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EL/WG JUNE 2009

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SERIES S-1063BOX 61FILE 6ACC. 1998/0283

IMPORTANT TASKS PERFORMED BY MILOBS

General

1. MILOBS are the eyes and ears of SRSG/FORCE CDR/CMO/DCMO. MILOBS are reasonably senior, highly mature and experienced military officers who are carefully selected for an objective and unbiased reporting in war torn countries. They are performing very important tasks in UNAMIR(RWANDA). Hence it is felt that even in the revised mandate, the strength of MILOBS should not be reduced/ be only marginally reduced. Some of the important tasks performed by the MILOBS are given in succeeding paras.

Patrolling.

2. Patrolling is an essential activity for observing, dominating, enquiring and assessing the prevailing situation in the area of responsibility. The main aims of patrolling are:-

- (a) To confirm/verify/supervise an incident, agreement or any violation.
- (b) To obtain information about terrain and topography.
- (c) To assess the general situation in a given area.
- (d) To show the presence of UN.
- (e) To interact with local people and other agencies to obtain any information which could be useful to UNAMIR operations/tasks.

Visits to Communes.

3. Visit various Communes in the area of responsibility to enquire about the following and take necessary actions/ info concerned agencies for necessary actions:-

- (a) Meet Commune Bourgemestre and enquire about Commune problems.
- (b) Population. Population details , ethnic groups and their intersay relationship.
- (c) Assess living conditions of local population.
- (d) Food. Check availability of food and water in the Commune. Distribution of food if any and what agency?
- (e) Orphans. Their number, condition and problems.
- (f) Education. State of education, number of children attending, availability of teachers and problems if any.
- (g) Prisons. Check conditions of prisos and detention centres . Check condition of prisoners, human right violations and the judicial system available.
- (h) Agriculture. Check availability of agricultural implements, seeds and water for cultivation.
- (i) Health. Check prevelent diseases hospitals/health centres, availability of doctors/nurses and supply position of medicines.
- (j) Security. Assess the security situation, cases of banditary arrests, killings by RPA and others.
- (k) RPA. Deployment , strength, Commanders and their attitude towards local population.

(l) Administrative Setup. The setup, their attitude, efforts towards reconciliations and inclinations.

(m) Returnees. Their numbers, integration in mainstream, problems, assistance provided by local administration, security/harrasment if any, housing, food and attitude of locals and RPA.

Escort Duties.

4. MILOBs provide unarmed escorts to :-
 - (a) VIPs and other visiting persons.
 - (b) NGOs.
 - (c) IDPs while moving back to their home communes. During Op RETOUR the MILOBs were tasked for following:-
 - (i) Monitoring of target Communes.
 - (ii) Liaise and coordinate between Open Relief Centres (ORC), local authorities and IDPs.
 - (iii) Escort IDP convoys from Displaced Persons Camps (DPC) to ORC/ home communes in conjunction with RPA and UN troops.
 - (iv) Provide liaison between RPA and Un troops.

Humanitarian Situation.

5. MILOBs are monitoring the humanitarian situation in their respective sectors. Each sector has a Hum Offr who works in close coordination with local Humanitarian, Human Rights and other NGOs. Some of the important tasks are:-
 - (a) Close contact with the Prefect and representative of the Ministry of Rehabilitation.
 - (b) To work in close cooperation with UNHCR and render necessary assistance to them in execution of their tasks in rehabilitation of IDPs and returnees.
 - (c) Assist World Food Programme (WFP) in coordination of food and aid delivery to medical centres and orphanages.
 - (d) Works in close coordination with HR and ICRC to assess the situation in Commune cachots and prisons.

Advantages of MILOBs

6. MILOBs have tremendous advantage over other agencies in carrying out accurate observation, evaluation and assessment since they are all offr with good experience, sound military background and possess analytical mind. Some of the striking advantages of Military Observers (officers) are:-
 - (a) Even in absence of comprehensive guidelines, they can carry out their tasks effectively. They do not need supervision.
 - (b) Because of their military background, they can carry out an accurate assessment of the prevailing security situation.

(c) It is much easier for an officer to interact with the local population (keeping in mind the language problem in Rwanda).

(d) Correct assessment is very essential for optimum utilisation of meagre UN resources. MILOBs can make an accurate assessment of existing situation as also to what is likely to happen in the near future due to their constant interaction with local population and NGOs.

(e) It has been experienced that often representatives of HR and other NGOs insists on MILOBs accompanying them.

(f) Where numbers are playing predominant role (as the Rwandese Govt is insisting on certain numbers of total strength of UNAMIR all inclusive), retention of maximum number of MILOBs may be more useful to UNAMIR.

Recommendations.

7. In view of foregoing , it is strongly felt that one of the following options could be adopted:-

(a) Option One. The strength of MILOBs to remain at the existing level. This option would be most beneficial to the organisation due to reasons given above.

(b) Option Two. The strength of MILOBs be reduced from present 320 to 224 (a reduction of 30 %) as per following details (detailed Revised Organisation chart is given at Appx attached):-

- (i) MILOB HQ. MILOB HQ including HAC - 22.
- (ii) Sectors.

MILOBS TASKS IN REVISED MANDATE

1. Deploy in new MILOB sectors by 10 Jul 95.
2. Constantly monitor, assess and report on the prevailing situation in the area of responsibility.
3. Monitor border crossing of Rwandan refugee returnees from Zaire, Burundi, Tanzania and Uganda.
4. Carry out regular patrolling in area of responsibility.
5. Monitor security situation in the area of responsibility.
6. Monitor the following in communes:-
 - (a) Security situation.
 - (b) Population.
 - (c) Returnees, their numbers, resettlement and their problems.
 - (d) Development activities.
 - (e) Attitude of RPA and civil authorities towards local population.
 - (f) Agricultural activities.
 - (g) Health and hygienic conditions in commune and commune prisons.
 - (h) Humanitarian needs.
7. Having obtained the humanitarian needs and other problems contact concerned authority/agency including NGOs to solve their problems to the maximum extent that is feasible.
8. Humanitarian team of MILOBs will maintain close liaison with HAC .
9. Provide unarmed escorts to VIPs and NGOs if required.
10. Assist humanitarian agencies in coordinating their activities.
11. Assist NGOs in coordinating their activities.
12. Be prepared to coordinate and if possible provide transport for the repatriation of refugees.
13. Motivate refugees, where feasible, to return to their homes.
14. Monitor refugee movement within Rwanda.
15. Maintain good liaison and coordinate activities with formed troops as required.
16. Maintain liaison with local authorities and RPA.

OPS OFFERS CONF (25 JAN 96) : AGENDA POINTS

1. WELCOME
2. INTRO NEW OPS OFFERS
3. MILOB OPS
 - A. MANDATE PRIORITY - REFUGEES
 - B. VISIT TO BDR POSTS TC COMMUNES
 - C. PRISONS, CACHOT, INCIDENTS , MONITORING
 - D. LIAISON WITH RPA , NGOs , UN AGENCIES.
 - E. MEDIATOR ROLE
 - F. SHARING OF INFO WITH ALL RADIO UNAMIR , TRIBUNAL, RPA, UN AGENCIES, NGOs.
 - G. HUMANITARIATION ASSISTANCE (DATA , TPT, ENGR, COMN) COORD WITH NGOs. FOR PROBLEMS REFER TO HAC.
4. DRAW DOWN PLANS
 - A. DATES
 - B. PLANS
5. FINAL REPORT
6. DOCUMENTS
 - A. ALL SITREPS
 - B. INCIDENT AND INVESTIGATION REPORTS
 - C. DATA
7. H/T CERTS OLD SECTS
8. RETURNEE DATA
 - A. MANDATE PRIORITY , DAILY FIGURES TO NY
 - B. FIGs FROM UNHCR , IOM AND MILOBS
 - C. VARIATIONS
 - D. FINAL COMPILATION , SECTS AS WELL. SINCE BEGINNING OF UNAMIR OR AT LEAST SINCE JAN 95.
9. SITREP FORMAT
10. PTS FROM SECTS
11. CMO's REMARKS
12. CLOSING ADDRESS

1. Welcome
2. Intro
3.
4.
5. Final Report
6. Documents

BRIEFING NOTES - OPERATIONS

FORCE HQ - UNAMIR

INTRODUCTION

1. UNAMIR has gone through a great transformation since Oct 93 and this has led to a remarkable modification in the deployment and the operations of the Force.

AIM

2. The aim of this brief is to give a background history of RWANDA and UNAMIR since its inception in Oct 93.

SCOPE

3. The brief will cover the following:
- a. GENERAL INFORMATION.
 - b. BACKGROUND HISTORY OF RWANDAN CONFLICT.
 - c. FORMATION OF UNAMIR AND ITS DEPLOYMENT.
 - d. UNAMIR DEPLOYMENT AFTER 06 APRIL 94.
 - e. NEW MISSION AND CONCEPT OF OPERATION.
 - f. IMPORTANT OPERATIONS BY UNAMIR.
 - g. CONCLUSION.

GENERAL INFORMATION

4. Geographical Location. Rwanda is located in East Central Africa, having a relatively small area. The country is bounded on the North by UGANDA, to the East by Tanzania, to the South by Burundi and Zaire to the West.

5. Terrain. The terrain is rugged with steep hills and ridges. The North is dominated by a powerful chain of volcanoes known as the VIRUNGA. The highest is the KARISIMBI (Approx 4500 meters).

6. Vegetation. This varies from tropical rain forest in the West to savanna grassland in the East.

7. Ethnic Division. ~~The population is made up of three ethnic~~

groups: HUTU 85%, TUTSI 14% and TWA 1%.

BACKGROUND HISTORY OF CONFLICT

8. ZAIRE, RWANDA and BURUNDI have identical colonial past in that they were all under Belgian domination.

9. RWANDA and BURUNDI were both originally inhabited by the TWA tribe. Then came the HUTUS from the North, hundred of years ago followed by the Tutsis during the 18th century. Under colonial rule the Tutsis were exclusively given western education which made them dominant over the rest of the local population even though they did not form the majority. The Tutsi domination created problems in both countries. In Burundi the minority Tutsi tribe still controls the military, Civil Service and the economy of the country.

10. In 1959 the Tutsi domination of the majority Hutu in RWANDA was rejected through a rebellion which resulted in the overthrow of the ruling Tutsis. The rebellion led to the fleeing of over 160,000 Tutsis into neighbouring countries while an estimated 20,000 were killed. In 1961 a UN supervised referendum in the country brought victory to the Hutu led party known as the "Party of Hutu Emancipation Movement (PARME HUTU). The power base in Rwanda therefore shifted to the Hutu majority from 1961.

11. The situation in Rwanda though tense was stable until Oct 1990 when an estimated force of about 10,000 men largely made up of exiled Tutsis crossed into North Eastern Rwanda from Uganda. The initial attack was repulsed by the RGF with the help of Zairian and French troops. The force which was known as the Rwandan Patriotic Force turned guerrilla with most of its attacks on Rwanda coming from the North and North West. The attacks continued with the RPF gaining territory until March 1993 when a cease fire agreement was signed between the Government and the rebels. Under the truce, the RPF gave up about half the territory it controlled to give way for the creation of a 19 KM wide demilitarized Zone. On 04 August 1993 the RPF and RGF under the aegis of the OAU signed the ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT which called upon the UN to put in place an International neutral force known as United Nations Assistance Mission In Rwanda (UNAMIR) to assist in a 22 month peace process starting from 5 Oct 93. At Arusha the warring factions agreed on the following:

- a. Install a Broad Base Transitional Government.
- b. Set up transitional institutions
- c. Deploy a neutral international force
- d. Withdraw foreign troops from Rwanda.

- e. Deploy an RPF battalion in Kigali to protect RPF dignitaries involved in the transition process.
- f. Integrate RGF and RPF into the National Defence Force.
- g. Protect expatriates and ensure the security of humanitarian agencies operating in Rwanda.
- h. Integrate OAU observers into UN observers.
- i. Repatriate refugees and resettle displaced persons.
- j. Ensure a secure atmosphere for a general election.

FORMATION OF UNAMIR AND ITS DEPLOYMENT

13. Based on the Arusha Agreement, the Security Council adopted Resolution 846 which sent a Reconnaissance Mission to Rwanda on 17 Aug 93. The mission was assigned the task of assessing and reporting on the contributions which the UN could make to assist the OAU in the implementation of the peace agreement. It was also assigned the task of assessing the human and material requirements essential to the implementation of the peace agreement. On 5 Oct 93 the Security Council adopted Resolution 872 which gave UNAMIR a mandate for 6 months.

14. Prior to the arrival of UNAMIR troops in Rwanda, the OAU had an observer team of 104 officers and a sixty-man company from Tunisia to monitor the cease fire. These officers and men were absorbed by UNAMIR when it was established.

15. In order to execute this mandate, the UNAMIR force was deployed in 6 Sectors as follows:

- a. UNOMUR Sector. The UNOMUR Sector covered areas in northern Rwanda and part of southern Uganda. The Sector was patrolled by Military Observers.
- b. RPF Sector. The RPF Sector, referred to the area north of the DMZ. This included areas occupied by the RPF during the cease fire in 1993.
- c. The DMZ Sector. The DMZ Sector was a 19 KM wide "No mans Land" or buffer zone created to separate the warring factions. UNAMIR had the following forces deployed in the area:

- (1) Ghanaian Bn.
- (2) Bangladesh Engr Coy.
- (3) MILOB Teams.

(4) Tunisian Coy (-)

d. The RGF Sector. The RGF Sector referred to the areas immediately south of the DMZ controlled by the RGF. MILOBS were responsible for monitoring the cease fire in that sector.

e. KIGALI WEAPON SECURE AREA (KWSA). KWSA included areas immediately surrounding Kigali the capital, and it had the following units:

- (1) Belgian Bn (-).
- (2) Bangladesh Bn (-) comprising:
 - (a) Log Coy.
 - (b) Med Pl.
 - (c) Mov Con Pl.
 - (d) Tpt Pl.
- (3) MILOBS.

f. The Southern Sector. The Southern sector referred to the area south of the RGF Sector. The forces which operated there were largely MILOB Teams.

UNAMIR DEPLOYMENT AFTER APR 94.

16. After the death of President Juvenal Habyarimana under very suspicious circumstances, the Presidential Guard went on a rampage killing opponents of the government and all Tutsis they could lay their hands on with the assistance of the Interhamwe, a pro-government militia organisation. Their reasons being that the plane crash was the work of forces opposed to the government. The RPF in Kigali having been appalled by the systematic killing of their sympathizers, broke out of their confinement at Parliament House thus ending the cease fire reached with the former Government in March 1993. In order to stop the carnage by the Presidential Guards and the Interhamwe, the RPF in the North moved southwards to linked up with those in Kigali and advanced in three fronts, a Western, a Central and an Eastern front. The main thrust of the RPF advance was concentrated on the eastern front which turned westwards after moving southwards from the east. The RPA leadership was resolute so was their advance, with the RGF, Presidential Guards and Interhamwe fleeing ahead of the RPF advance. The RPF advance only stopped when the French occupied the Sector 4, formerly known as the Humanitarian Protection Zone (HPZ). The HPZ thus provided a safe haven for both the RGF and Militia, majority of whom since the

withdrawal of the French on 21 Aug 94 have fled to Zaire.

17. During the war the deteriorating situation led to the scaling down of the UNAMIR force from 2517 to just under 500 and the tasks the small force undertook were as follows:

- a. Provided security to displaced persons in camps under UNAMIRs care.
- b. Performed escort duties.
- c. Provided Humanitarian Assistance to Displaced Persons.
- d. Monitored the activities of Non Government Organizations.
- e. Ensured the security of personnel involved in Humanitarian Aid distribution. And finally,
- f. Transfer of Rwandese from territory held by either the RGF or the RPF to the other.

18. Now UNAMIR is much bigger than the 500 troops it had during the war. The target UNAMIR strength now stands at 6,100. To date the following countries have contributed troops:

- a. Australia.
- b. Britain.
- c. Canada.
- d. Ethoipia.
- e. Ghana.
- f. Malawi.
- g. Nigeria.
- h. Senegal, Chad, Congo, Niger, Guinea Bissau
- i. Tunisia.
- j. Zambia.
- k. India and Mali.

NEW MISSION AND CONCEPT OF OPERATION

19. UNAMIR mission now is to assist and co-ordinate the humanitarian support of participating countries and NGOs with the

view to bringing an end to the crisis in Rwanda.

20. The thrust of UNAMIR's effort is to bring back refugees and displaced persons and settle them in their respective home areas. Rwanda has therefore been divided into 6 sectors.

- a. SECTOR 1 - NICOY AND MILOBS.
- b. SECTOR 2 - GHANBATT AND MILOBS.
- c. SECTOR 3A - MALAWICOY AND MILOBS.
- d. SECTOR 3B - MALICOY AND MILOBS.
- d. SECTOR 4A - ZAMBATT AND MILOBS.
- e. SECTOR 4B - FRAFBATT, consisting of 5 countries namely; Chad, Congo, Guinea Bissau, Niger and Senegal.
- f. SECTOR 4C - ETHIOBATT with MILOBS.
- g. SECTOR 5 - TUNBATT with MILOBS.
- h. SECTOR 6 - INDBATT with MILOBS.

22. The new concept of operation of UNAMIR therefore aims at:

- a. Stabilizing refugees and displaced persons in their present locations.
- b. Preparing the home communes for their return by helping to improve essential life supporting services in the communes with the assistance of NGOs.
- c. Then encouraging them to return to their home areas.
- d. Providing transportation, food, water, medical assistance on their way to their homes.
- e. Assisting the people to return to their normal life and finally,
- f. Handover in due course all humanitarian activities to the Rwandese Government.

23. Based on the new concept of operations some of the tasks performed by the formed troops include the following:

- a. Conduct of protective operations such as:
 - (1) Road blocks.

- (2) Check Points (static and random).
 - (3) Vital point protection.
 - (4) Observation posts.
 - (5) Cordon and search and
 - (6) Patrol.
- b. Provide security in large towns, villages and in refugee/displaced peoples camps.
 - c. Deny insurgent activity in their sectors.
 - d. Guard UN installations within the UNAMIR AOR.
 - e. Assist local authority in maintaining law and order in camps.
 - f. Motivate the displaced persons to return to their homes.
 - g. Assist the NGOs in the distribution of food, water and medical support.
 - h. Assist in the coordination of all activities of NGOs.
 - i. Handover all activities to the Government and NGOs progressively as the situation becomes normal.

IMPORTANT OPERATIONS BY UNAMIR

24. UNAMIR Occupation of the HPZ. On 22 Aug 94, UNAMIR took over the HPZ and the French Forces (less FRAFBATT) withdrew from Rwanda. It was at this point that the HPZ became known as Sector 4.

25. Operation FOXTROT. During the French occupation of Sector 4, a Gendarmerie was established which was not recognised subsequently by the newly established Rwandan Government. UNAMIR undertook to successfully disarm and demobilise this force.

26. Reintegration of Sector 4. The RPA was gradually reintegrated in Sector 4 in the Sep/Oct period. During this time, the Government policy of reconciliation was articulated by leaders and Prefect administration was re-established. RPA troops are now permanently deployed throughout the Sector.

27. Operation HOMEWARD. Operation Homeward was mounted in Sep 94 to capitalise on the temporary availability of UNAMIR resources (principally transport and coordination expertise) to assist relief agencies to relocate IDPs to their homes. Although the operation was relatively limited in its success, it provided valuable lessons

as precursor to Operation RETOUR.

28. Operation HOPE

a. Operation Hope was a cordon and search operation which was undertaken by UNAMIR in co-ordination with the RPA to clear KIBEHO and NDAGO IDP camps (Sector 4) of criminal elements which were looting and committing acts of banditry and murder aimed at discouraging IDPs in those camps from voluntarily going back to their respective home communes. The operation was conducted from 13-15 Dec 94. A total of 1,552 UNAMIR troops, MILOBS and support staff participated in the op.

b. The RPA contributed two battalions during the op as the outer cordon troops. In addition, they provided a small number of liaison officers.

c. The operation was extremely successful, as several hundred weapons were confiscated and 44 suspected criminals were apprehended and handed over to the office of the Prosecutor in GIKONGORO in the presence of Human Rights and ICRC representatives.

29. Operation RETOUR. This operation is aimed at an information campaign to create conditions in the Displaced People's Camps to sufficiently motivate IDPs to return to their homes while simultaneously gearing up the target communes to receive the returnees. The operation is being conducted in three phases.

a. Phase 1.

(1) The preparation of home communes, ORCs, temporary shelters for IDPs;

(2) Information campaign in target camps.

(3) The establishment of conditions in the camp which are conducive to voluntary vacation.

b. Phase II.

(1) Processing of IDPs through registration, screening and search procedures in marshalling areas.

(2) The safe movement of IDPs to ORC/home communes.

c. Phase III. Establishment of IDPs in their home communes.

28. Currently two camps have been officially closed by OP RETOUR, Cyanika and Rukondo. Over 35000 IDPs have so far been evacuated by vehicles to various sectors within the UNAMIR AOR.

CONCLUSION

29. UNAMIR since 6 Apr 94 has undergone very important changes. The force is now over 6000 strong and now vigorously pursuing its mandate to return the country to normality. There is a steady influx of refugees and internally displaced persons to their respective homes in towns and villages across the length and breadth of the country due to the improved security situation in the country. The situation is far from normal, however the government's policy of reconciliation if pursued diligently by the people and government of Rwanda will yield great dividends.

Date Feb 95

A APOGAN-YELLA
Lt Col
Operations

MILOB OPS OFFERS CONF
(09 OCT 95)

1. GEN SIT.

*OVERALL CALM *ACTS IN CAMPS *RET INFLUX ANY TIME ZAIRE, TANZ
*LOW INTENSITY INSURGENCY GEARING UP GISENYI, RUH, CYAN, GIKO, KIB
*MOV EASTWARDS *MAY INCREASE IN KIG-MEDIA, IMAGE RPA/FRGF, PSY
*MINES, AMBUSH *NEED TO BE CAREFUL *MINE AWARENESS CLASS SECTS

2. MANDATE. *DEC *MID OCT *09 OCT REPORT IN SC

*POST DEC *CHANCES OF MILOB MSN?

3. MILOB ACTIVITIES.

*ONLY PEOPLE ON WHOM UNAMIR DEPENDS ON *EARN NAME BY WORK
*MUCH BETTER NOW *DEPENDENCY *UN AGENCY, NGOS COOP
*REL WITH LOCALS *RPA

4. HELI PTLG. *NOT FULLY USING *LOOSING 2 SOON *MORE LOSS
*REQUEST *CORRECT TASKING-HELI RECCE/PTL *TIMING *HALTAGE
*2 MILOB WITH HELI AT LZ *FOR AGENCIES/NGOs *MILOB ADEQ

5. SRSG REPORT/DATA. *IMP *DELAY *NOT ALL *IMAGE

6. RETURNEES/OLD IDPs.

*IMP	*NECESSITY	*PRIORITISATION	*MILOB COLLECTION
*DIFF FIG	*NA FIG	*DIFF INTERESTS	*PROVN OLD DATA
*POPU	*RETURNEES	*NO EXPECTED	*INFRA AVAILABLE
*RESO NEED	*SCHOOL	*ORPHANAGE	*PRISON NO, CONDI
*FOOD	*WATER	*FARMING, SEEDS	

7. SITREP.

*IMP ONLY MILOB PTLG	*NY SIT FROM MILOB	*MORNING PRAYER
*REPs OF ALL PRESENT	*IMP EVENT, SENSATIONAL INPUT	
*FORMAT *INFO ADEQ	*OWN ACTS H/L	*RET BDR, TC, COM
*NORMAL XG *DAILY MUST	*FIGs TO NY DAILY	*DIFF SOURCES
*TIMELY *TELE/FAX	*LENGTH 2-3 PP	*WEEKEND NO PTLG?
*CORRECT GR *ROUTE ONLY	*PLACE, COMMUNE.	

8. FORWARDING OF DATA/INFO. VERY SLOW IN MANY CASES.

*TRANSIT CAMPS *SRSG REPORT *RADIO UNAMIR *B/M LIST

9. COMN FACILITIES WITH MILOBs. TELE, FAX, RWANDA TELE.

*IMPRESSION OF COMN PEOPLE *HESITANCY *IF MILOB MSN
*HANDLE WITH CARE *NORMAL USER MAINT *MORE TO LEARN TO OP

10. DUTY OFFR. *TELE *RADIO *FAX *ATTENTIVE

11. MED CAS EVAC.

12. STAFF VISIT PGME.

13. RADIO UNAMIR.

*IMP ONLY MEANS OF DISSI *NY, SRSG KEEN *FUTURE PLANS *USEFUL
*MILOBs ASSIST MAX- NEEDED, MILOBs BETTER IMAGE, BE HEARD&KNOWN

14. HUM ASSISTANCE. *RESO LTD *NY INSTRS *NO PROMISES

*CAN MANAGE THRU NGO/AGENCIES *ATTEMPTING AT KIG.

15. PROBLEMS OF STRENGTH, VEHs.

16. CONCLUSION.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE TO THE PRESENT RWANDESE IMBROGLIO

Introduction

1. The history of Rwanda is one of long established interethnic bloodshed. The Rwanda which one sees today has been a witness to many historical events which bear Tutsis date from the fifteenth century when the Tutsis moved into the region from Ethiopia. They imposed an overlordship on the testimony to the difficult period through which the people of this country have gone through. Clashes between the Hutus and Tutsis and established two feudal kingdoms in the areas of present day Rwanda and Burundi. Although the country has gone through a great transformation since that period but the basic problem of inter ethnicity still persists.

Aim

2. The aim of this lecture is to give an overview of the historical perspective to the present Rwandese Imbroglio.

Preview

3. For the case of assimilation I will cover the lecture in the following phases :-

- | | | | |
|----|---------|---|--|
| a. | Phase 1 | - | General Information. |
| b. | Phase 2 | - | Early Settlement and The Colonial era. |
| c. | Phase 3 | - | 1959 Hutu rebellion. |
| d. | Phase 4 | - | Period after independence. |
| e. | Phase 5 | - | The Crises. |
| f. | Phase 6 | - | Conclusion. |

General Information

4. **Geography**. Rwanda is a landlocked country located in east central Africa with an area of approx 26,338 sq km. It is bounded on the north by Uganda, on the east by Tanzania, on the south by Burundi and on the west by Lake Kivu and Zaire.

5. **Terrain**. The central portion of Rwanda is dominated by a hilly plateau averaging about 1700m in elevation. Towards the Tanzania border the land slopes downward to a series of marshy lakes along the upper Akagera river. On the western side of the plateau is a mountain system avg about 2740m, forming the watershed between the Nile and the Congo river systems. The northern reaches of these mountains contain the Virunga volcanoes, which include Mt Karisimbi (4505m), the highest peak.

6. **Climate**. The climate of Rwanda is tropical. There are two wet seasons, Oct to Dec and Mar to May. The avg temp is 19°C.

7. **Vegetation.** This varies from tropical rain forest in the West of Savama grassland in the East.

8. **Population.** Rwanda is one of the most densely populated areas in Africa with a population of approx 8 million. The population is relatively homogeneous with the Hutu comprising 90%, the Tutsi 9% and the Twa 1%.

9. **Economy.** Rwanda is one of the poorest countries in the world and has been streamered by high birth rate and civil strife. About 50% of GDP comes from the agricultural sector. This chief cash crops are coffee, tea and pyrethrum. The small industrial sector contributes 17% to GDP. The Rwandan economy remains dependent on coffee exports and foreign aid.

10. **Communications.** The highway system has a total of 4885 km of which 1200 km are paved. Lake Kivu is the only inland waterway. There are 8 airports and no railway system. The telephone system is poor with a radio of 2 telephone per 1000 persons.

Early Settlement and the Colonial Era

11. The Twa pygmies were the first known inhabitants of Rwanda. The Hutus, probably from the Congo River Basin, were well established by the 15th century, when the Tutsi came down from the north and conquered the area. The Tutsis used the same methods for securing domination over the Hutu as they did in Burundi. They introduced a feudal land system in which the Hutus became a caste of serfs forced into subjugation and economic dependency by a Tutsi nobility. The kings, or nzwamis became the absolute monarchs of the region.

12. From the seventeenth century until the monarchy was overthrown in 1959, the kingdom of Rwanda was one of Africa's most organized states. Society was stratified into castes. The royal family, nobles, army commanders, most chiefs and people who kept cattle were Tutsi. Some chiefs, soldiers and peasants were Hutus. A small group of hunters and potters were Twa. However social mobility and intermarriage blurred caste distinctions. In fact, Hutu who was made a chief could become a Tutsi through "Kwihutura" (shedding "Hutuness"). Over one or two generations, a Tutsi family could lose its cows, turn to cultivation, marry into Hutu families, and eventually become Hutu. Early European travellers noted the Tutsis from belief in their own intelligence and superiority and the Hutu's lack of self esteem.

13. The feudal system was an oppressive burden for Hutus. The system was based on cattle and it also weighed heavily on the poor Tutsis. This feudal past still burns in the mind of Banyarwanda (East Africa's largest ethnic group. The term embraces three sub groups : Hutu, Tutsi and Twa). Hutu use it to justify expelling Tutsi from Rwanda. Many Tutsi believe that feudalism in Rwanda would have eventually given way to democratic rule as it did in Europe.

14. The advent of colonialism interrupted any natural social evolution that might have moved towards ethnic equality. Rwanda became a German Colony in 1885, when it was designated as a German Sphere of interest at the Council of Berlin. The Germans basically delegated power to the Tutsi monarchy keeping the caste system between the Hutus and Tutsi in place. In 1916 during WW I the Germans surrendered to the Belgian forces. In 1923 the country became mandated territory of the league of nations under Belgian supervision. Belgian administration also followed the German pattern of relaying on the Tutsi aristocracy.

15. The Belgians depend ethnic division producing much of the bitterness that has followed to this day, by advancing the Tutsi at the expense of the Hutu for forty years. The most hated aspect of Belgian rule was the draconian forced labour. Where Hutu chiefs were ruling the Belgians installed Tutsi. They sharpened class differences by reclassifying all Rwandese with less than 10 cows as Hutu and those with more as Tutsi. Until the late 1940s they educated only Tutsis. In the 1950s the western powers became preoccupied with the threat of a 'Red Belt' of radical independent states across Africa. Suspecting some Tutsi nationalists of leftism, Belgium concluded that the way to forestall communism in Rwanda was to support the Hutus against the Tutsi. The Belgian Special Resident "acted with unshakable conviction that he was liberating the Hutu peasantry from the oppression of both feudalism and communism". In 1959, as independence loomed, Belgium switched support to the Hutu. To this day, Tutsi feel profoundly betrayed by Belgium.

1959 Hutu Rebellion

16. In March 1957, there came the first real challenge to the Belgian sanctioned Tutsi supremacy. Nine Hutu intellectuals issued the Balantu Manifesto, which focused on criticising the social, economic and political monopoly of the Tutsi. For two years, the opportunity to democratize was lost, as the Belgians silently ignored the Hutu call. In 1959, events began to run out of control. In July, the reform minded king Mutara died mysteriously in Bujumbura. In August, Rwanda's first political party, the Union National Rwandese (UNAR) was formed. Though it included some Hutu, it was militantly pro monarchy, Tutsi and anti Belgian. It was concentrated in October by the formation of the all Hutu Parti du Mouvement de l' Emancipation Hutu (PARMEHUTU). On 01 November, UNAR activists attacked a Hutu subchief who was a key figure in PARMEHUTU. In revenge, Hutu attacked a Tutsi chief who belonged to UNAR. Rwanda's communal violence had begun. Across the country, Hutu bands set fire to thousands of Tutsi, and Tutsi struck back, killing Hutu leaders. Several hundred people died. The Belgians did little to contain the violence, when they finally did act, they cracked down on the Tutsi arresting 919 compared to 312 Hutu.

17. In the month that followed, at least 350 Tutsi chief and subchiefs were killed, arrested or made to resign. The Belgians replaced them with Hutu who often continued the harassment, particularly the burning of Tutsi huts. By April 1960, about 22000 Tutsi were displaced internally.

18. In Jun and Jul 1960, the country's' first local elections were held amid more violence. PARMEHUTU scored an overwhelming victory, winning 2390 out of 3125 seats out of 229 newly created administrative units, 210 were headed by HUTU burgomasters. Confident of the backing of the Belgians, many burgomasters used their positions to persecute Tutsi. In March 1961, the UN commission for Rwanda-Burundi noted that in the previous 18 months, there had simply been a "transition from one type of oppressive regime to another".

19. On Jan 28, 1961, at Gitarama, Rwandas' burgomasters and local officials met. With the blessing of the Belgians, but in defiance of the UN, which had laid out a slower schedule towards independence, PARMEHUTU abolished the monarchy and declared Rwanda a republic. Independence brought no let up in attacks on Tutsi, and by 1963, about 120,000 had fled to other countries.

Period after Independence

20. In June 1962 UN General Assembly resolution terminated the Belgian trusteeship and granted full independence to Rwanda effective 1 July 1962. It brought the Hutu majority to power under Prime Minister Gregorie Kayibanda. Racial tension continued after independence, with serious tribal warfare breaking out in 1963. Hutu gangs attacked from Burundi and killed an estimated 10,000 Tutsi. The government prosecuted about 20 prominent Tutsi, some of whose names had been on a list of prospective future ministers. In 1964 the UNHCR estimated that about 150,000 Banyarwanda had fled to Tanzania, Burundi, Zaire and Uganda. The vast majority of the refugees were Tutsi. Between 40 and 70 percent of Rwandas' Tutsis fled their country between 1959 and 1964.

21. Although intertribal tensions eased for many years after that, there was a resurgence of anti Tutsi feeling in 1972 when tens of thousands of Hutu tribespeople were massacred. In 1973, the existing constitution which barred Kayibanda from seeking another term, was altered to permit continuation of his regime. The move increased tribal hostilities. With the prospect of civil war looming, a bloodless coup took place in July 1973 and the Army Commander, Major General Juvenal Habyarimana ousted Kayibanda. The new government suspended portions of the constitution, dissolved the legislature and the PARMEHUTU party, and installed a civilian military government with a centralized system of administration. Three years later, the regime formed the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND), the country's' sole legal power. A new constitution was adopted by referendum in 1978, and Habyarimana was confirmed president for another term. Single party legislative elections were held in 1981, 1983 and 1988. Habyarimana won a fourth term as president in 1988.

22. Despite MRND assertions of promoting national unity, a policy of discrimination against the Tutsi continued and in September 1990, Rwanda once again faced a Hutu-Tutsi confrontation. Approximately 10000 long exiled Tutsis, calling themselves Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), crossed the border from Uganda in an effort to topple

Habyarimana's government. They were led by Paul Kagame, the former security chief of the Ugandan Army, and assisted by officers and soldiers of the Ugandan NRA. All hell broke loose. Two days later, at Habyarimana's request, France, Belgium and Zaire flew in troops to help the Rwandan Army repulse the rebels.

23. With this support assured, the Rwandan Army went on the rampage against the Tutsi and any Hutu 'suspected' of having collaborated with the rebels. Thousands were shot or hacked to death and countless others indiscriminately arrested, headed into football stadia or police stations and left there without food or water for days. Many died and many fled to Uganda.

24. The setback for the RPF was only temporary, however. They invaded again in 1991, this time better armed and prepared. The government forces were thrown back over a large area of Northern Rwanda, and by early 1992, the RPF was within 25 km of Kigali. The attacks continued with the RPF gaining territory until March 1993 when a cease fire agreement was signed between the Government and the rebels. Under the truce, the RPF gave up about half the territory it controlled to give way for the creation of a 19 km wide demilitarized zone. On 04 August 1993 the RPF and RGP under the aegis of the OAU signed the ARUSHA peace agreement which called upon the UN to put in place an international neutral force known as United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) to assist in a 22 month peace process starting from 05 Oct 93. At Arusha the warring factions agreed on the following :-

- a. Install a broad based transitional government.
- b. Set up transitional institutions.
- c. Deploy a neutral international force.
- d. Withdraw foreign troops from Rwanda.
- e. Deploy RPF battalion in Kigali to protect RPF dignitaries involved in the transition process.
- f. Integrate RGF and RPF into the national defense force.
- g. Protect expatriates and ensure the security of humanitarian agencies operating in Rwanda.
- h. Integrate OAU observers into UN observers.
- j. Repatriate refugees and resettle displaced persons.
- k. Ensure a secure atmosphere for a general election.

25. The government could not implement the Arusha agreement. It was considered that the power sharing was not proportionate. Arusha favored 60% of the positions for Hutu and 40% to Tutsis. The Hutu extremists did not agree to this formula judging from their own population, therefore resolved to create an atmosphere of insecurity especially by the youth wing (INTERHAMWE) of the ruling party (MRND).

The Crisis

26. On 06 April 94, President Habyarimana and Ntaryamira of Burundi were killed in suspicious circumstances. The plane carrying them from Tanzania after a meeting was suspected hit while making landing approach towards Kigali Airport, the two presidents and the crew were killed.

27. The death of the President was clearly a signal as the presidential guard went on rampage killing and maiming especially members of the Tutsi tribe and the Hutu moderates. The mechanism of events pointed towards a planned genocide. The first victims were members of the interim cabinet including Mrs Agathe U - the first woman prime minister. The RPF in Kigali having been appalled by the systematic killing of their sympathizers, broke out of their confinement at Parliament House thus ending the cease fire reached with the former Government in March 1993. In order to stop the carvage by the Presidential Guards and the Interhamwe, the RPF in the North moved southwards to link up with those in Kigali and advanced in three fronts, a Western, Central and an Eastern front. The RPA leadership was resolute so was their advance, with the RGF, Presidential Guards and Interhamwe fleeing ahead of the RPA advance. The RPF advance only stopped when French occupied present sector 3, formerly known as Humanitarian Protection Zone (HPZ). The HPZ thus provided a safe haven for both the RGF and Militia, majority of whom since the withdrawal of the French on 21 Aug 94 have fled to Zaire.

28. The RPF declared a unilateral ceasefire on 19 Jul 94 and installed a 'broad based transitional government'. A moderate Hutu, Pasteur Bizimungu, was installed as President and another Hutu, Faustin Twagiramungu, as Prime Minister. A new post of Vice President was created, filled by the military commander of the RPF, Maj Gen Paul Kagame who is also the Defence Minister.

Conclusion

29. In spite of the prevalent calm in the country one cannot undermine the deeprooted ethnic hatred between the two communities. The Kibeho incident is a live example of the insanity which still persists. The crises in Rwanda had created a fleeting international focus on the Rwandan refugees. Given the history of communal violence in Rwanda, it is unlikely that refugees will actually return without assurances to their security. The situation is far from normal, however the governments policy of reconciliation is pursued diligently by the people and government of Rwanda will yield great dividends.

TEAMS

1. COMMUNICATIONS

<a> 2 X MOTOROLA HAND HELD SETS.

 1 X MOTOROLA MOBILE STATION.

2. TRANSPORT

1 X TOYOTA FOURRUNNER/LAND CRUISER.

OTHER EQUIPMENT/STORES

1. 1 X SAT DISH.

2. 1 X TV.

3. 1 X VCR.

4. 2 X GENERATORS.