


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
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11/5/09

**Note to the Secretary-General**

**Chad and CAR: deployment of a United Nations delegation**

1. In light of the repeated calls for assistance from the Government of Chad to the international community, and your report of 22 December 2006, the Security Council, in its 16 January Presidential Statement (S/PRST/2007/2), requested that an Advance Mission to Chad and the Central African Republic be deployed as soon as possible.
2. On 23 March, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chad, Mr. Allam-Mi, met informally with Council Members. The Minister reiterated President Déby's agreement with the deployment of a United Nations presence to eastern Chad, stressing that Chad would prefer a modestly sized mission. The Minister suggested Chadian alternatives to the proposals contained in our report, which envisaged deployment of either a large infantry brigade totalling approximately 6,000 all ranks, or a division-size numbering some 10,900 military personnel.
3. The proposals made by the Government of Chad do not include provisions for the protection of all civilians at risk, but rather the protection of refugees and the humanitarian workers. They also focus on the assistance that the United Nations could provide to the Chadian forces, including the Armée Nationale Tchadienne (ANT), which, if implemented, would compromise the United Nations impartiality vis-à-vis Chadian rebel groups.
4. After presenting his Government's suggestions to Council Members, Mr. Allam-Mi stressed that the Chadian Government's position was not "definitive" and that it remained open to discussions. The Minister also stated that an international "civilian presence" could be deployed as a first step, subject to a "re-evaluation" of the need for a United Nations military component at a later stage. Lastly, the Minister strongly questioned the *raison d'être* of the United Nations Advance Mission, which would be tasked to prepare the deployment of a larger United Nations presence. Despite these misgivings, the Foreign Minister made clear that the Government of Chad would not oppose discussion of these issues with a "United Nations delegation".
5. On the basis of the above, a small multi-disciplinary delegation, (12-15 persons, including specialists in political and humanitarian affairs, military, police, administration and planning) could be deployed to N'Djamena to discuss the way forward with the national authorities. Some members of the Security Council, including the French, the UK and the US are encouraging us to do so. The delegation could be tasked to explore with the national authorities the possibility of deploying the Advance Mission, and opportunities for the United Nations multi-dimensional presence described in your report. If talks succeed, the delegation could serve as a nucleus of the Advance Mission.



6. We should, nevertheless, also be prepared for the possibility that the Government of Chad may continue to resist the notion that the Advance Mission collect more information on the situation in the border areas as well as explore the modalities for a United Nations presence aimed at protecting the civilian population (not only the refugees). In any case, the delegation would produce a draft report for your consideration and possible onward transmission to the Security Council on the position of the Chadian authorities 30 days after its arrival in Chad.

7. I am attaching the Terms of Reference for the proposed UN delegation. I would suggest that Mr. François Dureau, Chief of the DPKO Situation Centre, lead the delegation and oversee its day-to-day management, including contact with Government officials and other interlocutors. Mr. Dureau led the two technical assessment missions that were sent to Chad in January-February and late November and would thus ensure the required continuity. Should higher-level consultations become necessary, I would consider dispatching a more senior DPKO official.

8. If you agree with these recommendations, I will submit to you a draft letter to President Déby, informing him of your intention to dispatch a delegation to N'Djamena shortly.



Jean-Marie Guéhenno  
3 May 2007

cc: Mr. Nambiar  
Mr. Pascoe  
Mr. Holmes  
Mr. Gutters



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
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### Note to the Secretary-General

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Jean-Marie Guéhenno  
3 May 2007

cc: Mr. Nambiar  
Mr. Pascoe  
Mr. Holmes  
Mr. Gutierrez



**Terms of Reference for the United Nations Delegation to Chad**

**Background**

1. On 16 January 2007, the Security Council adopted a Presidential Statement (S/PRST/2007/2), which requested the Secretary-General to deploy as soon as possible an Advance Mission to Chad and the Central African Republic as envisaged in paragraph 88 of his report of 22 December (S/2006/1019). In the meantime, the Secretary-General issued another report on 23 February (S/2007/97), including a description of the Advance Mission and detailed proposals for the size, structure and mandate of a UN multi-dimensional presence in the two countries, which envisaged the deployment of either a large infantry brigade totaling approximately 6,000 all ranks, or a division-size force numbering some 10,900 military personnel.
2. On 23 March, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chad met informally with the Security Council. The Minister reiterated President Déby's agreement with the deployment of a United Nations presence to eastern Chad, however stressing that Chad would prefer a more "modestly" sized mission. The Minister suggested alternatives to the proposals contained in the latest SG report of 23 February (S/2007/97). After presenting his Government's suggestions to Council Members, Mr. Allam-Mi stressed that the Chadian Government's position was not "definitive" and that they remained open.
3. While the Minister strongly questioned the *raison d'être* of the UN Advance Mission, which would be tasked to prepare the deployment of a larger United Nations presence, he added that the Government of Chad would not oppose discussion of these issues with a "UN delegation".
4. In light of the above, the Secretary-General has decided to deploy, as a matter of urgency, a UN delegation to Chad.

**Mandate**

5. The UN delegation will:
  - Consult with national authorities of Chad, including at the highest level, to further clarify the rationale for the two options described in the Secretary-General's report of 23 February (S/2007/97), including the requirement for a military protection component;
  - Explore with the national authorities the possibility of deploying the Advance Mission, and opportunities for the United Nations multi-dimensional presence described in the last Secretary-General's report;

- Conduct the necessary scoping and planning work relevant to the options contained in the last Secretary-General's report, including on major elements of the proposed scenarios;
- Engage Chadian authorities in a discussion on the modalities of relocating a number of refugee camps away from the border with Sudan;
- Consult the diplomatic community, UN Country Team and other stakeholders on the ground.
- If need be, additional consultations will be required with the national authorities of the Central African Republic (CAR);
- Provide regular and special reports to UNHqs, including on all major contacts.

6. If there is consensus on the proposals and options described in the Secretary-General's report of 23 February (S/2007/97), the UN delegation will serve as a nucleus of the Advance Mission authorized by Security Council's Presidential Statement of 16 January 2007 (S/PRST/2007/2).

7. Should the Government of Chad not accept the options made by the Secretary-General and/or the deployment of the Advance Mission, the UN delegation would not be authorized to negotiate a new proposal for a peacekeeping presence in Chad, but would be expected to assess the situation and submit its comprehensive recommendations to the USG for peacekeeping operations for further guidance. If need be, these recommendations should be in the form of a draft report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council.

#### **Timeframe and outputs**

8. The UN delegation will deploy in May 2007 and remain in Chad for 30-45 days. It will be joined by a high-level Representative of the Secretary-General pending discussions with the national authorities. The final duration of the delegation's mission will be decided by the Under Secretary-General of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Last, the delegation will produce a draft report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the position of the Chadian authorities 30 days after it deploys to Chad.

#### **Composition**

9. The UN delegation will be deployed to N'djamena (with the possibility of traveling in Chad and the CAR subject to the DSS approval) and will comprise the following officers:

- 1) Chief of Staff (D-1)
- 2) Senior Administrative Officer (D-1)

- 3) Humanitarian Liaison Officer (P-4)
- 4) Political Affairs Officer (P-4)
- 5) Reporting Officer (P-3)
- 6) 2 Military Planning and Liaison Officers (Colonel and Major)
- 7) 2 UN Police Officer (Police Commissioner and Colonel of gendarmerie)
- 8) Logistics Officer (P-5)
- 9) 3 General Service Staff (FS)

10. In order to ensure continuity, a number of Secretariat staff (one military, one police and one from OO) who participated in the Team Assessment Missions, will join the UN delegation the first week of their mission to facilitate contacts with Chadian authorities and other stakeholders.