United Nations Nations Unies

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

TO: Mr. Vijay Nambiar
A: Chef de Cabinet
Executive Office of the Secretary-General

DATE: 18 April 2008

REFERENCE:

THROUGH:
S/C DE:

FROM: Horst Heitmann
DE: Director
Security Council Affairs Division
Department of Political Affairs

SUBJECT: **Security Council: Report on Activities**
OBJET:

Attached please find, for the attention of the Secretary-General, a note on the joint meeting of members of the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC), held on Thursday, 17 April 2008 (a.m.).

cc: Mr. Pascoe (o/r)
Mr. Menkerios

APR 1 8 2008

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Thursday, 17 April 2008 (a.m.)

INFORMAL MEETING

Joint Meeting of SC and AUPSC members

Members of the Security Council and the AUPSC held their second joint meeting today, under the co-chairmanship of Ambassador Kumalo of South Africa (President of the Council for the month of April 2008), Ambassador Sawers of the United Kingdom and Ambassador Zewde of Ethiopia (the AUPSC Chair for the month of April 2008). In short introductory remarks, the co-chairs reaffirmed the importance and urgency of strengthening cooperation and coordination between the two bodies, as well as challenges in this regard.

The participants first discussed effective ways to strengthen cooperation and coordination between the two bodies. Speakers were unanimous in welcoming the joint UNSC/AUPSC meetings, with the Russian Federation praising them as the beginning of a "beautiful tradition". Indonesia suggested to hold such a meeting early in the year to benefit the incoming elected members of the Security Council. A number of speakers (e.g. Nigeria (AUPSC) the Russian Federation) made procedural points, maintaining that as in the case of the first meeting in Addis Ababa last year, the yearly joint meeting should be co-chaired by the Presidents of the two bodies. As a way out, Ambassador Churkin suggested the possibility of calling these encounters "meeting between the members" of the two Councils. This proposal did not receive support from other speakers and it was not further discussed (however, Ambassador Churkin raised this procedural matter at the informal consultations of the Council in the afternoon). Ambassador Zewde opined that the joint endeavor should be presented as a meeting between the two organs.

Burkina Faso, which was represented on both Councils but pledged to "speak with one voice", suggested that the cooperation between the two bodies should focus on the sharing of information, knowledge and expertise. He further suggested that a member of UNSC should attend AU meetings, as already happened this year, and perhaps the other way around too, and that the AUPSC should get more involved in UNSC visits to Africa with either its President or 2-3 of its members joining the UNSC mission. Ambassador Kafando also argued for greater UN support to build AU capacity in conflict prevention and management, as well as in early warning. Similarly, China underlined the need to find more reliable resources for AU peace efforts, especially in logistics and finances. Ambassador Wang, echoed by Libya, praised the ten-year capacity-building programme in peace and security issues by the UN Secretariat, as

well as the establishment of a UN liaison office in Addis Ababa and assistance section in New York. Ambassador Ettalhi argued for institutionalizing the cooperation between the two Councils, in particular through an immediate establishment of specific mechanisms for the implementation of resolution 1809, but with a clear separation of responsibilities and roles between the two bodies. While the UNSC had the primary responsibility for maintaining peace and security, it had to appreciate situations when the AUPSC played its regional role, he further stressed. China, joined by Belgium, drew attention to the "comparative advantages" of the UN and AU, with the two organizations complementing each other: the former offering its experience and resources and the latter being familiar with local issues and accepted by the countries concerned. Italy and Belgium stressed the need for much more than just cooperation and coordination. Italy urged the two organizations to work together every step of the way to achieve their common objectives. However, France was opposed to the idea of institutionalizing the UNSC/AUPSC cooperation, maintaining that the UN Charter gave the primary responsibility for peace and security to the UNSC and this responsibility could not be delegated to other organizations. There should be no "à la carte security" or "à la carte peacekeeping", Ambassador Ripert said. He underscored the need to focus on what the Council could do together with the AU.

Moving on to the specific issues, the United States briefed AUPSC members on the situation in the Sudan, including the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the activities of UNMIS, the political process in Darfur and the difficulties confronted by UNAMID. Ambassador Khalilzad noted that the political process still faced "major obstacles", and called for the appointment of a single chief negotiator. Pointing out that UNAMID had barely 1,000 troops more than the former AMIS, he stressed the need to speed up its deployment and demanded that the Sudanese government lift all restrictions on the mission.

Responding on behalf of the AUPSC, Nigeria shared the concern with the slow progress both on the implementation of the CPA and the deployment of UNAMID. It stressed that the AU was very much seized of the situation in the Sudan, citing the establishment of AU liaison offices in Khartoum and Juba as well as the appointment of a special envoy by IGAD. On UNAMID, he maintained that African countries were willing to contribute to the mission, but could not do so due to financial and logistical constraints. He underlined the need to ensure the safety of rebel leaders, who had been reluctant to join the peace talks due to concern about their own security.

France observed that the problem of hunger did not exist in Darfur four years ago when the conflict had broken out. Ambassador

Ripert asserted that the Sudanese government bore the primary responsibility for the delay in the international response to the crisis over the last three years. Belgium agreed that UNAMID should utilize the "comparative advantages" of the UN and AU, and called for an open political dialogue between the two bodies in order to avoid misunderstandings which could be "harmful" for the two bodies and might cause a "split" in their joint endeavors.

Algeria (AUPSC) underlined the need for international assistance in order for the AUPSC to meet the expectations of the African people and thus acquire credibility among them. While admitting that the slow deployment of UNAMID had led to "some disappointment", China insisted that equal attention should be given to the political process, which had been lagging "far behind". Ambassador Wang also noted that the root cause of the crisis was the lack of social and economic development, which was closely linked to the question of peace and security. Echoing China's argument, Libya maintained that the UN and AU should focus on the political process and exert "genuine pressure" on the unwilling rebel groups. Ambassador Ettalhi also noted that given the "regional nature" of the crisis, it was essential for the Sudan and Chad to settle their bilateral disputes. He reiterated that Khartoum had extended a "large measure of cooperation" to the UN and the AU, and urged the UN to overcome the remaining problems concerning the UNAMID deployment. Chad (AUPSC) took issue with Libya's reference to the need to settle its dispute with the Sudan, blaming the latter for causing the crisis, and in particular for its support to Chadian rebel groups.

Turning to the situation in Somalia, Uganda (AUPSC) briefed the Council on the activities of AMISOM, which continued to face "serious financial and logistical constraints". He reiterated the need to replace the mission with a UNPKO. Pending such a deployment, he called on the UN to put in place a financial, logistical and technical support package for AMISOM "in a manner similar to what was done for AMIS". He also urged the Council to send a clear message of warning to "all spoilers bent on undermining the peace process" and, together with the AU, to call on all the parties in Somalia to comply with international humanitarian law.

Responding on behalf of the Council, the United Kingdom reassured the AUPSC of the Council's commitment to cooperate with the AU in assisting the TFIs. Ambassador Sawers then switched to speak in his national capacity, and observed that despite some political progress, such as the establishment of the new government, the country remained fraught with humanitarian and other problems. He stated that Council members were now reflecting on the proposals contained in the latest report of the Secretary-General, with a view to adopting a resolution in the coming weeks. In this context,

Ambassador Sawers said that the Council was mindful of the experience of successful and unsuccessful experiments vis-à-vis PKOs. (He explicitly pointed to the "concern" among Council members that UNAMID could become an unsuccessful experiment.) Citing the risk of overreaching and setting expectations too high, he emphasized that "the mood on the Council is to do more but in a progressive way". As to the issue of resources and finances, Ambassador Sawers noted that the Council would wait for the envisaged report of the panel of distinguished persons, which was to consider the modalities of how to support AU peacekeeping operations.

On the other hand, Italy believed that there was a "strong feeling" in the Council to do more even on a progressive basis. Ambassador Mantovani urged the Council to be more pro-active by factoring in the AU's views, stressing that AMISOM was a test case for UN/AU cooperation. He reiterated the need for a "swift UN re-hatting" in Somalia as soon as the necessary conditions were met. China stated that he had been "moved" by the briefing by Uganda, noting that the Somali crisis had been with the Council for too long and the suffering of the people had to be put to an end. Ambassador Wang maintained that all conflicts should be treated with "the same seriousness", with the UN taking a leading role. At this juncture, he questioned the wisdom of rigidly applying the "no peace, no PKO" principle, citing as an example the case of Lebanon where UNIFIL had been deployed despite continuous fighting. He urged the Council to meet expectations in Africa, contending that when there was political will, more could be done. Gabon (AUPSC) underlined the need to do more on the question of security, and urged the Council to provide AMISOM with financial and logistical support.

As for the DRC, France noted that this was a difficult time, as expectations among the people were increasing while the international community seemed to be "walking away" from the DRC. Ambassador Ripert underlined the importance of showing peace dividends to the Congolese people. He acknowledged that much remained to be done, as the security situation continued to be precarious, particularly in the Kivus, and sexual violence was rampant. He stressed the primary responsibility of the DRC to take up the challenges with the support from the international community.

Responding on behalf of the AUPSC, Angola explained the activities of the AU in support of the political and constitutional process in the DRC. He shared the concern with the situation in the Kivus but highlighted the "valuable contribution" made by the AU in facilitating the holding of the Goma conference, which had given rise to hope for stability in the eastern DRC. He called for further international support to consolidate the progress made so far.

Turning to the situation in Côte d'Ivoire, Ambassador Bruno Zidouemba of Burkina Faso (AUPSC) welcomed the progress achieved in the wake of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA), in particular regarding the identification issue; the electoral process with the first round of presidential elections now set for 30 November 2008; and the restoration of state authority throughout the country. At the current stage, the country faced two essential issues: the convening of free, transparent and democratic elections, on the one hand, and financing the process of overcoming the crisis, on the other. Despite the delays that the original timetable had experienced, the peace process in Côte d'Ivoire advanced slowly but steadily. However, he pointed out that the process remained fragile and needed sustained support by the international community, in particular the UN, AU and other partners.

In addition to the four cases discussed above, Ambassador Zewde of Ethiopia (AUPSC) briefly referred to the questions of the Comoros and Kenya. On the Comoros, which was on the agenda of the AU, she said that the AU would keep the Secretary-General informed of developments. She noted that a good lesson had been learnt from the situation in Kenya on the necessity to avoid duplication in mediation efforts by the two organizations. She stated that the AU Assembly had decided to reflect on the way elections were prepared and organized in Africa, with a view to avoiding post-election turmoil as in the case of Kenya and other countries.

The United Kingdom stated that the Council hoped that Zimbabwe would not slip into a conflict, and reaffirmed support for the ongoing efforts of SADC in this regard. If the government did not abide by the outcome of the elections, he warned, it would become a "stain" to the reputation of not only Zimbabwe but also the whole of Africa. Concluding, Ambassador Sawers said that the Council was looking forward to having the next meeting with the AUPSC in Addis Ababa in 2009.

South Africa introduced a number of amendments to the draft communiqué, which was adopted after a brief exchange of views (Attachment).

Kiyotaka Kawabata/Nikolai Galkin
SCSB/SCAD/17 April 2008

Attachment

DRAFT JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF THE MEETING BETWEEN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. *Recalling* that the Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and recalling the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations on the relationship with regional arrangements;

2. *Recognizing* that an effective relationship between the United Nations and the African Union , in particular the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council would contribute significantly towards addressing common peace and security challenges and facilitate their resolution in Africa;

3. *Reaffirming* the importance of the AU's role in the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and Constitutive Act of the AU **Protocol**, the importance of co-ordination between the UN and AU in pursuance of this role and of making full use of the UN and AU's complementary capacities and experience.

4. *In that regard, underlining* the importance **and the need for** the operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture, especially the African Standby Force **and the continental Early Warning System**;

5. *Recalling the* Presidential Statements and decisions of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council on the relationship between the two bodies;

6. *Recalling* also the joint Communiqué agreed by the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council on **16** June 2007;

7. At our second meeting, both Councils explored ways and means of developing a stronger working relationship between the two bodies, and following an exchange of views expressed satisfaction with the ongoing efforts to strengthen their relationship, through:

a) enhancing cooperation in the fields of conflict prevention, management and resolution, including in respect of issues such as the good offices of the Secretary-General, mediation support, effective use of sanctions, early warning and support of the AU Panel of the Wise; peacekeeping and peace building;

b) taking steps to identify predictable, sustainable and flexible resources for the African Union, in order to undertake peacekeeping operations in the context of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.

c) sharing of experiences on working methods between the two structures;

d) Encouraging the implementation of the 10-Year Capacity Building Programme for the AU, in particular between the UN Secretariat and the AU Commission and looking forward to the first review by the two organization of the Programme.

e) discussing ways that the UNSC and the broader international community can cooperate with the AU to assist it in further developing its military planning, technical, logistical, financial management and administrative capacities, so that the AU is able to conduct peacekeeping operations in the most effective, transparent and accountable manner

f) sharing information on African conflict situations on the respective agendas of the two bodies, including but not limited to **Somalia; Sudan; Cote d'Ivoire and DRC**.

8. ***We welcome*** **the progress made in the establishment of the African Peace and Security architecture and we** *re-affirm* our determination to strengthen the AU conflict prevention, management and resolution capacities and post-conflict stabilization capacities, through;

a) assessing regularly the developments in the region;

b) supporting African regional and sub-regional capacities for early warning to enable prompt response to early warning indicators; and

c) supporting African Union capacities for mediation

9. In this regard we welcome initiatives such as the African Union Peacekeeping Support Team established by the United Nations, the capacity building efforts undertaken by the EU in the framework of the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, and other actions, including bilateral initiatives in support of AU capacity-building that will contribute, in a coordinated way to improvements in mission planning and mission management.

10. We look forward to further discussions at our next meeting in **Addis Ababa** 2009.

New York
17th April 2008.