet Nam supports the concept of a nuclear-freeze: wants a ban on the use of and ultimate destruction of all nuclear weapons; regards both horizontal and vertical proliferation as equally dangerous for mankind. Most recently, Viet Nam has warmly welcomed the Joint Declaration addressed by India, the United Republic of Tanzania, Argentina, Mexico, Greece, and Sweden to nuclear-weapon States for a halt in the nuclear-arms race, and the reduction and eventual destruction of all nuclear weapons. Referring to the positive response this declaration received from the Soviet Union, Viet Nam called upon the United States and other nuclear powers to do the same.

Chemical and bacteriological weapons: Speaking at the 46th meeting of the First Committee, the Vietnamese delegate to the 39th session said that having suffered from the first large-scale chemical warfare in history in which 100,000 tons of toxic chemicals were sprayed over its territory, Viet Nam attaches utmost importance and is very sensitive to the issue of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons. It also drew attention to the human and environmental effects of the use of such weapons both in immediate and long-terms.

During the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, Viet Nam had submitted a formal communique in which it accused the United States for the use of chemical weapons in Viet Nam. At the 39th session, Viet Nam sponsored resolution 39/65 B which, inter alia, reaffirmed the necessity of the speediest elaboration and conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction.

Establishment of zones of peace and nuclear-weapon-free zones: Viet Nam like other Non-Aligned countries regrets the delay in convening an International Conference on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. While supporting initiatives for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South East Asia, Vietnamese position on this issue reflects the view of those Non-aligned Countries who, like India, maintain that agreement among the States of a region is necessary for this purpose.

Disarmament machinery: Viet Nam has recently voiced criticism of the disarmament machinery for non-implementation of the program of action adopted by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It has in particular regretted the procedures for decision-making in the Conference on Disarmament and the working of the Disarmament Commission as a deliberative subsidiary organ of the General Assembly.

VD/CM

cc: SG (2)
VD
b/f: AS
File:
Xref:

cc: Mr. Olivares
Mr. Ahmed
PK

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTES ON THE MEETING BETWEEN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
AND AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK ON 15 JANUARY 1985 AT 4.30 P.M.

Present:

The Secretary-General

H.E. Mrs. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick,
Permanent Representative of the
United States Mission to the
United Nations

Mr. Dayal

Mr. Warren Clark,
Minister-Counselor with the United
States Mission to the United
Nations

Ambassador Kirkpatrick stated that it was the conviction of the United States Government that the Vietnamese had "no disposition" at present to depart from Kampuchea. On its side, the United States fully supported the principles adopted by the United Nations in successive resolutions of the General Assembly and in the International Conference on Kampuchea. Ambassador Kirkpatrick expressed the hope that, in his forthcoming discussions with the Vietnamese, the Secretary-General would express the concern of her Government regarding the need to resolve problems relating to U.S. Prisoners-of-War and those still considered Missing-in-Action. Further, the United States Government hoped that the Secretary-General would urge the Vietnamese to respond to the US suggestion for another meeting to discuss the freeing and resettlement of those who had been detained in Vietnam because of their association with the United States. Finally, Ambassador Kirkpatrick hoped that the Secretary-General would have the opportunity to intercede on behalf of Mr. William Mathers, a United States citizen whose yacht was seized by the Vietnamese in July 1984 and who was being held without charges.

The Secretary-General took note of the points that Ambassador Kirkpatrick had raised. He indicated the names of the countries he would be visiting. When the Secretary-General mentioned that he would be making a brief stop-over in Laos, Ambassador Kirkpatrick mentioned that a number of American MIA's were still reportedly in that country. She hoped that the matter would therefore also be raised in Vietiane.


The Secretary-General mentioned that his own efforts were, in a sense, parallel to those of the Ad Hoc Committee established after the International Conference. The purpose of his mission would be to encourage a process of negotiations in the region so that Vietnamese forces could, in time, be withdrawn from Kampuchea. The Secretary-General added that he had been in touch, amongst others, with the Ambassador of Democratic Kampuchea and had received a message yesterday from Prince Sihanouk.

In wishing him well for his mission, Ambassador Kirkpatrick stated that she very much hoped that the Secretary-General would be able to receive Assistance Secretary Wolfowitz after his return to New York. The Secretary-General stated that he would be happy to do so.

As the meeting concluded, the Secretary-General mentioned that he had met Ambassador von Schirnding of South Africa on 14 January, who would shortly be visiting his capital. The Secretary-General had urged him to seek ways of making progress in regard to the question of Namibia.

**

** Attached are copies of the speaking notes that Ambassador Kirkpatrick used and also a note in regard to the William Mathers case.


15/1

January 15, 1985

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: Ambassador Kirkpatrick
FROM: POL - Warren Clark *W*
SUBJECT: Your Talk with Secretary General prior to his Asian trip

Paul Wolfowitz regrets he is out of the country this week. He would like to meet with the Secretary General if convenient upon the Secretary General's return.

The East Asian Bureau would like you to raise four subjects with the Secretary General and ask for his help:

1. CAMBODIA

Notwithstanding statements by the Vietnamese, we have seen no indication the Vietnamese are willing to withdraw their forces as a condition of settlement. We strongly support the principles agreed in the United Nations International Conference on Kampuchea in 1981: Withdrawal of all foreign forces and free elections under international auspices.

2. POW/MIAs

We hope the Secretary General will use his good offices to urge the Vietnamese to be more forthcoming in cooperating with us to resolve the POW/MIA problem.

3. REFUGEES

We hope the Secretary General will urge the Vietnamese to respond to our suggestion for another meeting to discuss the freeing and resettlement of persons in Vietnamese prisons because of their association with the former Saigon government and the United States.

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4. WILLIAM MATHERS

An American citizen has been detained by Hanoi since last July when his yacht was seized in what the Vietnamese call their territorial waters. We are not aware of any formal charges made against him. We hope the Secretary General will urge the Vietnamese to release him.

Notes on these subjects are attached. They can be given to the Secretary General or to his chief associate for this trip, Rafi Ahmad.

Attachments:

Talking Points from EAP

POL:WClark/bd

0021B 1-15-84

Clearance: Exec:HFeldman _____

CONFIDENTIAL

Cambodia

-- The continued Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia is the major threat to stability in Southeast Asia.

-- It violates the will of the Cambodian people.

-- It threatens the security of Thailand and the other countries of the region because, if allowed to stand, it would represent the vindication of the use of force and because large hostile forces remain on Thailand's borders, forces which have repeatedly violated Thai territory, as recently as this week.

-- It exacerbates tensions between Vietnam and China.

-- It fosters a growing Soviet military presence in a new region.

-- For these reasons, the United States will not normalize relations with Vietnam until its forces are withdrawn from Cambodia.

-- We believe that a negotiated settlement is the best hope for resolving the Cambodian problem. A military victory by either side is not in sight.

-- A settlement should be based upon the principles of the UN's 1981 International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK), i.e., withdrawal of all foreign forces, free elections under international auspices and the establishment of a government in accordance with the will of the Khmer people. These principles have been reaffirmed every year by overwhelming majorities in the UNGA Kampuchea resolution.

-- We and the ASEANS have paid close attention to Hanoi's expressions of its willingness to compromise on a negotiated Cambodian settlement. However, we have seen nothing to indicate that the Vietnamese are prepared to take the fundamental step of withdrawing their forces as a condition or a settlement. To the extent that Hanoi speaks of allowing others besides their own Cambodian clients to participate in a government of national reconciliation, it is in the context of a government formed under the guns of a continuing Vietnamese occupation.

-- Neither we nor the ASEANS could accept a return to power of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge under any circumstances.

-- We believe that the non-Communist resistance factions of Prince Sihanouk and Son Sann must be major players in any settlement because of their international reputation and their acceptability to the Cambodian people.

POW/MIAs

-- The United States has made some progress with the Vietnamese in working toward as full as possible an accounting of our servicemen who disappeared during the war. However, we are not satisfied with that progress.

-- Even if the Vietnamese were to withdraw from Cambodia, the American people would not tolerate normalization of relations with Vietnam until Hanoi demonstrated greater cooperation in resolving the POW/MIA issue.

-- We would appreciate it if the Secretary General would use his good offices to urge the Vietnamese to be more forthcoming in cooperating with us to resolve the POW/MIA problem. It is in Vietnam's own interest to be more helpful.

Refugees

-- The UN's Orderly Departure Program is a going concern which has made it possible for Vietnamese to leave the country without risking clandestine departure by sea. We appreciate the active role the UN has played in making the program work.

-- We consulted with the Vietnamese under UNHCR auspices on the US portion of the ODP in October in Geneva, and we have made progress in ensuring a more effective program. However, more could be done by the Vietnamese, including granting exit permits to more persons from areas outside the Ho Chi Minh city region and from the US Special Priority Lists -- persons who presently make up the largest percentage of those still fleeing by boat because they are unable to obtain exit permits.

-- The United States is very interested in setting up a practical program for freeing and resettling in the US the thousands of persons who remain in Vietnamese prisons because of their association with the former Saigon government or the US. These persons and their families are of profound humanitarian concern to the United States.

-- The Vietnamese have said they are willing to let these people go, if the US will take all of them. We have agreed to take these people and their families, provided an orderly program can be set up and mutual agreement can be reached on who is to be included. We will do what is necessary on our part to set up such a program.

-- For example, Vietnam has said that it does not believe these people should be discussed within the UNHCR framework. For this reason we agreed to meet bilaterally with the Vietnamese, without a UNHCR representative present, when we talked about this subject last October in Geneva.

-- We have proposed to the Vietnamese that we meet again to discuss this subject, and we are waiting for a response.

-- Because the continued imprisonment of thousands of these persons remains one of the unresolved humanitarian legacies of the Vietnam War, we would hope that the Secretary General could urge the Vietnamese to respond to our suggestion for another meeting soon so that we can begin to bring them and their families to the United States. In doing so, he can make it clear that we are willing to be flexible in meeting Vietnam's concerns. An agreement would be a significant achievement for the US and Vietnam and would be received very positively by the world community.

William Mathers

-- American citizen William Mathers was detained by Hanoi in July when his yacht entered Vietnamese territorial waters. He has not been tried, nor have we been notified of any formal charges. We would appreciate if if the Secretary General would urge the Vietnamese to release Mathers. He can be given the attached fact sheet.

THE WILLIAM M. MATHERS CASE

William M. Mathers, an American businessman who has been living in Singapore since 1970, was taken into custody by a Vietnamese maritime patrol boat on July 21, 1984 (the Vietnamese put the date as July 22) while sailing his yacht So Fong from Singapore to Hong Kong via Thailand. The Vietnamese have told us that he was violating their territorial waters. (The Vietnamese have drawn a base line around the islands off their coast and thus, though the So Fong was apparently in what we, and the larger international community, would consider international waters when apprehended, in Vietnam's view she was on the line separating their internal from their territorial waters.) Mr. Mathers has been held since then in the Mekong Delta city of Can Tho in Hau Giang Province. He has apparently been interrogated with a view to establishing that he was on an espionage mission, though the Vietnamese have told us only of the charge of violating their territorial waters. The other people on the yacht when it was apprehended were four French citizens (two women and two children) and a young Australian working as the So Fong's mechanic. The Vietnamese released the French citizens in September and the Australian on November 29. The former were not charged with any crime, though they did have to pay over \$2,000 for room and board. The latter was found guilty of entering Vietnam's territorial waters without authorization and taking photographs of a border area. He had to pay a \$5,000 fine and have his photographic equipment confiscated. Mr. Mathers is thus the only one of those aboard the So Fong remaining as a prisoner in Can Tho. His boat is moored in a side channel off the Bassac branch of the Mekong and in recent months he has apparently been kept aboard her.

Other than Mr. Mathers' nationality, the Vietnamese authorities seem concerned by the sophistication of the equipment aboard the So Fong and Mr. Mathers' service as an officer of the United States Navy in Vietnam, specializing in diving during the war. There is no reason, however, to doubt Mr. Mathers' bona fides. He left the Navy in 1970 and became a very successful businessman in Singapore, specializing in diving, salvage and marine construction. He also had the hobby of diving to many famous sunken ships, e.g., H.M.S. Repulse, and used the So Fong for his business and his hobby. In addition, he leased the yacht to others to help defray the maintenance costs. Both he and the So Fong are well known in Southeast Asia and have been mentioned in various publications. Mr. Mathers was making the voyage to Hong Kong (where the So Fong was built in 1937) to show the yacht to prospective buyers as he was liquidating his interests in Singapore with a view to returning to the United States.

The United States has, since July, been making representations on Mr. Mathers' behalf with the Vietnamese Embassy in Bangkok. These have included a demarche urging his release by Ambassador Dean. Thus far, however, the Vietnamese have told us only that he is accused of violating their territorial waters, that he is being held in Can Tho, that he is being well treated, and that he is in good health. In the last several months they have told us nothing at all. There has been no outside contact with Mr. Mathers since his arrest, though he was seen briefly from time to time by his shipmates from the So Pong when they were still prisoners. The Vietnamese have kept him in isolation. The Vietnamese have not transmitted any letters from him to his family and friends and we do not know if he has received any of the mail given to the Vietnamese to be passed to him. The Australian Embassy, on our behalf, has asked to visit him, but thus far they have not received permission to do so.

Mr. Mathers has now been held for almost six months with, as far as we are aware, no charges laid against him. He has been given no opportunity to communicate with his family or with his government. His parents, Mr. and Mrs. William H. Mathers, applied in November to the Vietnamese authorities for permission to enter Vietnam and to see their son. As of yet, they have received no reply from the Vietnamese. Mr. Mathers, senior, is connected with the law firm of Chadbourne, Park, Whiteside and Wolff in New York.

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ITINERARY

COMPOSITION OF PARTY

MALAYSIA

SINGAPORE

INDONESIA

CEYLON

TIME DIFFERENCES
FROM NEW YORK

MALAYSIA

1. Background

Area : Total of 329,750 square kilometers on Peninsular Malaysia, and Sarawak and Sabah in North Borneo.

Population : Mid-1983 estimates : 14,740,000
Majority Malays (48 per cent), Chinese (33 per cent), Indians (9 per cent), Borneo indigenes (9 per cent).
Kuala Lumpur, the capital, has approximately one million inhabitants.

Religion : Islam is the state religion, but minority groups include Hindus, Buddhists and Christians.

Government : A federal system of government under an elective constitutional monarchy. There are thirteen states, nine with hereditary rulers, from whose ranks one Sultan is elected King for a five-year period.

Head of State : H.M. the Yang di Pertuan Agong Tunku Mahmood Iskandar, (Sultan of Johore) elected on 26 April 1984, and enthroned on 15 November 1984.

Deputy Supreme Head of State : Raja Azlan Shah. (Sultan of Perak)

Prime Minister : Mr. Mahathir Mohamad - has been Prime Minister since 1981 and is the first holder of this post without royal connections.

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Home Affairs :
Datuk Musa Hitam

Minister of Foreign Affairs : Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen
(since July 1984)

2. Economic and Social Profile

Strong, although dependent on world markets. Malaysia is a major producer of five key commodities - tin, palm oil, rubber, timber, pepper - as well as an exporter of oil and gas products. Annual growth rate has been approximately 6 per cent in the recent past. The inflation rate is less than 5 per cent. The GNP per capita was \$ US 4,088 in 1982.

3. Development Assistance

The total amount of technical assistance Malaysia received in 1982 from external sources amounted to \$47 million. Bilateral donors including Australia, Federal Republic of Germany, Japan and UK were the largest sources of technical assistance contributing a total of \$35 million. The priority areas in which the donors provided assistance were: Natural Resources (24.3%), Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (20%), and Education (17.6%). The total amount of Capital assistance for Malaysia committed in 1982 was \$647 million. The principal financing came from Japan (\$203 million) followed by IBRD (\$177 million) and ADB (\$120 million) for assistance in the fields of Natural Resources, Transport and Communications, and Industry, etc. Assistance from the UN system in 1982 was predominantly provided by UNDP (\$6.6 million) with smaller amount of contribution by UNHCR (\$1.1 million), UNFPA (\$970,000), UNICEF (\$590,000), IAEA (\$448,000), WHO (\$395,000), FAO (\$270,000), UNIDO (\$123,000), and UNESCO (\$110,000).

4. The UNDP Programme

The total UNDP resources (IPF) available for programming by UNDP in 1982-1986 amount to \$8.3 million. The Government is however making cost-sharing contributions (begun under the Second Country Programme, 1977-81), and is expected to provide roughly a total of \$2 million under cost-sharing arrangements during 1982-86.

The Third Country Programme for Malaysia, 1982-86, takes into consideration the objectives of the Fourth Malaysia Plan (FMP) and therefore closely reflects national socio-economic development priorities. The Plan seeks to implement with greater vigour the Government's New Economic Policy through a two-pronged development strategy which aims at: eradicating poverty by raising income levels and increasing employment opportunities for all, irrespective of race; and (b) restructuring society so as to reduce the economic imbalances that exist among the various races and to eventually eliminate the identification of race with economic function. The FMP also emphasises balanced growth and the reduction of disparities among states and regions within the country.

In line with the Fourth Plan priorities, UNDP assistance gives emphasis to projects in the agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, manufacturing and services sectors as well as studies organized for implementation of the New Economic Policy. On the other hand the nature of the activities and inputs selected for UNDP assistance under the Third programme has been influenced by the need to focus on critical areas of policy and planning, research and human resources development which are crucial to Malaysia's development, and the relatively small size of UNDP financing. Under the Third Country Programme, the Government has decided to continue collaboration between UNDP and other multilateral development assistance organizations, such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.

5. Additional Relevant Facts and Considerations

Several UN organisations/Agencies including WHO, UNHCR, and UNFPA have their offices in Malaysia. The UNDP Regional Representative (Mr. U.U. Kim) is co-ordinating Agency inputs. There are 66 internationally recruited UN personnel serving in Malaysia.

MALAYSIA

Nationals of Malaysia on geographical and non-geographical posts with the United Nations and some other UN organs

1. There were 15 nationals of Malaysia on geographical posts at the United Nations Secretariat as of 30 November 1984, as compared with a desirable range for the country of 4-15. Malaysia is therefore within its desirable range.
2. In addition there were, as of 30 November 1984, 33 Malaysia nationals on non-geographic posts at the UN Secretariat, plus 39 employed by UNDP*, 3 by UNICEF, and 27 by UNCHR. The above-mentioned organizations therefore equals 117.
3. Attached is a table containing statistical data on Malaysia's representation in the United Nations Secretariat for the last 10 years, as of 30 June of each year, which is the end of the year for the purpose of reporting to the General Assembly. This table also indicates the most recent data available for 30 June 1984. Attached as well is a list of 117 nationals of this Member State within the UN Secretariat and other organizations. This list shows the names, level of posts encumbered, functional title and office and duty station where the staff members were employed as of 30 November 1984.

*The current information on the local staff of UNDP is unavailable at this time due to technical reasons and as a result, the data provided for some local staff members might be out of date. The data on the international staff, however, is reasonably up to date.

Division for Policy Co-ordination
Office of Personnel Services

STAFF MEMBERS WHO ARE NATIONALS OF
MALAYSIA
IN POSTS SUBJECT TO GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION
1975-1984*

	<u>USG</u>	<u>ASG</u>	<u>D-2</u>	<u>D-1</u>	<u>P-5</u>	<u>P-4</u>	<u>P-3</u>	<u>P-2</u>	<u>P-1</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Desi- rable range</u>	<u>Contri- bution</u>	<u>Weighted range</u>	<u>Weighte Staff Positio</u>
1975	-	-	-	-	1	4	5	-	-	10	2-7	0.07	59-168	225.8
1976	-	-	-	-	1	4	5	-	-	10	3-7	0.07	73-178	226
1977	-	-	-	1	-	6	3	-	-	10	4-9	0.09	108-258	295
1978	-	-	-	1	-	7	3	-	-	11	4-9	0.09	109-258	325
1979	-	-	-	1	-	8	3	-	1	13	4-9	0.09	109-258	369
1980	-	-	-	1	-	9	4	-	1	15	4-9	0.09	110-259	423
1981	-	-	-	1	2	9	1	1	-	14	4-15	0.09	145-584	552
1982	-	-	1	-	4	6	1	1	-	13	4-15	0.09	144-583	546
1983	-	-	1	-	5	7	-	2	-	15	4-15	0.09	143-583	626
1984	-	-	1	-	7	4	-	3	-	15	4-15	0.09	144-583	633

	<u>Staff at beginning of year</u>	<u>A P P O I N T M E N T S</u>			<u>S E P A R A T I O N S</u>			<u>Adjust- ments</u>		<u>Staff at end of year</u>
		<u>Career</u>	<u>Non- career</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Career</u>	<u>Non- career</u>	<u>Total</u>			
1975	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-1	10
1976	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10
1977	10	-	1	1	-	1	1	-	-	10
1978	10	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	11
1979	11	-	1	1	-	-	-	+1	-	13
1980	13	1	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	15
1981	15	-	1	1	2	-	2	-	-	14
1982	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-1	13
1983	13	-	1	1	-	-	-	+1	-	15
1984	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	+1	-1	15

*As of 30 June 1984

MALAYSIA
STATUS OF ASSESSED AND VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS
AS OF 10 JANUARY 1985
(in US dollars)

Name of Fund	Outstanding Contributions for 1983 and prior years	1984		1985	
		Assessment or Pledge	Payment	Assessment or Pledge	Payment
A. ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS - Rate of Assessment		0.09%		0.09%	
Regular Budget		584,717	584,717	575,003	-
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) up to 31/5/85		6,220	6,220	3,168	-
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) up to 18/4/85		<u>25,014</u>	<u>25,014</u>	<u>12,501</u>	<u>-</u>
SUB-TOTAL		<u>615,951</u>	<u>615,951</u>	<u>590,672</u>	<u>-</u>
B. VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS					
Voluntary Fund for the United Nations Decade for Women	2,000	5,000	5,000	-	-
United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa	-	1,000	1,000	-	-
United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa	-	1,000	1,000	-	-
Trust Fund for Publicity against Apartheid	-	500	500	-	-
Kampuchean Emergency Trust Fund	-	33,788	33,788	-	-
United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control	-	-	-	8,500	-
SUB-TOTAL	<u>2,000</u>	<u>41,288</u>	<u>41,288</u>	<u>8,500</u>	<u>-</u>
TOTAL	<u>2,000</u>	<u>657,239</u>	<u>657,239</u>	<u>599,172</u>	<u>-</u>

NOTE ON PROFESSOR UNGKU AZIZ OF MALAYSIA

1. By its resolution 39/99 K of 14 December 1984, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to continue to take all necessary measures for establishing the University of Jerusalem "Al Quds". Essentially the task entrusted to the Secretary-General involves the preparation of a feasibility study. In the past, in response to similar requests, the Secretary-General had designated experts to prepare such a study but the experts had not been able to do so because Israel had refused to co-operate and to let them visit Jerusalem.
2. In pursuance of the above resolution, the Secretary-General requested the Rector of the United Nations University, Dr. Soedjatmoko, to designate an expert to prepare the feasibility study. In this connection, he made clear that the expert would be required to undertake the task only if Israel should reconsider its position and agree to co-operate with the United Nations.
3. On 10 January 1984, the Rector informed the Secretary-General that Professor Ungku Aziz, member of the Council of the United Nations University, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur and Royal professor of economics, would be the UNU expert to assist the UN in the preparation of the feasibility study. The Rector indicated that Professor Aziz had obtained the consent of the Prime Minister of Malaysia for this purpose and suggested that the Secretary-General might meet with Professor Aziz during his visit to Kuala Lumpur.
4. If the Secretary-General should meet with Professor Aziz in Kuala Lumpur, the following points may be mentioned:
 - (a) The Secretary-General may wish to express appreciation for Professor's Aziz's willingness to assist the United Nations in the preparation of the proposed feasibility study, particularly in view of the professor's outstanding achievements and past services with the UN.

- (b) A sine qua non condition for the preparation of the feasibility study is for the experts to visit Jerusalem and discuss with the Israeli Government, which is in control of the area, various aspects relating to the establishment of the proposed university. The Secretary-General will approach the Government of Israel and request it to co-operate with the experts and, in particular, to give them free access to Jerusalem and the West Bank.
- (c) When the necessary clearance is obtained, the Secretary-General will inform Professor Aziz and make arrangements for him to visit New York and Jerusalem.
- (d) The Secretary-General attaches great importance to the question of the University of Jerusalem and will exert all possible efforts to persuade the Government of Israel to co-operate in this connection. However, it must be borne in mind that in light of past experience and in view of the present political situation, Israel may continue to refuse to co-operate with the United Nations in this matter.

Position of Malaysia on Disarmament Issues

General: Its membership in the ASEAN and concerns specific to that region are reflected in Malaysian position on disarmament matters. Considering itself as a country with low military expenditure and facing problems of socio-economic development, Malaysia firmly supports the non-aligned position on the relationship between disarmament and development. Its otherwise low-key profile in disarmament has been marked by a strong support of ASEAN initiative on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South East Asia.

Nuclear arms race and related matters: As a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, Malaysia shares the emphasis on the primacy of nuclear disarmament including the need for meaningful measures to prevent a nuclear war. At the 39th session of the General Assembly, it drew attention to the support given by the ASEAN to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South East Asia.

Militarization of outer space: Malaysia views advances in military technology as far outstepping the process of disarmament negotiations and regards the militarization of outer space as a threat to international security.

Initiative on Antarctica: Malaysia has proposed the creation of a United Nations Committee on Antarctica so as to deal with several aspects of the disarmament, security and environmental issues including those of the mineral resources.

ITINERARY

COMPOSITION OF PARTY

CONTENTS

SINGAPORE

INDONESIA PROGRAM

18 January 1985

SINGAPORE

1. Background

Area: 617.8 square kilometers

Population : estimated at 1982 to be 2,488,400. 76 percent are of Chinese origin; 14 percent Malays, 6.4 percent Indian and 2.2 percent other ethnic groups. There are four official languages - Chinese (Mandarin), Malay, Tamil and English, which is the principal means of communication.

Religion : Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism are practised among the Chinese to varying degrees. 17 percent are Moslem, some Hindus, and Christians estimated at 9 percent.

Gouvernement : A Parliamentary form of Government with the President as Titular Head of State.

President: C.V. Devan Nair

Prime Minister : Lee Kwan Yew. He has headed the Government and the People's Action Party (PAP) since 1959. The PAP was until 1981 the only party represented in Parliament. Following the December 1984 elections, 2 opposition party members were elected to the 79 - seat Parliament.

Minister for Foreign Affairs and Community Development: Suppiah Dhanabalan.

2. Economy

Based on a successful programme of promoting industrial investment and providing financial and technical services, thereby giving Singapore an economic importance in the region out of proportion to its size. Has successfully phased out labour intensive industries in favour of advanced technology. It is one of the world's largest off-shore banking centers, is the second largest port in the world, and the third largest oil-refining centre. Unemployment is virtually nil and the inflation rate 3 percent. Real growth for 1984 is expected to be 9%. The GNP per capita is US\$6,000, the 27th highest in the world and the highest in the region.

SINGAPORE

Nationals of Singapore on geographical and non-geographical posts with the United Nations and some other UN organs

1. There were 12 nationals of Singapore on geographical posts at the United Nations Secretariat as of 30 November 1984, as compared with a desirable range for the country of 4-15. Singapore is therefore within its desirable range.
2. In addition there were, as of 30 November 1984, 6 Singapore nationals on non-geographical posts at the UN Secretariat, plus 3 employed by UNDP*, 1 by UNICEF, and 6 by UNCHR. The above-mentioned organizations therefore equals 28.
3. Attached is a table containing statistical data on Singapore's representation in the United Nations Secretariat for the last 10 years, as of 30 June of each year, which is the end of the year for the purpose of reporting to the General Assembly. This table also indicates the most recent data available for 30 June 1984. Attached as well is a list of 28 nationals of this Member State within the UN Secretariat and other organizations. This list shows the names, level of posts encumbered, functional title and office and duty station where the staff members were employed as of 30 November 1984.

*The current information on the local staff of UNDP is unavailable at this time due to technical reasons and as a result, the data provided for some local staff members might be out of date. The data on the international staff, however, is reasonably up to date.

Division for Policy Co-ordination
Office of Personnel Services

STAFF MEMBERS WHO ARE NATIONALS OF
SINGAPORE
POSTS SUBJECT TO GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION
1975-1984*

	<u>USG</u>	<u>ASG</u>	<u>D-2</u>	<u>D-1</u>	<u>P-5</u>	<u>P-4</u>	<u>P-3</u>	<u>P-2</u>	<u>P-1</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Desi- rable range</u>	<u>Contri- bution</u>	<u>Weighted range</u>	<u>Weighted Staff Position</u>
1975	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	3	2-7	0.04	44-158	47.5
1976	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	-	3	2-7	0.04	67-174	51
1977	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	3	-	6	3-8	0.08	103-253	135
1978	-	-	-	-	-	1	3	3	-	7	3-8	0.08	103-253	159
1979	-	-	-	-	-	1	4	2	-	7	3-8	0.08	103-253	164
1980	-	-	-	-	-	2	7	2	-	11	3-8	0.08	104-254	265
1981	-	-	-	-	-	2	8	3	1	14	4-15	0.08	137-577	411
1982	-	-	-	-	1	3	7	2	1	14	4-15	0.08	137-576	443
1983	-	-	-	-	1	4	5	3	-	13	4-15	0.09	143-583	427
1984	-	-	-	-	1	4	5	2	-	12	4-15	0.09	144-583	402

	<u>Staff at beginning of year</u>	<u>A P P O I N T M E N T S</u>			<u>S E P A R A T I O N S</u>			<u>Adjust- ments</u>		<u>Staff at end of year</u>
		<u>Career</u>	<u>Non- career</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Career</u>	<u>Non- career</u>	<u>Total</u>			
1975	4	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	3
1976	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
1977	3	2	1	3	-	-	-	-	-	6
1978	6	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	7
1979	7	-	2	2	2	-	2	-	-	7
1980	7	-	4	4	-	-	-	-	-	11
1981	11	-	4	4	-	1	1	-	-	14
1982	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14
1983	14	-	1	1	-	2	2	-	-	13
1984	13	-	-	-	-	2	2	+1	-	12

*As of 30 June 1984

SINGAPORE
STATUS OF ASSESSED AND VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS
AS OF 10 JANUARY 1985
(in US dollars)

Name of Fund	1984		1985	
	Assessment or Pledge	Payment	Assessment or Pledge	Payment
A. ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS - Rate of Assessment	0.09%		0.09%	
Regular Budget	584,717	584,717	592,329	-
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) up to 31/5/85	6,220	6,220	3,168	-
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) up to 18/4/85	<u>25,014</u>	<u>25,014</u>	<u>12,501</u>	-
SUB-TOTAL	<u>615,951</u>	<u>615,951</u>	<u>607,998</u>	-
B. VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS				
Kampuchean Emergency Trust Fund	<u>20,000</u>	<u>20,000</u>	-	-
SUB-TOTAL	<u>20,000</u>	<u>20,000</u>	-	-
TOTAL	<u>635,951</u>	<u>635,951</u>	<u>607,998</u>	-



TO: The Secretary-General
A:

DATE: 16 January 1985

REFERENCE: _____

THROUGH:
S/C DE:

FROM: Patricio Ruedas *Patricio Ruedas*
DE: Under-Secretary-General
for Administration and Management

SUBJECT: Singapore
OBJET:

1. In my memorandum of 11 January I had transmitted to you data regarding the financial contribution and personnel representation of the countries you are going to visit shortly. I am now enclosing an analysis relating to the contribution of Singapore.

2. This is a special and important case. On 4 January 1985, the Permanent Representative sent you a note verbale, attached, conveying the statement of his Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the decision by Singapore to leave UNESCO. It is said in that statement, notably, that Singapore has decided to withdraw from UNESCO "because it has become a victim of an unfair system of assessment for contributions to the United Nations regular budget", which also determines their contributions to UNESCO. It is also said that "If this adverse trend continues, Singapore may have to reassess its membership in some of the other international organizations as well".

3. The enclosed analysis contains detailed material on the Singapore contribution. Basically the situation can be summarized thus, (a) Singapore's contribution has increased from 0.04 per cent in 1966 to 0.09 per cent in 1985, i.e. by 125 per cent; the figure of 400 per cent mentioned in the Foreign Office statement apparently reflects also the growth in the budget itself - a factor which affects equally all Member States; (b) the main reason for this increase is the rapid rise in per capita income in Singapore; (c) it is true that the assessment rates of Socialist countries have generally decreased and that of the United States has maintained the level of 25%, but the lag has been taken up, not only by the newly industrialized developing countries such as Singapore or Brazil, but to a much larger extent by the developed Member States; and (d), all of the factors mentioned in the Foreign Office statement have been and are the subject of lengthy debate and consideration in the Committee on Contributions and in the Fifth Committee, - debate and consideration which have led finally to resolutions of the General Assembly binding on all parties.

4. There is, of course, one overriding consideration. This is, to my knowledge, the first case of a withdrawal on strictly financial grounds. It places in stark relief the danger of a collapse of the system of universality, which would be replaced by one of national cost-benefit analyses - something like an international supermarket in which customers would be free to buy or not to buy.

ANALYSIS OF THE STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
IN SINGAPORE ON THE DECISION BY SINGAPORE TO LEAVE UNESCO

(Note No. 1/85 dated 4 January 1985 from the
Permanent Representative of Singapore)

Statement

"Singapore has decided to withdraw from UNESCO because it has become a victim of an unfair system of assessment for contributions to the United Nations regular budget, which also determines Singapore's assessed contribution to UNESCO, a United Nations specialized agency." (para. 1)

Comment

It is rare to find a Member State that admits openly that its rate of assessment represents a fair and equitable share of the expenses. Similarly, no individual taxpayer ever considers himself to be fairly
... taxed. The attached article on "The Opulence of Singapore" published in the New York Times Magazine on 16 December 1984 describes what has enabled Singapore, an island state, to make the leap from underdevelopment to "high tech" in less than 20 years. According to the article, "a Singaporean's per capita share of the gross national product is more than \$6,500 a year, Asia's highest standard of living after Japan. Many Singaporeans enjoy a style of living that rivals the West".

Statement

"In apportioning the burden of relief, no distinction is made between developed and developing countries." (last sentence of para. 2)

Comment

That is true because for purposes of "granting relief" and "sharing the relief burden", Member States are divided into two groups: (a) Member States with per capita income below the limit, which is currently \$2,100,

are granted relief or deduction from their national income to arrive at their assessable income; (b) Member States with per capita income above the limit share in the relief burden; their assessable income is therefore equal to their national income plus their share in the relief burden. The dividing line is per capita income limit, which is an economic criterion. The Group of 77 has proposed in its draft resolution (A/C.5/39/L.18) that "the redistribution of the burden of relief shall not fall on developing countries". This is of particular importance to the middle-income developing countries. Since Singapore's average per capita income is above the per capita income limit used in the relief formula, it has consequently shared in the relief burden.

Statement

"The methodology used to determine the United Nations Scale of Assessment is unfair and does not truly reflect the country's real capacity to pay. The use of national statistics at market prices to assess Member States' real capacity to pay is a major defect. It does not provide a uniform measure to compare the economic performance of both market and centrally-planned economies. There is no mechanism to correct for distortion to statistics, provided by the statistical bureaux of socialist economies, caused by inflation and exchange rate fluctuations." (para. 3)

Comment

The Committee on Contributions has recognized the shortcomings associated with the use of national income estimates at the market prices and converted into US dollars as a measure of capacity to pay of Member States. It has studied various ways of improving on that measurement. As early as 1969, the Committee on Contributions reported to the General Assembly at its twenty-fourth session as follows:

"Traditionally, the Committee has based its calculations on a measure of national output data expressed in current prices converted into United States dollars but has taken account of price changes wherever they were found to have had a noticeable effect on the level of assessment. The Committee recognized that the choice between using current or constant prices was not important when changes in a country's exchange rate were in line with changes in its price level. The Committee also recognized that the need for special attention in its work arose where changes in price levels were not proportionately reflected in exchange rates, either for the whole or part of the period under review.

"At the same time, the Committee considered that there were serious difficulties involved in the use of constant prices instead of current prices. These difficulties include: (a) non-availability of constant price data for the economies of many Member States; (b) the possibility that the rate of conversion applied to the base period might by itself be undervalued or overvalued; and (c) imperfections in prices indexes."

Since then, it reviewed regularly various methods to take into account the impact of varying rates of inflation and exchange rates on the comparability of national income statistics expressed in US dollars. In its latest report to the General Assembly (A/39/11), the Committee on Contributions studied the possibility of using "pseudo exchange rates" which are now described as price-adjusted exchange rates (PARE) and purchasing power parities (PPP). As on previous occasions, the Committee concluded that the PARE conversion can only be used to adjust exchange rates for changes in prices from one period to the other but does not adjust for discrepancies in the base period. On the other hand, the PPP conversion was deemed impractical at this stage because of lack of benchmark data for a large number of Member States.

Statement

"The economies of the socialist countries have enjoyed high economic growth rates in recent years but these countries are having their scale of assessment reduced in the next United Nations budget triennium (1986-88). By contrast, developing countries which have enjoyed similar economic growth have had their scale of assessment increased. In the

next budget triennium (1986-88), the United States contribution will remain fixed at 25% of the total United Nations budget. The scale of assessment of most socialist bloc countries will be stagnant or decline, and the contributions of most western countries will also remain stagnant or decline. However, Singapore and many other developing countries will have their assessed contributions increased." (para. 4)

Comment

Similar comments were raised by some members of the Committee on Contributions and were reflected in para. 32 of the Committee's report (A/39/11) as follows:

"Attention was drawn by some members to the fact that, while the rates of economic growth of CMEA countries as a whole, as published in United Nations documents, showed a higher increase than those of OECD countries as a whole, the former's United Nations rates of assessment were on a downward trend and vice versa. Some other members emphasized that the rates of economic growth of CMEA countries, as published in the United Nations documents, were based on data on national income in constant prices and in national currency of each country, whereas the scale of assessments which should reflect the Member States' relative capacity to pay was based on national income data expressed in current market prices and in United States dollars. Consequently, there could be no direct relationship between the rates of economic growth published for CMEA countries and the trend of their rates of assessment. Yet, other members believed that the issue had not been sufficiently studied to reach any conclusion at that time."

Statement

"Singapore's assessed contribution to the United Nations Regular Budget increased by 100% in the first decade of Singapore's membership in the United Nations. From 1976 to 1984, Singapore's contribution increased by

more than 400%. Singapore's assessed contributions to United Nations Specialised Agencies, such as UNESCO, have also risen sharply along with this trend." (second half of para. 5)

Comment

If contribution here means contribution in US dollars, then part of the increase reflects increases in the budget of the United Nations. The rate of assessment of Singapore was 0.04 per cent in 1966-1967, 0.05 per cent in 1968-1973; then it dropped down to 0.04 per cent in 1974-1976, increased to 0.08 per cent in 1977-1982 and is now 0.09 per cent. The actual increase in rate of assessment is therefore 125 per cent between 1966 and 1983.

The following table might explain Singapore's concern regarding the next scale of assessments:

	Official Scale 1983-1985 %	(Average 1973-1982)		Projected Scale for 1986-1988 %
		National income (million US dollars)	Per Capita income (US dollars)	
Cuba	0.09	12 680	1 322	0.12
Malaysia	0.09	14 602	1 145	0.12
Philippines	0.09	22 284	493	0.10
Singapore	0.09	7 051	3 013	0.11

Singapore's contributions to the United Nations Regular Budget in recent years are as follows:

1985	\$ 592 329
1984	584 717
1983	529 514
1982	483 459
1981	457 023
1980	409 646



Cable: SINGAWAKIL NEWYORK

Our Ref:

Your Ref: Note No.1/85

PERMANENT MISSION OF SINGAPORE
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

TWO UNITED NATIONS PLAZA, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017

The Permanent Representative of Singapore to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to convey, for information, a statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Singapore on the decision by Singapore to leave the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO):

"Singapore is withdrawing from UNESCO not because of the criticisms of UNESCO made by the United States and the United Kingdom. Singapore believes that UNESCO has a useful role to play in many countries although Singapore has been inactive in UNESCO for many years. As a small developing country, Singapore must set priorities and practise economy in its participation in international organisations to ensure that its efforts and resources are best used to serve the interests of the nation. For this reason, Singapore is not a member of many Specialised Agencies of the United Nations. Singapore has decided to withdraw from UNESCO because it has become a victim of an unfair system of assessment for contributions to the

United Nations regular budget, which also determines Singapore's assessed contribution to UNESCO, a United Nations Specialised Agency.

The United Nations Scale of Assessment is calculated on the basis of the average national income of a member State over a ten-year base period. Countries with per capita incomes below US\$2,100 are given relief in their assessed contributions. The burden of relief is absorbed by all countries with per capita incomes above US\$2,100 in accordance with their assessable national income. In apportioning the burden of relief, no distinction is made between developed and developing countries.

The methodology used to determine the United Nations Scale of Assessment is unfair and does not truly reflect the country's real capacity to pay. The use of national statistics at market prices to assess member States' real capacity to pay is a major defect. It does not provide a uniform measure to compare the economic performance of both market and centrally-planned economies. There is no mechanism to correct for distortion to statistics, provided by the

statistical bureaux of socialist economies, caused by inflation and exchange rate fluctuations.

The economies of the socialist countries have enjoyed high economic growth rates in recent years but these countries are having their scale of assessment reduced in the next United Nations budget triennium (1986-88). By contrast, developing countries which have enjoyed similar economic growth have had their scale of assessment increased. In the next budget triennium (1986-88), the United States contribution will remain fixed at 25% of the total United Nations budget. The scale of assessment of most socialist bloc countries will be stagnant or decline, and the contributions of most western countries will also remain stagnant or decline. However, Singapore and many other developing countries will have their assessed contributions increased.

Singapore, as a small country with no natural resources, is vulnerable to the vagaries of the international economic environment. It is still in the process of development with a vast proportion of the national budget devoted to education and to building up

the infrastructure of the country. Its economy has not achieved the ability to generate the self-sustaining growth found in the industrialised countries.

" Singapore's assessed contribution to the United Nations Regular Budget increased by 100% in the first decade of Singapore's membership in the United Nations. From 1976 to 1984, Singapore's contribution increased by more than 400%. Singapore's assessed contributions to United Nations Specialised Agencies, such as UNESCO, have also risen sharply along with this trend.

For the moment, there is little hope of a more equitable methodology emerging in the foreseeable future to determine members States' real capacity to pay. Singapore, however, cannot let such a situation continue indefinitely. Under these circumstances, Singapore has decided to withdraw from UNESCO. If this adverse trend continues, Singapore may have to reassess its membership in some of the other international organisations as well."

The Permanent Representative of Singapore to the United Nations avails himself of this opportunity

to renew to the Secretary-General of the United Nations
the assurances of his highest consideration.

NEW YORK

4 January 1985



ITINERARY

COMPOSITION OF PARTY

CONTACT

INDONESIA

PROGRAMME

INDONESIA

1. Background

- Area : 1,904,569 square kilometers (excluding East Timor).
- Population : 157,881,000 by mid-1983 estimates.
Mostly comprised of Malay stock, 3 1/2-4 million ethnic Chinese. The fifth most populous country in the world. Jakarta's population is estimated to be approximately 7 million.
- Religion : More than 90 per cent profess Islam (the largest Moslem population in the world), the remainder being Christians, Hindus and Buddhists.
- Government : There is a strong executive presidency. The People's Advisory council, the highest state organ, elects the President and Vice-President. There is a state ideology of "Pancasila", the five guiding principles of monotheism, humanitarianism, national unity, democracy by consensus and social justice.
- Head of State : President Suharto, since 27 March 1968
- Vice-President : General Umar Wirhadikusumah
- Minister of Foreign Affairs :
Prof. Dr. Mochtar Kusumaatmadja.

2. Economic and Social Profile

Sixty per cent of government revenue is derived from oil taxes, and 70 per cent of export earnings came from oil products in 1983. Indonesia is the principal oil producer in the Far East and its economy has shown growth largely because of its oil products and favourable world market prices for rubber, timber and tin. Agriculture employs 60 per cent of the workforce and provides one-third of the GDP. The main export products in this sector are : rubber, timber, sugar, coffee, and tea. Other crops, such as rice, corn and root vegetables are grown for domestic consumption. The GNP per capita was US \$520 in 1982, which is relatively modest considering that Indonesia is rich in such resources as petroleum, natural gas, minerals and timber.

The deterioration of the international economy, which began in 1980, has affected Indonesia through the dramatic fall of demand and prices both for the traditional, primary agricultural export commodities and the dominant revenue earner, oil and natural gas liquids. Facing severe constraints on foreign exchange and budgetary resources, the Government in 1983 started to launch a series of far-reaching measures designed both to achieve a rapid correction in the balance of payments and to lay the basis for long-term structural adjustments. The principal measures taken included a 28 percent devaluation, a major rephasing of the public sector investment programme and a substantial financial reform. The success in the Government's short-term economic management and adjustment combined with increased oil output is expected to lead to a recovery in GDP growth in 1984 to around 5.0 percent compared to zero growth in 1982. The balance of payments for 1983/84 showed remarkable improvements with the current account deficit estimated to have been reduced by \$2.6 billion to \$4.2 billion. Indonesian development planning objectives call for a "take off" of the economy in the 1990's.

3. Development Assistance

Indonesia has been receiving externally financed assistance for many years in the past. The total amount of technical assistance committed for Indonesia by multi-bilateral donors in 1982 was around \$270 million. Major bilateral donors are USA, Australia, The Netherlands, Japan, and UK, while UNDP (\$18.4 million) and UNICEF (\$13 million) are the largest sources of technical assistance among the multilateral donors. Other sources of assistance from the UN System are UNHCR (\$6.5 m), UNFPA (\$2.4 million), WHO (\$4.9m), and FAO (\$2.2m). (Figures in brackets are those of 1982).

4. The UNDP Programme

The total resources available for programming during the Third Country Programme amount to \$83 million. This includes \$33.5 million in the Government cost-sharing contribution (Joint Programme Funding), an innovative mechanism designed to maximise technology transfers to Indonesia through UNDP programmes.

Areas of concentration in the UNDP Third Country Programme are: agriculture and irrigation, medium and small scale industries; regional, urban and rural development; rural infrastructure; science and technology; social services; and trade and export promotion.

5. Additional Relevant Facts and Considerations

Several UN organizations/Agencies have their offices in Jakarta: UNICEF, ILO, WHO, FAO, and UNHCR have each a country representative; UNESCO: a Regional Director for Science and Technology for South-East Asia; IBRD: a Director, and IMF: a Resident Representative. The UNDP Resident Representative (Mr. Gamil Hamdy) is co-ordinating Agency inputs. There are 270 internationally recruited UN personnel serving in Indonesia.

ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) has its Headquarters in Jakarta.

6. Additional suggestion by UNDP for the Secretary-General

Special issues relating to UNDP operations in Indonesia

The Secretary-General may wish to note that the UNDP Resident Representative/Resident Coordinator (Mr. Gamil Hamdy) has taken special pride in a decision of the Government to cost-share with the UNDP so as to expand the resources for the technical cooperation in Indonesia. This was formalized in the Memorandum of Understanding of the Joint Programme Funding which was signed in Jakarta on 4 October 1982. Under this arrangement, the Government has so far committed \$33.5 million to UNDP. This financing arrangement is unique to UNDP and reflects Government's particular interest in UNDP technical cooperation activities.

In the light of the above, should the Secretary-General so desire, he may wish to commend the Government for its special contribution (Joint Programme Funding) to the Country Programme and for the trust it has shown in the ability of the UN and UNDP system to assist Indonesia in carrying out various development activities. He may point out that UNDP will do its best to ensure that the quality of its inputs will be at a level commensurate with the expectations of the Government.

INDONESIA IA

Nationals of Indonesia on geographical and non-geographical posts with the United Nations and some other UN organs

1. There were 9 nationals of Indonesia on geographical posts at the United Nations Secretariat as of 30 November 1984, as compared with a desirable range for the country of 4-16. Indonesia is therefore within its desirable range.
2. In addition there were, as of 30 November 1984, 45 Indonesia nationals on non-geographic posts at the UN Secretariat, plus 83 employed by UNDP*, 81 by UNICEF, 14 by UNCHR, 1 by UNRWA, and 2 by UNU. The above-mentioned organizations therefore equals 235.
3. Attached is a table containing statistical data on Indonesia's representation in the United Nations Secretariat for the last 10 years, as of 30 June of each year, which is the end of the year for the purpose of reporting to the General Assembly. This table also indicates the most recent data available for 30 June 1984. Attached as well is a list of 235 nationals of this Member State within the UN Secretariat and other organizations. This list shows the names, level of posts encumbered, functional title and office and duty station where the staff members were employed as of 30 November 1984.

*The current information on the local staff of UNDP is unavailable at this time due to technical reasons and as a result, the data provided for some local staff members might be out of date. The data on the international staff, however, is reasonably up to date.

Division for Policy Co-ordination
Office of Personnel Services

STAFF MEMBERS WHO ARE NATIONALS OF
INDONESIA
IN POSTS SUBJECT TO GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION
1975-1984*

	<u>USG</u>	<u>ASG</u>	<u>D-2</u>	<u>D-1</u>	<u>P-5</u>	<u>P-4</u>	<u>P-3</u>	<u>P-2</u>	<u>P-1</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Desi- rable range</u>	<u>Contri- bution</u>	<u>Weighted range</u>	<u>Weighted Staff Position</u>
1975	-	1	-	-	2	2	5	3	1	14	5-9	0.19	118-208	380.2
1976	-	1	-	2	3	8	1	1	-	16	5-9	0.19	100-196	444
1977	-	1	-	2	4	9	-	-	-	16	5-10	0.14	136-285	577
1978	1	-	-	2	5	9	-	-	-	17	5-10	0.14	136-286	624
1979	1	-	-	1	6	6	-	-	-	14	4-9	0.14	136-285	529
1980	1	-	-	2	6	6	-	-	-	15	5-10	0.16	149-298	572
1981	-	-	-	2	6	5	-	-	-	13	5-17	0.16	199-638	595
1982	-	-	1	1	3	5	1	-	-	11	5-17	0.16	197-636	491
1983	-	-	1	1	2	5	1	-	-	10	4-16	0.13	173-613	442
1984	-	-	1	2	2	4	1	-	-	10	4-16	0.13	174-613	460

	<u>Staff at beginning of year</u>	<u>A P P O I N T M E N T S</u>			<u>S E P A R A T I O N S</u>			<u>Adjust- ments</u>		<u>Staff at end of year</u>
		<u>Career</u>	<u>Non- career</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Career</u>	<u>Non- career</u>	<u>Total</u>			
1975	16	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-1	14
1976	14	1	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	16
1977	16	-	-	-	1	-	1	+1	-	16
1978	16	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	17
1979	17	-	-	-	-	2	2	-	-1	14
1980	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	+1	-	15
1981	15	-	-	-	-	2	2	-	-	13
1982	13	-	1	1	2	1	3	-	-	11
1983	11	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	10
1984	10	-	1	1	-	1	1	-	-	10

*As of 30 June 1984

INDONESIA
STATUS OF ASSESSED AND VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS
AS OF 10 JANUARY 1985
(in US dollars)

Name of Fund	1984		1985	
	Assessment or Pledge	Payment	Assessment or Pledge	Payment
A. ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS - Rate of Assessment	0.13%		0.13%	
Regular Budget	844,591	844,591	845,395	-
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) up to 31/5/85	17,074	17,074	4,576	-
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) up to 18/4/85	18,067	-	18,057	-
SUB-TOTAL	879,732	861,665	868,028	-
B. VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS				
Voluntary Fund for the United Nations Decade for Women	3,000	3,000	3,000	-
United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa	3,000	3,000	-	-
United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa	3,000	3,000	-	-
Trust Fund for the World Disarmament Campaign	5,000	5,000	5,000	-
United Nations Fund for Namibia	4,000	4,000	-	-
International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women	5,000	5,000	-	-
Trust Fund for the International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa	20,000	20,000	-	-
Kampuchean Emergency Trust Fund	10,000	10,000	-	-
United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control	2,000	2,000	2,000	-
SUB-TOTAL	55,000	55,000	10,000	-
TOTAL	934,732	916,665	878,028	-

Position of Indonesia on Disarmament Issues

General: As a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, Indonesia is one of the more active members of the ASEAN in its initiatives on disarmament issues. This, in part, can be attributed to the fact that Indonesia is one of the original members of the Non-aligned Movement wherein President Sukarno played a very active role during the Bandung Conference of 1955. Its position on issues divided on East-West lines is generally one of greater equidistance as compared to Viet Nam which votes closer to the Socialist and Thailand which often endorses Western lines particularly on issues like the need for verification and compliance on bilateral disarmament negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Nuclear arms race and related issues: Problems related to the nuclear arms race dominate Indonesian position on disarmament. At the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament, Indonesia proposed a 50 per cent reduction on the existing nuclear stockpiles. It actively supports initiatives to establish the security guarantees to non-nuclear States. As party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Indonesia is among those non-aligned States which emphasize the need of implementing Article VI of that Treaty and thereby putting a halt to vertical proliferation. Stressing that the implementation of NPT has put an unequal emphasis on the horizontal as compared to the equally important aspect of vertical proliferation, Indonesia wants the forthcoming Review Conference to consider ways of rectifying this situation.

This nuclear capability of South Africa has been criticized by Indonesia as constituting an inherently dangerous development in the area of nuclear proliferation.

Conventional arms race: Indonesia has repeatedly called upon arms producing countries to co-operate in reversing the conventional arms trade.

United Nations machinery on disarmament: At the 39th session of the General Assembly, Indonesia expressed dissatisfaction with the pace of progress in the multilateral fora for negotiating disarmament. It welcomed the United Nations initiative to study all aspects of the naval arms race. The Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations in New York, Ambassador A. Atala is the Chairman of the Expert Group assisting the Secretary-General to carry out a study on the naval arms race.

Talking Points for the Secretary-General

Bali

Background

Bali is an island province of Indonesia located to the east of Java with an area of 2,147 square miles. It consists of eight districts each administered by a Council which is usually headed by a radja or local ruler. The terrain is mountainous including the majestic Bali peak which is volcanic.

The people are of Hindu-Javanese culture who have preserved their cultural and religious identity even after the advent of Islam in Indonesia in the sixteenth century. Bali has become renowned as a treasure house of the old Indonesian culture, for its handsome people and for its natural beauty. The people are deeply imbued with their culture, fond of music, poetry, dancing and festivals and have extra-ordinary skills manifested in their fine arts and crafts.

Balinese life centres upon religion : Hinduism, more specially Shivaism fused with Budhism, Malay ancestor cults and other animistic and magical beliefs and practices. As a result of a caste system, there is an elaborate ettiquette concerning rank, including different modes of speech.

Balinese art and music are rich and vigorous. Each village has its own "gamelon" club which stages plays based on ancient Hindu epics.

Balinese economy is agricultural with its farmers among the most skillful in Indonesia. Tourism has gained increasing importance in recent years.

Talking Points

You may wish to express your profound appreciation for the rich cultural treasure of Bali and for the remarkable artistic genius of its people which has made them famous throughout the world. On a lighter note, you may add how much you had been able to relax after a long and tiring journey and a heavy schedule of work in this captivating and beautiful Shangrila of South East Asia.

NOTE ON BOROBUDUR/YOGYAKARTA

-The city of Yogyakarta has a special historical significance for Indonesia. After president Sukarno and vice president Hatta proclaimed Indonesia's independence on 17 August 1945 in Jakarta, the allied troops and the returning Dutch harassed the new republican government and on January 4, 1946, Sukarno evacuated the entire government by train to Yogyakarta, which was free from Dutch influence. It remained the capital of Indonesia until 1950 when the UN sponsored transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch to Indonesia was effected and Jakarta became the permanent capital of the republic. Yogyakarta or Yogya therefore symbolized Indonesia's independence during those years when the republican government in Yogyakarta had no typewriters, stationary, no medicines and the only radio equipment was of 1935 vintage. As the Dutch blockaded all ports, the only way to obtain supplies was through smuggling. The struggle for independence was carried out from this city. Thus, until today, Yogyakarta is more nationalistic and relatively less westernized than Jakarta or other major cities of Indonesia.

--Wisma negara. literally, state house. It is the official state guesthouse where the secretary general's party will stay. During the revolutionary period, this was the official residence of president Sukarno. Thus, although there are international style hotels in Yogyakarta, a stay at this guesthouse is considered an honour accorded only to the highest VIP guests.

--Sri Paku Alam will be the host of the secretary general and his party. Although his official title is vice governor of the special region of Yogyakarta, (daerah istimewa Yogyakarta), he is the de facto governor. This is because the nominal governor, Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwono, former vice president of Indonesia (before Adam Malik), resides most of the time in Jakarta and is a prominent statesman. During pre world war II days, both the Sri Sultan and the Sri Paku Alam were princes governing over the sultanate of Yogyakarta and the Paku alam principedom respectively. Together with the neighbouring Susuhunan principedom of Surakarta, these were autonomous states under the "protection" of the Dutch, as distinct from the regencies and provinces of the rest of Java.

--Yogya is also known as the cradle of Javanese arts and culture. The Javanese, speaking the Javanese language, inhabit central and east Java. The Sundanese, speaking the Sundanese language, inhabit West Java. The Balinese speak yet another language. There are over 30 major languages and 250 dialects in Indonesia. However, all educated people speak the national language, bahasa Indonesia. Yogya is famous for its "batik" making and silver smithery. The gamelan, typical

Javanese classical music accompanies the classical dance.

-- Yogya is also an educational centre, being the home of Gajah Mada university, founded as the first university of the republic of Indonesia during the revolutionary period. It rivals in size and reputation the University of Indonesia in Jakarta, the way Harvard and Yale or Oxford and Cambridge rival each other. The latter was a continuation of pre world war faculties of medicine and law.

--Borobudur. Located about 40 Kilometres from Yogya. I presume the SG is sufficiently briefed on this largest Buddhist monument of the world, built during the Syailendra dynasty between 778 and 842. Of interest is probably the fact that although Indonesia is predominantly a muslim country, the Borobudur as well as the classical dance and music of Yogya and environments reveal the continuing influence of the indigenous Javanese culture and the ancient Hindu Buddhist empires. Yogya and environs is also home to a small but devout Roman catholic population. Yogya boasts several catholic churches where mass is said in Javanese, a good catholic hospital and a seminary. Of course, catholicism is predominant in the island of Flores and in East Timor. Christianity is also predominant, among others, in West Irian and the Moluccas in east Indonesia.

--"nasi gudeg". This is a famous meal indigenous to Yogya which will probably be served at the banquet. If so, it may be interesting to describe it beforehand. It consists of rice and a variety of side dishes including young jackfruit stew (sweet and brownish in color), chicken curry, boiled egg and a hot curry made of tender cow skin. Everything is sweet in Yogya as before the war it was the centre of Indonesia's sugar industry and Java was a big exporter of sugar. Although Indonesia is predominantly muslim, alcoholic beverages are available in most supermarkets and restaurants. However, state banquets will probably not include alcoholic drinks.

Talking Points for the Secretary-General

Yogyakarta

Background


Yogyakarta, has been long famous as a cultural and educational centre. It served as the seat of government for the Republic of Indonesia between 1946 and 1949 and was the centre of the independence struggle. In recognition of the role played by the Sultan of Yogyakarta in the independence struggle, Yogyakarta has been given the status of a Special Territory in the Indonesian constitution.


In the town are the spacious 18th century Palace of the Sultan of Yogyakarta, the State University established after independence (Gadja Madah), the Hatta Foundation Library, an art Academy and many educational institutions. The city is also known for the temples of Borobudur and Prambaran, the beautiful country around Kalinrang and its batik, leather and silverwork, the later of these being centred in the village of Kotagede.

Talking Points

You may wish to express your admiration for the central role that Yogyakarta has played in Indonesian history and in particular in the independence struggle of Indonesia and its continuing significant as a great centre of learning and culture. You may also praise the remarkable skills of its people so evident in the fine batik, silver and leather work which is known the world-over.

You may like to say how deeply you were impressed by the historic temples of Borobudur and Prambaran during your visit and express your gratification that the United Nations system had been able through UNESCO to contribute to their restoration and preservation as an important cultural heritage of the people of Indonesia.





AIRPORT INFORMATION

City	GMT	Name of Airport	Distance to Town (km)	Coach Fare	Taxi Fare	Airport Tax
Abu Dhabi	+ 4	New Abu Dhabi International	45	—	ADH 80	—
Adelaide	+ 10½	Adelaide International	5	AUD 2.40	AUD 7	AUD 20
Amsterdam	+ 1	Schiphol	15	DFL 7	DFL 40	—
Athens	+ 2	Hellinikon	10	DRA 60	DRA 300	—
Auckland	+ 13	Auckland International	22.5	NZD 4	NZD 21	NZD 2
Bahrain	+ 3	Muharraq	6.5	—	BHD 5	—
Bandar Seri Begawan	+ 8	Brunei International	8	—	BRD 20	—
Bangkok	+ 7	Don Muang	25	BHT 100	BHT 300	BHT 120
Bombay	+ 5½	Bombay	29	INR 15	INR 70	INR 100
Brisbane	+ 11	Brisbane International	10	AUD 2	AUD 7	AUD 20
Brussels	+ 1	Zaventem	20	—	BFR 950	BFR 250
Cairo	+ 2	Cairo International	22.5	—	EGL 5	EGL 5
Copenhagen	+ 1	Kastrup	10	DKR 16	DKR 55	—
Dhahran	+ 3	Dhahran	8	ARI 10	ARI 30	—
Dubai	+ 4	Dubai	4	—	ADH 30	—
Frankfurt	+ 1	Rhine Main	15	DMK 4	DMK 40	—
Hong Kong	+ 8	Hong Kong International	7.5	HKD 4	HKD 40	HKD 100
Honolulu	— 10	Honolulu International	11	USD 5	USD 14	USD 3
Jakarta	+ 7	Halim Perdanakusuma	13	—	RPA 4000	RPA 4000
Kaohsiung	+ 8	Kaohsiung International	11	NTD 10	NTD 150	NTD 200
Kuala Lumpur	+ 8	Subang	22.5	RGT 7	RGT 18	RGT 15
Kuantan	+ 8	Kuantan	16	—	RGT 15	RGT 5
London	0	Heathrow	24	UKL 2	UKL 13	—
Los Angeles	— 8	Los Angeles International	24	USD 6	USD 30	USD 3
Madras	+ 5½	Meenambakkam	16	INR 10	INR 40	INR 100
Male	+ 5	Male International	2	—	USD 5	USD 7
Manila	+ 8	Manila International	12	USD 2	USD 2.50	USD 10
Medan	+ 7	Polonia	2	—	RPA 3500	RPA 3400
Melbourne	+ 11	Tullamarine	21	AUD 5	AUD 15	AUD 20
Osaka	+ 9	Itami	16	JYE 320	JYE 4000	—
Paris	+ 1	Orly	14	FFR 51	FFR 150	—
Penang	+ 8	Penang International	17.5	—	RGT 15	RGT 5
Perth	+ 9	Perth	10	AUD 3.50	AUD 9	AUD 20
Rome	+ 1	Leonardo Da Vinci	35.5	LIT 4000	LIT 35000	—
San Francisco	— 8	San Francisco International	21	USD 5	USD 25	USD 3
Seoul	+ 9	Kimpo	26	WON 500	WON 3500	WON 3700
Singapore	+ 8	Changi	20	—	SID 12	SID 12
Sydney	+ 11	Kingsford Smith	11	AUD 3	AUD 10	AUD 20
Taipei	+ 8	Chiang Kai Shek	40	NTD 75	NTD 800	NTD 200
Tokyo	+ 9	Narita	65	JYE 2500	JYE 18,000	JYE 2000
Zurich	+ 1	Kloten	12	—	SFR 40	—

AVERAGE TEMPERATURE

City	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Abu Dhabi	18	19	22	25	30	32	35	35	33	27	24	20
Adelaide	24	23	21	19	15	12	11	12	14	17	19	22
Amsterdam	3	3	5	9	14	15	17	18	16	11	7	4
Athens	9	10	12	15	20	25	27	27	24	20	15	11
Auckland	20	20	19	16	14	12	11	11	13	14	15	18
Bahrain	17	18	21	25	30	32	33	34	31	28	25	18
Bandar Seri Begawan	27	27	27	28	28	28	28	28	28	27	27	27
Bangkok	26	27	29	30	30	29	28	28	28	27	27	27
Bombay	24	24	26	28	30	29	27	27	26	28	27	26
Brisbane	28	25	24	21	18	16	15	16	21	23	23	25
Brussels	2	3	6	8	13	16	18	17	14	10	5	3
Cairo	13	14	17	21	25	27	28	28	26	24	20	15
Copenhagen	0	0	2	7	12	15	18	17	13	9	4	1
Dhahran	17	18	21	25	30	32	33	34	31	28	25	18
Dubai	18	19	22	25	30	32	35	35	33	27	24	20
Frankfurt	1	3	6	10	14	18	16	18	15	9	5	2
Hong Kong	15	15	18	22	25	27	29	29	27	25	21	18
Honolulu	22	22	23	24	25	26	27	27	27	26	25	23
Jakarta	26	26	27	28	28	27	27	27	27	27	27	26
Kaohsiung	17	19	25	25	30	30	30	31	30	30	27	23
Kuala Lumpur	27	28	28	28	28	27	27	28	28	27	27	27
Kuantan	27	28	28	28	28	27	27	28	28	27	27	27
London	5	5	7	9	12	16	18	17	15	11	7	5
Los Angeles	13	14	15	16	18	20	22	22	22	20	17	14
Madras	29	31	33	35	38	37	35	35	34	32	29	29
Male	29	30	31	31	31	31	30	30	29	30	30	30
Manila	26	26	28	29	29	29	28	28	28	27	27	26
Medan	27	27	28	28	28	28	27	28	28	27	27	27
Melbourne	20	20	19	16	13	11	10	11	13	15	16	18
Osaka	3	4	7	13	17	21	25	26	23	17	11	6
Paris	3	4	7	11	13	17	19	18	16	11	6	4
Penang	27	28	28	28	28	28	28	27	27	27	27	27
Perth	23	23	21	19	16	14	13	13	14	16	19	21
Rome	8	9	11	14	18	22	25	25	22	18	13	9
San Francisco	10	12	13	13	15	15	15	15	16	16	14	8
Seoul	-4	0	3	13	15	20	24	25	20	13	7	0
Singapore	27	27	27	27	28	28	28	28	28	27	27	27
Sydney	22	22	21	19	15	13	12	13	15	18	20	21
Taipei	17	19	25	25	30	30	30	31	30	30	27	23
Tokyo	3	4	7	13	17	21	25	26	23	17	11	6
Zurich	0	2	6	9	14	17	19	19	16	10	5	1

Temperature °C

SOLUTIONS TO PUZZLES

CROSSWORD

C	A	L	L	O	F	F	B	O	U	N	C	E	R
L	E	W	R	A	T	H	O						
I	N	T	E	L	L	E	C	T	U	A	L	I	S
M	N	T	S	S	S	H	L	A					
K	E	E	N	C	H	U	M	P	E	L	A	N	
E	R	R	E	A	S	Y	C						
R	E	S	C	U	E	R	N	O	T	T	R	U	E
	O	M					O	E					
S	A	F	E	B	E	T	W	O	O	D	C	U	T
T	C	A	W	A	D	E	R						
A	U	R	A	W	I	L	T	S	A	P	I	A	
B	E	W	N	C	O	T	I						
B	U	D	D	I	N	G	C	H	A	M	P	I	O
N	E	I	F	E	E	A	O	E					
D	I	T	H	E	R	S	D	U	R	A	N	C	E

QUICK CROSSWORD

ACROSS: 1 Reels, 4 Tinker, 9 Topside, 10 Tango, 11 Nile, 12 Remorse, 13 May, 14 Wake, 16 Tidy, 18 Foe, 20 Leather, 21 Lash, 24 Blind, 25 Slumber, 26 Stench, 27 Theme.
DOWN: 1 Rotund, 2 Expel, 3 Soil, 5 Intimate, 6 Kindred, 7 Rioter, 8 Weary, 13 Methodic, 15 Avarice, 17 Globes, 18 Frisk, 19 Charge, 22 Amble, 23 Quit.

CHESS

1. N×N P×N 2. B×Pch! K—R1 (If 2. . . . Q×B 3. R—Q8ch B—B1 4. Q×R wins the house, while 2. . . . K—B1 3. B—B5ch mates) 3. Q×R! Resigns since 3. . . . Q×Q 4. R—Q8ch B—B1 5. B—Q4ch Q—K4 6. B×Q is mate.

TRELLIS

RI/SE/AC/HE/AP/SE/RA/RE/EF/TS

BRAIN TWISTER

Eight. Quaddie was on a safe bet that the square root I did in my head was an easy one involving no fractions, ie that $\frac{1}{2}(n^2 + n)$ was a perfect square. But $\frac{1}{2}(n^2 + n) = \frac{1}{2}n(n + 1)$ which is the formula for the sum of the natural numbers $1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + \dots$ etc. The only square totals we come to in adding the first 50 of these are 1,36,1225 when $n = 1,8,49$. I would hardly have called for paper and pencil to take the square root of 1 or 49, so 8 must have been the number I first thought of. His final instructions were merely red herrings invented on the spur of the moment when he realised my square-root alacrity had given the game away.

ELIMINATION

The remaining word is 'Moaning'. (a) 19-4; (b) 3-14; (c) 26-17; (d) 12-24; (e) 16-31; (f) 2-21; (g) 22-7; (h) 9-30; (i) 29-8; (j) 15-37; (k) 36-6; (l) 23-25; (m) 34-20; (n) 11-32; (o) 33-5; (p) 10-35; (q) 28-18; (r) 1-13.

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128 Warncke Road, Wilton, Connecticut 06897, USA
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Cable: NIELCOM WILTON

LEBANON	Beirut	Weiner Haus Hotel, Room 101, P O Box 113-5132, Lyon Street, Hamra, Beirut, Lebanon.	350050/1/2, 345328	350050/1/2, 345328	—
MALAYSIA	Ipoh	66 Jalan Leong Sin Nam, Ipoh, Perak, Malaysia.	(05)512646, (05)515743 (07)222175	—	—
	Johore Bahru	Johor Towers, 3rd Floor, Suites 346-347, Jalan Gereja, Johor Baru, Malaysia.	(07)236176 (03)987033	—	—
	Kuala Lumpur	Wisma Singapore Airlines, 2-4 Jalan Dang Wangi, Kuala Lumpur 01-09, Malaysia.	(03)923122	(03)923122	(03)760227, (03)766318, (03)761041, (03)757866, (03)757824
	Kuching	Ang Cheng Ho Building, Ground Floor, Jalan Tunku Abdul Rahman, Kuching, Sarawak, Malaysia	20266/7	20266/7	—
	Kota Kinabalu	United Trading Building, 20 Jalan Pantai, P O Box 2067, Kota Kinabalu, Sabah, Malaysia.	55444	55444	—
	Miri	Kampong Dagang Shopping Centre, 1st Floor, Shophouse Lot 264, Miri, Sarawak, Malaysia.	33167, 36645	33167, 36645	—
	Penang	Wisma Penang Garden, Ground Floor, 42 Jalan Sultan Ahmad Shah, Penang. Malaysia.	(04)364411, (04)364015	(04)363322, (04)363701	(04)831911, (04)831271
MALDIVES	Male	Sisil Corner, Faamudheyri Magu, Male 02, Maldives.	—	—	2071, 2073, 2074, 2075 Ex 45
NETHERLANDS	Amsterdam	Parnassustoren, 4th and 5th Floors, Locatellikade 1, Amsterdam 1076 AZ, Netherlands.	(020)642151	(020)640911	177117, 170753
NEW ZEALAND	Auckland	West Plaza Building, Lower Ground Floor, corner of Customs and Albert Streets, P O Box 4290, Auckland 1, New Zealand.	793209	32129	27/56706, 27/50789 Ex 429,432
	Christchurch	AMP Building, Ground Floor, Cathedral Square, P O Box 78, Christchurch, New Zealand.	68099, 68001/2	—	—
	Wellington	Norwich Insurance House, 3-11 Hunter Street, Wellington New Zealand	739749/50, 739753/4/8	739749/50, 739753/4/8	—
NORWAY	Oslo	Haakon VII Gt 5, Oslo 1, Norway.	(02)427395	—	—
PHILIPPINES	Manila	138 H V Delacosta Street, Salcedo Village, Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines. (Main Office).	8189951	8188341	8319886, 8311765/93
		Magsaysay Building, 520 T M Kalaw Street, Ermita, Manila, Philippines. (Branch Office).	—	—	—
SAUDI ARABIA	Dhahran	Kaki Building, Prince Nasser Street, P O Box 1760, Alkhobar, Saudi Arabia.	8646025, 8645545, 8640515	8646025, 8645545, 8640515	8792013, 8649766
		Airline Centre, King Abdul Aziz Boulevard, P O Box 1760, Alkhobar, Saudi Arabia.	8951515/64, 8954636	8951515/64, 8954636	—
	Jeddah	Kaki Centre, Medina Road North, P O Box 1620, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.	6674345, 6671813, 6671690	6674345, 6671813, 6671690	—
			—	—	—
SINGAPORE	Singapore	Airline House, Airline Road, Singapore 1781.	—	5456666	5423333
		SIA Building, 77 Robinson Road, Singapore 0106.	2238888	—	—
		Mandarin Hotel, Orchard Road, Singapore 0923.	2238888	—	—
		Apollo Hotel, Havelock Road, Singapore 0316.	7333128	—	—
		Pavilion Intercontinental Hotel, 1 Cuscaden Road, Singapore 1024.	2238888	—	—
SRI LANKA	Colombo	Lloyd's Building, 15-A Sir Baron Jayatilake Mawatha, Colombo 1, Sri Lanka.	22711	22711	030-2262
SWEDEN	Stockholm	6 Riddaren Grev Turegatan 10, Stockholm, Sweden.	—	(08)243680	—
SWITZERLAND	Geneva	7 Rue du Mont-Blanc, 1201 Geneva, Switzerland.	(022)322203 4/5	—	—
	Zurich	Schutzengasse 23, Ground Floor, 8023 Zurich 1, Switzerland.	(01)2113094	(01)2113094	(01)8142767
TAIWAN	Taipei	148 Sung Chiang Road, Taipei, Taiwan.	5314232	5115291, 5368636	(033)832247, (033)832492
	Kaohsiung	Ambassador Hotel, 202 Minsen 2nd Road, Kaohsiung, Taiwan	(07) 2115211	—	(07) 8012141/2
THAILAND	Bangkok	62/1-4 Silom Road, Bangkok, Thailand.	2351570-9	2351580-9	5237299, 2860190 Ex 175, 260/1
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	Abu Dhabi	BOAC Building, Sheikh Hamdan Street, Flat 4-5, Abu Dhabi UAE.	324188, 344111	344104, 321612, 339532	757500 Ex 2578/9
	Dubai	Pearl Building, 2nd Floor, Suite 201, Bin Yas Street, Deira, Dubai, UAE.	232300	232300	281739
UNITED KINGDOM	London	143-147 Regent Street, London W1, UK.	(01)4398111	(01)7470007	(01)7457056, (01)7454152
	Birmingham	The Rotunda, 7th Floor, New Street, Birmingham B2 4PA, UK.	(021)6435171	(021)6435171	—
	Glasgow	Stock Exchange House, 5th Floor, St. George's Place, Glasow G2 1BU, UK.	(041)2040656	(041)2040656	—
	Manchester	Macintosh House, 3rd Floor, Market Place, Shambles Square, Manchester M4 3AF, UK.	(061)8323346	(061)8323346	—
USA	Atlanta	230 Peachtree Street NW, Suite 305, Atlanta, Georgia 30303, USA.	(404)5775644	(800)7423333	—
	Chicago	6 North Michigan Avenue, Suite 1304, Chicago, Illinois 60602, USA.	(312)3326780	(800)7423333	—
	Dallas	1111 West Mockingbird Lane, Suite 925, Dallas, Texas 75247, USA.	(214)6316613	(800)7423333	—
	Honolulu	Pioneer Plaza, Suite 1110, 900 Fort Street Mall, Honolulu, Hawaii 96813, USA.	(808)5246063	(808)5246063	(808)8360375
	Houston	3701 Kirby Street, Houston, Texas 77098, USA.	(713)5221631	(800)7423333	—
	Los Angeles	8350 Wilshire Boulevard, Beverly Hills, California 90211-2381, USA.	(213)6558830	(800)7423333	(213)6461168,
	Miami	200 South Miami Avenue, Suite 286, Miami, Florida 33130, USA.	(305)3743030	(800)7423333	—
	New York	535 Fifth Avenue, Suite 1206 New York, NY 10017, USA.	(212)9499098	(800)7423333	—
	Orange County	1000 Quail Street, Suite 190, Newport Beach, California 92660, USA.	(714)4763131/2	(800)7423333	—
	San Francisco	476 Post Street, San Francisco, California 94102, USA.	(415)7817304	(800)7423333	(415)8767372/3/4
	Washington	1050 17th Street NW, Suite 400, Washington D.C. 20036, USA.	(202)4663748	(800)7423333	—