

UNAMIR

UN AGENCIES AND NGOS

3 JAN 1995

PLEASE RETAIN.
ORIGINAL ORDER

CONFIDENTIAL
RM/WG APR 2009

UNARCHIVES

SERIES	<u>51120</u>
BOX	<u>42</u>
FILE	<u>2</u>
ACC.	<u>1998/0278</u>



95 JAN -4 09 58

CRN 002/
1 of 40

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN/GOULDING/HANSEN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: KITTANI/GHAREKHAN/AIME, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
MRS. OGATA, HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, GENEVA

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI *Shaharyar M. Khan*

DATE: 3 JANUARY 1995

NO.: MIR 0021

NO. OF PAGES: 40

SUBJECT: SMSG RWANDA'S VISIT TO ZAIRE, DECEMBER 28-31

1. I visited Kinshasa from 28th - 31st December accompanied by a team that included Brig. Gen. Anyidoho, DFC, Mr. Arnauld Akodjenou, Head of Desk, Zaire OPS, UNHCR, who joined me from Geneva and four UNAMIR experts. During my stay in Kinshasa, I was received twice by the Prime Minister, Mr. Kengo Wa Dondo; the Minister of Defence, Admiral Mavua Mudima; the Minister for Justice, Mr. Kamanda Wa Kamanda; the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Lunda Bululu and the Minister for Interior, Mr. Malumba Mbangula. After my meeting with the Defence Minister, technical level talks were held between our team led by Brig Anyidoho and the Zairean technical team. President Mobutu did not receive me but I have indicated that I would fly out to Gbadolite at the President's convenience to call on him. I also met the heads of Missions of USA, France and Belgium.

2. I informed my interlocutors that our shared objective was to persuade the refugees to return home voluntarily. I stated that there were two main obstacles to refugee return, namely, intimidation by political elements controlling the camps and the refugees' fears of retribution and harassment on return. I stated that while it was essentially for the Zairean government to address the issue of intimidation, the Rwandese government needed to allay doubts in the minds of refugees returning home. The UN was prepared within financial limitations to help both governments mount campaigns, in a synchronised manner, to achieve the objective of a significant refugee return to Rwanda. I briefed Zairean leaders on Operation Retour and stated that the express reason for my visit was to work out details of logistic and financial support that the UN would consider providing within its limited means.

3. While the Zairean response, as a whole, was positive, there were two distinct strains apparent in their assessment of the situation. Prime Minister Kengo Wa Dondo referred to recent meetings between the two Prime Ministers and the Presidents in which essential elements had been agreed. He also underscored the commitments he had made during his recent visit to New York when he met the Secretary-General and addressed the Security Council. He acknowledged that the options had been narrowed down to Zaire providing troops to control the camps and security corridors into Rwanda. Also, that Rwanda should play its part by organizing Security Zones and providing assurances to the Hutu refugees. The Prime Minister felt that it was high time for action to be taken on the agreed agenda. He welcomed my visit in the context of logistic and financial support from UN for the operation. The Prime Minister was, therefore, positive, constructive and eager to start the operation.

4. The second strain articulated by the Minister of Defence - who is close to President Mobutu - questioned Rwanda's motives. His view was that the "Tutsi dominated government" did not want the Hutu refugees back, that Bizimungu and Twagiramungu had no clout, that Kagame had made provocative statements like the right of hot pursuit into Zaire, that unless genuine reconciliation was set in motion refugees would not return home, that Kagame had made no serious effort to negotiate. I replied that while many of the concerns articulated by the Defence Minister and other Zairean leaders were legitimate, our experience in Rwanda was that the RPA had cooperated on a number of important issues related to the treatment of refugees. I gave the example of Operation Retour in which the RPA had accepted our advice of not closing down IDP camps by force but to allow a gradual, voluntary melt-down. Also, after the French



departure from HPZ, RPA had heeded our advice not to send in its forces for a period of 6-8 weeks. Operation Retour was an effective test of the Rwanda government's bona-fides and if it succeeded, the same formula of a dignified, secure, welcoming return of refugees would be applied to Goma, Bukavu and Ngara. As far as reconciliation was concerned, 2000 former RGF being re-integrated in Gako was not a small figure. I also informed Zairean leaders that the Rwandese government had agreed to cooperate with the International Tribunal. While I held no brief for the Rwandese government and even if Zairean government's worst fears were true, it was still worth making the effort to enable the refugees in Zaire to return voluntarily. At this point, Mr. Akodjenou, the UNHCR representative, made an important contribution by asserting that in UNHCR's assessment, if the intimidation in the camps around Goma could be controlled, a majority of refugees would return home despite fears of harassment. Eventually, the Minister of Defence acknowledged the importance of making a combined effort to enable the refugees to return home voluntarily. Thus, the bottom line of both strains - one eager, the other skeptical - was to seek UN's support for a major effort by Zaire to control the law and other situations in the camps and encourage the refugees to return to Rwanda.

5. I now proceed to the details of our negotiations.

6. The Zairean Force

(i) The Prime Minister and Zairean Ministers stated that the Zaire government would select a well-trained, elite force to carry out the operation in the camps.

Comment: it could be the Presidential Guard but not necessarily so. The selected contingent would gather in Kinshasa and would be flown out to Goma/Bukavu.

(ii) The Prime Minister stated that a force of 1500 had been contemplated. We indicated that a force of 1500 may be appropriate for North Kivu (Goma) but may be inadequate for a simultaneous operation in South Kivu. We indicated a preference for a simultaneous rather than a sequential operation. In discussions at the technical level, the Zairean side agreed to a force of 2500 which would be divided between North and South Kivu. However, for internal reasons, they are maintaining the indicated figure of 1500.



(iii) The Zaireans made it clear that they would NOT want to have a UN battalion providing corridor-security on Zairean soil. This security would be undertaken by Zairean troops who would hand-over returning refugees at the border to UNAMIR.

Comment: your proposal at para 2 (c) of code cable 4217 would therefore not be necessary.

7. UN troop contribution

(i) The Zairean accepted that UN officers (ratio 20:1) would form part of the Zairean force, as trainers/advisers/experts to the operation. These officers should be drawn from military or para-military units and not from Civpol units as indicated in para 2 (a) of your code cable 4217. It was agreed that 125 such advisers would be required for the 2500 force operation.

Comment: A number of these 125 trainers/advisers could be supplied from Milobs with UNAMIR. It would be necessary to obtain permission from their parent countries for their redeployment from Rwanda to Zaire.

(ii) It was agreed that there were no grounds to appoint UN Milobs for the operation (para 2 (b) of your code cable). Instead, a contingent of about 50 UN officers may be appointed to form a mini-GHQ in Goma -with an antenna in Bukavu - that would oversee and coordinate the operation in Zaire as also coordinate with the Rwandese government through UNAMIR.

(iii) A platoon for security of GHQ as also a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) to counter violence in the camps would be attached to the Goma GHQ.

Comment: Most of the staff required for (ii) and (iii) above could also be drawn from UNAMIR with permission from countries concerned for redeployment.

8. Status and nomenclature of operation

(i) The Prime Minister and Zairean leaders were emphatic that UNAMIR should not be seen to spill over into Zaire. The UN operation in Zaire should, therefore, have a separate name and persona. However, Zaire had no objection to this operation being carried out under overall command structure SRSG and Force Commander in Rwanda. The name and acronym



suggested is United Nations Refugee Mission in Zaire UNREMIZ.

Comment: This refers to para 2 (d) of code cable 4217).

(ii) As regards command and control, we pressed for the operation (UNREMIZ) to be placed under UN command and control, (as leaving Zaire to pursue its own agenda could prove hazardous). We felt that a UN Force Commander (a Brigadier, preferably a Francophone African country) should be assisted by a Zairean Deputy Force Commander (a Colonel) and that the Zairean troops along with a) UN/advisers, b) GHQ and c) Security support should form UNREMIZ.

(iii) The role of UNREMIZ would be to bring order and security into the camps as indicated in para 2 (a) of your code cable. By its presence, UNREMIZ would inspire confidence in the camps and would reduce intimidation. They would also escort refugee convoys to the border from where UNAMIR/UNHCR would arrange escorts to security zones, welcome centres, relief centres, etc. UNREMIZ would act under a UN Security Council Mandate (Chapter VI).

(iv) The Zairean forces would wear their own uniforms with special berets (colour to be determined). UN forces would wear blue-berets.

Comment: Uniforms would need to be provided.

9. Timing and Alternative Camps

(i) It was agreed at the technical level talks that UNREMIZ should be a four month operation.

Comment: (i) My personal feeling is that a six-month period would be more realistic. Prime Minister Kengo agreed with my view in our wrap-up meeting. He said the mandate could be extended.

(ii) I believe Zaire is pressing for the shorter period in order to keep costs down and also to enable them to hold elections in July 1995.



(ii) As indicated by the Prime Minister, the senior political leadership would be moved to the West Coast.

(iii) Although the issue was not raised in the negotiations, it is likely that Zaire would expect UNHCR/UN's help to move the refugees who decide to stay in Zaire to camps located about 150 kms away from the border.

10. Logistic Support

Attached at Annex "A" is an estimate of the logistic support required. It is recommended that the items required may be airlifted directly from UNISOM to Goma. Alternatively a single country may undertake the operation. Speed is of the essence and highest priority must be accorded to delivering logistics on time.

11. Financial Support

As directed in para 4 of your code cable, it was made clear that there were limitation on financial support from UN and that, in any case, UN international rates could not apply to a national effort. The Zairean side understood that international rates could not be applied to national troops. However, they indicated that some financial incentive needed to be provided to the Zairean troops. As suggested in para 2 (e) of your code cable, we have examined the pay scale of UNDP local staff. It is our considered opinion that a fair salary would equate to the average pay scale for local staff which ranges between US\$400-500 per month. My military advisers feel that an additional US\$50-100 pay should be added to this figure providing a salary of US\$500-600 per person to the Zairean troops. The total expenditure for 4 months would amount to approximately US\$ 4 million.

Comment: It is important to "incentivise" the Zairean army by offering them a "completion bonus" of US\$ 50-100 per month after a successful operation. This sum to be given direct to the soldiers instead of through the government.



12. The Rwanda Operation

A parallel operation to welcome back the refugees in safety and with proprietary rights needs to be mounted in Rwanda. This operation would require the following actions:

(a) The opening of security zones/welcome centres within Rwanda (at some distance from the frontier). These security zones would have UNAMIR, UNHCR, ICRC and Human Rights monitors deployed within the camps to provide security and protection. However, Rwandese government officials would be able to exercise authority and even RPA would have the right to enter the camps.

(b) Three security zones should be opened opposite Goma, Bukavu and Ngara in consultation with UNHCR/Agencies.

(c) UNHCR, Agencies and NGOs would provide facilities in the camps.

13. Conclusions and Recommendations

(a) I gained the impression that Zaire had decided to act against militarisation and intimidation in the camps. UN's offer of logistic, human and financial support was, therefore, timely and welcome for the government.

(b) Our emphasis in the negotiations has been that the UN operation should be:

- (i) Inexpensive
- (ii) Practical and easily mounted
- (iii) Effective.

(c) Zaire would like to mount the action immediately. UN back-up (logistics, force, financial arrangements) must be in place within a month for the operation to start in 1st week of February.



(d) While UNAMIR could provide the bulk of the human element and have it in place in time, immediate action would be necessary to (a) appoint commanders/deputy commander, (b) obtain permission for UNAMIR contingents and Milobs to serve with UNREMIZ and (c) for the logistics to be in place within 4 weeks.

(e) The financial terms should be settled in New York.

(f) The basic reason for attaching 125 UN advisers to the 2500 force, for a UN commander and for a GHQ is to ensure that Zaire remains faithful to the mandate and its force is not derailed from achieving the given targets.

(g) The weakest link in the entire operation is logistics. The basic logistics must be made available on the ground before the operation starts otherwise chances of its success will be heavily reduced. It would seem that either a single country (USA, France, Germany, NATO, Europe, Britain) can mount this logistic back up operation or an airbridge should be set up between Mogadishu and Goma.

(h) President Mobutu must be persuaded to go through with the operation. The Rwandese leadership, for its part must also be persuaded to provide security and a welcoming attitude to returning refugees. The Secretary-General may wish to intercede himself with the Presidents of Zaire and Rwanda. The leaders of USA, France, Belgium and OAU for Zaire and USA, Uganda and OAU for Rwanda may also be requested to intercede with Zairean and Rwandese leaders, once the operation is launched.

14. I enclose logistic requirements Annex "A" and the agreed minutes of the two technical teams Annex "B."


15. I am proceeding to Tanzania on 4th January and will report to Headquarters on 5th January.

16. Best regards.

CRN 002
9 of 40

1.0 Force level

Judging from the threat analysis in the existing camps it is estimated that it will require a force level of a an infantry brigade to undertake the task to provide security at the actual camp sites. This force will need to be equipped with wheels and some track APC's to perform military and police duties. Two Infantry Battalions will be deployed in Goma and one Infantry Battalion will be deployed in Bukavu area. The Infantry force will be entirely provided by the Zairian Armed Forces where the logistical support will be provided by international troops. The total strength of this force will be of 3,000 troops. The structure of this force will be such that it will have control over the camp sites with an emphasis on the security of the refugees.



1.1 Concept of Operation

To be defined by Force Commander UNREMIZ after his reconnaissance.

1.2 Threat

To be defined by Force Commander UNREMIZ after his reconnaissance.

¹ The Force HQ includes 100 Zairian troops and a UN defence platoon of a strength of 30

² These Infantry Battalions are light Infantry Battalions. Each Battalion will have only 5 APCs track.

1.3 Employment of Infantry units

To be defined by Force Commander UNREMIZ after his reconnaissance.

1.4 Employment of Support elements

1.4.1 Engineer Troop

This troop will have a total of 50 all ranks. This unit should be organized into a Troop Headquarters and its inherent construction, plant and technical troops, and should have sufficient resources to undertake a variety of minor construction, reconstruction and utility tasks. The troop will be based in Goma and elements will be sent to Bukavu on an as required basis. This troop must be capable within its own organization to undertake the following tasks:

- a. Minor repair and maintenance of existing facilities;
- b. Expansion of existing camp sites;
- c. Repair of existing bridges;
- d. Repair of existing roads;
- e. Operate a ROWPU to provide potable water to the Force. Water for the refugees is provided by UNHCR;
- f. Minor construction of buildings; and
- g. Explosive ordnance disposal in the existing refugee camps.

1.4.2 Air element

The Air element will be composed of three helicopters Bell 212 type and will have 34 all ranks. Two helicopters will be based in Goma and one will be in Bukavu. One of the two helicopters in Goma will be dedicated for Medical evacuation. Fix wings requirements will be provided on an as required basis by other neighboring missions or commercially. This air element will undertake the following tasks:

- a. Emergency resupply of troops;
- b. Air reconnaissance;
- c. Casualty evacuation;
- d. Transportation of reserve or Quick Reaction Force; and

- e. Command and liaison tasks.

C2W 002

11 of 40

1.4.3 Medical Section

This medical section will be composed of 25 all ranks. This section will be responsible to provide level 01 emergency treatments including emergency dental services for the International troops only. This Medical Section will be deployed in Goma. This medical facility will have a 1 day holding policy (to be reviewed as required) then evacuation/repatriation to Zairian or national facilities will occur. It is to be noted that the medical support for the Zairian troops will be integral to their Infantry units. Among other health needs, the medical section will be able to undertake the following:

- a. Co-ordination of aero-medical evacuation;
- b. Minor surgery to the troops;
- c. Minor and emergency dental services;
- d. Ambulance service; and
- e. Put in place a 05 beds ward facility.

1.4.4 Logistics Composite Battalion

The Logistics Composite Battalion will be composed of a Transport Company (86 all ranks), a Field Workshop (70 all ranks) and a Supply Platoon (30 all ranks). The main elements will be deployed in Goma with forward logistics elements in Bukavu. This Battalion will have a total strength of 186 all ranks and must be equipped to carry out the following tasks:

- a. Stockpiling and distribution of ration, water, petrol oil and lubricants (POL) and spare parts to unit locations;
- b. 2nd and 3rd line Transportation; and
- c. 2nd and 3rd line Repair and recovery.

1.4.5 Communication squadron

There is virtually no existing telecommunication system in the areas of the actual camps. There is therefore a need for the force to have its own inherent communication system to undertake the following:

- a. HF communication network between Goma, Bukavu, Kigali, Kinshasa and the camps;
- b. Facsimile;

- c. Telephone - INMARSAT and cellular;
- d. Air despatch services;
- e. Postal services to troops and refugees; and

CRN 002
12 of 40

2. Logistical aspects

2.1 Assumptions

The following assumptions were made:

- a. Zairian troops (3 x Inf Bn and Force HQ) will come with no equipment and UN will buy all the necessary equipments;
- b. The three Infantry Battalions and the Force HQ will come from Kinshasa military region;
- c. Two Infantry Battalions will be deployed in Goma and one in Bukavu;
- d. The Infantry Battalions will be equipped with wheel vehicles. 20 track APCs will be allocated for the 3 Infantry Battalions and the Force HQ. The defence platoon will also have 4 APCs;
- e. Main elements of Logistics Composite Battalion will be deployed in Goma with an element in Bukavu;
- f. Support elements will provide 2nd and 3rd line support. 1st line support will be done by the Zairian Force (Admin Coy of the Inf Bn) with UN provided equipment; and
- g. Support elements will deploy with the required equipment as proposed in Annex C;
- h. All resupply stocks will be flown in to Goma/Bukavu area and then truck in.

2.2 Strength of the Force

Annex A provide all the details on the composition and strength of the Zairian Force and the Support elements.

2.2 Equipments required for the Zairian Force

Annex B provide the details of the list and the cost of the equipment to buy for the Zairian Force (3 Inf Bns and the HQ Force) to enable them to accomplish this Mission.

2.3 Equipments required for the Support Force

Annex C provide the details of the list of equipment that the

Support elements need to ~~deploy~~ with in view of supporting the Force.

2.4 Movement costs

All the costs incurred to move the Zairian troops (3 Inf Bns and the HQ staff) from their actual garrison to Goma and Bukavu are found at Annex D. The costs incurred to move the Support Element troops and equipment from their country to Goma and Bukavu are found at Annex E.

2.5 Accommodation and site preparation required for the Force

The costs incurred for renting some offices and building some accommodation for the Force are found at Annex F.

2.6 Sustainment costs of the Force

The monthly costs and the total costs to sustain the Force for a period of 6 months are found at Annex G.

2.7 Summary of the costs

The summary of all the costs is found at Annex H.

- a. Fixed costs;
- b. Monthly operational costs; and
- c. Total costs of the operation.

©
STRENGTH OF THE FORCE

Annex A
CRN 002
14 of 40

ELEMENTS	PERSONNEL STRENGTH
Force HQ	130 ¹
3 x Infantry Bns (800 ea/Bn)	2400
UNMOs	125
Sig Troop	50
Engr Troop	50
Tpt Coy	86
Fd Wksp	70
Sup Platoon	30
Med Section	25
Air Element	34
TOTAL STRENGTH	3000

¹ The Force HQ is composed of 100 Zairian troops and 30 UN troops.



Annex B

CRN 002

15 of 40

**LIST AND COST OF EQUIPMENTS
FOR THE ZAIRIAN FORCE (1)**

EQUIPMENT	QUANTITY	COST/UNIT \$US	TOTAL COST \$US
LIGHT VEHS	125	\$20,500	\$2,562,500
MEDIUM VEHS	60	\$75,000	\$4,500,000
HEAVY VEHS	4	\$100,000	\$400,000
MOTORCYCLES	12	\$1,100	\$13,200
LIGHT VEH AMB	4	\$40,000	\$160,000
LIGHT TRAILERS	125	\$3,000	\$375,000
MED TRAILERS	15	\$3,000	\$45,000
APC TRACK	20	\$300,000 rental/6months	\$6,000,000
BUS 15 PAX	15	\$19,000	\$285,000
FUEL TRUCKS	3	\$95,000	\$285,000
WATER TRUCKS	3	\$95,000	\$285,000
FIELD KITCHEN	16	\$50,000	\$800,000
GEN 1.5 KW	100	\$1,000	\$100,000
GEN 10 KW	15	\$8,100	\$121,500
GEN 30 KW	4	\$25,000	\$100,000
PISTOL	125	\$350	\$43,750
RIFLES GALIL LONG	1,050	\$1,000	\$105,000
RIFLES GALIL SHORT	1,450	\$1,000	\$145,000
LIGHT MG	221	\$2,000	\$442,000
HEAVY MG	102	\$3,000	\$306,000
RUBBHALLS 40' X 20'	25	\$25,000	\$625,000
10 MEN TENTS	275	\$1,000	\$275,000
KIT BAGS	2,625	\$50	\$131,250
KNAPSACK	2,625	\$200	\$525,000

EQUIPMENT	QUANTITY	COST/UNIT \$US	TOTAL COST \$US
WEBBING	2,625	\$50	\$131,250
CAMP BEDS	2,625	\$100	\$262,500
BLANKETS	5,250	\$50	\$262,500
SLEEPING BAGS	2,625	\$300	\$787,500
MOSQUITO NETS	2,625	\$50	\$131,250
WASH BASIN	2,625	\$0	\$26,250
BUCKETS	500	\$5	\$2,500
WATER JC 20L	5,000	\$7	\$35,000
FUEL JC 20L	2,500	\$15	\$37,500
DINING TABLES 2' X 6'	350	\$100	\$35,000
DINING CHAIRS	2,500	\$20	\$50,000
TARPAULINS 20' X 30'	50	\$500	\$25,000
IMMERSION HEATERS	125	\$200	\$250,000
URINE TUBES	125	\$10	\$1,250
CAMP TOILETS	125	\$20	\$2,500
MESSTIN	2,625	\$2	\$5,250
BOWLS SOUP	2,625	\$2	\$5,250
CUPS	2,625	\$1	\$2,625
JUGS WATER	250	\$2	\$500
KFS SETS	2,625	\$5	\$13,125
GAS CYLINDERS	40	\$200	\$8,000
UNIFORMS	7,875	\$150	\$1,181,250
BOOTS	5,250	\$60	\$315,000
GREY SOCKS(PR)	13,125	\$1	\$13,125
BELTS	2,625	\$2	\$5,250
BERETS	2,625	\$5	\$13,125
T SHIRTS	7,875	\$3	\$23,625

EQUIPMENT	QUANTITY	COST/UNIT \$US	TOTAL COST \$US
DISTINCTIVE BADGES	2,625	\$2	\$5,250
HANDCUFFS	2,625	\$10	\$26,250
GAZ MASKS	2,625	\$150	\$393,750
UN FLAGS	60	\$16.05	\$963
HELMETS	2,625	\$121	\$317,625
BATONS	2,625	\$10	\$26,250
SHIELDS	2,625	\$50	\$131,250
KNIFES	2,625	\$25	\$65,625
FLACK JACKETS	2,625	\$350	\$918,750
NIGHT VISION DEVICES TRIPOD	20	\$26,750	\$535,000
NIGHT VISION GOGGLES	20	\$7,000	\$140,000
FLOOD LIGHT	100	\$1,000	\$100,000
BINOCULARS	250	\$250	\$62,500
MINE DETECTORS	60	\$2,000	\$120,000
FUEL BLADDERS 25,000L	10	\$10,000	\$100,000
WATER BLADDERS 25,000L	10	\$10,000	\$100,000
CONCERTINA 25M ROLL	400	\$25	\$10,000
BARBED WIRE 25M ROLL	40	\$25	\$1,000
SAND BAGS	50,000	\$.30	\$15,000
6' POST PICKETS	10,000	\$3.05	\$30,500
8' POST PICKETS	10,000	\$5.00	\$50,000
CGI SHEET 6'	500	\$3.45	\$1,725
SHOVELS ROUND	500	\$10	\$5,000
TYE WIRE 5KG ROLL	50	\$10	\$500

EQUIPMENT	QUANTITY	COST/UNIT \$US	TOTAL COST \$US
TIMBERS 2"X4"X8'	3,000	\$3	\$9,000
PICK	500	\$7	\$3,500
AXES	500	\$10	\$5,000
SLEDGE HAMMER	40	\$100	\$4,000
CHAIN SAW	25	\$500	\$12,500
PLASTIC ROLLS 1.5M X 100M	100	\$50	\$5,000
PLYWOOD .75"X4'X8'	1,000	\$50	\$50,000
HAMMERS HAND	100	\$4	\$400
NAILS 3"/ #	200	\$3	\$600
NAILS 4"/ #	300	\$3	\$1,200
NAILS 6"/ #	500	\$3	\$1,500
AMMO 9MM PISTOL	15,000	\$00.50	\$12,500
AMMO 5.56MM RIFLES	300,000	\$00.50	\$150,000
AMMO LIGHT MG	40,000	\$00.50	\$20,000
AMMO HEAVY MG	40,000	\$00.50	\$20,000
RADIO HF COMPLETE	30	\$1,000	\$30,000
RADIO VHF HAND HELD	300	\$600	\$180,000
TYPING MACHINES	25	\$400	\$10,000
COMPUTERS WITH PRINTERS AND SOFTWARES	15	\$3,500	\$52,500
MEGAPHONS	25	\$100	\$2,500
MEDICAL SUPPLIES FOR THE FORCE	TBD BY FMO	TBD BY FMO	\$300,000

RAW 002
190740

EQUIPMENT	QUANTITY	COST/UNIT \$US	TOTAL COST \$US
1ST AID KITS	2,625	\$50	\$131,250
COLEMAN STOVES	350	\$75	\$26,250
STATIONNERIES FOR THE FORCE	TBD	TBD	\$30,000
			\$26,480,963

1. Zairian Force includes 3 Inf Bns of 800 people each and the Zairian portion of the HQ element (100 peoples) for a total of 2,500.
2. Quantity of each major items includes 5% as a reserve/spares.

LIST OF EQUIPMENTS
FOR THE SUPPORT ELEMENTS

EQUIPMENT	UNMOS (125)	DEF PL (30)	SIG TP (50)	ENGR TP (50)	LOG COMP BN (186)			MED SEC (25)	AIR ELMT (34)	TOTAL (500)
					TPT COY (86)	FD WKSP (70)	SUP PL (30)			
LIGHT VEHS	65	4	10	10	16	12	4	4	3	128
MED VEHS	0	0	2	5	15	5	0	0	0	27
HVY VEHS	0	0	0	3	15	2	0	0	0	20
MOTOS	0	0	3	0	2	2	1	1	1	10
LIGHT VEH AMB	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	3	0	7
LIGHT TLRS	0	0	10	10	16	12	4	4	3	59
MED TLRS	0	0	2	5	15	5	0	0	0	27
HVY TLRS	0	0	0	3	15	2	0	0	0	2
RECOVERY VEH HEAVY	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	2
RECOVERY VEH LIGHT	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	3
TRACK APC	0	4	0	0	0	1 ARV	0	0	0	4
BUS 40 PAX	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	6
BUS 15 PAX	0	1	1	1	6	1	1	1	1	13
DUMP TRUCK	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
FUEL TRUCK	0	0	0	1	4	0	0	0	0	5
WATER TRUCK	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	3
SEWAGE TRUCKS	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
FIELD KITCHEN	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7
ROWPU	0	0	0	2		0	0	0	0	2
FORK LIFT	0	0	0	1	2	1	3	0	0	7

EQUIPMENT	UNMOS (125)	DEF PL (30)	SIG TP (50)	ENGR TP (50)	LOG COMP BN (186)			MED SEC (25)	AIR ELMT (34)	TOTAL (500)
					TPT COY (86)	FD WKSP (70)	SUP PL (30)			
MRT WHEEL	0	0	1	1	2	6	0	0	0	10
MRT TRACK	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	2
MRT RADIO	0	0	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	4
MRT WELDING	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	2
MRT ELEC	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	2
GEN 1.5 KW	65	5	5	5	10	8	3	2	2	105
GEN 10 KW	0	0	2	1	1	2	0	1	1	7
GEN 30 KW	0	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	0	7
PISTOL	125	1	7	3	3	4	1	10	10	164
RIFLES	0	29	43	47	83	66	29	15	24	336
LIGHT MG	0	4	3	3	5	4	1	0	1	21
HEAVY MG	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
RUBHALLS 20'X40'	0	0	4	2	2	3	5	2	1	19
10 MEN TENT	65	4	6	6	10	8	4	3	4	110
KIT BAGS	125	30	50	50	86	70	30	25	34	500
KNAPSACKS	125	30	50	50	86	70	30	25	34	500
WEBBING	125	30	50	50	86	70	30	25	34	500
CAMP BEDS	125	30	50	50	86	70	30	25	34	500
BLANKETS	250	60	100	100	172	140	60	150	68	1100
SLEEPING BAGS	125	30	50	50	86	70	30	25	34	500
MOSKITO NETS	125	30	50	50	86	70	30	75	34	550

QW 002
22 of 40

EQUIPMENT	UNMOS (125)	DEF PL (30)	SIG TP (50)	ENGR TP (50)	LOG COMP BN (186)			MED SEC (25)	AIR ELMT (34)	TOTAL (500)
					TPT COY (86)	FD WKSP (70)	SUP PL (30)			
WASH BASIN	125	30	50	50	86	70	30	75	34	550
BUCKETS	125	30	50	50	86	70	30	75	34	550
WATER JC 20 L	125	30	50	50	86	70	30	25	34	500
FUEL JC 20 L	130	18	100	500	100	76	50	30	20	1044
DINING TABLES 2' X 6'	5	10	20	20	30	25	10	12	12	144
DINING CHAIRS	10	30	50	50	86	70	30	25	34	385
TARPAULINS 20' X 30'	3	2	4	4	5	4	3	1	1	27
IMMERSION HEATERS	3	3	3	3	6	5	3	2	2	30
URINE TUBES	3	4	5	5	9	7	3	3	3	42
CAMP TOILETS	0	1	3	3	4	4	1	1	1	18
MESSTIN	125	30	50	50	86	70	30	25	34	500
BOWLS SOUP	125	30	50	50	86	70	30	25	34	500
CUPS	125	30	50	50	86	70	30	25	34	500
JUG WATER	0	3	5	5	9	7	3	3	4	39
KFS SETS	125	30	50	50	86	70	30	25	34	500
GAS CYLINDERS	0	0	2	4	2	6	2	2	2	20
UNIFORMS	375	90	150	150	264	210	90	75	102	1500
BOOTS	250	60	100	100	172	140	60	50	68	1000
GREY SOCKS (PR)	625	150	250	250	430	350	150	125	170	2500

EQUIPMENT	UNMOS (125)	DEF PL (30)	SIG TP (50)	ENGR TP (50)	LOG COMP BN (186)			MED SEC (25)	AIR ELMT (34)	TOTAL (500)
					TPT COY (86)	FD WKSP (70)	SUP PL (30)			
BELTS	125	30	50	50	86	70	30	25	34	500
UN BERETS	125	30	50	50	86	70	30	25	34	500
T SHIRTS	375	90	150	150	264	210	90	75	102	1500
UN BADGES	750	180	300	300	516	420	180	150	204	3000
UN FLAGS	65	3	5	5	8	7	3	3	4	103
HANDCUFFS	125	30	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	155
AZ MASKS	125	30	50	50	86	70	30	25	34	500
HELMETS	125	30	50	50	86	70	30	25	34	500
BATON	125	30	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	155
SHIELDS	125	30	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	155
KNIFES	125	30	50	50	86	70	30	25	34	500
FLACK JACKETS	125	30	50	50	86	70	30	25	34	500
NIGHT VISION DEVICES TRIPOD	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	0	1	12
NIGHT VISION GOGGLES	10	4	4	4	6	5	2	0	2	37
FLOOD LIGHT	2	5	5	5	5	5	4	2	2	35
BINOCULARS	125	30	5	5	10	7	3	3	3	191
MINE DETECTORS	10	2	2	10	2	2	1	0	0	29
FUEL BLADDERS 25,000 L	0	0	0	1	2	1	0	0	1	6
WATER BLADDERS 25,000 L	0	0	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	8

QW 002
27 of 40

EQUIPMENT	UNMOS (125)	DEF PL (30)	SIG TP (50)	ENGR TP (50)	LOG COMP BN (186)			MED SEC (25)	AIR ELMT (34)	TOTAL (500)
					TPT COY (86)	FD WKSP (70)	SUP PL (30)			
CONCERTINA 25M ROLL	10	20	10	100	20	15	10	0	10	195
BARBED WIRE 25 M ROLL	5	10	5	20	10	10	5	0	5	70
SAND BAGS	500	1000	500	10, 000	500	500	200	0	200	13400
6' POST PICKETS	50	50	50	1000	50	50	30	0	30	1310
8' POST PICKETS	50	50	50	1000	50	50	30	0	30	1310
CGI SHEETS 6'	10	20	20	200	20	20	10	0	10	310
SHOVELS ROUND	65	30	50	50	86	70	30	25	34	440
TYE WIRE 5 KG ROLL	2	3	2	15	3	3	1	0	1	30
TIMBERS 2"X4"X8'	0	0	0	5000	0	0	0	0	0	5000
PICK	65	10	10	50	40	30	5	0	5	215
AXES	65	10	10	50	40	30	5	0	5	215
SLEDGE HAMMER	2	3	2	7	3	3	1	0	1	22
CHAIN SAW	2	2	2	10	2	2	1	0	1	22
PLASTIC ROLLS 1.5MX100M	2	3	3	50	5	4	3	0	2	72
PLYWOOD .75"X4'X8'	0	0	0	1000	0	0	0	0	0	1000
HAMMERS HAND	65	10	10	50	25	25	10	0	10	205
NAILS 3"/#	0	2	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	102
NAILS 4"/#	0	4	0	150	0	0	0	0	0	154

EQUIPMENT	UNMOS (125)	DEF PL (30)	SIG TP (50)	ENGR TP (50)	LOG COMP BN (186)			MED SEC (25)	AIR ELMT (34)	TOTAL (500)
					TPT COY (86)	FD WKSP (70)	SUP PL (30)			
NAILS 6"/#	0	2	0	150	0	0	0	0	0	154
AMMO PISTOL	12,500	100	700	300	300	400	100	1000	1000	16400
AMMO RIFLES	0	2900	4300	4700	8300	6600	2900	1500	2400	33600
AMMO LIGHT MG	0	800	600	600	1000	800	200	0	200	4200
AMMO HEAVY MG	0	400	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	200
RADIO HF COMPLETE	5	1	3	3	4	4	2	2	2	26
RADIO VHF HAND HELD	125	10	50	25	30	25	15	15	15	310
INMARSAT	0	0	4	1	1	1	1	1	1	10
TYPING MACHINES	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	9
COMPUTERS WITH PRINTERS/ SOFTWARES	3	1	3	2	2	2	2	1	1	17
MEGAPHONS	10	2	10	2	2	2	1	1	1	31
MEDICAL SUPPLIES	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD
FIRST AID KITS	125	30	50	50	86	70	30	25	34	500
STATION- NERIES	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD
COLEMAN STOVES	65	5	10	10	15	12	5	5	5	132
ELICOPTER	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3

MOVEMENT COST OF THE ZAIRIAN FORCE

PERSONNEL MOVEMENT COST

SER	A/C TYPE	PAX PER FLIGHT	TOTAL PAX	FROM	TO	FLIGHTS REQD	COST/HR	FLIGHT TIME RETURN TRIP	COST/ FLIGHT	TOTAL COST
1	IL 76	140	1675	KINSHASA	GOMA	12	\$6000	4.3 HRS	\$25,800	\$309,600
2	L100	120	825	KINSHASA	BUKAVU	7	\$5200	5.8 HRS	\$30,160	\$211,120
										\$520,720

1. Cost/hr of flight includes the cost of fuel at US\$2/gallon.

EQUIPMENT MOVEMENT COST

TYPE OF EQUIPMENT	COST
APCs Tracks	\$1,964,760
WHEEL VEHICLES	\$3,064,000
OTHER EQUIPMENTS	\$1,500,000
TOTAL	\$6,528,760

- . Cost of moving APC's has been calculated using the cost of moving APC's from USA to UNAMIR ie \$4,911,900 for 50 APC's. In this staff checks we have 20 track APCs -> $\$4,911,900 \div 50 \times 20 = \$1,964,760$.
- . Cost of moving other wheel vehicles has been estimated at \$8,000/veh. There are 383 vehicles to move as per Annex A (including all the trailers).
- . The cost to move the rest of the equipment to be bought for the Zairian Force has been estimated at \$1.5M.



MOVEMENT COSTS OF THE SUPPORT ELEMENTS

REQUIREMENT	EQUIPMENT	PERSONNEL	TOTAL COST
COST OF MOVEMENT OF SIGNAL TROOP FROM EUROPE	\$2,000,000	60,000\$	\$2,060,000
COST OF TRANSPORT OF ENGINEERING TROOP FROM EUROPE	\$3,200,000	\$60,000	\$3,260,000
COST OF TRANSPORT OF MEDICAL SECTION FROM EUROPE	\$500,000	\$30,000	\$530,000
COST OF TRANSPORT OF AIR ELEMENTS FROM EUROPE	\$800,000	\$40,800	\$840,800
COST OF MOVEMENT OF TRANSPORT COMPANY FROM NORTH AMERICA	\$3,000,000	\$215,000	\$3,215,000
COST OF MOVEMENT FIELD WORKSHOP FROM NORTH AMERICA	\$4,100,000	\$175,000	\$4,275,000
COST OF MOVEMENT OF SUPPLY PLATOON FROM NORTH AMERICA	\$500,000	\$75,000	\$575,000
COST OF MOVEMENT OF DEFENCE FORCE FROM KIGALI	\$25,000	\$3,000	\$28,000
COST OF MOVEMENT OF UNMOS	\$520,000	\$46,250	\$566,250
GRAND TOTAL	\$14,645,000	\$705,050	\$15,350,050

1. Since it is not known where the support elements will come from, it was assumed for the purpose of this staff check exercise, that these units would be balanced equally between Europe and North America. The following was then used : Transport Squadron, Field Workshop, and Supply Company would be from North America, and the others, i.e. Medical Company, Engineering Squadron, and Air Elements from Europe. UNMOs will be coming from all over the world. The defence Force will be coming from Kigali.
2. The figures for movement cost of equipment are based on the contingent cost of transportation estimates listed in the Secretary General's report for UNAMIR (see page 72). Cost of movement from Europe was estimated as a median between cost of movement from United Kingdom and Germany. Cost of movement from North America was based on cost of movement from Canada and the United States.
3. The figures for movement of personnel has been estimated using:
 - a. \$1,200/ticket for people travelling from Europe;
 - b. \$2,500/ticket for people travelling from North America;
 - c. \$1,850/ticket for the UNMOs (median of \$1,200 and \$2,500) since the UNMOs.



COSTS FOR THE ACCOMODATION OF THE FORCE

ACTIVITIES	COSTS FOR ZAIRE TROOPS	COSTS FOR SUPPORT TROOPS	TOTAL COST
CONSTRUCTION OF KITCHEN AND MESS HALL	\$1,118,625	\$223,725	\$1,342,350
RENTAL OF OFFICE SPACES	\$120,000	\$180,000	\$300,000
CONSTRUCTION OF ABLUTION SITE	\$143,360	\$71,680	\$215,040
TOTAL	\$1,381,985	\$475,405	\$1,857,390

1. The costs for constructing kitchens and mess halls were quoted from the Standard Costs Manual For Peace Operations, page 23. \$89,490/unit of 200 persons FOB ->

- a. Zairian Force: $\$89,490 \times (2500/200) = \$1,118,625$.
- b. Support Elements: $\$89,490 \times (500/200) = \$223,725$

2. The cost of rental offices as been based on the actual costs paid in Kigali ie \$20,000/complex of 50 offices/month and \$5,000/complex of 25 offices/month:

- a. for each Zairian Bn: $\$20,000 \times 6(\text{months}) \times 4(\text{including Force HQ}) = \$480,000$.
- b. for the support units: $\$5,000 \times 6(\text{months}) \times 8(\text{sub units}) = \$240,000$.

3. The cost of constructing ablution sites has been established based on the technical specifications quoted from the Standard Costs Manual For Peace Operations, page 23: \$8,960/unit:

- a. For each Inf Bn: one unit/Coy and one unit for the Force HQ -> $((5 \text{ Coys} \times 3) + 1(\text{HQ})) \times \$8,960 = \$143,360$.
- b. For the support elements: one unit/element -> $8 \times \$8,960 = \$71,680$.

SUSTAINMENT COSTS OF THE FORCE

ACTIVITIES	COST PER MONTH ZAIRE FORCE	COST PER MONTH SUPPORT ELEMENTS	TOTAL COST PER MONTH	TOTAL COST FOR 6 MONTHS
FRESH RATIONS	\$819,750	\$163,950	\$983,700	\$5,902,200
COMPOSITE RATIONS	\$675,000	\$135,000	\$810,000	\$810,000 X
LAUNDRY/HAIR CUT/TAILOR/ BOOT REPAIR	\$50,000	\$10,000	\$60,000	\$360,000 X
CLOTHING ALLOWANCE	\$175,000	\$35,000	\$210,000	\$1,260,000 X
DAILY ALLOWANCE	\$96,000	\$19,200	\$115,200	\$691,200 X
TROOP COST REIMBURSEMENT	150 \$1,250,000	\$530,375	\$1,780,375	\$10,682,250 XX 3.5 M.
DEATH AND DISABILITY COMPENSATION	\$59,600	\$4,450	\$64,050	\$384,300 ✓
SPARE PARTS FOR MAINTANANCE OF WHEEL VEHICLES	\$74,580	\$83,160	\$157,740	\$946,440
SPARE PARTS FOR MAINTANANCE OF APC'S	\$12,500	\$3,750	16,250	\$97,500
PETROL OIL & LUBRICANTS FOR VEHICLES	\$139,776	\$142,506	282,282	\$1,693,692
PETROL OIL AND LUBRICANTS FOR APC'S	\$13,978	\$14,251	28,229	\$169,374

ACTIVITIES	COST PER MONTH ZAIRE FORCE	COST PER MONTH SUPPORT ELEMENTS	TOTAL COST PER MONTH	TOTAL COST FOR 6 MONTHS
MONTHLY HIRE COST PER MONTH FOR 3 HELICOPTERS	0	\$348,750	\$348,750	\$2,092,500
AVIATION FUEL CONSUMPTION FOR 3 HELICOPTERS PER MONTH	0	\$45,000	\$45,000	\$270,000
VEHICLES INSURANCE	\$8,199	8,599	\$16,798	\$100,788
TOTAL	\$3,374,383	\$1,543,991	\$4,918,374	\$25,460,244

1. Fresh rations and water are calculated at \$10.93/day/men.
2. Composite rations reserve (30 days) is calculated at \$9.00/day/men. **This is used as a reserve only and this cost is incurred only once.**
3. Laundry/hair cut/boot repair and tailor repairs allowance is calculated at a rate of \$20/month/soldier.
4. Clothing allowance including ammunition is calculated at a rate of \$70.00/month/soldier.
5. Daily allowance allocation is calculated at a rate of \$1.28/day/men.
6. Standard troop cost reimbursement. The cost has been established as follow:
 - a. For the Zairian Force: \$500/Month/soldier.
 - b. \$988/men/month for 75% and \$1,279/men/month for 25% of the strength.
7. Death and disability allocation has been calculated at 1% of average monthly strength.
8. Spare parts are calculated at the rate of \$330/Month/veh for Contingent vehs and for APC's at the rate of \$625/month/veh:
 - a. For the Zairian Force: 226 wheel vehs and 20 track APC's.
 - b. For the Support elements: 252 wheel vehs and 6 track APC's.

SEN 002

32 of 40

9. POL is calculated at the following rate of:
- fuel: # of vehs X \$1.82/gal X 10gal/day for wheel vehs and 15gal/day for APC's
 - lubricants: 10% of total cost of fuel
10. Vehicles insurance is calculated at the rate of \$400/year/veh (\$33.33/month/veh).
11. The cost of renting helicopters has been established at \$1,550/hr and was calculated for 75 hours/month/helicopter for Bell helicopters. The fuel cost has been established at 100 gal/flying hour/helicopter at a cost of \$2/gal.

SUMMARY OF THE COSTS

C/N 002

33 of 40

FIXED COSTS

ACTIVITIES	ZAIRIAN CONTINGENT	SUPPORT ELEMENTS	TOTAL
EQPT PURCHASE	\$26,465,713	-	\$26,465,713
MOVEMENT PERS TO MISSION AREA	\$520,720	\$705,050	\$1,225,770
MOVEMENT PERS FROM MISSION AREA	\$520,720	\$705,050	\$1,225,770
MOVEMENT EQPT TO MISSION AREA	\$6,528,760	\$14,645,000	\$21,173,760
MOVEMENT EQPT FROM MISSION AREA	\$6,528,760	\$14,645,000	\$21,173,760
ACCOMODATION	\$1,381,985	\$475,405	\$1,857,390
TOTAL	\$41,946,658	\$31,175,505	\$73,122,163

OPERATION COST

	ZAIRIAN CONTINGENT	SUPPORT ELEMENTS	TOTAL
MONTHLY COST	\$3,374,383	\$1,543,991	\$4,918,374
COST FOR 6 MONTHS	\$16,871,298*	8,588,946 *	\$25,460,244 *

* Cost of operation for 6 months is not the monthly cost x 6 since the cost to buy composite rations is done for 30 days only.

TOTAL COSTS OF THE OPERATION

TYPE OF COSTS	ZAIRIAN FORCE	SUPPORT ELEMENTS	TOTAL
FIXED COSTS	\$41,946,658	\$31,175,505	\$73,122,163
6 MONTHS SUSTAINMENT COSTS	\$16,871,298	\$8,588,946	\$25,460,244
TOTAL	\$58,817,956	\$39,764,451	\$98,582,407

MINUTES OF THE MEETING BETWEEN DELEGATES OF THE MINISTRY
OF NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZAIRE
AND DELEGATES OF THE UNITED NATIONS
HELD IN KINSHASA, ZAIRE
30 - 31 DECEMBER 1994

CN 002
37 of 40

PREAMBLE

1. A meeting was held on 30 and 31 December 1994 in the conference room of the Zairian Ministry of National Defense between representatives of this Ministry and members of the United Nations. This meeting commenced at 11:00 on 30 December. The list of participants at this meeting is located in Annex A.

2. The objective of this meeting was to discuss the modalities for the participation of the ZAF (Zairian Armed Forces) and UN troops in the deployment of a joint security force designed to create favorable conditions to assure the voluntary return of the Rwandan refugees in Zaire to their own country. This force will also provide protection for the convoy of voluntary returnees as they return through the security corridors between the camps in Zaire and the Zairian-Rwandan border. This return concerns only Rwandan refugees and not the Burundi refugees located in the Sud Kivu region.

3. The meeting was also called to establish the logistical support required to carry out this joint mission.

POINTS OF DISCUSSION

1. Command structure. It was agreed that the command of this operation would be under the aegis of the United Nations. The Commander shall be a French-speaking African and should also come from an African nation. The Deputy Commander shall be a member of the ZAF and should be appointed by the Zairian authorities as soon as possible.

2. Location of Force Headquarters. The two parties agreed that the headquarters should be located in Goma with a branch in Bukavu.

3. Concept of Operation. The Zairian authorities proposed a draft of the general conceptual plan of operation to members of both delegations on 31 December 1994 in anticipation that a more detailed plan of operation will be developed later.

4. Intervention Force. The Zairian authorities agreed to supply a force of 1,500 men to carry out this mission. However, the United Nations asked that this number be increased to 2,500. The two parties have also agreed that the United Nations would provide troops equivalent to 5% the strength of security forces which would serve as monitors, staff, and support staff. In addition, it was

- agreed that UNAMIR troops would not be deployed on Zairian soil.
5. Selection of troops. The Zairian authorities guaranteed that they would select the best available elements within their armed forces.
6. Troops Point of Departure. The Zairian authorities specified that the ZAF troops participating in this Mission would be deployed from Kinshasa.
7. Logistical Support. It was agreed that all the support equipment required for this operation would be supplied by the United Nations. The Zairian authorities expressed an interest in managing the coordination and execution of logistical support. The UNAMIR Deputy Force Commander expressed reservations with regard to the general application of this proposal in all areas of support. However certain areas, such as medical support, may be placed entirely under Zairian control. This subject will need to be addressed by higher authorities in both parties at a later date.
8. Uniforms. The two parties are in agreement that ZAF participating in this Mission should wear identical Zairian uniforms. These troops shall be identified by a distinctive insignia. The troops provided by the United Nations shall wear their national uniforms as well as the blue beret. The Zairian troops will wear a beret whose color has yet to be determined.
9. Duration of the Operation. It was agreed, after discussion on this matter, that the duration of this operation should be four months. The first month shall be devoted to the installation of the required elements. The identified tasks of the mission will be carried out in the following two months. The fourth month will be used to break camp. The UNAMIR Deputy Force Commander stressed that this timetable seemed a bit ambitious but that it was achievable if the operation was well planned. The operation may be extended for an additional two months if necessary.
10. Naming the Operation. After some discussion, it was agreed that the following respective French and English acronyms may be used to designate this mission: MINURAZ (Mission des Nations Unies pour les Réfugiés au Zaïre) and UNREMIZ (United Nations Refugee Mission in Zaïre). The ZAF may assign a particular name to this mission as is commonly the case in most nations participating in a UN mission. The Zairian delegation proposed three names: BOZONGI (in Lingala), KURUDI (in Kiswahili), and KUREJEA (in Kiswahili) all of which signify RETURN.>
11. Allowance. To be determined by the United Nations. This point was the subject of discussion between the Secretary General of the United Nations and the Prime Minister of Zaïre during his recent visit to New York.

CRN 002
38 of 40

②

POPULATION IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS (Based on data provided by UNHCR).

Nord Kivu. Refugees are found in the following refugee camps:

	Camp	Distance from Goma
a.	MUGUNGA	15 Km
b.	KIBUMBA	30 Km
c.	KAHINDO	55 Km
d.	KATALE	65 KM
e.	Military personnel	
	(Total Population	850,000)

2. Sud Kivu. Refugees are found in the following refugee camps:

	Cities	
a.	BUKAVU ¹	
b.	UVIRA and outskirts ²	
c.	Military personnel	
	(Total Population	600,000)

REQUIRED EQUIPMENT

The Zairian authorities presented a list of equipment required to carry out this mission. This list may be found in Annex B. The UNAMIR Deputy Force Commander indicated that this list would be examined by UNAMIR experts.

¹ The refugees are scattered over 30 sites within a 70 Km radius of Bukavu.

² These camps are located 130 Km from Bukavu.

CAN 002
37 of 40

COMMENTS FROM THE UNAMIR DEPUTY FORCE COMMANDER

The UNAMIR Deputy Force Commander recommended that the Zairian delegation act quickly and with precision to identify those responsible for the intimidation in the refugee camps. This intelligence will facilitate the rapid mounting and execution of the operation.

COMMENTS FROM THE UNHCR REPRESENTATIVE

Ms. Idowu from UNHCR underlined the fact that the repatriation of refugees must be on a voluntary basis in order to maintain trust among all the refugees living in Zaire. She desires that no weapons be used, and in this spirit, the members from UNAMIR see no need to require support weapons for this operation.

END OF MEETING

The meeting ended at 14:45 on 31 December 1994.



List of Participants

	Name	Function	Unit
1.	Col Mag Mbidi Nikeni	Cons Principal MDN	MDN
2.	Col Med Kabanda Kurhenga	Cmdr Medical Corps	ZAF
3.	Col Bem Iduma - Molengo	Dir Ops	GACI
4.	Lt Col Tem Kayumbi Bantapi	Logistics Corps	ZAF
5.	Col Bem Bofale W'Efonge	Principal Cons	MDN
6.	Col Tem Mutuale Malangu	Deputy Acn SARM	ZAF
7.	Col Bem Ndoma - Moteke	DSP	ZAF
8.	Col Bem Bahindwa N.	G3 EMG	ZAF
9.	Brig Gen Anyidoho	Deputy Comdr UNAMIR	UNAMIR
10.	Mr. Sidique Dao	Assistant to the SRSG	UNAMIR
11.	Ms. Roseline Idowu	Admin. in charge of Protection	UNHCR
12.	Mr. Gilles Brière	Logistical advisor	UNAMIR
13.	Maj Tushar Pitre	Ops Officer	UNAMIR
14.	Mr. Stanley Olivier	Interpreter	UNAMIR

LIST OF EQUIPMENT

1. Required Equipment:

Designation	Unit	Quantity	Unit Price	Total
<u>Arms</u>				
Short barreled GALIL rifles	pce	1,500		
Long barreled GALIL rifles	pce	1,500		
Revolvers (Gp)	pce	TBC		
Munitions	pce	TBC		
Support weapons	pce	TBC		
Daggers	pce	2,500		
Tear-gas grenades		TBC		
Shields		2,500		
<u>Equipment</u>				
Complete uniforms	pce			
Helmuts	pce	7,500		
Trunccheon	pair	2,500		
hand-cuffs	pce	2,500		
Gas masks	pce	2,500		
Megaphones	pce	TBC		
Individual tents	pce	2,500		
Blankets	pce	5,000		
Sleeping bags	pce	2,500		
Backpack	pce	2,500		
Duffle bag	pce	2,500		
Mess tins	set	2,500		
Cutlery (KFS)	pce	2,500		
Typewriters		TBC		
<u>Transportation</u>				
Transport Truck (MAN)	pce	4/Company		
Jeeps	pce	TBC		
Motorcycles	pce	1/Section		
Ambulances		TBC		
<u>Transmission</u>				
Small Comm. Center (Base)	pce	TBC		
Walkie-Talkie	pce	1/Section		

ERN 002

70 of 70

2. Monthly Supplies



a. Office Supplies (set):

TBC

b. Diesel:

TBC

c. Gasoline:

TBC

d. Rations: 3 meals/day comprised of fresh and combat rations.

3. Rotations: All details regarding this subject are to be confirmed.