

OUTGOING CODE

OK/Kee

To : A/SEC GEN, New York

From : LINNER, Leo *Linner*

Date : 11 November 1961

No. : *L-13*

SECRET

1. Reference your 7876 Jerkovic reports from Albertville that on 10 November the representatives of CFL and FILTISAF asked protection for the evacuation of their wives and children from Albertville to Usumbura. Protection was immediately accorded and they were evacuated on 10 November by boats at 1400 hours and 2000 hours. No other Belgians up to midnight 10th had asked for UN protection.

2. We need hardly add that protection will always be accorded and evacuation arrangements made as promptly as possible whenever requested.

N.K.

OUTGOING CODE

OK/Koe

To: : A/SEC GEN, New York

From: : LINNER, Leo *Linner*

Date: : 11 November 1961

No. : *L-9 12*

SECRET

Reference your 7848

Jerkovic reports as follows regarding

general situation in Albertville as of 10 November night -

"SITUATION IN ALBERTVILLE VERY TENSE BUT WE HAVE IT WELL IN HAND. KARTEL AND KONAKAT LEADERS CALL DAILY AT MY OFFICE AND WE WORK TOGETHER BEING PRESENT OURSELVES IN THE MIDST OF EVENTS WHEREVER THEY OCCUR IN ORDER TO CALM THE POPULATION. THERE ARE 60 PERSONS OF THE OLD POLICE COMPOSED MOSTLY OF BALUBAS AND OTHER RACES FROM OUTSIDE OF KATANGA WHO IN MY OFFICE YESTERDAY AFTERNOON 9 NOVEMBER 1961 HAVE DECLARED THEMSELVES READY TO COOPERATE WITH THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. THIS MORNING 10 NOVEMBER WE HAVE WITH THE CONSENT OF KARTEL AND KONAKAT LEADERS AND ADMINISTRATION PARTIALLY ARMED THEM WITH THEIR OWN ARMS WHICH WE TOOK DURING THE PAST EVENTS. NUMBER OF ARMS GIVEN BACK 30. IN THE TOWN AND SURROUNDING TOWNS GROUPS OF NON CONTROLLED PEOPLE CIRCULATE WHO DECLARE THEMSELVES AS JEUNESSE BUT WHO IN REALITY DO NOT BELONG TO ANY PARTY BUT ARE ONLY AWAITING OPPORTUNITIES FOR PILLAGE. THEY MOLEST THE VEHICLES AS WELL AS THE WHOLE POPULATIONS. EYE HAVE GIVEN ORDERS TO THE NEW POLICE TO GIVE THEM A LAST WARNING TO DISPERSE THEMSELVES AT THE LATEST BY 3 OCLOCK THIS AFTERNOON 10 NOVEMBER OR ARREST EN MASSE WOULD COMMENCE AT 3 OCLOCK TODAY. THE SAME SUGGESTION EYE HAVE MADE TO COLONEL SATHE SO THAT THE BRIGADE WITH THEIR PATROLS ACT LIKEWISE TO WHICH COLONEL SATHE HAS AGREED. EYE HAVE ASKED COLONEL ALEMU TO SEND ME MWAMBA ILUNGA PROSPER FROM KABALO WITH WHOM EYE HOPE WE WILL ENDEAVOUR TO END ALL THE

SECRET

TROUBLES WHICH NOW EXIST. CONCERNING THE OLD GENDARMERIE 8 BLACK OFFICERS CAME TO MY OFFICE YESTERDAY 9 NOVEMBER AND DECLARED TO BE READY TO WORK FOR CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND THEY HAVE UNDER THEIR ORDERS ABOUT 150 MEN. EYE HAVE ADVISED THEM TO HAVE ALL THESE PEOPLE REENTER THE CAMP AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE. EYE HAVE ARRANGED WITH THEM FOR MONDAY 13 NOVEMBER AT 11 OCLOCK A LITTLE MILITARY PARADE AT THE CAMP WHERE THEY WILL BE INSPECTED BY COLONEL SATHE AND WHERE MWAMBA ILUNGA PROSPER WILL GIVE THEM CONGOLESE FLAGS. EYE HOPE TO SETTLE ALL THESE QUESTIONS IN ALBERTVILLE EXCEPT UNFORESEEN CIRCUMSTANCES IN A PERIOD OF 4 TO 5 DAYS WHEN EYE FORESEE STRONG IMPROVEMENTS AS PER OPINION OF EVERYBODY. CONCERNING THE UNIFORMS FOR THE NEW ANC IN ALBERTVILLE AS WELL AS FOR THE POLICE AND OF THEIR SALARY PAID IN THE FUTURE BY THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN LEO EYE SHALL SETTLE THIS WITH MWAMBA ILUNGA PROSPER IN ORDER TO FIND A SOLUTION."

Please also see our 2569.

N.K.

OUTGOING CODE

ot/foe

TO : ~~ACTING~~ SEC GEN, New York

FROM: LINNER, Leopoldville

/Kini

Date: 11 November 1961

No. : L- 8 11

SECRET

1. Reur 7846 and further to para two of our 2566. Text of note verbale dispatched to Adoula yesterday follows: "M. Chalmers a été appréhendé par les forces des Nations Unies, en exécution du paragraphe A-2 de la Résolution du Conseil de sécurité du 21 février 1961, à Manono, le 28 août, alors qu'il servait dans les forces katangaises, et fut transféré à Kamina puis à Léopoldville sous la garde des Nations Unies et détenu en attendant son interrogatoire et son rapatriement. Dans la nuit du 28/29 octobre, Chalmers s'est échappé de la surveillance des Nations Unies, mais revint se constituer prisonnier sur les conseils du Consul de Grande-Bretagne. Au cours de ses déclarations aux officiers des Nations Unies qui conduisirent son interrogatoire à Kamina et à Léopoldville, Chalmers prétendit être le meurtrier de M. Patrice Lumumba. Les déclarations pertinentes qu'il a faites sont contenues dans l'annexe ci-jointe. On peut ajouter que ces déclarations ne sont pas signées, Chalmers ayant refusé de le faire quand il le lui fut demandé à l'issue de son interrogatoire. En même temps le Chargé de la Mission désire informer le Premier Ministre que les fonctionnaires des Nations Unies qui ont interrogé Chalmers font toutes réserves quant à la crédibilité de ses déclarations. Ils signalent également que Chalmers est un individu vaniteux et vantard dont la stabilité mentale est très

SECRET

discutable et qu'il est vraisemblable qu'il ait fabriqué cette histoire pour servir ses buts personnels. Nous proposons donc de remettre Chalmers, qui, en tant que mercenaire étranger tombe sous le paragraphe A-2 de la Résolution du Conseil de sécurité du 21 février 1961, aux autorités britanniques aux fins de rapatriement.

Le Premier Ministre n'est pas sans ignorer que la mort de M. Lumumba fait actuellement l'objet d'une enquête par une Commission établie selon la Résolution 1601 (XV) de l'Assemblée générale, et que les travaux de la Commission ont fait l'objet d'un échange de Notes entre le Ministre des Affaires étrangères du Gouvernement de la République du Congo et le Président de la Commission laquelle a été également informée de ces mêmes renseignements."

2. Annex referred to in Note contained French translation of relevant statements of Chalmers.

NK/mb

c.c. Mr. Kanakaratne

OUTGOING CODE

OK/Koe
ROUTINE

TO : A/SEC GEN, New York
FROM: LINNER, Leopoldville

Linner

SECRET

Date: 11 November 1961

No. : L- *7* 10

Further to A-2549.

Englund reported today: "So far there is no indication that any aircraft from Cairo has come to the Province. We will continue our examinations and let you know."

JP/mb

c.c. Force Commander

OUTGOING CLEAR

PRIORITY

LEOPOLDVILLE
11 November 1961

UNATIONS
New York

L-*B* 9 A/SEC GEN from LINNER

Following is text of letter addressed by President Stanleyville Provincial Government to Colonel Kapaso, C/O of Third Groupement, and dated 1 November:

"Pour éviter les arrestations arbitraires, j'ai l'honneur de vous demander de bien vouloir me prêter votre secours afin de les éviter.

Il faudrait, par exemple, pour ce qui concerne l'intervention de la Gendarmerie que l'ordre soit uniquement donné par moi ou à mon absence par le Vice-Président AGOYO Honoré, le Ministre de l'Intérieur BAIKPON ou par le Premier Bourgmestre.

Aucune autre Autorité, pas même les Ministres n'ont le droit de commander la Force de l'Ordre.

Pour ce qui concerne Monsieur ATETO l'intéressé doit être mis immédiatement en liberté et aucune garde ne peut demeurer devant sa maison. Une seule chose, il faut que Monsieur ATETO soit empêché de quitter Stan pour le moment.

Pour cela il suffit que Air Congo et OTRACO en soient avisés. Je veux que les instructions soient données immédiatement".

OUTGOING CODE

OK/Koe
PRIORITY

To : A/SEC GEN, New York
From: LINNER, Leopoldville
Date: 11 November 1961
No. : L- *5* 8

Mini
SECRET

O'BRIEN in his Elleo 134 reports:

"Further to our Elleo 132 Kimba telephoned me tonight to say that the Government had approved his going to Leopoldville for negotiations with the Central Government, within a week, but on two conditions: first that the ANC forces do not cross the Katanga border in the meantime and second that there would be no transfer of power in Albertville. I made it clear that I had no power to accept on behalf of the Central Government these or any other conditions but that I would transmit the message to you for the Central Government. He is anxious for an immediate reply."

~~cc. Force Commander.~~

WEJP/cc

OK/Koe

OUTGOING CODE

PRIORITY

TO : A/SECGEN, New York

FROM: LINNER, Leopoldville *Linini*

Date: 11 November 1961

No. : L- *3* 7

SECRET

In his Elleo 133 O'Brien reports: "Kimba has now notified to me the names of Katangan representatives on the joint sub-committees and has proposed that this "Commission" should go to Kabalo, Nyunzu and Albertville. I am agreeing to a visit by 1 of these commissions to these centers provided that another of the commissions goes to Jadotville, Kipushi and Kolwezi, while the third remains at disposition to pay emergency visits to any center either party may suggest. The names are: Le Major Mukalamushi, le Capitaine Kabwe, le Lieutenant Ngoie, le Lieutenant Mpundu, le Lieutenant Senga, le Lieutenant Kalaba."

JP/mb

c.c. Force Commander

Of/Sec

OUTGOING CODE

PRIORITY

To : A/SEC GEN, New York

From : LINNER, Leopoldville

Kimba

Date : 11 November 1961

No. : L- *3* 6

SECRET

In his Elleo 132 O'Brien reports:

"I saw Kimba today at his request and had a frank and cordial conversation of about two hours with him. He was worried about the situation in North Katanga which he wishes to visit. I gave him an outline of the situation in the North and it became apparent that he was aware that the Central Government could if it wishes install itself in a large region of the North. I made it plain to him that the UN could not oppose this development if it were demanded by the Central Government and desired by the population. I emphasized that the real problem did not lie in North Katanga or any other specific region but lay in the fact that the constitutional problem remains unsolved for lack of contact and agreement between the Central and the Provincial Government. As long as contact was not established and agreement reached between both the perspective would be one of endless troubles, fighting, refugees etc. only direct contact between responsible leaders could avoid this grim prospect. The sending of messengers or of missions who lacked power to negotiate would not solve the problem, nor could the UN solve it although their good offices are always available.

"I proposed that failing President Tshombe he himself should go to Leo. As regards Aville and other North Katangan centers I told him that we would agree to one of the joint sub-committees to which he had just nominated their representatives should go there assuming that others will visit Kolwezi, Kipushi

JP/cc

.../...

etc. such visits would however be of little use unless progress was made with the Central Government which other members did not want at any price. He realizes that without such agreement there is a long and dark period ahead. If the ANC crossed the Katangan border in force it would be impossible for him or any other Minister to go to Leo. He asked that the UN should use its influence to obtain a truce following which it would be possible to send a Rep to Leo. I told him that while I was disposed to forward any proposition he would wish to carry on, I did not think that any proposition as vague as this could serve the purpose. If I was in a position to say that he would go to Leo on say 17 Nov. provided there were no further incident in the meantime, that would be another matter, it would also be of little use to send a minor functionary as before, or even a junior minister. I repeated the usual guarantees of protection and safe return, Kimba said that he would recommend this to Tshombe and he hoped to have a positive response for me shortly.

"Commentary: At no time throughout the conversation was a political note introduced by either of us and Kimba accepted realistically and calmly my quite frank statements regarding the North Katangan situation. I have the impression from his remarks that he and perhaps most of his colleagues see the importance of securing a settlement but that they are rather frightened by the bitterness and extremism of some of their colleagues incited by foreign elements."

SECRET

OUTGOING ~~XXXX~~ CODE

PRIORITY

To : A/SEC GEN, New York

From : LINNER, Leopoldville

Date : 11 November 1961

No. : L- ~~2~~ 5

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SECRET

Further to our A-2547, 2557 and reur 7805, following received from O'Brien:

"List of political advisers of 3rd August was a list of Political advisers in the administration only and it was made absolutely clear at the time that this was so. Herman was not a member of the administration and therefore the fact that his name did not figure on this list has no relevance. We refused Tshombe's request to give him an inclusive list of Conseillers politiques occultes since it is impossible in present situation here for such a list to be exhaustive."

cc. Mr. Kanakaratne.

NK/cc

OUTGOING CODE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO : A/SEC GEN, New York
FROM: LINNER, Leopoldville
Date: 11 November 1961
No. : L- 1-2-3-4-

Linner

SECRET

This being the first cable addressed to you directly, I would like to begin it by congratulating you, personally and on behalf of the whole Organization, on your nomination as Acting Secretary-General and assure you of our wholehearted support at all times, to the best of our abilities.

Ref. your 7798-99.

1. We are in agreement with the extent to which ONUC can give military assistance to the Central Government as being determined by the various Secco and GA resolutions. Nevertheless, it is necessary to elaborate somewhat on the political and especially the military considerations forming the basis on which the Central Government intends to take control of North Katanga. For one thing, the armed forces or other military means at its disposal have been and still are prerogatives of the Central Government. It should be remembered that prior to Independence, the Katanga Province had no armed forces nor did it have any military equipment. The only real armed forces were those of the "force publique" which was under the direct control

SECRET

of the executive in Leo. The "Gendarmerie" was no more than a handful of men equipped solely with rifles, as it existed and still does in the other provinces. When the force publique mutinied, Tshombe sent a large number of its Congolese elements away, imprisoned some others, and the more important elements of this Force publique, i.e. the foreign elements and Belgian officers, were absorbed into the Gendarmerie which was only then created as an effective force which has not ceased to reinforce itself since July 1960, import of heavy military equipment and other ammunitions taking place only since the creation of this military body. Government's point of view, as has been expressed yesterday by Adoula to Rykhie, is that because it has abided all the time with the resolution of the Secco and has therefore not imported any arms or ammunitions, the Central Government now finds itself in a very weak position vis-à-vis Katanga which has continuously strengthened its forces in spite of the same resolutions, the ONUC having never taken any action to prevent such importations from taking place in Katanga and for this reason the Government will not hesitate to make us bear the responsibility of this situation.

2. Two possible interpretations could be given here:

- a) From the point of view of UN we certainly never thought of suggesting the launching of any such action or having any publicity about it contemplated on the eve of Secco meeting. Our A-2542 followed para 19 of A-2497-8 in which we had proposed to give you a more detailed plan of the operation the Government wished and still wishes to launch in North Katanga.

SECRET

L-2

b) If your point 2 referred to the Government, this may be interpreted as a restriction of its political freedom and of its right to present the argumentation it deems best in order to justify and support its viewpoint ^{on} ~~at~~ the eve of a Secco meeting.

3. a) We have never given any indication to the Government that we would support, in one way or the other, their plan to penetrate into North Katanga, but have indeed advised them to delay such plan and it can be reasonably stated that without this delaying pressure we have brought to bear, the ANC troops would have penetrated into North Katanga, regardless of possible consequences.

Khipry indicates

b) It must be borne in mind that in spite of all the actions undertaken by Tshombe in his particular area, North Katanga has never been entirely conquered or "pacified", to use Katanga's phraseology. During and after the recent hostilities, the Gendarmerie garrisons located in the various localities in the North Katanga have even sought our protection because of the extreme hostility on the part of the local population. Moreover, the Baluba control, at present, without the assistance of any military force, the areas where this penetration is envisaged, with the exception of Kongolo and its immediate surroundings. Finally, if ONUC at the time of the ANC penetration continues to prevent, as indicated in the Protocole on the cease-fire, the arrival of Gendarmerie reinforcement, there is no reason to foresee a battle between forces since an opposing force will be inexistent.

SECRET

These views are shared by
~~This particular point of resistance is also upheld by the Force~~
Commander, as indicated in his comments which were stated in my A-2558.
I personally feel that even with a great degree of support from our side, this penetration is a gamble, the Leo troops having already given clear evidence of their lack of discipline, both in Luluabourg and in the Kasai-Katanga border, and there is no reason to believe that the discipline and morale amongst the Stanleyville troops would be better.

c) Sendwe has already on two occasions gone to North Katanga at a time when the situation was even less favourable than at present and we have reported the tremendous welcome with which he was met by the Muluba population. He would be going again primarily as the uncontested Chief of Balubakat, position which even Tshombe does not contradict.

4. We fully concur in your interpretation of ONUC's mandate, as already pointed out in A-2546, para 14. However, we must be able to adopt and give our own troops a line of action in case the Congolese *do not* heed ~~not~~ our advise of caution and decide to go ahead with the operation, as described in our A-2542.

5. We agree with your position. Sendwe has asked us for a means of transport only for himself and his party. On the same plane he would like us to accept purely medical freight. As to the reconciliation action which is envisaged and, in some cases, has already been achieved, it would take place between Baluba tribes and minorities of Lundas and other akin tribes.

SECRET

L-3

6. a) Khiary here feels that the Central Government controls Lundula and his troops. What is much less sure are the value of these troops and their degree of discipline, this being general in the Congo.

Force Commander has reservations regarding the amount of control the Central Government exercises presently over Lundula's troops, but feels nevertheless that both Lundula and Mobutu's troops, as indeed these two generals, would readily come to an agreement in view of the proposed goal, i.e. the invasion and annexation of North Katanga.

I personally feel that some members in the Central Government may think it has control over Lundula and the troops under his command. I do not share their confidence. The mere fact that Lundula did not meet with Adoula and Mobutu in Luluabourg is, I think, significant enough. Englund reported yesterday that Lundula was arriving in Leo this afternoon. If so, this is certainly a good sign, but even if this visit should lead to a reconciliation between Mobutu and Lundula and a clarification of the ANC top command, I still believe there is a long way to go before the Central Government can have any real control over Lundula's forces. I would even go further and say that the recent mutiny in Kasai shows Leo has not even control over its own troops. It is worthy of note, in this respect, that the Central Government is most *concerned over recent developments* ~~anxious to reaffirm its control~~ *seems* ~~and it is~~ determined to take severe action against its mutinous elements who are presently imprisoned *pending trial.* ~~and who will be tried incessantly.~~

SECRET

b) Please refer to para 4 of our A-2542. We would not provide air transport.

7. Khiary thinks there is only one location where possible resistance can be met, Kongolo, and he further thinks that because of its present isolation amongst a hostile population and the fact that it is far away from its bases of support would soon bring its surrender. Para 6 of our A-2558 presents a different assessment which was based on recent military information brought to my attention by Rykhie, as other paragraphs in that cable, assessment supported by the Force Commander, subject to the reservations he made in the penultimate paragraph. I understand, however, that just before his departure yesterday morning and after meeting with Khiary, Rykhie revised his position and he should be able to give you a final determination.

8. This is to be analysed in a restrictive sense. We would give no other facilities than those we normally provide, that is to say Congolese planes would benefit from our technical air control facilities to land and take off again only.

9. The aerial protection is a most important point in the whole plan. If we give it, the peaceful penetration would take place, as already described. Otherwise, there are serious risks involved, not only for the Congolese, but also for our own troops in case of aerial bombings. The Force Commander states that it would have to be provided ^{ONLY} ~~but~~ for the safety of our own troops. IF

SECRET

L-4

Khiary thinks that if Tshombe was to resort to such aerial attacks without counter actions on our part, we may be criticized for not having fulfilled our mandate, knowing that the planes are manned by mercenaries for whom we have a definite mandate to expulse from Katanga. Another danger would ~~also~~ lie in that Government could also resort to bilateral assistance for the purchase of planes, the hiring of pilots, etc. This was already pointed out in para 4 of A-2570 and we know that the Government has already sought such bilateral assistance, particularly from Yugoslavia, this latter country having already indicated that it would be prepared to meet the Government's request, but only if authorized to do so by the UN.

10. Your assumption is correct.

11. Noted and appreciated.

12. The Government has not been informed of the proposed Ordonnance ~~whose~~ ^{of which} draft has been prepared at the initiative of our Air Commodore. Your analysis being somewhat restrictive does not permit us ~~from~~ ^{to} giving further comments. However, your attention is drawn to another Ordonnance which has been taken at your request regarding the control of the air traffic. As you know, that Ordonnance was enforced only in Stanleyville against Air Jordan planes and in Leo once against an aircraft belonging to an American Company. We know, on the other hand, that arms and ammunitions have been transported by air into Katanga without meeting any opposition on our part and this for the simple reason that ~~since~~ this traffic was taking place in locations where, in view of our lack of forces, we had no troops.

SECRET

13. Headquarters has already concluded that an action on the part of the Central Government in the whole of Katanga would be considered as a police operation. If we maintain this position, its ultimate results must also be accepted. ~~No matter how paradoxical this action from the Government could appear, it is nevertheless legal and authorized, whereas a Katanga counter offensive would be interpreted as rebellion or intervention, then falling within limits of our mandate.~~

14. Noted.

15. Our capability in North Katanga rests in holding places already in our possession, but we have no worthwhile capability to move out from those places. Therefore, the type of help which we could give would be:

a) To hold airfields for safe landings of ANC carrying aircraft;

b) To maintain control of the towns or road centers involved, from the point of law and order;

c) To prevent Gendarmerie interference;

This point would of course be a question of degree.

d) To assist in the ground distribution of food and medicine to the local populations.

16. No promises or commitments have been or will be made without your prior authorization.

SECRET

17. As this cable is being sent we can now confirm that Lundulla arrived at 1430 Z at Ndjili where he was greeted by Mobutu and numerous officers of Leo ANC Headquarters. He was immediately taken to Adoula with whom he is presently conferring. He will be guest of Mobutu during his stay in Leo.

c.c. Force Commander

JP/mb

OUTGOING CODE

ROUTINE

To : Bunche
From : Linner
Date : 10 Nov 1961
No : A- 2573

Popoulak

SECRET

*ok
for*

In his Elleo 126 O'Brien reports: Quote

We can confirm that Lasimone was arrested imprisoned and left the country. The reason for this arrest was that he was suspected of being in contact with the UN. Since Miss Erfields departure for Léopoldville he has been suspected on this ground and Colonel Faulques has been urging his removal as a security risk. It is possible that his recent contacts with us became known. He was arrested by the Gendarmerie probably on Faulques orders. The arrest of Lasimone, like the earlier arrest of Brown, does not repeat not imply any change in the attitude shown Katangese authorities towards the employment of mercenaries. Both Brown and Lasimone were regarded as security risks and both had personal enemies in the mercenary establishment. Unquote.

cc: Force Commander

JP/jg

OUTGOING CODE

PRIORITY

To : Bunche
From : Linner
Date : 10 Nov 1961
No : A- 2572

Longpaul

SECRET

OK for

Further to ONUC 6537 Tickner in his CIV 175 reports: Quote

1. At about 1545 hours the town was full of rumours of mutiny at the ANC camp. Belgians started coming into the office and the manager closed the Banque du Congo. We had the ANC Liaison Officer with us and he found out by telephone that a company at the Ecole Militaire had refused to be sent to Léo. About half an hour later he told us that Ndjoko had persuaded them to go on with their duties because only those found guilty of misconduct were being sent to Léo.
 2. At about 2045 hours I was fetched to the office. Mayamba special Commissioner was demanding our help to arrest a Katangese european at Atlanta hotel. I went to investigate but by the time I arrived he had gone across to the hotel and I followed with the Brigade Major and 6 armed Nigerian soldiers. The Commissioner was by this time in his car with the European and 6 armed gendarmerie. He told me that he had invited him to stay the night at his house and would settle the matter in the morning. I kept him in conversation long enough for the prisoner who was in the outside seat of the car nearest us to see who we were and to seek protection if he wished. The Place was well lit and the Nigerians had their blue berets. He made no attempt to seek protection and clearly accepted the situation. We therefore could take no action.
- Unquote.

JB/jg

cc: Force Commander

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

OK
four

To : Bunche , New York
From : Linner , Léopoldville
Date : 10 November 1961
No : A - 2570 , 2571

Linner

SECRET

1. Khiary est rentré de Stan. Il a vu Gizenga pendant 1h30 . Tous les arguments de politique interne et externe ont été passés en revue . Le problème du Katanga a été étudié sous tous ses aspects . Khiary expliqua les dangers d'une action militaire dans les conditions actuelles de l'ANC : sans unité de commandement, sans préparation logistique préalable sans armement suffisant etc . Il évoqua la réunion⁽¹⁾ prochaine du Conseil de sécurité au cours de laquelle certains pays parleront sûrement de la position délicate de Gizenga . Au Congo on parle déjà de sa trahison, de son engagement avec telle puissance étrangère. On va jusqu'à dire qu'il a partie liée avec Tshombé .
Gizenga répondit sans pouvoir justifier qu'il n'avait pas confiance dans les Nations Unies et surtout dans les délégués locaux de l'Organisation. Les problèmes politiques congolais sont une affaire strictement politique congolaise et qu'il s'entretiendrait de cela avec le Premier Ministre dès son retour à Léopoldville . Les Nations Unies doivent pour démontrer leur bonne foi et remplir leur mandat mettre fin au scandale Katangais ou se retirer et nous laisser régler nos problèmes . Je ne suis pas ici en dissidence contre le Gouvernement, je remplis une mission et je retournerais dès ma tâche terminée ."

.....

2) Khiary a vu ensuite Lundulla. Les mêmes problèmes ont été évoqués sous leur aspect militaire. L'attention du Général a été attirée sur sa fausse position entre le Gouvernement central et Gizenga. Lundulla doit faire son choix tant qu'il est encore temps. Lundulla reconnaît la délicatesse de sa position. Il réitère son obéissance au Gouvernement central et à Adoula, répète sa méfiance vis à vis de Mobutu, s'attaque à Gizenga et promet enfin de venir à Léopoldville pour se mettre en contact avec Adoula et régler les problèmes que pose l'unification de l'Armée. Lundulla a confirmé qu'il arriverait Samedi à Léo. Il a téléphoné ce jour à deux reprises au Premier Ministre et au Ministre de l'Intérieur.

A. 2571

3) Que ce soit avec Gizenga ou Lundulla, Khiary pense que la solution du problème de Stan est entre les mains de Gbenye. Ce dernier peut faire pression sur ~~xxxxxx~~ l'un et influencer l'autre pour les ramener dans le droit chemin. Il s'en sert comme moyen de pression sur Adoula pour obtenir de lui certaines concessions et une ^{actuelle} orientation de la politique ~~plus nationaliste qu'actuellement~~ ^{des}. C'est un jeu dangereux qui pourrait avoir un effet contraire ^s à ceux qu'on en attend. En effet certains membres du Gouvernement Adoula sont encore prêts à jouer la carte de Tshombe contre Gizenga. Tshombe pourrait alors sous la pression des événements et pour satisfaire son amour propre renouer le dialogue avec Léo mais au détriment de Gizenga : démontrant par là, ~~reprendre~~ son anti-communisme et son désir de trouver une solution avec le Gouvernement central. Ce matin Khiary a rendu visite à Gbenye, ~~il~~ l'a mis au courant d'abord de ses démarches à Stan et a insisté de nouveau sur la nécessité d'une ^{collaboration} ~~solution~~ franche entre Gbenye et Adoula. Il a démontré à Gbenye la fausseté et le danger de certaines de ses positions. Gbenye parut ébranlé et a immédiatement pris contact avec Adoula pour s'entendre sur le règlement de la situation au Kivu, de la réception de Lundulla, de l'ordre du jour des conversations militaires. Khiary a vu ensuite Adoula qui a paru très satisfait du revirement de Gbenye et du dénouement possible de la crise militaire.

4) Khiary a présenté au Premier Ministre le Général IYASSU accompagné de RYKHIE . Au cours de la conversation, Adoula a fait part aux deux généraux et à Khiary de la confiance qu'il place en ²⁾ l'Organisation pour aider le Congo à sortir de sa crise. Il a fait toutefois comprendre d'une façon nette à Rykhie ^{et} ^a lui demand^{er} d'~~en~~ informer le Secrétaire général et Bunche ³⁾ que si le Gouvernement central se trouvait aujourd'hui dans une position de faiblesse sur le plan militaire par rapport au Katanga c'est surtout à cause de son respect des décisions de l'Organisation internationale . En effet depuis un an le Gouvernement central n'a pas acheté une arme cependant que les Nations Unies ont permis à Tshombe de s'armer d'une façon flagrante : aviation, blindés, recrutement des mercenaires etc. Si les Nations Unies ne peuvent dans la crise actuelle ~~compenser~~ cette faiblesse nous serions obligés de nous renforcer par les mêmes moyens que ~~employés~~ Tshombe . Nous avons beaucoup d'offres d'aide et nous avons même des possibilités de fabrication de certains engins de guerre dans nos propres usines. Adoula a ajouté : "j'attends une décision du Conseil de Sécurité pour ^{fixer} ~~obtenir~~ d'une façon définitive ~~dans mon~~ la position de ^{LA POSITION DE} Gouvernement ."

mm
MON

MK/sl

MK.

OUTGOING CODE

OK
you.

To : BUNCHE, NEW YORK

From : LINNER, LEOPOLDVILLE

Date : 10 November 1961

No. : A-2569

ROUTINE

SECRET

1. Following cable received from O'Brien regarding situation in Albertville:

" Des graves troubles viennent d'éclater ici fomentés par des Belges envoyés dans ce but. Dans des bagarres commençant dimanche-lundi, il y a eu quatre morts et une soixantaine de blessés dont quatre gravement. Les autorités locales et les chefs de Konakat et Kartel ont aidé les forces de l'ONU afin de calmer la population. Nous avons arrêté sur place dans la cité indigène même un Belge qui n'est pas habitant d'Albertville. Celui-ci a été vu par la population avec fusil à la main. Il prétendait être à la chasse. Il n'y a pas du tout une explication satisfaisante de sa présence dans la cité indigène où il a passé plusieurs nuits déjà avant les événements. Nous sommes persuadés qu'il est venu ici exprès pour fomenter des troubles et il est probable qu'il tombe sous le coup du paragraphe A-2 à double titre de conseiller politique et de paramilitaire. Cet homme s'appelle Vervist. Nous croyons que son rapatriement en Belgique s'impose pour éviter son activité nuisible ici et probablement ailleurs au Katanga. (1) Si nous ne recevons pas d'avis contraire de vous dans les vingt-quatre heures nous l'enverrons à Léo. Ces incidents prouvent que le Gouvernement provincial est très inquiet au sujet de la situation à Albertville et surtout de la tendance des dirigeants locaux de coopérer étroitement avec l'ONU et de s'orienter vers le Gouvernement central. Pour empêcher cela ils sont visiblement prêts à tous les moyens en se servant de leurs outils favoris : les mercenaires et les

dissensions inter-tribales. Toutefois les incidents n'ont pas ébranlé les dirigeants locaux et ceux de Konakat et de Kartel qui continuent de coopérer et l'ONU continue à tenir la situation bien en mains. "

2. The individual named in it, Vervist, now in Leopoldville under UN custody and being interrogated. If it is clear that his activities bring him within para A-2 of Security Council resolution, we propose to repatriate him.
3. Another Belgian, Venereth, alleged to have addressed about 90 Gendarmerie soldiers in Albertville, has also been apprehended by UN troops and is being interrogated in Albertville before transfer to Leo.

cc. Mr. N. Kanakaratne

NK/mr

OUTGOING CODE

IMMEDIATE

Handwritten signature/initials

To : BUNCHE, NEW YORK
From : LINNER, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 10 November 1961
No. : A-2568

Handwritten signature/initials

Please see our 2363.

1. Further to last sentence of para 1, West German authorities here are still ~~denying~~ ^{refusing} responsibility for repatriation of Wiltowski on grounds that he came to Katanga from Belgium and not directly from West Germany.
2. Wiltowski, ⁽¹⁾ as you already know, is stateless, originally Polish. He carries a special document issued by West German Government to foreign residents valid for three year period ending 24 November 1961 - in two weeks time - bearing No. 28901/F121473 issued on 25 November 1958. As an employee of the American Labour Service Company and working for the US armed forces in Europe, Wiltowski had been in France for two years in Orléans from where he had come to Germany in July this year for a few days and gone on to Belgium. His document carries a Belgian visa issued by the Belgian Consulate-General in Cologne. During interrogation he stated that he was recruited by Katangese agents in Paris for work in Katanga ~~and~~ but that he did not know that he was being recruited for military service. ⁽²⁾ He went to Brussels for transport to Katanga. He arrived in Katanga on July 10, and was in Kamina until 1st September when he surrendered voluntarily to ONUC troops. Position of West German authorities is that during his stay in France he had failed to renew re-entry permit to Germany which had expired in 1959 and that he had ceased thereby to be a German resident. West German Government therefore has refused to be responsible for repatriating him to West Germany, pointing out to us their co-operation in repatriating stateless person Jakiniuk who had been

permanent resident of West Germany before entering Katanga. Wiltowsky some days ago informed ONUC officials that he would go on hunger strike and was dissuaded by official of West German Embassy who visited him.

3.3¹ It will be most unfortunate if Wiltowski is not repatriated to Europe, either by West German authorities or by Belgian authorities before the only travel document he has expires in 14 days. You are aware of intentions of Central Government regarding internment of foreign mercenaries. In view of the fact that all others in Wiltowski's position have been evacuated to Europe (except Moos for whom French have tacitly accepted responsibility) and in view of particular fact that he was never actively engaged in hostilities with ONUC troops but surrendered during earliest days of operation "Rumpunch" we think special efforts should be made to have him returned to Europe. In our view this matter should be taken up immediately with the West German Observation Mission in New York so that the West German Government could treat this as a special case requiring immediate and favourable decision.

cc. Mr. N. Kanakarathne

OUTGOING CODE

OK
Charley
PRIORITY

To : Bunche

From : Linner *Mini*

Date : 10 Nov 1961

Nº : A - 2567

Reur 7802 am giving Rykhie copies of reports giving detailed account of
Luluabourg incidents

cc: Force Commander

Q JP/jg

OK/Koe

OUTGOING CODE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO : BUNCHE, NEW YORK
FROM : LINNER, LEOPOLDVILLE
DATE : 9 November 1961
NO. : A- 2566

Mini

Your 7787.

1. Note to British Ambassador, as approved by you, despatched yesterday. British ~~Charge d'Affaires~~ ^{Embassy} very concerned about our communication of contents of Chalmers' statement to the Central Government and has been making every effort to persuade us to hold this. ~~They have~~ asked whether we intend to hand over Chalmers to Central Government.
2. As instructed in your 7733 we are today addressing formal note to Prime Minister, as indicated in para two of our 2551, conveying information relating to Chalmers, as well as our own views regarding credibility of Chalmers. It is more than likely that Central Government may formally request us to turn Chalmers over to them. Please let us know immediately what we should do if such request is made, having regard to serious British concern about our transferring Chalmers to Congolese custody, although we have noted views already expressed in penultimate sentence of your 7733.

NK/mm

NK/mr

OUTGOING CODE

OK/Kov

To : BUNCHE, NEW YORK

From : LINNER, MACEOIN, AHMED, LEOPOLDVILLE

Lin

Date : 9 November 1961

No. : A- 2565

Kitona Base.

1. Adoula has formally raised, in written note, the question of our transferring the arms and ammunition presently at Kitona Base under our custody to ANC, pointing out that there now exists in the Congo a legal Government which is entitled to claim these arms and ammunition. You are of course aware of the circumstances in which we took charge of these arms and ammunition last year.

2. Although Adoula's point may be valid, question arises whether in the present circumstances transference of war material to ANC would be justified having regard to ONUC's responsibilities for maintenance of law and order and prevention of civil war situations. Will appreciate your views without delay.

cc. Force Commander
Mr. S.H. Ahmed, CAO
Mr. N. Kanakaratne

OUTGOING CLEAR

PRIORITY

LEOPOLDVILLE
9 NOV 1961

1961 NOV -9 AM 11:15

O.N.U.C.

UNATIONS
NEW YORK

A- 2564

BUNCHE FROM LINER

Lin

1. Prime Minister, Force Commander, Khiary and Mobutu returned from Luluabourg last evening 17.15Z.
2. Khiary left for Stan 05.30 Z today and is expecting to return this evening.

JP

cc: Force Commander

2
NK/mr

OUTGOING CODE

To : BUNCHE , NEW YORK
From : LINNER, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 9 November 1961
No. : A- 2563

Please refer to our 2299 regarding Huyghe.

1. Information has now been received from ONUC military that he is back in Elisabethville.
2. In this connection please see our 2560-61, CCC.1.(e).

cc. Mr. N. Kanakaratne

NK/mr

3

OUTGOING CODE

OK/Voe

To : BUNCHE, NEW YORK
From : LINNER, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 9 November 1961
No. : A- 2562

Lin

Reference your 7806. As regards first paragraph of Belgian Government's communiqué published on 30 October, please see our 2560-61, para CCC.1.(e) and 2.(a).

cc. Mr. N. Kanakaratne